Sergei Mariev Byzantine Perspectives On Neoplatonism

Byzantine Perspectives on Neoplatonism
Byzantinisches Archiv
SeriesPhilosophica
Herausgegeben von
Sergei Mariev
Wissenschaftlicher Beirat:
John Demetracopoulos, Jozef Matula,
John Monfasani, Inmaculada Prez Martn,
Brigitte Tambrun-Krasker
Band 1
Byzantine Perspectives
on Neoplatonism
Edited by
Sergei Mariev
ISBN 978-1-5015-1167-7
e-ISBN (PDF) 978-1-5015-0359-7
e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-1-5015-0363-4
ISSN 1864-9785
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for atthe Library of Congress.
Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie;
detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de.
2017 Walter de Gruyter Inc., Boston/Berlin

Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck
Printed on acid-free paper
Printed in Germany
www.degruyter.com
Contents
Sergei Mariev
Neoplatonic Philosophy in Byzantium | 1
Sergei Mariev and Monica Marchetto

The Divine Body of the Heavens | 31
Michele Trizio
The waves of passions and the stillness of the sea: appropriating neoplatonic
imagery and concept formation-theory in middle Byzantine commentaries on
Aristotle | 67
Graeme Miles
Psellos and his Traditions | 79
Joshua Robinson
Proclus as Heresiarch: Theological Polemic and Philosophical Commentary in
Nicholas of Methones Refutation (Anaptyxis) of Proclus Elements of
Theology | 103
Magda Mtchedlidze
Two Conflicting Positions Regarding the Philosophy of Proclus in Eastern Christian
Thought of the twelfth Century | 137
Jess de Garay
The Reception of Proclus: From Byzantium to the West (an Overview) | 153
Flavia Buzzetta, Valerio Napoli

Elementi di demonologia neoplatonica nellopuscolo bizantino
| 175
Lela Alexidze
Plethon on the Grades of Virtues: Back to Plato via Neoplatonism? | 221
Udo Reinhold Jeck

Europa entdeckt die mittelalterliche byzantinisch-georgische
Philosophie | 243
Selected Bibliography | 271

Sergei Mariev
Neoplatonic Philosophy in Byzantium
An Introduction
Unresolved tension between Platonic heritage and Christian doctrine is one of the hall-
marks of the history of Byzantine philosophy. On the one hand, Byzantine scholars
from all periods showed significant interest in the doctrines of Plato and the Platon-
ists. On the other hand, many of them perceived these doctrines as a source of error
and even as the root of all heresies. In consequence, they frequently made attempts
to harmonize Neoplatonic doctrines with Christianity, but also criticized, refuted and
even condemned them. These attempts at harmonization, criticism, refutation and
condemnation with regard to Neoplatonic texts and authors constitute a fascinating
chapter in the history of Byzantine civilization. The following pages do not pretend to
offer an exhaustive overview of the history of the reception of Neoplatonic philosophy
in Byzantium. The objective is to sketch a general map of this vast territory, which
is still being discovered by modern scholarship, by identifying the most important
figures and texts that can be seen as boundaries and milestones. The individual
contributions collected in this volume will then provide a more detailed account of
some specific episodes and figures on this map, and thereby continue this ongoing
process of discovery.
The end of the 5th century is the most probable date for the historically enigmatic
figure of P s . - D i o ny s i o s t h e A r e o p a g i t e, who transposed in a thoroughly origi-
nal way the whole of Pagan Neoplatonism from Plotinus to Proclus, but especially that
of Proclus and the Platonic Academy in Athens, into a distinctively new Christian con-
text. Ps.-Dionysios was a figure of considerable authority for many Byzantine schol-
ars, not least because the pseudonym chosen by the otherwise unknown author of
the Corpus areopagiticum identified its author as Dionysios the Areopagite, an Athe-
nian citizen converted to Christianity by the apostle Paul, as reported in the Acts of
the Apostles. The apostolic age of these writings, so established, was one of the deci-
sive factors in cementing their authority in Byzantium. The link between Proklos and
Ps.-Dionysios was thus reversed: the holy Dionysios was believed to be the teacher
1 An impressive list of ca. 21 hypotheses with regard to the historical identity of the author of the
Corpus areopagiticum possible candidates include Severos of Antioch, Peter the Fuller, Peter the
Iberian, Sergios of Reshayna is assembled in Hathaway 1969, 3135. On the relationship between
Platonism and Christianity in the writings of Ps.-Dionysios the Areopagite cf. Saffrey 1982, Perl 2007,
Dillon and Wear 2007, Dillon 2014a, Beierwaltes 1997.
2 Corrigan and Harrington 2015.
3 Cf. Acts, 17, 1634, esp. 3234.
DOI 10.1515/9781501503597-002
2 | S. Mariev
and not the pupil of Proklos. As the lemma Dionysios the Areopagite in the Suda,
a massive 10th-century Byzantine encyclopedia, demonstrates, for the Byzantines it
was Proklos who appropriated some of the teachings of Dionysios and not Dionysios
who transposed Neoplatonic teachings into a Christian context. Some Byzantine au-
thors even went so far as to accuse the Athenian philosophers of having hidden the
works of Dionysios in order to be able to present some of his teachings as their own.
A manuscript containing the writings of Ps.-Dionysios, which is most probably to be
identified as Cod. par. gr. 437, arrived from Byzantium in the West in September 827 as
a present from the Byzantine emperors Michael II and Theophilos to Charlemagnes
son and successor Louis the Pious, thus initiating the rich history of reception of this
author in the Latin World.
In contrast to Ps.-Dionysios, the G a z a n C h r i s t i a n s , and in particular Aineias
of Gaza, Prokopios of Gaza and Zacharias (the Rhetor), attacked the Neoplaton-
ists and their idea of the eternity of the world. Their arguments in a significantly
less sophisticated and systematic form anticipated some of the arguments that John
Philoponos formulated in his treatise De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum.
Jo h n P h i l o p o n o s (ca. 490575), himself a student of the Neoplatonic philoso-
pher Ammonios Hermeiou (ca. 435517), wrote a large number of works on different
subjects, including commentaries on Aristotle and medical, astronomical and gram-
matical treatises. Arabian scholars, who were mainly interested in Philoponos com-
mentaries on Aristotle, first noticed a number of contradictory opinions in his writings
and sought to explain them by hypothesizing that Philoponos had written his De ae-
ternitate mundi contra Proclum either in order to defend himself against the Christians
who had been threatening him or because the Christians had offered him money in ex-
change for the composition of this work. Towards the beginning of the 20th century,
Gudemann and Kroll formulated a biographical hypothesis that distinguishes two pe-
riods in John Philoponos life, namely an initial pagan and, following a supposed con-
version to Christianity, a later Christian period. They assigned a large number of com-
4 Suda, d 1170 , ed. Adler 1928.

5 Makris 2000, 9f.
6 Cf. McCormick 1987.
7 On Christian culture in Gaza during the late fifth and early sixth centuries cf. Champion 2014, Watts
2005, Hevelone-Harper 2005.
8 Cf. PLRE II, Aeneas of Gaza 3, p. 17.
9 Cf. PLRE II, Procopius of Gaza 8, pp. 921922.
10 Cf. PLRE II, Zacharias (the Rhetor) 4, pp. 11941195.
11 Cf. Sorabji 2012, VII: The main subject of the Theophrastus [by Aeneas of Gaza] was the human
soul []. But it overlapped in one part with the subject of the other two Christian texts, the Christians
creation of the world from a beginning, as opposed to the Neoplatonists eternal creation of the world.
12 Cf. Sorabji 2012, VIII.
13 A comprehensive list, including less easily accessible publications, is found in Scholten 1997, vol.
1, 3543.
mentaries on Aristotle to the first, pagan period, and the De aeternitate mundi contra
Proclum and some other, mostly theological treatises to the second. However, reliable
biographical details about John Philoponos life are scarce in the extant sources, while
the name John seems to suggest that he was born to a Christian family, and so Gude-
mann and Krolls hypothesis found little acceptance in subsequent scholarship. In
De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum, which can be securely dated to 529, John Philo-
ponos mounted a vigorous attack on Proklos, rejecting the idea of the eternity of the
world and proposing instead a system based on the idea of creatio ex nihilo of the world
and of matter.
The composition of De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum is not the only milestone
in the rich history of the reception of Neoplatonic philosophy during the 6th century.
Writing around 540, Jo h n, who was the bishop o f S c y t h o p o l i s in Palestine, became
one of the first Byzantine scholars to write a commentary on the works of Ps.-Dionysios
the Areopagite. His scholia, or marginal commentaries, containing theological and
philosophical observations on Ps.-Dionysios text, enhance our understanding of the
ways in which Byzantine theologians received the ideas of Proklos through the medi-
ation of Ps.-Dionysios. In addition, his scholia constitute one of the first instances of
the reception of Plotinos in Byzantium.
M a x i m o s H o m o l o g e t e s or C o n f e s s o r (580662) was certainly one of the
most outstanding intellectual figures of the 7th century. He was a prolific author
whose theological works were widely read throughout the entire Byzantine period.
The authority he wielded and the reverential awe with which his writings were read
can be compared only to the renown that Ps.-Dionysios enjoyed during the Middle
Ages in the West. Maximos voluminous writings, for many of which there are still no
reliable modern critical editions, amount to as von Balthasar aptly characterized
them a monumental synthesis of the theological and philosophical traditions
14 Cf. the opinion of Scholten 1997, vol. 1, 30f. who pointed out that contradictory opinions identi-
fiable across many of Philoponos works do not constitute a reliable basis for postulating different
phases in the authors life, especially since the commentaries as a genre were not meant to serve as
a vehicle for the authors opinion but rather to propagate common and widespread views. Verrycken
1990 prefers to group Philoponos works into two categories, which he simply labels Philoponos-1
and Philoponos-2, explicitly refraining from any attempt to assign the works from either group to a
period in Philoponos life. The group Philoponos-1 contains works that show traces of Neoplatonic
views, especially those taught in the Alexandrian school, while works belonging to Philoponos-2
are clearly Christian in character.
15 Cf. Verrycken 2010, with bibliography on pp. 11431147. On Philoponos Byzantine legacy, cf. Bydn
2012, esp. 8285.
16 Parry 2006b, 224.
17 On the use of the Enneads of Plotinos in John of Scythopolis scholia to the Corpus dionysiacum, cf.
OMeara 1992b, 56. Cf. also Podolak 2007, Rorem and J. C. Lamoreaux 1998b, Frank 1987, Beierwaltes
1972a and Beierwaltes and Kannicht 1968.
4 | S. Mariev
of his times. Within this synthesis Maximos found a place for some central Neo-
platonic concepts that were familiar to him mostly but not exclusively through the
mediation of Ps.-Dionysios the Areopagite, by adapting Neoplatonic concepts to the
exigencies of his own, Christian perspective.
Jo h n o f D a m a s k o s (ca. 650 after 754) was born to an influential Arabo-
Christian family, the Mansur, whose members had held important posts in the finan-
cial administration under the Umayyad dynasty. He lived his entire life outside the
political boundaries of the Byzantine empire, but, as a Christian, took an active part
in the religious and intellectual life of Byzantium. The first half of the 7th century
was a turbulent period in Byzantine history. Arab invasions, the constant Bulgarian
menace, internal political disruptions such as the revolt of Artabasdos, and, most im-
portantly, the first phase of the conflict over the veneration of images (ca. 726 787)
were some of the events that dominated the political and religious life of Byzantium.
It is difficult to determine with precision which of his works were known in Byzantium
during his lifetime. That his name was indeed well-known within the boundaries of
the empire during this period is beyond any doubt. As a defender of veneration of re-
ligious images he was anathematized by the iconoclast Council of Hiereia in 754. The
fact that an ecclesiastical council convened by the Emperor Constantine V directed
this highest form of ecclesiastical censure at him can be taken as a reliable indica-
tion that at least some of his writings were not only read but also exercised significant
influence during the time leading up to the council. John of Damaskos was certainly
18 Cf. von Balthasar 1988.

19 Cf. Cvetkovi 2015 and Pereira 2011. For a reconstruction of the ways in which Maximos received
and transformed Neoplatonic concepts within his own perspective cf. Gersh 1978b, 204260.
20 Louth 2008, 590 observes that The attribution of the scholia on the Dionysian writings to Max-
imus once made it seem that Maximus had been a close student of Dionysius. However, the recent
discovery (first by Hans Urs von Balthasar, and now confirmed by the research of Beate Suchla) that
most of the scholia were compiled by John of Scythopolis [] has changed the terms of the debate. []
The influence of Dionysius on Maximus is, however, manifest, even if we discount the few scholia that
may still belong to Maximus. Cf. Tatakis 2003b, 65: to Maximos belongs the honor of having intro-
duced into Christian thought the Neoplatonism of Pseudo-Dionysios and, more importantly, his doing
so without sacrificing the substance of Christianity, that is, its historical image. On the relationship
between Maximos and Ps.-Dionysios, cf. de Andia 2015, Louth 1993, Vlker 1961, von Balthasar 1988,
110122, Sherwood 1957.
21 Cf. Trnen 2007, 16. On the thorny question of the sources of Maximos Homologetes cf. Van Deun
and Mueller-Jourdan 2015. In the conclusion of his study, Mueller-Jourdan 2005, 193 pointed towards
une certaine familiarit du Confesseur avec le vocabulaire et les ides de la tradition jamblichenne
telle quelle t reformule dans lEcole philosophique dAthnes o dominent incontestablement le
figures de Proclus, de Damascius et de Simplicius, admitting that la frquentation des textes nous
a souvent pousss nous demander si la mdiation du Corpus dionysien relativement bien admise ne
devait pas tre foncirement rvise.
acquainted with the Christian Neoplatonism of Ps.-Dionysios the Areopagite. In his

preface to the Fountain of Knowledge, John sets himself a threefold objective:
(a) to set forth what is most excellent among the wise men of the Greeks, knowing that anything
that is true has been given to human beings from God, [] gather together what belongs to the
truth and pick the fruits of salvation from the enemies, and reject everything that is evil and
falsely called knowledge. (b) Then [] set forth in order the chattering nonsense of the heresies
[], so that by recognizing what is false we may cleave the more to the truth. (c) Then, with the
help of God and by his grace, set out the truth.
In the first part of the Fountain of Knowledge, he introduces his readers to some fun-
damental logical concepts that had been elaborated by the pagan philosophers. In
this text he repeatedly contrasts the teachings of the outer philosophers with those
of the Holy Fathers, rethinking the very same concepts in a Christian sense. In the
second part (On Heresies), he offers an exposition of the ancient heresies. In this con-
text he identifies Hellenism as one of the four mothers of heresies and includes
Platonists in the list of heresies that had sprung from it:
There are four mothers and archetypes of all heresies: first, Barbarism; second, Scythianism;
third, Hellenism; fourth, Judaism from which all other [heresies] spring up. [] Thereafter, Hel-
lenism brought forward the heresies of later times, namely the heresies of the Pythagoreans, Pla-
tonists, Stoics and Epicureans.
In his Accurate Exposition of the Orthodox Faith (the third part of the tripartite trea-
tise Fountain of Knowledge), he presents in a systematic fashion the Christian view of
the world, and, in order to achieve this goal, draws on Ps.-Dionysios the Areopagite.
Viewed as a whole, the writings of John of Damaskos, with their opposing tendencies
of both assimilating and rejecting Neoplatonic views, illustrate the tension between
Platonic heritage and Christian doctrines that is so characteristic of the entire history
of Byzantine philosophy.
The end of Iconoclasm in 843 and the ascent to the Byzantine throne of Basil I, the
founder of the Macedonian dynasty, in 867, following the assassination of his prede-
cessor Michael III (842867), mark the transition to a period of relative political stabil-
ity that would continue for the major part of the Macedonian era (8671056). P h o t i o s,
22 Rorem 1993, 170171; 215 and de Vogel 1985, 39.

23 Cf. Ierodiakonou and Zografidis 2010, 858.
24 John of Damaskos, Philosophical Chapters, proemium 4357; transl. Louth 2002, 31.
25 Cf. Richter 1982, 7680 for discussion of the collections of material on which John of Damaskos
drew when composing his Dialectics and for an account of the relationship between, on the one hand,
the Dialectics and, on the other, the Neoplatonic commentaries on the Categories of Aristotle and the
Eisagoge of Porphyrios.
26 Cf. Richter 1982, 80 and John of Damaskos, Dialectics, 48, ed. Kotter. Cf. also Kontouma 2015, V,
35.
27 John of Damaskos, De haeresibus, I, proem and 2, 213, 2, ed. Kotter.
6 | S. Mariev
the nephew of the patriarch Tarasios who had played a key-role in the abolition of the
iconoclast policy in 843, at a young age already held a high position within the bu-
reaucracy of the Byzantine capital. He participated in an embassy to the Arabs (in
838, 845 or 855) and held the office of protoasekretis, the chief of imperial chancery.
Under Michael III, Photios was appointed patriarch. After his ascension to the throne,
Basil I banished and condemned Photios with the help of an ecclesiastical council of
869/870. Later, following the death of Photios rival Ignatios, Photios was restored to
the patriarchal throne. In Basils conflict with his son Leo VI, Photios sided with the
father and so Basils sudden death and Leo VIs accession in 886 put an end to Photios
career. Together with Arethas and Leo the Mathematician, Photios is commonly con-
sidered a representative of the first Byzantine renaissance, that is to say, a period
of Byzantine cultural history that witnessed a particular intensification of contacts
with antiquity. In addition to his famous Bibliotheca, a description or survey of
386 books by both pagan and Christian authors which Photios and his circle of close
friends and associates had read, Photios was also the author of the first Aristotelian
commentary produced in a post-iconoclast Byzantium. It is found in the Amphilochia,
a series of answers addressed to Amphilochios, the metropolitan of Kyzikos, which
treat a number of philosophical and theological subjects. In questions 137147, Pho-
tios formulated criticism of the Aristotelian concept of substance. This commentary
28 A number of issues that need to be considered when applying the term renaissance to Byzantium
are discussed in: Schreiner 1989, Treadgold 1984, Runciman 1970 and Heisenberg 1926.
29 Cf. Treadgold 1980.
30 On question 145 cf. Schamp 1996; on question 142, cf. Ierodiakonou 2005b; on question 138, cf.
Anton 1994 and especially Bydn 2013.
31 Cf. Bydn 2013, 15: Especially, he contends (in sect. 5) that primary substances, i.e. individuals,
and secondary substances, i.e. universals, did not obtain the name of Substance synonymously; cf.
Bydn 2013, 23: His central argument seems to be that in order for all substances to belong to the
same genus, they cannot, as Aristotle claims, have different degrees of substantiality. [] Either, then,
(a) all universals on all levels have to be put on a par with individuals, or (b) all universals on all
levels have to be eliminated []. or (c) the individuals plus all universals on all levels but one must
be eliminated. But (a) is impossible, since individuals and universals on different levels are after all
not equally expressive. In the choice between (b) and (c) it seems that Photios, on the authority of the
Fathers, opts for (c).
shows traces of the influence of Neoplatonic commentaries. Some other questions

show evidence of Photios reception of Ps.-Dionysios the Areopagite.
The end of the 9th and beginning of the 10th centuries witnessed the activities
of Arethas, bishop of Caesarea, who was born in Patras towards the mid-9th century
and died after 932. He commissioned a copy of Platos works, which is preserved as
Cod. bodl. gr. E. D. Clarke 39. It is now the oldest extant manuscript, discounting
papyrus fragments, for about half of the dialogues of Plato (Tetral. IVI, comprising
24 dialogues). The once common opinion that it was Arethas who added scholia in a
tiny uncial hand in the margins of this manuscript (schol. B) is no longer tenable.
He also compiled commentaries on the Eisagoge of Porphyrios and the Categories of
Aristotle that demonstrate influence of Neoplatonic commentaries. His commentary
shows clearly that Arethas was using Aristotles text primarily to expound within its
framework a Neoplatonist ontology.
M i c h a e l P s e l l o s is a central figure in the history of Byzantine philosophy in
general. He also played a particularly important role in the history of the reception
of Neoplatonic philosophy in Byzantium. He was born in 1018 in Constantinople, re-
ceived a traditional, that is predominantly literary, education (he was already study-
ing grammar at the age of five and later learned rhetoric with the help of John Mau-
ropous) and began at a relatively young age a career in the civil administration of
the empire, in the course of which he served under eleven emperors and empresses
and either played (or somewhat exaggeratedly claimed to have played) an important
role at the court during the reigns of Constantine X, Romanos IV and Michael VII.
In 1054 he was forced to resign and became a monk on Mt. Olympos. It was at this
point in his life that he exchanged his baptismal name Constantine for the monas-
tic name Michael. The date of his death (at any rate after 1076) remains disputed.
32 On Photios knowledge of philosophy and in particular his familiarity with pagan Neoplatonic phi-
losophy, cf. Westerink 19861991, v. I, LXXVIII and Treadgold 1980, 8. Treadgold was able to recognize
in the Bibliotheca traces of Photios intense interest in philosophy. Christov, however, is skeptical re-
garding the claim of any interest in philosophy evinced in the Bibliotheca and points out that if philo-
sophical interests can be discerned in the Bibliotheca, then it is an interest in Alexandrian Neoplaton-
ism (Christov 2015, 301). However, Christov recognizes clear traces of Neoplatonic influence, and in
particular that of Simplikios, in the Commentary on the Categories of Aristotle (Christov 2015, 302). On
the transmission of philosophical texts in Byzantium during the 9th century cf. Martone 2008, 228
238; cf. also Westerink 1990, Dain 1954, Wilson 1996a. Cf. also the recent studies by Menchelli, e.g.
Menchelli 2015.
33 Cf. Alexopoulos 2014 and Christov 2015, 306.
34 On this manuscript cf. Whittaker 1991, Irigoin 19851986, 154156, des Places 1957, Bidez 1954,
Gifford 1902, Burnet 1902.
35 This is the siglum adopted in Cufalo 2007, XXXVIII.
36 The arguments can be found in Luzzatto 2010, esp. 96ff.
37 Cf. Anton 1997, 294.
38 Anton 1997, 295. Antons opinion is taken up in Matula 2011, 98.
39 Cf. Kaldellis 2011, who rehearses the entire scholarly debate on this question.
8 | S. Mariev
Psellos was a polymath who bequeathed to posterity an enormous literary heritage.

Scattered among more than 1500 manuscripts, his oeuvre comprises texts of almost
every genre, including historiography, rhetoric, philosophy and law, as well as a col-
lection of letters. Psellos was an initiator and a driving force behind a cultural project
of impressive dimensions. His declared intent was to rediscover the treasures of Hel-
lenic, that is pagan, culture and to find place for this rediscovered wisdom at the very
heart of the Byzantine paideia. In 1047, or slightly earlier, Constantine IX made Psel-
los hypatos ton philosophon, literally a consul of the philosophers, that is to say a
president over the teachers of philosophy or an overseer of philosophical education
in Byzantium. This title was introduced for Michael Psellos; his most renowned suc-
cessors included John Italos and Theodoros of Smyrna. It is against the background
of Psellos implementation of this cultural and educational project that his interest
in Neoplatonic sources must be viewed and evaluated. Psellos was an avid reader of
Plotinos, Porphyry, Iamblichos, Syrianos, Proklos, Simplikios, John Philoponos and
Olympiodoros. He quoted extensively from the Enneads and made compilations
40 Cf. Moore 2005c for orientation in the primary and secondary material pertaining to Psellos.
41 Cf. J. Duffy 2002a.
42 On Psellos and Plotinos, cf. Westerink 1959 and F. F. Lauritzen 2014 (to be used with caution, see
below note 43.); on Psellos and Proklos cf. in particular OMeara 2014a; Cf. Parry 2006b, 228; Jenkins
2006a; Cacouros 2000a, 592593; Benakis 1987a, 252253; Chrestou 2005a and Chrestou 2005c. On
Psellos and Iamblichos, cf. Sicherl 1960; on Psellos and Damaskios, Maltese 1987, 66. On Psellos and
commentators on Aristotle, cf. e.g. Ierodiakonou 2002c.
43 F. Lauritzen has recently examined a number of opuscula in which Psellos quotes extensively from
Plotinos. In particular, he examines the famous Op. 33, in which Psellos addresses the much-debated
and particularly thorny question of the ideas. F. Lauritzen is of the opinion that in this Opusculum
Psellos distances himself from the conception of the ideas that had been elaborated in Middle Platon-
ism, for example by Alkonoos. F. Lauritzen maintains that Psellos, against the idea of Alcinous who
claims that the ideas pre-exist the cosmos itself, and also pre-exist being itself tries to advance a
neoplatonic view of the ideas as beings, and therefore acceptable both to the neoplatonists and the
ecclesiastical authorities (F. Lauritzen 2014, 61). Op. 33 does not in fact aim at a clarification of the
question of whether or not the ideas are pre-existent with respect to the sensible cosmos. Neither does
the pre-existence of the ideas with respect to the sensible cosmos imply the pre-existence of the ideas
with respect to the being itself, given that one of the fundamental theses of Neoplatonism proclaims
that there is a being that is proper to the ideas and that this being is much more original and authentic
than the being of the sensible things. The problem that Psellos actually addresses in the Opusculum
is an attempt to clarify the ontological standing of the ideas with respect to the Intellect / Demiurge:
are they only thoughts of God? Or do they subsist by themselves and outside of the Demiurge? Psellos
does make reference to Middle Platonism, but only insofar as he takes up the Middle-Platonic concept
of ideas as thoughts of God (on this cf. Alkinoos, Didaskalikos, Lehrbuch der Grundstze Platons, ed.
by O.F. Summerell/Th. Zimmer, Berlin 2007, 23; cf. Ferrari 2011, 237). It is well known that Plotinos had
travelled along and left behind him the path of those philosophers who understood ideas as thoughts
of God (cf. Linguiti 2011, 248) and arrived at an original conception according to which 1) the Intellect
does not think anything that is external to itself and precedes itself, but is what it is and thinks what
is in it (cf. Enn. V 9, 5.1416); 2) the object of its thought, i.e. every single idea, is itself Intellect (cf.
of excerpts from Proklos works. Some of Proklos works used by Psellos are still ex-
tant and others are lost. Even though Psellos was very interested in and had pro-
found knowledge of Neoplatonic ideas, he frequently distances himself from them. On
some occasions he points out the views that are unacceptable for a Christian, stress-
ing the absolute authority of Christian doctrine. On other occasions, on the contrary,
he insists on including references to pagan doctrines even when commenting on and
explaining Christian texts and does not hide his own conviction that Hellenic doc-
trines contain grains of truth and that familiarity with these doctrines can advance
the understanding of Christian truth. The attitudes Psellos reveals towards Neopla-
tonic sources inevitably bring up the question of how Psellos viewed, or, in more rad-
ical terms, how Psellos lived the relationship between pagan philosophy and Chris-
tian faith. Was Psellos a good Christian who resorted to a pagan and, more specifi-
cally, Neoplatonic heritage in order to uphold and advance Christian truth? Did he
favour the synthesis of Hellenic wisdom and Christian faith without questioning the
necessity of making Hellenic heritage subordinate to Christian orthodoxy or was he
a neo-pagan, hiding behind apparent and openly professed Orthodox beliefs in or-
der to spread dissent and disseminate Neoplatonic wisdom? These questions are not
easy to answer. A more subtle and, in my view, more productive approach to Psellos
as a philosopher should leave behind these rather crude alternatives Was Psellos a
true Christian or was he a [crypto-] neopagan?, and seek instead to understand the
complexity of Psellos attitude towards Neoplatonic philosophy, and to view his at-
Enn. V 9, 8.34); 3) the ideas are not only thoughts of the Intellect (Enn. V 9, 7.1418), in the sense that
the Intellect comes to think of the particular Ideas which first then and thereby come into existence.
The Ideas are internal to it, as it were from the very beginning (Emilsson 2007, 156, n. 23). As a num-
ber of scholars have already demonstrated, in Op. 33 Psellos, on the one hand, rehearses the thesis of
the Middle Platonists according to which the ideas are thoughts of God (even though he specifies that
making them ideas does not mean that they are conceived as non-constituted principles and without
substantial existence (cf. Michaelis Pselli philosophica minora, vol. 2., Leipzig 1989, ed. D. OMeara,
112,78). On the other hand, he proposes the Plotinian theory of identity between the Intellect and
the ideas (113, 1314), having compiled the third part of the Opusculum from Enn. V 9 (113, 22ff.; cf.
Westerink 1959, 10; Benakis 2002, 412413; cf. Lagarde 2002; del Campo Echevarra 2012, 204213).
44 Cf. OMeara 2014a, Bidez 1905, OMeara 2013.
45 For example, Proklos Commentary on the Enneads or his Commentary on the Chaldean Oracles (cf.
OMeara 2014a, 169).
46 Cf. Maltese 1994a and F. Lauritzen 2010a.
47 As Siniossoglou 2011, 7185 portrayed him.
10 | S. Mariev
titude as a reflection of an ultimately unresolvable tension between the heritage of

antiquity and Christian faith that was predominant in Byzantium.
The relationship between Hellenic and, more specifically, Neoplatonic philoso-
phy, on the one hand, and Christian Orthodoxy, on the other, became a major issue
for Psellos disciple Jo h n I t a l o s, who faced trial for heresy. The entries in the Syn-
odikon of Orthodoxy that deal with his case create an image of John Italos accused of
believing in the truth of Greek philosophy and of giving preference to Greek philos-
ophy over Christian Orthodoxy, and even of denigrating Christian doctrines openly
and deliberately. Furthermore, the accusations brought against him appear to be as
follows: first, illicitly applying philosophical principles to the understanding of Chris-
tian dogma and, second, admitting as true the impious opinions of the Platonists con-
cerning the soul and the universe, in particular the idea of the eternity of the universe
and the view that matter, conceived as self-constituted and coeternal with the Demi-
urge, receives form from the ideas. In his corpus of writings we find indeed count-
less references not only to Aristotle, but also to Neoplatonic doctrines. The references
to the Neoplatonists are fully integrated into John Italos own argumentation. These
references, however, do not necessarily imply that John Italos was an adherent of Neo-
platonic philosophy, pursuing a subversive agenda of bringing pagan wisdom back to
life to the detriment of Christian orthodoxy. Quite the contrary, John Italos frequently
uses references to Platonic and Neoplatonic doctrines within demonstrations of Chris-
tian theses and on many occasions acknowledges the incompatibility of Christian
48 It is this unresolvable tension in Psellos work that OMeara 1998a, 439 has in mind, when he asks
the following question: Dans le trait n. 45, Psellus fait rfrence (p. 159,1) des philosophes interm-
diaires, cest--dire des philosophes qui sinspirent la fois de la pense grecque et de dogmes chr-
tiens. Psellus se distancie par rapport de tels penseurs, se situant clairement du cot de la doctrine
chrtienne. Mais ne pourrait-on pas le dcrire comme tant lui-mme plutt un de ces philosophes
intermdiaires ?.
49 Cf. Gouillard 1967, 5661, 188202. Gouillard 1967, 195 points out that loeuvre dItalos ne justifie
pas ces imputations. Cf. also Gouillard 1985a.
50 The Quaestiones Quodlibetales, the main work of John Italos, is not only a collection of the answers
that Italos provided to various questions formulated by important personages of the time or to partic-
ular aporiai, but it also contains drafts of lessons for his students and transcriptions of Johns lessons
made by those students, which makes it difficult to establish precisely where the personal doctrine of
Italos begins and where a simple exposition or interpretation of the teachings of Greek philosophers
ends. Cf. Stephanou 1949a, 8185.
51 In treatise 89, entitled How should we understand what is said about matter, that it will suffice
for the resurrected men, Italos aims at solving a difficulty connected with the idea of resurrection. In
this passage Italos does not mention the name of Proklos, but merely refers to the philosophoi without
further specification; nevertheless, he takes up the Proklean idea that matter derives from the first
unlimitedness. He states: one could be at loss about how it is possible that one and the same mat-
ter underlies a great number of forms not one time after the other but at one and the same time. In
response to this one would say that even by the philosophers themselves matter is called something
great and small and, in addition, unlimited, because it is called by them begotten of the Father and
doctrine and Platonic wisdom. In some treatises he openly takes a position against
the Ancients. For example, in treatise 92 of his Quaestiones Quodlibetales, Italos char-
acterizes as nonsensical the Platonic opinion that matter is something simple and
incorporeal, ungenerated and incorruptible and coeternal with the Demiurge. John
Italos even takes up the arguments whereby Proklos had confuted Plotinian identifi-
cation of matter with evil and uses them to demonstrate that matter could not have
been created by God directly. At the same time, he uses references to principles of
Proklean metaphysics in order to rule out that matter, which was conceived also by
Proklos as something simple, could have been mediately created by God. Finally, he
uses a reference to the Neoplatonic idea that matter is the uttermost being in order
to demonstrate the weakness of the last option, namely that matter is generated by
itself (for if this had been the case, matter would have been the first being and not the
last, as he argued). In this way Italos, taking as his point of departure the principles of
Neoplatonic philosophy and using the arguments of some Neoplatonic philosophers
not produced by some other causes; for the unlimited thence derives from the first unlimitedness.
Because it is unlimited and belongs to the first unlimitedness, it is obvious that it is not impossi-
ble for it to underlie unlimited [forms]; if this is so, then it is not impossible for it to underlie finite
[forms] as well; and the unlimited is dissolved and we will face no difficulty (Ital. q. 89 CK 216.37
2176). When Italos speaks of matter as begotten of the Father, he clearly refers to Psellos teachings
on the Chaldean Oracles and to the monistic cosmology of the Oracles themselves (cf. Michael Psell.
, in Opuscula psychologica, theolog-
ica, daemonologica, ed. D. OMeara, p. 151.9: (cf. S. Lanzi (ed.), Michele
Psello. Oracoli Caldaici, Milano 2001, p. 66f.). Cf. R. Majercik (ed.), The Chaldean Oracles. Text. Trans-
lation and Commentary, Leiden 1989, fr. 34, p. 61). In treatise 71, Italos describes matter as something
changeable and flowing and the primary evil, as some think, and poverty and truly privation; here
Italos combines the Plotinian doctrine of matter as primary evil and truly privation (cf. Plot., Enn. II
4,14; Enn. I 8,14) with the idea of matters mutability and instability and even corruptibility, and so
he concludes that, since matter is changing and fluid and corruptible, also the form of the universe,
inasmuch as it is enmattered, cannot be exempt from the process of corruption that concerns matter:
Because the form of the universe is also enmattered, which always perishes and is moved in all kinds
of ways, as has been said, why is it not unreasonable to think that matter is subject to corruption and
the universe, which is in matter/enmattered, instead persists? (Ital. q. 71; CK 194. 1528). Thus Italos
integrated the reference to Plotinos doctrines into his own argumentation, which aims at demonstrat-
ing Christian theses (i.e. the corruptibility of the world). It is worth noting that according to Plotinos
matter is primary evil and truly privation, but it does not change and cannot be corrupted; for Plotinos
matter is a tendency towards substantial existence; it is static, without being stable [] a phantom
which does not remain and cannot get away either (Enn. III 6, 7.1318), but, insofar as it is matter, it
cannot be altered (cf. Plot., Enn. III 6,10 and II 5,5) and it is incorruptible (cf. Plot., Enn. III 6, 8).
52 Cf. Gouillard 1976a, 313, note 64. The views of Gouillard have been recently taken up by Michele
Trizio (cf. Trizio 2014a, 190).
53 The anathema was pronounced because such a conviction implies contradiction of the free will
of God who has brought into being all things out of nothing and as creator has freely and sovereignly
established for all things the beginning and the end (Gouillard 1967, 59.220224).
54 Ital. q. 92 CK 227.1730.
55 Trizio 2014d.
12 | S. Mariev
against others, demonstrates that matter as it was conceived by Plotinos and Proklos
does not exist. He considers various definitions of matter provided by the ancient
philosophers and proceeds to examine the implications of each one of them in order
to demonstrate that they are all untenable and that matter the way the Greeks speak
of it does not exist, being merely a groundless phantasy. In treatise 93, John Italos
takes as his point of departure the definitions of nature provided by Aristotle (namely,
nature as the immanent principle of movement and rest) and by the Platonic philoso-
phers (namely, the idea of nature as the last demiurge, as uttermost life and as an
instrument of God) and shows how these definitions lead to absurd consequences. In
the end, he proposes a definition of nature that was given by the Fathers of the Church
and asserts its validity. It is, of course, far from certain whether this opusculum of John
Italos is indeed representative of his philosophical views and not merely a school ex-
ercise. And yet this question applies to the entire corpus of John Italos writings, given
the numerous ambiguities it presents.
This ambiguous attitude towards the Neoplatonic heritage was further exacer-
bated in the works of John Italos disciple E u s t r a t i o s o f N i k a i a, who also faced
an accusation of heresy. In his theological writings, in particular those that treat
Christological questions, he makes use of Neoplatonic doctrines. In his commentary
on the Nicomachean Ethics, he also makes frequent references to Proklos and even
in a certain sense identifies with Proklos thought, presenting as his own points of
view some Proklean doctrines. The doctrines of the Neoplatonic philosophers (not
only Proklos, but also Plotinos and probably Damaskios) clearly influenced the
commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics written by M i c h a e l o f E p h e s o s. Echoes
of Neoplatonic doctrines are also discernible in the text of the Epitome written by
T h e o d o r o s o f S my r n a, another bearer of the title consul of the philosophers.
The widespread interest in Neoplatonic, and specifically Proklean, philosophy during
this period also encompasses the resentment towards these doctrines that pervades
56 Trizio 2014a, 187.

57 Ital. q. 92, CK 228.2627. Cf. Ioannou 1956, 7273.
58 Cf. Steel 2002a, 53.
59 Cf. Trizio 2014a, 197: Most Proclean doctrines discussed in Eustratios commentary on book I of
the Nicomachean Ethics and presented by him as Platonic are reiterated as Eustratios own views
in his commentary on book VI of the same work. Cf. Trizio 2009a.
60 Cf. Steel 2002a, 5556.
61 Cf. Steel 2002a, 54. Cf. also Mariev 2015.
62 Theodoros makes reference to e.g. a classic distinction between the causes properly so called
and by-causes, even if he makes this distinction anonymously and as a commonly accepted view
in antiquity (cf. Trizio 2012, 85).
63 Cf. Podskalsky 1976b, 509. Cacouros 2000a, 594 rightly pointed out that these texts are reflective
of a more widespread interest in Proklean philosophy, which is in turn part of a larger framework of a
dispute about the relationship between theology and philosophy.
the Refutatio of N i c h o l a s o f M e t h o n e. This work was motivated by Nicholas of

Methones preoccupation with the fascination that Neoplatonic philosophy exercised
over his contemporaries and by his desire to lead them back to the simplicity of the
true faith. By examining the propositions of the Elementatio theologica one by one,
Nicholas aims to identify in every one of them those teachings that contravene Chris-
tian doctrines and thus to expose the deception that in his view was lurking behind
the fascinating complexity and pernicious refinement of Proklean thought. In this
way, his treatise becomes a harsh critique of Proklos. Unlike I s a a k S e b a s t o k r a t o r
(11th century), whose treatise On providence was a compilation of Proklean texts into
which he interpolated material from the Christian theologians Ps.-Dionysios the Are-
opagite and Maximos Homologetes in order to dissimulate the true origin of his work
and to christianize Proklos, N i c h o l a s o f M e t h o n e contrasted Ps.-Dionysios the
Areopagite with Proklos and used Ps.-Dionysios to rectify Proklos supposed devi-
ation. Nicholas also postulated a relationship between the philosophy of Proklos
and some Christian heresies.
During the 13th and 14th centuries, after the watershed in Byzantine history
created by the trauma, as Byzantines viewed it, of the capture of Constantinople
by the Latins, Neoplatonic philosophy continued to exercise significant influence.
N i k e p h o r o s B l e m my d e s (11971272) was the author of an Epitome Physica that
shows the influence of Simplikios. Blemmydes copied entire passages from Sim-
plikios Commentary on the Physics, slightly modifying them and making some at-
tempts to free them from pagan implications. In the end, he successfully adopted
a number of Neoplatonic theses (for instance, the idea of nature as an instrumental
cause). G e o r g e A k r o p o l i t e s, who was a disciple of Nikephoros Blemmydes, ad-
mitted that he had sufficiently understood some passages of Gregory of Nazianzos
64 Cf. Trizio 2014a, 202203 and the contribution of Joshua Robinson in the present volume.
65 Cf. Angelou 1984d, LVIII.
66 Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus Elements of Theology, ed., with intro. by A.D. An-
gelou, Athens/Leiden 1984, 1.152.12.
67 Cf. Niarchos 19831984; Niarchos 1985; Terezis 1995; Terezis 1997; Tempelis 1999.
68 Cf. Steel 1982. On the identification of this Isaak with the brother of Alexios I cf. Steel 1982, 373. On
the identity of Isaak cf. Steel and Opsomer 2003, 48.
69 Nicholas of Methone considered Ps.-Dionysios to be the teacher and not the pupil of Proklos. Ac-
cording to Nicholas, Proklos had departed from the teachings of Dionysios and corrupted them. As
shown by Alexidze 2002a, 117, Nicholas frequently contrasts Proklos with Dionysios in a forced and
groundless way, i.e. in those cases where similarities between the two philosophers prevail over the
differences.
70 Cf. the contribution of Joshua Robinson in the present volume.
71 Cf. Golitsis 2007. On Blemmydes life and works cf. Stavrou 2007. On the influence of the Dialectica
of John of Damaskos on the Epitome Logica cf. Conticello 1996.
72 Golitsis 2007, 244 and 254255.
73 Cf. Golitsis 2007, 250.
14 | S. Mariev
only after having studied Plato, Proklos, Iamblichos and Plotinos. It was G e o r g e
P a c hy m e r e s (12421307), however, who demonstrated profound interest in Prok-
los, whom he studied very intensively during the years 12801300. He made a copy
of Proklos Commentary on the Parmenides that was actually an edition of Proclus
commentary, comprising many corrections, philological conjectures and philosoph-
ical interventions. An important place in Byzantine reception of the Neoplatonic
heritage belongs undoubtedly to Nikephoros Chumnos (12611327), who wrote, inter
alia, a polemic essay against Plotinos (On the soul, against Plotinos). In this trea-
tise he criticizes in particular two Platonic, and more specifically Plotinian, ideas,
namely the pre-existence of souls and metempsychosis. Chumnos took up a num-
ber of theses that had been formulated by Gregory of Nyssa and demonstrated that,
contrary to Plotinos, the soul is not pre-existent with respect to the body, does not
descend into the body and does not transmigrate from one body into another. Against
the idea of the pre-existence of the soul and its descent into the body, Chumnos ar-
gues in favour of the Christian idea of the simultaneous creation of the soul and the
body. Against the idea of metempsychosis, Chumnos maintains that the soul does not
transmigrate from one body into another, but is connected to the body that came into
being with it and desires to return to that body after the body dies and the soul is left
by itself. As Gregory of Nyssa had previously asserted, Chumnos also maintained
that an indissoluble bond ties the soul to its body and that this bond cannot be broken
74 Cf. Georgii Acropolitae In Gregorii Nazianzeni Sententias, in Opera, II, Leipzig 1903, 71, 113.
75 Cf. Cacouros 2000a, 596. Cacouros suggests that interest in Proklos among the Byzantines during
the period after the reconquest of Constantinople from the Latins in 1261, as manifest in the writings
of Pachymeres, est d au fait que, dj dans lempire de Nice, lHypotypsis de Proclus avait t
introduite dans le cursus des tudes astronomiques relevant du quadrivium. Ce bref texte a d servir
de passeport pour luvre philosophique de Proclus sous les Palologues (Cacouros 2000a, 626).
It is worth noting that George Pachymeres produced a paraphrase of the Ps.-Dionysian corpus. Cf.
Aubineau 1971; Rigo 1997, 519.
76 Steel and Mac 2006a, 77.
77 An overview of its content is found in Benakis 1997.
78 At the same time, Chumnos harshly criticizes the theory of anamnesis that Plotinos had used to
corroborate his theses of the pre-existence of souls with respect to bodies. Chumnos denies that the
soul according to the intellect has a perfect knowledge before it descends into the body, and he main-
tains that the soul is generated together with the body and is provided with perfect knowledge from
the very beginning of its constitution. The soul, which is joined with the organic body from the be-
ginning, is perfect in itself and possesses perfect knowledge, but requires equally perfect organs in
order to unfold its own faculties in conjunction with the body and its activities in the sciences. Cf.
Bydn 2003, 338: his own view posits innate complete knowledge implanted by the Creator, which,
although not forgotten, is in the cases of some branches of knowledge (inter alia natural philosophy,
no doubt) obscured to the intellect and only clarified by the help of the organs of the soul (the four
lower soul faculties).
79 To be more precise, he conceives the intellectual nature as twofold: on the one hand, there is a
soul that subsists only by itself and does not tend toward a union with the body; on the other, there
is a soul naturally united with the body that does not desire to separate itself from it, to the extent
and on the account of it the soul, once it is freed from the body that was born with
it, tends to return to the body which it had to abandon. Nikephoros Chumnos was
involved in a harsh dispute with T h e o d o r o s M e t o c h i t e s, who had been his friend
but later became his rival and even antagonist. Their dispute revolved around ques-
tions of literary style, astronomy and, in particular, the superiority of astronomy over
physics. As demonstrated by evenko, and more recently by Bydn, Theodoros
Metochites made use of the De communi mathematica scientia of Iamblichos both in
his Logoi 13 and 14 (directed against Nikephoros Chumnos) and in his Stoicheiosis as-
tronomike. Polemis has recently argued in his edition of Metochites Carmen 10 that in
this text Metochites also used some additional Neoplatonic material and in particular
Proklos. What is important, however, is that Theodoros Metochites not only made
use of the texts written by Iamblichos and Proklos, but also seems to adhere in his
conception of the mathematical entities to their projectionist point of view.
that, once it becomes separated from the body, it tends to return to that body which it had to abandon,
which means that the resuscitated body is identical with the earthly body.
80 Cf. Greg. Nyss. De an. et resurr. 76.4677.23. On Chumnos debt to Gregory of Nyssa cf. Amato and
Ramelli 2006, 2930: la polemica stessa sviluppata da Cumno contro Plotino e la dottrina della
preesistenza delle anime e della loro trasmigrazione di corpo in corpo era gi ben presente ed es-
plicita nel De anima et resurrectione del Nisseno, opera che Niceforo mi sembra conoscere bene e alla
quale pare alludere.
81 evenko 1962, 6887.
82 Bydn 2003, 342344.
83 I. Polemis 2006, 190: However, Iamblichus is not the only source of Metochites. In all probabil-
ity, Metochites also made use of Proclus, for he quotes a passage from an unspecified work of Aristotle
dealing with the level of accuracy encountered in various sciences, which is also quoted by Iamblichus
anonymously. The same passage is to be found in Procluss commentary on the Elements of Euclid,
explicitly attributed to Aristotle. The fact that Metochites drew this passage from Proclus is demon-
strated by the fact that the introductory phrase of the quotation, which is common in both Proclus
and Metochites, is absent from the treatise of Iamblichus. Polemis repeats these arguments in his re-
cent edition of the Carmina (cf. Theodori Metochitae Carmina, edidit I. Polemis [Corpus Christianorum
Series Graeca 83], Turnout 2015, XCIX).
84 Bydn 2003, 291 was of the opinion that Metochites is concerned to emphasize the separability of
mathematical objects from sensible ones, but he does not ascribe to the former an absolutely separate
mode of being. Bydn 2003, 295 stressed Metochites adherence to the abstractionist point of view:
In spite of Metochites emphasis on the separability of mathematical objects, the abstractionist point
of view is in fact consistently upheld throughout Stoicheiosis 1:25. I. Polemis 2006, 191, noted, contra
Bydn, that Bydns is surely refuted by some passages in Poem 10, where it is affirmed that math-
ematical objects come before matter, though they sometimes give the impression of coming after it.
Bydn 2011, 1268 has recently modified his position, In his Poem 10 (On Mathematics), he describes
mathematical objects as being only apparently the products of abstraction from sensibles, and actu-
ally unconsciously preexisting in reason (or mind), in a way that suggests that he aligned himself
with the projectionism of Iamblichus and Proclus. On the difference between the projectionist and
the abstractionist point of view cf. Bydn 2003, 293 ff.
16 | S. Mariev
N i k e p h o r o s G r e g o r a s (12601358/61), a pupil of Theodoros Metochites, is

remembered in the history of Byzantium not only as the author of the voluminous
Historia Rhomaike and a staunch leader of the anti-Palamite movement, but also for
his polemics against Barlaam of Calabria. Shortly after the deposition of the Emperor
Andronikos II by his grandson Andronikos III, Theodoros Metochites and Nikephoros
Gregoras fell out of favour on account of their close ties to the deposed emperor. After
the death of Theodoros Metochites, Nikephoros Gregoras made several attempts to re-
turn to play an active role in the intellectual life of the Byzantine capital. It was with
this objective that he composed his famous dialogue Phlorentios or about Wisdom. In
this dialogue Nikephoros Gregoras criticized a number of Aristotelian points of view,
which a certain Xenophanes, an avatar of Barlaam of Calabria in the fictional setting
of the dialogue, supposedly defended. The fictional debate between Xenophanes, that
is Barlaam of Calabria, and Nikagoras, the literary persona of Nikephoros Gregoras
himself, concerns not only questions of natural philosophy, but also of logic. With re-
gard to Aristotelian logic, Gregoras demonstrated that neither the dialectical nor the
scientific syllogisms constitute science. In his opinion, the syllogistic techne is not a
science at all, but merely a pedagogical instrument for the use of those who are by
nature incapable of beginning from what is first. Importantly, in formulating his crit-
icism Gregoras used some theoretical elements taken from Plotinos and even made
verbatim quotations from the Plotinian treatise On Dialectics. Gregoras interest in
ancient Platonism is also evident in his Explicatio in librum Synesii De insomniis. As
Bydn has pointed out, the De insomniis is consistently treated as the work of a pa-
gan Platonist, while Gregoras is careful to point out [...] which of Synesius views
are distinctly pagan, but never descends to polemic or apologetics. In a passage
85 On his life and the problems of dating cf. Beyer 1978.

86 Cf. Ierodiakonou 2011b, 696, during the first half of the fourteenth century, Nikephoros Gregoras
argued that logical studies should be altogether dismissed and logical theory should be regarded as
completely useless. His contemporaries, however, Barlaam of Calabria and George Palamas, claimed
that logic is indeed useful in defending Christian belief, but they disagreed between them as to its
precise use.
87 Cf. Mariev 2016. On the subject of Plotinian influence on Gregoras cf. Guilland 1926, 204; Iero-
diakonou 2002d, 222224. Gregoras cites a number of Plotinian passages in his letters, cf. Nicephori
Gregorae epistulae, edidit Petrus Aloisius M. Leone; accedunt epistulae ad Gregoram missae Matino,
1982, Vol. II, 22.7480; 23.9195; 96106; and in his Historia Rhomaike, ed. L. Schopen, Bonn: 1830,
1088,11089,4; 1090,1216; 1090, 1618; 1090, 1820; 1092, 1114; 1092, 1417; 1092, 1719; 1092,19
1093,9.
88 Bydn 2014a, 169 points out that some of Synesius philosophical views were bound to strike a
chord with men like Metochites and Gregoras, who both had a strong predilection for late antique Pla-
tonism as did many other Byzantine intellectuals from Michael Psellos to George Gemistos Plethon.
89 Cf. Bydn 2014a, 173. Bydn observes that Gregoras inserts examples and parallels from the Bible
for many of the views and practices referred by Synesius in order to placate suspicious Christian
minds (p. 173). In some places, Gregoras tends to play down some of the apparent differences be-
tween these views and practices and those adhered to by Gregoras contemporaries (p. 173).
of his Historia Rhomaike, Gregoras attacks Gregory Palamas, his intellectual adver-
sary against whom he fought during the entire second half of his life, and in partic-
ular Palamas distinctio realis between Gods essence and energies. In his criti-
cism of Palamas, Gregoras highlighted a subtle and yet undeniable theoretical proxim-
ity between Palamas and Proklos, suggesting that Palamas had merely appropriated
Proklean teachings according to which the unparticipated () precedes the
participated (), and the participated precedes the participant (),
that is to say the doctrine that the henads, which are above being but are capable
of being participated, function as mediating entities between the participant entities
and the unparticipated One. Gregoras observation should obviously be read with ex-
treme caution. However, it is important to understand that not only do some of Pala-
mas theses point towards what can be characterized as unconscious Neoplaton-
ism, but, as Demetracopoulos maintains, Palamas also quite consciously adopted
some typically Neoplatonic, and more specifically Proklean, theoretical elements.
It is probable that he did so because he thought that Proklos was a quasi-Christian
author, whose authority derives from the indisputable authority of Ps.-Dionysios the
Areopagite. The influence of Ps.-Dionysios the Areopagite on Palamas has been ex-
tensively studied and is universally recognized. The details are much disputed, es-
pecially with respect to Meyendorffs thesis that Palamas corrected Ps.-Dionysios,
90 Cf. Nicephori Gregorae, Byzantina Historia XXIII, ed. L. Schopen, Bonn 1830, 1100.101101.11. Cf.
Procl. El. Th. 24 Dodds. Cf. Demetracopoulos 2011b, 898: He likewise attacked Palamas distinctio
realis between Gods essence and energies as being just a Christian adjustment of Proclus meta-
physical doctrine of henads.
91 Cf. Demetracopoulos 2011c, 277: As Gregory Acindynos and Nicephoros Gregoras (12931361) no-
ticed in Palamas own time, Palamas explicit distinction between lower deity and Gods transcen-
dental essence as well as his plural use of is redolent of Proclus metaphysical tenet that each
level of the hierarchical structure of beings derives its ontological grade from its essence, whereas it
produces the lower level by granting, in terms of its superior, existence, substance, qualities, and en-
ergy to its inferior. With regard to Gregoras criticism, Demetracopoulos 2011c, 278 remarks that the
passages they invoked do not correspond with concrete passages in any of Palamas writings. Still,
the Palamite terms lower deity or deities and Gods transcendental essence do appear in Proclus
writings, and are used by Palamas in a non-Dionysian, if not anti-Dionysian, way.
92 von Ivnka 1964.
93 Demetracopoulos 2011c, 278 and 356.
94 Demetracopoulos 2011c, 356, n. 293 remarks: Palamas, just like Barlaam the Calabrian and many
other Late Byzantine thinkers, allowed themselves to draw freely upon Proclus because they believed
him to be a semi-Christian or sympathetic to Christianity, inasmuch as he had heavily drawn on what
they thought was the literary production of Pauls disciple, Dionysius the Areopagite.
95 Cf. Meyendorff 1959. Ritter 1997, 579 accepts Meyendorffs thesis as incontestable. This hypothe-
sis was characterized as a mere illusion by Golitzin 2007, 86. Louth 2008, 597 stresses that it is
not clear, however, that this [the correction] is necessary, for Dionysiuss understanding of hierarchy
does not interpose the hierarchies between God and humankind, with ascent to God entailing ascent
through the hierarchies.
18 | S. Mariev
with a view to neutralizing Neoplatonic tendencies discernible in his writings. The

corpus of Ps.-Dionysios also played an important role in the dispute between Pala-
mas and Barlaam, influencing the way in which each of them assimilated Proklean
theoretical elements.
The last century in the history of Byzantine philosophy was dominated by the fig-
ure of G e o r g i o s G e m i s t o s ( P l e t h o n ). Much has been written about his fascinat-
ing biography, and about the fate of his main philosophical work, the Laws, which
was burned by his intellectual adversary Georgios (Gennadios) Scholarios, and this
story need not be rehearsed here in detail. Plethon is rightly considered the fountain-
head for the Neoplatonic revival of the later Quattrocento. He was convinced that
the salvation of the Byzantines depended on the success of a political and spiritual
renewal and argued in favour of a return to the roots of Hellenic greatness. Accord-
ingly, he became an active promoter of a religious system that closely resembled, at
least in some aspects, Hellenic Platonism. The pantheon that he developed in the Laws
shows clear analogies with Proklean theology. And yet, his attitude towards Neopla-
tonism and especially the Neoplatonic doctrines of Proklos is not merely receptive.
On the one hand, Plethon did adopt and reformulate within his own theoretical frame-
work a number of important elements of Proklos metaphysics. On the other hand, the
96 Cf. Kneevi 2015, in particular the discussion of Meyendorffs thesis on pp. 376377.
97 Cf. Rigo 1997, 524ff.
98 Demetracopoulos 2011a, 142 maintains that The close affinities of this corpus [the corpus Dionysi-
acum] with Proclus made Barlaam feel free to integrate into his writings numerous terms and doc-
trines from several Proclean works (Elements of Theology, Platonic Theology, Commentaries on Al-
cibiades, Parmenides, Timaeus et al.) and eclectically combine them with Christianity. Barlaam did
the same with Platos texts (e.g., Euthyphro, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Timaeus, Republic) as well as with
those by many other Neoplatonists (Porphyry, Iamblichus, Syrianus, Olympiodorus), along with some
Byzantine Neoplatonizing authors (Michael Psellos, Michael of Ephesus, Eustratios of Nicaea). On
the sources of Barlaam, cf. also Demetracopoulos 2003, 83122. Quite predictably Siniossoglou tries
to style Barlaam also as a crypto-pagan. Siniossoglous position was effectively criticised by Kappes
2013, in particular on Barlaam, 211213.
99 Cf. Woodhouse 1986b and Masai 1956b.
100 Monfasani 2006.
101 Hankins 1990b, 194.
102 On the specific meaning of the word Hellenic during the last two Byzantine centuries and es-
pecially during Plethons lifetime, cf. Page 2008.
103 As Gersh has recently pointed out, the affirmations made by Plethons adversary Gennadios
Scholarios, who alleged that Plethon was merely repeating Proklean views (cf. Georg. Schol. Letter
to Exarch Joseph, in C. Alexandre (ed.), Plthon: Trait des Lois, trans. A. Pellissier, Paris 1858, app.
424. 413), cannot serve as a reliable basis for the evaluation of Plethons actual reception of Prok-
los. However, there is evidence of Plethons reception of Proklos (cf. Plethon, Letter to Bessarion [19]
and Letter to Bessarion [21], in L. Mohler, Kardinal Bessarion als Theologe, Humanist und Staatsmann.
Funde und Forschungen, III, Paderborn 1923, 458463 and 465468; cf. Leg. III. 34, 168.21ff.; cf. the
passages analyzed in Gersh 2014a).
theoretical distance between him and Proklos is difficult to overlook. Scholars con-
tinue to debate the status of the first principle within Plethons theoretical system,
that is to say the question of its transcendence and independency. This question is
closely related to another controversial issue, namely the problem of Plethonian re-
jection of the Neoplatonic negative theology. A number of scholars stress that Plethon
does not accept the negative approach to the first principle, thus clearly distanc-
ing himself from Neoplatonism. Other scholars point towards some other works of
Plethon that clearly demonstrate his adherence to the negative theology. An even
more interesting question concerns the motives that could have induced Plethon to re-
ject some Proklean theoretical elements. Gersh has recently suggested that Plethons
oscillating attitude between assimilation and refutation should be traced back to his
desire to to excavate a Platonism that is free of later Christian accretions. What-
ever Plethons personal credo and his personal attitude towards Christianity Tatakis
spoke of Plethons indifference towards Christianity; Hankins believed that even
though Plethon surely rejected dogmatic and institutional Christianity, he did
not reject Christianity per se, while Carab described Plethon as an enemy of the
Christian doctrine it is still true that Plethonian theology (as set out in the Laws)
contains theoretical elements that are irreconcilable with Christian doctrine (such as
absolute and indivisible unity of the first principle, universal determinism, the com-
plete eternity, both a parte post and a parte ante of the universe and of the soul, and
metempsychosis).
In the spring of 1439 Plethon finished his De differentiis, a work of immense impor-
tance in which he mounted a violent attack on Aristotle, demonstrating the superiority
104 Gersh 2014a, 218 observes that the Byzantine thinkers approach varies between the extremes
of following Proclus on a precise textual level and of either ignoring his views or contradicting them
explicitly. Tambrun had already highlighted not only similarities, but also a number of important dis-
agreements between Plethon and Proklos (cf. Tambrun 2006a, 153168). On the relationship between
Plethon and Proklos cf. also Nikolaou 1982.
105 Cf. Tambrun 2006a, 175176: En premier lieu [...] il exclut la thse de base du noplatonisme
selon laquelle le premier principe la premire cause , est lUn (hen) qui nest pas tre (on). Plthon,
au contraire, pose que le premier principe [...] est auto-tre [...]. Deuximement, Plthon naccepte pas
dapproche ngative du premier principe.
106 Cf. Gersh 2014a, 222223. Hladk 2014, 7577 provides a rather ambiguous interpretation of this
issue (cf. Bydn 2014b, 297).
107 Cf. Gersh 2014a, 218. Plethons approach is based, according to Gersh, on two ideas about the
history of philosophy, first, that the Zoroastrian oracles contain pre-Platonic doctrine copied by
Platonists; second, that Proclus expounds a Platonism contaminated with Christian features derived
from Dionysius the Areopagite (p. 218).
108 Tatakis 2003b, 241.
109 Hankins 1990b, 202.
110 Carab 2010, 67.
111 Carab 2010, 68.
20 | S. Mariev
of Plato. The composition of this treatise started a controversy over the respective
merits of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy that continued both in the Byzantine
East and in the Latin West for over thirty years.
Cardinal B e s s a r i o n (14081472), one of the most brilliant of Plethons disci-
ples, promoted a very different view on the relationship between Plato and Aristotle
to that his teacher had expounded in his De differentiis. In 1458 George of Trebizond
published the treatise Comparatio philosophorum Platonis et Aristotelis, in which he
attacked Plato and the Platonic doctrines by alleging that Platonic philosophy was
irreconcilable with Christian doctrines and, viewed as a whole, amounted to noth-
ing more than a muddle of monstrosities and depravities. Aristotelian philosophy,
on the contrary, according to George of Trebizond, was not only perfectly compatible
with Christian doctrines, but even contained some fundamental Christian theses in
nuce. Bessarion wrote his major philosophical work, In Calumniatorem Platonis (ICP),
to confute George of Trebizond. In his response, Bessarion does not attempt to criti-
cize, let alone to calumniate Aristotle. He adopted a completely different strategy.
As Bessarion stressed on several occasions throughout his work, he held Plato and
Aristotle in great esteem. Given that both philosophers were pagans and therefore un-
able to elevate themselves to the truth of the Christian faith, and even though some
aspects of Platonic teaching are indeed irreconcilable with the teachings of Christian-
ity, Platonic philosophy exhibits a greater affinity with Christian doctrines than does
Aristotelian philosophy. Bessarion demonstrated, on the one hand, that George of
Trebizond, though he pretends to be an advocate of Aristotle, in reality does not un-
derstand Aristotle and as a consequence deviates from the interpretations of Aristotle
that had been elaborated by the holy teachers of the Church. At the same time,
Bessarion stressed the high degree of correspondence between the opinions of Plato
and those of the holy teachers of the Church, who frequently resorted to them and
even explicitly expressed their approval of them. Bessarion also sought to demon-
strate that many aspects of Aristotelian thought are not in disaccord with Platonic
philosophy. Aristotle wrote as a physicist who concentrates on natural entities. Plato
wrote as a theologian who contemplates divine realities that are free from matter. It
becomes quite obvious at this point that when Bessarion adopts this strategy of recon-
ciliation, his aim is not only to demonstrate that the contradictions between Plato and
Aristotle are only apparent, but also to suggest the superiority of Plato over Aristotle
112 Demetracopoulos defends the thesis whereby Plethons acquaintance with the Thomistic version
of Aristotelianism probably explains why he did not follow the soft, compromising Neo-platonic line
of trying to integrate Aristotle into a general Platonic outlook and preferred, instead, to demote him
(Demetracopoulos 2002, 169; cf. Demetracopoulos 2006).
113 Cf. Bessarion, ICP II, 3.3.
114 Cf. Bessarion, ICP III, 19.6.
115 Cf. Bessarion, ICP II, 3.2.
116 Cf. Bessarion, ICP I, 3.1.
in the realm of theology. To reach his objectives Bessarion made use of both Greek
and Latin sources. In particular, in Book 3 of the ICP Bessarion made extensive use of
Scholastic sources in order to demonstrate how ignorant his adversary George of Tre-
bizond was not only of Aristotle, but also of Scholastic authors. The insertion of this
third book into the ICP which increased from three to four the total number of books
containing a refutation of the three-book Comparatio philosophorum is one of the
most important changes that Bessarion made during his composition of the ICP. In
the first redaction the presence of the Latin sources was less conspicuous. Bessar-
ion made extensive use of Greek and in particular of Neoplatonic sources, quoting
and paraphrasing a number of passages from Simplikios Commentary on the Physics
and several of Proklos works, such as the Commentary on the Timaios and Platonic
Theology. Bessarion closely relied on these sources in order to underline a number
of similarities between Platonic and Christian doctrines. For instance, in the second
book of the ICP, without mentioning Proklos by name, Bessarion quotes extensively
from Proklos digression on matter, in order to substantiate his own thesis that Plato
thinks of matter as something brought into being by God and not as a principle that
is independent from God and coeternal with him, as George of Trebizond had alleged.
The reference to the Proklean doctrine according to which matter proceeds from the
117 The Latin edition of the ICP, as it appeared in print in 1469, contained six books. In addition to the
four books containing a refutation of the three books of the Comparatio philosophorum, it contained
Bessarions criticism of George of Trebizonds translation of Platos Laws (book 5) and Bessarions De
Natura et Arte (book 6). The De Natura et Arte had been written at the beginning of the dispute between
George of Trebizond and Bessarion, namely at the time when Bessarion had already read Georges
defamatory pamphlet containing a refutation of a letter Bessarion had written to Theodoros Gazes,
but had not yet had a chance to read Georges Comparatio. Cf. Mariev 2013 and Mariev, Marchetto, and
Luchner 2015, ixivx.
118 Monfasani 2012a, 473.
119 Cf. Monfasani 2012a, 472: when Bessarion first came to write the In Calumniatorem Platonis, his
sources were all Greek save for a small handful of classic Latin references and a single Latin patristic
reference. It is important to note that already in the De Natura et Arte, i.e. at the very first stage of
the debate between Bessarion and George of Trebizond, which can be securely dated to 1458, Bessar-
ion resorted to Thomas Aquinas. Bessarions actual source was the Compendium that he had brought
with him from Byzantium to the West. This first reference to Thomas Aquinas in Bessarion remained
undiscovered for a long time, leading a number of scholars, including John Monfasani, to believe that
Bessarion did not make use of Aquinas until he began to work on the refutation of the Comparatio or
even later. On the relationship between the Greek original of the ICP and the role of Niccol Perotti in
the process of correction of the Latin version of the ICP cf. Monfasani 1995; Monfasani 2012b.
120 Cf. Monfasani 2012a, 472. On Bessarions study of the Platonic Theology and on his notes in the
Cod. Monac. gr. 547 cf. Hankins 1990a, 442; Saffrey 1960. Cf. also Mac, Steel, and DHoine 2009.
121 Cf. Bessarion, ICP II 6, 11.620 (Mohler, p. 120.520). Cf. Prokl. In Tim. I 384, 22385,9. In his di-
gression on matter in the Commentary on Timaios, Proklos deals with the question of whether matter
is created or uncreated. In this context he refers to the Platonic Philebos and uses this reference to sup-
port his own thesis that, according to Plato, matter proceeds from the One and the first Unlimitedness,
which is prior to the One Being.
22 | S. Mariev
One and the First Unlimitedness is, in other words, used by Bessarion to suggest that
there is a fundamental agreement between Platonism tout court and Christian doc-
trine, which in a similar way asserts that matter was created by God. Bessarion inter-
prets Plato not only through the filter of pagan Neoplatonism, but also through the
mediation of the Christian Neoplatonism of Ps.-Dionysios the Areopagite. An appeal
to Ps.-Dionysios allows him to demonstrate that there is a symbiosis between Pla-
tonic teaching and Christian doctrine that manifests itself even in the very fact that
Ps.-Dionysios, one of the most eminent Christian authorities, uses Platonic language
when speaking of God.
Abbreviations
ICP Bessarion, In Calumniatorem Platonis Libri IV, textum graecum addita vetere ver-
sione latina (Kardinal Bessarion als Theologe, Humanist und Staatsmann, Vol. 2),
ed. L. Mohler. Quellen und Forschungen aus dem Gebiete der Geschichte, Grres-
Gesellschaft, Vol. XXII. Paderborn 1927
PLRE J. R. Martindale (1980). The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire. 2 vols. Cam-
bridge
Secondary Sources
Adler, A. (1928). Suidae Lexicon. Vol. 14. Lipsiae.

Alexidze, L. (2002a). Dionysios Areopagita in den mittelalterlichen Kommentaren zur Elementatio
theologica des Proclus. In: Selbst Singularitt Subjectivitt. Vom Neuplatonismus zum
Deutchen Idealismus. Ed. by T. Kobusch, B. Mojsisch, and O. F. Summerell. Amsterdam and
Philadelphia, pp. 111130.
Alexopoulos, T. (2014). Aeropagitic influence and neoplatonic (Plotinian) echoes in Photius'
Amphilochia: question 180. In: Byzantinische Zeitschrift, pp. 136.
Amato, E. and I. Ramelli (2006). Filosofia rhetoricans in Niceforo Cumno: l'inedito trattato Sui corpi
primi e semplici. In: Medioevo Greco 6, pp. 140.
Angelou, A. D. (1984d). The Intellectual Background of the . in: Nicholas of Methone,
Refutation of Proclus' Elements of Theology. Ed. by A. Angelou. Athens and Leiden, pp. LIIILXIV.
Anton, J. P. (1994). The Aristotelianism of Photius's Philosophical Theology. In: Aristotle in Late
Antiquity. Ed. by L. P. Schrenk. Washington, pp. 158183.
Anton, J. P. (1997). Neoplatonic elements in Arethas' Scholia on Aristotle and Porphyry. In:
Noplatonisme et philosophie mdivale. Ed. by L. Benakis. Turnhout, pp. 291306.
Aubineau, M. (1971). Georges Hiromnemon ou George Pachymrs, commentateur du
Pseudo-Denys? In: Journal of Theological Studies 22, pp. 541544.
Beierwaltes, W. (1972a). Johannes von Skythopolis und Plotin. In: Studia Patristica XI/2. Ed. by
F. L. Cross. Berlin, pp. 37.
122 Cf. Bessarion, ICP II 4, 13. Cf. Del Soldato 2014, XIV; Monfasani 2013, 353.
Beierwaltes, W. (1997). Dionysius Areopagites: ein christlicher Proklos? In: Platon in der
abendlndischen Geistesgeschichte. Ed. by T. Kobusch and B. Mojsisch. Darmstadt, pp. 71100.
Beierwaltes, W. and R. Kannicht (1968). Plotin-Testimonia bei Johannes von Skythopolis. In:
Hermes 96, pp. 247251.
Benakis, L. (1987a). Neues zur Proklos-Tradition in Byzanz. In: Proclus et son influence. Ed. by
G. Boss and G. Seel. Zrich, pp. 248259.
Benakis, L. (1997). Nikephoros Choumnos (12501327), ber die Seele gegen Plotin. In:
Benakis, L. (2002). , , . ,
. In: Texts and Studies on Byzantine Philosophy. Athens,
pp. 425456.
Beyer, H.-V. (1978). Eine Chronologie der Lebensgeschichte des Nikephoros Gregoras. In:
Jahrbuch der sterreichischen Byzantinistik 27, pp. 127155.
Bidez, J. (1905). Psellus et le commentaire du Time de Proclus. In: Revue de philologie 29,
pp. 321327.
Bidez, J. (1954). Arthas de Csare editeur et scholiaste. In: Byzantion 9, pp. 391408.
Burnet, J. (1902). Arethas and the Codex Clarkianus (Plato, Phaedo, 96ac). In: Classical Review
16, p. 276.
Bydn, B. (2003). Theodore Metochites' Stoicheiosis astronomike and the study of natural
philosophy and mathematics in early Palaiologan Byzantium. Gteborg.
Bydn, B. (2011). Theodore Metochites. In: Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Ed. by
H. Lagerlund. Dordrecht, pp. 12661269.
Bydn, B. (2012). A case for creationism: Christian cosmology in the 5th and 6th centuries. In: The
Many Faces of Byzantine Phiosophy. Ed. by B. Bydn and K. Ierodiakonou. Athens, pp. 79107.
Bydn, B. (2013). Photios on the Non-Synonymy of Substance: Amphilochia 138. In: Aristotle's
Categories in the Byzantine, Arabic and Latin Traditions. Ed. by S. Ebbesen, J. Marenbon, and
P. Thom. Copenhagen, pp. 934.
Bydn, B. (2014a). Nikephoros Gregoras' Commentary on Synesius, De insomniis. In: On
Prophecy, Dreams and Human Imagination. Ed. by D. A. Russell and H.-G. Nesselrath. Tbingen,
pp. 163188.
Bydn, B. (2014b). Review of V. Hladk, The Philosophy of Gemistos Plethon. In: Aestimatio 11,
pp. 290311.
Cacouros, M. (2000a). Deux pisodes inconnus dans la rception de Proclus Byzance aux
XIIIeXIVe sicles. In: Proclus et la Thologie Platonicienne. Ed. by A.-P. S. et C. Steel. Leuven,
pp. 589627.
Carab, V. A. (2010). Pletho Apostata. Giessen.
Champion, M. W. (2014). Explaining the Cosmos: Creation and Cultural Interaction in Late-Antique
Gaza. Oxford and New York.
Chrestou, K. P. (2005a).
. . In: 25, pp. 117175.
Chrestou, K. P. (2005c).
. . In:
10, pp. 1374.
Christov, I. (2015). Neoplatonic Elements in the Writings of Patriarch Photius. In: The Ways of
Byzantine Philosophy. Ed. by M. Kneevi. Alhambra, pp. 289309.
Conticello, V. (1996). La Source de connaissance de Jean Damascne (ca. 650ca. 750).
PhD thesis. Paris.
24 | S. Mariev
Corrigan, K. and L. M. Harrington (2015). Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. In: The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. by E. N. Zalta. Spring 2015. url:
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/pseudo-dionysius-areopagite/.
Cufalo, D. (2007). Scholia graeca in Platonem. Vol. I. Pleiadi 5. Roma.
Cvetkovi, V. (2015). The Transformation of Neoplatonic Philosophical Notions of Procession
(proodos) and Conversion (epistrophe) in the Thought of St. Maximus the Confessor. In: The
Ways of Byzantine Philosophy. Ed. by M. Kneevi. Alhambra, pp. 171184.
Dain, A. (1954). La transmission des textes littraires classiques. In: Dumbarton Oaks Papers 8,
pp. 3347.
De Andia, Y. (2015). Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and Maximus the Confessor. In: The Oxford
Handbook of Maximus the Confessor. Ed. by P. Allen and B. Neil. Oxford, pp. 177193.
De Vogel, C. J. (1985). Platonism and Christianity: a mere antagonism or a profound common
ground? In: Vigiliae Christianae 39, pp. 162.
Del Soldato, E. (2014). Introduzione. In: Basilio Bessarione: Contro il Calunniatore di Platone.
Roma, pp. IXXXV.
Del Campo Echevarra, A. (2012). La teora platnica de las Ideas en Bizancio (siglos IXXI). Madrid.
Demetracopoulos, J. (2002). Georgios Gennadios II-Scholarios' Florilegium Thomisticum: His Early
Abridgment of Various Chapters and Quaestiones of Thomas Aquinas' Summae and his
Anti-Plethonism. In: Recherches de Thologie et Philosophie mdivales 69, pp. 117171.
Demetracopoulos, J. (2003). Further Evidence on the Ancient, Patristic, and Byzantine Sources of
Barlaam the Calabrian's Contra Latinos. In: Byzantinische Zeitschrift 96, pp. 83122.
Demetracopoulos, J. (2006). Georgios Gemistos-Plethon's Dependence on Th. Aquinas' Summa
contra Gentiles and Summa Theologiae. In: Archiv fr mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur
12, pp. 276341.
Demetracopoulos, J. (2011a). Barlaam of Calabria. In: Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Ed. by
Demetracopoulos, J. (2011b). Nikephoros Gregoras. In: Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy.
Ed. by H. Lagerlund. Dordrecht, pp. 897899.
Demetracopoulos, J. (2011c). Palamas transformed. In: Greeks, Latins and intellectual History
12041500. Ed. by M. Hinterberger and C. Schabel. Leuven, pp. 263372.
Des Places, . (1957). Deux tmoins du texte des Lois de Platon: Eusbe, vque de Csare de
Palestine; Arthas, archevque de Csare de Cappadoc. In: Wiener Studien: Zeitschrift fr
Klassische Philologie, Patristik und lateinische Tradition 70, pp. 254259.
Dillon, J. (2014a). Dionysius the Areopagite. In: Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the
Renaissance. Ed. by S. Gersh. Cambridge, pp. 111124.
Dillon, J. and S. K. Wear (2007). Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition: Despoiling
the Hellenes. Aldershot.
Duffy, J. (2002a). Hellenic Philosophy in Byzantium and the Lonely Mission of Michael Psellos. In:
Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources. Ed. by K. Ierodiakonou. Oxford, pp. 139156.
Emilsson, E. K. (2007). Plotinus on Intellect. Oxford.
Ferrari, F. (2011). La dottrina delle idee nel medioplatonismo. In: Eidos-Idea. Platone, Aristotele e
la tradizione platonica. Ed. by F. Fronterotta and W. Leszl. Sankt Augustin, pp. 233246.
Frank, R. M. (1987). The Use of the Enneads by John of Scythopolis. In: Le Muson 100,
pp. 101108.
Gersh, S. (1978b). From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of
the pseudo-Dionysian Tradition. Leiden.
Gersh, S. (2014a). George Gemistos Plethon. In: Interpreting Proclus. Ed. by S. Gersh. Cambridge,
pp. 216225.
Gifford, E. H. (1902). Arethas and the Codex Clarkianus. In: Classical review 16, pp. 391393.
Golitsis, P. (2007). Nicphore Blemmyde lecteur du commentaire de Simplicius la Physique

d'Aristote. In: The Libraries of the Neoplatonists. Ed. by C. D'Ancona. Leiden and Boston,
pp. 243256.
Golitzin, A. (2007). Dionysius the Areopagite in the Works of Gregory Palamas. On the Question of a
Christological Corrective and related Matters. In: Scrinium 3, pp. 83105.
Gouillard, J. (1967). Le Synodikon de l'Orthodoxie. dition et commentaire. In: Travaux et
Mmoires 2, pp. 1316.
Gouillard, J. (1976a). La religion des philosophes. In: Travaux et Mmoires 6, pp. 305324.
Gouillard, J. (1981). La religion des philosophes. In: La vie religieuse Byzance. London.
Gouillard, J. (1985a). Le procs officiel de Jean l'Italien. Les Actes et leurs sous-entendus. In:
Travaux et Memories 9, pp. 133174.
Gudemann, A. and W. Kroll (1916). Ioannes Philoponus. In: Paulys Realencyclopdie der
classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Ed. by G. Wissowa and W. Kroll. Vol. IX, 2. Stuttgart,
pp. 17641795.
Guilland, R. (1926). Essais sur Nicphore Grgoras. Paris.
Hankins, J. (1990a). Bessarion's Debt to Proclus in Book II of the Calumniator. In: Plato in the
Italian Renaissance. Vol. 2. Leiden and New York, pp. 441444.
Hankins, J. (1990b). Plato in the Italian Renaissance. Vol. I. Leiden.
Hathaway, R. F. (1969). Hierarchy and the definition of order in the letters of Pseudo-Dionysius: a
study in the form and meaning of the Pseudo-Dionysian writings. The Hague.
Heisenberg, A. (1926). Das Problem der Renaissance in Byzanz. In: Historische Zeitschrift 133,
pp. 393412.
Hevelone-Harper, J. (2005). Disciples of the Desert: Monks, Laity and Spiritual Authority in
Sixth-Century Gaza. Baltimore.
Hladk, V. (2014). The Philosophy of Gemistos Plethon. Platonism in Late Byzantium, between
Hellenism and Orthodoxy. Farnham.
Ierodiakonou, K. (2002c). Psellos' Paraphrasis on Aristotle's De interpretatione. In: Byzantine
Philosophy and its Ancient Sources. Ed. by K. Ierodiakonou. Oxford, pp. 157181.
Ierodiakonou, K. (2002d). The Anti-logical Movement in the Fourteenth Century. In: Byzantine
Philosophy and Its Ancient Sources. Ed. by K. Ierodiakonou. Oxford, pp. 219236.
Ierodiakonou, K. (2005b). The Byzantine Reception of Aristotle's Categories. In: Synthesis
philosophica 39, pp. 731.
Ierodiakonou, K. (2011b). Logic, Byzantine. In: Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Ed. by
Ierodiakonou, K. and G. Zografidis (2010). Early Byzantine Philosophy. In: The Cambridge History
of Philosophy in Late Antiquity. Ed. by L. P. Gerson. Vol. 2. Cambridge, pp. 843868.
Ioannou, P. (1956). Christliche Metaphysik in Byzanz: Die Illuminationslehre des Michael Psellos und
Joannes Italos. Ettal.
Irigoin, J. (19851986). Deux traditions dissymtriques: Platon et Aristote. In: Annuaire du Collge
de France: rsums des cours et travaux 86, pp. 683699.
Jenkins, D. (2006a). Psellos' Conceptual Precision. In: Reading Michael Psellos. Ed. by C. Barber
and D. Jenkins. Leiden and Boston, pp. 131151.
Kaldellis, A. (2011). The date of Psellos' death, once again: Psellos was not the Michael of
Nikomedeia mentioned by Attaleiates. In: Byzantinische Zeitschrift 104, pp. 651664.
Kappes, W. (2013). Idolizing Paganism Paganism Demonizing Christianity, propos: N.
Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium. In: Archiv fr mittelalterliche Philosophie und
Kultur 19, pp. 210243.
26 | S. Mariev
Kneevi, M. (2015). Authority and Tradition. The Case of Dionysius Pseudo-Areopagite in the
Writing On Divine Unity and Distinction by Gregory Palamas. In: The Ways of Byzantine
Philosophy. Alhambra, pp. 375389.
Kontouma, V. (2015). The Fount of knowledge between conservation and creation. In: John of
Damascus. New Studies on his Life and Works. Ed. by V. Kontouma. Farnham. Chap. V, pp. 35.
Lagarde, B. (2002). Review of Benakis, , , . In:
Texts and Studies on Byzantine Philosophy. Ed. by L. G. Benakis, pp. 457461.
Lauritzen, F. (2010a). L'ortodossia neoplatonica di Psello. In: Rivista di Studi bizantini e neoellenici
47, pp. 285291.
Lauritzen, F. (2014). Psellos and Plotinos. In: Byzantinische Zeitschrift 101.2, pp. 5366.
Linguiti, A. (2011). Dottrina delle idee nel neoplatonismo. In: Eidos-Idea. Platone, Aristotele e la
tradizione platonica. Ed. by F. Fronterotta and W. Leszl. Sankt Augustin, pp. 247261.
Louth, A. (1993). St. Denys the Areopagite and St. Maximus the Confessor: a question of influence.
In: Studia Patristica 27, pp. 166174.
Louth, A. (2002). St John Damascene. Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology. Oxford.
Louth, A. (2008). The Reception of Dionysius in the Byzantine World: Maximus to Palamas. In:
Modern Theology 24, pp. 585599.
Luzzatto, M.-J. (2010). Codici tardoantichi di Platone ed i cosidetti Scholia Arethae. In: Medioevo
greco 10, pp. 77110.
Mac, C., C. Steel, and P. D'Hoine (2009). Bessarion lecteur du Commentaire de Proclus sur le
Parmnide. Avec une dition de ses scholies aux livres II et III. In: Byzantion 79, pp. 240279.
Makris, G. (2000). Zwischen Hypatios von Ephesos und Lorenzo Valla. Die areopagitische
Echtheitsfrage im Mittelalter. In: Die Dionysius-Rezeption im Mittelalter: Internationales
Kolloquium in Sofia vom 8. bis 11. April 1999. Ed. by C. C. Bojadiev. Turnhout, pp. 439.
Maltese, E. V. (1987). Damascio in Psello. In: Studi italiani di filologia classica, Terza serie 5, p. 66.
Maltese, E. V. (1994a). Michele Psello commentatore di Gregorio di Nazianzo. In: Syndesmos. Studi
in onore di Rosario Anastasi. Ed. by A. Carile. Vol. 2. Catania, pp. 289310.
Mariev, S. (2013). Der Traktat De natura et arte des Kardinals Bessarion. In: Inter graecos
latinissimus, inter latinos graecissimus. Ed. by C. Mrtl, K. Kaiser, and T. Ricklin. Berlin und
New York, pp. 367389.
Mariev, S. (2015). Theoretical Eudaimonia in Michael of Ephesos. In: Quaestio 15, pp. 5562.
Mariev, S. (2016). Plotinus in the Phlorentios of Nikephoros Gregoras. In: Koinotaton Doron. Ed. by
A. Berger et al. Berlin, pp. 101108.
Mariev, S., M. Marchetto, and K. Luchner, eds. (2015). Bessarion: ber Natur und Kunst / De Natura
et Arte. GriechischLateinischDeutsch. Hamburg.
Martindale, J. R. (1980). The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire. 2 vols. Cambridge.
Martone, L. I. (2008). La conoscenza di Fozio della filosofia neoplatonica: la Collezione filosofica e
la questio 75 ad Anfilochio. In: Antonianum 83, pp. 227246.
Masai, F. (1956b). Plthon et le platonisme de Mistra. Paris.
Matula, J. (2011). Arethas of Caesarea. In: Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy
between 500 and 1500. Ed. by H. Lagerlund. Dordrecht, pp. 9799.
McCormick, M. (1987). Byzantium's Role in the Formation of Early Medieval Civilization: Approaches
and Problems. In: Illinois Classical Studies 12.2, pp. 208220.
Menchelli, M. (2015). Nota storico-tradizionale al Commento al Timeo di Proclo nelle et macedone,
comnena, paleologa tra supporti librari e documentari. In: Studia Graeco-Arabica 5,
pp. 145164.
Meyendorff, J. (1959). Introduction l'tude de Grgoire Palamas. Paris.
Monfasani, J. (1995). In: Byzantine Scholars in Renaissance Italy: Cardinal Bessarion and Other
Emigrs. Selected Essays. Aldershot. Chap. 2 and 3.
Monfasani, J. (2006). Pletho's date of death and the burning of his Laws. In: Byzantinische
Zeitschrift 98.2, pp. 459463.
Monfasani, J. (2012a). Cardinal Bessarion's Greek and Latin Sources. In: Knotenpunkt Byzanz.
Ed. by A. Speer and P. Steinkrger. Berlin, pp. 469480.
Monfasani, J. (2012b). Cardinal Bessarion's own Translation of the In calumniatorem Platonis. In:
Academia 14, pp. 721.
Monfasani, J. (2013). The Pre- and Post-History of Cardinal Bessarion's 1469 In Calumniatorem
Platonis. In: Inter graecos latinissimus, inter latinos graecissimus: Bessarion zwischen den
Kulturen. Ed. by C. Mrtl, C. Kaiser, and T. Ricklin. Berlin, pp. 347366.
Moore, P. (2005c). Iter Psellianum: a detailed listing of manuscript sources for all works attributed to
Michael Psellos, including a comprehensive bibliography. Toronto: Pontificial Institute of
Mediaeval Studies.
Mueller-Jourdan, P. (2005). Typologie spatio-temporelle de l'Ecclesia byzantine. Leiden.
Niarchos, C. G. (19831984). Nicholas of Methone's Criticism on Proclus Theory of participated or
unparticipated Intelligence (nous). In: 1314, pp. 324345.
Niarchos, C. G. (1985). The Concept of Participation according to Proclus, with reference to the
Criticism of Nicholas of Methone. In: Diotima 13, pp. 7894.
Nikolaou, T. (1982). Georgios Gemistos Plethon und Proclus. Plethon's Neoplatonismus am Beispiel
seiner Psychologie. In: Jahrbuch der sterreichischen Byzantinistik 32, pp. 387399.
O'Meara, D. J. (1989). Philosophie antique et byzantine: propos de deux nouvelles collections.
In: Freiburger Zeitschrift fr Philosophie und Theologie 36, pp. 471478.
O'Meara, D. J. (1992b). Plotinus. In: Catalogus Translationum et Commentariorum: Mediaeval and
Renaissance Latin Translations. Ed. by P. O. Kristeller, F. E. Cranz, and V. Brown. Vol. VII.
Washington (D. C.), pp. 5573.
O'Meara, D. J. (1998a). Aspects du travail philosophique de Michel Psellus (Philosophica Minora,
vol. II). In: Dissertatiunculae criticae: Festschrift fr Gnther Christian Hansen. Ed. by
C.-F. Collatz et al. Wrzburg, pp. 431439.
O'Meara, D. J. (2013). Psellos' Commentary on the Chaldean Oracles and Proclus' lost
Commentary. In: Platonismus und Esoterik in byzantinischem Mittelalter und italienischer
Renaissance. Ed. by H. Seng. Heidelberg, pp. 4558.
O'Meara, D. J. (2014a). Michael Psellos. In: Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the
Owen, E. C. E. (1931). and Cognate Words. In: The Journal of Theological Studies 32,
pp. 133153.
Page, G. (2008). Being Byzantine: Greek identity before the Ottomans. Cambridge.
Parry, K. (2006b). Reading Proclus Diadochus in Byzantium. In: Reading Plato in Antiquity. Ed. by
H. Tarrant and D. Baltzly. London, pp. 223235.
Pereira, M. J. (2011). Maximus the Confessor. In: Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Ed. by
H. Lagerlund. Dordrecht, p. 734.
Perl, E. D. (2007). Theophany: The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite. Albany.
Podolak, P. (2007). Giovanni di Scitopoli interprete del Corpus Dionysiacum. In: Augustinianum 47,
pp. 335381.
Podskalsky, G. (1976b). Nikolaos von Methone und die Proklosrenaissance in Byzanz (11. 12. Jh.)
In: Orientalia Christiana Periodica 42, pp. 509523.
Polemis, I., ed. (2006). Theodoros Metochites Poem 10. Introduction, Critical Edition, Translation and
Notes. Amsterdam.
Richter, G., ed. (1982). Johannes von Damaskos: Philosophische Kapitel. Stuttgart.
28 | S. Mariev
Rigo, A. (1997). Il Corpus pseudo-dionisiano negli scritti di Gregorio Palamas (e di Barlaam) del
13361341. In: Denys l'Aropagite et sa postrit en Orient et en Occident. Ed. by Y. de Andia.
Paris, pp. 519534.
Ritter, A. M. (1997). Gregor Palamas als Leser des Dionysius Ps.-Areopagita. In: Denys l'Aropagite
et sa postrit en Orient et en Occident. Ed. by Y. de Andia. Paris, pp. 565579.
Rorem, P. (1993). Pseudo-Dionysius: a Commentary on the Texts and an Introduction to Their
Influence. Oxford.
Rorem, P. and J. C. Lamoreaux (1998b). John of Scythopolis and the Dionysian Corpus: annotating the
Areopagite. New York and Oxford.
Runciman, S. (1970). Byzantium and the Renaissance. Tucson.
Saffrey, H. D. (1960). Aristote, Proclus, Bessarion: A propos de l'Un transcendental. In: Atti del XII
Congresso internazionale di filosofia. Firenze, pp. 153158.
Saffrey, H. D. (1982). New Objective Links between the Pseudo-Dionysius and Proclus. In:
Neoplatonism and Christian Thought. Ed. by D. J. O'Meara. Norfolk, pp. 6474.
Schamp, J. (1996). La localisation chez Photios. Traduction commente de Questions
Amphilochios 145. In: Aristotelica Secunda. Ed. by A. Motte and J. Denooz. Lige, pp. 265279.
Scholten, C., ed. (1997). Johannes Philoponos: De opificio mundi. Freiburg.
Schreiner, P. (1989). Renaissance in Byzanz? In: Kontinuitt und Transformation der Antike im
Mittelalter. Ed. by W. Erzgrber. Sigmaringen, pp. 389390.
evenko, I. (1962). tudes sur la polmique entre Thodore Mthochite et Nicphore Chumnos.
Bruxelles.
Sherwood, P. (1957). Denys l'Aropagite, IV: Influence du Pseudo-Denys en Orient. 4. Saint Maxime
le Confesseur. In: Dictionnaire de Spiritualit. Vol. 3, pp. 295299.
Sicherl, M. (1960). Michael Psellos und Iamblichos' De Mysteriis. In: Byzantinische Zeitschrift 53,
pp. 819.
Siniossoglou, N. (2011). Radical Platonism in Byzantium. Cambridge.
Sorabji, R. (2012). Preface: Waiting for Philoponus. In: Aeneas of Gaza: Theophrastus, tr. by J.
Dillon and D. Russell, with Zacharias of Mythilene: Ammonius, tr. by S. Gertz. London,
pp. VIIXXX.
Stavrou, M. (2007). Introduction gnrale. In: Nicphore Blemmyds, uvres thologiques. Vol. I.
Paris, pp. 13171.
Steel, C. (1982). Un admirateur la cour des Comnnes: Isaac le Sbastocrator. In: Maximus
Confessor. Actes du Symposium sur Maxime le Confesseur Fribourg, 25 septembre 1980. Ed. by
F. Heinzer and C. Schnborn. Fribourg, pp. 365373.
Steel, C. (2002a). Neoplatonic Sources in the Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics by
Eustratius and Michael of Ephesus. In: Bullettin de philosophie mdivale 44, pp. 5157.
Steel, C. and C. Mac (2006a). Georges Pachymre philologue: Le Commentaire de Proclus au
Parmnide dans le manuscrit Parisinus gr. 1810. In: Philosophie et sciences Byzance de 1204
1453. Ed. by M. Cacouros and M. H. Congourdeau. Leuven, pp. 7799.
Steel, C. and J. Opsomer (2003). Introduction. In: Proclus, On the Existence of Evils. London,
pp. 153.
Stephanou, P. . (1949a). Jean Italos philosophe et humaniste. Orientalia Christiana Analecta 134.
Rome.
Tambrun, B. (2006a). Plthon. Le retour de Platon. Paris.
Tatakis, B. (2003b). Byzantine philosophy. Translated by N. J. Moutafakis. Indianapolis.
Tempelis, E. (1999). , ,
. In: 1, pp. 5061.
Terezis, C. (1995). La critique de Nicolas de Mthone la thorie de Proclus concernant le schma:
Manence Procession Conversion. In: Byzantion 65, pp. 455466.
Terezis, C. (1997). Le libre arbitre chez Nicolas de Mthone. In: Byzantion 67, pp. 565569.
Trnen, M. (2007). Union and Distinction in the Thought of St Maximus the Confessor. Oxford.
Treadgold, W. T. (1980). The nature of the Bibliotheca of Photius. Washington (D. C.)
Treadgold, W. T., ed. (1984). Renaissances before the Renaissance: cultural revivals of late antiquity
and the Middle Ages. Stanford (California).
Trizio, M. (2009a). Neoplatonic Source-Material in Eustratios of Nicaea's Commentary on Book VI of
the Nicomachean Ethics. In: Medieval Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics. Ed. by
C. Barber and D. Jenkins. Leiden and Boston, pp. 71109.
Trizio, M. (2012). Ancient Physics in the Mid-Bizantine Period: The Epitome of Theodore of Smyrna,
Consul of The Philosohers under Alexios I Komnenos (10811118). In: Bulletin de philosophie
mdivale 54, pp. 7799.
Trizio, M. (2014a). Eleventh- to twelfth-century Byzantium. In: Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity
to the Renaissance. Ed. by S. Gersh. Cambridge, pp. 182215.
Trizio, M. (2014d). A Late Antique Debate on Matter-Evil Revisited in 11th-Century Byzantium: John
Italos and His Quaestio 92. In: Fate, providence and moral responsibility in ancient, medieval
and early modern thought: studies in honour of Carlos Steel. Ed. by P. D'Hoine and G. Van Riel.
Leuven, pp. 383394.
Van Deun, P. and P. Mueller-Jourdan (2015). Maxime Le Confesseur. In: La thologie byzantine et sa
tradition. Ed. by C. G. Conticello. Vol. I/1. Turnhout, pp. 387510, 430433.
Verrycken, K. (1990). The Development of Philoponus' Thought and its Chronology. In: Aristotle
Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and their Influence. Ed. by R. Sorabji. London,
pp. 233274.
Verrycken, K. (2010). John Philoponus. In: The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity.
Ed. by L. P. Gerson. Vol. II. Cambridge, pp. 733755.
Vlker, W. (1961). Der Einfluss des Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita auf Maximus Confessor. In: Texte
und Untersuchungen 77, pp. 331350.
Von Balthasar, H. U. (1988). Kosmische Liturgie: das Weltbild Maximus' des Bekenners. 3rd ed.
Einsiedeln.
Von Ivnka, E. (1964). Platon Christianus. bernahme und Umgestaltung des Platonismus durch die
Vter. Einsiedeln.
Watts, E. (2005). An Alexandrian Christian response to fifth-century Neoplatonic influence. In: The
Philosopher and Society in Late Antiquity. Ed. by A. Smith. Swansea, pp. 215229.
Westerink, L. G. (1959). Exzerpte aus Proklos' Enneadenkommentar bei Psellos. In: Byzantinische
Zeitschrift 52, pp. 110.
Westerink, L. G. (19861991). Le texte du trait des Premiers Principes. In: Damascius: Trait des
premiers principes. Ed. by L. G. Westerink. Vol. 1. 3 vols. tr. J. Combs. Paris.
Westerink, L. G. (1990). Das Rtsel des untergrndigen Neuplatonismus. In: Philophronma:
Festschrift fr Martin Sicherl zum 75. Geburtstag. Von Textkritik bis Humanismusforschung.
Ed. by D. Halfinger. Paderborn, pp. 105123.
Whittaker, J. (1991). Arethas and the Collection Philosophique. In: Paleografia e codicologia
greca. Ed. by D. Harlfinger and G. Prato. Vol. I. Alexandria, pp. 513521.
Wilson, N. G. (1996a). Scholars of Byzantium. London and Cambrigde.
Woodhouse, C. M. (1986b). George Gemistos Plethon: the last of the Hellenes. Oxford.
Sergei Mariev and Monica Marchetto
The Divine Body of the Heavens
The Debates about the Body of the Heavens during Late Antiquity
and their echoes in the works of Michael Psellos and John Italos
Introduction
As has already been stated by Paul Moraux, to establish who was the first to con-
ceive the theory of the fifth element is an arduous task. It appears that this doctrine
originated in the circles of the ancient Academy and that it sprung from a rather ob-
scure observation which is found in Platos Timaios. In Timaios 53 c 455 c 6, Plato
first reduces each element to its being a body (in the sense of a solid), the body to the
plane surfaces that form its facets, and those surfaces to elementary plane figures, i.e.
triangles, and these in turn to elementary triangles. He then demonstrates that four
regular polyhedra (which are each derived from a union of the elementary triangles)
correspond to the constitutive parts of the traditional four elements, while the fifth
kind of a solid, viz. the regular dodecahedron to which no fifth element corresponds
is used by God for the Universe in his decoration thereof. Going beyond Platonic
teachings, some of Platos disciples established a perfect correspondence between the
polyhedra and the elements.
1 Moraux 1963. On the history of the doctrine of the first body (up to John Philoponos), cf. also Jori
2009. On this doctrine in early Palaiologan Byzantium, cf. Bydn 2003.
2 Plato, Timaios, 55 c 56 (engl. tr. from R.G. Bury, London 1961, p. 135).
3 According to the genuine doctrine of the Timaios, there are only four elements (53c); the stars are
not made of a particular element, but rather for the most part of fire (Plato, Timaios, 40a); the aether is
merely a particular kind of air (Plato, Timaios, 58d). Nevertheless, schon in der Alten Akademie gab
es abweichende Ansichten. So berichtet Xenokrates, da Platon nicht vier, sondern fnf Elemente
angenommen habe. Ebenso scheinen Herakleides Pontikos und die Ps.Platonische Epinomis ein fn-
ftes Element zu kennen, vielleicht auch Speusipp (Drrie and Baltes 1998, 190211 and 558588, here
p. 558). Wilberding has pointed out that there are other passages in the Platonic corpus that could be
taken to corroborate this exegesis (Wilberding 2006, 13; for these passages see also Wilberding 2006,
1415).
DOI 10.1515/9781501503597-003
32 | S. Mariev and M. Marchetto
Aristotle formulated the doctrine of the fifth element explicitly and gave it a dis-
tinct form. The fifth element for him is actually the first body, which constitutes the
stars and the celestial spheres: the fifth element naturally moves in a circle, it is un-
generated and incorruptible, unchangeable and devoid of weight, different from other
elements and excellent to such a degree that the heaven which is constituted by such
body is divine and it seems that there is nothing superior that can move it. By intro-
ducing the fifth element, Aristotle not only establishes a clear and radical difference
between the sublunar and celestial regions, but also obtains an additional proof of the
fact that the universe is one and eternal.
Nevertheless, the theory of the fifth element becomes the subject of acute de-
bates soon thereafter. While Plotinos and Anatolios reject this doctrine implicitly,
4 There is some other body separate ( ) from those around us here, and of a
higher nature in proportion as it is removed from the sublunary world (Arist., De Caelo, I 2, 269 b 14
17; Engl. tr. from W.K.C. Guthrie, Aristotle: On the Heavens, Cambridge 1960, p. 17). On the structure
of section I 2, cf. Gigon 1952 and the discussion of Gigons thesis in Falcon 2001, 112114. Cf. also Jori
2009, 381385.
5 Cf. Drrie and Baltes 1998, 563f. Aristoteles hatte seinen ther nie so genannt, sondern allenfalls
vom ersten Element gesprochen [] Die Bezeichnung des thers als eines fnften Elements ist also
wahrscheinlich eine Kontamination des Platonischen Dodekaeders mit dem ther von Aristotelesist
also wahrscheinlich eine Kontamination des Platonischen Dodekaeders mit dem ther von Aristote-
les.
6 Arist. De caelo, I 9, 279 a 3334 (Engl. tr. from W.K.C. Guthrie, Aristotle: On the Heavens, Cambridge
1960, p. 93). Cf. Jori 2002, 25: Poich il corpo primo [] mostra caratteristiche proprie di un essere
divino, sembra legittimo pensare che il cielo, costituito precisamente di tale corpo, sia il dio supremo.
Jori points out, however, that Aristotle distinguishes elsewhere between the heavenly body and the
incorporeal mover (e.g. Arist., De caelo, II 6, 288 b 46) and also seems to make an allusion to the
divine beings which transcend the heaven (e.g. Arist. De caelo, I 9, 279 a 18 f.).
7 Wildberg 1988, 1415 pointed out: Systematically, Aristotles doctrine of the eternity and eternal
self-identity of the world relies to a large extent on his theory of aether []. Historically, however, it
would not be true to say that Aristotle deduced the notion of the eternity of the world from his con-
ception of aether. He himself regards the theory of aether merely as a confirmation of the belief in an
eternal universe. In his dialogue De philosophia he puts forward a number of independent arguments
for the eternity of the world.
8 The polemics against the theory of the fifth element began already in the Hellenistic period not
only among the Stoics but also in the Peripatetic school: Theophrastos pointed out the difficulties that
were inherent in the doctrine of the elements which had been formulated by his teacher (cf. Moraux
Quinta essentia, col. 1231); Strato, head of the Peripatetic school after Theophrastos, explicitly rejected
the doctrine of the fifth element (cf. Moraux 1963, 1232); the Peripatetic philosopher Xenarchos of Se-
leukeia composed a treatise Against the fifth substance in which he confuted the arguments that had
been brought forward by Aristotle in support of the idea of the first body (cf. Moraux 1963, 1237; Drrie
and Baltes 1998, 570). Xenarchos was in turn confuted point by point in Alexander of Aphrodisias
Commentary on De Caelo (cf. Resigno 2004, 7480). On Themistios as the first witness to Alexander of
Aphrodisias Commentary on De Caelo, cf. Resigno 2004, 8598; on the use which Simplikios makes of
Alexanders Commentary on De Caelo in his own Commentary on De Caelo, cf. Resigno 2004, 115133;
Porphyrios and Proklos do so explicitly. John Philoponos mounts a vigorous attack

on Proklos and Aristotle precisely on account of the fifth element; Simplikios in turn
vigorously criticizes Philoponos. As the writings of Michael Psellos and John Italos
demonstrate, these Late Antique debates found an echo towards the end of the Middle
Byzantine Period. The present contribution discusses the passages that Michael Psel-
los and John Italos devoted to the subject of the fifth element (which is understood as
the substance of the heavens). The objective, however, is not only to analyze these
passages, but also to delineate the theoretical background to the questions addressed
by Michael Psellos and John Italos and to show the peculiarity of their own contribu-
tions. For these reasons the investigation will comprise two parts: the first is dedicated
to the reconstruction of several crucial points of the debate over the fifth element dur-
ing Late Antiquity. The second part concerns the echoes of this debate in the works of
Michael Psellos and John Italos.
1.1 Plotinos
The Platonists had already made some attempts to develop a doctrine of the five ele-
ments and even to attribute this doctrine to Plato himself. However, the doctrine of the
five elements within Platonism remained a marginal issue, as Drrie and Baltes have
stressed, and presented various difficulties. Those Neoplatonic philosophers who
rejected the Aristotelian teachings on the fifth element always faced the challenge of
conceiving an alternative way to explain the difference between the sublunar and the
heavenly regions. Plotinos contribution to this question is especially significant.
In the Enn. II 1 (40) 1, Plotinos addresses the question concerning the element of
which the heaven is made. He begins by questioning the Platonic thesis (Tim. 41 a7
b6) according to which the incorruptibility of the universe depends on the will of god.
He proceeds in the following way: one could certainly argue that the universe, in spite
of the fact that it has a body, persists not only in its form but also in its individual
identity because it comprises any reality within itself, in such a way that there is
no other being into which it could be transformed. Even if this reasoning is applicable
to the universe, it is not applicable to some of its parts, which nevertheless cannot
be considered to be corruptible, namely the Sun and other heavenly bodies. If one
does not wish to negate the incorruptibility of the heavenly bodies, one has to explain
on the general attitude of Simplikios and the different intentions that lay behind the interpretations
of both commentators, cf. Guldentops 2005.
9 Cf. Drrie and Baltes 1998, 584.
10 The reconstruction of the history of the quinta essentia, understood as a body or a vehicle of the
soul, and the stance which Michael Psellos and John Italos adopted on this question lies outside the
scope of the present contribution. On this question, cf. infra, note 94.
11 Cf. Drrie and Baltes 1998, 569570.
why things in the sublunar world have only an everlasting duration of form, while the
heaven and its parts have a duration of particular individuals: why some things are
permanent in this way and others not, but have only permanence of form, and also
why the parts in heaven are permanent as well as the whole. Given that the nature
of body is in continual flux, what is difficult to understand, according to Plotinos,
is the reason why the heaven, even though it has a body, can preserve its individual
identity. In order to solve this difficulty Aristotle had introduced the idea of a body
of the heavens that is different from the sublunar elements, ungenerated, incorrupt-
ible and unchangeable; however, this assumption is not necessary for Plotinos, in the
same way as it is not necessary for him to oppose the Platonic doctrine according to
which the celestial gods consist for the most part of fire (Timaios 40a):
There would be no difficulty for Aristotle, if one accepted his assumption of the fifth body. But for
those who do not postulate this fifth element but hold that the body of the heaven is composed of
the same elements of which the living creatures down here are made, the question does arise how
there can be individual identity. And still more, how can the sun and the other things in heaven
be individually everlasting when they are parts?
For Plotinos it is the soul that maintains the unity of the universe, while the body of
the universe is in harmony with the purpose of the soul which governs it. In order to
explain the ontological difference which subsists between the celestial and sublunar
realities, Plotinos distinguishes between the cause of the celestial realities (i.e. the
cosmic Soul) and the cause of the inferior realities (i.e. the Soul which is derived from
the cosmic Soul as its image and therefore is equipped with a lesser potency). In
addition, he specifies that the heavenly body is more pure and better than the bodies
in the sublunar world:
If one takes into account the sovereign cause, the soul, along with bodies of the kind which exist
in heaven, pure and altogether better than those of earth (for in other living things too, nature
selects and places in their most important parts the bodies of better quality), one will have a solid
conviction about the immortality of the heaven.
In accordance with Timaios 40a one could maintain that the heaven is made of fire
for the most part, but Plotinos asks the question whether in heaven there is only fire
12 Plotinos, Enn. II.1.1, 3840 (Engl. trans. in A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus: Enneads, vol. II, London 1966,
p. 11).
13 Plotinos, Enn., II.1.2, 67 (Engl. tr., p. 13).
15 Cf. Plotinos, Enn., II.1.2, 2325 (Engl. tr., p. 15).
16 Cf. Plotinos, Enn., II.1. 5, 510 (Engl. tr., p. 21).
or whether there are other elements as well. Indeed, Plato maintains in the Timaios
that god, when he started to construct the body of the universe, made it out of fire and
earth, since nothing can be visible without fire and nothing can be tangible without
some solidity nor solid without earth (Timaios 31b 58), so that it might seem that
the fire that constitutes the heavenly bodies for the most part cannot be solid without
having earth within itself. According to Plotinos, however, to conceive the elements in
such a way that every single one of them contains all the others within itself is to deny
to every one of them its own and autonomous substance and existence. It follows
that if it is true that each element is necessarily in communion with all the others, it
is not true that
the element which gains something is composed of both, itself and that of which it has a share;
but, through the community of the universe, while remaining itself it takes, not the actual other
element but something which belongs to it, not air, for instance, but the yielding softness of air.
Quite the contrary: not only should one not think that the heavenly fire actually con-
tains earth in order to have solidity, but also one has to ask, according to Plotinos,
whether it is not on account of the soul that the fire itself becomes solid.
One thing is certain for Plotinos: first, he believes, just as Plato before him
(Timaios 58c5d1), that there are different kinds of fire; second, that the heav-
enly fire, which is different from the flame of the sublunar world because it is an
equable and placid fire, is not forced by the Soul to move in a circle, as one might
have thought on the assumption of Aristotle that its natural movement is rectilin-
18 As Falcon 2001, 135 points out, allinterno della tradizione platonica Tim. 31b32c stato ampia-
mente utilizzato per bloccare le conclusioni che Aristotele raggiunge nel De caelo a proposito della
natura dei corpi degli oggetti celesti. However, from Plotinos point of view, the principle which can
be derived from Timaios (32 a7b8), according to which every body is a combination of the four el-
ements, leads ultimately to absurd results. To think that there is earth in the heavenly world is not
to be aware of the difference of that world. And so, if seguendo la tradizione platonica precedente a
Plotino, essi [il Sole, la Luna, i rimanenti pianeti e il Cielo delle stelle fisse] saranno una combinazione
di terra, acqua, aria e fuoco in cui il fuoco predomina al punto da poter dire che la Luna, il Sole, i rima-
nenti pianeti e il Cielo delle stelle fisse sono fatti (per la maggior parte) di fuoco, then per Plotino,
quegli stessi oggetti [celesti] saranno invece fatti solo di fuoco, ma questo fuoco parteciper di alcune
propriet caratteristiche della terra, dellacqua e dellaria (Falcon 2001, 136).
19 Cf. Plotinos, Enn., II.1. 6, 23 f. (Engl. tr., p. 25).
22 Cf. Plotinos, Enn., II 1.6, 5354 (Engl. tr., p. 27).
23 When speaking of the Sun, Plotinos specifies that Plato calls it the brightest and also says it is
the clearest; so he prevents us from thinking that it is made of anything but fire, but by fire he does not
mean either of the other kinds of fire but the light which he says is other than flame, and only gently
warm (Plotinos, Enn., II.1.7, 2327; Engl. tr., pp. 2931). On the three kinds of fire in Plotinos and his
reception and transformation of Zenos doctrine of two kinds of fire, cf. Graeser 1972, 2224.
ear. Actually, the fire moves in a straight line only until it has not reached its proper
place; once fire has reached its proper place, it rests, or, to be more precise, since
it is natural to it to move, it only remains to it to be tractable and drawn by soul to
an excellent life in a way according with its nature, to move in the soul in a noble
place. Plotinos specifies that this activity of the Soul is not dragging, which would
be an activity against nature, because nature is just what has been ordained by the
universal soul. It follows consequently that in the heavens the soul moves the
body in a manner natural to it there.
1.2 Proklos and John Philoponos
Iamblichos embraces the Aristotelian doctrine of the fifth element and even goes
so far as to describe the ethereal body of the heaven not only as unmixed with any
of the material elements, exempt from all contrariety [], free from all variation,
completely purified from any capacity for changing into anything else, and utterly lib-
erated from any tendency towards the centre or away from the centre, but even as
so closely akin to the incorporeal essence of the gods that it is itself immaterial
body. In contrast, Proklos takes up and in part misunderstands the Plotinian
argument set out in Enn. II.2.1, 2023, in order to demonstrate that, contrary to Aris-
totle, the heaven can consist of fire, given that by nature fire moves not in a straight
line but in a circle. In his Commentary on Timaios, Proklos states:
Suppose Aristotle had heard what we have said and urged the following puzzle: how is it that if
there is fire in the heavens they are moved in a circle and not in a straight line? We would have
to respond to him by invoking Plotinus argument that every simple body, when it is in its proper

26 Plotinos, Enn., II.1.3, 1821 (Engl. tr., pp. 1517).
28 Wilberding 2006, 65.
29 On Iamblichos theory of the substance of heavens, cf. Nasemann 1991, 69104; cf. Drrie and
Baltes 1998, 584, note 30; Moraux 1963, 1241; Jori 2009, 251.
30 Iamblichos, De myst. V.4, ed. G. Parthey, Amsterdam 1965, p. 202, 45 (Engl. tr. by E.C. Clarke/J.M.
Dillon, Atlanta 2003, p. 229)
31 Iamblichos, De myst. V.4, p. 202, 1016 (Engl.tr. p.231).
32 Iamblichos, De myst. I.17, p. 51, 1012 (Engl. tr. p. 65).
33 Iamblichos, De myst. V.4, p. 202, 10 (Engl. tr. p. 231). Cf. Plotinos, Enn. II.5.3, 1819.
34 Wilberding has shown that when Proklos assigns to Plotinos the argument that the straight mo-
tions of the elements are unnaturally disposed (cf. Proklos, In Tim., ed. E. Diehl, Leipzig 190306, II.11,
27 ss.), he ends up offering an inaccurate account of Plotinus position. He [Plotinus] is much closer
to the first alternative sketched above fire has two natural motions only he complicates this view
by linking it to a psychosomatic account of fire. Thus, the straight upward motion of fire is natural to
fires body, and fires circular motion is natural to its soul (Wilberding 2006, 64).
place, either remains motionless or is moved in a circle, lest it depart from its proper place []
Overall, the movement of the elements in a straight line results from their being in a position that
is contrary to their natures. So it is simply a mistake to say that when fire moves in a straight line
it is moved in accordance with nature.
For Proklos, the fire moves in a straight line upwards in an attempt to leave behind
an alien place and a condition which is contrary to its nature; once it has reached a
proper place, the fire returns to a condition in accordance with its nature, and, out of
this reason, moves in a circle.
Proklos contrasts those Platonists who simply reject the Aristotelian doctrine of
the fifth element as un-Platonic with those who admit as Platonic the idea that the
heaven consists of a substance which is different from the sublunar elements, but who
are convinced that Plato considers only these last elements in his famous passage at
Timaios 32 b 48. Proklos then expounds the outlines of his theory of heaven: it is
constituted mostly of fire, which, although predominant, embraces in itself the qual-
ities of other elements in a fiery fashion. The fire in the heaven is not identical
with the fire in the sublunar world; the other elements which the heavenly fire em-
braces in itself are also of a different kind with respect to those of the sublunar world:
the whole heaven is composed predominantly of fire, but it includes, in a causal way ( ),
the powers of the other elements for instance, the solidity and stability of earth []. One should
consider that the fire there is not the same as the fire here below the moon, but rather up there is
divine fire which is an imitation of intellectual fire that has been woven together with life [] But
earth is up there in a causal way ( ), being another form of earth.
As is well known, according to Proklos no procession can take place without interme-
diaries and, therefore, without a well-ordered gradation; accordingly, if it is true that
there are definite gradations between, on the one hand, the most elevated elements
(which are immanent to the Demiurge and therefore are intellective potencies which
cannot be participated in) and, on the other hand, the inferior elements of the sublu-
35 Proklos, In Tim., II 11, 2432 and 12, 58 (Proclus, Commentary on Platos Timaeus, Vol. III, Book
3, Part 1: Proclus on the Worlds Body, transl. by D. Baltzly, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 5253). Cf. Arist. De
mundo IV.3, 310 b 16. Baltzly states that Proclus may have taken some inspiration from this passage of
Plotinus [Enn. II.2.1, 2333] []. But he develops a position that adapts the idea of essentially moving
fire to an Aristotelian framework of natural place (Baltzly 2002, 278).
36 Cf. Proklos, In Tim., II 12, 613 (engl. tr. by D. Baltzly, Cambridge, 2007, p. 53). Cf. Proklos, In Tim.,
III.115, 1017 (T. Taylor, Proclus commentary on the Timaeus of Plato, vol. II, p. 827).
37 Cf. Proklos, In Tim., II 42, 921 (engl. tr. by D. Baltzly, Cambridge, 2007, p. 90; cf. A. J. Festugire,
Proclus: Commentaire sur le Time, vol. III, pp. 7071).
38 The word indicates qualities here, cf. Drrie and Baltes 1998, 284.
39 Proklos, In Tim., II 49, 15 (engl. tr. by D. Baltzly, Cambridge, 2007, p. 99).
40 Proklos, In Tim., II 43, 2124, 2831 e 44, 2 (engl. tr. by D. Baltzly, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 9192,
translation slightly modified: is translated as in a causal way in accordance with Baltzly
2002, 273).
nar realm, then it is not possible to think that the elements are in the heaven in the
same way as they are in the Demiurge or in the sublunar world:
For there are as many middle terms between the Demiurge and the things in the sublunary realm
as there are ways in which it is necessary for us to consider the [grades of] elements, since the
procession goes to the elements [as we find them here] through these middle terms. Therefore the
elements are in the heavens, though not in the mode in which they are found in bodies which are
the works of genesis (). But neither are they in the heavens in the manner in which
they are in the Demiurge.
Proklos goes even further. Having demonstrated that the same elements are found
on different levels of being, but at each level in a different mode, he introduces the
distinction between the elements in a pure state and the same elements in a mixed
state and in composition with all the others. Given this distinction between the pure
and the commingled elements, and given that every single element which is found
within the sublunar world originates from a mixture of the same four pure elements,
and since the heaven is constituted not of the commingled elements of the sublunar
world, but of the same elements in their most elevated form, i.e. in a pure state, it is
legitimate, according to Proklos, to speak of the body of the heaven as a fifth element
in addition to the four elements of the sublunar world.
The five elements are said to be elements of the cosmos, surely on account of the fact that the
cosmos has been constituted from them, while the four elements count as the elements of each
of these [five]. For the heavens are composed out of the four and so is the realm of generation.
Therefore, the heavens are a fifth substance () besides these four elements, since it is a
combination from the simple elements. For in the heavens the elements are not the same [as
41 Proklos, In Tim., II 47, 49 (engl. tr. by D. Baltzly, Cambridge, 2007, p. 97).

42 The question can be considered in two ways. One alternative: as the translation of Baltzly 2007
seems to suggest, each sublunar element and, in addition, the heaven results from a combination of
the four pure (= simple) elements, while all these five elements (the four sublunar elements plus the
heaven taken as an element) constitute the elements of the universe (cf. also Baltzly 2002, 285, who
insists that for Proklos the elements which constitute the heaven are the same as those that constitute
the sublunar world but also significantly different from the sublunar elements). The other alternative:
the elements which are called commingled originate from the combination of the pure elements
(e.g., that which is called fire is actually a composite of all the elements with a prevalence of fire);
these commingled elements as such constitute the sublunar world and, taken in their most elevated
form, the celestial world. It appears that Festugire tends towards this latter interpretation and main-
tains that the heaven originates from the union of (the more elevated and subtle parts of) the sublunar
commingled elements when he states: Feu, air, eau, terre, seront donc dits sans doute lments
du monde entier, mais ils serons dits aussi [] lments (simples) de chacun des quatre lments
(mls) qui constituent et le ciel et la cration sublunaire (Festugire, Proclus: Commentaire sur le
Time, vol. III, p. 79, note 2).
43 In Festugire: Le Ciel donc est fait aussi de la cinquime substance en plus des quatre lments,
lesquels [pl. refers to lments] rsultent du mlange des lments simples (Festugire, Proclus: Com-
mentaire sur le Time, vol. III, p. 79).
they are here] but are rather the highest forms of them and the four elements of all things are
unmixed and are bounded in relation to one another by their appropriate forms.
In this way, Proklos not only succeeds in making sense out of the enigmatic passage
in which Plato speaks of the five worlds (Tim. 55d2, which obviously correspond to
the five solids that are mentioned in Tim. 55ac), but also indicates a possible way to
reconcile Platonic and Aristotelian theories. Proklos states in the Proem that Aristotles
theories are in many cases consistent with Platos, for instance when he examines the
body of heaven: for what is the difference between calling it a fifth element, or a fifth
cosmos, and a fifth shape, as Plato did?.
In the thirteenth argument of his treatise De aeternitate mundi, Proklos considers
again the fifth element and on this occasion he not only makes use of some Aristotelian
assumptions but even appears to sustain the thesis that the heaven is constituted of an
element which is different from the elements of the sublunar world. Taking as his point
of departure the passage Tim. 34a, where Plato states that the Demiurge imprints on
the universe the movement that is closest to the intellect, i.e. the uniform motion in a
circle on the same spot, Proklos claims that Plato, by attributing this movement to the
universe, must of necessity attribute it to the heaven, and draws the conclusion that if
the heaven has this movement by nature, it cannot have the movements in a straight
line which are typical of the sublunar elements and that therefore the heavenly body
must be something else besides these.
Determined to prove that the heaven is constituted by the same elements as the
sublunar world and equally generated and corruptible, Philoponos rejects Proklos
argument together with his conclusions. For the former student of Ammonios, it
seems as though Proklos is at variance not only with the Platonic doctrine but also
with himself. First of all, since Plato speaks explicitly of the circular movement as the
movement that imitates the intellect and since no body without life, without soul
and exclusively by the irrational and natural impulse of motion would be capable
of imitating the intellect,
44 Proklos, In Tim., II 49, 2229 (Engl. tr. by D. Baltzly, Cambridge, 2007, p. 99).
45 Proklos, In Tim., I 6, 327, 2 (H. Tarrant, Commentary on Platos Timaeus, Cambridge 2007, vol. I, p.
99). On this issue, cf. Drrie and Baltes 1998, 584585. Cf. also Siorvanes 1996, 207316.
46 Proklos, apud John Philoponos, Contra Proclum, XIII, ed. H. Rabe, Leipzig 1899 [reprint Hildesheim
1963], 478.6 (Engl. tr. in J. Wilberding, Against Proclus On the Eternity of the World, 1218, London
2006, p. 22).
47 On Ammonios interpretation of De caelo, cf. Resigno 2004, 100106. Moraux has pointed out that
diese unmittelbar an Xenarchos anknpfende Polemik fehlt noch in den lteren Kommentaren des
Philoponos. Der Kommentar zur Physik (aus d.J. 517 n. Chr.) weist in dieser Hinsicht noch keine Abwe-
ichung von der damaligen peripatetischen Orthodoxie auf. Der erste deutliche Angriff auf die Lehre
vom fnften Element als Substanz des Himmels und der Gestirne erscheint in der Schrift De aet. mundi
c. Procl. (aus dem J. 529) (Moraux 1963, 1243).
48 John Philoponos, Contra Proclum, XIII, 486.2223 (Engl. tr. by Wilberding, London, 2006, p. 26).
it is clear to everyone that Plato says that the circular motion is proper and naturally belongs to
the heaven, not insofar as the heaven, conceived separately from the soul set over it, is per se a
body, but insofar as it is a living thing and the motion comes to be in it by the agency of soul.
Secondly, even if the heaven is moved in a circle simply owing to its inborn inclination,
Philoponos asks, is it not Proklos himself who stated in the tenth argument of the De
aeternitate mundi, but also in the Commentary on Timaios that each of the cosmic
elements in its proper place either rests or moves in circle? Therefore, either the
circular motion has come to the heaven by the agency of the soul which induces the
simple bodies that constitute the heaven to move with a motion which is different with
respect to the one they would have had according to their own nature or alternatively
the heaven moves in circle by the agency of nature, even if it is made of bodies that
go straight, because each of these bodies, once it has reached a proper place, stops
moving in a straight line and either rests or moves in a circle.
John Philoponos insists on pointing out that the same Proklos in his other works,
and especially in his lost treatise An Examination of Aristotles criticism of Platos
Timaeus , states that the nature () of heaven is not different or alien ( )
from that of the elements of the sublunar world:
If, then, the nature of heaven is not alien to the sublunar elements, as even Proclus thinks, if
rather the pinnacle of the sublunar elements is in them [viz. the celestial bodies] (since the celes-
tial bodies are by nature fiery but also have the pinnacles of the other elements), if the exegete of
Plato will declare that he agrees with Platos doctrine on these points, how can he in the treatise
now before us, as if having forgotten his own statements, give off contradictory statements by
saying that heaven transcends the elements that move in a straight line[]?
In particular, Philoponos criticizes all the interpretations of Plato which try to force
the Platonic text along lines which would make it agree with Aristotle and attempt to
extract from the Timaios especially from the Platonic hint at the fifth solid (Tim.
55c45) or at the fifth cosmos (Tim. 55d1) allusions to the fifth element of which the
heavens are supposedly made.
For John Philoponos, Plato manifestly states that God uses the fifth polyhedron for
the whole cosmos and not for the creation of the heavenly body; when addressing
the question whether the world is one or there are infinite worlds, Plato, according
51 Before drafting the Commentary on the Timaios Proklos had written a polemic treatise against Aris-
totle in order to defend the Timaios against the Aristotelian objections. As stated by Steel, the treatise
is lost but can be reconstructed on the basis of Philoponos testimony, who quotes this treatise thirteen
times in Contra Proclum (Steel 2005, 172).
53 Cf. John Philoponos, Contra Proclum, XIII, 532. 1523 (Engl. tr. by Wilberding, London, 2006, p. 51).
to John Philoponos, simply limits himself to pointing out that the question is badly
stated and that it would be stated correctly only if one asked if there is one or five
worlds, since there are five kinds of geometrical solids that are derived from the union
of the elementary triangles; for the rest, he denies the possibility of the five worlds,
stating that there is only one.
1.3 John Philoponos and Simplikios
John Philoponos also wrote another polemical treatise, the De aeternitate mundi con-
tra Aristotelem, which is attested in the quotations Simplikios makes from it in his
Commentary on De Caelo in which he criticizes the Aristotelian theory of the aether
expressed in De caelo and, at the same time, presents his own cosmology. In the con-
text of his discussion of the Aristotelian theory of heaven in Contra Aristotelem, John
Philoponos formulates his own theory of the two natural motions of fire. As is well
known, in De caelo Aristotle denies that the fire can move in a circle according to
nature or contrary to nature; however, in the first book of Meteorology, he maintains
that the sphere of fire is moved in a circle because it is carried round by the motion of
heaven. This contradiction has led commentators to reflect on the possibility of the
circular motion of fire. In Contra Aristotelem, Philoponos for his part maintains that if
it is true that parts of fire move naturally upwards, it is equally true that the totality
of fire moves naturally in a circle; by eliminating in this way any difference between
the movement of the heavenly body and that of the sphere of fire, he successfully sug-
gests the idea that the heaven itself can consist of fire and, to be more precise, of
56 As explained by Wildberg, in De caelo IV Aristotle summarizes his theory of natural motion and
place of elementary bodies. According to him the sublunary universe is stratified in concentric layers
of the elementary masses: the spheres of earth, water, air and fire. The loci of these spheres are the
natural places of the elementary bodies constituting the spheres, and the displaced elemental parts,
if unobstructed, move to the appropriate loci by virtue of a natural principle [] In the Meteorology,
which presupposes this theory, the stratum of fire is said to consist not of what we are accustomed
to call fire but rather of the hot and dry exhalations () from the earth [] The firesphere
is bounded by the celestial region; in order to explain various meteorological phenomena Aristotle
supposes that the sphere is carried round in a circle by the agency of the heavens (Wildberg 1988,
125126).
57 Cf. Aristot., Meteorologica, 1.3, 340 b32341 a3; 1.4, 341 b2224 (Engl. tr. by H. D. P. Lee, Aristotle:
Meteorologica, London 1952, p. 21 and p. 31).
58 Cf. Wildberg 1988, 127 and 132.
59 Cf. John Philoponos, Contra Aristotelem, fr. I/12: apud Simplikios, In de Caelo, ed. J.L. Heiberg,
Berlin 1894, 35, 1220, Engl. transl. by C. Wildberg, Philoponus: Against Aristotle, on the eternity of the
world, Ithaca/New York 1987, p. 48.
fire that does not differ from that of the sublunar world. It is true that Philoponos
admits that there are different kinds of fire and even makes use of the Aristotelian
passage that states that in the immediate proximity to the earth and water there are
air and what we are accustomed to call fire, though it is not really fire; for fire ()
is an excess of heat ( ) and a sort of boiling. Philoponos uses this
passage in order to claim that also for Aristotle there are different kinds of fire:
But neither, he says, the fire of the firesphere nor the celestial fire are capable of burning
(), but what is capable of burning is the fire in our region, which is excess of fire
( ), according to Aristotle.
However, even if the burning flame is not the natural fire, the difference is only one of
gradation: in reality these two are one and the same element and so it can be stated
that the celestial and the sublunar realities are made of one and the same element.
Philoponos actually specifies by making a reference to Plato that the heaven
consists of fire for the most part, but that it does not solely consist of fire, given that
all the fine and purest substance of all elements [] has been chosen for the compo-
sition of the celestial bodies, while the more material and so to speak sludgy portion
of these elements exists here below; however, it still remains true for John Philo-
ponos that even if in heaven there are the finest and most pure parts of the sublunary
elements, the celestial bodies have the same qualities as the sublunar bodies. As Sim-
plikios stated, not without some animosity,
60 As Wildberg points out, Plotinus, who rejected Aristotles notion of aether, nevertheless main-
tained that the universe is eternal. And in the course of his argument Plotinus postulates two kinds
of fire []. When Philoponus on the other hand claims that fire possesses two natural movements, he
no doubt wants to imply that the sublunary fire is identical in nature to the fire which resides in and
constitutes the celestial region. For only on the assumption of one kind of fire will it follow that the
heavens are perishable too (Wildberg 1988, 134).
61 Arist. Meteorologica, I. 3, 340 b 2123 (Engl. tr. by H. D. P. Lee, London, 1952, pp. 1921). In Contra
Proclum, Philoponos makes a similar remark in reference to Aristotle, you yourself say that flame
() is not the natural fire but an excess of fire ( ), just as snow is an excess of cold.
For the natural fire is rather vital and not caustic [] And you say that the hupekkauma is also of this
sort [i.e. not flame]. Accordingly, the celestial fire is also rather of this vital sort (Contra Proclum XIII,
518.411, Engl. tr. by Wilberding, London 2006, p. 43; cf. also Arist., De generatione animalium, 736 b
29737 a 7, transl. in A. L. Peck, Aristotle: Generation of Animals, Cambridge, 1963, pp. 171173). In both
contexts Philoponos collocates his explanations within a discussion of a passage from Meteorologica
in which Aristotle denies that the celestial bodies can be made of fire, because in this case each of
the other elements would long ago have disappeared (Arist., Meteorologica I.3, 340 a 23, Engl. tr. by
H. D. P. Lee, London, 1952, p. 15).
62 John Philoponos, Contra Aristotelem, fr. III/52: apud Simplikios, In De Caelo 81, 79 (Engl. tr. by C.
Wildberg, Ithaca/New York, 1987, p. 70). John Philoponos definition of flame is not Aristotelian (cf.
Wildberg 1988, 167 and Arist., Meteor. I.4, 341 b 2223).
63 John Philoponos, Contra Aristotelem, fr. III/56: apud Simplikios, In De Caelo 84, 1821 (Engl. tr. by
C. Wildberg, Ithaca/New York, 1987, p. 73).
But further, as the Grammarian does not scruple to blaspheme heaven outright insanely rather
and evidently blaspheme God who had given and gives substance [] to the heavens, he openly
proclaims that the things in heaven do not possess any other nature than the elements in this
world. For there is, he says, perhaps no quality observed in the things there that does not also
belong to the terrestrial bodies.
Simplikios is convinced that the Platonism of John Philoponos is only apparent and
that he is guided in his interpretation by vainglory more than by love of knowledge,
which induces him to find a disaccord between Plato and Aristotle, and so he con-
siders Philoponos theses with disdain, but nevertheless closely and thoroughly ex-
amines them. Simplikios believes that John Philoponos has an anthropomorphic rep-
resentation of God and that, precisely on account of his erroneous conception of God,
he ends up with the cosmological error which holds that the heavens possess the same
nature as the sublunar realities and hence are generated and destructible, for how
would someone who thinks that God is of the same nature as he himself hesitate to
disrespect the most beautiful and noblest of Gods creations?
Eager to give Philoponos a lesson in Platonic exegesis, Simplikios points out that
the fire mentioned by Plato, and of which the heaven is for the most part supposedly
made, is not the sublunar fire, but a celestial fire which is pure light:
Now this man [sc. the Grammarian] seems to follow Plato who says that the heavens consist of
fire, not knowing what Plato means by fire, and that it is not the same as what Aristotle says
moves upwards [] but this kind of fire, the celestial, Plato wants to be pure light (phs), [for he]
defines light too as one form of fire.
Therefore, when Plato says that the heaven is made of fire for the most part (Tim. 40a2
3), and since he distinguishes between three kinds of fire (Tim. 58c5d1), it is the
view of Simplikios that Plato intends to say that the heaven for the most part is made
64 John Philoponos, Contra Aristotelem, fr. III/59: apud Simplikios, In De Caelo 88, 2832 (Engl. tr. by
C. Wildberg, Ithaca/New York, 1987, p. 74).
65 As Hoffmann pointed out, Simplikios believes that the lover of knowledge, i.e. the reader and
the interpreter who is genuinely a philosopher, seeks the deeper meaning in Platos writings, i.e. the
meaning which in the end is in accord with Aristotelian philosophy, whereas Philoponos, who is not
genuinely a philosopher, points out all those aspects of the philosophy of Plato which apparently
contradict Aristotle and in doing so he misunderstands the true meaning of the Platonic doctrine (cf.
Hoffmann 1987a, 62). Simplikios quotes the Contra Proclum by Philoponos only two times, saying that
he has not read it (Simplikios, In de Caelo, 135.2731136.17), while he criticizes the Contra Aristotelem
not only in the In De Caelo, but also in the In Phys.
66 Simplikios, In De Caelo 90, 2022 (in John Philoponos, Contra Aristotelem, fr. III/60, Engl. tr. by C.
Wildberg, Ithaca/New York, 1987, p. 75).
67 Simplikios, In De Caelo 66, 33 67,16 (in John Philoponos, Contra Aristotelem, fr. II/40: engl. tr. by
C. Wildberg, Ithaca/New York, 1987, pp. 5960). Cf. Plato, Timaios, 58 c5d1.
68 Simplikios infers from the Platonic text a hierarchical order of the different kinds of fire, which for
him are the following: , cf. Simplikios, In de caelo, 85.8; cf. Arist. Top. 5,5
of the purest part of fire, i.e. of light. To be more precise, just as every single sublunar
element is actually constituted by the four simple elements, but receives its essence,
its proper character and its name from the predominant simple element, in the same
way the heaven, which is composed of the purest and the most elevated parts of the
four elements, also receives its essence mainly from the which is predomi-
nant, i.e. from light (the purest part of fire):
Just as each of the elements which are called sublunar is composed of the four simple elements in
the true sense of the word, but are invested with substance, characterized and called according
to the predominant one, similarly the heaven, too, consists of the summits of the four elements
and is invested with substance according to the best of the summits and is rendered most lumi-
nous and wholly bright and accordingly is called Olympos.
For Simplikios it is important to underline that when Aristotle criticized the idea that
the heaven is made of fire by asserting its ethereal nature, he did not want to criticize
Plato, but instead reacted, ante litteram, to the impiety of the Christians, and wanted
to suggest against any attempt at assimilating the heavenly to the sublunar fire and,
consequently, the heaven itself to the sublunar world the heterogeneousness and
transcendence of the heaven with respect to the sublunar world:
Why does Aristotle seem to adopt a position contrary to Plato when he does not concede that the
substance of the body of the heaven be neither composite nor simple, as fire or any other of the
so-called elements? Could it be that he foresaw the immense madness of these impious manikins
with regard to the heavens and was it for this reason that he desired to conceive [the heaven] as
completely transcendent with respect to the sublunar world and as possessing divine superiority
in comparison to it and refrained from using the words that could attempt to drag it down to a
similarity [i.e. with the sublunar world]?
[134 b2830]. This order allows him to consider light as the of fire and to describe the heaven
as essentially luminous (cf. Hoffmann 1987b, 215216; cf. also Hoffmann 1987a).
69 Simplikios, In De Caelo, 85.915. Cf. Fr. tr. by P. Hoffmann, Sur quelques aspects de la polmique
de Simplicius contre Jean Philopon, p. 216: De mme en effet que chacun de ceux que lon appelle
lments sublunaires est compose des quatre lments simples qui sont vritablement, mais reoit
son essence, son caractre propre et sa dnomination de la prdominance dun seul de ces lments,
de mme aussi le Ciel, qui est constitu des cimes ( ) des quatre lments, est ralis
en son essence () daprs celle de cimes qui domine ( ): dans son
complet achvement, il est trs lumineux et tout brillant et cest pourquoi on lhonore aussi du nome
dOlympe.
70 Simplicius, In De Caelo, 85.3186.7. Cf. Fr. tr. by P. Hoffmann, Sur quelques aspects de la polmique
de Simplicius contre Jean Philopon, p. 220: Comment Aristote peut-il sembler prendre une position
contraire celle de Platon en ce qui concerne lessence du corps cleste, en nadmettant ni quil est
compos ni quil est simple, comme le feu ou nimporte quel autre de ceux que nous nommons le quatre
lments? Sans doute avait-il prvu le fol emportement, dignes de celui des gants, de ces homoncules
impies lancs lassaut des ralits clestes; et comme pour cette raison il voulait que le Ciel fut conu
comme transcendant absolument le monde sublunaire [] il sest abstenu aussi dutiliser des mots
However, if Aristotle does not disagree with Plato, so, in Simplikios view, Plato
does not disagree with Aristotle either, especially given that, when introducing in the
Timaios a fifth geometrical solid, he accords to the heaven its own proper nature:
Plato also seems to assign another substance to the heavens: for if he thinks that the five bodies
are form-producing, and if he says that the totality was delineated, in respect of its being a deter-
minate heaven, by the dodecahedron, which is something distinct from the pyramid, octahedron,
icosahedron, and cube, it is clear that according to him it is distinct in respect of substance as
well [] And so the dodecahedron was according to him the shape of a single body, namely that
of the heaven, which he called ether.
1.4 Patristic Literature
As Richard has pointed out, from a Christian point of view the fundamental differ-
ence is not between the sensible and the intelligible substance, but rather between
God and his creatures. In this new context, in which emphasis is placed on the idea
of creation, on the centrality of man but also on resurrection, the concept of the fifth
element does not simply fall into oblivion. Allusions to the doctrine of the fifth ele-
ment are found in connection with attempts to define the special corporeality of the
angelic intelligences and of the bodies of resurrected. Some hints at the doctrine of
the fifth element in its specific cosmological meaning are found in hexaemeral litera-
qui entreprendraient dattirer le Ciel vers le bas, cest--dire vers une ressemblance [avec les lments
sublunaires].
71 Cf. Simpl. In Phys., ed. H. Diels, Berlin 1895, 1165, 2133 (On Aristotles Physics 8.15, trasl. by
I. Bodnr/M. Chase/M. Share, London 2012, p. 63): But not even when Aristotle introduces the fifth
substance does he differ in concept from the other, and especially from Plato. For if the reason why
Plato would say that the heavens also consist of fire, earth, and what is between, is that it is visible
and tangible, and nothing is visible without fire, or tangible without earth, we must ask Aristotle, too,
if he too would not concede both points: both that the heavens are visible and tangible, and that these
[features] belong primarily to fire and earth. Why, then, does he call it a fifth substance? The answer
is that it is because Plato says that the substance of the heavens is different from the four elements
beneath the moon, since he attributed the dodecahedral figure to the heavens, while he adorned each
of the four [other elements] with a different figure (
, ). Thus, he too says there is
a fifth substance, that of the heavens ( ); for it is
other than the four sublunar elements, since the dodecahedron is the fifth figure, and the figures are
substantial ( ,
, ).
72 Simplicius, In De Caelo, 12.1627 (On Aristotles On the Heavens 1.14, trasl. by R.J. Hankinson,
Ithaca/New York 2002, p. 31).
73 Richard 2003, 119 and 218.
74 Driven by the necessity to formulate an adequate concept of angelic creatures which are immate-
rial but differ from the perfect immateriality of God some Church Fathers introduce a reference to a
subtle corporeality which exhibits many characteristics traditionally associated with the fifth element
ture as well, and in particular in connection with the treatment of the substance of the
heaven (Gen. 1,1) and of the firmament (Gen. 1, 6/8). Basil, for example, first identi-
fies the as a fine nature which is neither solid, nor thick (
). He then proceeds to a consideration of opinions expressed
by cosmologists on the issue of the substance of heaven: in this way he reports the
Platonic arguments in favor of the thesis that it is composed of the four elements. He
then sets out Aristotelian arguments in favor of the existence of the ethereal body (
). Finally, he makes a reference to the fact that this last theory has
also been challenged, while at the same time limiting himself to pointing out the pos-
sibility of an ascent from the beautiful creatures to that which is above all beauty.
(cf. Ppin 1964, 317). The case of Origen is significant in this regard: he attributes to the angels and to
the resurrected a body of luminous light ( ), which is also called ethereal ()
(cf. Origen, Comm. in evangelium Matthaei, XVII, 30.4859 Klostermann). Crouzel makes the following
comment: Les corps des ressuscits sont donc qualifis dtincelants, mai aussi dthrs: Origne
adopte ainsi, non sans la modifier, une doctrine cosmologique utilise sous forme diverse par Platon
et par Aristote (Crouzel 1990a). On the complex relationship between, on the one hand, the Platonic
doctrine of the vehicle of the soul and, on the other hand, the Pauline teaching of the spiritual body
and Origens doctrine of the radiant body, cf. E. R. Dodds 1963b and Crouzel 1990b. However, Origen
rejects the doctrine of the fifth element not only because this doctrine is not confirmed by the Scrip-
tures, but also because the introduction of the idea of a body that is completely different from the
animal body would lead to a distortion of the logical connection of the facts particularly as the holy
apostle clearly lays it down that no new bodies are to be given to those who rise from the dead but that
they are to receive the same ones which they possessed during life, only transformed from a worse to
a better condition (Origen, De principiis, III.6,6 Koetschau; Engl. tr. in Origen On First Principles, ed.
by G.W. Butterworth, New York 1966, p. 252). This means that the position of Origen is marked by a
high degree of ambiguity: on the one hand he rejects the doctrine of the fifth element, while on the
other hand his rejection only concerns the interpretation of the fifth element as another body beside
the terrestrial. Origen actually accepts the aether in the meaning of the quality which the terrestrial
body assumes at the moment of resurrection (cf. Crouzel 1990a, 193).
75 On the different interpretations of Gen.1.1 in hexaemeral literature, Van Winden 1997.
76 Basil, In Hex., I.8 (14,22 Amand De Mendieta/Rudberg). As is well known, Basil used to distinguish
the heaven () from the firmament (), attributing to the former a fine nature ()
(cf. Basil, In Hex., I.8 = 14, 2223 Amand De Mendieta/Rudberg) and to the latter a firm nature ()
(cf. Basil, In Hex., III.4 = 44, 15 Amand De Mendieta/Rudberg). However, Basil had explicitly left open
the question of the composition of the firmament, just as he declared that the nature of the first heaven
cannot be specified: Basil lt ausdrcklich die Beschaffenheit und Elementenzusammensetzung
des Firmaments offen, so wie er auch schon die Natur des ersten Himmels fr nicht angebbar erklrt
(C. Scholten, Antike Naturphilosophie und Christlische Kosmologie, Berlin/New York 1996, p. 274).
77 Basil, In Hex., I.11 (18,19 Amand De Mendieta/Rudberg).
78 John Philoponos takes up his polemics against the Aristotelian theory of the fifth element in his
treatise De opificio mundi, but he also moves beyond this point by modifying his previous position
on the substance of heaven in the light of the biblical text. In III.5 he asserts that the firmament
() does not consist of fire for the most part, but of water and air (cf. John Philoponos, De opif.
mundi III.5; 118119 Reichardt; Germ. tr. in Johannes Philoponos, De opificio mundi, ed. C. Scholten, I,
Freiburg i.B. 1997, pp. 289291).
Gregory of Nyssa also seems to be making a reference to the Aristotelian doctrine of

the fifth element in his Commentary on Hexaemeron when he rules out the possibility
that the firmament is made of the four elements or of some other body besides these
four, even if this reference must be considered problematic.
The reference to the fifth element in Gregory of Nazianzos is also problematic. He
hints at it in his poem On Providence, where he states that the stars pursue their own
path [] whether their nature is the self-nourishing one of fire or whether there is what
is called a fifth body ( , ,
). However, on closer examination this passage leaves open the question
of the substance of the stars. Elsewhere Gregory describes this substance simply as
fiery.
In Oration 28 Gregory considers the ethereal body in close relation to the circular
movement of the heavens and denies that God can be conceived as a fifth body.
In this important oration, which will later attract the attention of Michael Psellos,
Gregory engages himself in a dispute against Neoarianism and tries to explain that the
human intellect is not able to fathom God. Also the alpha-privatives are not capable
of fathoming the nature of God. If one insists on using deductive argumentation in
order to conceive God, the conclusions reached are absurd. God cannot be a body,
because in this case he could not be unlimited, invisible and impalpable, nor would he
escape being composite and dissoluble. Perhaps so Gregory He could be identified
with a fifth body which is endowed with such features that render it quasi immaterial,
but this stratagem would be of little use. The question would remain: will He be
79 Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, In Hex., PG 44, 80.4654: ,

, , ,
, ,
, ,
. F.X. Risch has made the following suggestion regarding the ex-
pression : es mag also sein, dass auch Gregor an des Aristoteles Himmelse-
lement [] denkt []. Es ist aber auch mglich, dass Gregor wieder seinen Bruder Basilius folgt, der
in demselben Zusammenhang [...] abweist, der Himmel bestnde aus Eis; die Nichtzugehrigkeit
zur wahrnehmbaren Welt begrndet er damit, dass die Feste als weder aus den vier Elementen
noch aus einem fnften Element gebildet ist(Risch 1999, 178, 180). For Gregory of Nyssa, who departs
from the opinion of Basil in this regard, the coincides with the first heaven and marks the
boundary between the intelligible and the sensible worlds (cf. Scholten 1996, 276278).
80 Gregory of Nazianzos, Poemata Arcana, ed. by C. Moreschini, trasl. by D.A. Sykes, Oxford 1997, pp.
2627.
81 Richard 2003, 208.
82 Cf. Richard 2003, 209211, 216217.
83 Cf. the explanation by F. W. Norris, Arius evidently considered the ultimate nature of God to be
ineffable to the Son and thus to all creatures, but Epiphanius cited by Aetius and Socrates quoted
Eunomius as claiming that any Christians could know Gods being as well as God himself knew it
(Norris 1991, 54). While the followers of Eunomios did not in fact sustain the view reported by Socrates,
nevertheless , which they knew and could describe (Norris 1991, 106, 131, 112).
one of the things that are moved and carried along? Furthermore, how is it possible
Gregory asks polemically that something which has created beings is moved in
the same way in which the beings created by it are moved, and, if it is moved, what is
that which moves it? Gregory contemplates here the last possibility, namely that God
is a body which is devoid of materiality to an even higher degree, something other
than the fifth element, an angelic body, which leads him to formulate questions that
are even more difficult: What grounds have they for asserting angels have bodies?
[] How far will God transcend angels who are his ministers?. For Gregory, who is
perplexed at the attribution of a body to the angels, attributing to God a supra-angelic
body can only be an abyss of non-sense.
84 The French translator specifies that the question means here en allant vers, avec une ide de
recherche, cest--dire: o Dieu trouvera-t-il sa place? (Grgoire de Nazianze, Discours 2731, in-
troduction, texte critique, traduction, par P. Gallay, p. 116). And thus he translates: vers qui sera-t-il
parmi les tres mobiles et emports par le mouvement (Grgoire de Nazianze, Discours 2731, intro-
duction, texte critique, traduction, par P. Gallay, p. 117). Anne Richard provides the following explana-
tion: dpouill des attributs les plus grossiers de la materialit, il se rattacherait nanmoins au monde
physique par son caractre spatial, impliqu comme les astres dans le movement de translation:
, Auquel des corps mus par translation saccordera-t-il?
(Richard 2003, 105).
85 , , , ,
, , ,
.
, , ,
, ; ; ;
; ; (Gregory of Nazianz, Or. 28, 8; 116 Gallay; Engl.
tr. by Wickham/Williams in Norris, Faith gives Fullness to Reasoning, p. 228).
86 Gregory of Nazianz, Or. 28, 8 (116 Gallay; Engl. tr. by Wickham/Williams in Norris, Faith gives
Fullness to Reasoning, p. 228). In this passage, Gregory clearly distinguishes the ethereal body from
the angelic body and expresses doubts about attributing corporeality to the angels. In Or. 38, he asserts
that the angels are at the service of God and should be considered either as intellectual spirits (
) or as so to speak immaterial and incorporeal fire ( ) or as
some other nature (Gregory of Nazianzos, Or. 38, 9.89; 120 Moreschini), which seems to imply a
clear reference to the fifth element (cf. Ppin 1964, 316). It is equally true, however, that in Or. 28 he
proposes to understand the words wind () and fire () in reference to the angels as if
they had the sense of being what is ideal and purifies since I am aware that these same epithets
are applied to the primal being of God as well (Gregory of Nazianzos, Or. 28,31.1114; 170172 Gallay),
and God is surely devoid of any corporeality (cf. Richard 2003, 151).
87 Cf. Gregory of Nazianz, Or. 28, 8 (116 Gallay; engl. tr. by Wickham/Williams in Norris, Faith gives
Fullness to Reasoning, p. 228). Once Gregory has shown that God can be neither a body nor an im-
material body (), it becomes important for him to emphasize that even if one stated that God
was incorporeal, one would not arrive at an understanding of his essence. Even if every
strives to grasp God, it is incapable of doing so. The only remaining alternative is to try to comprehend
God by taking Beauty and the order of the visible universe as a point of departure. Gregory points out,
however, the risk involved in such an attempt: to come to a standstill partway along the way, by con-
2.1 Michael Psellos
As has been pointed out by Maltese, Michael Psellos is not so much interested in adopt-
ing a systematic approach to philosophy but prefers to dedicate his attention to sin-
gular issues or specific aspects of a question. Depending on his audience, the cir-
cumstances or his intentions, which vary according to the occasion, he modulates his
theses even on the same subject. He follows the ideal of polymatheia even when he
teaches, cultivates very disparate interests, but in general seems to be guided by the
profound desire to integrate Hellenic heritage and Christian Orthodoxy.
The present state of research on Michael Psellos and the nature of the corpus of
his texts the fact that many parts of it have been edited only recently, the peculiar-
ity of his approach to philosophy, which oscillates between compiling extant sources
and introducing innovations, his enthusiasm for ancient philosophical doctrines and
respect for Christian orthodoxy all these aspects make it necessary to abandon a
systematic approach to his doctrine and instead to face the challenging task of indi-
viduating some lines of research, without any pretence to exhaustiveness.
1) In Opusc. 13, , there are some references to the
fifth element of heaven. As OMeara has pointed out in the apparatus fontium, in
Opusc. 13 Psellos relies on the Commentary on De anima by John Philoponos. This
Opusculum has recently been studied by Delli, who in her article dedicated to the
pneumatic body has compared an excerpt found in Opusc. 13 (which mentions dif-
ferent vehicles of the soul) with the corresponding passage in John Philoponus.
However, Opusc. 13 contains not only references to the doctrine of the souls vehi-
sidering some creatures to be God, for instance the stars or the heavens, which surely have something
divine but are not God.
88 Maltese 1994a, 297 and 303.
89 Cf. Kaldellis 2007, 191.
90 On Psellos cf. e.g. Kaldellis 2007; Benakis 2008; F. Lauritzen 2010a; Kaldellis 2012; Meeusen 2012;
Papaioannou 2013a. For Kaldellis, who clearly states that Psellos aims not only at integrating pagan-
ism and Christian orthodoxy, but actually at subverting the orthodoxy, a full reckoning may one day
prove that Psellos was lying to his students when he denied that my goal is for you to exchange our
doctrines for Hellenic beliefs I would be mad to do that (Kaldellis 2007, 202). Siniossoglou has re-
cently proposed the thesis that Psellos adopted the strategy of dissimulation in order to preserve the
Hellenic heritage and even to convey the message of the superiority of pagan philosophical tradition
in spite of the restrictions imposed by the dominant ideology (Siniossoglou 2011, 71f.). Siniossoglou,
however, abstains from a serious conceptual and philological examination of Psellos texts.
91 On Psellos corpus, cf. J. Duffy 2006a.
92 Cf. Psellos, Opusc. 13, in Philosophica Minora vol. II, ed. D.J. OMeara, Leipzig 1989, p. 30ff.; cf. also
Drrie and Baltes 1998, 569 and note 71.
93 Cf. Delli 2007a, 213214 and cf. Psellos, Opusc. 13, in Philosophica Minora vol. II, ed. D.J. OMeara,
Leipzig 1989, p. 34.1729 and John Philoponos, In de an.,17.191830 Hayduck. Psellos speaks of the
pneumatic body also in De omnifaria doctrina, where he distinguishes more accurately different
degrees of the body of the soul (Psellos, De omnifaria doctrina, ed. Westerink, p. 40 [n. 56: subtle
cles, but also a significant reference to the related but nevertheless different
question of the matter of the heavens. This case also calls for a comparison between
the passage in Psellos and its source, the Commentary by John Philoponos.
Philop. In De anima I, 55.2557.1 Hayduck: Psellos, Opusc. 13 (p.

, , 37.1826 OMeara): -
, -
, , , ,
, , , - , <>
, . , -
.
. , -
( 5 6 . ) ,
, -
, , -
, -
- ,
, , - -
, , -
, -
, , -
, , -
[...] -
- -

,
-
[]
-

. , . -
, , .

.
radiant body ( / ) enmattered pneuma ( ) the body which has

nature of a shell (lit.: like an oyster, )]. Cf. Proklos, El. Th. prop. 205211 Dodds.
94 On the Neoplatonic theory of the vehicle, cf. E. R. Dodds 1963d; Baltes 2002, 122128 and 374401;
Toulouse 2001; Aujolat 1998; on Psellos concept of the vehicle, cf. Blumenthal 1996, 112.
95 On the assumption of a fifth element, cf. Michael Psellos, Opusc. 13 (p. 61, 2029 OMeara). In this
passage of the Opusc. 13 Psellos makes a compilation from Philoponus In De an. and, following his
source, he speaks of an eternal celestial body. Cf. John Philoponos, In De an. 448. 432 Hayduck e
Philoponus On Aristotle On the Soul 3.18 trasl. by E. Charlton, Ithaca/New York 2000, p. 23.
, -
,
. -
,
. -
,
. -

.

,
( 5 7. )
.
Since there are three things in the natural entities, form, matter and the cause by which
the form is [in] the matter, there are five methods [of investigation] concerning these:
physics, which discusses the form, matter, and the cause, e.g. the matter of the celes-
tial bodies is not the four elements, but rather something fifth and spherical, since it is
the most spacious [of shapes] or because the appropriateness of such a shape that has
neither beginning nor end. It is moved in a circle in imitation of the intellects which are
above it and which turn in on themselves: since the intellect, while seeing the forms, sees
itself, and inversely, and because the intellect is everywhere. And the student of nature
investigates these things; for this reason he gives a definition consisting of matter and
form.
As the comparison of the two texts clearly shows, Psellos turns the elaborate expo-
sition of John Philoponos into a series of summary notes which were most probably
intended for the use of his students leaving out the references to Plato (Tim. 33 b),
Aristotle (De caelo 286 b 10ff.) and Plotinos (Enn. II.2.1.) found in the Commentary of
John Philoponos. The reference to the fifth body, however, is preserved by Psellos,
who states that the matter of celestial bodies is not the four traditional elements but
rather something fifth and spherical ( ).
2) In De omnifaria doctrina a text that like no other of Psellos works expresses
his encyclopedic spirit and eagerness to explore the entire realm of human knowl-
edge the references to the issue under consideration occur in a section concerned
with questions of astronomy ( 120138 Westerink). Here, Psellos sets out Platos and
96 Engl. Tr. in Philoponus On Aristotle On the Soul 1.12, by P.J. van der Eijk, London 2005, pp. 7374.
97 On the differences between Psellos and Philoponos with regard to their respective methods, cf.
Delli 2007a, 215. On the motives which might have induced Psellos to use John Philoponos as his
source, cf. Zervos 1919a, 157158.
Aristotles opposing views on the substance of the heavens, the Sun and the stars.
According to Psellos, Plato thinks that the bodies on earth are [made] of the last por-
tion of the elements which is in some way coarser and more material, while the heaven
takes its substance from the portion of them [i.e. of the four elements] which is more
brilliant, while Aristotle attributes to it [i.e. to the heaven], on account of the dif-
ferent movement, also a different substance in comparison with the [four] elements
and calls the heaven and the stars below it and even down to the moon aether and
names it the fifth body.
In prop. 130 Psellos uses the expression ethereal body ( ) not in
reference to the fifth body of Aristotle, but more generally in reference to the body of
the heaven and the heavenly bodies, and makes it clear that while Plato, who makes
the whole ethereal body out of fire, earth and the other two elements, would reason-
ably say that the sun is hot; Aristotle, who posits this body as something different
besides the elements, does not say that the sun is hot nor that it has any other qual-
ity, and for this reason has to give an answer to the question why that which is not
itself hot, is able to heat.
In his prop. 133 Psellos explains why the ethereal body of the heaven and of the
stars has spherical form by drawing on Neoplatonic arguments:
While there are many shapes triangular, quadrangular, cubic, pyramidal and the other recti-
linear [shapes] the spherical is the most beautiful. The heaven and all the stars are of spherical
shape. [] For the ethereal body was necessarily lathed into the most beautiful shape, for it imi-
98
, . (Psellos, De om-
nifaria doctrina, ed. Westerink, p. 67, n. 126).
99 ,
,
. ,
. (Psellos, De omnifaria doc-
trina, ed. Westerink, p. 69, n. 131).
100 ,
, . (Psellos, De omni-
faria doctrina, ed. Westerink, p. 65, n. 121).
101 ,
.
(Psellos, De omnifaria doctrina, ed. Westerink, p. 65, n. 121).
102
,
, (Psellos, De omni-
faria doctrina, ed. Westerink, p. 69, n. 130). As Westerink has pointed out, in this paragraph Psellos
makes use of Olympiodoros Commentary on Meteorologica.
tates the intellect. For just like the intellect returns to itself, so the ethereal body turns in on itself,
being guided by the intellect and returning to the intellect.
It is difficult to identify the true opinion of Psellos himself in a text like De omnifaria
doctrina, in which he constantly oscillates between repetition and interpretation, on
the one hand producing a faithful compilation of his sources, and on the other hand,
maintaining critical distance from the opinions he cites and even passing negative
judgements upon them. It is clear, however, that Psellos sees the need to expound
the Christian point of view and at the same time to collect the grains of truth scattered
through the salty waters of Hellenic wisdom. In prop. 157, Psellos emphasizes that
we [i.e. the Christians] hold the opinion that the world is not ungenerated nor incor-
ruptible, for we have learned from the holy Scriptures that it was created and that it
will have an end, and in prop. 18 he inserts a reference to the fifth element in the
context of a discussion of the issue: from which first element God started the creation
of the universe.
103 , , , , ,
, .
. [...].
. ,
, . (Psel-
los, De omnifaria doctrina, ed. Westerink, p. 70, n. 133). Cf. also Psellos, De omnifaria doctrina, ed.
Westerink, p. 70, n. 134.
104 Cf. Psellos, De omnifaria doctrina, ed. Westerink, pp. 9899, n. 201.
105 ,
(Psellos, De omnifaria doctrina, ed. Westerink, p. 81, n.
157).
106 Michael Psellos, De omnifaria Doctrina, ed. L.G. Westerink, p. 25, n. 18. The title of proposition
18 goes back to Plutarchs Plac. II.6. As Baggarly demonstrated in 1970, a parallel exists between the
Hexaemeron I., PG 89 857 D (l. 45)-858 A (l. 9) [..] and the De omnifaria doctrina 18 (Baggarly 1970, 345;
on this question, cf. Anastasios Hexaemeron, I, IV.1.3 [ed. J. D. Baggarly and C. A Kuehn, Anastasius
of Sinai Hexaemeron, Rome 2007, 1214; cf. Anastasii Sinaitae, Sermones Duo, ed. by K.H. Uthemann,
Corpus Christanorum Serie Greca 12, Leuven 1985, p. CXLVII, note 289; cf. Anastasios of Sinai in
The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, ed. by A. Kazhdan, New York 1991, I, p. 88; cf. Introduction to
Anastasius of Sinai Hexaemeron, ed. J. D. Baggarly and C. A Kuehn, Rome 2007, pp. XIX-XX). In De
omn. doctr. n. 18 Psellos first explains the point of view of those who 1) subdivide the universe into
four elements, on the one hand, and the fifth body or the aether, on the other hand, and maintain that
the four elements are located below the aether and 2) hold the opinion that the heaven is the most
beautiful part of the aether and that it was generated first. Then Psellos considers the opinion of those
who believe that the world is ungenerated and consequently maintain that everything is . It is at
this point that Psellos concludes against those who consider the heaven to be ungenerated that
it is necessary to be of the opinion that the heaven was created first, since it is a superior body and
comprises all the rest ( ,
) (Michael Psellos, De omnifaria Doctrina, ed. L.G. Westerink, p. 25, n. 18)
3) In Opusc. 50, which Benakis referred to as auctoris tractationem de quinta es-

sentia, Michael Psellos introduces some considerations that address the question
of the fifth element and the history of the debates related to it and even makes a very
brief reference to his own opinion regarding this question.
Opusc. 50 forms part of a series of lessons dedicated to the exegesis of Or. 28
of Gregory of Nazianzos. In Opusc. 50, Psellos takes as his point of departure the
hypothesis which was formulated in Or. 28,8: . In the first place,
Psellos considers it necessary to subdivide () the immaterial according
to the opinions which previous philosophers have formed about it. The immaterial
is or is considered as the fifth element or, alternatively, as something else; if it is
something else, then, according to Psellos, this is either the angelic body, to which
Gregory refers in his oration, or something above it. Psellos introduces here a refer-
ence to the fire of which the Stoics speak and which is of many kinds, such as the fire
which consumes but also the fire which nourishes, forms, gives life, constitutes the
stars and souls and is identical with God who pervades everything.
If we say that it is immaterial, it is in turn necessary to subdivide [it] in accordance with the dif-
ferent opinions of the philosophers. It is either the fifth [element] or something else that goes
beyond it; and if it is something else, then it is either the angelic [body] or something above it;
this, too, happens to be of many kinds and of many powers, in accordance with that which has
been foolishly said by those Greeks who seemed to be speaking about God, and especially the
Stoics.
Turning to the analysis of the fifth element, Psellos places special emphasis on the
fact that when Aristotle conceives the fifth essence, he takes a path which was not
only not taken by the Academics ( [...] ) but also
107 Cf. Benakis 2008, 180, apparatus criticus.

108 The exegesis of this oration extends from Opusc. 48 to Opusc. 52. Opusc. 51 is dedicated to the
thorny question of the angelic body, which Gregory had clearly distinguished from the ethereal body
(cf. Psellos, Theologica, opusc. 51, ed. P. Gautier, vol. I, Leipzig, 1989, p. 199, 103104). On Psellos con-
cept of the angelic body, cf. E.R. Dodds (ed.), Proclus: Elements of Theology, Oxford 1933, Commentary
to prop. 208, p. 306. On the intentions and motivations of Psellos, cf. J. Duffy 2002b, 147150.
109 Gregory of Nazianzos can be considered one of Psellos favourite authors, to whom he dedicated
much space in the Theologica, not only on account of Gregorys authority on doctrinal questions or
his rethorical skills, but also on account of Gregorys ability to function as an ideal mediator between
Christian orthodoxy and Platonic doctrines (cf. Maltese 1994a, 295; cf. also Schwaderer 2007; cf. Rhoby
2007).
110 Cf. supra.
111 On this subject, cf. Moraux 1963, 1234.
112 ,
. , ,
,
(Psellos, Theologica, opusc. 50, ed. P. Gautier, vol. I, Leipzig, 1989, p.
192, 59).
not recognized by the Peripatetics (this is perhaps an allusion to Strato, the sec-
ond successor to Aristotle or to the peripatetic philosopher Xenarchos), and which
even Plato, the supreme guide in the field of science, did not seek to explain either in
the Parmenides, where he speaks as a theologian, or in the Timaios, where he inves-
tigates natural causes. Having specified that as a principle of this presupposition
he took () the most natural () movements of the bodies,
Psellos goes on to reconstruct the history of the concept of the fifth element in the
Late Antiquity. He emphasizes the fact that this doctrine was admired and defended
against its critics by Alexander, Themistios and later Simplikios, and that it received
hard blows from Proklos, and John Philoponos and Ammonios inveighed against
it, while Plotinos and Iamblichos did not attack it too severely out of respect for Aris-
totle, and, even though they conceded () this concept, they tended to
confirm only the ideas which were their own:
Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistios, who made a paraphrase of the [works] of the Philoso-
pher [i.e. Aristotle], and indeed later Simplikios admire this teaching, embrace it and set it against
the teachings of other philosophers. Proklos, however, who was a better student of nature than
anyone else, produced a storm of arguments against it; the most industrious John [=John Philo-
ponos] and the great Ammonios inveighed against it on several occasions, while Plotinos and
Iamblichos did not attack this teaching too severely out of respect for the Philosopher [i.e. Aris-
totle], but conceded to him this concept, while they confirmed only [the ideas] which were their
own.
Psellos decided to omit an exposition of the ways in which this theory has been vali-
dated or confuted and merely alludes to the books dedicated to this argument, deem-
ing it sufficient to state that between John Philoponos and Simplikios he considers
John Philoponos to be the winner ( ). Psel-
los then proceeds to a close exegesis of a passage from Gregory of Nazianzos. He begins
by stating Gregorys affirmation,
What if we call God also immaterial [for he attaches a body to the divine], what if we call God
the fifth element as envisaged by some, borne along with the circular motion? Let us assume
113 Cf. Moraux 1963, 1232.

114 Cf. Psellos, Theologica, opusc. 50 (Gautier 193,1318).
115 Psellos, Theologica, opusc. 50 (Gautier 193, 2021).
116
,
. , ,
,

, (Psel-
los, Theologica, opusc. 50, Gautier 193194, 3947).
117 Cf. Psellos, Theologica, opusc. 50 (Gautier 194, 52). Cf. Bydn 2003, 178. On Psellos attitude to-
wards Simplikios, cf. Benakis 2008, 4142.
that He is some immaterial and fifth body, and incorporeal, if they wish, in accordance with their
free-moving, self-constructing argument.
According to Psellos, Gregory is very far from accepting the opinion of Aristotle, since
he speaks of and , affirming that it is the same, i.e. equally
erroneous, to imagine a fifth body and an incorporeal body. What is more, Gregory
does not adduce this doctrine in order to confute it for Psellos this is clear from the
remark that Gregory adds immediately thereafter:
but rather with the purpose of reducing to absurdity the arguments of those who
ascribe this body to God.
It is only with this intention, according to Psellos, that Gregory asks:
. The meaning of this question, which is intended
as a polemic against those who represent God as the fifth body, is clear to Psellos:
since Aristotle conceives as an ethereal body not only the sphere of the fixed stars (
= ), but the entire heaven, and, therefore,
also the stars and the planets, the philosophers who represent God as a fifth body are
required to clarify which part of the fifth element God is supposed to resemble (
;); is he supposed to be identical with the
Sun, the Moon or one of the fixed stars or should the movements of the planets be
attributed to him? In any case, anyone who represents God as a fifth element this
is how Psellos views Gregorys position commits a grave error and a hybris which
consists in believing that God is of the same substance as his creatures:
For it is a downright hybris if, on the one hand, a man, having formed a man-like statue, makes
it inferior to his own substance and, on the other hand, [if] God who has created everything out
of nothing should be of the same substance and nature as these things and should be moved
around in a circle like the heaven, upwards and downwards in accordance with the properties of
the other elements.
This is not all. If it is true that there are those who believe that God, who is the principle
of movement for all the rest, can be completely identified with that which is moved,
Gregory confutes them, taking the movement as his point of departure:
118 [ ], , ,
, , ,
(Psellos, Theologica, opusc. 50, Gautier
194, 5660).
119 Cf. Psellos, Theologica, opusc. 50 (Gautier 194, 6970). On the meaning of ouranos cf. Arist. De
caelo, I, 9, 278 b 222.
120 ,
,
, ,
(Psellos, Theologica, opusc. 50, Gautier 195, 8387).
How does he confute them? From the movement itself. If in our world everything that is moved
is moved by something else that moves [it] and if the mover is also moved by another mover, this
[latter], too, will be moved by another one and so on in the same way, so that our thought will
go ad infinitum, since by advancing both from those that move and from those that are being
moved we will arrive at similar [results]. If one has to come to a halt somewhere, at any rate at
that which is unmoved, then what else would this be if not God? Therefore God is not a fifth body,
since it [i.e. the fifth body] is in motion, whereas he [i.e. God] remains unmoved.
2.2 John Italos
In spite of the great relevance of the figure of John Italos for the intellectual history of
the Middle Byzantine Period and for the history of Byzantine philosophy in general,
a comprehensive study of the works of this student of Michael Psellos is still lacking
and even the existing critical editions of his texts are deficient in several respects. As
A. Rigo has rightly pointed out, this is especially true with regard to the most im-
portant work of John Italos, i.e. Quaestiones quodlibetales. The following analysis will
concentrate on one text with the title
(= 42 Cereteli/ Ketschakmadze), which forms part of the Quaestiones. This text is
particularly interesting because, in his discussion of the body of the heaven and the
opinions of Plato and Aristotle on this question, Italos advances the thesis concerning
the accord between Plato and Aristotle that had already been formulated by Proklos
and Simplikios.
In , John Italos seeks to demonstrate
that the disagreement between Plato and Aristotle is only apparent, in spite of the fact
that the former maintains that the heaven is made up of the four elements and the lat-
121 ; .
, , ,
, ,
. , ;
, , (Psellos, Theologica, opusc. 50, Gautier 195,
96102).
122 Manca uno studio approfondito dellopera di G. (e va anche segnalato che le edizioni disponi-
bili sono per certi versi carenti), volto a distinguere tra le sue effettive composizioni, gli appunti dei
discepoli (vedi, per esempio, la Quaestio 44) e i semplici excerpta di autori pi antichi (cos la Quaes-
tio 59 riproduce una argomentazione del manicheo Fotino, la Quaestio 87, come gi ricordato, passi
delle orazioni sulle immagini di Giovanni Damasceno ecc.). Questo vale innanzitutto per lo scritto pi
significativo, le 93 Quaestiones quodlibetales. (Rigo 2001, 65). On the trial of Italos, cf. Clucas 1981a;
Gouillard 1983; Gouillard 1985b. On Italos, cf. F. Lauritzen 2008a; Ioannou 1956; Stephanou 1949a.
123 As pointed out by K. Ierodiakonou, what mainly survives from his writings is the commentary
on the second, third, and fourth book of Aristotles Topics; two small treatises on dialectic and on
the Aristotelian syllogisms together with a very brief synopsis of rhetoric; and finally, the Quaestiones
quodlibetales, a collection of 93 answers to philosophical questions posed to him by his students
(Ierodiakonou 2011a, 624).
ter asserts that the heaven is . John Italos takes as his point of depar-
ture a consideration which seems to reach back to a passage in Proklos Commentary
on the Timaios, in which Proklos deals with several physical theories with regard to
the number of qualities/powers that can be attributed to the elements.
According to Proklos, while some philosophers erroneously attribute a single
quality to each of the elements, there are others, such as Ocellus, who in his trea-
tise On Nature is supposed to have wrongly assigned only two qualities/powers to
the elements, and, what is more, to have committed the error of considering fire
and water as the elements most contrary to one another, while the earth is in truth
more opposed to fire than is water. At this point Proklos introduces the thesis of the
correlation between simple motions and simple bodies and between contrary motions
and contrary bodies which had been set out by Aristotle in De Caelo, thus turning his
attention to several contradictions which can be found in Aristotles
and .
Taking up Proklean arguments, John Italos leaves out the reference to Occelus
and his work On Nature and proceeds to an exposition of the Aristotelian theory of the
124 Cf. John Italos, , ed. G. Cereteli/N. Ketschakmadze,

Tbilisi, 1966, 108, [12].
125 Cf. Proklos, In Tim., II, 37.1735 (Engl. tr. by D. Baltzly, Cambridge, 2007, p. 84).
126 Cf. Proklos, In Tim. II, 38.15 (Engl. tr., pp. 8485): , ,
, , ,
, ,
.
127 D. Baltzly points out that Proclus makes two objections here. First, since the adjacent elements
have one power in common with their neighbour and one power opposed, how will we get an orderly
cosmos? The elements are no more akin than they are opposed (II.38.716). Second, such a theory
makes each extreme term more opposed to an intermediate than to an opposite term. Fire and Earth at
least have dryness in common. But Fire and Water are completely opposed. An adequate theory should
reveal how Fire and Earth are completely opposed. By Aristotles lights, the natural motions of these
two elements are opposites: upward and downward. But how could it be that nature has assigned
them opposite motions and natural places farthest from one another if they arent by their very nature
maximally opposed (in Tim. II.38.1731)? (Baltzly 2007, 17).
128 Proklos, In Tim. II, 38.293239.18 (Engl. tr., p.86): [] ,
, , , .

, , ,
,
, , , ,
. , .
Proklos phrase could be referring to tout lensemble avant de Gen. B, cf. en
effet des assertions comme de Caelo A 2, 269 a 9 ss. (cf. Festugire, Proclus: Commentaire sur le Time,
vol. III, p. 66, n. 3). The phrase could be Proklos reference to Arist., De gen-
eratione et corruptione B 3, 330 b 30 ff: cest peut-etre cette feu-eau = chaud-froid [] que
Proclus a en vue (Festugire, Proclus: Commentaire sur le Time, vol. III, p. 67).
elements found in in order to point out the contradictions indicated by

Proklos in his treatment of the Aristotelian and . John Ita-
los maintains that in the first work mentioned above (i.e. , since John
Italos inverts the order in which the two Aristotelian works are mentioned in Prok-
los) Aristotle claimed that earth is contrary to fire, while in the second work (i.e.
) he states that water is contrary to fire:
The philosopher Aristotle in his work On Nature says that there are four elements; he teaches that
each of them has powers and motions and he shows their number on the basis of their contrary
motions and places; on some occasions, he teaches that earth is contrary to fire and on other
occasions that water is contrary to fire. As [already] mentioned, in On Power he says that the
earth is opposite to fire and in On Movement he says that water is opposite to it.
Later on in the text, John Italos once again turns back to Proklos and argues (a) that
the elements, since they are solid, can only be brought into unison by two middle
terms, so that (b) the elements must be four in number. Furthermore, still following
Proklos, he points out (c) the necessity of attributing no less than three dynameis to
each element. However, slightly later in the text, John Italos adds (d) that the thesis
that the elements are four in number is established on the basis of both their move-
ments and the other qualities which are present in relation to them:
Since they are solid and not plane, their bonds with one another require two middle terms, for
the plane requires only one middle term and with the solid this is never the case. (b) From these
axioms he shows that the elements must necessarily be four; (c) for it is not correct to say that
each of the afore mentioned bodies have only two powers, as some ancient philosophers had
believed, but three, as the more accurate of them [have stated] [] (d) For these reasons it is said
129
,
, ,
, , (John
Italos, , ed. G. Cereteli/N. Ketschakmadze, 109, [16]).
130 Already for Plato, what brings solids into unison is never one middle term alone but always two
(cf. Plato, Tim. 32 b 24).
131 Cf. Proklos, In Tim., II, 39.1519 (Engl. tr. p. 86).
132 Cf. Proklos, In Tim., II, 39. 2028 (Engl. tr. pp. 8687).
133 On Aristotles attempt to distinguish the body, understood as a geometrical solid, from the body
as a physical body which has a nature that renders it capable of movement, cf. Falcon 2001, 18. Falcon
rightly points out that a monte degli sforzi di Aristotele [di distinguere corpo matematico da corpo
fisico] e dei filosofi di et ellenistica vi fosse probabilmente lintenzione di bloccare la strada alla ri-
costruzione geometrica della realt tentata da Platone (Falcon 2001, 65). In Aristotles view, a theory
(be it Platonic or even Academic, and especially so) which maintains the generation of bodies from
surfaces entails grave and unacceptable consequences (cf. Aristot., De caelo, III.1, 299 a 2 ff).
that there are four elements on the basis of their movements and other powers that are there in
their case.
Having examined the question of the powers/qualities of the four elements, John Ita-
los proceeds to consider the fifth body. Since the fifth body, as Aristotle teaches, has a
motion which is different from that of the other elements, it will also have a different
nature ( ). This being so, while the Peripatetics attempt to
demonstrate that it (i.e. the fifth body) does not belong to the other elements, the Pla-
tonists, who prove their opinion by means of physical and mathematical arguments
( ), maintain that
the heaven consists of the four elements. In this way and for these reasons it seems
that Aristotle is at variance with Plato. However, in spite of the seeming contrast be-
tween the Aristotelian and Platonic theories of the heaven, it is important for Italos
to take into consideration the opinion of those philosophers John refers to them as
who do not cling to the letter of Aristotles and Platos teaching but are
able to penetrate to the bottom of their thoughts and so finally realize that there is no
difference in the ways in which they both conceive the heaven.
In this way and on account of these [reasons] Aristotle would appear to be contrary to Plato [...].
But those who are more punctilious than others and who do not cling to the words and expres-
sions of the ancients, but also decide to go into their thoughts in depth, speak about them more or
less in this way in their own writings, namely that there is no difference between the two philoso-
phers with regard to the body of the heaven. For Plato, who considers the physical entities one
after the other from a mathematical point of view and shows from both the sides and shapes and
from their analogy that this universe is kept together and animated, and even if [this statement]
is sacrilegious and senseless that it is an image of a perfect Living Being which had been gen-
erated from the primordial Egg and is called Phanes according to the ancient Greek theologians,
said that the heaven was the fifth figure. He assigned to the earth the cube [...] and to the heaven
the dodecahedron, calling this the fifth, beginning with the cube.
134 , (a)
, . (b)
(c)
, , ,
, [] (d)
(John Italos,
, ed. G. Cereteli/N. Ketschakmadze, 109, [713]; [1819]).
135 Cf. John Italos, , ed. G. Cereteli/N. Ketschakmadze,
109, [22]-110, [2].
136 , [].
,
,
,

,
Here Italos refers to the platonic idea that the universe is animated as a blasphemous
idea. However, his interpretation of the pretended conflict between Plato and Aristo-
tle with respect to the crucial issue of the fifth element follows that of Proklos. Accord-
ing to Italos who is evidently reading Plato by following the Proklean Commentary
on Timaios , Plato, too, in attributing a dodecahedron to the heaven, conceived
it as a fifth body in addition to the four elements. Italos seems to be echoing Prok-
los when he asks, what difference does it make if the heaven is said to be a fifth
element or a fifth figure, as Plato says? There is certainly a difference in the way
in which the elements are considered: physically speaking the elements are said to
have qualities () and different qualities ( ), while
mathematically speaking they are said to have sides. However, the sides and the
qualities are in truth the same () with respect to the physical bodies, for
as had already been pointed out by Proklos the physical entities are to be spo-

, .
, [] , .
(John Italos, , ed. G. Cereteli/N. Ketschakmadze, 110,
[317]). The edition of Cereteli has in text; Joannou reads (cf. John Italos, Quaestiones
Quodlibetales, ed. P. Joannou, Ettal 1956, p. 52).
137 Cf. Ioannou 1956, 38. Cf. Stephanou 1949a, 9193. Cf. also Gouillard 1981, 313: Italos reconnat
lincompatibilit de tel ou tel systme paen existence de la Nature, trnit de la Matire, Ame du
monde avec nos critures, avec les matres de la vrit, avec les matres de notre savoir nous,
de la pit avec limpit et le blasphme . In his book, P. Joannou insists on the fact that Italos
rejects the doctrine of emanation (Ioannou 1956, 45), considers the Paradigms as concepts in the mind
of God (ivi, p. 52), rejects the Greek doctrine of the eternity of matter (ivi, p. 72) by showing that var-
ious definitions of matter provided by the Greeks are unacceptable (ivi, p. 73). However, Stephanou
points out the following: Le P. Joannou nous avertit avec raison que malgr leur language nopla-
tonicien, la pense de Psellos et dItalos reste chrtienne. Or, prcisment ce language apparemment
equivoque auquel on pourrait ajouter les rapprochements oprs par le deux philosophes entre des
ralits chrtiennes et certain lments de la spculation noplatonicienne sont due non pas au be-
soin de termes pour exprimer le dogme, mais lengoument pour la philosophie antique (Stephanou
1957, 434). More recent authors have attempted to see John Italos as an obstinate crypto-pagan very
skilled at dissimulation, who made concessions to Orthodoxy only in order to protect his own pagan
beliefs (cf. Siniossoglou 2011, 83).
138 On account of the Orphic doctrine of the primordial egg and of Phanes who comes from this egg
and corresponds to the Living-Thing-itself of Proklos, cf. Proklos, In Tim., I 428.9f (engl. tr. by D.T.
Runia, Cambridge 2008, p. 313f.).
139 John Italos, , ed. Cereteli/Ketschakmadze, 110, [19
20]. Cf. Proklos, In Tim., I 6, 327, 2 (cited in note 44 above); cf. also Simplikios, In Phys. 1165, 2139
(cited in note 71 above) and Trizio 2011, 18.
140 John Italos, , ed. Cereteli/Ketschakmadze, 111, [3
5].
141 Cf. Proklos, In Tim., II, 39.1819 (engl. tr. p. 86): the physical beings are images of mathematical
ones. It is worth noting that for Proklos an order in the sensible realm would not be possible without
ken of as resembling the mathematical (

).
Conclusions
The present contribution has examined the doctrine of the fifth element in an attempt,
on the one hand, to trace the crucial stages of the debates it inspired during Late An-
tiquity and, on the other hand, to analyze the passages that Michael Psellos and John
Italos devoted to this question and which contain distinct echoes of these controver-
sies.
In the case of Michael Psellos, the references he makes to the doctrine of the fifth
element in De omnifaria doctrina and in Opusc. 13 reflect the eclectic nature of his
work and reveal his manifold interests as well as the ambiguity of the views of this
most elusive Protean character, torn between reverence for the cultural heritage of
the Ancients and esteem for Christian Orthodoxy. In Opusc. theol. 50 he demonstrates
his awareness of the debates over this issue during Late Antiquity. Psellos touches on
the positions of Plotinos and Iamblichos, considers the attempts of Simplikios to de-
fend the doctrine of the fifth element and hints at the polemics between Simplikios
and John Philoponos, while at the same time stating his own preference for the latter.
In Opusc. theol. 50 Psellos does not regard the problem of the fifth element in isolation
as a question of physics or metaphysics only, but reveals his interest in its implications
for Christian theology, since he comments on an oration of Gregory that explored these
implications and, following Gregory, rejects the possibility of conceiving God as a di-
vine body.
In the case of John Italos, examination of the passages he explicitly dedicated to
the problem of the fifth element has underlined a certain reconciliatory tendency
which he adopted on this issue and which accords with the reconciliatory solu-
tions proposed by both Proklos and Simplikios, which have also been analyzed in the
present article. In particular, analysis of John Italos text has shown that he integrates
several passages from Proklos into his own writings while at the same time admit-
ting that some platonic conceptions are not compatible with orthodoxy. John Italos
arguments aim at demonstrating that the contradictions between Plato and Aristotle
are only apparent and are motivated by the fact that the Platonists considered beings
not only as physical, but also as mathematical entities. He achieved this aim by blur-
a mathematical relationship; nevertheless, we cannot restrict ourselves to a mathematical consider-

ation of the physical world, because the principles of nature do not admit the rigor and exactness of
the mathematical principles (cf. Proklos, In Tim., II, 23.933; engl. tr. pp. 6869).
142 John Italos, , ed. Cereteli/Ketschakmadze, 111, [56].
143 Cf. M. Psello, Imperatori di Bisanzio, a cura di D. del Corno, Milano 1984, I, p. XIV.
ring or downplaying the differences between diverse approaches and insisting on the
fundamental similarities of the problems that were at stake.
Bibliography
Secondary Sources
Aujolat, N. (1998). The pneuma and the luminous body of the soul according to the Prologue of
John Philoponus Commentaire sur le De Anima d'Aristote. In: Byzantinoslavica 59, pp. 123.
Baggarly, J. D. (1970). A parallel between Michael Psellus and the Hexaemeron of Anastasius of
Sinai. In: Orientalia Christiana Periodica 36, pp. 337347.
Baltes, M. (2002). Die philosophische Lehre des Platonismus. Von der Seele als der Ursache aller
sinnvoller Ablufe. Vol. 6. Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt.
Baltzly, D. (2002). What goes up: Proclus against Aristotle on the fifth element. In: Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 80, pp. 261287.
Baltzly, D. (2007). Proclus, Commentary on Plato's Timaeus. In: vol. 3. Cambridge.
Chap. Introduction.
Benakis, L. (2008). Einleitung. In: Michael Psellos: Kommentar zur Physik des Aristoteles. Athens,
3*64*.
Blumenthal, H. J. (1996). Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity. Interpretations of the De
Anima. London.
Clucas, L. (1981a). The Trial of John Italos and the Crisis of Intellectual Values in Byzantium in the
Eleventh Century. Mnchen.
Crouzel, H. (1990a). La doctrine orignienne du corps ressuscit. In: Les fins dernires selon
Origne. Vol. VI. Aldershot, pp. 191192.
Crouzel, H. (1990b). Le thme platonicien du vhicule de l'me chez Origne. In: Les fins
dernires selon Origne. Vol. III. Aldershot, pp. 225237.
Delli, E. (2007a). Entre compilation et originalit. Le corps pneumatique dans l'oeuvre de Michel
Psellos. In: The Libraries of the Neoplatonists. Ed. by C. D'Ancona. Leiden, pp. 210229.
Dodds, E. R. (1963b). Le corps astral dans le Noplatonisme. In: Proclus, Elements of Theology.
Ed. by E. R. Dodds. Oxford, pp. 313321.
Dodds, E. R. (1963d). Proclus: The Elements of Theology. A Revised Text with Translation,
Introduction and Commentary. In: ed. by E. R. Dodds. Oxford. Chap. Appendix II: The Astral
Body in Neoplatonism, pp. 313321.
Drrie, H. and M. Baltes (1998). Der Platonismus in der Antike. Vol. 5. Stuttgart.
Duffy, J. (2002b). Hellenic Philosophy in Byzantium and the Lonely Mission of Michael Psellos. In:
Duffy, J. (2006a). Dealing with the Psellos Corpus: From Allatius to Westerink and the Biblioteca
Teubneriana. In: Reading Michael Psellos. Ed. by C. Barber and D. Jenkins. Leiden and Boston,
pp. 112.
Falcon, A. (2001). Corpi e movimenti. Il De Caelo di Aristotele e la sua fortuna nel mondo antico.
Napoli.
Gigon, O. (1952). Aristoteles-Studien. In: Museum Helveticum 9, pp. 113136.
Gouillard, J. (1981). La religion des philosophes. In: La vie religieuse Byzance. London.
Gouillard, J. (1983). Review of L. Clucas, The Trial of John Italos and the Crisis of Intellectual Values
in Byzantium in the Eleventh Century. In: Byzantinische Zeitschrift 76, pp. 3133.
Gouillard, J. (1985b). Le procs officiel de Jean l'Italien. Les Actes et leurs sous-entendus. In:
Graeser, A. (1972). Plotinus and the Stoics. Leiden.
Guldentops, G. (2005). Plato's Timaeus in Simplicius' In de Caelo. A Confrontation with Alexander.
In: Platons Timaios als Grundtext der Kosmologie in Sptantike, Mittelalter und Renaissance.
Ed. by T. Leinkauf and C. Steel. Leuven, pp. 195212.
Hoffmann, P. (1987a). Simplicius' Polemics. In: Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian
Science. Ed. by R. Sorabji. London, pp. 5783.
Hoffmann, P. (1987b). Sur quelques aspects de la polmique de Simplicius contre Jean Philopon.
In: Simplicius. Sa vie, son uvre, sa survie. Ed. by I. Hadot. Berlin, pp. 183221.
Ierodiakonou, K. (2011a). John Italos. In: Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Ed. by
H. Lagerlund. Dordrecht.
Jori, A. (2002). Aristotele: Il cielo. In: Milano. Chap. Introduzione, pp. 11115.
Jori, A. (2009). Aristoteles, ber den Himmel. In: Berlin. Chap. Introduction, pp. 193259.
Kaldellis, A. (2007). Hellenism in Byzantium. The Transformations of Greek Identity and the Reception
of the Classical Tradition. Cambridge.
Kaldellis, A. (2012). Byzantine Philosophy inside and out: Orthodoxy and dissidence in
counterpoint. In: The Many Faces of Byzantine Philosophy. Ed. by B. Bydn and
K. Ierodiakonou. Athen, pp. 129151.
Lauritzen, F. (2008a). Psello discepolo di Stetato. In: Byzantinische Zeitschrift 101, pp. 715725.
47, pp. 285291.
Meeusen, M. (2012). Salt in the holy water: Plutarch's Quaestiones naturales in Michael Psellus' De
Omnifaria Doctrina. In: Plutarch in the Religious and Philosophical Discourse of Late Antiquity.
Ed. by L. Roig Lanzillotta and I. Muoz Gallarte. Leiden, pp. 101121.
Moraux, P. (1963). Quinta essentia. In: Paulys Realencyclopdie der Classischen
Altertumswissenschaft, Siebenundvierzigster Halbband. Vol. 24/1. Stuttgart, cols. 11711263,
14301432.
Nasemann, B. (1991). Theurgie und Philosophie in Jamblichs De mysteriis. Stuttgart.
Norris, F. W. (1991). Faith gives Fullness to Reasoning. The five Theological Orations of Gregory
Nazianzen. In: Leiden. Chap. Commentary on Oration 28.
Papaioannou, S. (2013a). Michael Psellos. Rhetoric and Authorship in Byzantium. Cambridge.
Ppin, J. (1964). Thologie cosmique et thologie chretinne. Paris.
Resigno, A. (2004). Alessandro di Afrodisia. Commentario al De Caelo di Aristotele, Frammenti del
primo Libro. In: Amsterdam. Chap. Introduction, pp. 53138.
Rhoby, A. (2007). Aspekte des Fortlebens des Gregor von Nazianz in byzantinischer und
postbyzantinischer Zeit. In: Theatron: Rhetorische Kultur in Sptantike und Mittelalter. Ed. by
M. Grnbart. Berlin and New York, pp. 409417.
Richard, A. (2003). Cosmologie et thologie chez Grgoire de Nazianze. Paris.
Rigo, A. (2001). Giovanni Italo. In: Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani. Vol. 56. Roma, pp. 6267.
Risch, F. X. (1999). Gregor von Nyssa. ber das Sechstagewerk. Stuttgart.
Scholten, C. (1996). Antike Naturphilosophie und christliche Kosmologie in der Schrift De opificio
mundi des Johannes Philoponos. Berlin.
Schwaderer, I. (2007). Selbstapologie und Legitimation: Das Leitbild Gregor von Nazianz in den
theologischen Schriften des Michael Psellos. In: Formen und Funktionen von Leitbildern.
Ed. by J. Hahn and M. Vielberg. Stuttgart, pp. 285298.
Siorvanes, L. (1996). Proclus. Neo-platonic Philosophy and Science. New Haven.
Steel, C. (2005). Proclus' Defence of the Timaeus against Aristotle's Objections. In: Platons
Timaios als Grundtext der Kosmologie in Sptantike, Mittelalter und Renaissance. Ed. by
T. Leinkauf and C. Steel. Leuven, pp. 163193.
Stephanou, P. . (1949a). Jean Italos philosophe et humaniste. Orientalia Christiana Analecta 134.
Rome.
Stephanou, P. . (1957). Recension P. Joannou, Die Illuminationslehre des Michael Psellos und
Johannes Italos. In: Orientalia Christiana Periodica 23, pp. 431436.
Toulouse, S. (2001). Les thories du vhicule de l'me dans le noplatonisme: gense et volution
d'une doctrine de la mdiation entre l'me et le corps. PhD thesis. cole pratique des hautes
tudes.
Trizio, M. (2011). Dissensio philosophorum. Il disaccordo tra Platone e Aristotele nei commenti
filosofici di Eustrazio di Nicea. In: ed. by L. classica nel pensiero medievale. Turnhout,
pp. 1738.
Van Winden, J. C. (1997). The Early Christian Exegesis of Heaven and Earth in Genesis 1.1. In:
Arche. A Collection of Patristic Studies. Leiden, pp. 94106.
Wilberding, J. (2006). Introduction to Plotinus' Cosmology. A Study of Ennead II.1 (40). Text,
Translation, and Commentary. Oxford.
Wildberg, C. (1988). John Philoponus' Criticism of Aristotle's Theory of Aether. Berlin and New York.
Zervos, C. (1919a). Un philosophe noplatonicien du XIe sicle. Michel Psellos. Sa vie. Son uvre.
Ses luttes philosophiques. Son influence. Paris.
Michele Trizio
The waves of passions and the stillness of the
sea: appropriating neoplatonic imagery and
concept formation-theory in middle Byzantine
commentaries on Aristotle
The textual tradition of Proklos commentary on Alcibiades I shows remarkable simi-

larities with that of other Proklean works. In fact, like Proklos commentary on Platos
Parmenides, credit for the transmission of the commentary on Alcibiades I is due to the
scholarship of 13th c. Byzantine scholar George Pachymeres, whose hand is respon-
sible for the first mss. preserving these works. Furthermore, as with other Proklean
works, the commentary on the Alcibiades I was read and excerpted before the appear-
ance of the first testimonia of the text. In other words, This commentary shares the
vicissitudes of most other Proklean works which were read, discussed and even re-
futed in the 11th and 12th c., even though the first mss. preserving these works date
to the late 13th c. This is particularly evident when considering the tradition of Prok-
los Elements of Theology, whose Refutation, written by Nicholas of Methone around
1155/1160, which transmits the text of the Elements indirectly, predates the appearance
of the first mss. preserving the Elements alone.
The prehistory, so to say, of Proklos in the Byzantine textual tradition includes two
11th/12th c. Byzantine scholars named Eustratios of Nicaea and Michael of Ephesos.
1 See A. P. Segonds 1985, cvcxxv, revising and completing Westerink 1954, viixi. To these data one
should add that the text as we know it today is incomplete, for about 60% of the work is lost (See
Segonds xxxixxl; cxxcxxv). On Pachymeres scholarship, see Golitsis 2008. On Pachymeres as a
copyist and reader of Proklos works, see Westerink 1989; Steel 1999; Steel and Mac 2006b; Luna and
A. P. Segonds 2007. On the more general topic of Pachymeres activity as a copyist and the intellectual
circle around him, see Golitsis 2010.
2 See Steel 2002a; Trizio 2009a; Trizio 2014b; OMeara 2014b. According to Luna and A. P. Segonds
2007, Proklos commentary on the Parmenides could have been available in a now lost 9th c.
manuscript belonging to the so-called philosophical collection, on which see Cavallo 2007a. A
link between this group of 9th c. manuscripts (in particular Par. gr. 1807, manuscript A of Plato) and
eleventh-century Byzantine scholar Michael Psellos has been suggested, among others, by Saffrey
2007.
3 On the textual tradition of Nicholas Refutation of Proklos Elements of Theology, see E. R. Dodds
1963a, xxxxxxi and Angelou 1984a, xxxviiixliv and xlviili. On the more general problem of Byzan-
tine scholarship on Proklos, see Podskalsky 1976c, Benakis 1987b and Parry 2006c. See also Trizio
2014b for an overview of the eleventh-twelfth-century.
4 On Eustratios career and biography, see Cacouros 2000c; on Michael, see Golitsis 2015 (forthcom-
ing).
DOI 10.1515/9781501503597-004
68 | M. Trizio
Their role within the tradition and circulation of Neoplatonic source-material in the
Middle-Byzantine period has not received sufficient attention from scholars, despite
the few available studies on this topic suggesting the fruitfulness of thorough inves-
tigation of their works in order to highlight the dependence on Neoplatonist books
and the strategy used in their exploitation. Michael for example is known for relying
on Syrianos commentary on the Metaphysics in his own commentary on Metaphysics
ZN and for utilizing Proklos commentary on Alcibiades I in his commentary on Nico-
machean Ethics 10. As to Eustratios, he shows a remarkable knowledge of Proklean
works such as the Elements of Theology, the Platonic Theology and the commentary
on the Parmenides. However, a closer reading of his commentaries on Nicomachean
Ethics 1 and 6 reveals that he was acquainted with the commentary on the Alcibiades
I as well. In fact, Eustratios reliance on this text may be unsurprising if, as has re-
cently been suggested, Eustratios and Michael of Ephesos not only collaborated in
the writing of the commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, but probably grew up to-
gether under one and the same teacher, John Italos. They must have shared the same
library and had access to the same books. However, while Michaels quotations from
his sources are often word for word transcriptions, Eustratios more often than not
rephrases Proklos text autonomously. He changes the grammar and the word order
and reframes Proklos vocabulary in new sentences. Clearly this makes it more diffi-
cult to identify the precise Proklean passages which Eustratios is actually excerpting.
Though in many cases there is little doubt that in composing his commentaries on
Nicomachean Ethics 1 and 6 Eustratios had Proklos texts on his desk. In this paper I
shall focus on Eustratios nuanced strategy of appropriating Proklos work.
I.
When commenting on Aristotles mention (1096b1718) of certain pleasures and hon-
ours which are pursued per se, Eustratios contends that among these one must count
only those pleasures that arise in the soul from the contemplation of beings and the
absence of bodily passions. When referring to the condition that characterizes the
embodied soul, Eustratios relies on the imagery of the stream or wave ()
of passions in which the soul is drawn, and contrasts this condition with the rest or
5 Cf. Luna 2001.

6 Cf. Steel 2002a.
7 On this see Giocarinis 1964, Steel 2002a, Trizio 2009a.
8 See the literature collected by Golitsis 2015 (forthcoming).
9 This is precisely the case in Michaels long excerpt from Proklos commentary on Alcibiades I (Prokl.
In I Alc., ed. A.P. Segonds, v. 2, Paris 1986, pp. 293, 6295, 24) discovered by Steel 2002a, 5556.
10 On Eustratios way of excerpting Proklos, see Trizio 2009a and Trizio 2014b.
11 Eustr. In I EN, ed. G. Heylbut, Berlin 1892, p. 52, 3235.
The waves of passions | 69
peace or, even better, the stillness of the sea () as a metaphor for the souls
impassibility and the lack of bodily passions. The passage reads as follows: And the
condition that derives from the impassibility occurs when the soul reaches a quiet
and undisturbed stillness, when freed from the waves of passions and its lower fac-
ulties are controlled by its nobler part. A comparison between Proklos commentary
on Alcibiades I and this Eustratian passage demonstrate beyond any doubt the latters
dependence upon the former:
Prokl. In Alc. I, 44, 1115, p. 36, 1217 Segonds: Eustr. In I EN, pp. 52, 3553, 3
- Heylbut:
, - , -
- -
, ,
, - , -
-
. .
After Numenius, the Neoplatonists mostly elaborated on the metaphor of waves and
water as the souls condition in the material world, drawn in the stream of passions
and bodily affections, in the context of their allegorical interpretation of Homer. Here
Eustratios utilizes Proklos as a repertoire of arguments and imageries which he incor-
porates into his own comments on Aristotles text with some variations to the grammar
and structure of the original passage. This attitude, though it avoids copy-paste quo-
tation and supports a rather mimetic attitude, nevertheless reveals Eustratios sources
clearly. Accordingly, Eustratios statement, elsewhere, that the descended soul is like
drawn and fallen into a violent stream of flowing water (
) should be read against this
background.
Eustratios appropriation of Proklos Homeric scholarship fits in with other Eu-
stratian passages where the commentator suggests that true knowledge demands
transcendence of the passions and the knowledge based upon sense-perception
data. The Christian overtones in Eustratios account for true knowledge are evi-
12 See e.g. Prokl. In Alc. I, 59, 8, p. 49, 8; In Remp., ed. W. Kroll, Leipzig 1899, v. 1, p. 175, 28; In Crat.,
ed. G. Pasquali, Leipzig 1908, p. 178, 46; In Tim., ed. E. Diehl, Leipzig 1903, v. 1, p. 85, 6. See also the
similar usage of the imagery of (flood) in Hymn. I, ed. E. Vogt, Wiesbaden 1957, l.20; IV, 10 Vogt
and (gulf) in Hymn., I, 30 Vogt. On this Neoplatonic imagery and its allegorical background,
see among others Ppin 1982; A. P. Segonds 1985, 148, n. 5; Lamberton 1989a, 221232; Brisson 1992,
578584; Van den Berg 2001, 168, 175176. The link between the imagery of water and sea as referred
to the material world and the allegorical interpretation of Homeric writings is, for example, evident in
Prokl. In Crat., p. 158, 710 Pasquali.
13 Eustr., p. 92, 13 Heylbut.
14 On this see Trizio 2009a, 90108.
70 | M. Trizio
dent in his refusal of metempsychosis: the soul received the intelligibles within itself
when created by God. Nonetheless, even when endorsing this Christian view in its
general terms, the commentators vocabulary borrows from Proklos. The latter is in-
voked even in describing the loss of the Adamic condition, an event which, according
to Eustratios, bears neither moral nor eschatological undertones, but merely explains
the reason why the soul, having lost its perfect and continuous knowledge, has to
recollect little by little the innate intelligibles contained that it forgot after binding
with the body and matter.
Accordingly, Eustratios theory of concept formation depends heavily on Proklos.
In Eustratios view real knowledge takes place at the level of non-discursive think-
ing, when the soul can approach the intelligibles grasping them through direct ap-
prehensions ( );
contrary to discursive reasoning, immediate intellection consists in grasping the in-
telligibles directly ( -
). Thus the soul gains knowledge of the true beings by grasping
them through direct apprehensions (
); elsewhere Eustratios claims that this superior kind
of knowledge takes place by imitation of the supreme Intellect, when the soul grasps
the intelligibles through direct and non-syllogistic apprehensions (
). In the same
context, Proklos speaks of the contemplation of the intelligible substance as some-
thing which takes place when we enter the simple, unmoved and undivided genera of
beings by means of direct and undivided apprehensions ( -
);
elsewhere he remarks that the first dialectics is that which knows the true beings
through direct apprehensions ( -
); finally, when commenting on the Chaldean Oracles
Proklos defends that the intellect thinks all things by means of direct and undivided
apprehensions ( ).
15 On this see Ierodiakonou 2005a.

16 On Eustratios account of the loss of the Adamic condition and its Byzantine reception, see Trizio
2013.
17 Eustr. In VI EN, ed. G. Heylbut, Berlin 1892, p. 273, 56.
18 Eustr. In VI EN, p. 297, 2021 Heylbut. I read here instead of .
19 Eustr. In VI EN Heylbut, p. 314, 1415.
20 Eustr. In VI EN, p. 315, 3536 Heylbut. See also Eustr. In VI EN, p. 378, 23 Heylbut: -
.
21 Prokl. 247, 57, In Alc. I, p. 294, 68 Segonds.
22 Prokl. In Prm., 704, 2122, ed. C. Steel et al., Oxford 20072009, p. 102, 2223. See also In Tim., 1,
pp. 438, 30439, 1 Diehl: .
23 Prokl. Ecl. De Phil. Chald., fr. 4, ed. des Places, Paris 1961, ll.34.
II.
As noted above, Eustratios believes that in order to reach this superior knowledge one
must do away with passions and bodily hindrances. Along the same lines Michael of
Ephesos long excerpts from Proklos In Alcibiades I paraphrases Proklos long pro-
treptic invitation to do away with the multifarious passions and desires for external
objects and transcend and unite with the one in us, the flower of the intellect ( -
). Eustratios himself relies on the very same imagery, after the authority
of Ps.-Dionysios the Areopagite, for describing the soul that becomes divine as it is
united with God in accordance with the one present in it (
). The reference to Dionysios is problematic in that the
expression flower of the intellect ( ) as such occurs only in the scholia
to the corpus dionysiacum attributed to 6th c. Bishop John of Scythopolis, who does not
seem to refer this imagery to the one in the soul. Thus one may fruitfully speculate
that under the mask of Ps.-Dionysios the Areopagite Eustratios dissimulates Proklos
assertion in his commentary on the Alcibiades I that by participating in the Intellect
we also participate in the primary principles whereby unity comes to all beings ac-
cording to the one and, so to say, the flower of our essence, through which above all
we join the divine( , ,
). A comparison between the two texts once
again suggests Eustratios dependence on Proklos:
Proklos, In I Alc., 247, 911, p. Eustr. In I EN, p. 4, 3338 Heylbut:

294, 1114 Segonds:
- ,
, , -
,
- , -
24 Prokl. In Alc I, 245, 6248, 4, p. 293, 6295, 4 Segonds. On Michaels excerpts see Steel 2002a. On
the notion of the flower of the intellect and its background in the Chaldean Oracles see Lewy 1956,
165169; Rist 1964; Gersh 1978b, , 119121; Majercik 1989, 4243, 138139.
25 Eustr. In I EN, p. 4, 3738 Heylbut.
26 See Rorem and J. C. Lamoreaux 1998a, 117118. Nonetheless, as specialists know, Ps.-Dionysios
does indeed speak of flowers (De Div. Nom., ed. B.-R. Suchla, Berlin 1990, p. 132, 14) in a way which
is strongly reminiscent of Proklos with respect to the Son and the Holy Spirit being flowers and
supressential lights of the divinity. See also Michael Psellos, Phil. Min. 2, ed. D.J. OMeara, Leipzig
1989, p. 131, 2324.
72 | M. Trizio
, ,
. .
Let me focus on Proklos reference to the flower of our essence as that whereby above
all we join the divine ( ). This matches other
passages in Proklos work, as when he speaks of that part of the rational soul whereby
we join the gods ( ); or the description of knowledge
related to this faculty as that through which only divinely inspired knowledge enters
in conjunction with the gods ( -
); or Proklos description of the most perfect form of life as that through which
we join the gods ( ); and finally Proklos reference to
the intellectual part of the soul as the only one through which we may become akin to
the divine ( ). Doubtless, these statements
form the basis for Eustratios description in his commentary on Posterior Analytics 2 of
intellectual knowledge as that which allows us to join the divine things ( -
); or elsewhere, like when Eustratios speaks of the contemplative
man as he who becomes akin to God and the divine things through abstinence from
passions ( ).
Actually most of Eustratios vocabulary concerning the passions and the body as a
burden for the soul and the latters need to imitate the Intellect is taken from Proklos:
(1) Proklos, In Alc. I, 127, 1014, p. 105, 1116 Segonds:
,

, . (2)
In Alc. I, 144, 69, p. 120, 710 Segonds:

. (3) In Alc. I, 251, 10
12, p. 297, 1315 Segonds:
. (4) Theol. Plat., 1, 74, 2425 Saffrey-
Westerink: . (5) In Prm. 988,
2628, p. 203, 2628 Steel et al.:
, .
27 See also Prokl. In Parm., 1071, 2531, p. 41, 1942, 24 Steel: ,

, <...>;
, ;
28 Prokl. In Tim., 1, p. 223, 1718 Diehl.
29 Prokl. In Tim., 3, p. 160, 12 Diehl.
30 Prokl. In Remp., 1, p. 177, 16 Kroll.
31 Prokl., Plat. Theol., ed. H.D. Saffrey, L.G. Westerink, vol. 1, Paris 1968, p. 15, 78.
32 Eustr. In A.Po. 2, ed. M. Hayduck, Berlin 1907, p. 19, 2223.
(1) Eustr. In I EN, p. 59, 3460, 3 Heylbut:

. (2) Eustr. In I EN 70,
1219 Heylbut: .
, ,
, ,
, ,
,
-
. (3) Eustr. In I EN, 88, 1015 Heylbut: , , ,
-
, ,
,
,
. (4) Eustr. In VI EN 271, 2830 Heylbut:
, -


. (7) Eustr. In VI
EN, 377, 39378, 4 Heylbut: ,
,
, ,
.
III.
Let me return to Eustratios metaphor of the embodied soul as drawn and fallen into a
violent stream of flowing water ( -
). In connection with this imagery, Eustratios elaborates
an emphatic description of the innate knowledge of the soul as something that re-
quires a cleansing to become visible, like a live coal covered in ash, of which only
the smoke is visible; but then, once the smoke disperses, shines and is often rekin-
dled as fire when in contact with firewood ( ,
,
). This imagery depicts innate
knowledge in the soul as a fire that is at first only visible through the little smoke em-
33 Eustr. In VI EN, p. 320, 2936 Heylbut. The same imagery is also present at Eustr. In A.Po. 2, p. 258,
12 Hayduck.
74 | M. Trizio
anating from the ashes of an almost extinguished fire. However, if kindled properly,
the fire (of knowledge) may burn again. In fact, Eustratios believes that true knowl-
edge is only due to the innate logoi in the human soul, whereas sense-perception data
are biased and deceitful. However, in its present state, the soul has lost awareness of
these contents. Yet, just as the fire which is about to be extinguished may be rekin-
dled, so the innate knowledge in the soul can be reactivated when stimulated by the
experience of sensible realities. In other words, according to Eustratios, the latter is
not a reliable source of knowledge, but it is nevertheless useful for reactivating the
recollection of the innate knowledge of the soul.
In spite of all my efforts I could not trace this imagery in Eustratios back to any
of the known Neoplatonic or Patristic sources. It would be tempting here to hypothe-
size the authors dependence upon some lost Neoplatonic source which may still have
been available at the time. In fact, even the image of the fire covered in ash used to
describe innate knowledge in the soul is strongly rooted in Neoplatonic literature. As
specialists are likely aware, following some verses in the Chaldean Oracles fire became
an allegory for describing intellectual power in the soul in Neoplatonism. Unsurpris-
ingly, Proklos commentary on Alcibiades I reveals a terminological echo of Eustratios
passage when describing the gods who show the souls the path towards the intelligi-
ble and kindle the anagogic fires (
). Even though one cannot rule
out the possibility that Eustratios had access to sources unknown to us, his creative
approach to Neoplatonic sources is so consistent throughout his work that it is easy
to believe the imageries discussed in this paper are his own. Throughout his commen-
taries on Aristotle Eustratios does not simply copy Proklos, but seemingly imperson-
ates Proklos, as though he himself were a Neoplatonist. In this way the author suc-
ceeds in creating imageries which are both traditional, rooted in earlier Neoplatonic
allegories, and at the same time novel, never before composed as Eustratios does.
IV.
Just as this strategy is clear to modern readers, so it must have been evident to 11th
12th centuries readers of Eustratios work. Eustratios appealed to readers both
fellows of his and important members of the aristocracy with philosophical inter-
ests who could detect the Neoplatonic flavour of his imagery and at the same time
appreciate the creative process that led the author to produce his own Neoplatonic
34 On this, see Trizio 2009a, 99108.

35 See e.g. Oracula Chaldaica, fr. 126, fr. 130, fr. 190. Cf. Majercik 1989, 189190; 211.
36 Prokl. In I Alc., 188, 1718, p. 248, 1718 Segonds. See also Theol. Plat., 3, p. 5, 1216 Saffrey-
Westerink.
metaphors. This leads me to conclude by framing Eustratios peculiar hermeneutic

within two connected factors that had an impact on the Byzantine culture of the time:
the first is the rise of Neoplatonic vocabulary as the noblest and finest philosophical
vocabulary then available. An interesting parallel is that of Eustratios former teacher
John Italos. In a piece in the interpretation of Odyssey 19, 562567, Italos contrasts
a noble interpretation of the Homeric passage at stake to a vulgar or low class
() one. Intriguingly, the noble interpretation is meant to match the dignity
of the addressee of this piece, that is to say the third son of emperor Konstantine X
(10591067), Andronikos Doukas, and is constructed entirely from Neoplatonic vo-
cabulary found in the works of Plotinos and Proklos. So, just like Eustratios, also
Italos writes for an important member of the aristocracy; and just like his pupil, Italos
also believes that in order to construct an interpretation of a passage that is both
sound and appropriate to the status of the reader, one must adopt Neoplatonic vocab-
ulary and its related imagery. The second aspect, related to the first, is the revival of
Neoplatonic allegorical hermeneutics in 11th12th c. Byzantium and its Neoplatonic
roots. Though further studies are needed to shed light on this trend, the case of
Eustratios quite clearly suggests that it had an impact on the writing of Aristotelian
commentaries as well.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
[Pseudo] Dionysios Areoipagites, De Divinis Nominibus. B.R. Suchla (ed.), Corpus Dionysiacum i:
Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita. De divinis nominibus, Berlin 1990.
Eustratios, In Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea I. G. Heylbut (ed.), Berlin 1892, 1121.
Eustratios, In Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea I. G. Heylbut (ed.), Berlin 1892, 256406.
Eustratios, In Aristotelis Analyticorum Posteriorum librum secundum, M. Hayduck (ed.), Berlin 1907.
Michael Psellos, Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica. D.J. OMeara (ed.), Michaelis
Pselli philosophica minora, vol. 2., Leipzig 1989. Oracula Chaldaica. . des Places (ed.), Oracles
chaldaques, Paris 1971.
37 His fellows are explicitly mentioned by Eustratios as the intended audience of his commentary
on Posterior Analytics 2 (Eustr. In A.Po. 2, p. 123, 2729 Hayduck), whereas his commentaries on
Nicomachean Ethics 6 are addressed to a princess (In VI EN, 256, 3257, 12 Heylbut), probably Anna
Komnene ( ca. 1153).
38 On this work of Italos, see Trizio 2013. See also Ricklin 1998, 278284, which escaped my attention
when writing my piece on this Italos text. On Andronikos as addressee of philosophical works, see
I. D. Polemis 1968, 4648. On Psellos and Italos scholarship for Andronikos and Michael VII, see the
remarks by Conley 1998, 5155.
39 On which see Cesaretti 1991a; Roilos 2005, 121126, 175182, 198201, 296299, with particular
emphasis on Proklos as source for 11th12th c. Byzantine allegoric hermeneutics. See also Roilos 2004.
76 | M. Trizio
Proklos, In Platonis Alcibiadem I. A.P. Segonds (ed.), Proclus. Sur le premier Alcibiade de Platon, 2
vols., Paris 19851986.
Proklos, In Platonis Rem publicam. W. Kroll (ed.), Procli Diadochi in Platonis rem publicam
commentarii, 2 vols. Leipzig 18991901.
Proklos, In Platonis Cratylum. G. Pasquali (ed.), Procli Diadochi in Platonis Cratylum commentaria.
Leipzig 1908.
Proklos, In Platonis Timaeum. E. Diehl (ed.), Procli Diadochi in Platonis Timaeum commentaria, 3
vols, Leipzig 19031906.
Proklos, Hymni 17. E. Vogt (ed.), Procli hymni, Wiesbaden 1957.
Proklos, Theologia Platonica. H.D. Saffrey, L.G. Westerink (ed.), Proclus. Thologie platonicienne,
vols. 16, 19681997.
Proklos, Eclogae de philosophia Chaldaica. . des Places (ed.), Oracles chaldaques, Paris 1971,
206212.
Secondary Sources
Angelou, A. D. (1984a). Introduction. In: Nicholas of Methone. Refutation of Proclus' Elements of
Theology. Ed. by A. D. Angelou. Athens, pp. ixlxxx.
Benakis, L. (1987b). Neues zur Proklos-Tradition in Byzanz. In: Proclus et son influence. Actes du
Colloque de Neuchtel, juin 1985. Ed. by G. Boss and G. Seel. Neuchtel, pp. 241253.
Brisson, L. (1992). Porphyre. La vie de Plotin II. Paris.
Cacouros, M. (2000c). Eustrate de Nice. In: Dictionnaire de Philosophes Antiques. Ed. by
R. Goulet. Vol. III. Paris, pp. 378388.
Cavallo, G. (2007a). Qualche riflessione sulla collezione filosofica. In: The Libraries of the
Neoplatonists. Ed. by C. D'Ancona. Leiden, pp. 155166.
Cesaretti, P. (1991a). Allegoristi di Omero a Bisanzio: Ricerche ermeneutiche (XIXII secolo). Milano.
Dodds, E. R. (1963a). Introduction. In: Proclus. The Elements of Theology. Ed. by E. R. Dodds.
3rd ed. Oxford, pp. ixxlvii.
Gersh, S. (1978b). From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of
the pseudo-Dionysian Tradition. Leiden.
Giocarinis, K. (1964). Eustratius of Nicaea's Defense of the Doctrine of Ideas. In: Franciscan
Studies. Franciscan Studies 24 24, pp. 159204.
Golitsis, P. (2008). Georges Pachymre comme didascale. Essai pour une reconstitution de sa
carrire et de son enseignement philosophique. In: Jahrbuch der sterreichischen
Byzantinistik 58, pp. 5368.
Golitsis, P. (2010). Copistes, lves et rudits : la production de manuscrits philosophiques autour
de Georges Pachymre. In: The Legacy of Bernard de Montfaucon: Three Hundred Years of
Studies on Greek Handwriting. Ed. by A. Bravo Garca, I. Prez Martn, and J. Signes Codoer.
Bibliologia 31. Turnhout, pp. 157170, 75776.
Golitsis, P. (2015 (forthcoming)). Michel d'phse. In: Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques.
Ed. by R. Goulet. Paris.
Ierodiakonou, K. (2005a). Metaphysics in the Byzantine Tradition: Eustratios of Nicaea on
Universals. In: Quaestio 5, pp. 6782.
Lamberton, R. (1989a). Homer the Theologian: Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading and the Growth of
the Epic Tradition. Berkeley.
Lewy, H. (1956). Chaldaen Oracles and Theurgy. Cairo.
Luna, C. (2001). Trois tudes sur la tradition des commentaires anciens la Metaphysique d'Aristote.
Leiden, Boston, and Kln.
Luna, C. and A. P. Segonds (2007). Introduction. In: Proclus. Commentaire sur le Parmnide de
Platon. Ed. by C. Luna and A. P. Segonds. Paris.
Majercik, R. (1989). The Chaldean Oracles: Text, Translation and Commentary. Leiden.
O'Meara, D. J. (2014b). Michael Psellos. In: Interpreting Proclus from Antiquity to the Renaissance.
Ed. by S. Gersh. Cambridge, pp. 165181.
Parry, K. (2006c). Reading Proclus Diadochus in Byzantium. In: Reading Plato in Antiquity. Ed. by
Ppin, J. (1982). The Platonic and Christian Ulysses. In: Neoplatonism and Christian Thought.
Ed. by D. J. O'Meara. Norfolk (VA), pp. 318.
Podskalsky, G. (1976c). Nikolaos von Methone und die Proklosrenaissance in Byzanz (11./12. Jh.)
Polemis, I. D. (1968). The Doukai: A Contribution to Byzantine Prosopography. London.
Ricklin, T. (1998). Der Traum der Philosophie im 12. Jahrhundert. Traumtheorien zwischen
Constantinus Africanus und Aristoteles. Leiden, Boston, and Kln.
Rist, J. (1964). Mysticism and Transcendence in Later Neoplatonism. In: Hermes 92, pp. 213225.
Roilos, P. (2004). Unshapely Bodies and Beautifying Embellishments: The Ancient Epics in
Byzantium, Allegorical Hermeneutics, and the Case of Ioannes Diakonos Galenos. In: Jahrbuch
der sterreichischen Byzantinistik 64, pp. 231246.
Roilos, P. (2005). Amphoteroglossia: A Poetics of the Twelfth-Century Medieval Greek Novel.
Cambridge (MA).
Rorem, P. and J. C. Lamoreaux (1998a). John of Scythopolis and the Dionysian Corpus. Annotating the
Areopagite. Oxford.
Saffrey, H. D. (2007). Retour sur le Parisinus graecus 1807, le manuscript A de Platon. In: The
Libraries of the Neoplatonists. Ed. by C. D'Ancona. Leiden, pp. 328.
Segonds, A. P. (1985). Introduction. In: Proclus. Sur le premier Alcibiade de Platon. Ed. by
A. P. Segonds. Vol. 1. Paris, pp. viicxlviii.
Steel, C. (1999). Proclus comme tmoin du texte du Parmnide. In: Tradition et traduction. Le
textes philosophique et scientifiques grecs au Moyen ge Latin. Ed. by R. Beyers et al. Leuven,
pp. 281303.
Steel, C. and C. Mac (2006b). Georges Pachymre philologue: le Commentaire de Proclus au
Parmnide dans le manuscrit Parisinus gr. 1810. In: Philosophie et science Byzance de 1204
1453. Lex textes, les doctrines et leur transmission. Ed. by M. Cacouros and M. Congordeau.
Leuven, pp. 77100.
Trizio, M. (2013). Escaping through the Homeric Gates. John Italos' Neoplatonic Exegesis of
Odyssey 19.562567 Between Synesius and Proclus. In: Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione
Filosofica Medievale 24, pp. 6983.
Trizio, M. (2014b). Eleventh-to Twelfth-Century Byzantium. In: Interpreting Proclus from Antiquity
Van den Berg, R. M. (2001). Proclus' Hymns. Essays, Translations, Commentary. Leiden.
Westerink, L. G. (1954). Introduction. In: Proclus Diadochus. Commentary on the first Alcibiades of
Plato. Ed. by L. G. Westerink. Amsterdam, pp. viixi.
Westerink, L. G. (1989). Introduction. In: George Pachymeres. Commentary om Plato's Parmenides
(Anonymous Sequel to Proclus' Commentary). Ed. by T. Gadra. Athens, pp. ixxix.
Graeme Miles
Psellos and his Traditions
1 Introduction
Though Michael Psellos work is now more accessible than ever before, there remains
a great deal to be interpreted, and in particular two central questions require address:
what is Psellos relationship to Christianity? What is his relationship to Neoplaton-
ism? On a first glance at his numerous surviving works, the answers to both might
seem quite straightforward. With regard to Christianity, it is well known that Psellos
was willing to become a monk, and that he wrote and lectured extensively on theo-
logical topics, besides writing hagiographic works and religious orations. His great
admiration for Gregory of Nazianzus ought to be evident to any reader of the short
texts collected as his Theologica. In terms of philosophical affiliation, Psellos ad-
miration for Proclus and (somewhat more reservedly) for other Neoplatonists is also
evident. What then, one might wonder, is the problem? Closer investigation brings
out several related issues concerning both his religious and philosophical positions
and the relationship between the two.
It is well known that there were suspicions of Psellos orthodoxy, to which he
responded vigorously, though differently in different contexts. His Admission of
Faith, is a carefully conventional document, but his epistolary responses to Ker-
oularios and Xiphilinos on this issue are rather more spirited and individual state-
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference of the International Society for Neo-
platonic Studies in Cardiff (June 2013). I would like to express my gratitude to Dr Sergei Mariev, who
organised a very stimulating panel on Byzantine Neoplatonism, and to the other delegates for discus-
sion and suggestions.
1 The series of Teubner editions initiated by Westerink provides the fundamental materials; I shall
refer especially to Psellos, Ph. M. I; Ph. M. II; Theol. I; Theol. II, and Or. M. Kaldellis ongoing series of
translations (beginning with Kaldellis 2006) promises to expose a wider audience to Psellos work.
An invaluable bibliographic guide is provided by Moore 2005a. Because a great deal of Psellos work
remains untranslated, I provide my own translations in the course of the discussion below. These
make no claim to elegance, but only to convey the structure and content of Psellos discussions. I also
paraphrase frequently for reasons of space.
2 Psellos, Theol. I and Theol. II. As Maltese 1994b, 295 observes: il ruolo di Gregorio prevale rispetto
alla materia biblica ed incomparabilmente superiore a quello degli altri Padri e autori bizantini.
Further on Psellos use of Gregory see especially Papaioannou 2013b, 5187.
3 It is impossible to discuss Psellos philosophical work without reference to Proclus. See in particular
Chrestou 2005b; F. Lauritzen 2010b, 2012, 2013 and OMeara 2014c. Also still useful is Zervos 1920.
4 See Garzya 19661967, 4243, who observes that it follows the same order as the Nicaean-
Constantinopolitan creed and is heavily dependent on John Damascenes de fide orthodoxa.
DOI 10.1515/9781501503597-005
80 | G. Miles
ments of his position. As a Consul of the Philosophers ( ) in

eleventh-century Constantinople, Psellos was obliged to respond to, and in a sense
to represent, pre-Christian, Hellenic learning in a Christian society. This position,
and his great erudition and evident commitment to these studies, were certainly
enough to raise the suspicions of those who favoured a narrower range of intellec-
tual affiliations. Indeed, these suspicions appear to have been in part responsible for
Psellos loss of favour at court and brief self-exile to Olympos. In more recent times
Psellos orthodoxy has been suspected to the extent that one image of the Byzantine
polymath in contemporary scholarship has been that of the secretly anti-Christian
Psellos, encoding his true beliefs for the astute reader. This rather extreme view is
difficult to maintain in light of Psellos many, careful theological discussions and his
hagiographic and other religious works. These works, far from being pressed upon
him, represent a conscious and deliberate choice to work within Christian discourse
and an Orthodox tradition which Psellos clearly knew very well. Gregory of Nazianzus
in particular looms large, not only as one of the theological founding figures of the
Orthodox Church, but also as an ideal writer and rhetorician, onto whom Psellos
projected the attributes which he himself aspired to embody.
Psellos detailed knowledge of Platonic, and especially Neoplatonic, philosophy
is easily demonstrated. In many of the lectures and essays now edited as his Philo-
sophica Minora, he outlines arguments from ancient authors, especially Proclus, and
the framework of his thought, to be sure, is Neoplatonic. What Psellos chooses to say,
however, within this framework, can on occasion be rather more surprising, and his
Platonism is evidently of a rather unorthodox kind. The relationship of this philo-
sophical affiliation to the Christian faith, moreover, is precisely the point at issue in
his defence of his religious orthodoxy in the letters to Keroularios and Xiphilinos. De-
spite the ease with which he mixes Christian and pagan learning in his theological lec-
5 On the greater difficulties faced by the next Consul of the Philosophers, Psellos student Johannes
Italos, see F. Lauritzen 2008b, Arabatzis 2002, Angold 1995, 5054, Gouillard 1976b, 1985c, Clucas
1981b, Podskalsky 1977, Anastasi 1975, Browning 1975, Hussey 1960, Tatakis 2003a, Joannou 1956 and
Stephanou 1949b. Hellenes in Psellos, as generally in Byzantine Greek, means pagan Greeks. See,
among many examples, Psellos, Ph. M. I, 3, 1719.
6 On his time at Olympos in 1054 see the four short pieces numbered 36 in Littlewoods Oratoria Mi-
nora and F. Lauritzen 2011; Gautier 1974a. On the relative stability of Psellos position at court and a
very plausible explanation for this: F. Lauritzen 2007a.
7 Kaldellis 1999.
8 Papaioannou 2013b, 5187.
9 Examples will occur in the course of the following discussion. For more straightforward reporting
of Proclus views see for instance Psellos, Ph. M. II, 26 (On Evil) which follows closely Proclus De
Malorum Substinentia 11, 1.
10 On Psellos critical understanding of Platonism see OMeara 1998b and on his high valuation of
the human composite as a whole: Miles 2014. On contemplation of the natural world as an important
component of his mysticism (following Niketas Stethatos): F. Lauritzen 2011.
tures, readers (and presumably some at least of his initial listeners) might wonder at
the prominent use of Neoplatonic hermeneutics to make sense of Christian scripture.
More than just providing a pagan prefiguring of Christian thought, a notion which
would have been quite unobjectionable and conventional, Proclean Neoplatonism
serves implicitly as a means to greater understanding of scripture and other Christian
texts. Though Psellos is always careful in these contexts to separate us Christians
from those Hellenes, the implicitly high valuation of Neoplatonism as hermeneutic
key is remarkable.
The immense complexity of the philosophical, literary, rhetorical and religious
traditions that Psellos, like other Byzantine thinkers, inherited, was such that it of-
fered great scope for choosing ones own position, and for combining positions and
ideas from previous authors in new ways. Of this kind of intellectual freedom, Psel-
los made considerable and brilliant use. This is becoming increasingly apparent in
the newer scholarship on his work, and it may be said with some confidence that the
way forward in Psellan studies lies in detailed and careful readings of his many texts,
in particular with an eye to how these combinations, transformations and balancing
acts are carried out in the context of specific discussions. One of the major traits
of his thought, which has become increasingly apparent to scholars approaching his
work from a number of angles, is the ability to unite apparent contradictions, to find
middle ground. Trizio suggests, in a thoughtful and thought provoking article on the
methodological difficulties in studying, and indeed defining, Byzantine philosophy,
that discussion must proceed from the inner criteria of the tradition under investi-
gation. Likewise, I attempt to clarify Psellos understanding of the undertakings
which he considers to be philosophy as far as possible from indications in the texts
themselves rather than according to external criteria for what counts as philosophy or
theology.
The chapter to follow falls into three major sections concerned with the different
facets of Psellos self-proclaimedly multifaceted persona and activity, and the inter-
action of these sides of his character with each other. The first examines Psellos the
Platonist, and the nature of his uses of and reactions to Platonic tradition. The sec-
ond turns to Psellos the Christian, while the third looks at the tensions between these
two aspects and the possibilities for their union. Even in the first two sections, the
Christian will intrude upon the Hellenic and vice versa. This in itself is telling of how
intertwined the strands of Psellos traditions are. Naturally, no single article is going
to exhaust these topics, but I hope, through close readings of some telling texts, to
11 Such work is, of course, underway in many quarters. In addition to Papaioannou 2013b see Barber
and Jenkins 2006; F. Lauritzen 2008b, 2010b, 2011, 2012; de Vries-van der Velden 1999.
12 On Psellos rhetorical self-fashioning see especially Papaioannou 2013b. On Psellos finding of mid-
dle ground: Jenkins 2006b, Delli 2007b and Miles 2014.
13 Trizio 2007b.
82 | G. Miles
offer provisional observations on Psellos thought in general, and in particular to

further the understanding of Psellos complex, Typhoean nature, and some of the
delicate balances which he was able to strike.
2 Psellos the Platonist

As has often been observed, Psellos philosophical writings range widely in charac-
ter. On many occasions, he is content with outlining for his students the teachings
of the ancients, paraphrasing or quoting the authors in question and making some
comment on the arguments that he presents. To take just one example of many, in
his essay On the Intelligible Beauty, Psellos closely follows Plotinus famous essay
of the same title. Even in this relatively straightforward pedagogical piece, the Plo-
tinian material appears to be combined with Proclus, unsurprisingly perhaps given
Psellos close acquaintance with Proclus works. However that may be, Psellos is also
at pains to state his own opinion on the ancient material which he is summarising: it
is, to my mind, he says, not very discordant, and whatever is hard and unyielding
in those things, has been made consistent by me. The role which Psellos sees him-
self playing in the presentation of this material is made clearer in the conclusion of
this piece, when he writes that these things were said by those who are followers of
Plotinus and Iamblichus mixed up together (), but has been purified
() among us. Here, as often we are Christians, as opposed to the
Hellenes whose views he has been discussing.
It is easy to be scornful of this fairly bare reporting of ancient philosophical po-
sitions, but it must be stressed that teaching of this sort was something that Psellos
found in need of reviving. Though his claims to have found philosophy utterly ne-
glected and to have brought the study back to life are, of course, motivated in large
part by the requirements of his self-presentation, there does seem to have been a great
deal of truth to these assertions. Philosophy, especially Platonic philosophy, had
been neglected in Byzantium in the centuries leading up to Psellos, and his efforts as
14 This is an observation often made in recent studies of Psellos. See for instance OMeara 1998b, 431,
who stresses the caractre provisoire of his observations on Psellos philosophy. See also Cacouros
(2007, 207208) cautions regarding attribution of texts to Psellos.
15 OMeara 1998b.
16 Psellos, Ph. M. II, pp. 115117.
17 Plot., Enn., V 8 [31], ed. P. Henry, H.-R. Schwyzer, Oxford 1977, vol. II, pp. 268287.
18 On Psellos use of his sources see Delli 2007b.
19 Psellos, Ph. M. II, 34, p. 116, 910.
20 Psellos, Ph. M. II, 34, p. 117, 2022.
21 Frequently cited in this regard is the autobiographical passage in the Chronographia: Chapter 38,
ed. . Renauld, Paris 1926, p. 136. See the sceptical view of Browning 1975, 6. More recently, and largely
a teacher did exert a real influence, however pedestrian this activity may sometimes
appear.
Psellos attitude to the Platonic tradition is not, however, uncritically positive.
Though, as is well known, he writes of Proclus with keen admiration, he is not al-
ways so favourably disposed towards other Neoplatonists. Porphyry, in particular,
is a frequent target for negative comments. To take just one example, Psellos essay
On Hades begins with a request from a student to hear an opinion on Hades dif-
ferent to the ones which he already knows. The remainder of the passage recounts a
view of Porphyry that the mythological Hades is in fact an allegorical representation
of the pneuma which the psyche had acquired from the spheres and put on as a gar-
ment ( ). This garment goes with the soul when it leaves the
body, taking images from life with it. Though Psellos gives a considerable amount
of detail in his explication of Porphyrys thought, he is quite vehement in empha-
sising that he does not agree: I do not say these things, for I am not so crazy, but
the teller-of-prodigies () Porphyry, who first and most of all did not make
clear the beliefs of the Hellenes, but even made them more vain. One of the motivat-
ing factors for this dislike of Porphyry is, of course, the generally negative reputation
that he had always held among Christians due to the importance of his anti-Christian
polemic. Though on other occasions Psellos uses Porphyrys works rather more ap-
preciatively, in the present passage the irreconcilability of Porphyrys theory which
Christian eschatology leads to its dismissal without real argument. This explains, in
confirming Psellos view of his uniqueness in his time, albeit with some qualifications: J. Duffy 2002c.
On the dates of the lectures: Kaldellis 2005.
22 There are, on occasion, criticisms of Proclus. See for instance Psellos, Theol. I, pp. 145148, where
the view of Proclus is dismissed along with Porphyry and Iamblichus. Here Proclus is even described
as a teratologos, which is elsewhere used perjoratively of Porphyry (Psellos, Ph. M. I, 40, 41). Delli
well describes the variety of attitudes with which Psellos cites Proclus: il oscille entre ladmiration
sans rserve et lironie plus ou moins lgante (2007, 228). She also well observes that his greater
familiarity with Proclus over some other authors (e.g. John Philoponus) allows Psellos to be rather
freer in his treamtment of Proclean material.
23 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 40, pp. 148151.
24 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 40, 7, p. 149.
25 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 40, 1115, p. 149. Psellos draws here on Porphyrys Sententiae ad Intelligibilia
Ducentes, Sentence 29 (p. 18, 7 Lamberz), as Duffy observes in his apparatus fontium (Psellos, Ph. M.
I, 40, p. 144), and as Psellos states himself in the opening of this piece (lines 13). For commentary:
Brisson 2005, 590606.
26 Psellos, Ph. M. I, I 40, 4042, p. 150.
27 Von Harnack 1916; Berchmann 2005; Morlet 2011, the latter with substantial earlier bibliography.
On Porphyrys religion: Johnson 2013.
28 See for instance Psellos, Theol. I, 11, 132134 and I, 12, 110118. Though in the latter instance the
exact reference in Porphyry is not clear, his approving use of the great Porphyry ( -
) is clear. For a detailed evaluation of Psellos reworking of Porphyrys De Antro Nympharum see
Cesaretti 1991b, 90123.
84 | G. Miles
particular, the unusually abrupt transition from apparently neutral presentation of

the doxa to Psellos hostile response.
As Lauritzen has recently demonstrated, there is a tendency in Psellos discus-
sions of ancient philosophy to link figures of whom he does not approve with Christian
heresies, thus effectively damning them by association. Porphyry is subjected to this
treatment with particular frequency. By contrast Proclus is almost always cited with
approval. In part, this strong approval of Proclus had long been made possible by the
works of the Pseudo-Dionysius. For Psellos, as for the majority of pre-modern readers,
these works belonged to the Athenian convert of Paul (Acts 17:34). Psellos states most
clearly in his discussion On Theology and Judgement Concerning the Hellenes his
view of the relationship between Proclus and Dionysius: This subject has been more
broadly treated ( ) by Dionysius the Areopagite, but later and
using a syllogistic method it has been made exact by the Lycian born Proclus. This is
really the reverse of the hostile procedure discussed above: while in those cases Psel-
los associates arguments and thinkers with heresies as a means of dismissing them,
the accepted orthodoxy of the Pseudo-Dionysius grants to Proclus a kind of orthodoxy
by association, despite the firmly anti-Christian stance of Proclus himself. In this
same text, in fact, Psellos is following in the footsteps of the Pseudo-Dionysius, taking
Proclean thought (on this occasion drawn from the Elements of Theology) and using it
to explicate specifically Christian problems. The use of Neoplatonic arguments in dis-
cussion of Christian theology is a characteristic Psellan trait. The writings published
as his Theologica, even more than the Philosophica Minora and the better known De
Omnifaria Doctrina, afford a great many examples of this practice, which I shall dis-
cuss further below.
In the examples discussed so far it has already become apparent that Psellos will,
on occasion, happily take up positions at odds with the philosophical material that he
is presenting for his students. The question of how far his thought moves beyond his
sources to become innovative or original is one to which only a tentative answer can
29 F. Lauritzen 2011, 289: Vittima preferita di tale operazione sembra essere Porfirio; al contrario, un
filosofo stimato da Psello fu il neoplatonico Proclo.
30 Psellos, Ph. M. II, 35, p. 118, 30 p. 119, 3. Trizio 2007b, 280 observes that in several documents,
especially doctrinal condemnations, the use of syllogisms in theology is labelled a sophistical de-
vice, and therefore sometimes as a philosophical practice in the pejorative and generic meaning of the
word. This does not imply, of course, that this was the only possible view, and Psellos observation
on the syllogistic character of Proclus as opposed to the Pseudo-Dionysius is not really a criticism
of Proclus.
31 Proclus firm, Hellenic piety, and his occasional trouble with Christian opponents, are best ob-
served in Marinus Vita Procli. See the editions of Marinus, Vita Procli with commentary of R. Masullo;
and Marinus, Proclus ou sur le Bonheur of H. D. Saffrey and A.-Ph. Segonds, with Italian and French
translations respectively.
32 See F. Lauritzen 2010b on Psellos use of Neoplatonic arguments in support of Orthodox Christian
positions.
currently be given. It should be added too that the modern concern with originality
is not one that we can assume that Psellos shared. Nonetheless, it is of interest to see
the extent to which Psellos work constitutes a contiuation rather than a mere trans-
mission of Platonic tradition. In a thoughtful discussion of the short texts which he
had edited as the second volume of Psellos Philosophica Minora, OMeara finds even
in some less novel passages considerable virtues: Mais il faut accorder Psellus une
matrise de la littrature antique concerne, un talent de dialecticien non ngligeable,
une prise de conscience claire des problmes que pose la psychologie noplatonici-
enne et des moyens de les rsoudre. In another piece (On the Way in Which Some
People Become Intelligent and Others Stupid), he finds Psellos able to use ancient
material, on this occasion both medical and philosophical, to change his students
perception of themselves and of an apparently disabled boy, Eudokimos, whom they
had been mocking, approaching the problem in a genuinely philosophical and scien-
tific spirit. Approaching a somewhat different text, the Paraphrasis on Aristotles De
Interpretatione, Ierodiakonou finds Psellos innovating in his treatment of the logical
relations between different types of assertions and negations.
This command of philosophical tradition and ability to apply its methods to par-
ticular problems in themselves make Psellos a remarkable figure in his time. Psellos
also inherits, from both Platonic and Christian tradition, the practice of allegorical
reading, and in this mode of discourse he can often be seen at his freest and most
original. He applies this type of reading to Hellenic myth, on occasion to Plato, and
to scripture and the writings of the fathers of the church, and makes general obser-
vations about its nature and purpose. In the opening of his Allegory on Tantalus,
Psellos as often addresses a group of students who have asked him to interpret the
myth for them. Once more, he says, you have drawn me back to the doors of po-
etry, from which I have drawn myself up with difficulty to the philosophical court.
To the myth in its bare () form he would not willingly return, but since the
myth has a greater meaning in it than initially appears, he will descend to it from
the sublimity of philosophy. Psellos changes images at this point to consider myth
33 OMeara 1998b, 436.

34 Psellos, Ph. M. II, 19, pp. 8893.
35 OMeara 1998b, 437438.
36 Ierodiakonou 2002b, especially 172179.
37 The bibliography on allegory is enormous. See among much else Lamberton 1989b on Neoplatonic
allegorical reading, and more recently Lamberton 2013 on Proclus practice. Further on Proclean alle-
gory: Chlup 2012a, 185200. For a general survey of allegory: Whitman 2000.
38 For examples of allegorical reading of Hellenic myth see Psellos, Ph. M. I, 42 and 44; of scripture
Psellos, Theol. I, 1 and 7.
39 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 43, pp. 153157.
40 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 43, 12, p. 153.
41 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 43, 47, p. 153.
86 | G. Miles
as play for the philosopher ( ). It is, perhaps, this spirit of

play which allows him the freedom of which he avails himself in these allegorical
texts. Psellos extends the list of playful pursuits for philosophers to include not only
myth but also pleasant speech ( , that is, rhetoric) and history, that
either dissipates the soul or draws it together.
It may well be the case that the opening of poem 25 of Gregory of Nazianzus, al-
ways Psellos favourite Christian author, is in the background here: .
, (Grey hair plays too. But its games are earnest games).
There, however, Gregory is bidding farewell to pagan culture in the form of the Helico-
nian Muses, the laurel (of Apollo) and the madness of the tripods (lines 34). While
Psellos, like Gregory, is concerned with the right form of play for one who would seem
to have moved beyond it, he is returning to just the thing to which Gregory was bidding
farewell: Hellenic myth. He is, however, keen to state the precise manner in which he
is making this return. Like the philosopher of the Republic who returns to the cave
to help his fellow prisoners, Psellos is descending from the heights to these relatively
lowly matters. The exhortation (let us play) that follows may also recall
Plotinus similar exhortation to play in his essay On Nature, where he considers
the dreaming of physis and its creation of physical things. There too, the invitation
serves to claim a greater than usual degree of speculative licence.
One of the most striking of Psellos applications of allegory is his reading of the
sphinx. Here, he sees in the traditional image of the sphinx an image of the com-
posite nature of human beings, put together from dissimilar parts ( -
): some parts have to do with rational powers, in others we share in the
irrational nature. The moulding of the human being pours all of them together,
he says, and for a time they are unclear. In response to this mixed nature he imag-
42 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 43, 11, p. 153. Duffys emendation of in his text of this piece is preferable to
the manuscripts plainly mistaken . Boissonades would have little difference in mean-
ing and is also possible.
43 J.-P. Migne (editor), Gregorii Theologii Opera Quae Exstant Omnia, in J.-P. Migne, Patrologiae Cursus
Completus, Series Graeca, vol. XXXVIII, p. 96.
44 The lines are evoked more directly in a twelth-century allegorical reading of Heliodorus Aethiopica
(Miles 2009, 300) which comes down under the name of Philip the Philosopher, who is in fact Phila-
gathos of Cerami. On the attribution see Lavagnini 1974. The echo of Gregory in that piece was pointed
out to me by K. Demoen.
45 Plot. Enn. III 8 [30], ed. P. Henry, H.-R. Schwyzer, Oxford 1964, vol. I, p. 362, 118.
46 The echo would admittedly not be a very strong one, and Enneads III 8 does not seem to be other-
wise cited by Psellos, though III 7 (On Eternity and Time) appears frequently.
47 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 44, pp. 158161. This is a complex passage; for fuller discussion see Miles 2014.
See also on Psellos allegorical reading Cesaretti 1991b, 29124 and Kolovou 2010.
48 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 44, 24, p. 158.
49 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 44, 256, p. 158.
50 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 44, 3132, p. 159.
ines three choices of way of life. If someone at once recognises truly existent things
(), Intellect and Soul, he at once ascends to Psyche, then Intellect and through
it is united with god. This is, of course, a standard Neoplatonic narrative of ascent,
Christianised by the substitution of union with god for the approach to the One. In con-
trast to this, one may choose to live the life of the beasts, existing merely in becoming
(). A great chasm separates these lives and so Psellos posits a middle life
which some of the Chaldaean oracles call partly light and partly dark but which
I would simply call a human one. Psellos establishment of this middle ground is
a notable tendency of his thinking. When there is a battle between the two opposed
tendencies, he suggests, the two faculties cross into each others spheres. For most
people, he concludes, this middle life is the most likely outcome.
The allegorising approach to myth and the psychological and metaphysical frame-
work in which Psellos works in this passage is thoroughly Neoplatonic. Nonetheless,
within this long established structure and interpretive mode he is able to argue not
for the idealised ascent of the soul but for the acceptability and likelihood of a more
mixed, human existence. Kaldellis observes in the Chronographia a rehabilitation
of the body, which is also observable in some at least of these short philosophical
works. It is important to note that Psellos major Neoplatonic influence is not Plot-
inus but Proclus, for whom matter was able to play a larger and more positive role.
Nonetheless, it is not merely accidental, I would suggest, that this middle life finds
one of its fullest expressions in this allegorical passage. Rather, the space for philo-
sophical play which Psellos claims for this practice allows him greater liberty to think
through his own position. In particular the notion that reason should not cross outside
its sphere into functions that should be fulfilled by the irrational parts of the human
composite is a striking development.
In presenting allegorical readings to his students, Psellos often considers the na-
ture of the practice itself. Once more, this can on occasion be the conventional, re-
ceived view: the ancients concealed secret wisdom in their myths which it is the task
of the interpreter to reveal. Images like drawing aside the curtain to reveal the mys-
51 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 44, 3237, p. 159.

52 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 44, 3740, p. 159.
53 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 44, 4749 p. 159. On Psellos and the Chaldaean Oracles see des Places 1971, 46
52; Athanassiadi 1999, 2002 (the latter contrasting Psellos and Plethons uses of the oracles). Psellos
knowledge of the oracles seems to derive from Proclus now lost commentary on them.
54 Jenkins 2006b, Delli 2007b, Miles 2014.
55 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 44, 7780, p. 160.
56 This is a central argument of Kaldellis 1999, though with some exaggeration of the degree to which
this might conflict with both Platonism and Christianity.
57 See on this Chlup 2012a, especially 201233.
58 A sophisticated instance of this understanding of allegory and a defence of of the methods validity
appears in Porphyrys Cave of the Nymphs, which Psellos knew and selectively summarised. See note
28 above.
88 | G. Miles
teries or more colourfully removing the excrement of myth to find the meaning
within depict allegorical reading in this traditional way. Equally prominent, how-
ever, in Psellos reflections on allegory are metaphors that present the process as a
transformation of the ancient material. This group of images appear to be used only in
discussing Hellenic pagan, as opposed to Christian, objects of interpretation, though
the images describing this type of interpretation are themselves drawn from both parts
of his intellectual inheritance.
Psellos Allegory on the Sphinx is useful here once more. In the conclusion
of the piece Psellos writes: Whether the myth intended such a thing, I do not know;
and if I have thought out something eccentric (), this too is both philosoph-
ical and Pythagorean. Similarly in his allegorical interpretation of the Homeric line
the gods sat beside Zeus and took council, he stresses the transformative nature
of this reading practice in both the opening and the conclusion of the piece, on both
occasions making use of one of his favourite images: brackish and drinkable waters.
In his prefatory remarks, Psellos speaks of the interpretation to follow as another
form of technical discourse ( ), which has a capacity for
transformation ( ), as if someone might change the bitter
waters to sweet. He goes on to claim that it is no great achievement to proclaim di-
vine things according to their own nature, but a greater one to change things of quite
contrary nature towards a more divine form. He makes clear that the opposition is
between Hellenic thought and Christianity, and reinforces the notion of a transfor-
mation of one into the other through the image of Moses transforming his staff. The
finest of the wise ( ) is the one who can effect this transforma-
tion. In the conclusion of the piece, he emphasises this understanding of allegorical
reading once more: This is the myth, this the transformation of the lie into the truth.
59 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 44, 114, p. 158.

60 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 46, 2324, p. 165.
61 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 44, 111112, p. 161.
62 Many of Psellos interpretive passages focus on a single sentence or phrase. See for instance Psel-
los, Ph. M. I, 42; Psellos, Theol. I, 7.
63 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 42, pp. 148152. See also J. Duffy 1999. Psellos draws this image, of course, from
Phaedrus 243d.
64 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 42, 56, p. 149. is one of the terms Psellos uses to refer to allegory,
though it can also refer to rhetoric in general. The relationship of rhetoric to philosophy in Psellos
thinking is a complex one, which Papaioannou 2013b makes a major contribution towards clarifying.
See especially 2950.
65 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 42, 67, p. 149.
66 The idea of a symbol which is unlike the higher reality to which it refers is an important one for
Proclus, though its use here by Psellos is quite different. See for instance in Remp. I.198, 1324.
67 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 42, 79, p. 149.
68 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 42, 1415, p. 149.
By applying this method, he promises his students, you would not only wash off the
bitter by the drinkable discourse, but might also make the bitter into drinkable.
The position which Psellos takes is a very particular type of defensive allegory.
While this type of allegorical reading usually identifies an unacceptable surface mean-
ing as a cue to hunt for hidden wisdom, Psellos takes the rather more unusual po-
sition that the apparently unacceptable nature of Greek myth makes it all the more
desirable as an interpretive object for the master of allegorical transformation, not be-
cause something else is hidden there but because the metamorphosis into truth will
be all the more profound. Psellos is at his firmest here in stressing the distinction be-
tween us (Christians) and the Hellenes. This is the position which OMeara identifies
as his attitude officielle, insisting on the absolute priority of Christian doctrine.
His relationship to the two is not always so stable, nor so clear.
It must be stressed that this understanding of allegory as transformation is one
which Psellos reserves for the interpretation of Hellenic, non-Christian materials.
Though his actual practice in allegorising Christian materials is really very similar,
the expressed understanding of what he is doing is more conventional. I shall turn to
some of these passages in the next section on Psellos the Christian.
3 Psellos the Christian

On Christian topics, as much as on Hellenic philosophy, Psellos produced a substan-
tial corpus of lectures, letters and orations. As with the texts which modern readers
and editors classify as philosophical, many of the theological writings have only been
properly edited in recent decades. Here too, the primary texts are only just beginning
to receive scholarly attention, and it will be some time before a really complete picture
of Psellos theological activities can emerge.
The most immediately striking feature of Psellos Theologica, for a reader ac-
quainted also with his Philosophica Minora, is the continuity of the two. These lectures
as a whole, whether designated philosophical or theological in recent editions, are
parts of a continuous pedagogical and philosophical undertaking. As Maltese well
observes, Psellos discussions of his favourite patristic author, Gregory of Nazianzos,
are only occasionally concerned with rhetorical and stylistic matters, but far more
69 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 42, 138141, p. 152.

70 On the motivations for Platonic allegorical reading see Lamberton 1989b.
71 OMeara 1998b, 438.
72 Again see OMeara 1998b, 439 on Psellos resemblance to the philosophes intermdiares despite
his claims.
73 F. Lauritzen 2010b; Maltese 1994b.
90 | G. Miles
often with the conceptual content of Gregorys work. That is not to suggest, how-
ever, that the rhetorical virtues of Gregory are of no concern to Psellos. Rather, it is
precisely as a model of both the philosopher and the rhetorician, and moreover as
one who put Hellenic philosophy to effective use in Christian theology.
Psellos most characteristic strategy in approaching scriptural and patristic topics
is the use of Neoplatonic thought, especially Proclus, to illuminate the Christian ob-
jects of his interpretation. In Theologica his lecture entitled ,
(On the phrase, You will see the rear parts), for instance, Psellos responds once
more to a query from his students (as the conclusion, lines 113116, makes clear), this
time concerning the meaning of god saying to Moses in Exodus that Moses will see his
rear parts ( ) but not his face (Exodus 33:23). Psellos begins by saying that he
sees these words as applying not only to Moses or to some particular individual but
to each person, for everyone deemed worthy of seeing god sees only the back parts,
neither clearly nor with unobstructed sight nor with free eyes, but concealed behind
some stone and viewing the as if through some hole of moderate size but
not daring to make an attempt at the front parts.
This first part of the lecture offers an initial response to the text, and raises the
issue, which he also addresses elsewhere, of the nature of human perception of di-
vinity. From this relatively straightforward discussion, in which Psellos has in effect
merely generalised the passage concerning Moses into a statement on the possibili-
ties of epiphany for humanity in general, he proceeds to interrogate the biblical text
more closely, asking what the hind parts of god might be. Indeed, he goes on, the
apparent ascription of parts to what is bodiless and non-composite is curious. Piling
up a list of the front and back parts of humans and other animals, he emphasises
the incongruity of ascribing any of these things to god. In all of the forms which god
has taken in appearing to those worthy of , such as light or a solar disk
or a cloud or a storm, he has been seen as without parts. Therefore Moses should, in
apprehending the rear parts of god, also have apprehended the front.
At this point, Psellos moves from considering the sentence in relatively literal
terms to allegorical and Neoplatonic ones. If someone wishes, he says, to go up to
74 Maltese 1994b, 296297.

75 See F. Lauritzen 2012 for a reading of Psellos, Theol. I, 11 with particular attention to its Neoplatonic
character.
76 Psellos, Theol. I, 26, pp. 102106.
77 Psellos, Theol. I, 26, 812, p. 103. The correct reading, let alone the meaning of , the
reading of Parisinus graecus 1182, is unclear. This is unfortunately the only witness at this point. De-
spite this, the sense of the surrounding passage is clear.
78 See Psellos, Theol. I, 11, among others, with F. Lauritzen 2012.
79 Psellos, Theol. I, 26, 1723, p. 103.
80 Psellos, Theol. I, 26, 2527, p. 103.
81 Psellos, Theol. I, 26, 2730, p. 103. Similarly in his discussion of the Transfiguration Psellos insists
that all of the Trinity was contemplated within the one vision: Psellos, Theol. I, 11, 106126, p. 46.
intellect from perceptions, perhaps this one will find the solution to the enquiry and
will recognise the rear parts of god. For the front parts and the rear parts are actually
in different forms, bodily or bodiless. That is to say, the relationship of front and
back can be interpreted in a variety of ways at different levels of being. After con-
sidering first the arrangement of the physical cosmos according to the description of
Platos Timaeus, Psellos outlines the Neoplatonic levels of being by reference to their
metaphorical positioning behind or in front of each other. The terms used (-
, , ) are derived from Proclus. Only the One, he
says, is uncreated and first at the front ( ). So many as have
seen this have not been powerful enough to have seen it for themselves without inter-
mediary ( ), but have seen it through the parts be-
hind and subsequent things ( ). Psellos rephrases
and reinforces his point, quoting the words of the great Dionysius, that the cre-
ator of all does not emerge from its own oneness. Rather, he says, it is known
by its signs (), likely borrowing this latter term from Proclus. While
Pseudo-Dionysius goes on to state that by means of scripture we can be led through
the sensible to the intelligible ( (I 3, p. 9 Heil)), Psel-
los imagines a different hierarchy of knowledge of the divine, depending on the level
of the ontological procession from which one is inferring the nature of its initiator.
The lowest level is inference from matter, the furthest echo of god ( -
). Psellos proceeds to imagine an ascending scale of higher levels, and
of different unnamed people who work from them. After the one working from mat-
ter ( ), another ( ) works from bodies
on which form has been imposed ( ), another pro-
82 Psellos, Theol. I, 26, 3135, p. 104.

83 Psellos, Theol. I, 26, 3637, p. 104; Plato, Timaeus 28b24.
84 and : Proclus, Elements of Theology 14, ed. E. R. Dodds, Oxford 1963
(second edition) ; Proclus, Elements of Theology 40, Dodds.
85 Psellos, Theol. I, 26, 4043, p. 104.
86 Psellos, Theol. I, 26, 4445, p. 104.
87 Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, De Coelesti Hierarchia I 2, p. 8, Gnter Heil (editor), in Gnter
Heil and Adolf Martin Ritter, Corpus Dionysiacum II. Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita. De Coelesti Hierar-
chia, De Ecclesiastia Hierarchia, De Mystica Theologia, Epistulae.
88 Psellos, Theol. I, 26, 467, p. 104. The two manuscripts of Psellos passage differ here, with P read-
ing and L . The uncertainty of reading in this passage of the Pseudo-Dionysius
is evidently an ancient one; Cordier observes in his edition of the Pseudo-Dionysius that Scotus and
Sarracenus read (Patrologia Graeca III, pp. 121122 n. 25).
89 See for instance the similar usage at Proclus, In Tim., II 273, 16, where Proclus states that the cosmos
possesses overt tokens () of its own divinity, but also invisible signatures () of
its participation in Being. Translation from: Proclus Commentary on Platos Timaeus by D. T. Runia
and M. Share.
90 Psellos, Theol. I, 26, 4756, p. 104.
91 Psellos, Theol. I, 26, 5053, p. 104.
92 | G. Miles
ceeding onwards from the harmony and arrangement of these things towards each
other, recognised from the circling of the heavens and its ceaseless motion the un-
moving nature. The last, and presumably the most insightful is the one who rising
above time and nature draws upon eternity ( ) to know god.
This is a theme on which this text expands in its last major section, speaking this
time in the person of Moses. Psellos first raises, in his own voice, the question of why
Moses did not more directly describe for us his experience of god, and turns rhetor-
ically to ask Moses himself, you who are the one most able to see god, the one more
august than any prophet. Moses initial response is very brief: Because god is not
really these things which I have seen. He and the other prophets have seen god un-
der different forms: But god is different to these things, greater than form, above be-
ing (), in the image of the one alone, and even this very indistinctly. Much
as in his lecture on the transfiguration, Psellos is keen to stress that the differences
in visionary experience arise from the different characters and levels of understand-
ing of those seeing the vision of god, not from a change in god himself. Indeed, he
stresses the transcendence of god (identified with the Platonic One or Good) over all
form. Already, the speech of Moses, like the preceeding analysis in Psellos own voice,
has come to sound decidedly Platonic. Even more remarkably, Psellos Moses goes on
to clarify the nature of the One, following closely Proclus De Decem Dubitationibus
circa Providentiam (10, 1031): it is not a material one / unity, nor an atom, nor a
genos, nor a form, nor a soul, nor intellect, nor being, nor any other of the things be-
yond these, but on the one hand it is being because it subsists (), and on
the other is not being because it is beyond the subsistance () of the things
that are. Whether or not Psellos listeners were able to identify the echoes specifi-
cally of Proclus, the Platonic (to a modern reader Neoplatonic) nature of this teaching
in the mouth of Moses must have been apparent. This is even more true in the fol-
lowing lines, where Psellos Moses moves from Proclus to Plato himself, summarising
in brief but recognisable form Diotimas teaching to Socrates about the philosophical
use of erotics ( ), and the progression from appreciating immediate, sensory
beauty to knowledge of Beauty itself (Symposium 209e5211d1). Psellos Moses argues
particularly for a progression from observing the order and beauty of the cosmos to
recognition of its maker. The reason for this particular approach to knowledge of god
has been given implicitly in the introduction to Moses speech: this, according to Psel-
los, is what Moses did when he described the creation in Genesis (
92 Psellos, Theol. I, 26, 5356, p. 104.

93 Psellos, Theol. I, 26, 5763, pp. 104105.
94 Psellos, Theol. I, 26, 6465, p. 105.
95 Psellos, Theol. I, 26, 737, p. 105.
96 F. Lauritzen 2012, 171.
97 Psellos, Theol. I, 26, 812, p. 105.
98 Psellos, Theol. I, 26, 87104, pp. 105106.
). Finally, Psellos returns to speaking in his own person

to interpret as Christ the stone by which Moses was concealed to see god. Dismissing
briefly some speculations of those who do not look from behind this stone, Psellos
urges his students to undertake the kind of ascent that he has been outlining: But
we, whether we should fix ourselves steadfastly to perceptible things or whether to
the beauties of intellect, hiding ourselves behind Christ himself, the intelligible stone
( ) on which the church was founded, might progress with exactness to-
wards the contemplation of truly existing things ( ).
Numenius of Apamea famously (and rhetorically) asked, What is Plato but an
Atticising Moses?, and in this passage of Psellos we find the thought inverted, pro-
ducing a Moses who is a kind of Hebrew Plato. Though Psellos elsewhere uses Platonic
and Neoplatonic concepts to elucidate scriptural and patristic problems, the place-
ment of these Hellenic thoughts into a speech in the person of Moses is still a striking
move. At least three considerations ease the strangeness of this choice, but do not en-
tirely remove it. Firstly, the pedagogical practice of writing a paraphrasis explaining
the teachings of a philosopher by adopting, more or less consistently, his persona,
bears a distant resemblance to what Psellos does here. The ancient rhetorical prac-
tice of adopting historical characters in declamation comes closer. Psellos knew, for
instance, Dio Chrysostoms use of this device in his Olympic Oration, where he adopts
the character of Pheidias to make his defence of sculpture as an artform (XII 55 ff.).
Indeed, the adoption of character in his speeches is a feature of Gregory of Nazianzus
which Psellos praises highly. Finally the allusion to the Symposium suggests a fur-
ther precedent, in Socrates delivery of much of his speech on eros through the char-
acter of Diotima. All three of these precedents do something to ease the strangeness
of Psellos approach here, but it remains a vivid and surprising pedagogical strategy.
4 Psellos as Philosopher and Christian

The readiness with which Psellos combines Christian material with Hellenic philos-
ophy will be apparent from the preceding examples. It would be easy to multiply in-
stances. I would like to move instead at this point to some discussion of the general
99 Psellos, Theol. I, 26, 72, p. 105.

100 Psellos, Theol. I, 26, 113116, p. 106.
101 This fragment of Numenius (8, 13, des Places) is quoted in Clement of Alexandria and Eusebius
(Praeparatio Evangelica XI 8, 1), so it is very likely that Psellos was familiar with this notion. See Whit-
taker 1967; Edwards 1990.
102 On Psellos own paraphrasis on Aristotles De Interpretatione see Ierodiakonou 2002b.
103 Psellos cites this passage at Psellos, Or. M., p. 90.
104 Psellos, Discourse, 359385.
94 | G. Miles
tendencies which can be observed in Psellos use of these traditions, and in particular
some points at which tensions arise, and how they might be reconciled.
It is well known that Psellos orthodoxy was questioned, and his letter responding
to his sometime friend Xiphilinos on the issue is among Psellos best known works.
The nature of the criticisms raised by Xiphilinos, and no doubt by others, is clear from
Psellos response: he has been accused of being a Platonist rather than a Christian,
and he responds in spirited terms, arguing that Xiphilinos might bring the same crit-
icism against the great fathers of the church, such as Gregory and Basil, who drew
on Plato in combatting heresy. Like these fathers, he claims not to have adopted
the content of Platos teaching (), but to have mixed what was compati-
ble with sacred [Christian] discourse ( ). This, indeed, is the core
of his defence: he has taken what is useful from Hellenic learning but remains a Chris-
tian.
There is, however, much to bemuse his readers, including no doubt Xiphilinos, in
his articulation of this defence. As Wilson already observed, the texts which Psellos
chooses to echo in this letter contain some which must have seemed dubious to a less
broad-minded reader. Some of these texts, such as the novels of Achilles Tatius and
Heliodorus, while they might be considered frivolous and mildly immoral, might be
justified, as Psellos does elsewhere, on the grounds that they could be useful for de-
veloping ones style. His use of Iamblichus De Mysteriis might be seen to venture
in a more serious way onto unorthodox ground. One of the oddest echoes is that
of Philostratus Life of Apollonius of Tyana, a work which enjoyed a long notoriety
as an apparent portrait of a pagan counter-Christ. It is difficult to know how far to
press these unorthodox echoes. Certainly, they are not unique to this letter. In another
105 The standard edition, Italian translation and commentary is Psellos, Letter to Xiphilinos. See also
Psellos, Letters.
106 Wilson 1996b, 131 wonders how Psellos escaped anathema.
107 Psellos, Letter to Xiphilinos, 1 and 4, pp. 49 and 5253.
108 Psellos, Letter to Xiphilinos, 104, p. 52.
110 Wilson 1996b, 131.
112 See Papaioannou 2013b, 107 on the acceptability of authors such as Philostratus or the ancient
novelists for educated Byzantine readings. For Psellos engagement with these works see his essay on
Heliodorus and Achilles Tatius (Psellos, Essays). Nonetheless, the novels in particular were sometimes
in need of defending. See Grtner 1969, Sandy 2001, Hunter 2005, Miles 2009. Though the rebirth of
the novel in Byzantium was somewhat later than Psellos, there are important changes evident in his
attitude to fictionality: Papaioannou 2013b, 232249.
114 Psellos, Letter to Xiphilinos, 210212, p. 56 adapting Philostratus, Life of Apollonius I 5.
115 Though Philostratus made no direct comparisons between Apollonius and Jesus, later authors
were more direct. See: Elsner 2009; Dzielska 1986. On the Arabic elaborations of Apollonius as magi-
cian: Weisser 1980.
letter of complaint to another sometime friend, Leon Paraspondylos, Psellos employs

the terms of the Chaldaean Oracles to joke somewhat bitterly that Leon seems to have
disappeared into the paternal abyss, and so has been unable to answer his corre-
spondence.
It is a difficult question in reading any text, from any era, to know how far one
should push this sort of intertextuality. There is no one correct interpretation of these
echoes, but rather they leave open a range of possibilities for their readers. Certainly
Psellos, by quoting sources that would have seemed dubious to many of his contempo-
raries, could create the appearance of confirming rather than rebutting their doubts
about his orthodoxy. There remained, however, the two responses to these doubts
which he does make, one philosphical and one rhetorical: they could be defended
as stylistic ornament, drawn from the ancient texts in a supposedly neutral fashion,
or ancient learning in general could be defended as a kind of philosophical armoury
against heresy.
Psellos also makes use in this letter of the possibility of allegorising Moses ascent
of Mount Sinai. Though here it is not developed nearly so fully as in the remarkable
lecture analysed above, it is still an important section for the overall import of the
letter. Though the central notion is the same, and is a traditional one, it is treated
somewhat differently here. On this occasion Psellos begins with direct denial of the
literal interpretation of the mountain as one perceptible to the senses ( ),
then states that it is a symbol of the elevation of the psyche beyond matter ( -
). Despite the ultimately Stoic echo
with which this account begins (Zeno, de affectibus 209), the ascent as Psellos goes
on to develop it is very much a Neoplatonic one. It is to be undertaken on the basis
of and purifications () leading to contemplative viewing,
the ultimate goal being to ascend . Criscuolo identifies a possible reference
116 Letter 9 in Psellos, Letters, p. 239. On this letter and the difficult relationship between Psellos
and Leon Paraspondylos see de Vries-van der Velden 1999, 199. On Psellos letters see most recently
Bernard 2011, Papaioannou 2011, 2012.
118 Far from originating with Psellos, this allegorical understanding of Moses ascent of Sinai has
strong patristic pedigree in Gregory of Nyssa. See Criscuolo 1973b, 76.
120 Psellos actual source here is very likely Galen, de Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis, given his evi-
dent interest in medical matters and frequent reference to such material in his lectures. It should be
added that Stoicism, as well as Platonism, is raised in this letter: in the opening lines Xiphilinos has
evidently said that both Chrysippus and Plato belong to Psellos. Nonetheless, in Psellos reply Sto-
icism is discussed far less and always in a secondary position to Platonism. The wider role of Stoicism
in Psellos thought requires attention, but is outside the scope of this paper.
96 | G. Miles
to the Pseudo-Dionysius (De Mystica Theologia 3) in the phrase . Though

these two words in themselves are not enough to be considered a quotation, the use
of a few lines later does suggest that Psellos is drawing here on the Are-
opagite. This word is used on several occasions in the Pseudo-Dionysius, especially
in De mystica theologia, to describe the darkness in which god dwells, an important
theme in Pseudo-Dionysius mysticism. This sense of is not, however, unique
to these texts, and is drawn ultimately from Exodus 20:21. Once more, Psellos fol-
lows a well established interpretation of Moses ascent as mystical allegory. Psellos
concludes: This mountain is darkness () and utter silence after much move-
ment, and cessation of all intellection (). Once more the language is general
enough that it need not strongly recall any particular source, but is readily paralleled
in the Pseudo-Dionysius. Despite his own claim that he has drawn these things from
the Chaldaeans and brought them into line with our oracles, that is, Christian
teaching, what is important here is that Psellos operates within a mystical discourse
made acceptable by the precedent of the Pseudo-Dionysius, and within a Christian
Neoplatonism. Psellos self-defence in this Letter to Xiphilinos may be outspoken and
employ some risky strategies, but he is not forging a new position for himself relative
to the Christian and Neoplatonic traditions so much as knowingly and ably taking up
a position that had long been available.
Christianity and Platonism, as we have seen, often combine reasonably comfort-
ably in Psellos thinking, appearing together not least in his frequent ascents of the
mind. It should not be lost sight of, however, that there are differences in his treat-
ment of these traditions. While, as discussed above, he is willing to concede on oc-
casion that the meanings that he finds in Hellenic texts by allegorical methods may
not have been intended at all, he does not appear ever to extended this insight to the
practice of allegory on Christian texts. He is, in fact, less direct in his statements re-
garding his own reading practices when he is concerned with Christian topics. There
are, however, some interesting exceptions: for instance in a fragmentary discussion
122 Pseudo-Dionysius, De Mystica Theologia I 3, p. 144, Adolf Martin Ritter (editor), in Gnter Heil
and Adolf Martin Ritter, Corpus Dionysiacum II. Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita. De Coelesti Hierarchia,
De Ecclesiastia Hierarchia, De Mystica Theologia, Epistulae.
123 The concept is a common Neoplatonic one, and the phrase appears frequently, and unsurpris-
ingly, in Proclus too, as for instance at Proclus, Th.P., I 14, 9.
125 See Lampe 1968, s.v. 2b.
126 , , .
127 Discussion in Criscuolo 1973b, 76.
129 See for instance Ps.-Dionysios, De Mystica Theologia II 1, p. 145, Adolf Martin Ritter (editor), in
Gnter Heil and Adolf Martin Ritter, Corpus Dionysiacum II. Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita. De Coelesti
Hierarchia, De Ecclesiastia Hierarchia, De Mystica Theologia, Epistulae.
of Proverbs 9:2, he observes that the composite, triple nature of human beings (bod-
ily, psychic and intellectual) necessitates a tripartite practice in interpretation and
in the opening of his discussion of events preceding the Last Supper, he is impa-
tient in his dismissal of what he regards as useless interpretive approaches. Nonethe-
less, in general Psellos reserves his most searching analyses of his own reading, and
his most striking images for the practice of interpretation, for his discussions of Hel-
lenic texts and myths. The reason for this is clear, for instance, in a text such as the
Funeral Eulogy for Nicholaos of the Beautiful Spring. In the process of giving his eu-
logy of Nicholaos, Psellos also sketches an ideal of the intellectual monk. As one
might expect from elsewhere in his works, this portrait includes a discussion of the
correct use of Hellenic learning. Once more, Psellos is at pains to emphasise that he
does not take over this pagan learning wholesale, nor does he reject the rose because
of its thorns. Here once more, allegory is mentioned as a major interpretive tool.
Even in this monastic setting, far from the philosophy seminar in which the lectures
of the Philosophica Minora appear to have been given, Psellos presents a reasonably
consistent view of the role of Hellenic learning.
There has been occasion already to observe the frequency of ascents of the mind
in Psellos, and in these it has often been the case that the Christian and the Hellenic are
intertwined. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that he regards this type of spiritual
exercise, indeed, this type of spiritual and philosophical path, as an open possibility
for his students and himself. The humility with which he speaks of his own limited
achievements, especially compared to Gregory of Nazianzus does not imply that he
regards it as impossible to undertake the ascent. When Psellos discusses these topics,
in other words, balancing himself between Christianity and Neoplatonism, this is not
just a conceptual game in which one must move about concepts while attempting to
remain within the bounds of orthodoxy. He shows, rather, a real concern with philos-
ophy and religion as lived, and fundamentally compatible, experiences. The wariness
of ascetic excess which he shows on some occasions does not indicate that he rejects
asceticism in general. Rather, once more, this is a matter of balance and finding
middle ground.
131 Psellos, Theol. I, 8, p. 32.

132 Psellos, Theol. I, 8, 56, p. 32. Proclus also discusses the relationship of three types of poetry to
three dispositions of the soul at in Remp. I. 177179.
134 See on this text the edition with notes of Gautier 1974a.
135 See, for instance, Psellos, loge Funbre, 969, especially lines 235255, pp. 4142.
136 Psellos, loge Funbre, 319321, p. 45.
137 Psellos, loge Funbre, 307315, p. 44.
138 As at Psellos, Theol. I, 23, 139145, pp. 91 and I, 64, 168179, p. 252.
139 For a careful discussion of Psellos views on monasticism and appropriate degrees of asceticism
see F. Lauritzen 2007b.
98 | G. Miles
Psellos is not then an outlying iconoclast, nor a mindless proponent of received

opinions. Though we should be wary of hunting for originality in Byzantine phi-
losophy, not least because it is hardly among the ambitions of a writer like Psellos
himself, this need not make us think, conversely, that we are dealing in these texts
with automata. Certainly, in Michael Psellos, we find a person with an independent
mind, but both of the traditions which he inherited, the Christian and the Platonic,
had scope for this, and indeed, one might argue, require this to be fully inherited and
lived. There are, doubtless, differences of emphasis between texts by Psellos, and con-
tradictions and inconsistencies remain. This though, was the nature of the tradition as
much as of Psellos himself. That Psellos points of reference are traditional on both the
Christian and the Hellenic sides does not mean that he is insincere or merely deriva-
tive. His concerns are those of an intensely lived spiritual and practical life, and in the
articulation of these thoughts he makes intelligent use of the philosophical and theo-
logical resources to hand. When he differentiates himself from particular philosoph-
ical positions he is also generally differentiating himself from particular individuals,
living or dead, who for him exemplify them. Psellos articulation of himself through
the complex Byzantine inheritance is a lived and personal affair, however abstruse its
expression may sometimes become.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Marinus, Vita Procli R. Masullo, ed. (1985). Marino di Neapoli, Vita di Proclo. Naples.
Marinus, Proclus H. D. Saffrey and A.-P. Segonds, eds. (2002). Marinus, Proclus ou sur le Bonheur.
Paris.
Porphyry, Sent. E. Lamberz, ed. (1975). Porphyrius, Sententiae ad Intelligibilia Ducentes. Leipzig.
Proclus, E.T. E. R. Dodds, ed. (1963c). Proclus, Elements of Theology. Oxford.
Proclus, In Remp. G. Kroll, ed. (1899 and 1901). Procli Diadochi in Platonis Rem Publicam
Commentarii. Leipzig.
Proclus, In Tim. E. Diehl, ed. (1903). Procli Diadochi in Platonis Timaeum Commentaria. Leipzig.
Proclus, On Timaeus D. T. Runia and M. Share, eds. (2008). Proclus, Commentary on Plato's
Timaeus. Volume II. Book 2: Proclus on the Causes of the Cosmos and its Creation, Cambridge.
Proclus, Th.P. H. D. Saffrey and L. G. Westerink, eds. (1968). Proclus, Thologie Platonicienne.
Paris.
Psellos, Chron. . Renauld, ed. (1926). Psellos, Chronographie. Paris.
Psellos, Discourse A. Mayer (1911). Psellos, Discourse Improvised by the Hypertimos Psellos to
the Bestarchs Pothos who asked Him to Write about the Style of the Theologian (Psellos' Rede
ber den rhetorischen Character des Gregorios von Nazianz). In: Byzantinische Zeitschrift.
Ed. by A. Mayer. Vol. 20, pp. 27100.
Psellos, DOD L. G. Westerink, ed. (1948). Psellos, De Omnifaria Doctrina. Nijmegen.
Psellos, Essays A. R. Dyck, ed. (1986). Psellos, The Essays on Euripides and George of Pisidia and
on Heliodorus and Achilles Tatius. Vienna.
Psellos, Letter to Xiphilinos U. Criscuolo, ed. (1973a). Psellos, Epistola a Giovanni Xiphilino. Naples.
Psellos, loge Funbre P. Gautier (1974b). Psellos, loge Funbre de Nicholas de la Belle Source
par Michel Psellos Moine l'Olympe. In: 6, pp. 969.
Psellos, Or. M. A. R. Littlewood, ed. (1985). Michaelis Pselli Oratoria Minora. Leipzig.
Psellos, Ph. M. I J. M. Duffy, ed. (1989). Michaelis Pselli Philosophica Minora, Vol. I. Opuscula
Logica, Physica, Allegorica, Alia. Leipzig.
Psellos, Ph. M. II D. J. O'Meara, ed. (1992a). Michaelis Pselli Philosophica Minora, Vol. II. Opuscula
Psychologica, Theologica, Daemonologica. Leipzig.
Psellos, Theol. I P. Gautier, ed. (1989). Michaelis Pselli Theologica. Vol. I. Leipzig.
Psellos, Theol. II L. G. Westerink and J. Duffy, eds. (2002). Michaelis Pselli Theologica. Vol. II.
Leipzig.
Psellos, Letters K. Sathas, ed. (1876). . Vol. V. Paris.
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, CH and MT G. Heil and A.M. Ritter, ed. (1991). Corpus
Dionysiacum II. Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita. De Coelesti Hierarchia, De Ecclesiastia
Hierarchia, De Mystica Theologia, Epistulae. Berlin.
Secondary Sources
Anastasi, R. (1975). Psello e Giovanni Italo. In: Siculorum Gymnasium 28, pp. 525538.
Angold, M. (1995). Church and Society in Byzantium under the Comneni 10811261. Cambridge.
Arabatzis, G. (2002). Blme du philosophe, loge de la vraie philosophie et figures rhtorique: le
rcit d'Anne Comnne sur Jean Italos revisit. In: Byzantinische Zeitschrift 95, pp. 403415.
Athanassiadi, P. (1999). The Chaldaean Oracles: Theology and Theurgy. In: Pagan Monotheism in
Late Antiquity. Ed. by P. Athanassiadi and M. Frede. Oxford.
Athanassiadi, P. (2002). Byzantine Commentators on the Chaldaean Oracles: Psellos and Plethon.
In: Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources. Ed. by K. Ierodiakonou. Oxford, pp. 237252.
Barber, C. and D. Jenkins, eds. (2006). Reading Michael Psellos. Leiden.
Berchmann, R. M. (2005). Porphyry Against the Christians. Leiden.
Bernard, F. (2011). Exchanging logoi for aloga: cultural capital and material capital in a letter of
Michael Psellos. In: Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies 35, pp. 134148.
Brisson, L., ed. (2005). Porphyre. Sentences. Etudes d'introduction, Texte Grec et Traduction
Franaise, Commentaire. Paris.
Browning, R. (1975). Enlightenment and Repression in Byzantium in the Eleventh and Twelth
Centuries. In: Past and Present 69, pp. 1123.
Cacouros, M. (2007b). Survie culturelle et rmanence textuelle du noplatonisme Byzance.
Elments gnraux, lments portant sur la logique. In: The Libraries of the Neoplatonists.
Ed. by C. D'Ancona. Leiden, pp. 177210.
Cesaretti, P. (1991b). Allegoristi di Omero a Bisanzio: ricerche ermeneutiche (XIXII secolo). Milano.
Chlup, R. (2012a). Proclus: An Introduction. Cambridge.
Chrestou, K. P. (2005b).
. . In: 25, pp. 117175.
Clucas, L. (1981b). The Trial of John Italos and the Crisis of Intellectual Values in Byzantium in the
Criscuolo, U., ed. (1973b). Psellos: Letter to XiphilinosEpistola a Giovanni Xiphilino. Naples.
De Vries-van der Velden, E. (1999). Les amitis dangereuses: Psellos et Lon Paraspondylos. In:
Byzantinoslavica 60, pp. 315350.
Delli, E. (2007b). Entre compilation et originalit. Le corps pneumatique dans l'oeuvre de Michel
100 | G. Miles
Des Places, . (1971). Oracles Chaldaques. Paris.

Duffy, J. (1999). Bitter Brine and Sweet Fresh Water. The Anatomy of a Metaphor in Psellos. In:
Novum Millenium: Studies in Byzantine History and Culture Dedicated to Paul Speck, 19
December 1999. Ed. by C. Sode and S. A. Takcs. London, pp. 8996.
Duffy, J. (2002c). Hellenic Philosophy in Byzantium and the Lonely Mission of Michael Psellos. In:
Dzielska, M. (1986). Apollonius of Tyana in Legend and History. Rome.
Edwards, M. J. (1990). Atticizing Moses? Numenius, the Fathers and the Jews. In: Vigiliae
Christianae 44, pp. 6473.
Elsner, J. (2009). Beyond Compare: Pagan Saint and Christian God in Late Antiquity. In: Critical
Inquiry 35, pp. 655683.
Grtner, H. (1969). Charikleia in Byzanz. In: Antike und Abendland 15, pp. 4769.
Garzya, A. (19661967). On Michael Psellus' Admission of Faith. In:
35, pp. 4146.
Gautier, P. (1974a). loge funbre de Nicolas de la Belle Source par Michel Psellos moine
l'Olympe. In: 6, pp. 969.
Gouillard, J. (1976b). La religion des philosophes. In: Travaux et mmoires 6, pp. 305324.
Gouillard, J. (1985c). Le procs officiel de Jean l'Italien: Les actes et leurs sous-entendus. In:
Travaux et Mmoires 9, pp. 133174.
Hunter, R. (2005). Philip the Philosopher on the Aithiopika of Heliodoros. In: Metaphor and the
Ancient Novel. Ed. by M. P. S. Harrison and S. Fragoulidis. Groningen, pp. 123138.
Hussey, J. M. (1960). Ascetics and Humanists in Eleventh-Century Byzantium. London.
Ierodiakonou, K., ed. (2002a). Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources. Oxford.
Ierodiakonou, K. (2002b). Psellos' Paraphrasis on Aristotle's De Interpretatione. In: Byzantine
Jenkins, D. (2006b). Psellos' Conceptual Precision. In: Reading Michael Psellos. Ed. by C. Barber
and D. Jenkins. Leiden, pp. 131151.
Joannou, P. (1956). Christliche Metaphysik in Byzanz I. Die Illuminationslehre des Michael Psellos
und Joannes Italos. Ettal.
Johnson, A. P. (2013). Religion and Identity in Porphyry of Tyre. The Limits of Hellenism in Late
Antiquity. Cambridge.
Kaldellis, A. (1999). The Argument of Psellos' Chronographia. Leiden.
Kaldellis, A. (2005). The Date of Psellos' Theological Lectures and Higher Religious Education in
Constantinople. In: Byzantinoslavica 68, pp. 143151.
Kaldellis, A., ed. (2006). Mothers and Sons, Fathers and Daughters. The Byzantine Family of Michael
Psellos. Notre Dame (Indiana).
Kolovou, F. (2010). Der Mythos im Imitatio-Konzept des Michael Psellos. In: Imitatio Aemulatio
Variatio. Ed. by A. Rhoby and E. Schiffer. Vienna, pp. 165173.
Lamberton, R. (1989b). Homer the Theologian. Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading and the Growth of
Lampe, G. W. H. (1968). A Patristic Greek Lexicon. Oxford.
Lauritzen, F. (2007a). A Courtier in the Women's Quarters: The Rise and Fall of Psellos. In:
Byzantion 77, pp. 251266.
Lauritzen, F. (2007b). Psellos and the Nazireans. In: Revue des tudes Byzantines 65, pp. 359364.
Lauritzen, F. (2008b). Psello discepolo di Stetato. In: Byzantinische Zeitschrift 101, pp. 715725.
Lauritzen, F. (2010b). L'ortodossia neoplatonica di Psello. In: Rivista di Studi Bizantini e
Neoellenici 47, pp. 285291.
Lauritzen, F. (2011). Stethatos' Paradise in Psellos' Ekphrasis of Mt. Olympos (Orat. Min. 36
Littlewood). In: Vizantijskij Vremennik 70, pp. 139150.
Lauritzen, F. (2012). Psellos the hesychast: a neoplatonic reading of the Transfiguration on Mount
Tabor. In: Byzantinoslavica 70, pp. 167180.
Lauritzen, F. (2013). Psellos and neo-Platonic mysticism. The secret meaning of the Greek alphabet
(Opusc. phil I 36, 335642). In: Platonismus und Esoterik in byzantinischen Mittelalter und
italienischer Renaissance. Ed. by H. Seng. Heidelberg, pp. 2943.
Lavagnini, B. (1974). Filippo-Filagato promotore degli studi di greco in Calabria. In: Bolletino della
Badia greca di Grottaferrata 28, pp. 312.
Maltese, E. V. (1994b). Michele Psello Commentatore di Gregorio di Nazianzo: Note per una lettura
dei Theologica. In: SYNDESMOS: Studi in onore di Rosario Anastasi. Ed. by A. Carile. Vol. 2.
Catania, pp. 289309.
Miles, G. (2009). The Representation of Reading in Philip the Philosopher's Essay on Heliodorus.
In: Byzantion 79, pp. 292305.
Miles, G. (2014). Living as a Sphinx: Composite Being and Monstrous Interpreter in the ``Middle
Life'' of Michael Psellos. In: Conjunctions: Body and Mind from Plato to the Enlightenment.
Ed. by D. Kambaskovic-Sawers. Dordrecht.
Moore, P. (2005a). Iter Psellianum. A detailed listing of manuscript sources for all works attributed to
Michael Psellos, including a comprehensive bibliography. Toronto.
Morlet, S., ed. (2011). Le trait de Porphyre contre les chrtiens. Un sicle de recherches, nouvelles
questions. Paris.
O'Meara, D. J. (1998b). Aspects du travail philosophique de Michel Psellus (Philosophica minora,
vol. II). In: Dissertatiunculae Criticae: Festschrift fr Gnther Christian Hansen. Ed. by
O'Meara, D. J. (2014c). Michael Psellos. In: Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance.
Ed. by S. Gersh. Cambridge, pp. 165181.
Papaioannou, S. (2011). Michael Psellos on friendship and love: erotic discourse in
eleventh-century Byzantium. In: Early Medieval Europe 19, pp. 4361.
Papaioannou, S. (2012). Fragile Literature: Byzantine Letter-Collections and the Case of Michael
Psellos. In: La face cache de la littrature byzantine. La texte en tant que message immdiat.
Ed. by P. Odorico. Paris, pp. 289328.
Papaioannou, S. (2013b). Michael Psellos. Rhetoric and Authorship in Byzantium. Cambridge.
Podskalsky, G. (1977). Theologie und Philosophie in Byzanz. Der Streit um die theologische Methodik
in der sptbyzantinischen Geistesgeschichte (14./15. Jh.), seine systematischen Grundlagen und
seine historische Entwicklung. Mnchen.
Sandy, G. N. (2001). A Neoplatonic Interpretation of Heliodorus' Ethiopian Story. In: . La
belle saison de l'hllenisme. tudes de littrature antique offertes au Recteur Jacques
Bompaire. Ed. by A. Billault. Paris, pp. 169178.
Stephanou, P. . (1949b). Jean Italos, philosophe et humaniste. Rome.
Tatakis, B. (2003a). Byzantine Philosophy (trans. N. J. Moutafakis). Indianapolis and Cambridge.
Trizio, M. (2007b). Byzantine Philosophy as a Contemporary Historiographical Project. In:
Recherches de Thologie et Philosophie Mdivales 74.1, pp. 247294.
Von Harnack, A. (1916). Porphyrius, Gegen die Christen, 15 Bcher. Zeugnisse, Fragmente und
Referate. Berlin.
Weisser, U. (1980). Das Buch ber das Geheimnis der Schpfung von Pseudo-Apollonios von
Tyana. Berlin.
Whitman, J., ed. (2000). Interpretation and Allegory: Antiquity to the Modern Period. Leiden.
Whittaker, J. (1967). Moses Atticizing. In: Phoenix 21, pp. 196201.
Wilson, N. G. (1996b). Scholars of Byzantium. Cambridge MA.
Zervos, C. (1920). Un philosophe noplatonicien du Xie sicle. Michel Psellos. Sa vie. Son uvre. Ses
luttes philosophiques. Son influence. Paris.
Joshua Robinson
Proclus as Heresiarch: Theological Polemic
and Philosophical Commentary in Nicholas of
Methones Refutation (Anaptyxis) of Proclus
Elements of Theology
1 Introduction
Nicholas of Methones Refutation of the Elements of Theology constitutes one of the
most detailed and explicit reactions to Proclus work in Byzantium, though also per-
haps the most negative. In this essay, after briefly introducing Nicholas and placing
his Refutation in historical context, I will focus on several theological and philosoph-
ical aspects of the Refutation.
Regarding the life of Nicholas of Methone, we know only what can be deduced
from his own works. His first firmly datable work, a life of St. Meletios, was written
in 1141, though one or more polemical treatises may have preceded this. In his last
datable work of 1160 he describes himself as an old man, so he was perhaps born in the
first decade of the twelfth century. Angelou suggests that he was probably installed
as bishop of Methone prior to 1147, given his involvement at that time in a controversy
regarding the Patriarch of Constantinople, and places his death sometime between
1160 and 1166.
1 Nicholas of Methone, //
Refutation of Proclus Elements of Theology, ed. A. Angelou (Corpus philosophorum Medii Aevi.
Philosophi Byzantini 1), Athens/Leiden 1984, cited hereafter as Ref. Roman numerals indicate pages
in Angelous introductory chapters. The Refutation itself is cited by chapter, page and line. For reviews
of Angelous edition, see Kazhdan 1989; Lackner 1988; Steel 1987 and Constantelos 1985.
2 An anonymous reviewer has observed that the distinction between theology and philosophy that
structures my article is in fact an imposition of our modes of thought on the Byzantine author, and
risks obscuring rather than clarifying his thought. I take this criticism to heart, but there has not
been time for the radical revision that would be required to adequately address the problem, nor am I
even sure how I would do so. The reader is therefore requested to take this binary structure (theology-
philosophy) as perhaps little more than a convenient principle of organization that allows me to dis-
play a series of important and distinct aspects of Nicholas Refutation, even while admitting that, in
Nicholas mind, these aspects might not have corresponded to distinct categories of theology and
philosophy, but rather to distinct aspects within a theological vision that was itself conceived of as
Christian philosophy. For a helpful consideration of this complex issue, see Trizio 2007a.
3 See Angelou, Ref., xiii.
4 See Angelou, Ref., x.
5 Angelou, Ref., x, xxiii.
DOI 10.1515/9781501503597-006
104 | J. Robinson
Sixteen works by Nicholas survive. These comprise, in brief, three works against
the Latins regarding the procession of the Holy Spirit, one against the Latins regarding
the use of unleavened bread (azymes), one work of hagiography (mentioned above);
one work against those who doubt that the Eucharist is the body and blood of Christ,
one regarding a controversial patriarchal appointment, one exegetical treatise against
Arian and Origenist interpretations of a Pauline passage; three treatises regarding the
predestined ends of life; two treatises against Soterichos Panteugenos, patriarch-elect
of Antioch, who held innovative views regarding a certain liturgical formula; one let-
ter to the Emperor Manuel I Comnenos; and, finally, the Refutation of Proclus. As is
apparent, Nicholas was a fairly polemical writer. Angelou suggests that he enjoyed
an unusual degree of intimacy with the Emperor Manuel, and that he was held in
respect as a theologian. He was best known to the later tradition for his anti-Latin
treatises, which were excerpted and anthologized by Kamateros and Choniates, gain-
ing the attention of both the Latin theologian Hugh Eteriano and the unionist patriarch
John Bekkos.
We do not know when Nicholas began writing his Refutation of the Elements of
Theology, but another of his works, written in Methone and definitely datable to 1156,
seems to refer to it. In this work Nicholas briefly discusses the four material elements,
and says that he will further examine this topic in his exegeses. This topic of the four
elements is in fact treated in Chapter 74 of the Refutation, and so the reference seems
to show that in 1156 he had not yet finished the Refutation, and perhaps had not yet
proceeded beyond the 73rd chapter. Based on this scant evidence, the most we can
say is that probably the majority of the Refutation was written between 1150 and 1170.
While the Elements of Theology contains 211 chapters, Nicholas Refutation breaks off
abruptly after 198 chapters. Possibly Nicholas never completed the text, or perhaps
the concluding chapters have simply not survived.
After its first edition by Voemel in 1825, the Refutation received considerable at-
tention at the end of the nineteenth century from Drseke, who, after initial enthu-
siasm for Nicholas, came to the conclusion that the Refutation was plagiarized from
6 See Angelou, Ref., xxvxli.

7 Angelou, Ref., xii.
8 See Angelou, Ref., xlv.
9 See Angelou, Ref. 74, 77, 17.
10 It is clear from Nicholas prologue (p. 3, 2324) that he knows that Proclus work contains 211 chap-
ters. E. R. Dodds (ed.), Proclus, The Elements of Theology, Oxford 1963, the second edition (cited hence-
forth as ET, chapter, page, line), comments thus (xlv): The abrupt manner in which Nicolaus com-
mentary ends, together with the mention in the superscription to the Proclus text in C of 211 proposi-
tions (200 in B, no numeral in D), points rather to a mutilation of our text of Nicolaus than to Nicolaus
having used a mutilated text of Proclus.
11 Nicolai Methonensis Refutatio institutionis theologicae Procli Platonici, ed. J. Th. Voemel, in Initia
Philosophiae ac Theologiae ex platonicis fontibus ducta: Pars Quarta, Frankfurt 1825.
Proclus as Heresiarch | 105
a much earlier anti-Proclean work by Procopius of Gaza. This view was rejected by
Stiglmayr, Dodds and Mercati, but in recent years the plagiarism thesis has been re-
vived in a modified form by Amato, editor of the works of Procopius of Gaza. While
I hope to address this question before long in another publication, here I take it for
granted that the work is an original composition by Nicholas.
Nicholas Refutation has to be understood against the intellectual background of
his time. In the century following the death of Proclus in 485, we can identify two major
instances of Proclean influence on (or provocation of) Christian authors. The first is
that of Pseudo-Dionysius, whose corpus was produced sometime between 485 and
530. This is an important case to keep in mind when reading Nicholas, for Dionysius
turns out to be one of the two main patristic sources in his arguments against Proclus
(Gregory Nazianzen is the other). To some degree we may say that Nicholas critique
of Proclus simply makes explicit and prominent a critical perspective on Proclus that
is implicit and occasional in Dionysius.
Second, John Philoponus (d. 570) responded at length to Proclus in his work
Against Proclus on the Eternity of the World. This text is also possibly relevant to
Nicholas Refutation, for while John and Nicholas were responding to different Pro-
clean texts, they each wrote lengthy refutations of specific Proclean works, and the
topic of eternity is certainly discussed in the Elements of Theology. The questions
that obviously suggest themselves (though I will not pursue them here) are whether
Nicholas shared Philoponus perspective on these issues and whether he was influ-
enced by Philoponus.
A third area of early Proclean influence is in the School of Gaza. Procopius of Gaza
(c. 465529) may have taken a critical interest in Proclus, though the evidence for this
is tenuous, and the slight evidence that Procopius wrote a critique of Proclus com-
mentary on the Chaldaean Oracles has often been confused with the much more du-
12 Drseke 1895a, 1897a.

13 Stiglmayr 1899a; Dodds 1963, xxxi; Mercati 1931, 26466.
14 See Procopius of Gaza, Opuscula rhetorica et oratoria: cum testimoniis et fragmentis (quorum inedi-
tum unum ex Refutatione Procli institutionis theologicae); accedunt Procopii et Megethii rhetoris mutuae
sex, ed. E. Amato, Berlin 2009; Amato 2010, 512; and Procopius of Gaza, Discours et fragments, ed. E.
Amato, Paris 2014, xlvil, 501503.
15 For the dating of the Dionysian corpus, see Rorem and J. Lamoreaux 1998, 10.
16 On the other hand, it has been argued that Nicholas teaching differs in certain respects from that
of Dionysius; see Biriukov 2013.
17 John Philoponus, De aeternitate mundi contra Proclus, ed. H. Rabe, Leipzig 1899 [reprint
Hildesheim 1963]; De aeternitate mundi / ber di Ewigkeit der Welt, hrsg. und bers. von C. Scholten,
Turnhout 2009; Against Proclus On the Eternity of the World 15, tr. M. Share, London 2005; Against
Proclus On the Eternity of the World 68, tr. M. Share, London, 2005; Against Proclus On the Eter-
nity of the World 911, tr. M. Share, London 2010; Against Proclus On the Eternity of the World 1218,
tr. J. Wilberding, London 2006.
106 | J. Robinson
bious claim that he wrote a refutation of the Elements of Theology. With far better
evidence, however, Delphine Lauritzen has recently shown Proclean influence in the
poetry of John of Gaza (6th c.).
After the sixth century, Proclus influence on Christian authors is minimal until
the eleventh century, when Michael Psellos ( c. 1081) took great interest in Proclus,
quoting many of his works often, and especially the Elements of Theology. John Ita-
los ( after 1082) used to be associated more with Proclus, but more recently schol-
ars have qualified this. Isaac Sebastocrator, who was likely the brother of Alexios
Komnenos (in which case he was also involved in Italos trial for heresy in 1082),
produced a Christian adaptation of the Proclean opuscula. Eustratios of Nicaea ( c.
1120) made sympathetic use of Proclus in his Aristotelian commentaries. And the
Georgian figure John Petritsi, whose dates are uncertain, seems to have imbibed the
vogue for Proclus in Constantinople, for he subsequently produced a Georgian transla-
tion of, and highly sympathetic commentary on, the Elements of Theology. All of this
indicates a renewed interest in Proclus in the eleventh and twelfth centuries in Byzan-
tium, and, in some cases, a sympathetic readership. Although we cannot tell precisely
who Nicholas audience is, the so-called Proclus-renaissance of the eleventh century
18 See Westerink 1942a, who only discusses a possible Procopian refutation of Proclus commentary
on the Chaldean Oracles. The issue becomes confused in Aly 1957, and this confusion is perpetuated
in Whittaker 1975.
19 See D. Lauritzen 2015, xiiixiv, xlix, and especially lxilxiii.
20 On Psellos and Proclus, see OMeara 1989, 1998a, 2014e.
21 See Trizio 2014c.
22 On the identity of the author of these adaptations, see Steel and Opsomer 2003, 48, note 19: Three
Byzantine princes of the name Comnena [sic] Sebastokrator are known to us: the elder brother of Alexis
I, his third son, brother of Johannes II (111843), and the third son of Johannes II (114380). The third of
these can be safely ruled out. D. Isaac (1977), pp. 257, considers the second as author of the treatises.
We propose (with Boese) to identify the author with the first Isaak, the elder brother of Alexis I, who
played a role in the process against Italos as well (1082).
23 Proclus, Trois tudes sur la Providence I: Dix problmes concernant la Providence, d. et tr. par D.
Isaac, Paris 1977; II: Providence, Fatalit, Libert, d. et tr. par D. Isaac, Paris, 1979; III: De lexistence du
mal, d. et tr. par D. Isaac, avec une note additionelle par C. Steel, Paris 1982. These editions present
Moerbekes Latin translations of Proclus opuscula, with Isaac Sebastocrators Greek texts as appen-
dices. A full Greek retroversion of the Proclean treatises has recently been published: Tria Opuscula:
Griechische Retroversion Mit Kommentar, hrsg. von B. Strobel (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca Et
Byzantina), Berlin 2014.
24 On Eustratios and Proclus, see Steel 2002; Trizio 2009b; and Trizio 2014c.
25 For a discussion of his biography, see G. Gigineishvili 2007, 1219. On the commentary see also
Ioane Petrizi. Kommentar zur Elementatio theologica des Proklos: bersetzung aus dem Altgeorgis-
chen, Anmerkungen, Indices und Einleitung, hrsg. von L. Alexidze und L. Bergemann, Amsterdam,
2009; Iremadze 2004a; Alexidse 2002.
(and its continuation in the twelfth century) is clearly the general context in which we
must understand Nicholas decision to write his Refutation.
The full title of the work is

(Explication of the Elements of Theology of Proclus of Lycia the Platonic Philosopher:
that those who read [this book] might not be seized by its seemingly compelling per-
suasion and be tempted against the true faith). The text is structured as a chapter-by-
chapter response to the Elements of Theology, and begins with a prologue that runs
to about four pages. The opening word of the title, anaptyxis, is translated as refuta-
tion in Angelous edition, which is quite reasonable if we read this word in light of
the subtitle (that those who read this book might not be seized []), as well as in the
light of Nicholas promise in the first paragraph that for each chapter he will provide
some refutation ( ) of the errors therein. It is useful, however, to keep
in mind the neutral connotation of the wordsomething like explanation or expli-
cation, for Nicholas operates in several modes of anaptyxis, not all so polemical as is
implied by refutation.
In his prologue Nicholas writes that he is concerned by the interest that certain
of his contemporaries are showing in Proclus, an interest that he fears may lead them
into heresy. For this reason, he says,
myself taking care so that many of our contemporaries do not suffer that fate, so many as judge
the chapters of Proclus of Lycia worthy of study [], I knew that it was necessary, having diligently
fixed my mind on them, to identify in regard to each of these chapters the belief opposed to the
divine faith, with also some refutation that would uncover the contrivance hiding in elegance,
and thus escaping the notice of the many.
After the prologue, Nicholas embarks upon his chapter-by-chapter commentary. Al-
though Nicholas Refutation accompanies the text of the Elements of Theology in most
of the manuscripts, neither Voemel nor Angelou included Proclus text in their respec-
tive editions. The Refutation is best read alongside the Elements, however, and in-
26 For the fundamental article on this subject, see Podskalsky 1976a; see also Benakis 1987c and Parry
2006a.
27 Cf. the opening of Dionysius Divine Names (ed. B. Suchla, Berlin/New York, 1990), where he says
he will offer an anaptyxis of the divine names (DN 1, 1 585B; CD 107, 2): , ,
, , . For an
example of a more sympathetic mode of anaptyxis in Nicholas, see Chapter 122 of the Refutation, and
the end of my forthcoming article, Dionysius against Proclus: the Apophatic Critique in Nicholas of
Methones Refutation of the Elements of Theology, in Proclus and His Legacy, ed. D. Butorac and D.
Layne. See also the excellent discussion of Ref. 122 in Alexidse 2002.
28 Ref. Prologue, 2, 612.
29 Both Voemel and Angelou include only the text of Proclus propositions, omitting the proofs, and in
Angelous case the text provided for the propositions derives not from the three principal manuscripts
108 | J. Robinson
deed constant reference to Proclus text is necessary, for Nicholas often quotes not
only the proposition, but excerpts and terms from the proof as well. In addition, he
sometimes provides cross-references to other propositions in the Elements, usually in
order to refute Proclus from his own premises.
With two or three exceptions, the Elements of Theology is his only apparent Pro-
clean source. These exceptions are a passage in Chapter 48 that suggests familiarity
with Proclus Commentary on the Timaeus, another citation or paraphrase in Chapter
77 whose source remains unidentified, and a possible allusion, a passage in Chap-
of the Refutation, but from Dodds edition of Proclus Elements. This is occasionally misleading, for
Nicholas text of Proclus sometimes differs from Dodds text, so that Nicholas appears in his commen-
tary to be paraphrasing Proclus when in fact he is quote Proclus verbatim from a variant text.
30 See Ref. 48, 54, 2231:
,
.
, -
,
,
(And common to all is the confession that matter is deprived of all
form; therefore Plato even says that it is similar to God dissimilarly, since the things said privatively
concerning God in a superior sense are understood concerning it [matter] in an inferior sense. The re-
sult is that without origin and imperishable and without parts and incomposite and all such
things would be said concerning it in an inferior sense, since it is inferior to originated things and to
perishable things and to things having parts and to all beings whatsoever, and it lacks perfection and
self-sufficiency to the extent that it is even nothing in actuality, being understood and impressed only
upon a bastard intellect.). Cf. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum commentaria II, 257, 28258, 7: -

, ,
, ,
, , .
, ,
, (tr. Runia and Share, Commentary on Platos
Timaeus, Cambridge 2008, 103: And analogously, if in each case you take the superior of the two and
make it bastard at the superior level, you will be able to see how the One is knowable. It is knowable
by a bastard intellect and a bastard opinion. For this reason it is not properly knowable as a simple
object and also not from a cause. It is known, therefore, by bastard means, because it happens in a
way that is superior in both cases. Opinion does not know through a cause and that [object] [i.e. the
One] is not knowable from a cause. Intellect knows its object as something simple, so it is bastard
intellect which knows that [object] [the One], because this happens in a manner superior to [intellec-
tive] knowing. The superior [form of knowing], therefore, is bastard in relation to the Intellect, just
as that [object] [the One] is superior to being simple, such as the intelligible realm is for the intellect
and for that to which the intellect is cognate and not bastard[].), emphasis added. The Proclean
passage is not easy, but the expression bastard intellect ( ) appears nowhere else besides
these two passages in the TLG, which strongly suggests a connection between the two passages.
31 Ref. 77, 80, 69: ,
, ,
ter 13 that echoes closely a phrase in Proclus Commentary on the Alcibiades. If it is

the case that Nicholas was unfamiliar with other Proclean sources, this might help
to account for an important feature of his understanding of the Elements: as I dis-
cuss below, apophatic theology plays a major role in Nicholas critique of Proclus,
who, according to Nicholas, lacks a proper recognition of Gods transcendence and
unknowability. This particular contrast between his own position and that of Proclus
would seem harder to maintain if he were familiar with Proclus Commentary on the
Parmenides or his Platonic Theology, for in these works it is clear that, like Dionysius
and Nicholas after him, Proclus too holds that the first principle is unknowable. On
the other hand, even the Elements of Theology itself, while giving the appearance of a
rational system, contains a few clear indications of the transcendence and unknowa-
bility of the first principle, so some additional explanation of Nicholas position may
be required.
Nicholas Refutation represents a confrontation between two opposed, yet anal-
ogous systems. That is to say, both Nicholas and Proclus offer a comprehensive pic-
ture of reality, though they disagree regarding many features of that picture. Nicholas
Refutation is thus not a disinterested consideration of the meaning of Proclus text, for
at every step he seeks to show to what degree and how Proclus philosophy is at odds
, (But this one says that a certain

matter is a certain potential being, but each idea of beings is actual; prime matter is potentially all
things, and Being-in-itself is in every way actual, so that he would deify both the first idea of being and
the [ideas of] individuals, in addition to matter.). Nicholas clearly attributes this statement to Proclus,
yet nothing like this appears in the Elements of Theology, nor have I found it elsewhere in Proclus.
32 Ref. 13, 18, 3132: , , ,
[] (for nothingneither word, nor name, nor conceptbrings forth its
hiddenness, which is transcendently established in inaccessible places []); cf. Proclus, Com-
mentary on the First Alcibiades, 319, 14 (p. 421), ed. L. Westerink, Westbury 2011:
.
, ,
(tr. ONeill, Westbury 2011, 420: Now among the first
principles of reality, the Good transcends beauty and the beautiful lies superior to justice. The first is
established in inaccessible heights above the intelligibles, whereas the second is situated secretly
among the first of the intelligibles and more evidently at the lower limit of that order [...]), emphasis
added.
33 See, for example, the following passage from the Platonic Theology (The Theology of Plato, tr.
Thomas Taylor, Westbury 1995, 151, translation modified): We endeavor therefore to know the un-
known nature of the first principle through the things that proceed from and are converted to it; and
we also attempt through the same things to give a name to that which is ineffable. This principle, how-
ever, is neither known by beings, nor can be spoken of by any one of all things; but being exempt from
all knowledge and all language, and subsisting as incomprehensible, it produces from itself according
to one cause all knowledge, every thing that is known, all words, and whatever can be comprehended
by speech.
34 See Proposition 123. I have discussed this issue more extensively in my recent dissertation on the
Refutation.
110 | J. Robinson
with Christian teaching. The result is that the Refutation can be read in two very differ-
ent ways: on the one hand, since Nicholas devotes considerable space to expounding
his own Christian views (often more space than he gives to the details of a given propo-
sition), this has the effect of making his text to some degree an independent treatise,
in the sense that Nicholas own views are intelligible whether or not one reads his
Refutation alongside the Elements of Theology; on the other hand, to understand in
detail his arguments against Proclus requires close attention to Proclus own text and
to the way in which Nicholas weaves Proclus words and phrases into the exposition
of his own views. Sometimes he openly states his disagreement with Proclus, but at
other times his criticism of Proclus is simply implied by his paraphrase.
I divide my discussion of the Refutation here into two main parts that to some
extent correspond with these two ways of reading. Part I, itself subdivided into two
sections, is a consideration of the work as theological polemic. In the first section of
this part (1.1), I consider Nicholas own major themes, formulated in opposition to
Proclus, and primarily theological and traditional in character rather than philosoph-
ical. In the second section of this part (1.2), I discuss Nicholas idea that Proclus is a
source of Christian heresies. Part II contains a consideration of Nicholas treatise as
philosophical commentary.
1.1 Polemical Theology: Creation and Trinity as Themes in the

Refutation
The fundamental disagreement between Nicholas and Proclus concerns the meaning
of the monarchy of the first principle, with respect to both unity and unicity. On the
one hand, to Proclus unitarian conception of the first principle Nicholas opposes the
Christian doctrine of the Trinity, identifying the Trinity with the One as the source
35 Within this article, spaced out words in Greek and corresponding English indicate quotation or
paraphrase from Proclus Elements; italics indicate quotation from other sources; bold is used to draw
attention to verbal parallels without asserting that such parallels amount to a citation. I am currently
preparing a new combined edition and translation of both Proclus Elements and Nicholas Refutation.
This edition will correct occasional errors in Angelous text, but will also, more importantly, identify
the many excerpts and terms from the Elements that Nicholas quotes or paraphrases. Only with such
an edition is it possible to follow the thread of Nicholas arguments. The Elements of Theology is al-
ready well-served by editions: that of Dodds, which is well known, and also the recent revised edition
and German translation by Schomakers and Onnasch (Proklos, Theologische Grundlegung, Leipzig
2015); by publishing Proclus Elements along with Nicholas Refutation, however, it will be possible to
replicate the format of the manuscripts of the Refutation (in which the two texts alternate chapter by
chapter), and also to present the recension of Proclus text that Nicholas actually read. In other words,
this new edition of the Elements will not aim to establish the archetype of all the manuscripts, but only
that of the family of manuscripts to which Nicholas Refutation belongs (Dodds First Family; see p.
xxxiii of his edition). On the need for such an edition, see Steel 1987.
of all things. In this respect Nicholas disagreement has two dimensions: on the one
hand, to Proclus unitarian conception of the first principle Nicholas opposes the
Christian doctrine of the Trinity, identifying the Trinity with the One as the source
of all things. In this sense Nicholas disagreement with Proclus concerns the mean-
ing of the unity of the first principle (and here he employs a traditional anti-Jewish
polemic). On the other hand, to the Proclean teaching of an emanative hierarchy of
causes, Nicholas opposes the doctrine of creation, i.e., of one God who without me-
diation freely produces all beings from not being ( or ).
This understanding of divine production is for Nicholas a criterion of belief in one
God.
Nicholas monotheistic and Trinitarian convictions are of course given by Chris-
tian tradition; in neither case does Nicholas intend to prove the doctrine in question
by purely philosophic means. The case for monotheism (or creation) can however be
articulated in philosophical terms, and to the degree that Nicholas does so, this can
be considered as his primary philosophical disagreement with Proclus. By contrast,
although Nicholas does offer arguments for the doctrine of the Trinity (on the basis
of analogies between creation and creator), his stance is primarily defensive, for he
argues that the doctrine of the Trinity exceeds the grasp of reason, without for all that
being irrational.
In Prop. 11 Proclus states, All beings proceed from one cause, the first. Nicholas
not only comments at length upon this proposition, but also cites it seven other times
in the Refutation (more than any other Proclean passage), which shows its importance
for his critique. At first glance, Prop. 11 seems to express a point of fundamental
agreement between Nicholas and Proclus, for Nicholas too can affirm that everything
proceeds from one cause; but he does not agree with the way in which Proclus un-
derstands this claim, and he criticizes the formulation because it is open to diverse
interpretations. To put it another way, while Proclus and Nicholas agree that there is
a first cause, they disagree as to what it means that there is a first cause. For Proclus,
the primary causality of the One or Good is consistent with the secondary causality of
Being, Life and Intellect; he conceives of these as causes that are similar, qua causes,
to the first cause. Thus, while in Proclus view these secondary causes differ from the
first cause in the degree or scope of their causality, they do not differ in kind.
A typical term that Proclus uses for this causation is paragein (), to pro-
duce. Just as the One is productive, so also the Intellect is productive, and so on.
36 An anonymous reviewer, citing Balibar 2006, has pointed out that the term monotheism does not
exist in patristic and Byzantine writings. This is a very interesting fact, whose explanation, as Balibar
shows, is well worth pondering. I am not sure that the absence of the term shows that the concept did
not exist, but in any case I intend it here simply as convenient short-hand for Nicholas frequent and
explicit insistence that there is but one God, and for the consequences involved in this claim.
37 ET 11, 13, 7: , .
38 Ref., chs. 21, 36, 38, 40, 41, 97 and 185.
112 | J. Robinson
For Nicholas, however, the first Cause must transcend its effects so completely that
any causality they may possess cannot be considered metaphysically productive.
As he puts it in Chapter 38,
while we must concede that there are many beings, some closer to the Cause and more similar,
and others more remote and more dissimilar, nevertheless, one must not grant that there are
some causes closer than others, and one must rather believe with our theologians, who speak in
the Spirit of God, that all things came into being from the Father through the Son in the super-
naturally Holy Spirit, who are the single principle and cause of all things; but the other things
that are between the principle and the things that subsist remotely from it are ministering and
serving spirits of the principle, and co-workers with us of the return to the better, and we must
not at all say that the prior things are productive and subsistence-giving causes, either of us or of
subsequent beings.
If the secondary causes were productive, then they would, as causes, be similar to the
first Cause, and it would no longer transcend them. This thesis is in the first place a
theological axiom for Nicholas, and not the result of philosophical reflection. The clos-
est he comes to arguing for it occurs in his commentary on Prop. 4 (All that is unified
is other than the One itself.). While this passage concerns the unity of the Cause vs.
unified things, what he says here would also apply to what I am calling primary vs.
secondary causation:
Which indeed has already been said by us: each of the Three in the super-unified Triad is one,
itself in itself, and at the same time the Three are the One itself, avoiding both confusion in the
union and division in the distinction, since they transcend every one and multitude, and are
established beyond every union and every distinction that is observed in the beings that are after
them, as the first hypothesis (), which draws its necessity from the impossibility that
the productive Cause of all things be co-ranked with the things produced from it. Therefore the
Super-unified is not co-ranked with the unified things, nor is that which is beyond everything
co-ranked with all things or with the universe.
39 Ref. 38, 47, 1221: , , -

, , ,
-
,

,
.
40 Ref. 4, 8, 111:
,

, -
.
.
The argument here is not developed, yet the idea is clear enough: the first cause simply
cannot be co-ranked with its effects, and is thus unlike them in some fundamental
sense.
Elsewhere Nicholas frequently describes God as exrmenon (), tran-
scending all beings. Proclus uses this word too, but in Proclus writings the term
applies to multiple levels of the metaphysical hierarchy, designating the relative tran-
scendence of one level over another and, in general, of the participated term over the
participant. As Nicholas uses the term, however, exrmenon describes exclusively
the relationship of God to creatures, and this gives a greater force to the notion of tran-
scendence in Nicholas.
Since, for Nicholas, only God is productive, it follows that all the productive
functions of the lower hypostases in Proclus system must be ascribed instead to the
first Principle. As universal cause, the Principle is not only the One and the Good, but
also Being, Life and Intellect, since it is cause of all these qualities among creatures.
The Proclean hypostases thus become simply so many divine names, as in Diony-
sius, each designating the same unique creator. Nor are the divine names limited
to these, but indeed every feature of the created order can name God cataphatically.
As Nicholas writes in Chapter 21:
this [Trinity] we proclaim to be the one Principle of all things, not one principle of henadic hy-
postases (if, as he claims, such things exist), and another of the intellectual being, and another
of the psychic [being] and another of the corporeal natures, but one and the same Principle of
all beings, of non-beings (for even these he calls as though they were), of intellect, of reason, of
41 Nicholas uses this verb 31 times in the Refutation.

42 Taking into account cognates, Proclus uses this verb a total of 19 times in the Elements, in the
following chapters: 23, 51, 75, 93, 98, 121, 122, 124, 130, 132, 141, 150,154, 156, 190.
43 For a related discussion of the significance of the expression beyond-being for both thinkers,
see Robinson 2016, forthcoming.
44 In Chapter 41 he glosses production as follows:
(strictly speaking, to produce is to make something to be from not being).
45 In this respect Nicholas stands on firm Dionysian precedent. Cf. Dionysius, DN 5, 2 816C817A; CD
181, 1619: ,
,
(But [this treatise] does not say that the
Good is one thing and Being is another and Life or Wisdom is something else, nor that there are many
causes and that various divinities, superior and inferior, produce various things, but that all the good
processions and the divine names hymned by us are of one God.).
46 Cf. Rom. 4:17: . The same idea recurs in Ref. 27, 57 and 74. Dodds
(ET, p. 231), commenting on Prop. 57, notes Nicholas and Dionysius agreement with Proclus on this
point. In Ref. 57 Nicholas writes: [] ,
([] who g iv e s s u b s i s t e n c e even t o p r iv a t i o n s and
to what does not exist, for he is praised as calling things that are not as though they were). Nicholas
great concern is to vest all causal power in the first principle, where even non-beings are present in
potentia; it is from this state that he calls them forth when he creates them as beings.
114 | J. Robinson
wisdom, of knowledge, of life, of nature, of forms, of privations; for it forms according to itself
these qualities of all corporeal and incorporeal beings; therefore we praise it as Intellect and as
Reason and as Life and as every Virtue, Wisdom, Righteousness, Peace, Love, Truth; and again
indeed we name it from the sensible things: Light, Firmament, Power, Might, Refuge, Guardin
short, all things, according to every form and every affirmation [].
On the other hand, precisely because of the transcendence of the first Cause, no crea-
ture is comparable to its divine source, and consequently no concept or name can
adequately designate God. All names must also be denied of God who, though pre-
containing all creatures, and named after them as their Cause, is also incomparably
superior to any of them, inexpressible by any names they might bear. For Nicholas, as
for Dionysius, this apophatic approach is also in some sense higher or more true
than the cataphatic approach. The following passage from Chapter 13 illustrates the
combination of affirmation, negation and super-affirmation:
According to us as well the Good and the One are thus identified, but in fact so are Being and
all the other names, since the unique Cause of all, the super-divine Monad and Triad, super-
essentially is all things, the Cause which, even if we name it thus, nevertheless we confess that
we do not know whatever is its very essence; for nothingneither word, nor name, nor concept
brings forth its hiddenness, which is transcendently established in inaccessible places. And thus
our discourse passes every opposition unharmed; for what would be opposed to the discourse
that both affirms well and negates all things concerning it, the former since it is all things before-
hand as cause, and the latter on account of the transcendence and ineffability of the essence?
Thus, a fundamental and pervasive element in Nicholas critique of Proclus is his op-
position to Proclus emanationist metaphysic, which Nicholas regards as incompati-
ble with the transcendence of the first principle required by the Christian doctrine of
creation.
47 Ref. 21, 29, 1122: , -

, , , ,
, , (
), , , , , , , ,

, , , , , -
, , , , , ,
[]
48 See Ref. 8, 12, 1420; 12, 17, 3218, 1; 119, 115, 1112.
49 Ref. 13, 18, 2719, 4:
, ,
, ,
, , , .

, ,
;
The other fundamental element in Nicholas critique of Proclus is his defense of

the doctrine of the Trinity. Nicholas gives pride of place to this theme in his Prologue,
where he suggests that Proclus Elements of Theology contains attacks on the Christian
doctrine of the Trinity:
This wise one, beginning the enterprise set forth by himself, says straightway in the first propo-
sition that e v e r y m u l t i t u d e i n s o m e w ay p a r t i c i p a t e s t h e o n e , scoffing perhaps at us
worshipers of the Trinity as revering a multitude before the One or even togetherwith the One
[].
Though Proclus presumably did not have Christian doctrine in mind when writing this
proposition, one can see the point. If every multitude in some way participates the one,
then one might suppose that the persons of the Trinity participate some prior unity,
or that the Son and Spirit participate the Father as a prior unity. Nicholas builds his
defense on apophatic theology:
And one must know that the things demonstrated by him concerning one and multitude are not
at all set against us in regard to the doctrine of the highest Trinity, since, to speak as does the
great Dionysius, that which is worshipped by us is both one and three and neither one nor three,
since it is beyond every one and every multitude, seeing that it is in fact even superior to number
and transcends every word and every concept. For truly that which is revered would hold nothing
beyond us, if it were captured by our intellect and reason; and it escapes not only our intellect but
even all the super-celestial beings, which are also intellects, since they are also called intellectual
substances. We confess therefore that the divinity is a triad and that the same is a monad and the
One; its being three does not exclude its being the One, nor does its being the One exclude its
being three, but rather, from both it is confirmed to be both. For it is three, not as being measured
by number, but as the one who gives existence to every three ( ) and
measures every number; wherefore it is not a countable three, so that it could also be called a
multitude, but three, the one and only, and not by participation in the One (for such participants
are countable, coordinate with the multitude), but as being itself the One.
50 Ref. Prologue, 4, 36:

,
[]
51 Ref. Prologue, 4, 195, 3: ,
,

.
,
,
.
,
. , ,
, , ,
),
. Cf. DN 13, 3 980C981A; CD 228, 17229, 14.
116 | J. Robinson
Thus, the doctrine of a transcendent creator, and the apophatic theology this doctrine
entails, make space as it were for the doctrine of the Trinity, a doctrine that is seem-
ingly contradictory and certainly incomprehensible. The logic is as follows: if, owing
to his transcendence as the ultimate cause, God is agreed in advance to be incom-
prehensible, it then becomes possible to affirm things of God, including the doctrine
of the Trinity, that do not fully make sense to us. In his comments on Proclus first
proposition Nicholas even explicitly asserts that in relation to the Trinity the law of
non-contradiction falls apart.
This appeal to transcendence and apophasis is a defensive move in this context,
for it aims not to prove the doctrine of the Trinity, but simply to show that the Trinity
is not subject to Proclus proofs or vulnerable to his logic. On the other hand, Nicholas
is also prepared to make a positive argument for the Trinity, an argument founded
in affirmative theology, i.e. by seeking phenomena in the created order for which the
Trinity is the paradigm and cause and from which, therefore, it can be named and
understood. And so, in the same final paragraph of the prologue, he continues thus:
Again, it is the One, yet is neither sterile nor altogether unmoved, but is itself the Cause of all
fecundity and motion; wherefore it is also the Fecund-in-itself and the unique and very first Self-
moved, lest it should be deprived of the best things that are derived from it. For if it is sterile,
whence comes fecundity for others, and if it is unmoved, whence comes motion? For the alterna-
tive is that one must grant that some other thing is the cause of these [aspects of created natures]
and thus the Cause of all things would not be one; but if, on the contrary, the Cause of all is both
one and fecund, then it must also be self-moved. Because of this Gregory the Theologian says,
the Monad from the beginning moved toward a dyad and at the Trinity came to a halt. Since then
this One is both fecund and self-moved, because of this it is also three, and since it is three (and
it is these not in a countable way, but as causing the subsistence of every number), on account
of this it is also one; or rather, let us say that the Three itself, unique and super-essential, is the
same as the One itself.
52 Ref. 1, 6, 16: Therefore it is clear that the One that pre-transcends the one that is distinguished-
by-opposition-to and co-ranked with the multitudethat One is not comprehended by the demonstra-
tion, since it transcends every division and demonstration; and in relation to it even the law of non-
contradiction falls apart (
,
.).
53 Ref. Prologue, 5, 315 (quoting Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 29, 2, 76B1314): ,
, ,
,
. , , , ;
,
, . , ,
. ,
, ( ),
, .
The two fundamental issues for Nicholas are thus the doctrine of creation (or produc-
tion) from nothing and the doctrine of the Trinity, which together constitute Nicholas
understanding of the monarchy of the first principle. The former seems to Nicholas to
be the only reasonable interpretation of metaphysical monarchy as a doctrine of the
unique source or cause of all things, a doctrine that Proclus seems to affirm in Prop.
11, but that he actually contradicts, according to Nicholas, by positing many produc-
tive hypostases and many gods. The latter issue, the doctrine of the Trinity, governs
54 Kazhdan, in his review of Angelous edition (see above, note 1), is overly reductive in relating the
theological concerns of the Refutation to Nicholas anti-Latin polemic in other works. Kazhdan sug-
gests that the emanative hierarchy of Proclus metaphysics resembles the hierarchical organization
of the Latin aristocracy, and thus that Nicholas defence of divine monarchy is implicitly an apology
for Byzantine imperial monarchy. A more helpful way of relating Nicholas Refutation to Greek-Latin
disputes is to consider the overlap between the issues the issues of polytheism and filioque. Nicholas
does not make this connection explicit in the Refutation, and in fact, when commenting on Proposition
22, he opposes Proclus proposition to the filioque, saying that someone might even use this propo-
sition against the Latins, who say that the Spirit has two principial causes []. Photios, however, an
important authority for Nicholas, does make the connection explicit in his On the Mystagogy of the
Holy Spirit (ed. J. Graves, Long Island City 1983), 11, p. 156: ,
, ;
; -
; (trans., p. 74: If one admits
of two causes in the divinely sovereign and superessential Trinity, where then is the much hymned
and God-befitting majesty of the monarchy? Will not the godlessness of polytheism be riotously intro-
duced? Under the guise of Christianity, will not the superstition of Greek error reassert itself among
those who dare to say such things?). And later, 37, p. 165: -
, , ,
, ,
, , ,
, (trans., p. 86: Moreover, if the Son is
begotten of the Father, and if the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, it would not be an inno-
vation in respect of the Spirit if another should proceed from Him. In accord with their mad opinion,
therefore, not three, but four hypostases could be inferred, or rather an infinitude, because the fourth
could produce another, and that one yet another, until they would surpass even pagan polytheism).
This second passage is clearly echoed by Nicholas in at least one of his own treatises on the filioque;
see his
(Chapters refuting the innovative Latin dogma that the Holy
Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son), in , -
. Vol. 1 (no more published), ed. Andronikos K. Demetrakopoulos, Leipzig 1866
(repr. Hildesheim 1965), 359380, here 364: ,
, ,
,
, ,
,
, (Or
if not the Son, but some other must be given from the Spirit either to be begotten or to proceed, as
each of these does from the Father, so that perhaps they should be preserved as same in honor and
118 | J. Robinson
Nicholas conception of the unity of the first principle, and so he does not concede
that the One transcends the Three.
1.2 Christian heresy from Proclus, Proclean perversion of

Dionysius
It may seem odd to call Proclus a heresiarch, as I have in my title, if we think of a

heresy as an aberrant doctrine arising within a religious community, and not as an
idea coming from outside the fold. In this sense of the word, Proclus is obviously not a
Christian heretic. I have used the word heresiarch, however, in order to convey the
relationship that Nicholas sees between Proclus and various Christian heresies. We
have seen already some of the ways in which Nicholas thinks that Proclus philosophy
is at odds with Christian doctrine, and it is primarily in these waysas a pagan, an
emanationist and a polytheistthat Proclus is problematic. Nicholas not only points
out these incompatibilities, however, but goes so far as to relate them explicitly to
various Christian heresies.
Thus, in his comments on Prop. 32, All reversion is accomplished through a like-
ness () of the reverting terms to the goal of the reversion, Nicholas is
concerned to point out, first, that in regard to the Trinity, likeness is an inappro-
priate term for characterizing the relation between the Son and the Father, who are
not like but identical in essence or nature. While he concedes that there is a sense in
which man can be said to revert to God, since he was created in the image and likeness
() of God, and is enjoined by Christ to become like your Father who is in the
heavens, Nicholas rejects an understanding of the incarnation (and consequently of
human redemption) that conceives of it exclusively in terms of reversion through like-
ness. For however much the human person may become like God, this likeness will
still be the likeness of a created image, without any removal of the natural difference
between the divine and human. Nicholas argues that in the case of a reversion where
difference is preserved, union is a more appropriate term than likeness for describing
the reversion, and he goes on to point out that the problem with Nestorius is precisely
that he makes reversion a function of likeness rather than union:
power, then what is brought forth from the Spirit would also be of the same nature and equal in power
as the bringer-forth [the Spirit] and with those [Father and Son] from whom this [Spirit] was brought
forth; what is worshiped will no longer be three, but four, or rather, the hypostases will advance in
this way to infinity, with the one brought-forth always being of the same nature and power with the
bringer-forth, so that those professing such things will even overtake Greek polytheism.). I would like
to thank an anonymous reviewer for alerting me to this connection with Photios.
55 ET 32, 36, 34: -
.
God the Word, wishing to revert to himself our nature that because of sin fell away from likeness
() to him, did not make the man from Mary like himself by illumining from without,
as Nestorius would say, but, just as he was whole and perfect God, so also he became whole and
perfect man, and he united to himself (did not make like) the compound of our nature assumed
by him from the holy Virgin, and he is confessed and believed to be one, from two and in two
perfect natures that are dissimilar as far as each one in itself is concerned.
On this view, such likeness of man to God as is possible results from the union, rather
than causing it; also, one must never conceive of such likeness as an effacement of the
natural difference between the divine and the human. Having thus rejected a (as he
sees it) Nestorian conception of the incarnate Word, Nicholas concludes with a general
statement of how Proclus has inspired the heretics:
And see, everyone who wishes to be pious, how from this wise man the heretics take the starting
points ( ) of their heresies: Arius takes the decline (), as already indicated,
and Nestorius takes the assimilation (), as also Origen takes the reversion or restitution
() from the proposition before this one.
Nicholas here lists in summary fashion three different heresies that he has just dis-
cussed in the immediately preceding chapters. In Chapter 28 he had criticized Proclus
methodology as follows:
To transfer to the begetter and begotten the things demonstrated concerning the producer and
the product, would be an error common to this philosopher and the associates of Arius and Eu-
nomius.
He elaborates this thought in Chapter 29, though without mentioning Arius name
again. According to Prop. 29, All procession is accomplished through a likeness of
the secondaries to the firsts, and Nicholas comments as follows:
The p r o c e s s i o n according to nature in respect of the divine being is not accomplished t h r o ug h

l i k e n e s s, and first and second by decline ( ) have no place there; for not by decline
do the Son or the Spirit p r o c e e d from the Father, but rather it is fitting to speak of sameness and
56 Ref. 32, 42, 210:

,
,
, , -
,
.
57 Ref. 32, 42, 1115:
, , ,
, .
58 Ref. 28, 37, 2938, 3:
,
.
120 | J. Robinson
otherness there; for the Three are same in nature or essence, but other in hypostatic or personal
properties.
Thus, whatever truth the Proclean proposition might express regarding the relation-
ships between created things or the relationship of creatures to the Creator, Nicholas
rejects its applicability to the Trinitarian relations, and sees the Arian and Eunomian
heresy precisely as a failure to observe this fundamental distinction.
Shortly after the above passage, in Chapter 31, Nicholas connects Origens escha-
tology with Proclus teaching in the Elements:
And Origen, drawing the basis () of his own heresy from concluding that e v e r y t h i n g
t h a t p r o c e e d s f r o m s o m e t h i n g r e v e r t s t o t h a t f r o m w h i c h it was brought forth, taught
the restitution ().
Given the anachronism involved, we may wonder whether Nicholas intended the ge-
nealogy of Christian heresy quoted earlier to be taken seriously in a historical sense.
What is clear is that he regarded these heresies as ever-present or recurrent tempta-
tions that Proclus works might encourage, for he saw a certain similarity between
Proclus teachings and these heresies. In Nicholas view, the fundamental error in Pro-
clus system is the absence of a doctrine of creation, of the production of all things
from nothing. Without a concept of creation, the transcendence of the first cause is
compromised, and, by the same token, the status of creatures is exaggerated through
the emanative diffusion of divinity. Consequently, what Christians clearly distinguish
as Trinitarian begetting on the one hand and creative production on the other are con-
fused in an emanative continuum in which the second hypostasis is subordinate to the
first (Arius), and in which the reversion of lower entities is envisioned ontologically
and universally rather than historically and individually in the drama of Christian re-
59 Ref. 29, 39, 38: ,

, .
60 Ref. 31, 41, 1214: -
,
.
61 On Arianism, see also Ref. 99, 96, 2331:
,
,
,
. , ,
,
, , , (See that this wise man supposes that t o
s u b s i s t and simply to be are the same, but they are not; for the hypostasis is not the same with the
substance; but he also takes to be f r o m a c a u s e for to become, as if it were universally the case
that the cause creates the things of which it is a cause; and on this account he calls e v e r y p r i n c i p l e
demption. Thus the return of all things can seem to be in the very nature of things,
hence universal (Origen); thus one may conceive of the Incarnation in terms of as-
similation (Nestorius), obscuring the natural and permanent difference between the
divine and the human.
I close this section by noting another genealogy of thought according to Nicholas.
If, on the one hand, Nicholas thinks that Christian heresy derives from Proclus, or at
least shares certain of his errors, on the other hand he thinks that Proclus himself is
dependent upon Dionysius, an assumption with two-fold interpretive results: if Pro-
clus teaching agrees with Christian teaching, this can be explained by his dependence
on the Christian Dionysius; if, however, he teaches error, this can be explained as a
perversion of his source. Thus Dionysius, despite (as we know) his great debt to Pro-
clus, can play a fundamental role in Nicholas critique of Proclus, for one of Nicholas
central contentions is that Proclus is insufficiently apophatic; otherwise he would not
have scoffed at those who believe in God as Trinity.
2 Philosophical Aspects of the Refutation

Before examining some particular philosophical aspects of Nicholas text, I would like
now to offer a brief analysis of what it means to speak of philosophical aspects in
this context. Although I have divided my presentation into two parts, attempting to
treat Nicholas first as theologian, and second as philosopher, in reality these two iden-
tities co-exist in Nicholas, and are closely intertwined in his text. Rather than speak-
ing of the theological vs. the philosophical parts of Nicholas work, it is perhaps more
helpful to think of his Refutation as operating between two poles: between himself the
subject, as a Christian thinker, and Proclus text, as the object of his attention. What
Nicholas says is at all times a product of this confrontation, but sometimes determined
more by his own identity, as in the issues considered thus far, and at other times de-
(according to him) o f e a c h s e r i e s u n o r i g i n a t e , since in fact all the things that subsist from it
come come be. But you, worshipper of the Triad, do not be snatched and carried away by such words,
lest you slip toward the Arian heresy; for the Son and the Spirit proceed, rather than coming into being,
from the Father, as hypostatic, rather than creative, Cause).
62 See Ref. 122.
63 Nicholas was certainly not the first to observe some relationship between Dionysius and Proclus,
and to reverse the actual order of dependence. Already in the scholia by John of Skythopolis on the
works of Dionysius the following comment is interpolated: One must know that some of the non-
Christian philosophers ( ), especially Proclus, have often employed certain con-
cepts of the blessed Dionysius [] It is possible to conjecture from this that the ancient philosophers
of Athens usurped his works and then hid them, so that they themselves might seem to be the progen-
itors of his divine oracles []. Some say that these writings do not belong to the saint, but to someone
who came later []. See Rorem and J. Lamoreaux 1998, 106. For the possibility of attributing this
scholion to John Philoponus, see Steel and Opsomer 2003, 6.
122 | J. Robinson
termined more by the specific features of Proclus text. This occurs in two principle
ways, in the moment of interpretation (whether explicit or assumed), and in the
moment of refutation or correction, which presupposes and depends upon the mo-
ment of interpretation. In speaking now of Nicholas as a philosopher, I primarily have
in mind these two moments, which we might also call exegesis and evaluation. We
may further subdivide the stage of evaluation: first, those cases in which Nicholas cri-
tiques Proclus position or argument on the basis of premises external to Proclus text,
whether derived from Christian dogma (as above), from another philosopher (usually
Aristotle), or from what Nicholas regards as common sense; second, those cases in
which Nicholas argues on the basis of premises internal to Proclus text, attempting
to turn Proclus thought against itself.
We might also speak of the philosophical interest of Nicholas text in the sense
of his treating certain recognizable philosophical topics. In this regard one may men-
tion at least four prominent topics in Nicholas Refutation that are not primarily or not
exclusively theological issues: (1) the structure of participation, (2) the concept of
eternity, (3) the doctrine of prime matter, and (4) the place of self-motion and free
will in the metaphysical hierarchy.
Finally, we might also say that Nicholas Refutation is philosophical to the extent
that he cites philosophers in support of his arguments. In this sense we may say that
Nicholas is to some extent an Aristotelian. Agreeing with Aristotles critique of the
Forms, Nicholas frequently rejects what he regards as Proclus hypostatization of ab-
stractions such as Time, Eternity, Whole and Part.
I turn now to some particular philosophical features of Nicholas approach to
Proclus. If Proclus propositions must often be rejected as incompatible with Christian
teaching, such a rejection can be carried out in two main ways. One way is to limit the
64 According to this schema then, Nicholas can be thought of as operating philosophically 1) when
he tries to understand Proclus, 2) when he draws from external premises the logical consequences
for Proclus position or argumentation, and 3) when he draws from one Proclean claim the logical
consequence for another Proclean claim.
65 This issue is discussed extensively in Robinson 2016, forthcoming.
66 See, for example, Ref. 55.
67 See especially Ref. 55 and 59.
68 See especially Ref. 14.
69 See, for examples, Ref. 5254; 8788; 9095.
70 Nicholas does identify seemingly contradictory or incoherent aspects of Proclus thought, at least
given Nicholas presuppositions. Not surprisingly, he finds such notions as self-sufficient and self-
constituted to be incoherent when applied to anything besides the first Cause. He points out the seem-
ing absurdity that something should subsist by reversion, as in ET 37. He finds it easy work to criticize
these points of Proclus philosophy that are widely agreed to be subtle and difficult to make sense of.
Though he does not read these passages with sympathy, his criticisms should at least prompt us to
try and make sense of what he found difficult. But he is perhaps more interesting when he makes a
greater effort to understand Proclus.
scope or applicability of a given proposition by claiming that it does not apply to God,
either in his internal Trinitarian relations, or in his relation to the world. In such cases,
Nicholas critique goes hand-in-hand with the main structural differences between
their positions, as already discussed, and relies especially on the apophatic critique
in order to say, for example, that Prop. 1 (Every manifold participates in some way
the One) is simply not applicable to the Trinity, since the Trinity is not a manifold,
and thus is not comprehended by the terms of the proposition, even if that proposition
is valid at lower metaphysical levels. This approach resembles somewhat the way in
which the Neoplatonists themselves used Aristotle, regarding his philosophy as true
with regard to the lower world, but inadequate in relation to the higher world.
Another example is the way in which, given his interest in strictly distinguishing
God from creation, Nicholas frequently emphasizes the difference between produc-
ing (), understood as the act of creating from not being, and bringing-
forth (), which Nicholas identifies with the begetting of the Son and the pro-
jection () or procession () of the Holy Spirit. Nicholas equally in-
sists upon the difference between creative productivity on the one hand, and natural
or super-natural fecundity () on the other. Only on one occasion does he
designate the creative productivity as fecundity, qualifying it then as a knowing
() or creative (), rather than natural, fecundity. On the
basis of such distinctions Nicholas frequently qualifies Proclus claims, pointing out,
for example, that since a given proposition concerns production, it is therefore ap-
plicable neither to the relations between the divine persons nor to the relations be-
tween creatures: the Father does not produce the Son, who is fully divine and consub-
stantial, nor does any creature produce another creature, for only God can do this.
By the same token, when Proclus occasionally uses the term (fertile or fe-
cund), Nicholas insists that this term is inadmissible for designating Gods creative
power, though it may serve to describe the Father in relation to the Son and Spirit.
These are examples of how Nicholas refutes Proclus by qualifying the scope or
applicability of Proclus propositions. Often, however, Nicholas does not simply qual-
ify the proposition in question but rejects it outright. In such cases Nicholas attempts
to identify problems in Proclus arguments by showing internal contradictions or in-
consistency with other Proclean propositions. In these efforts Nicholas arguments of
course presuppose his interpretation, which is not always correct. Nicholas is not a
very sympathetic exegete in the Refutation, though to varying degrees he does make
an effort to understand Proclus, and on occasion he even attempts to relate various
propositions to each other systematically.
71 Nicholas, unlike the Cappadocians, and like Dionysius, does not use the word , but, unlike
Dionysius, he frequently distinguishes his conception of production from that of Proclus by insisting
on production from not being ( or ).
72 See Ref. 151.
124 | J. Robinson
Since Nicholas argumentation is often quite specific to the context, I would like
now to consider one such attempt in some detail, namely his commentary on Props.
108112, a closely related sequence of propositions. These propositions have a cer-
tain unity, for they are all concerned with the participative relationships envisaged
between various metaphysical levels in Proclus system.
The general picture that emerges from a study of these propositions, in conjunc-
tion with earlier related material in the Elements, is of a structure in which the hy-
postases One, Intellect, Soul and Nature are related to each other in a descending em-
anation, yet each is also productive on its own level. Thus, the One produces both
Intellect, below itself, and the henads, coordinate with itself; Intellect in turn pro-
duces both Soul and intellects; Soul likewise produces both Nature and souls. The
whole structure can be schematized as follows:
One henad henad henad ...

|
Intellect intellect intellect intellect ...
|
Soul soul soul soul ...
|
Nature nature nature nature ...
Given this structure, the argument of Prop. 108 is that any given entity on one
level can participate in the monadic principle of the higher level in two distinct ways:
either through its own principle or through the term that corresponds to it in the higher
level. Prop. 109 then applies the general terms of the previous proposition to show
that a given intellect can participate in the One either through Intellect or through the
henad that corresponds to itself; a given soul can participate in Intellect either through
Soul or through a given intellect; a given nature can participate in Soul either through
Nature or through a given soul. Prop. 110 adds the additional detail that the higher
levels have fewer members than the lower members (they are thus more unified), and
Prop. 111 draws the particular consequences, that some intellects participate in gods
(henads), while others do not, some souls participate in intellects, while others do
not, and some natures participate in souls, while others do not. Prop. 112 adds that on
each level the first members, e.g. intellect in the above schema, have the form of
their priors, i.e. of the level above them. The first intellect is thus also a god, and so
forth. commentary.
73 Especially Propositions 2122.

74 See Dodds, ET, 255, and also the more complex schema given on p. 282.
75 This schema receives further elaborations later on in the ET, but this basic version is sufficient for
the purposes of discussing Nicholas
In order to discuss Nicholas commentary on these propositions, it will be helpful

to have the text of Prop. 108 at hand:
Every particular member of any rank () can

participate in the monad of the immediately supra-
- jacent order () in one of two ways: ei-
- ther through the universal of its own [rank or order],
, or through the particular member in that [higher
rank/order] which is co-ordinate () with
it in respect of its analogous relation to the whole
. series ().
- For if, for all things, the reversion is through like-

, - ness, and the particular member in the inferior
[rank] is dissimilar to the monadic universal in the
superior rank () both as particular [is dissimi-
lar] to universal and as one rank () and an-
, other [are dissimilar], but is similar both to the uni-
versal of the same series (), on account of
- the sharing of the property, and to the correspond-
ing [term] ( ) of the immediately supra-
- jacent [series], on account of its analogous sub-
- sistence, it is clear that through these mean terms
, the return to the former naturally comes about, as
- through similars, although it is dissimilar; for on
the one hand it is similar as a particular to a par-
, . ticular, and on the other hand [it is similar] as be-
, longing to the same series; but that universal of the
- supra-jacent [series] is unlike it in both these re-
- spects.
-
.
One of the difficulties the reader of Proclus faces here is how to understand Proclus
use of the terms taxis, diakosmesis and seira, which figure prominently in Props. 108
and following, and which occur frequently in the Elements. Are these terms distinct
in meaning, and if so, how do they relate to each other? Nicholas does think that they
each have a distinct significance, and attemps to relate them to each other system-
atically. In fact, however, while these terms sometimes have different meanings in
Proclus works, in Props. 108112 and in many other passages in the Elements they
are used more or less synonymously. All three terms here seem equally to designate
the various strata or levels of Proclus metaphysical hierarchy. It is difficult to see any
126 | J. Robinson
distinction in use between taxis and diakosmesis, though perhaps one distinction in
connotation between these two terms on the one hand, and seira on the other hand,
is that whereas taxis and diakosmesis designate a given metaphysical level statically
and as a whole, seira seems here to designate a given level or stratum specifically in-
sofar as one conceives of it as initiated by the monad of the series and proceeding
horizontally, as it were, into increasingly remote members. It is like the difference, in
mathematics, between speaking of the set of integers as a whole vs. counting them off
one at a time.
However clear this may be to us, for Nicholas the interpretation of Props. 108112
was made more difficult by the fact that Proclus does not use the term seira with com-
plete consistency throughout the Elements of Theology, but, in addition to the hori-
zontal sense that predominates in this treatise, occasionally employs it in a vertical
sense as well. Proclus uses the term seira a total of thirty-six times in the Elements, in
fifteen propositions. Close examination of all these propositions shows that in only
two, Props. 125 and 145, does seira have an unambiguously vertical sense. Elsewhere
in the Elements it always either clearly designates the taxeis or diakosmeseis that pro-
ceed horizontally both from the One and from the successive monads subordinate
to the One (i.e., intellect, soul, nature) or, if in a few propositions the horizontal
sense of seira is not inescapable, even in these it can at least easily be construed in
this sense.
Nicholas, however, for reasons that cannot be identified with certainty, begins to
take seira in a vertical sense in his commentary on Prop. 97, Every principial cause
of each series bestows of its own property () to the whole series; and that
which it is primally, this that [series] is by declension. Nicholas begins his com-
mentary thus:
He introduces many series, in order that he might also say that there are many henads instituting
each series and thus might establish polyarchy, that is polytheism.
As soon as one conceives of the series as proceeding from henads as their principles,
necessarily one also envisions these series as vertical. Proclus makes no mention of
henads in Prop. 97, but possibly this vertical sense of seira is suggested to Nicholas
by the term idiotes (), which in Prop. 145 connotes the distinctive property,
76 We have, after all, the benefit of Dodds commentary and other modern scholarship, not to mention
a greater willingness than Nicholas to understand Proclus on his own terms.
77 In Propositions 21, 97, 99100, 102, 108, 110111, 115, 119, 125, 145, 155, 181 and 204. Nicholas himself
uses the word a total of forty times, in chs. 21, 22, 59, 97, 99, 100, 108, 110112, 114115.
78 The term is arguably ambiguous in Props. 97 and 99.
79 ET 97, 86, 89:
, .
80 Ref. 97, 95, 911: ,
.
e.g. purgation, that is transmitted downward through a vertical series initiated by a

henad. It can perhaps be conceded that seira here is ambiguous or unspecified. On the
one hand, nothing in this proposition or its proof prevents one from understanding it
as discussing the relationship between the various monads and their respective or-
ders, e.g. Intellect in relation to intellects, Soul in relation to souls, and so forth. This
indeed is how Dodds understands it, stating that it prepares the way for the study of
the individual which begins at prop. 113, i.e. the series of gods, the series of
intellects and the series of souls.
On the other hand, however, perhaps nothing in Prop. 97 entirely rules out the
vertical construal, and two other factors in addition to the connotation of idiotes,
already mentioned, may contribute to Nicholas decision to construe it in this way.
The first is simply the linguistic fact that even though Proclus aims to delineate a com-
plex system in which some dependencies or orders of relation might meaningfully be
described as horizontal and others vertical (Soul vs. souls in the first instance,
One-Intellect-Soul-Nature in the second), he is constantly obliged to use language with
inescapably vertical connotations. Thus, for example, in Prop. 97 he speaks of the
single form in virtue of which they are ranked under the same series ( ,
).
A second and more significant factor is that Proclus system of multiple mon-
ads, each an unparticipated and self-constituted () principle, is for
Nicholas just as problematic as the system of henads that serves to rationalize the
Greek pantheon. Indeed, Proclus multiple monads subordinate to the One (e.g. Intel-
lect, Soul, Nature) are rejected by Nicholas for much the same reason that he rejects
the henads, for to affirm that intellect and soul are productive, for example, is to af-
firm multiple creators, hence gods, rather than one creator. One might say that, for
Nicholas, the affirmation of one creator is precisely the criterion of a genuine affir-
mation of one God, or even of one ultimate principle (monarchia, ). And so
he continues thus in Ref. 97:
But we, revering a monarchy and one tri-hypostatic God, proclaim that from him and through
him and in him all things are produced and remain and revert, ranked under one series which is
from him and in him and to him.
81 See Dodds commentary, ET, p. 251. The horizontal reading does seem to be suggested by the
terms and in lines 11 and 12.
82 See Nicholas commentary on Prop. 11.
83 Ref. 97, 1114:
-
, . See also Ref. 21, 28, 811: Therefore it is not the
case that many monads, both co-ordinate and excepted, each lead each rank (for the error of polythe-
ism would introduce this), but the Cause of all is one, transcending every multitude and every monad
[]. (
( ),
128 | J. Robinson
If one revisits earlier portions of the Refutation with this aspect (the problem of poly-
theism) in mind, it becomes clear that various aspects of Nicholas interpretation pre-
pare the way for the confusion that emerges in Ref. 97 and beyond. Already in Ref.
21 Nicholas associates the multiplicity of monads (the principles of the horizontal
series) with polytheism, even though he seems to recognize that the sense of seira
in Prop. 21 is the horizontal sense. Since, however, Nicholas point of comparison
is the Trinity, which he will happily call the first Monad, a certain analogy is sug-
gested (though then rejected) between the Trinitythe three persons being coordi-
nate insofar as they are consubstantial, and the henads, regarded by Proclus as a
multitude that is coordinate () with the One, its originative monad. Fur-
thermore, the series that Nicholas will himself recognize as real, the unique series
by which all things depend on the Trinity, is necessarily vertical, since he rejects any
coordination of created effects with their divine cause.
In Ref. 22 the senses of henad and monad begin to be confused: he compre-
hended the henarchic Henad with the many monads and declared earlier that the
things derived from it are c o - r a n k e d and c o - o r d i n a t e w i t h i t; thus the mon-
ads, which Proclus arranges vertically, are envisioned here as co-ranked and co-
ordinate with the One, i.e. as henads co-ordinate with the henarchic Henad.
In Ref. 64 the confusion between monads and henads is more explicit:
It is not the case that many s e l f- p e r f e c t h e n a d s or monads p r o c e e d e d from t h e o n e and

only and all-perfect Father, but only two, according to the t w o f o l d mode of natural fecundity
[].
As mentioned already, this confusion is aided by the Trinitarian reference point:

Nicholas conceives of the Son and Spirit as henads on the divine level, so to speak,
and thus as analogous with, though ultimately incomparable to, the horizontal Pro-
clean series of henads that are themselves principles of the vertical series. Later, in
Ref. 109, Nicholas speaks interchangeably of the very first henad ( -
, Proclus expression), and the very first monad ( ), a logical
[].), and in the same chapter (21, 28, 1822): He therefore, so that he might
introduce many principles and might thereby give proof of polytheism, supposes that there are many
ranks and many series, some corporeal and natural, some psychic, and some intellectual; to which
he adds also the henadic rank []. ( ,
, , ,
, [].). Nicholas here recognizes the
distinction between monads and henads, and so does not yet regard the series as descending from the
henads through successive levels; but the problem of polytheism is already central.
84 Ref. 22, 30, 2830:
[].
85 Ref. 64, 67, 1214:

[]
enough identification insofar as the One is the principle both of monads and henads,
but again suggesting a confusion in Nicholas mind between the two items in Proclus
system. According to Perczel, Proclus very rarely equates monad with henad and
never does it in the case of his first principle. Dionysius, on the other hand, does
precisely this.
It is worth noting also in this context that Nicholas primary point of reference
for the term monad (monas) is probably this line from Gregory of Nazianzus that
he cites repeatedly throughout the Refutation: the Monad from the beginning moved
toward a dyad and at the Trinity came to a halt. This is a good example of a char-
acteristic feature of Nicholas Refutation, namely the tendency to read Proclean terms
as freighted with Christian meaning (Trinitarian, christological or otherwise).
When Nicholas begins to comment upon Props. 108112, therefore, he has for sev-
eral chapters already been thinking of seira as designating a vertical relationship of
dependence upon henads, and so, rather than recognizing that in this set of proposi-
tions seira is used synonymously with taxis and diakosmesis, he initially attempts to
distinguish these three terms systematically. At the same time he also coordinates his
interpretation of Props. 108112 with two other important structures in the Elements of
Theology, the three-fold hierarchies of unparticipated, participated and participant,
and of whole-before-the-parts, whole-of-parts and whole-in-the-part. Consider the
following table that precedes Nicholas commentary on Prop. 108:
86 Perczel 2003, 1197, citing H. D. Saffrey and L. G. Westerink, Introduction, ch. 1, La doctrine des
hnads divines chez Proclus: origine et signification, in Thologie platonicienne Livre III, Paris 1978,
ix-lxxvii. Perczel argues that this feature of Dionysius writings is due to Origens influence. See Diony-
sius, DN 1, 4 589D; CD 112, 11:

[]; and CH 7, 4 212C; CD 32, 8: []

(
)
-
. For
another instance of Nicholas identification of God as both henad and monad, see Ref. 114, 111, 67,
where he writes of the s e l f- p e r f e c t h e n a d and one and only G o d, our holy Trinity which itself is
also Monad ( ); Nicholas
goes on to say (lines 1011) that each of the three [divine persons] individually and the whole three
at once are s e l f- p e r f e c t H e n a d and perfect G o d (
).
87 Quoting Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 29, 2, 76B1314; see Nicholas Prologue, as well as chapters
14, 20, 21, 146, 151 and 169.
88 See ET 2324.
89 See ET 6769.
130 | J. Robinson
Table 1
first rank second rank third rank

Order of henads unparticipated henad first common head individual heads
SERIES
SERIES
SERIES
Order of intellects unparticipated intellect intellect common to all individual intellects
Order of souls whole unparticipated soul common soul individual souls
Order of natures whole unparticipated nature common nature individual natures
Table 2
In Tables 1 and 2, diakosmesis (order) is understood, correctly I think, as des-

ignating a given level as a whole; in fact taxis (rank) and seira (series) should be un-
derstood as designating the same thing in Props. 108112. But Nicholas has instead
interpreted taxis as a subdivision within a given level. Thus, we have in first rank the
unparticipated term, in second rank the common term (which corresponds to par-
ticipated), and in third rank the individual terms (which correspond to participat-
ing). Seira, in Nicholas interpretation, becomes the vertical unity comprising every-
thing in a given rank, and so we have the series of unparticipated terms, the series of
participated terms, and the series of individuals. That there are only three ranks re-
sults from the fact that Nicholas has coordinated his interpretation here with Proclus
earlier discussion of the three-fold structure of participation (Props. 23 and 24), and
with Proclus three-fold taxonomy of wholes (Props. 6769).
Thus, probably for the reasons already discussed, Nicholas has already begun
to conceive of seira in a vertical sense when he comes to Prop. 108, and it is this
sense that he seeks to find in these propositions. Possibly he has also already stud-
ied the later propositions in which the meaning of seira is vertical (Props. 125 and
145), and so has them in mind too when studying these earlier propositions. In any
case, Nicholas is soon forced to modify his interpretation when he realizes that Pro-
clus does not systematically distinguish diakosmesis, taxis and seira. Even in Ref. 108
he observes that Proclus also seems to use taxis for diakosmesis here without making
a distinction. Shortly afterward, in Ref. 110, he remarks, Note that what he called
rank (taxis) in the aforegoing, and then also order (diakosmesis), now he calls this a
series (seira), exchanging the names often so as to confuse the argument, and thus so-
90 See Ref. 108, 104, 1822.

91 Ref. 108, 104, 2829.
phistically contriving to escape the notice of the hearer, and again in Ref. 112, He
takes rank and order and series interchangeably.
Somewhat surprisingly, rather than abandoning his vertical interpretation of
seira at this point, Nicholas instead finds a way to fit taxis and diakosmesis into a
vertical arrangement. And so, although he had initially conceived of the seira as per-
pendicular to the horizontal diakosmeseis, each comprising three taxeis, in Ref.
110, reacting to the confusion of terms that he has observed, he hypothesizes as fol-
lows:
[] perhaps he inter-weaves the whole series in this way: setting out according to depth first the
henads, beginning from the first henad, then the intellects, then the souls, and after these the
natures, each order arranged in analogous manner, so that the first intellect borders on the third
henad and the first soul borders on the third intellect, and the first nature borders on the soul
third in rank. For this reason he divides the one series into many members according to their
ranks, and says that only t h e f i r s t m e m b e r s i n e a c h s e r i e s p a r t i c i p a t e t h e t h i n g s
s i t u a t e d i n t h e i m m e d i a t e l y s u p e r - j a c e n t series, but the others besides these, since
they are brought forth m o r e r e m o t e l y, are not able t o e n j o y this participation, since with the
different rank they also possess a different nature in relation to the first members []
Because Nicholas thinks that each diakosmesis is subdivided into only three taxeis,
it appears to him now that Prop. 110 simply contradicts Prop. 108: whereas the ear-
lier proposition had affirmed that the particulars of one level could participate by two
different means the monad of the adjacent higher level, in the later proposition such
participation appears to be limited to the first member of each level. The apparent
contradiction arises from Nicholas assumption that the first members of Prop. 110
do not include any particular members of a given order, but only the universal ()
that is the principle of that order. This assumption is natural enough, given Nicholas
additional assumption that each level contains only three ranks, but in Proclus con-
ception each level would have many members, and thus, while some of these would be
excluded from participation in the higher level, many (and not only the first member
or monad of the series) would not.
In commenting on Prop. 111, Nicholas concludes that his re-interpretation of the
arrangement of the various orders or series in Ref. 110 has been confirmed, and so he
92 Ref. 110, 106, 3033 and Ref. 112, 109, 3.

93 Ref. 110, 107, 616: , -
, , , ,
,
.
,
, , ,
,
[].
94 See Dodds commentary, ET, 256.
132 | J. Robinson
provides two new diagrams, the second of which shows how one may conceive of four
distinct orders as one continuous series descending from the One (See Table 3).
The preceding analysis of Nicholas misunderstand-
ing, while perhaps tedious, may serve to illustrate the char-
Table 3
acter of Nicholas engagement with Proclus text. On the
one hand, this misunderstanding shows us the mistakes to
Henads first
which Nicholas was liable because his primary reference
Order
second
third point was Christian dogma rather than Proclus writings as
Intellects first a whole and the prior philosophical tradition. The polem-
Order
second ical centrality of polytheism vis--vis Nicholas own fun-

third
damental belief in one God who produces all beings from
Souls first
non-being has the tendency to obscure the differences be-
Order
second
third tween various principles (monads and henads) in Proclus
Natures first system of thought. Furthermore, the inescapably vertical
Order
second character of the relation between the transcendent Trinity

third and all creatures, none of which are horizontally coordi-
nate with their creator, results for Nicholas in a more natu-
ral contrast with the Proclean series in the vertical sense,
so that again the horizontal series tends to recede from his view.
On the other hand, it must be said that for all his prejudices Nicholas does at-
tempt to read the Elements of Theology systematically, notably in his coordination of
Proclus earlier propositions on participation and on wholes with the structure and
relationships discussed in Props. 108112. That this attempt is largely a failure is in
part simply a sign of the intrinsic difficulty of reading Proclus, and perhaps especially
of reading one Proclean treatise in isolation from others. To the extent that Nicholas
stumbles over such difficulties, his Refutation may serve the useful role of prompting
us to read Proclus more carefully and to attempt more coherent solutions to problems
that, to one degree or another, defeated Nicholas.
Bibliography and Abbreviations

Abbreviations
Ref. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus Elements of Theology

ET Proclus of Lycia, Elements of Theology
DN Dionysius the Areopagite, De divinis nominibus
CH Dionysius the Areopagite, De coelesti hierarchia
CD Corpus Dionysiacum
Primary Sources
Dionysius the Areopagite, De Divinis Nominibus, in B. Suchla (Hrsg.), Corpus Dionysiacum I, Berlin
1990.
Dionysius the Areopagite, De Coelesti Hierarchia, De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, De Mystica Theologia,
Epistulae, in G. Heil und A. M. Ritter (Hrsgg.), Corpus Dionysiacum II, Berlin 1991.
Dionysius the Areopagite, The Divine Names, tr. J. Parker, in The Works of Dionysius the Areopagite,
London 18971899, 1127.
Gregory Nazianzen, Oratio 29, dans Paul Gallay (d.), Grgroire de Nazianze, Discours 2731
(Sources Chretiennes 250), Paris 1978, 176225.
John Philoponus, De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum, H. Rabe (ed.), Leipzig 1899 [Reprint
Hildesheim 1963].
John Philoponus, De aeternitate mundi / ber die Ewigkeit der Welt, C. Scholten (Hrsg.), Turnhout
2009.
John Philoponus, Against Proclus On the Eternity of the World 15, tr. M. Share, London 2005.
John Philoponus, Against Proclus On the Eternity of the World 1218, tr. J. Wilberding, London
2006.
John Petritsi (Petrizi), Kommentar zur Elementatio theologica des Proklos: bersetzung aus dem
Altgeorgischen, Anmerkungen, Indices und Einleitung, L. Alexidze und L. Bergemann (Hrsgg.),
Amsterdam 2009.
Nicholas of Methone, Refutatio institutionis theologicae Procli Platonici, J. Th. Voemel (ed.), in Initia
Philosophiae ac Theologiae ex platonicis fontibus ducta: Pars Quarta, Frankfurt 1825.
Nicholas of Methone, various works, in ,
. Vol. 1 (no more published), Andronikos K. Demetrakopoulos (ed.), Leipzig 1866
(repr. Hildesheim 1965), 199380.
Nicholas of Methone, //
Refutation of Proclus Elements of Theology, A. Angelou (ed.) (Corpus philosophorum Medii
Aevi. Philosophi Byzantini I), Athens/Leiden 1984.
Photios, On the Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit, J. Graves (ed.), Long Island City 1983.
Proclus, The Elements of Theology, E. R. Dodds (ed.), Oxford 1963.
Proclus, Theologische Grundlegung, Ernst-Otto Onnasch und Ben Schomakers (Hrsgg.), Leipzig 2015
(contains a revised Greek text with German translation, notes and commentary).
Proclus, Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato, L. Westerink (ed.), and W. ONeill (tr.),
Westbury 2011.
Proclus, The Theology of Plato, tr. Thomas Taylor, Westbury 1995.
Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, E. Diehl (ed.), Leipzig 19031906; Eng. trans. of Book 2
by D. Runia and M. Share, Commentary on Platos Timaeus, Volume 2, Cambridge 2008
Proclus, Trois tudes sur la Providence I: Dix problmes concernant la Providence, D. Isaac (d. et
trad.), Paris 1977.
Proclus, Trois tudes sur la Providence II: Providence, Fatalit, Libert, D. Isaac (d. et trad.), Paris
1979.
Proclus, Trois tudes sur la Providence III: De lexistence du mal, D. Isaac (d. et trad.), avec une note
additionelle par C. Steel, Paris 1982. [These three volumes contain Latin translations of Proclus
opuscula, with Isaac Sebastocrators Greek adaptations as appendices].
Proclus, Tria Opuscula: Griechische Retroversion Mit Kommentar, B. Strobel (Hrsg.) (Commentaria in
Aristotelem Graeca Et Byzantina), Berlin 2014.
134 | J. Robinson
Procopius of Gaza, Opuscula rhetorica et oratoria: cum testimoniis et fragmentis (quorum ineditum
unum ex Refutatione Procli institutionis theologicae); accedunt Procopii et Megethii rhetoris
mutuae sex, E. Amato (ed.), Berlin 2009.
Procopius of Gaza, Discours et fragments, E. Amato (ed.), Paris 2014.
Secondary Sources
Alexidse, L. (2002). Dionysius Areopagita in den mittelalterlichen Kommentaren zur Elementatio

theologica des Proclus. In: Selbst Singularitt Subjektivitt. Vom Neuplatonismus zum
Deutschen Idealismus. Ed. by T. Kobusch, B. Mojsisch, and O. F. Summerell. Amsterdam,
pp. 111130.
Aly, W. (1957). Prokopios 20, Sophist aus Gaza. In: Paulys Realencyclopdie der classischen
Altertumswissenschaft. Vol. XXIII, 1. Stuttgart, cols. 259273.
Amato, E. (2010). Sul discusso plagio della Refutatio Procli Institutionis theologicae di Procopio di
Gaza ad opera di Nicola di Metone: nuovi apporti della tradizione manoscritta. In: Medioevo
Greco 10, pp. 512.
Balibar, . (2006). Note sur l'origine et les usages du terme monothisme. In: Critique 704705,
pp. 1945.
Benakis, L. (1987c). Neues zur Proklos-Tradition in Byzanz. In: Proclus et son influence: actes du
colloque de Neuchtel, juin 1985. Ed. by G. Boss and G. Seel. Zrich, pp. 247259.
Biriukov, D. (2013). Nicholas of Methone and his Polemics against Proclus in the Context of the
Early Byzantine Theological and Philosophical Thought. In: Saint Emperor Constantine and
Christianity, II. Conference Commemorating the 1700th Anniversary of the Edict of Milan. 31 May
2 June 2013. Ed. by D. Bojcovic. Nis, pp. 181188.
Constantelos, D. (1985). Review of: A. Angelou, ed. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus'
Elements of Theology, Athens/Leiden 1984. In: Greek Orthodox Theological Review 30,
pp. 375377.
Dodds, E. (1963). Introduction. In: Proclus, The Elements of Theology. Ed. by E. R. Dodds. 2nd ed.
Oxford, pp. ixxlvi.
Drseke, J. (1895a). Nikolaos von Methone als Bestreiter des Proklos. In: Theologische Studien
und Kritiken 68, pp. 589616.
Drseke, J. (1897a). Prokopios' von Gaza Widerlegung des Proklos. In: Byzantinische Zeitschrift 6,
pp. 5591.
Gigineishvili, G. (2007). The Platonic Theology of Ioane Petritsi. Piscataway (NJ).
Iremadze, T. (2004a). Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus: zur Rezeption der Proklischen
Philosophie im deutschen und georgischen Mittelalter: Dietrich von Breiberg, Berthold von
Moosburg, Joane Petrizi. Amsterdam.
Kazhdan, A. (1989). Review of: A. Angelou, ed. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus' Elements
of Theology, Athens/Leiden 1984. In: Speculum 64, pp. 196199.
Lackner, W. (1988). Review of: A. Angelou, ed. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus' Elements
of Theology, Athens/Leiden 1984. In: Jahrbuch der sterreichischen Byzantinistik 38,
pp. 476478.
Lauritzen, D. (2015). Introduction. In: John of Gaza. Description du Tableau cosmique. Ed. by
D. Lauritzen. Paris.
Mercati, G. (1931). Notizie di Procoro e Demetrio Cidone, manuele Caleca e Teodoro Meliteniota: ed
altri appunti per la storia della teologia e della letteratura bizantina del secolo XIV. In: Studi e
Testi 56, pp. 264266.

O'Meara, D. J. (2014e). Proclus in Psellos' Philosophical Synthesis. In: Interpreting Proclus. From
Antiquity to the Renaissance. Ed. by S. Gersh. Cambridge, pp. 165181.
Parry, K. (2006a). Proclus Diadochus in Byzantium. In: Reading Plato in Antiquity. Ed. by H. Tarrant
and D. Baltzly. London, pp. 223235.
Perczel, I. (2003). God as monad and henad: Dionysius the Areopagite and the Peri Archon. In:
Origeniana Octava. Leuven, pp. 11931209.
Podskalsky, G. (1976a). Nikolaos von Methone und die Proklosrenaissance in Byzanz. In:
Orientalia Christiana Periodica 42, pp. 509523.
Robinson, J. (2016). Dionysius against Proclus: the Apophatic Critique in Nicholas of Methone's
Refutation of the Elements of Theology. In: Proclus and His Legacy. Ed. by D. Layne and
D. Butorac. Forthcoming. Berlin.
Rorem, P. and J. Lamoreaux (1998). John of Scythopolis and the Dionysian Corpus. Oxford.
Steel, C. (1987). Review of: A. Angelou, ed. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus' Elements of
Theology, Athens/Leiden 1984. In: Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 49, pp. 503504.
Steel, C. (2002b). Neoplatonic Sources in the Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics by
Eustratius and Michael of Ephesus. In: Bulletin de philosophie mdivale 44, pp. 5157.
Steel, C. and J. Opsomer (2003). Introduction. In: Proclus, On the Existence of Evils. London,
pp. 153.
Stiglmayr, J. (1899a). Die Streitschrift des Prokopios von Gaza gegen den Neuplatoniker Proklos.
In: Byzantinische Zeitschrift 8, pp. 263301.
Trizio, M. (2007a). Byzantine Philosophy as a Contemporary Historiographical Project. In:
Recherches de Theologie et Philosophie Mdivales, pp. 247294.
Trizio, M. (2009b). Neoplatonic Source-Material in Eustratios of Nicaea's Commentary on Book VI of
C. Barber and D. Jenkins. Brill, pp. 71109.
Trizio, M. (2014c). Interpreting Proclus in 11th12th C. Byzantium: John Italos, Eustratios of Nicaea,
Nicholas of Methone. In: Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance. Ed. by
S. Gersh. Cambridge, pp. 182215.
Westerink, L. G. (1942a). Proclus, Procopius, Psellus. In: Mnemosyne 10, pp. 276277.
Whittaker, J. (1975). Proclus, Procopius, Psellus and the Scholia on Gregory of Nazianzus. In:
Vigiliae Christianae 29, pp. 309313.
Magda Mtchedlidze
Two Conflicting Positions Regarding the
Philosophy of Proclus in Eastern Christian
Thought of the twelfth Century
There are two systematic commentaries extant on Proclus Elements of Theology,

which were composed in the cultural region of Byzantium during the 12th century.
One of them, written in Georgian by Ioane Petritsi, is of an exegetical character, as
it aims to explain Proclus thought and demonstrate the universality of the elements
of theology. The second one, authored by Nicholas of Methone (11101160), an au-
thoritative theologian of his time, is a polemical work aiming to refute Proclus and
reveal the irreconcilability of his philosophy with Christianity. Naturally, there have
been studies comparing these two commentaries, which, it might be said, create the
impression of a polemical dialogue between texts expressing different points of view.
The focus of this paper is to accentuate the nuances which point out the existence
of certain relations between the two different types of commentaries on Proclus El-
ements of Theology (not to say between these two commentators). This is not only in
regard to their understanding of the Weltanschauung or the philosophical methodol-
ogy of Proclus, but also in regard to their use of certain expressions. At the same time,
there will be an attempt to consider the features characteristic of both commentaries
within the context of the relevant intellectual trends of the epoch.
When making a comparison of the works by Petritsi and Nicholas, first and fore-
most, attention must be focused on the prefaces to these works, where the authors
have explicitly stated their positions and objectives. Ioane Petritsi starts his introduc-
1 Ioane Petritsi is commonly believed to have been an early 12th century scholar who was instructed
at the so-called Imperial University of Constantinople, namely at the school of philosophy headed by
John Italos. However, some scholars have dated his activities to the second half of the 12th century (see
Chelidze 1994/1995, 113126). Some important works of new, extensive research on Petritsi have been
published in recent years (Melikishvili 1999, Iremadze 2004b, L. Gigineishvili 2007, Alexidze 2008a).
2 It should be noted that in the Georgian manuscripts each chapter of Proclus Elements of Theology is
followed by respective comments. However, the editors, Sh. Nutsubidze and S. Kaukhchishvili, pub-
lished the translation of Proclus work and Petritsis commentaries separately in different volumes.
They called the commentaries the Explanation as Petritsi himslf uses this term.
3 On Nicholas of Methone see Podskalsky 1976b, Angelou 1984c, Birjukov 2011.
4 On some parallels and differences between Nicholas of Methone and Ioane Petritsis works see:
Alexidze 2007, 237252; Tevzadze 1996, 188196. The polemic character of both works is noted by G.
Tevzadze (Tevzadze 1996, 196).
5 A number of research works have been devoted to shifts in the Byzantine culture of the 11th and 12th
centuries. For a general overview of the epoch see Kazhdan and Epstein 1985.
DOI 10.1515/9781501503597-007
138 | M. Mtchedlidze
tion by pointing out the kind of vision peculiar to great theological works in general
and by explaining the objective (sc. ) of Proclus work. According to Ioane, Pro-
clus aims to reveal and demonstrate (sc. ) the Supreme and Pure One through
the means of syllogistic compulsion (sc. ). He reiterates several times in the
Preface that Proclus investigates and defines this One through the laws of logic. In
accordance with the common rules established for prolegomena, Petritsi devotes spe-
cial attention to an explanation of the works title, along with its objective. According
to him, the title (sc. ) The Elements of Theology ( ) refers
to chapters of the work teaching beginners the simplest theological concepts (e.g. the
One, the true Being etc.) in the same way pupils start by learning the alphabetical el-
ements that make up words, and only after that they learn sentences built from words
and then a discourse composed of sentences.
As if alluding to Ioane Petritsi, Nicholas of Methone starts his work on Proclus
by stressing the difference between human wisdom and true wisdom, expressing his
surprise at the fact that Christians who, unlike the Hellenes, were granted the oppor-
tunity to look upon the Truth and commune with the divine mysteries, were attracted
to pagan learning ( ), preferring strange writings over the writings of Chris-
tians, rejecting the latters lucidity, simplicity as something ordinary, and cherishing
the formers intricacy ( ) and refinement ( ) as something truly sub-
lime ( ) and as genuine wisdom. As a result, they revert from the true faith
and slide into blasphemous heresy, due to compulsory persuasions that are craftily
devised ( ). Nicholas has clearly defined his objec-
tive in the very title of his work. He is determined to prevent his readers from being
held captive by the quasi compulsory persuasiveness ( ) of
Proclus work, and stumble against the true faith. Nicholas declares more precisely
in the preface that he aims to show by means of the elenctic method () the
fallacy hidden beneath the refinement () and explain to those who consider
6 Cf. [] , []
[] [] (Procl. Theol. Plat. I, 2, ed.
H. D. Saffrey, L. G. Westerink, Paris 1968, p. 10, 67).
7 Petr., Expl., Praef., ed. Sh. Nutsubidze, S. Kaukhchishvili, Tbilisi 1937, p. 3, 34 (Cf. Germ. tr.
by L. Alexidze, L. Bergemann, Kommentar zur Elementatio theologica des Proklos, Amsterdam and
Philadelphia 2009, p. 61). The composition and the terminology of the Preface have been examined in
Mchedlidze 1999, 132.
8 Petr., Expl., Praef., p. 3, 34, 1 Nutsubidze, Kaukhchishvili (Germ. tr. p. 6163). Cf. as a logical
necessity in Arst. Met. XI 8, 1064b 33, ed. W. D. Ross, Oxford, 1924.
9 Petr. Expl., Praef., p. 3, 1011; 4, 3; p. 5, 18 Nutsubidze and Kaukhchishvili (Germ. tr. p. 6263).
10 Petr., Expl., Praef., p. 4, 1213; 5, 236, 6 Nutsubidze and Kaukhchishvili (Germ. tr. p. 63; 6768).
11 Nic. Meth., Refut., Praef., ed. A. D. Angelou, Athens and Leiden 1984, p. 1, 82, 5
12 Nic. Meth., Refut.,p. 1 Angelou.
Two Conflicting Positions | 139
Proclus chapters entitled () The Elements of Theology to be worthy of dili-

gent study, that each chapter contains ideas contradicting the faith.
Ioane Petritsis work is a precise example of a diligent study of Proclus. He con-
stantly calls for attention and for a careful consideration of Proclean theories and ex-
pressions, believing in the necessity of the philosophical views of Platonism for the-
ological thought in general. In his evaluation of Proclean philosophy, Petritsi is not
stingy with positive epithets such as subtlety (sc. ), density, beauty,
sublimity (sc. ), the sun for contemplations etc. Although he considers
clarity to be a characteristic trait of Proclean demonstrations (sc. ), at the
same time, he is among those attracted to the intricacy (sc. ) of Proclus rea-
soning. He even borrows this Greek word to describe Proclus style: This
chapter is quite gripho; The idea is very difficult and gripho for those who are not
used to it, He introduces views that are necessary and griphos. etc. To be more
precise, Petritsi is interested in clarifying this complexity. He finds the refinement (sc.
) of the Greek philosophical language to be more of a merit, as an appropri-
ate trait for the exposition of philosophic theories, rather than a disadvantage.
It is obvious that Nicholas use of the epithet wise for the ancient philosophers,
especially with Proclus, is ironic as if in opposition to Petritsis appreciation of the lat-
ter. Their characterizations of Proclus personality are contrasting. Petritsi highlights
the exceptionality of Proclus, speaking of him as a gift of God. He says that Proclus, a
successor to the cathedra of divine Plato, was a son of a highly noble family. His par-
ents had been childless for a long time, constantly asking God for mercy. Finally, they
received a message from the divine oracle: they would bear a son who would spend
all his life in contemplating heavenly things. According to Ioane, Proclus was young
13 Nic. Meth., Refut., Praef., p. 2, 62, 12 Angelou.

14 Petr., Expl., 1, p. 10, 7; 1, p. 10, 13; 2, p. 20, 6; 20, p. 58, 12; 103, p. 149, 25 etc. Nutsubidze and
Kaukhchishvili (Germ. tr. p. 75; 76; 90; 143; 271). Very often, these are the Georgian equivalents of terms
used in Byzantine teaching literature, such as , etc.
15 Petr., Expl., 103, p. 150, 1014; Expl., 65, p. 130, 3031 Nutsubidze and Kaukhchishvili (Germ. tr. p.
271; 247) etc.
16 These are mostly well-known terms from a theory of rhetoric used to describe ones style.
17 Petr., Expl., 46, p. 105, 24 Nutsubidze and Kaukhchishvili (Germ. tr. p. 211) etc.
19 Petr., Expl., 44, p. 103, 34 Nutsubidze and Kaukhchishvili (Germ. tr. p. 208).
20 Petr., Expl., Praef., p. 5, 1819 Nutsubidze and Kaukhchishvili (Cf. Germ. tr. p. 67).
22 Petr., Expl., Praef., p. 5, 18 Nutsubidze and Kaukhchishvili (Germ. tr. p. 67) etc.
26 Petr., Expl., Praef., p. 6, 2327; Expl., 50, p. 107, 1719 Nutsubidze and Kaukhchishvili (Germ. tr. p.
69; 214).
27 Petr., Expl., 1, p. 10, 7; 63, p. 129, 2 Nutsubidze and Kaukhchishvili (Germ. tr. p. 75; 244) etc.
when through his inner purity he had extinguished the coals of youth that agitate
souls. He pursued the traditional curriculum of the humanities, natural sciences and
mathematics, after which he transcended the material world and contemplated the
world of true being. Then, having transcended this realm too, he even ascended be-
yond the intellect, succeeding in knowing, insofar as it is possible, the One who is
inaccessible even to the supreme intellect. According to Petritsi, it was Proclus who
had correctly interpreted the Platonic dialogues, defeating the Aristotelians with their
very own syllogisms.
In fact, Ioane Petritsi offers an encomium of Proclus, while Nicholas of Methone
composes a genuine psogos, rich with rhetoric. He compares Proclus to the builders
of the Tower of Babel who were eager to reach the heavens. According to Nicholas,
Proclus is one of the people who opposed the Church. As if responding to Petritsis
encomium, he writes that Proclus, strong in , would not concede primacy to
anyone resembling a youth (thus Nicholas seems to argue that Proclus did not over-
come his youthful vehemence even in his mature age), therefore he not only celebrated
the mysteries together with Aristotle, Plato, Pythagoras and other wise men, skilled in
the dogmas of false wisdom ( ), but became a witness, an initiate,
and a genuine servant of demons whom he worshipped as gods. Nicholas says that:
[] [] ,
-
, -
, -
-
-
.
[] [Proclus] made a fire, stoking it as much as possible with zeal against piety and baked bricks
within it arguments commingled and mixed with the entirety of Hellenic education. He as-
sembled them into two hundred eighteen chapters and erected a tower, having laid one chapter
upon another using the cohesion of logical demonstrations instead of pitch. He supposed that
by means of this construction he would not only reach the heaven, he would also transcend the
supra-celestial inteligenses and even ascend to God, the source of all, and seize the inaccessible.
However, Nicholas is certain that He who prevented the builders of the Tower of Ba-
bel by confounding their speech, will also destroy this new ambitious builder, setting
him at odds with himself. Nicholas promises that he will show how this has occurred
28 Petr., Expl., Praef., p. 4, 145, 22 Nutsubidze and Kaukhchishvili (Germ. tr. p. 6467).
29 Nic. Meth., Refut., Praef., p. 3, 115 Angelou.
30 Nic. Meth., Refut., Praef., p. 3, 1520 Angelou
and cites an example of a contradiction found in Proclus reasoning. His aim is to pre-
cisely illustrate the weakness and contradictory nature of the logic in Proclus state-
ments.
As was mentioned above, unlike Nicholas of Methone, Petritsi believes that Pro-
clus had ascended to the One. It was also said that according to him The Elements
of Theology is distinguished by its logical coherence. More specifically, he considers
that Proclus exposes his reasoning through a logical succession of arguments. After
Proclus has demonstrated one thesis in a convincing manner, Petritsi says, he uses
this flawless, irrefutable, perfectly grounded thesis as the foundation for the next one,
as if composing an integrated whole from individual parts (like how a body consists
of its own parts). Thus, what Nicholas calls bricks of the tower, Petritsi considers
as propositions joined together through the power of logical demonstrations. If we
translate Ioanes text into the metaphorical language of Nicholas of Methones text, it
will mean that Proclus had succeeded in building his tower by laying one brick upon
another.
After highlighting the logical character of Proclus reasoning, Petritsi starts the
exposition of Chapter One of The Elements of Theology by teaching the law of syllo-
gism. As if contradicting Petritsi, Nicholas starts his analysis of Proclus hypotheses
in Chapter One by arguing that no laws of logic are applicable to the Holy Trinity.
It should be noted that Nicholas of Methone already finds it necessary to point
out Proclus disparagement for the Trinity in the Preface. Moreover, he is sure that
Proclus first proposition is directed specifically
against Christianity in order to mock those who worship the Trinity as those who wor-
ship the multitude prior to the One or together with the One, whereas in his Preface,
Petritsi describes this very thesis as flawless, finding it as the starting point for Proclus
doctrine. Besides, according to Petritsi, arguing that one is prior to all numbers, Pro-
clus demonstrates the pure One by drawing a parallel with the one that is the source
of numbers and multiplicity.
On the contrary, Nicholas of Methone claims that the Christian Trinity has noth-
ing in common with the concept of quantity, as the Trinity is not the three belong-
ing to the series of numbers (he reiterates the same point in his commentaries).
He contrasts Pseudo-Dionysus and Gregory of Nazianzus with Proclus, explaining the

34 Petr., Expl., Praef., p. 4, 511 Nutsubidze and Kaukhchishvili (Germ. tr. p. 63).
35 Petr., Expl., 1, p. 7,1311,10 Nutsubidze and Kaukhchishvili (Germ. tr. p. 7577).
36 Nic. Meth., Refut., 1, p. 5, 246, 6 Angelou.
37 Procl., Elem. theol. 1, ed. F. R. Dodds, Oxford 1963, p. 2, 1.
39 Petr., Expl., Praef., p. 4, 14 Nutsubidze and Kaukhchishvili (Germ. tr. p. 63).
41 Nic. Meth., Refut., 1, p. 5, 176, 5 Angelou.
essence of the dogma of the Trinity based on their writings. Petritsi does not men-
tion any Christian theologians in the Preface of his Explanation, neither does he say
anything regarding the conformity of Proclean philosophy with Christianity. The same
can be said about the commentaries (The Explanation contains only several notes on
this point, whose authenticity is doubtful). Pursuant to the aim of his work, which
is the teaching of a metaphysical system based on Platonic philosophy, he discusses
the subjects and concepts related to Proclus work, as well as his opposition to the
Aristotelians. However, in his treatise, which has been added as an epilogue to his
Georgian translation of The Elements of Theology, Petritsi alludes to a statement by
Gregory of Nazianzus which had been cited by Nicholas of Methone in opposition to
the monism of Proclus, in order to highlight the points he finds consonant between
the Platonic vision of the divine triad and the Christian doctrine regarding the Holy
Trinity.
The characteristic difference between the positions of Ioane Petritsi and
Nicholas of Methone can be best appreciated if the intertextual dialogue is con-
sidered within the context of the epoch with regard to the following questions: the
attitude towards in general, the stance towards Platonism and Proclus, the
interpretation of the relationship between philosophy and theology, the issue of the
criterion of truth, and the concept of commenting on pagan authors.
It is well known that general education or was always honored
by the Byzantines. However, they always distinguished between divine wisdom, in the
sense of the knowledge transmitted by God, and secular wisdom, the so-called
or , identified with the knowledge inherited from the Hellenic
world, subordinating the latter to the former. It is likewise known that though held
in esteem, some hostility towards exo paideia had also existed in Byzantium, some-
times manifested even by those who had themselves received a fundamental Hellenic
education.
One of them, Nicholas of Methone, had made use of Hellenic heritage for the-
ological purposes, but yet opposing it at the same time. At the very beginning of his
work, Nicholas clearly states his position in regard to by referring to the
authority of the Apostle Paul (1 Cor. 12). By invoking the proper epithets for each
42 On Proclus commentators position towards pseudo-Dionysus see Alexidze 2002a, 111130.

43 (Gr. Naz. Or. 29, 2, in PG 36,
col. 76 B 89).
44 Petr., Postf., p. 209, 32210, 1 Nutsubidze and Kaukhchishvili (Germ. tr. p. 351352; Engl. tr. by
L. Gigineishvili, Ioane Petritsis Preface to his Annotated Translation to his book of Psalms, in T. Nut-
subidze, C. B. Horn, B. Louri, Leiden and Boston, 2014, p. 206). The treatise is devoted to the theol-
ogy of the Psalms, attempting to compare and reconcile Christian thought with Hellenic thought. If
Petritsis commentary on Proclus conveys his vision of Neoplatonism, the so-called Afterword reveals
his position on the relationship between Neoplatonism and Christianity.
45 Cf. Jo. Chrys., In I Cor., Hom. 7, 4, ed. J. P. Migne, PG 61, col. 5860; Jo. Dam., In I Cor., 23, ed. J. P.
Migne, PG 95, col. 581 ff.
kind of knowledge, he contrasts the human wisdom ( ) of the Hel-

lenes with our true wisdom ( ), and with the
Christian faith. Namely, he states, that human wisdom is possessed by those who
are , while true wisdom is possessed by those who are . Hellenic
wisdom was abolished in Christ, since it contains false opinions ( )
that darken the mind and is characterized by sophisticated and artificial statements,
while our wisdom, which originates from true faith ( ) and is granted to
us through the contemplation of the light of the Truth, is stated clearly and simply.
Therefore, the of Proclus is pseudo-knowledge ( ) for
Nicholas. Moreover, he even accuses Proclus of being a servant to the demons, thus
alluding to his theurgical activities. According to Nicholas of Methone, as soon as
Proclus the philosopher indulges himself in theology and starts talking about the in-
corporeal and the intelligible, he lapses most unwisely into corporeal thoughts.
By starting a commentary on the Neoplatonic philosopher through contrasting
these two wisdom, Nicholas outlines his position regarding the intellectual trend of ul-
timately harmonizing the two kinds of knowledge by finding more and more common
ground between them. For example, although Michael Psellos, the Consul of Philoso-
phers at the newly-founded philosophical school of Constantinople during the 11th
century, frequently describes Christian thought as ,
, and Christian authors as , he uses the terms or -
in reference to Hellenic thought in only a few cases. He prefers to say
and when comparing pagan and Christian writings.
The understanding of the relation between both kinds of wisdom or knowledge
is linked to the understanding of the relation between philosophy and theology. John
of Damascus, for instance, who had summarized the previous patristical tradition,
draws a sharp line between exo (sc. extraneous to Christian doctrine) and divine wis-

48 Cf. Jo. Dam., In I Cor., 2 Migne, PG 95, col. 585 C1 ff., in particular 588 B 7589 A 12.
49 This is a general appreciation since in several cases even Nicholas refers to some true statements
(See e. g. Nic. Meth., Refut., Praef., 2, 23 Angelou).
52 Nic. Meth., Refut., 23, p. 31, 1517 Angelou.
53 Psell., Paneg., 17, 361362, ed. G. T. Dennis, Leipzig 1994, p. 156; Psell., Theol. I, 113, 9, ed. P. Gautier,
Leipzig 1989, p. 442; Theol. I, 113, 50, p. 443 Gautier; Psell., Philos. min. I, 41, 2, ed. J. M. Duffy, Leipzig
1992, p. 146.
54 Psell., Theol. I, Opusc. 62, 5455, p. 244; Opusc. 33, 5152, p. 138; Opusc. 113, 61, p. 444 Gautier;
Psell., Philos.min. I, Opusc. 5, 37, p. 16 Duffy.
55 Psell., Orat. min., 24, 73104, p. 8687, ed. A. R. Littlewood, Leipzig 1985, etc.
dom, and although he considers theology as a part of theoretical philosophy, re-

lying on Aristotle and his commentators, in his understanding, theology is essen-
tially a science which implies the Christian doctrine:
, he states in reference to Dionysus the Areopagite. Consequently, this in-
volves the understanding of true philosophy as the love for Sophia, that is, the love
for God.
Psellos considers theology as the crown of philosophy ( [] -
) that is a science related to supra-material reality in
general. Hence, though he considers all Hellenic philosophers to be polytheists,
some of them, in his opinion, are , with Proclus being the head of the most
theological philosophers. He also calls Proclus the most wonderful, a really di-
vine man and really the great philosopher. Of course, Plato is for Psellos,
too. He is mentioned as , and -
, whereas Aristotle is called , and the myrrh of philosophy.
Syrianus and Amonius are deserving of the epithet great. All of them, as well as
other Hellenic philosophers, are called wise. As we can see, Psellos deeply appreci-
ates some of the Hellenic authors, in spite of the fact that along with true ideas, they
have enounced many theories irreconcilable with Christianity, which Psellos himself
qualifies as , tales and even silly talks, referring to Proclus as a tale
56 Jo. Dam., In I Cor., 23 Migne, PG 95, col. 581 ff., especially 581, D 79, 584 B 14C 7, 585 C 15.
57 Cf. Jo. Dam., Dialec., 49, 16 ff., ed. P. B. Kotter, Berlin 1969, p. 137.
58 Cf. Arist. Met., VI 1, 1026a 18 ff.; XI 7, 1064b 1 ff. Ross.
59 Jo. Dam., Expos. fid., 17.66, ed. P. B. Kotter, Berlin and New York 1973, p. 48.
60 Jo. Dam., Dialec., 49,1315, p. 137 Kotter.
61 Psell., Theol. I, Opusc. 75, 1011, p. 297298 Gautier.
63 Psell., Philos. min. I, Opusc. 45, 30, p. 163 Duffy.
64 Psell., Theol. I, Opusc. 22, 3839, p. 84 Gautier. Psellos focuses also on Gregorys statement about
ancient authors Gr. Naz., Or. 31, 5) and explains
to whom this statement refers (Psell., Theol. I, Opusc. 106, 1011, 9495, 110111, p. 418421 Gautier).
65 Psell., Chron., VI 38, 3, ed. D. R. Reinsch, Berlin and Boston 2014, p. 122.
70 Psell., Philos. min. II, Opusc. 17, ed. D. J. OMeara, Leipzig 1989, p. 82, 1112.
71 Psell., Theol. I, Opusc. 50, 18, p. 193; 53, 26, p. 204 Gautier.
72 Psell., Philos. min. I, Opusc. 5, 36, p. 16 Duffy.
73 Psell., Philos. min. II, Opusc. 16, p. 78, 2 OMeara; Psell., Theol. I, Opusc. 50, 45, p. 193 Gautier
74 Psell., Theol. I, Opusc. 90, 54, p. 354 Gautier; Psell., Philos. min. II., Opusc. 19, p. 89, 2627 OMeara;
Psell., Philos. min. I, Opusc. 36, 102105, p. 123 Duffy.
teller. But what is most interesting is that he sometimes conveys the views of ancient
authors without making any remark on their correlation to Christian viewpoints.
The works of John Italos, a disciple of Michael Psellos, reveal a further develop-
ment of his masters innovative approaches to ancient thought, although he also uses
the term exo and while exposing the philosophical theories of the Greeks, he some-
times points out his disagreement with them. Italos is not as eloquent as Psellos or
prone to lavishly apply epithets to ancient philosophers. Plato, however, is an excep-
tion, whom he refers to as follows: -
. Naturally, Italos also favours some of the Hellenic philosophers by calling them
, or (in accordance with the
Patristic tradition, the attributes great and divine are reserved for Christian au-
thorities such as Gregory of Nazianzus and Dionysius the Areopagite). Like Psel-
los, Italos also exposes the writings of Hellenic philosophers for teaching purposes,
quoting and mentioning them, including The Elements of Theology by Proclus.
Ioane Petritsi belongs to this intellectual current. The concept of the unity of
knowledge is manifested even more evidently in his works. There is no epithet like
exo in his comments, since he distinguishes only between right and wrong theories. As
mentioned, Petritsi discusses the mode of theological discourses in general. Accord-
ing to him, theology is a part of philosophy and philosophical writings which include
theories in regard to logic, mathematics, physics, and theology. He calls Plato di-
vine, the heyday of philosophy, the myrrh of theology and my Athenian. He
applies the epithet great to Plato and the Platonists, calling them philosophers
as well as theologians.
75 Psell., Philos. min. I, Opusc. 19, 175, p. 75 Duffy. Psell., Theol. I, Opusc. 74, 145146, p. 297 Gautier.
76 See, for example, Psell., Philos. min. II, Opusc 33, p. 111114 OMeara.
77 Ital., Opusc. 68, ed. G. Tsereteli, N. Kechagmadze, Tbilisi 1966, p. 184, 21.
78 Ital., Opusc., 36. 101, 3; Opusc. 37, p. 102, 4; Opusc., 68, p. 184, 22 Tsereteli and Kechagmadze.
79 Ital., Opusc. 71, p. 193, 16 Tsereteli and Kechagmadze.
82 Ital., Opusc., 69, p. 185, 31 Tsereteli and Kechagmadze.
83 Ital., Opusc., 87, p. 209, 32 Tsereteli and Kechagmadze.
84 Psell., Opusc. 10, p. 21, 3132 OMeara; Psell., Theol. I, Opusc. 7, 46, p. 29 Gautier.
86 Petr., Expl., Praef. p. 3, 34; 1, p. 10, 7; 103, p. 150, 1014 Nutsubidze and Kaukhchishvili (Germ. tr.
p. 61; 75; 271).
87 Petr., Postf. p. 222, 33222, 1 Nutsubidze and Kaukhchishvili (Germ. tr. p. 369; Cf. Engl. tr. p. 232).
88 Petr., Expl., Praef. p. 4, 14; Expl., 41, p. 100, 16; 52, p. 115, 4 Nutsubidze and Kaukhchishvili (Germ.
tr. p. 64; 204; 224).
89 Petr., Postf. p. 209, 2432 Nutsubidze and Kaukhchishvili (Germ. tr. p. 350; Engl. tr. 206).
Though John of Damascus opposed Hellenic wisdom, he believed like many of

the Church Fathers that Hellenic thought contained some useful ideas for Christianity.
In order to justify the use of Hellenic writings ( )
when compiling his Philosophical Chapters, he alluded to Apostle James by saying:
every good gift and every perfect gift is from above ( -
, Jm. 1:17). Ioane Petritsi alludes in his treatise to the same
passage from James epistle, but also takes Hellenic metaphysical theories into con-
sideration. In Petritsis view, various doctrines are pillars of wisdom (Allusion to Prov.
9:1), while Christian teaching is the rock consolidating human wisdom in its entirety.
Thus, if Psellos, being interested in contrasting ancient and Christian philosophies,
did not hesitate to point out the differences between them despite his quest for paral-
lels, and if John Italos, strongly influenced by Neoplatonism, sometimes objected to
ancient theories as well, it is Ioane Petritsi who tries to reveal only what they have in
common. Moreover, he even denies polytheism in Proclus theological-philosophical
discourse, finding it inappropriate to discuss his theurgical activities when com-
menting on his philosophical thought. Psellos could state that he was ashamed of
the two outstanding philosophers, Iamblichus and Proclus, because of their occupa-
tion with the Chaldean fallacy, whereas Petritsi seeks only the truth among even
the Chaldeans, and describes Platonists as pillars of wisdom, great and true theolo-
gians.
The question of a criterion that serves to identify those earlier theories (and also
any thought in general) that are in harmony with Christian doctrine arises in connec-
tion with this. Petritsi starts his treatise on the theology of the Psalms by reasoning
on the nature of the human mind and on the tribunal that we bear within our souls.
According to him, the Creator put a logos endiathetos into us, like a standard weight
that serves to weigh other things, so that we could apply our faculty of reasoning to
the tribunal within our souls in order to judge our spiritual activities whether they
have a good intention or not. These very judgments will be judged by God and will
be duly recompensed. It is through the faculty of judgment that the Lord likened man
to Himself. Thus, if we act upon our nature and follow God, He will grant His help
to us. The terms used by Petritsi, as well as the overall spirit of the treatise which
93 Jo. Dam., Dialec. Prooem., 4346 Kotter.

94 Petr., Postf. p. 208, 12209, 2 Nutsubidze and Kaukhchishvili (Germ. tr. p. 348349; Engl. tr. p.
202203).
96 Petr., Expl., 41, p. 97, 2629 (Germ. tr. p. 200201).
98 Petr., Expl., 64, p. 130, 67 (Germ. tr. p. 246).
99 Bas. Caes., Ep. 233 and 204, 5, ed. Y. Courtonne, t. 3, Paris 1966, p. 3941; t. 2, Paris, 1961, p. 176, 36
ff.
100 Petr., Postf. 207, 325 (Cf. Germ. tr. p. 347; Engl. tr. p. 199200).
aims to reveal the conformity of the Psalms with Christian teachings and with Hellenic
theories as well, attest that the passage deals with the criterion of truth.
As it is known, the question of criterion was relevant for the Church Fathers
(Clement of Alexandria, Basil the Great, at al.) as well, especially in the first cen-
turies when Christianity had to define its position regarding antiquity. In the 11th12th
centuries, when the same need reappeared, the question of personal criterion arose
once again. Intellectuals had to justify their deeper study of Hellenic philosophers
(specifically Neoplatonists, who lived after Christ but denied Him or were opponents
of Christianity) and earn the right to revise some authoritative opinions regarding an-
cient thought. However, if the Fathers associate the true criterion with faith (i.e. with
the word of God), the intellectuals of the new era emphasize the human faculty of
reasoning. Michael Psellos denounces those who lack their own criterion within their
souls, unable to test () others opinions or have opinions of their own, and
thoughtlessly and ignorantly follow their predecessors. Psellos always stresses that
he himself has studied the question he is discussing.
As an justification of his analytical approach to the issues of Christian theology,
Psellos declares that he has not been granted the opportunity to contemplate the truth
directly like the Apostle Paul and Gregory the Theologian. But at the same time he finds
exemples for his method of reasoning in Gregorys writings just as well. For instance,
when attempting to prove that the viewpoints of the ancient philosophers need to be
thoroughly studied, even if we do not share them, he refers to Gregory the Theologian,
who had studied Porphyrys writings, subsequently refuting them. According to him,
Gregory had also judged Platos and Aristotles ideas, giving them both their due.
Italos also highlights Gregorys scholarly () approach to a question at
issue, of how he takes all available viewpoints into account. Italos himself starts
his reasoning with Plato, even in his treatise concerning the resurrection (and at the
end he notes that the Christians do not have the same understanding of and
like the Hellenes).
Naturally, it is all the more important for them to acquaint themselves with the
correct thoughts whoever they may be, whether they be the Hellenes, Chaldeans,
Egyptians or the Christian heretic Origen. As Psellos argues, the best of our philoso-
phers picked true ideas from those writings. Regarding Proclus, he states that

103 See e.g. Ital., Opusc. 69, p. 185, 31 ff. Tsereteli and Kechagmadze.
104 Ital., Opusc., 69, p. 185, 31 Tsereteli and Kechagmadze. See also Psell., Theol. I, Opusc. 53, 26, p.
204; Opusc. 97, 25, p. 379 Gautier.
107 Psell., Paneg., 17, 361362, p. 156 Dennis. Also Psellos says about our philosophy, that it follows
Academy in understanding divinity as incorporeal (Psell., Theol. I, Opusc. 62, 22, p. 244 Gautier).
somethings are acceptable and other things are unacceptable. Sometimes he truly
praises him (for example, as the best expert in nature), while there are cases when
he is not satisfied with Proclus explanation, even calling his discourse silly, as
said above. In regard to the Hellenes, Italos writes candidly that aporiai in question
concerning the philosophical concepts must be resolved according to their opinions,
since they are teachers of this kind of knowledge, even if their thoughts frequently
contradict the sacred dogmas.
Psellos recognizes both ways of acquiring theological knowledge, divine inspira-
tion, and logical analysis. He praises the syllogistic methods used by Proclus, and
although he can say: I do not speak about the divine things through syllogisms and
do not follow the Hellenic methods, he in fact uses logical methods even when he
speaks about the Trinity. As for what concerns Italos, his treatises reveal that logical
necessity is the foremost criterion for him.
Ioane Petritsi, as mentioned, follows the Patristic tradition in recognizing the
Word of God as the measure of truth and seeking divine assistance in his pursuit of
truth, but the points he accentuates when reasoning about the human mind, en-
dowed with the faculty of judgment by the Creator Himself, manifest his high con-
fidence in his own intelligence. Especially interesting is Petritsis application of his
criterion theory: after presenting his views on the criterion, Petritsi undertakes the
judgment of various doctrines at his inner tribunal, relying on his own intelligence.
Thus encouraged by his own ability to reason, he reveals true theories (i. e. which are
in agreement with the Orthodox faith) in the writings of Moses, the Chaldeans, and the
Hellenes. It can be argued that Petritsi follows the tradition adopted in Christianity,
according to which almost all doctrines contain part of the truth, whereas Christian
theology possesses it in its entirety. However, Petritsi, continuing a movement inau-
gurated by Byzantine scholars in the 11th century, is eager to reveal much more affinity
with Hellenic thought: according to him, not only the Platonists, but also Aristotle and
Hesiod had confessed the supremacy of the original One. He even seeks to demon-
108 Psell., Philos. min. II, Opusc 35, p. 119, 1213 OMeara.
111 Psell., Theol. I, Opusc. 74, 145146, p. 297 Gautier; Psell., Philos. min. I, Opusc. 19, 175, p. 75 Duffy.
113 Psell., Chron., VI 42, 15, p. 124 Reinsch.
114 Psell., Philos. min. II, Opusc 35, p. 119, 2 OMeara.
115 Psell., Philos. min. II, Opusc.19, p. 89, 2627 OMeara.
116 Cf. Jo. Dam., In I Cor., 2 Migne, PG 95, col. 588 B 713.
117 Petr., Postf. p. 208220 Nutsubidze and Kaukhchishvili (Germ. tr. p. 349364; Engl. tr. p. 202228).
118 Petr., Postf. p. 212, 12215, 2 Nutsubidze and Kaukhchishvili (Germ. tr. p. 356359; Engl. tr. 212218
).
strate the harmony of the Psalms, Platonism and Christianity concerning the vision of
the Divine Triad.
Nicholas of Methone is against precisely this type of intellectualism and confi-
dence in the human mind. Following after John of Damascus, he states that he does
not trust his own wisdom and is not ambitious () to exhibit wisdom
acquired from outside through human instruction, but trusts God who is the Word
and Wisdom Itself, hoping that He will endow him with the word and with invincible
wisdom. I am courageous, he writes, knowing that I say nothing of my own (
), but like the Prophets, I listen to the Logos, who confounded the wise
men (I Cor. 1:27) and destroyed their wisdom. Thus, Nicholas applies the laws of
logic and makes use of the elenctic method, hoping for Gods help. Here too, one
may be under the impression that Nicholas text is reacting to Ioanes text. After ex-
hibiting his knowledge in Greek mythology, Petritsi once again borrows a Greek word
and ironically addresses his audience: Now I have showed you my
ambition (gifilotimie), dear listener!
Thus, the character of Petritsis commentary on The Elements of Theology by Pro-
clus is determined, on one hand, by his intellectual interest in ancient philosophi-
cal thought and on the other hand, by his concept of the unity of knowledge and
the notion of criterion: Since Superior Wisdom is also presented in Platonism, and
more specifically, in Proclus, his thought should be studied and explained through
exegetic methods. Proclus works on Plato are the main sources of Petritsis Explana-
tion, including their method and form. First of all Petritsi applies Proclus principle
of commenting on an author by relying on the latters own works, which means
that, according to Petritsi, Proclus concept should be elucidated by taking into con-
sideration his other works as well. For example, the term eros is not present in The
Elements of Theology, however, Petritsi pays special attention to the Neoplatonic con-
cept of love by taking into account its importance in Proclus philosophy (he inter-
prets the terms , on the basis of the Neoplatonic erotic theory). In
the Preface, Petritsi dwells on the significance of dialectics in considering the form of
119 The subject has been treated in a number of research works. See, for instance, Melikishvili 1999,
XLIIILXIV; Alexidze 2008a, 248249, Mchedlidze 2011, Mtchedlidze 2014, etc.
120 Nic. Meth., Refut., Praef., p. 2, 13 ff Angelou. Cf. Jo. Dam. Dialect. Prooem. 60 ff. Kotter); Jo. Dam.,
In I Cor., 2 Migne, PG 95, col. 589 C.
121 Cf. Io. Chrys., In I Cor., Hom. 7, 4 Migne, PG 61, col. 60, 20 ff.
122 Or, is it Petritsis response to Nicholas? Having analyzed Chapter 122, Lela Aleksidze finds it pos-
sible (naturally, assuming Petritsi was a 12th/13th century figure), that Petritsis commentary could
have been composed in response to the anti-Proclean trend or as a direct response to the criticism of
Nicholas of Methone (p. 246).
123 Petr. Expl., 26, p. 71, 5 (Cf. Germ. tr. p. 162). This term carries various connotations,
although a relationship to the concept of ambition is clearly preserved with Nicholas and Petritsi.
124 Procl. Theol. Plat. I, 2, p. 10, 14 Saffrey and Westerink; regarding this principle in Proclus, cf.
editors Note 1, p. 132.
The Elements of Theology, while as he explains Proclus text, he also presents to his
students other modes of theological discourse applied by the Neoplatonists: through
divine inspiration, through symbols, and through images.
It should be noted that although he admits to the universal character of philo-
sophical theology having its own inventory of basic concepts and terms, Petritsi fully
understands the impossibility of a systemic agreement between the philosophical-
theological doctrine of Neoplatonism and the world view of the Christian religion.
Thus, even though he attempts to reveal parallels between Orthodox thought and the
Platonic philosophers in his treatise (the so-called Afterword), when commenting on
Proclus, he concentrates on an explication of the Proclean system of metaphysics and
avoids parallels with dogmas of the faith (as mentioned previously, his Commentary
contains only few notes on this point, which are of questionable authenticity).
Thus, the works of Ioane Petritsi and Nicholas of Methone manifest two opposing
extremes of mainstream intellectual currents in the 12th century: conservative and
innovative. Besides, the evidence of different kinds of relations between the two texts,
with one of them aspiring to justify a study of Proclus Elements of Theology, and the
other proving the contrary, allows us to suppose that the Explanation of Elements
of Theology, composed by the Georgian philosopher for pedagogical purposes at the
so-called Gelati Monastery Academy, represents a specimen of the manuals used in
Byzantium for teaching Proclus work.
Bibliography
Primary Sources and Abbreviations
Arist. Met. Aristotles Metaphysics. W. D. Ross (editor). Oxford 1924
Bas. Caes., Ep. Saint Basil, Lettres. Y.Courtonne (editor/translator). Vol. 13, Paris
19571966
Jo. Chrys. In I Cor. St Joannis Chrysostomi In epistulam primam ad Corinthios. In Jacques
Paul Migne (editor): Patrologiae cursus completus. Series graeca. T. 61,
Paris, 1862. Cols. 9382
Jo. Dam., Dialec. St Joannis Damasceni Dialectica. P. B. Kotter (editor). In Die Schriften
des Johannes von Damaskos. B. 1 (Patristishe Texte und Studien. B. 7),
Berlin 1969
Jo. Dam. Expos. fid. St Joannis Damasceni Expositio Fidei. P. B. Kotter (editor). In Die
Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos. B. 2 (Patristishe Texte und
Studien. B. 12), Berlin and New York 1973
125 Procl. Theol. Plat. I, 4, p. 1723 Saffrey and Westerink. For a more detailed examination of these
methods in Petritsi see Mchedlidze 1999.
126 Teaching of Proclus, as it is known, was periodically prohibited in Byzantium, before and during
this century.
Jo. Dam. In I Cor. St Joannis Damasceni In epistolam primam ad Corinthios. In Jacques

Paul Migne (editor): Patrologiae cursus completus. Series graeca. T. 95,
Paris, 1864, cols. 569705
Ital. Joannis Itali Opera. G. Tsereteli, N. Kechagmadze (editors). Tbilisi 1966
Nic. Meth., Refut. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus Elements of Theology. A. D.
Angelou (editor). Athens and Leiden 1984
Petr. Expl. Ioane Petritsis Explanation of Proclus, the Platonic Philosopher. Sh.
Nutsubidze, S. Kaukhchishvili (editors). In Ioane Petritsis Works. Vol.
2, Tbilisi 1937
L. Alexidze and L. Bergemann, eds. (2009b). Ioane Petrizi, Kommentar
zur Elementatio theologica des Proklos. berzetzung aus dem
Altgeorgischen, Anmerkungen, Indices und Einleitung. Amsterdam and
Philadelphia
Petr. Postf. Ioane Petritsis Postface of the Explanation of Proclus, the Platonic
Philosopher. Sh. Nutsubidze, S. Kaukhchishvili (editors). In Ioane
Petritsis Works. Vol. 2, Tbilisi, 1937, p. 207223
L. Gigineishvili (2014). Ioane Petritsi's Preface to his Annotated
Translation to his book of Psalms. In: Georgian Christian thought and
its cultural context: memorial volume for the 125th Anniversary of
Shalva Nutsubidze (18881969). Ed. by T. Nutsubidze, C. B. Horn, and
B. Louri. Leiden and Boston, pp. 196235
PG Patrologiae cursus completus. Series graeca. J. P. Migne (editor). Vol.
166. Paris, 18661867
Procl., Elem. Theol. Proclus, The Elements of Theology. F. R. Dodds (editor). 2nd edition,
Oxford 1963
Procl. Theol. Plat. Proclus, Thologie platonicienne. H. D. Saffrey, L. G. Westerink
(editors/translators), Vol. 16, Paris 19681997
Psell., Paneg. Michaelis Pselli Orationes panegyricae. G. T. Dennis (editor). Leipzig
1994
Psell., Theol. I Michaelis Pselli Theologica. P. Gautier (editor). Leipzig 1989
Psell., Philos. min. I Michaelis Pselli Philosophica minora. T. 1, J. M. Duffy (editor). Leipzig
1992
Psell., Philos. min. II Michaelis Pselli Philosophica minora. T. 2. D. J. OMeara (editor).
Leipzig 1989
Psell., Orat. min. Michaelis Pselli Oratoria minora. A. R. Littlewood (editor). Leipzig 1985
Psell., Chron. Michaelis Pselli Chronographie. D. R. Reinsch (editor), Berlin and
Boston 2014
Secondary Sources
Alexidze, L. (2002a). Dionysios Areopagita in den mittelalterlichen Kommentaren zur Elementatio
theologica des Proclus. In: Selbst Singularitt Subjectivitt. Vom Neuplatonismus zum
Deutchen Idealismus. Ed. by T. Kobusch, B. Mojsisch, and O. F. Summerell. Amsterdam and
Philadelphia, pp. 111130.
Alexidze, L. (2007). Ioane Petritsi in the Context of Eleventh-Twelfth Century Byzantine Philosophy.
In: Byzantine Studies in Georgia. Ed. by N. Makharadze and T. Dolidze. Tbilisi, pp. 237252.
Alexidze, L. (2008a). Ioane Petrizi und die antike Philosophie. (In Georgian, with an extensive
summary in German). Tbilisi.
Alexidze, L. and L. Bergemann, eds. (2009b). Ioane Petrizi, Kommentar zur Elementatio theologica
des Proklos. berzetzung aus dem Altgeorgischen, Anmerkungen, Indices und Einleitung.
Amsterdam and Philadelphia.
Angelou, A. D. (1984c). Introduction on Nicholas' Life and Works, in Nicholas of Methone,
Refutation of Proclus' Elements of Theology. In: Nicholas of Methone. Refutation of Proclus'
Elements of Theology. Leiden, pp. IXLXIV.
Birjukov, D. (2011). Nicholas of Methone and his polemics against Proclus in the context of
Byzantine Proklos-Renaissance. In: Vestnik Russkoj christianskoj gumanitarnoj akademii
12.1, pp. 114122.
Chelidze, E. (1994/1995). The Life and Activities of Ioane Petritsi. In: Religion 3/4/5/6. (In
Georgian), 113126 (1994), 7689 (1995).
Gigineishvili, L. (2007). The Platonic Theology of Ioane Petritsi.
Gigineishvili, L. (2014). Ioane Petritsi's Preface to his Annotated Translation to his book of Psalms.
In: Georgian Christian thought and its cultural context: memorial volume for the 125th
Anniversary of Shalva Nutsubidze (18881969). Ed. by T. Nutsubidze, C. B. Horn, and B. Louri.
Leiden and Boston, pp. 196235.
Iremadze, T. (2004b). Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus. Zur Rezeption der Proklischen
Philosophie im deutschen und georgischen Mittelalter: Dietrich von Freiberg, Berthold von
Moosburg, Joane Petritsi. Amsterdam and Philadelphia.
Kazhdan, A. and A. W. Epstein (1985). Change in Byzantine Culture in the Eleventh and Twelfth
Centuries. Berkley, Los Angeles, and London.
Mchedlidze, M. (1999). The Main Principle of Ioane Petritsi's Exegetical Method. In: Works by
young researchers of the Philological Faculty (3), Dedicated to the 120th anniversary of the birth
of Academician Korneli Kekelidze. Ed. by L. Geguchadze. (In Georgian). Tbilisi, pp. 132138.
Mchedlidze, M. (2011). For a Triadic Vision of divine Nature (Michael Psellos, john Italos, Nicholas of
Methone, Ioane Petritsi). In: Philosophy in Global Change, Jubilee Volum Dedicated to the 65th
Anniversary of Burkhard Moisisch. Ed. by T. Iremadze, H. Schneider, and K. J. Schmidt. (In
Georgian). Tbilisi.
Melikishvili, D. (1999). Introduction to Petritsi's Life and Works. In: Ioane Petritsis Comments on
Proclus' Elements of Theology (A Translation in modern Georgian, Introduction and
Commentary). Tbilisi.
Mtchedlidze, M. (2014). As the mountains of God and the eternal mountains: Ioane Petritsi's
reasoning on the agreement of Plato with David the Prophet. In: Studies in the Humanities 3.
(In Georgian, with an extensive summary in English), pp. 168184.
Tevzadze, G. (1996). The History of Medieval Philosophy. (In Georgian). Tbilisi.
Jess de Garay
The Reception of Proclus: From Byzantium to
the West (an Overview)
1 Introduction
Despite being the object of numerous studies, Procluss reception in Byzantium and
the West continues to be a source of perplexities. My purpose in these pages is to
establish the differences between this reception in Byzantium and in the West, in order
to present a synoptic vision.
On the one hand, his writings were preserved in Byzantium by means that are
not always clear , even though he was considered the quintessential pagan philoso-
pher. On the other hand, Procluss reception in the West follows a clearer trail, espe-
cially after Moerbekes translations starting in 1268. It is quite significant that Mo-
erbeke, besides translating Aristotle, dedicated his attention to Proclus, and not, for
example, to Plato: the formers presence in Byzantium, unlike that in the West, was
important enough for Moerbeke to undertake this translation.
Nevertheless, Procluss reception, both in Byzantium and in the West, is marked
by important discontinuities, both in subjects and in time. That is to say: aside from
certain exceptions, it is impossible to speak of a continuous tradition or school that
considers itself indebted to Proclus, as opposed to the way in which we can, for exam-
ple, refer to long-lasting Aristotelian, Platonic, or even Neoplatonic traditions. This
also applies to the 15th and 16th centuries: while there are many authors inspired
by Proclus, it would be extravagant to locate them in a single tradition. Specifically,
in Pletho, Cusanus and Ficino, Procluss reception differs in essential aspects, even
while there are common themes.
The situation can be summed up as follows. 1) In the West Proclus remains nearly
unknown until 1268; it is only from then on that he begins to be better known, espe-
cially among the disciples of Albert the Great (Dietrich of Freiberg, Eckhart, Berthold
of Moosburg). His principal impact is on Nicholas of Cusa, at least beginning with 1434.
Nonetheless, other authors, like Bessarion, Pletho, Ficino and Pico also contribute to
his spreading influence. 2) In Byzantium, on the contrary, he was always a recognized
author, both because of his philosophical relevance as well as for his paganism. It is
principally with Psellos that his presence grows: on the one hand, the criticisms of
1 Gersh 2014b. For my part, I have examined certain aspects of this reception in: de Garay 2012, 2013,
2014.
2 Steel 2014, 247263, Boese 1987.
DOI 10.1515/9781501503597-008
154 | J. de Garay
his paganism intensify (condemnations of Italos and his disciples, the refutation of
Nicholas of Methone); on the other hand, his writings and teachings receive increas-
ing attention (Petritsi, Pachymeres).
2 A Brief Historical Journey from 11th until 16th

century
In Byzantium, Procluss reception was initially cut short by the prohibitions and cen-
sorship that the Byzantine imperial tradition imposed upon pagan religion, culture,
and philosophy. This is probably one of the main reasons why Proclus practically dis-
appears from academic discussions beginning in the 7th century, even though we still
have many of his writings, and many of his ideas reformulations purged of pagan
connotations continuously reappear in the writings of different authors.
It is only in the 11th century, by way of Psellos, that Procluss relevance as a
philosopher acquires new life, although the prosecution of Psellos and his disci-
ples delayed the spreading of his writings. Nevertheless, beginning with Psellos,
Procluss presence in Byzantium becomes more intense. After the Latin occupation of
Constantinople, the censorship of Procluss writings lessens. This can be inferred from
the attention Proclus received from George Pachymeres, or the proliferation of copies
of some of Procluss scientific writings throughout the Empire. Beginning in 1350 we
can actually speak of a systematic recovery of Procluss writings in Byzantium.
From a doctrinal point of view, the 15th century is marked by the rise of the fig-
ure of Georgius Gemistus Pletho: he gave new vitality to philosophical perspectives
very characteristic of Proclus, in a way that reminds one of Pselloss irruption in the
11th century, even to the point that Gennadius Scholarius accuses Pletho of plagiariz-
ing Procluss doctrines. Pletho is important for the history of the reception of Proclus
in the West, first and foremost because of his stay in Florence on the occasion of the
Council of Ferrara-Florence, and also, in an indirect way, through some of his dis-
ciples, especially Cardinal Bessarion. Nevertheless, Procluss reception in the West
has a story of its own that goes far beyond Pletho or Bessarion.
As also occurred in Byzantium, Procluss doctrines in the West were indirectly
spread through the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius. Even so, while in Byzantium the
3 OMeara 2014d, 165181.

4 Clucas 1981c; Gouillard 1985d; Gounaridis 2006, 3547.
5 Cacouros 2007a, 177210; Cacouros 2000b, 589627; Cacouros 2006, 151.
6 Lisi and Signes 1995, xliixlvi.
7 Mac, Steel, and dHoine 2009, 241279.
8 Dillon 2014b, 111125.
The Reception of Proclus | 155
Dionysian corpus impacted Byzantine culture and religion since the 6th century, in
the West we are forced to wait for the translations of Scotus Eriugena in the 9th century,
and Scotuss own philosophy, which ultimately relies on Proclus.
This indirect dissemination of Procluss doctrines in the West was reinforced by
the fortune of the Latin rendition of the so-called Liber de causis in the 12th century,
which builds upon certain propositions taken from Procluss Elements of Theology. Be-
ginning in the 12th century, many authors were inspired both by the Dionysian corpus
and the Liber de causis.
The direct reception of Procluss writings in the West excluding the early trans-
lation of the Elements of Physics in the 12th century begins with Moerbeke, whose
translations aroused particular interest among the disciples of Albert the Great, in-
cluding Dietrich of Freiburg, Berthold of Moosburg and Heymeric van der Velde.
Nicholas of Cusa also belongs to this tradition, linked to Albert the Great. Within
this heritage we also find Meister Eckhart, who aroused Cusanuss interest even be-
fore Proclus did. It is specifically in Nicholas of Cusa where we can rightfully speak, re-
garding Procluss reception, of a certain convergence of the Byzantine tradition (which
culminates in Pletho) and that of the Latin West. Without a doubt, the close relation-
ship between Bessarion and Cusanus catalyzed the exchange of ideas between both
traditions.
Proclus was also closely studied by Marsilio Ficino. On the one hand, by way of
Pletho Ficino recovers some of Procluss doctrines. On the other hand, he was aware
of Cusanuss interpretations, albeit in a secondary way. But above all, he had access to
Procluss corpus in its entirety, since he could read directly in Greek. He would go on
to translate the Elements of Physics, as well as extracts from the Commentary on Alcibi-
ades, the Commentary on the Republic, De sacrificio et magia, and even some hymns.
To a large extent, Ficinos own commentary on the Parmenides seems to follow that of
Proclus. Logically, there are common doctrines in Cusanus and Ficino, but, even so,
they differ in their interest in Proclus.
After Ficino, an echo of Procluss doctrines remained, e.g. in Giovanni Pico della
Mirandola or Agostino Steuco, even though the use of his writings was diluted when
faced with the abundant new translations of Aristotle and the academic debates be-
tween the different Aristotelianisms. Even so, Proclus undoubtedly benefitted from
the widespread intent at the time to edit and translate the writings of philosophers
9 Lossky 2009, 1933.

10 Gersh 1978a.
11 Colomer 1975, 81ff.
12 Retucci 2008, 135165.
13 Celenza 2002Allen, Rees, and Davies 2002.
14 Tambrun 2006a, 8991.
15 Kristeller 1987, 191211.
16 Schmitt 1996, 505532.
156 | J. de Garay
and scientists of antiquity. His works, and particularly his scientific writings, were
read widely.
Special importance must be given to the edition of the Greek text of the Commen-
tary on the First Book of Euclids Elements by Gryneus in 1533. Later, in 1560, Barozzi
prints the Latin translation, which would provide the occasion for an important de-
bate regarding the status of mathematics. In this case, Proclus will not be the leading
representative of a new vindication of Platonism; rather, this text, as an interpretation
of Euclid, will be the direct object of study by Aristotelians and mathematical circles.
In synthesis, the reception of Proclus runs along two clearly differentiated paths.
On the one hand, a direct reception can be located chronologically, both in Byzantium
as well as in the West. On the other hand, there is indirect reception, primarily by way
of the Dionysian writings, but also, in the case of the West, via Eriugena and the Liber
de causis.
3 Proclus in Byzantium
The immediate reception of Proclus is important, as can be seen in Damascius
and Pseudo-Dionysius, and, from a critical point of view, Philoponus. Nevertheless,
throughout the 6th century, his writings, and even references to him, seem to re-
main in the background, and there is hardly any mention of them in the 7th and
8thcenturies. It is only through the efforts of Leo the Mathematician and Arethas of
Caesarea that at least some of his writings received renewed attention, and it is
probably thanks to these two thinkers, among others, that Proclus is saved from dis-
appearing. Both Photius and the Suda register and disseminate knowledge about
Proclus, as well as some of his works, but without any special sympathy.
The situation is obviously different in the case of the Dionysian writings and the
interpretation developed by Maximus the Confessor, but in both cases some of Pro-
cluss doctrines, already Christianized and without any reference to Proclus himself,
are spread widely in Byzantium. Something similar could be said of Philoponus, Am-
monius and Simplicius.
The situation in Byzantium takes an important turn after Michael Psellos. If we
pay attention to his declarations, Procluss doctrines enjoy a central position in Psel-
loss thought. Nevertheless, while Psellos certainly does make use of Proclus in some
17 A. P. Segonds 1987, 319334.

18 Crapulli 1969; Sasaki 2003, 1362, 333358; Rabouin 2009, 199250.
19 Parry 2006d, 223235.
20 Lemerle 1971, 169176, 239241.
21 Lemerle 1971, 212.
22 Both [Aristotle and Plato] gave me a renewed desire to descend, as completing a circle, towards
the Plotinuses, Porphyrys and Iamblichos, with whose company I followed the road that led to the
areas, his cultural and philosophical interests go far beyond Procluss philosophy.
Specifically, Aristotle holds a place that is as relevant as Proclus, and Pselloss own
writings show a varied set of interests, in which history and politics play a significant
part.
Psellos follows Proclus straightforwardly on certain concrete questions, for ex-
ample in his commentary on the Chaldean Oracles, when questioning the place of
the imaginative faculty or the scale of the virtues; above all, however, Psellos sum-
marizes the general outline of Procluss thought. More specifically, what we might
call his rationalism, his naturalism, his vindication of Plato and the Platonic tradi-
tion, and of course his accepting the existence of an ancient form of wisdom which
dating back to the Chaldean Oracles, passes through Pythagoreanism and Plato, and
continues with the Neoplatonic philosophers integrates all other philosophies and
religions in a complete and coherent interpretation of reality. For Psellos, of course,
paganism in Proclus and other religions culminates in Christianity as the crowning
doctrine, greater than all other religions and philosophies.
Among Pselloss disciples, the figure of John Italus holds a special interest, for an
explicit reference to Proclus is made in his condemnation, as being the one who in-
spired his erroneous doctrines ( -
). Even so, an analysis of the texts condemning Italus shows
that the allusions to Proclus are superficial and of a rather rhetorical character, as
if Proclus was just a metonymy to signify the entire pagan philosophy ( -
), and, more generally, philosophy as a rational way of regarding the
Christian mysteries. In any case, a reading of Italoss own writings reveals a conscious
use of Procluss works.
The condemnation of some of Italoss disciples, e.g. Eustratius of Nicea, do not
add much more clarification to this subject, even when his writings show determinate
traces of Procluss doctrines, as is also the case with those of Michael of Ephesus. It
might be suggested, at any rate, that in the circle of Anna Komnene whether they
were philosophers or not Procluss writings were still being pondered.
admirable Proclus, with whom I moored as if in a wide port. There is where I learned all the doctrine
and the exact foundations of intellection: Michele Psello. Imperatori di Bisanzio (Cronografia), S. Im-
pellizeri, Milano 1999, 4 ed., VII, 38 (Spanish trans. by J. Signes Codoer, Madrid 2005, pp. 233234).
23 Podskalsky 1976d, 517518; Benakis 1987d, 252253.
24 In any case, Psellos remains terra incognita: cf. Signes Codoer 2005, p. 25. Also J. Duffy 2006b,
2006.
25 Kaldellis 2008, 194ff.
26 Kaldellis 2008, 203214.
27 Gouillard 1985d, 147, 202203.
28 Gouillard 1985d, 155, 370371.
29 Steel 2002c, 5157.
158 | J. de Garay
It is hard, in any case, to determine to what extent Procluss doctrines were still
in use. There are two authors that almost simultaneously around 1100 display a
very special interest in Procluss philosophy, even though they do so in entirely oppo-
site ways. On one hand, in Georgia Ioane Petritsi begins a rigorous study of Procluss
works. On the other hand, in Byzantium itself, Bishop Nicholas of Methone composes
a Refutation of the Elements of Theology, because he considers it a work that is espe-
cially threatening to Orthodoxy.
After 1261, we can perceive signs that the censorship of Proclus has eased up. On
one hand, we find the works of George Pachymeres on Proclus, especially those con-
cerning the Commentary on Platos Parmenides. Secondly, we can trace the spread
of Procluss scientific writings, probably meant to be used as school manuals. Finally,
we find a systematic copying of Procluss writings beginning in 1350, most probably
by the Prodromou-Petra monastery (in Constantinople).
In sum, we can distinguish various phases in the reception of Proclus in Byzan-
tium: 1) In the 5th and 6th centuries references to his doctrines and writings are fre-
quent. 2) In the following centuries his writings appear to have been forgotten, until
they surface again with Leo and Aretas. 3) Thanks almost exclusively to Psellos, Pro-
clus becomes newly important in philosophy, an importance he will maintain. 4) From
1261 to 1453 the theological censures are mitigated, and his writings once again circu-
late.
From the doctrinal point of view, the most striking aspect is the widespread ac-
ceptance of Dionysian theology, as opposed to the theology of Proclus, which is the
foundation for the former. This allows us to conclude that this rejection affects only
superficial aspects and not the deepest ground of the philosophy of Proclus. At any
rate, starting with Psellos, Proclus is presented as a symbol of Greek rationalism and
naturalism that subverts Christian mysteries, as opposed to St. Dionysius.
4 Proclus and Pletho

It does not appear that Pletho contributed in any serious way to the spreading of Pro-
cluss ideas in Italy, during his stay in Florence. His contributions were more focused
on the defence of Plato against Aristotle. Scholariuss reproaches of Pletho due to his
dependency on Proclus were based on the obvious coincidences between the two
30 Podskalsky 1976d, 520521; Angelou 1984b, lviii.

31 Alexidze and Bergemann 2009a; Iremadze 2004c.
32 Saffrey and Westerink 1987, vol. V, lixlxix.
33 Steel and Mac 2006a, 7799.
34 Cacouros 2000b, 615.
35 Woodhouse 1986a, 7378.
philosophers. And yet, behind these apparent coincidences, strong discrepancies can
be discerned between Proclus and Pletho. Of course, the fact that the Treatise on
Laws was destroyed renders us incapable of reaching any definitive conclusion. Even
so, it is possible to show how close or how far apart they are in their central tenets.
The most obvious coincidences are found in the general outlines of their thought.
Pletho, just like Proclus, belongs to the Platonic tradition. His critiques of Aristotle,
like those of Proclus, are only meant to show Platos superiority over his disciple; this
does not prevent them from adopting numerous Aristotelian doctrines. In general,
many of Neoplatonisms classic themes can be found in Pletho: for example, the affir-
mation of the Ones transcendence over the Intellect, as well as the middle place of the
Soul between the intelligible and the sensible world. Further, there is the derivation
of the whole of reality from the One, conceived as a First Cause, in such a way that
physical reality is but the unfurling of the Ones potency.
Additionally, in both Pletho and in Proclus there is a manifest interest in the re-
covery of Ancient Greek polytheism. In the eyes of Scholarius, this is undoubtedly the
most scandalous coincidence. In order to carry on with this task, Pletho, like Proclus
before him, holds that Platos intelligible world corresponds to a divine domain. That
is to say: Platonic ideas differently formulated by each of them, we should note,
are transformed into Ancient deities.
In any case, the result of this correspondence between Platonic ideas and pagan
gods implies a certain rationalization or demythologization of pagan religious tradi-
tions. That is to say, in both cases we can find philosophical notions behind divine
shapes, constituting an autonomous philosophical system. Pletho, like Proclus be-
fore him,strives to build a scientific theology, which can be developed in a strictly
rational fashion, but having a polytheist character, so that that it can be adjusted to
pagan beliefs.
Both authors also agree in their genealogical interpretation of knowledge. Pla-
tonic philosophy would be, in this interpretation, only the latest link in a much older
tradition dating back to an ancient wisdom that Plato encountered through Pythago-
ras. Both Pletho and Proclus find in the Chaldean Oracles a sacred revelation of this
ancient wisdom, even if they do so in different ways. All philosophies and religions are
36 Tambrun 2006a, 153168. See also: Plethon, Oracles Chaldaques, ed. B. Tambrun-Krasker, Brux-
elles 1995; Tambrun-Krasker 1987.
37 Saffrey and Westerink 1978, vol. III, lxxilxxii: Ainsi, dans la mesure o la thologie comme sci-
ence a supplant la thologie symbolique ou mythologique, qui tait la thologie traditionnelle depuis
les origines de la pense grecque, on peut dire que cette nouvelle thologie scientifique a opr une
sorte de dmythologisation. Mais il est vident que cette dmythologisation atteint son achvement
complet, lorsque les dieux du panthon olympien sont devenus les hnades divines. Lorsque Proclus
nous dit que la proprit qui dfinit la desse Hestia, cest tre en soi-mme, et celle qui dfinit la
desse Hra, cest tre en un autre, nous sommes devant un cas de dmythologisation complte.
Mais, parce que Proclus tait un gnie, il savait garder conjoints lordre de la thologie scientifique et
celui de la pit populaire qui nest autre que la dvotion du coeur.
160 | J. de Garay
nothing more than a reformulation, more or less distorted, of this philosophia peren-
nis.
In addition to the general outline of their doctrines, which have their origin in the
Neoplatonic tradition particularly in Proclus, of course there are numerous con-
crete points where Procluss influence becomes manifest, e.g. the positive character
attributed to matter, the role of the ochema, the peras-apeiria duality, the con-
ception of the particular as an expression of the universal, etc.
Scholariuss criticism therefore seems justified, in certain measure. Nevertheless,
a more detailed analysis of those of Plethos writings still available to us reveals dis-
crepancies with Proclus on numerous issues, some of them highly relevant. It is also
not at all clear just how deeply Scholarius was familiar with Proclus. There was a firmly
rooted prejudice in Byzantium that saw Proclus as a champion of paganism and an
enemy of Christian orthodoxy. It is even possible that some sort of Syllabus may
have existed, where those of Procluss ideas considered most dangerous were summa-
rized; this might constitute Scholariuss principal source of knowledge. In any case,
whether due to ignorance, or because he just wished to highlight Plethos heterodoxy,
Scholarius does not take into account the notable differences between the former and
Proclus.
Going beyond general outlines, Plethos interest in politics, laws, and, more con-
cretely, in the Byzantine Empire, is not found in Proclus. This does not mean a contra-
diction, since Proclus does concede value to political reflection, as his commentaries
on Platos Republic make manifest: he appreciates political virtue, and is not unaware
of the political intrigues of his time. It is, however, revealing that Plethos opus maior
was a Treatise on Laws, just as in Platos case. This change of perspective is visible in
his consideration of virtues: unlike the Neoplatonic scale of the virtues, in which po-
litical virtue can be found in the very early steps of moral progression, Pletho recovers
the central worth of justice as an essential virtue for the whole of society.
The most radical difference between them, made explicit by Pletho himself, lies
in the correspondence established by Pletho between the One and Being. In the case
of this last issue, Pletho does not just break with Proclus, but also with Plotinus and
Iamblichus. The transcendence of the One over Being was, in general, commonplace
in the Neoplatonic tradition.
38 Pletho, Oracles Chaldaques, 14, p. 22, 48. Cf. Procl., In Alcib., 320, 1011, ed. A.-Ph. Segonds, Paris
2003, p. 451n: ( , ) La matire a part lun-bien: thse capitale
de Proclus.
39 Pletho, Oracles Chaldaques, 14, pp. 1012, 89103.
40 Pletho, Tratado sobre las leyes, 105106.
41 Cacouros 2000b, 593595; Cacouros 2007a, 194.
42 Lisi and Signes 1995, xxxxxxv.
43 Tambrun-Krasker 1987; Masai 1956b, 245263.
At this juncture, Pletho shows signs of support for the rejection of negative the-
ology. While according to Proclus the First transcends all intellect, and can therefore
only be accessed through negation, Pletho on the contrary advocates an affirmative
theology, in which divine attributes may be expressed, both in the cases of the One
and the other gods.
We must take into account the fact that Pletho knows of the victory of the
Palamites, which had already been incorporated into Byzantine orthodoxy. Palamite
Hesychasm is a radical expression of negative theology that, inspired by Dionysian
texts, has characterized Orthodox spirituality ever since, especially monastic spiri-
tuality. Pletho, on the other hand, is completely allergic not only to Hesychasm, but
more generally to the entirety of monastic culture. He characterizes the monk as a
parasite that does not assume the mission given to every man, namely, to become a
link between the material and the intelligible world. By withdrawing from the world,
the monk relinquishes the divine mission that was entrusted to him.
In the same vein, the first differentiated expression of the One, according to Pro-
clus (peras-apeiria), is substituted in Pletho by the distinction between being by itself,
and being by reason of another. If, for Proclus, the apeiria expresses the infinite po-
tentiality of the One, irreducible to any affirmative statement, Plethos negative the-
ology, on the contrary, portrays the One as the only being that is by itself, unlike the
rest of realities that exist through another, which in a way recalls the Aristotelian dis-
tinction between substance and accidents.
Similarly, Plethos philosophy seems to be centered on the causal derivation of
reality from the One, while the epistrophe moment, the return of all that is real to the
One, seems to be relegated to a secondary importance. While Procluss reality has at its
essential core a triadic and circular scheme, Pletho seems to replace it with diairesis. If
Procluss Parmenides represents the culmination of Platonic theology, Plethos choice
of a reference dialogue seems to be the Sophist instead, inasmuch as everything seems
to be articulated around identity, otherness, repose and movement.
At any rate, the divine and intelligible world of Pletho differs considerably from
Procluss pantheon. Henads have disappeared; as has the Proclean triple division be-
tween what is intelligible (noetos), what is intelligible-intellective (noetos-noeros), and
what is intellective (noeros). The One, for Pletho, is immediately followed by Nous, as
in Plotinus, obviating Procluss emphasis on establishing mediations to avoid any dis-
continuity. Otherwise, demiurgy, which for Proclus is a divine activity proper to the
intellective (noeros) domain, in Pletho belongs to Zeus himself, and only in a deriva-
tive way does it belong to the second divinity (Poseidon).
More generally, Plethos pantheon differs radically from that of Proclus. With-
out a doubt Plethos sources are, in this matter, very different from those of Proclus.
44 Pletho, Oracles Chaldaques, 14, p. 18, 1419; cf. Tambrun 2006a, 149.
45 Tambrun 2006a, 158159.
162 | J. de Garay
Plutarch, Iamblichus, Timaeus of Locri, Julian and especially Aelius Aristides, are
more noticeably influential in Pletho. In addition, Orphic theology is not relevant for
Pletho as it is for Proclus.
Finally, Pletho emphasizes the necessity of destiny in a Stoic fashion, undervalu-
ing human freedom. Procluss determination to save human freedom is discarded by
Pletho, who wagers on accepting servitude to the best of beings.
In sum, Pletho can be considered to be the concluding term of the reception of
Proclus in Byzantium: on the one hand, he systematizes and radicalizes the rationalist
reading that Psellos and Italos had already proposed; and on the other, he completely
rejects Palamism and the mystical theology of Dionysius.
5 From Moerbeke to Nicholas of Cusa

Nicolas of Cusas reception of Proclus is dependent on a wholly different tradition
from that of Pletho. Even if they were coetaneous and coincided in space for the
brief years of the Council of Ferrara-Florence, at least and even despite Bessarion,
disciple of Pletho and friend of Cusanus, the interpretation of Proclus is considerably
different in Pletho than in Nicholas of Cusa.
In the Latin tradition, Dionysian writings had been the object of numerous com-
mentaries and interpretations which Cusanus knows and appreciates by the likes
of Eriugena, Thierry of Chartres and Albert the Great. The Liber de causis had served
as an inspiration for numerous authors since the 12th century, as well. Moreover, Mo-
erbekes translations, particularly the Elementatio theologica, had encouraged philo-
sophical reflection to move in a new direction, as can be seen in Dietrich of Freiburg
or Berthold of Moosburg. Additionally, in contrast to the Byzantine tradition, Latin
Platonists had always been fed by the writings of Augustine of Hippo.
The reading of Proclus, as a result, begins with Dionysius and his commentators,
as well as with St. Augustine and Avicenna. In contrast to Byzantium, in the West there
was no opposition between Dionysius and Proclus, but rather a complete continuity.
Nor was there religious censure of Proclus, as opposed to the condemnations of Aris-
totle and Eriugena. Religious reservations about rationalism were directed towards
Averroes and not towards Proclus.
Cusanuss acknowledgment of Procluss writings seems to date to a very early
time, certainly prior at least to his writing of the Docta ignorantia and De coniecturis.
We know this not only because we have at our disposal fragments of the Commen-
46 Tambrun 2006a, 187195.

47 Pletho, Tratado sobre las leyes, 6478.
48 dAmico 2009, 107134.
49 Kristeller 1987, 191211.
tary on the Parmenides and the Platonic Theology with comments written in his own
hand, but also because Cusanus seems to know and have assimilated the Elements
of Theology, which had inspired Dietrich and Berthold of Moosburg. Before Cusanus,
proposition 83 ( ) or
the equivalent proposition 15 of the Liber de causis (omnis sciens qui scit essentiam
suam est rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa), had already received par-
ticular attention among Alberts disciples (including Thomas Aquinas and Eckhart).
The return of thought to itself implied the intellection of the unum in nobis, which, in
turn, stands as the ground of itself and of all knowledge.
Right from the beginning of the Elements, Proclus lays down how, from the unity
of the unum in nobis, the contradiction between the One and the not-one arises:
. The synthesis of opposites, the coincidentia
oppositorum, defines the intellectus. Thus, the Commentary on the Parmenides ac-
quires a special relevance. The priority of negation over affirmation represents a doc-
trine defended by Cusanus throughout his whole life. In this sense, Eckhart and the
Pseudo-Dionysius are, for Cusanus, as important as Proclus. Dialectics thus appears
as one of his methodological bases. Negation is what makes the overcoming of the
one-sidedness of our knowledge possible. It is dialectics that makes possible, more
precisely, the overcoming negation of the one-sidedness of our knowledge, and
the integration of new perspectives into it.
The visio Dei opposes the angulus oculi of human knowledge. Our knowledge is
only partial, for we possess only one perspective, while God covers with his gaze the
totality of the universes viewpoints. Perhaps one of Procluss most influential theses
in the 15th century, especially in the West, is the one Trouillard calls monadology.
The sources of Renaissance perspectivism are undoubtedly many, but it is quite tempt-
50 Beierwaltes 2005, 6869; dAmico 2009, 111112.

51 Hankey 2002, 279324.
52 Procl., El. Th., prop. 2.
53 And yet he does not seem interested in Procluss scientific writings or in his Commentary on the
Timaeus. He also does not seem to have known the Commentary on the First Book of Euclids Elements,
which was not translated until 1560 by Francesco Barozzi.
54 dAmico 2009, 126132.
55 Mojsisch 1991, 675693.
56 Concerning the distinction intellectus-ratio, cf. Flasch 2001, 156164.
57 Beierwaltes 2005, 216222.
58 Trouillard 1959, 309320; cf. also Trouillard 1972, 20: Ainsi chaque point de lunivers intelligible
est dune manire originale le tout, non seulement parce quil est un foyer original de relations, mais
surtout parce quil effectue en lui-mme le processus constituant du tout.
164 | J. de Garay
ing at this point to refer to proposition 103 of the Elements of Theology:

, .
Already in De coniecturis, when referring to De tribus mundis, Cusanus reasserts
Procluss doctrine: centrum primi deus, centrum secundi intelligentia, centrum tertii
ratio. And he goes on to add: Omnia sunt in primo mundo, omnia in secundo,
omnia in tertio, in quolibet modo suo. But now, in a much more accented way than
even Proclus, this thesis is applied to man:
Homo enim deus est, sed non absolute, quoniam homo; humanus est igitur deus. Homo etiam
mundus est, sed non contracte omnia, quoniam homo. Est igitur homo microcosmos aut hu-
manus quidem mundus. Regio igitur ipsa humanitatis deum atque universum mundum hu-
manali sua potentia ambit.
Furthermore, in Cusanus the highlight is displaced from the human being in general
to the concrete individual in particular:
Singularitas igitur omnia singularizat, specialitas specializat, generalitas generalizat, universal-

itas universalizat. Omnia enim universalia, generalia atque specialia in te Iuliano iulianizant,
ut harmonia in luto lutinizat, et ita de reliquis. Neque in alio hoc ut in te possibile est. Hoc
autem, quod in te Iuliano est iulianizare, in hominibus cunctis est humanizare, in animalibus
animalizare, et ita deinceps.
59 In this sense Dodds (1962, 254) points out the following regarding prop. 103: The general principle
of which this is a particular application, viz. that all things, but in each after its own fashion, is
ascribed by Syrianus (in Metaph. 82. I ff.) to the Pythagoreans, and by Iamblichus (ap. Stob. Ecl. I.
xlix. 31 [866H]) to Numenius. Plot. applies it to the relations of intelligibles in general (V. viii. 4; II.
235. 23); it is explicitly laid down by Porphyry (aph. X), and from Iamblichus (cf. Pr., In Tim. I, 426,
20) onwards it is much resorted to. The later school saw in it a convenient means of covering all the
gaps left by Plotinus in his derivation of the world of experience, and thus assuring the unity of the
system: it bridged oppositions without destroying them. Pr. uses it not only to explain the Platonic
(in Prm. 751 ff.) and to solve Parmenidess difficulties about transcendent Forms (in
Prm. 928ff.), but also to link together the four material elements (in Tim. II. 26. 23ff.); he even adduces it
to justify the community of women and children in the Republic (ibid. I. 48. 24ff.); and it enables him to
evade such a question as Where does sphericity begin? by replying that it exists intellectively in the
demiurge, intelligibly in the , and on still higher planes secretly (ibid. II. 77: cf. 83. 161. 26,
III. 285. 30, in Prm. 812. 10). The formula was taken over by Ps.-Dion. (e.g. Div. Nom. 4. 7) to be echoed
in the Renaissance by Bruno, and later given a new meaning by Leibniz (cf. Principles of Nature and
Grace, 3: Chaque monade est un miroir vivant, reprsentatif de lunivers suivant son point de vue).
Similarly, regarding In Prm. 755, 514, J. Dillon comments: It is best, perhaps, to see the Platonic Forms
as distinct points of view within an integrated system, each containing the whole, but from a unique
perspective (Dillon 1987, 97). And also: The extreme realism of Proclus philosophical position leads
to his postulation of distinct entities answering to each aspect of an hypostasis, but things become
clearer if we think of them as just aspects after all (Dillon 1987, xx).
60 Nicholas of Cusa, De coniecturis, I 12, 62, Opera omnia, vol. III, ed. J. Koch, Hamburg 1972.
61 Nicholas of Cusa, De coniecturis, I 12, 63.
62 Nicholas of Cusa, De coniecturis, II 14, 143.
63 Nicholas of Cusa, De coniecturis, II 3, 89.
In a similar vein as Proclus, Cusanus holds that everything is in everything, but each
individual is in the individualized whole. The individual perspective on totality is
unique ( ).
This also applies to the diversity of religions. Already in Cusanus we may readily
find probably without it being related to Proclus an interpretation of the diver-
sity of religions as diverse ways of expressing the unknowable God, according to
their distinct traditions. The Neoplatonic and Proclean topos of the unity of all reli-
gions in a prisca theologia reappears in Cusanus. In a similar fashion, the Proclean
doctrine of the necessity of conjoining the distinct viewpoints corresponding to each
of the monarchs counselors seems to reawaken again, without Proclus his initial
support for Conciliarism.
Negative theology and cognitive partiality go hand in hand: if we can only utter
negative statements about God, our knowledge of any reality is weakened due to the
ultimate lack of grounding. We are only capable of forming conjectures, for the ground
of reality is veiled from us.
The priority of negation is closely linked to the priority of the One. In De principio,
Cusanus, following Proclus, argues in different ways about the necessity of the One
(unum necessarium): all that can be participated is plural and thus exists by means of
another, unlike that which cannot be participated (amethektos), which is One and
is per se subsistens (authupostatos). The One is beyond ens and non ens, beyond affir-
mation and negation, potency and act, and even beyond unity and plurality.
Infinity also reappears in Cusanus as a positive characterization of the One. The
autapeiria as expression of the One in Proclus is reaffirmed here. Infinity is thus one
of the aspects of negative theology: Gods unreachability resides also in His infinity.
Nonetheless, Cusanus deviates from Proclus at several points, especially as he
tries to accommodate him to Christian doctrines. On the one hand, he emphasizes
Christian monotheism, in contrast to Procluss attribution of authupostatos to other
gods besides the One, and even to souls; Cusanus limits the per se subsistere to God
alone. On the other hand, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, and particularly the
characterization of the Son as Logos, compels Cusanus to recover the Intellect as a
divine feature: God is One, but also Being, and Intellect (divina infinita ratio).
Lastly, an important change in perspective in Cusanuss reading of Proclus must
be highlighted. Human subjectivity (angulus oculi) now comes to the fore. While Pro-
64 Saffrey 1992a, 3550.

65 Procl., In Alc., 182, 120; Proclus. Sur le premier Alcibiade de Platon, Paris 2003.
66 Flasch 2001, 502510.
67 dAmico 2009, 116.
68 dAmico 2009, 113114.
69 Flasch 2001, 504: Es gibt nur ein authypostaton. Wir knnten das bersetzen: Es gibt nur
eineinziges Wesen, das alles ist, was sein kann. Es existiert nur eine Substanz.
70 Beierwaltes 1987, 287297.
166 | J. de Garay
clus draws attention to the soul and the One in the soul , Cusanus always centers
his considerations on man. The souls statute as a means is now undeviatingly redi-
rected towards man.
In sum, just as Plethon does, Nicholas of Cusa reads Proclus as engaged in a
polemic against Scholastic Aristotelianism. But unlike Pletho, the Cusanuss reading
is in continuity with St. Augustine and Dionysius. In this sense, he emphasizes the
value of interiority, i.e. the circular regression of thought towards itself, as a search for
the unum in nobis (Proclus) or of the abditum mentis (Augustine); and finally, as a way
for the mind to have access to the knowledge of God. In second place, in contrast to
Pletho and in continuity with Dionysius, Nicholas emphasizes the value of negation
and dialectic as a path to the progress of thought: the doctrine of the coincidentia
oppositorum and the characterization of God as non aliud are proof of it. Finally, his
interpretation of Proclus is inserted into the perspectivist context of the Renaissance,
where human subjectivity acquires force: in this way, the monadology of Proclus (El.
th.103) is interpreted as an essential trait of human knowledge, which is characterized
as angulus oculi and as conjecture.
6 From Pletho to Ficino

Compared to Pletho or Nicholas of Cusa, Ficinos reception of Proclus is a late devel-
opment. Ficino knows Platos writings well, and it seems reasonable to assume that
he was aware of Cusanuss stance. Moreover, he very early on translates Plato and
Plotinus, whom he knows profoundly, unlike Cusanus. In addition, he rates Pseudo-
Dionysius and Iamblichus above Proclus. Consequently, both the Byzantine and the
Latin tradition converge in Ficino. Furthermore, Ficino knows the history and writings
of the Platonist tradition with greater precision than Cusanus. At any rate, there are
some sources in Ficino that have a greater relevance than in Cusanus or Pletho (as is
the case, for example, of the Corpus Hermeticum).
Plethos connection with Ficino is rather indirect, insofar as Cosimo de Medici
seems to have drawn inspiration from Plethos ideas, during his stay in Florence to
promote the Academy that Ficino will run. In any case, he knew and studied his writ-
ings. There is a general notion in Plethos thought that is clearly echoed by Ficino:
the existence of an ancient wisdom that has been written down in the Chaldean Ora-
cles. In Pletho, this wisdom referred to Zoroaster as its eldest form. Ficino also held a
great appreciation for that work, even if he does not concede it the preeminence as a
sacred text bestowed on it by Pletho, which Ficino grants only to the Christian Scrip-
71 Flasch 2001, 153155.

72 Concerning the strong mark left by Iamblichus in Ficino, cf. Celenza 2002.
73 Tambrun 2006a, 241259.
tures. At any rate, Ficino acknowledges the successive commentaries to the Chaldean
Oracles undertaken by Pletho, Psellos, and Proclus himself.
The doctrine of ochema, present in the commentaries of Proclus, Psellos and
Pletho on the Chaldean Oracles, fruit of a long Neoplatonic tradition, is maintained
by Ficino. It is the vehicle of the soul and, at one of its levels, accompanies the soul in
its immortality. It is an ethereal and immortal element that withstands the corruption
of the body after an individuals death. It is the seat of the imaginative faculty and the
irrational soul.
On the other hand, dialectics also plays a central role in Ficino. The human soul,
after coming into the exterior world, reverses upon itself, becomes reflexive, and es-
tablishes an opposition between the outside world and what it is in itself. That is to
say, it has a negative potency that negates all that which it is not. Just as non-being
is infinite, this is an infinite potency. In this way, it is capable of establishing a me-
diation between all things, inasmuch as it relates to all that it itself is not, from God
(starting from the unum in nobis) to the body (and, in a broader sense, the sensible
world).
At any rate, perhaps the issue where Procluss presence in Ficino is more visible
and relevant is in his doctrine about the self-production of the soul. This is a no-
tion that Proclus stressed heavily in the Elements of Theology, and was afterwards
thoroughly developed by Latin writers based on the Liber de causis and Moerbekes
translations. The idea is that if something is capable of reflecting upon itself, then its
essence is capable of self-production.
In Dietrich of Freiberg, for example, this doctrine was interpreted with a special
radicalism. Heymeric van der Valde also alludes on several occasions to this proposi-
tion. Nicholas of Cusa, however, neatly distinguishes between Gods per se subsistere
and human reflexivity. For Pletho also, existing per se is proper only to Zeus.
Ficino gives ample consideration to this Proclean doctrine, though now in an orig-
inal way. On the one hand, Ficino characterizes the human soul as tertia essentia, that
is to say, as an intermediary being between God and the angels on one side, and qual-
74 Garca Bazn 1991, 131135.

75 Allen 1998, 149193.
76 Schefer 2001, 1327.
77 Every soul is self-animated. For if it is capable of reversion upon itself, and all that is capable
of such reversion is self-constituted, then soul is self-constituted and the cause of its own being
(Procl., Elem. Theol., prop. 189; Engl. tr. by E. R. Dodds). Also proposition 83: All that is capable of self-
knowledge is capable of every form of self-reversion. For that it is self-reversive in its activity is evident,
since it knows itself. [] But if in activity, then also in existence, as has been shown: for everything
whose activity reverts upon itself has also an existence which is self-concentrated and self-contained.
78 Proposition XIV (XV) of the Liber de causis held that: omnis sciens qui scit essentiam suam est
rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa: ed. A. Pattin, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 28 (1966), 134
203.
168 | J. de Garay
ity and the body on the other. This medial character makes it possible for the soul
to serve as a link between God and the physical world. The mediation of gods, angels
or demons makes way in Ficino for the exclusive mediation of the human soul. Ficino
has transferred to the human soul the Neoplatonic world of intelligibles. Further-
more, each soul Picoss objection notwithstanding has been individually created
by God. Each human soul is therefore self-productive, that is to say, it constitutes
itself.
Ficinos interpretation aims at a demonstration of the immortality of the soul, the
central purpose of his whole treatise. If the soul, once created, possesses the capacity
to exist by itself, then it must be immortal, for it would depend on nothing but itself
to exist. And this self-sustaining characterization of its essence can be argued to via
the reflexivity of its intellectual and voluntary activity. In all these considerations,
Ficino is following Proclus.
79 Ficino, Theologia Platonica, III, II, 1, ed. J. Hankins and W. Bowen, London 2004 (engl. tr. by M.
J. B. Allen, vol. I, pp. 231233): Ceterum ut ad id quandoque veniamus quod cupimus, in quinque
gradus iterum omnia colligamus, deum et angelum in arce naturae ponentes, corpus et qualitatem
in infimo; animam vero inter illa summa et haec infima mediam, quam merito essentiam tertiam ac
mediam more Platonico nominamus, quoniam et ad omnia media est et undique tertia.
80 Schefer 2001, 20: Ficino opre une vritable inflexion de lordre notique vers lordre psychique
en caractrisant la tierce essence par la triade tre-vie-pense qui dfinissait, chez Plotin, le Nos
mme cest--dire lIntelligence ou ltre.
81 Ficino, Th. Pl., V, XIII, 1, Hankins and Bowen, vol. II, p. 79: esse a deo accipit sine medio;
Quamquam Plotinus et Proclus aliique nonnulli Platonicorum animam fieri arbitrantur ab angelo,
tamen Dionysium Areopagitam, Origenem et Aurelium Augustinum, Platonicos excellentissimos, se-
quor libentius, qui animam putant a deo unico procreari.
82 If, for Pletho, epistrophe and circularity in general occupies only a place secondary importance,
for Ficino, as in Proclus, it becomes essential: Sempiternal circular motion, then, is proper to the third
essence insofar as the essence is brought back in a circle to itself (Ficino, Th. Pl., III, II, 8, Hankins,
vol. I, p. 244, Engl. tr. p. 245). Since it is the first to be moved, this essence necessarily moves through
itself freely and in a circle. If it moves through itself, it acts surely through itself (Ficino, Th. Pl., V, V,
5, Hankins, vol. 2, p. 30; Engl. tr. p. 31).
83 Si per operationem in se reflectitur, reflectitur etiam per essentiam (Ficino, Th. Pl., IX, I, 4, Han-
kins, vol. 3, p. 10). Reflexivity is a given feature of the intellect as much as it is of the will (Ficino,
Th. Pl., IX, I, 3, Hankins, vol. 3, p. 10): animam in se resolvi modis quatuor alias diximus, scilicet
per intellectum in naturam suam, quando quaerit, invenit consideratque seipsam, per voluntatem in
naturam eandem, quando se affectat et amat, per intellectum in actum ipsum intelligendi, quando et
rem intellegit et se intellegit intellegere, per voluntatem in voluntatis actum, quando et vult aliquid,
et vult se velle.
84 Proclus says and I just mention it in passing that soul, since it is the principle of generation,
gives birth to and animates itself such that it possesses essence from itself (Ficino, Th. Pl., VIII, XV, 4,
Hankins, vol. 2, p. 356; engl. tr. p. 357). Here Proclus makes the following distinction: he argues that
unchangeable essences come from God in a way just once, but that they preserve themselves through
their own power. For, since they exist through God simultaneously and without motion as wholes,
they are able in some manner to remain at rest thereafter through themselves, and then to proceed
Nevertheless, these arguments concerning the souls self-production deserve at-

tention not only regarding the souls immortality, but also because this doctrine in-
cludes within itself the affirmation of human freedom. In other words, if man is ca-
pable of existing and acting by himself, that means he is free. And if he can be in
contact with the first and the last essences (with God or matter), then he can shape
himself in the image of God or in the image of matter. His freedom allows him not only
to link all realities, but also allows him to move more freely in every way.
Thus, in Ficino Proclus does not receive the prominence that he had in Cusanus.
Plato himself and other Platonists (Plotinus, Iamblichus, Hermes and Pletho) receive
as much or more attention. In continuity with the reading of Pletho, he interprets the
human soul (tertia essentia) as a link between God and the physical world. Even more,
the Proclean doctrine about the self-constitution of the soul is at the base of Ficinos
doctrine of the essential freedom of the human being. Apart from that, his conception
of Platonic philosophy as the expression of a simple theology in which all the doctrines
are integrated points to the reading of Psellos and Pletho.
7 By way of a conclusion
1. The reception of Proclus in Byzantium and the West differs radically. While in
Byzantium he represents Greek rationalism as opposed to the mystical theology
of Dionysius , in the West Proclus is read through Dionysius, in opposition to
Aristotelian epistemology.
2. The rejection of Proclus in Byzantium is primarily due to religious censure and not
philosophical arguments. In the West, on the other hand, he does not habitually
receive theological criticisms and his writings are read from a fully philosophical
perspective.
3. Psellos and Pletho in Byzantium, and Nicholas of Cusa in the West represent the
most important landmarks for the direct reception of Proclus. Nevertheless, the tra-
dition in which Cusanus reads Proclus does not depend directly either from Psellos
or from Pletho.
by their own power from their own particular potentialities to their own acts. Wherefore he calls such
essences self-subsistent and claims that they are, in a sense, self-producing (Ficino, Th. Pl., XI, VI,
11, Hankins, vol. 3, p. 308; engl. tr. p. 309).
85 Ficino, Th. Pl., IX, IV.
86 Ficino, Th. Pl., IX, IV, 19, Hankins, vol. 3, p 5657: to move on ones own (per se moveri) and to act
freely (libere agere) are the same.
87 Ficino, Th. Pl., III, II, I, Hankins, vol. I, p. 230: Anima est medius rerum gradus, atque omnes
gradus tam superiores quam inferiores connectit in unum, dum ipsa et ad superos ascendit et descen-
dit ad inferos.
170 | J. de Garay
4. In any case, the indirect reception of Procluss doctrines, especially via Dionysius,
Eriugena and the Liber de causis, is of a great relevance for the history of thought.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Nicholas of Cusa, De coniecturis, in Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia jussu et auctoritate Academicae
Litterarum Heidelbergensis (19322007), vol. 3, ed. J. Koch, Hamburg 1972.
Nicholas of Methone, Nicholas of Methone. Refutation of Proclus Elements of Theology, ed. A. D.
Angelou, Leiden 1984.
Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology, 4 vols., ed. J. Hankins and W. Bowen, London 2004 (engl. tr. by M.
J. B. Allen, 6 vols., Harvard (MA), 20012006).
Georgius Gemistus Pletho, Trait des vertus, B. Tambrun-Krasker (ed.), Athens 1987. Corpus
Philosophorum Medii Aevi, Philosophi Byzantini 3, Leiden, 1987.
Georgius Gemistus Pletho, Pletn (Jorge Gemisto). Tratado sobre las leyes. Memorial a Teodoro, eds.
F. L. Lisi and J. Signes, Madrid 1995.
Georgius Gemistus Pletho, Magika logia tn apo Zoroastrou magn, Georgiou Gemistou Plthnos
Exgsis eis ta autalogia. Oracles chaldaques. Recension de Georges Gmiste Plthon. Edition
critique avec introduction, traduction et commentaire par B. Tambrun-Krasker. La recension
arabe des Magika logia par Michel Tardieu, Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi, Philosophi
Byzantini 7, Athens-The Academy of Athens, Paris, Librairie J. Vrin, Bruxelles, ditions Ousia,
1995. Sp. Tr.: Orculos caldeos con una seleccin de testimonios de Proclo, Pselo y M. Itlico,
ed. F. Garca Bazn, Madrid 1991.
Proclus, Sur le premier Alcibiade de Platon, 2 vols., ed. A.-Ph. Segonds, Collection des Universits
de France, Paris 19851986.
Proclus, The Elements of Theology, ed. E. R. Dodds, Oxford 1963.
Proclus, Elementatio theologica, translata a Guillelmo de Morbecca, ed. H. Boese, KUL, Ancient and
medieval philosophy, De Wulf-Mansion Centre, Series, 1, vol. 5, University Press 1987.
Proclus, Thologie platonicienne, 6 vols., eds. H. D. Saffrey and L. G. Westerink, Collection des
Universits de France, Paris 19681997.
Liber de causis, ed. A. Pattin, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 28 (1966), 134203.
Michael Psellos, Imperatori di Bisanzio (cronografia), ed. S. Impellizeri, Milano 1999. Span. Tr.:
Miguel Pselo. Vidas de los emperadores de Bizancio (Cronografa), ed. J. Signes Codoer,
Madrid 2005.
Secondary Sources
Alexidze, L. and L. Bergemann (2009a). Ioane Petritsi. Kommentar zur Elementatio theologica.
bersetzung aus dem Altgeorgischen, Anmerkungen, Indices und Einleitung. Amsterdam.
Allen, M. J. B. (1998). Synoptic Art. Marsilio Ficino: On the History of Platonic Interpretation. Firenze.
Allen, M. J. B., V. Rees, and M. Davies, eds. (2002). Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His Philosophy, His
Legacy. Leiden.
Angelou, A. D. (1984b). Introduction. In: Nicholas of Methone. Refutation of Proclus' Elements of
Theology. Ed. by A. D. Angelou. Leiden, pp. LIIILXIV.
Beierwaltes, W. (1987). Das seiende Eine. Zur neuplatonischen Interpretation der zweiten
Hypothesis des platonischen Parmenides: das Beispiel Cusanus. In: Proclus et son influence.
Ed. by G. Boss and G. Seel. Zrich, pp. 287297.
Beierwaltes, W. (2005). Cusanus. Reflexin metafsica y espiritualidad. Pamplona.
Benakis, L. (1987d). Neues zur Proklos-Tradition in Byzanz. In: Proclus et son influence. Ed. by
Boese, H. (1987). Wilhelm von Moerbeke als bersetzer der Stoicheiosis theologike des Proclus.
Louvain.
Cacouros, M. (2000b). Deux pisodes inconnus dans la rception de Proclus Byzance aux
XIIIeXIVe sicles. In: Proclus et la Thologie Platonicienne. Ed. by A. P. Segonds and C. Steel.
Leuven, pp. 589627.
Cacouros, M. (2006). La philosophie et les sciences du Trivium et du Quadrivium Byzance de 1204
1453 entre tradition et innovation: Les textes et l'enseignement, le cas de l'cole du Prodrome
(Ptra). In: Philosophie et sciences Byzance de 1204 1453. Ed. by M. Cacouros and
M. H. Congourdeau. Leuven, pp. 151.
Cacouros, M. (2007a). Survie culturelle et rmanence textuelle du noplatonisme Byzance. In:
The Libraries of the Neoplatonists. Ed. by C. d'Ancona. Leiden, pp. 177210.
Celenza, C. (2002). Late Antiquity and Florentine Platonism. The Post-Plotinian Ficino. In: Marsilio
Ficino: his Theology, his Philosophy, his Legacy. Ed. by M. J. B. Allen, V. Rees, and M. Davies.
Leiden, pp. 7197.
Clucas, L. (1981c). The Trial of John Italos and the Crisis of Intellectual Values in Byzantium in the
Colomer, E. (1975). De la Edad Media al Renacimiento. Ramn Llull, Nicols de Cusa, Juan Pico della
Mirandola. Barcelona.
Crapulli, G. (1969). Mathesis universalis. Genesi di una idea nel XVI secolo. Roma.
d'Amico, C. (2009). La recepcin del pensamiento de Proclo en la obra de Nicols de Cusa. In:
Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofa 26, pp. 107134.
De Garay, J. (2012). La recepcin de Proclo en Nicols de Cusa. In: Universalit della Ragione.
Pluralit delle Filosofie nel Medioevo. Ed. by A. Musco et al. Vol. II.2. Palermo, pp. 789796.
De Garay, J. (2013). The Reception of Proclus in Pletho and Ficino. In: The Theodosian Age (A.D.
379455). Power, Place, Belief and Learning at the End of the Western Empire. Ed. by
R. Garca-Gasco, S. Gonzlez, and D. H. de la Fuente. Oxford, pp. 175182.
De Garay, J. (2014). The Work of Proclus and its Reception in Byzantium. In: Mapping Knowledge.
Cross-Pollination in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Ed. by C. Burnett and P. Mantas.
London, pp. 2538.
Dillon, J. (1987). Commentary on Plato's Parmenides. New Jersey.
Dillon, J. (2014b). Dionysius the Areopagite. In: Interpreting Proclus: From Antiquity to the
Duffy, J. (2006b). Dealing with the Psellos Corpus: From Allatius to Westerink and the Biblioteca
Teubneriana. In: Reading Michael Psellos. Ed. by C. Barber and D. Jenkins. Boston, pp. 112.
Flasch, K. (2001). Nikolaus von Kues. Geschichte einer Entwicklung: Vorlesungen zur Einfhrung in
seine Philosophie. (Sonderausgabe). Frankfurt am Main.
Garca Bazn, F. (1991). Orculos caldeos con una seleccin de testimonios de Proclo, Pselo y M.
Itlico. Madrid.
Gersh, S. (1978a). From Iamblichos to Eriugena: An investigation of the prehistory and evolution of
the pseudo-Dionysian tradition. Leiden.
Gersh, S., ed. (2014b). Interpreting Proclus: From Antiquity to the Renaissance. Cambridge.
Gouillard, J. (1985d). Le procs officiel de Jean l'Italien. Les actes et leurs sous-entendus. In:
Travaux et mmoires 9, pp. 133174.
172 | J. de Garay
Gounaridis, P. (2006). Le procs de Jean dit Italos rvis. In: Historein 6, pp. 3547.
Hankey, W. J. (2002). Aquinas and the Platonists. In: The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages.
Ed. by S. Gersh and M. J. F. M. Hoenen. Berlin, pp. 279324.
Iremadze, T. (2004c). Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus. Zur Rezeption der Proklischen
Philosophie im deutschen und georgischen Mittelalter: Dietrich von Freiberg Berthold von
Moosburg Joane Petrizi. Amsterdam.
Kaldellis, A. (2008). Hellenism in Byzantium. The Transformations of Greek Identity and the
Acceptance of the Classical Tradition. New York.
Kristeller, P. O. (1987). Proclus as a Reader of Plato and Plotinus, and his Influence in the Middle
Ages and in the Renaissance. In: Proclus, lecteur et interprte des anciens. Ed. by J. Ppin and
H. D. Saffrey. Paris, pp. 191211.
Lemerle, P. (1971). Le premier humanisme byzantin. Notes et remarques sur enseignement et culture
Byzance des origines au Xe sicle. Paris.
Lisi, F. L. and J. Signes (1995). Introduccin. In: Pletn (Jorge Gemisto). Tratado sobre las leyes.
Memorial a Teodoro. Ed. by F. L. Lisi and J. Signes. Madrid, pp. XILXXXV.
Lossky, V. (2009). Teologa mstica de la Iglesia de Oriente. Barcelona.
Mac, C., C. Steel, and P. d'Hoine (2009). Bessarion lecteur du commentaire de Proclus sur le
Parmnide, avec une dition de ses scholies aux livres II et III. In: Byzantion 79, pp. 241279.
Mojsisch, B. (1991). Nichts und Negation. Meister Eckhart und Nikolaus von Kues. In: Historia
philosophiae mediiaevi. Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Festschrift fr
Kurt Flasch zu seinem 60. Geburtstag. Ed. by B. Mojsisch and O. Pluta. Vol. II. Amsterdam,
pp. 675693.
O'Meara, D. J. (2014d). Michael Psellos. In: Interpreting Proclus: From Antiquity to the
Parry, K. (2006d). Reading Proclus Diadochus in Byzantium. In: Reading Plato in Antiquity. Ed. by
Podskalsky, G. (1976d). Nikolaos von Methone und die Proklosrenaissance in Byzanz (11./12. Jh.)
Rabouin, D. (2009). Mathesis universalis: l'ide de mathmatique universelle d'Aristote
Descartes. Paris.
Retucci, F. (2008). Her f sprichet ein heidenischer meister in dem buoche, daz d heizet daz lieht
der liehte: Eckhart, il Liber de causis e Proclo. In: Studi sulle fonti di Meister Eckhart. Ed. by
L. Sturlese. Vol. I. Fribourg, pp. 135165.
Saffrey, H. D. (1992a). Accorder entre elles les traditions thologiques: Une caractristique du
noplatonisme athnien. In: On Proclus and his Influence in Medieval Philosophy. Ed. by
E. P. Bos and P. A. Meijer. Leiden, pp. 3550.
Sasaki, C. (2003). Descartes's Mathematical Thought. Dordrecht.
Schefer, B. (2001). La mdiation de l'me chez Marsile Ficin. In: Marsile Ficin. Les platonismes la
Renaissance. Ed. by P. Magnard. Paris, pp. 1327.
Schmitt, C. B. (1996). Perrenial Philosophy: From Agostino Steuco to Leibniz. In: Journal of the
History of Ideas 27.4, pp. 505532.
Segonds, A. P. (1987). Proclus: Astronomie et Philosophie. In: Proclus, lecteur et interprte des
anciens. Ed. by J. Ppin and H. D. Saffrey. Paris, pp. 319334.
Steel, C. (2002c). Neoplatonic Sources in the Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics by
Eustratius and Michael of Ephesus. In: Bulletin de Philosophie Mdivale 44, pp. 5157.
Steel, C. (2014). William of Moerbeke, translator of Proclus. In: Interpreting Proclus: From Antiquity

Tambrun-Krasker, B., ed. (1987). Plthon: Trait des vertus, dition critique avec introduction,
traduction et commentaire. Leiden.
Trouillard, J. (1959). La Monadologie de Proclus. In: Revue Philosophique de Louvain 57,
pp. 309320.
Trouillard, J. (1972). L'Un et l'me selon Proclos. Paris.
Woodhouse, C. M. (1986a). Gemistos Plethon. The Last of the Hellenes. Oxford.
Flavia Buzzetta, Valerio Napoli
Elementi di demonologia neoplatonica
nellopuscolo bizantino

Alcune considerazioni
In memoria del Prof. Alessandro Musco

(19502014), nostro carissimo maestro e
amico, con grande affetto e profonda
gratitudine
1 Un dossier bizantino sullantica religione greca

Nellambito degli scritti di demonologia della tarda cultura bizantina, si anno-
vera un breve testo intitolato , noto anche con
il titolo latino di Quaenam sunt Graecorum opiniones de daemonibus o, pi semplice-
mente, di Graecorum opiniones de daemonibus. Sulla scia della tradizione manoscrit-
ta, gli studiosi, fin quasi alla fine del secolo scorso, ne hanno attribuito in modo pa-
cifico la paternit a Michele Psello (10181078 circa). Gautier, curatore di una nuova
edizione del testo pubblicata postuma nel 1988, ha per negato la paternit pselliana
Questo saggio nasce da una convergenza dinteressi dei due autori, i quali hanno collaborato a uguale
titolo nellelaborazione e nella stesura di tutte parti del testo e si assumono una responsabilit unica
e indivisa per lintero lavoro e per i suoi limiti.
1 Per una trattazione generale del tema, rinviamo a Greenfield 1988, con ampi riferimenti alle fonti e
agli studi critici. Cf. anche Mango 1992; Guillou 2000. Per un quadro generale dello stato degli studi,
cf. Bravo Garca 2000, con i relativi riferimenti bibliografici.
2 Per una ricostruzione della tradizione manoscritta dellopuscolo, trasmesso in vari casi insieme a
opere pselliane o, comunque, attribuite a Psello, cf. Gautier 1988, 8692. Va ricordato che in vari ma-
noscritti il accostato al pi noto scritto
, o (De operatione daemonum o Timotheus sive de dae-
monibus Dialogus), correntemente attribuito a Psello, ma che Gautier, con una lettura critica non ac-
colta da vari studiosi, considera anchesso come inautentico (cf. Gautier 1980 e Gautier 1988, 8586).
Sullopuscolo cf. Moore 2005b, 220222.
3 Oltre alla presentazione del testo come opera di Michele Psello da parte di Boissonade (1838, 36)
e di Migne (1889, 875876), cf. Covotti 1898, 414, n. 1; Zervos 1919b, 126; Svoboda 1927, 3; Bidez 1928,
111112; Lewy 1956/2011, 478; Kriaras 1968, 1138; Grosdidier de Matons 1976, 349.
4 Cf. la nota editoriale in Gautier 1988, 85, in cui si precisa che lo studio risale al 1980.
DOI 10.1515/9781501503597-009
176 | F. Buzzetta, V. Napoli
dello scritto e ha rinunciato ad avanzare una sia pur congetturale proposta didenti-
ficazione del suo autore. La tesi della natura pseudepigrafica dellopuscolo ne rende
incerta la datazione, la quale, rispetto al sec. XI, potrebbe essere pi tarda, forse non
molto anteriore al pi antico manoscritto che la trasmette, il Vaticanus graecus 1411,
risalente, secondo una stima affidabile, alla fine del sec. XIV, intorno al 13801400.
Lopuscolo, che si rivela in larga parte dipendente da fonti bizantine, potrebbe dunque
risalire allepoca paleologa.
Loperetta si presenta come una sintetica e disorganica raccolta di dati relativi alle
credenze e alle pratiche religiose e magico-teurgiche del paganesimo greco nella sua
configurazione tardoantica, cos come era stato recepito nella civilt bizantina. Le-
sposizione del materiale documentario manifesta unimpostazione descrittiva e priva
di dichiarati intenti polemici di confutazione. La concisione dello scritto sembra an-
che trovare una sorta di giustificazione ideologica, da parte dellautore, nella battuta
di chiusura (138, p. 107), forse non semplicemente circostanziale,
(Questi [ragguagli] bastino sia a una lingua
purificata che a un orecchio assennato), da cui emerge il rilievo dellinopportuni-
5 Cf. Gautier 1988, in part. 91 ss. Lo studioso aveva gi anticipato en passant la tesi della non au-
tenticit pselliana del Quaenam sunt Graecorum opiniones de daemonibus in Gautier 1980, 105, n. 1
(studio in cui, come abbiamo gi ricordato, egli nega anche la paternit pselliana del De operatione
daemonum). Questa posizione di Gautier stata accolta da vari studiosi; cf. per es. Greenfield 1995,
127; Maltese 1990, 332, n. 35 (in cui ci sembra di ravvisare una posizione di cautela sulla questione);
va anche notato che OMeara non inserisce questo testo nella raccolta da lui curata degli opuscula di
materia teologica e demonologica attribuiti a Psello (vedi infra, Bibliografia). Di contro, altri studiosi
continuano a presentare lopuscolo come uno scritto di Psello; cf. per es. Lanzi 2001, 54, n. 132; Ed-
monds III 2004, 293, n. 83; Herrero de Juregui 2007, 138 e n. 49. Pi in generale, sullattribuzione a
Psello di opere bizantine redatte da altri autori, cf. Cacouros 2007c, 205206.
6 Cf. Gautier 1988, 89, in cui lo studioso afferma che tale datazione gli stata indicata da P. Canart.
7 Gli menzionati nel titolo dellopuscolo vanno intesi secondo il significato con cui nel mon-
do cristiano greco-bizantino ma anche nellambito della cultura greca pagana e cristiana tardoantica
usato il termine , il quale non si limita a manifestare una generica valenza etnica e culturale,
bens presenta una specifica connotazione religiosa e indica luomo che legato alla tradizionale reli-
giosit ellenica pagana; il termine, che nella tarda antichit era usato anche dai pagani per designare
se stessi, negli autori cristiani si colora, in genere, di una valenza negativa; cf. Chuvin 1991, 15. Sul
valore semantico del termine in questione nella tarda antichit, con riferimento al paganesimo e alla
cultura greca, cf. anche Bowersock 1990, in part. 713.
8 La distanza del compilatore cristiano dalle opinioni greche appare comunque chiara in alcuni
passi in cui possibile rilevare la sprezzante riprovazione di pratiche rituali pagane censurate come
turpi e folli, secondo i tradizionali parametri di polemica antipagana riscontrabili in scrittori cristia-
ni; cf. Ps.-Psell., Graec. opin., 3, 6568, p. 101 Gautier, in cui lautore sottolinea laischrotes dei riti
misterici, e 6, 101102, p. 105, in cui lantica cerimonia orgiastica bacchica presentata come mania.
9 Per i riferimenti al testo, qui come anche altrove, utilizziamo ledizione critica a cura di P. Gautier
(1988).
10 Riteniamo che tale rilievo finale sia riferito allintero scritto come una conclusione generale (cos
crediamo che intendano anche Boissonade, Migne e Gautier, i quali separano il rilievo in questione dal
Elementi di demonologia neoplatonica | 177
t, per i pii cristiani, di dilungarsi nella scrittura e di attardarsi nellascolto (o nella

lettura) di una materia considerata come scabrosa e potenzialmente pericolosa, qua-
le quella su cui verte lopuscolo, e rispetto alla quale il compilatore, qua e l, non
manca di palesare opportunamente la sua distanza ideologica. Sul piano contenutisti-
co, lopuscolo pu essere suddiviso in otto sezioni, consistenti in brevi unit testuali
autonome, incentrate ciascuna su uno specifico tema. La prima sezione (1, 125, pp.
9599) riguarda gli ordini e i caratteri specifici dei demoni (); la seconda (2,
2650, pp. 99101) verte sulle pratiche cultuali relative ai sacrifici cruenti (); la
terza (3, 5168, p. 101) offre dei ragguagli sui vari culti misterici ( ); la quar-
ta (4, 6975, pp. 101103) delinea una presentazione della stregoneria (); la
quinta (5, 7689, p. 103) traccia un profilo della magia (); la sesta (6, 90111, pp.
103105) prende in esame levocazione dei demoni (); la settima (7, 112125, p.
105) dedicata alla lecanomanzia (); lottava (8, 126137, pp. 105107),
infine, illustra le modalit del cosiddetto patto segreto caldaico (
).
Lopuscolo, nella variet dei suoi contenuti, non consiste in un trattato dedicato
in modo tematico alle dottrine demonologiche del paganesimo greco. Sulle orme del
giudizio di Gautier, va tuttavia rilevato che i rilievi relativi alle opinioni degli -
sui demoni, ricorrenti nelle varie parti dello scritto, assicurano a questo una certa
unit e ne giustificano in qualche misura il titolo. Sulla scia di questa linea di lettu-
ra, si potrebbe rilevare che il tema dei demoni costituisce, a suo modo, lunit focale
dello scritto o, magari, una sorta di fil rouge sotteso, se non proprio alla totalit, quan-
to meno a gran parte dei temi esposti nellopuscolo. Si potrebbe cos ipotizzare che il
titolo delloperetta, formulato con ogni verosimiglianza dallautore stesso e ritenuto
segmento testuale dellottava sezione con un capoverso) e non sia relativo soltanto allottava sezione,
in cui lautore dichiara di presentare il patto caldaico in modo conciso ( ); cf. Ps.-Psell.,
Graec. opin., 8, 127, p. 105 Gautier.
11 Si tratta di un tema diffuso nel mondo bizantino. Questa sezione, per es., presenta analogie te-
matiche con lopuscolo pselliano (cf. Psell., Op., ed. D. J. OMeara,
Leipzig 1989, 37, pp. 123, 15126, 13).
12 In questo contesto traduciamo il termine che indica un insieme di pratiche magico-
cerimoniali incentrate sullevocazione dei demoni malvagi con stregoneria, nella consapevolezza
dellinadeguatezza di questa opzione lessicale. Per altro verso, anche la traduzione del termine
con magia va presa con la debita cautela.
13 In questa divisione in otto paragrafi seguiamo Gautier (1988, 95107). Boissonade e Migne, invece,
dividono il testo in sette sezioni, accorpando in ununica sezione (la sesta), la parte sullevocazione
dei demoni e quella sulla lecanomanzia. Migne divide il testo introducendo una numerazione delle
parti, mentre Boissonade si serve dei capoversi. Sui contenuti dellopuscolo, cf. Svoboda 1927.
14 Cf. Gautier 1988, 85: il [scil. lopuscolo in questione] ne sagit pas dun trait o seraient exposes
et critiques les opinions des Grecs, comprenons des philosophes de la Grce antique, concernant
les dmons, mais dun assemblage htroclite de huit courtes sections dveloppant chacune un sujet
distinct, le seul lment qui assure lensemble une certaine unit et en justifie un peu le titre tant
le rle prt aux dmons dans chacun des chapitres.
da questi pienamente congruo alla materia trattata, tradisca una visione secondo la
quale lintera religiosit greco-pagana, nelle sue diverse manifestazioni, sia ricondu-
cibile alle figure dei demoni. Visione, questa, che appare segnata da filtri ermeneutici
e ideologici di matrice cristiana, radicati nella cultura bizantina.
Nellambito degli studi critico-storiografici stato rilevato che lopuscolo, nei suoi
vari contenuti, restituisce un complesso di prospettive teoriche elaborate o, comun-
que, sedimentate nellambito della frastagliata tradizione della filosofia neoplatonica,
conservatasi in vari modi nel mondo bizantino.
2 Lincidenza del tema dei daimones nellopuscolo

Nellopuscolo si riscontrano vari riferimenti ai demoni in sei delle otto sezioni.
La prima sezione, particolarmente rilevante per la sua posizione iniziale, inte-
ramente dedicata ai demoni, di cui presenta, come in un ampio giro di orizzonte, vari
aspetti e caratteri salienti.
La terza sezione, dedicata ai misteri, contiene un rimando ai demoni con riferi-
mento a varie figure, quali gli iniziati a Sabazio, i servitori della dea Madre, le Clodone
e le Mimallone, i Coribanti e i Cureti, presentate come immagini di demoni (
, 3. 65, p. 101). Questultimo rilievo, a nostro avviso, si estende verosimil-
mente a tutte le figure sopra indicate (e non soltanto ai Coribanti e ai Cureti) e coinvol-
ge anche Zeus, De-Demetra e Persefatta-Core, Afrodite e Dioniso, precedentemente
chiamati in causa (3, 5162, p. 101), come anche Baubo, ricordata subito dopo (3, 65
67, p. 101). Sembra che in questa parte il compilatore utilizzi come fonte saliente il
Protrettico ai Greci di Clemente Alessandrino e, sulla scia di questopera dalle tinte
polemico-apologetiche, sia portato a considerare lintero complesso rituale dei miste-
ri greci biasimati come turpi come presieduto dai demoni, di cui gli iniziati, nelle
15 Secondo questo possibile modello esplicativo, dunque, potremmo essere in presenza, dal punto
di vista emico dellautore, della percezione di unintrinseca coerenza tematica forte dellopuscolo,
determinata entro un orizzonte concettuale che presenta elementi dinterferenza tra la cultura religio-
sa greco-pagana, su cui verte lopuscolo, e la cultura religiosa cristiana, propria del compilatore. Sulla
nozione etnoantropologica della prospettiva emica, cf. Fabietti 1991/1994, 286 ss.
16 Per alcuni aspetti della sopravvivenza e della diffusione del neoplatonismo nella cultura bizantina,
cf. per es. Cacouros 2007c; Cavallo 2007b.
17 In questo contesto, potrebbe indicare le personificazioni mimetiche rituali, da parte de-
gli iniziati, delle figure sopra indicate, nellambito delle cerimonie misteriche, in una dinamica di
manifestazione di tali figure e didentificazione degli iniziati con esse.
18 Cf. Gautier 1988, 93; lo studioso, nel testo greco del 3 (cf. 101), riporta in corsivo le parole e le
espressioni che egli ritiene che il compilatore abbia tratto da Clemente Alessandrino. Per la critica dei
misteri greci in Clemente, cf. Protr., II 12, 1 ss., p. 11, 10 ss.
19 Cf. Ps.-Psell., Graec. opin. 3, 6768, p. 101 Gautier:
(E in tal modo nella turpitudine che essi compiono il [loro] rito iniziatico).
loro cerimonie, sarebbero seguaci. In tale lettura demonologica dei misteri, il com-
pilatore mostra di ricollegarsi a un assunto risalente alla polemica antipagana della
letteratura cristiana antica.
La quarta sezione, dedicata alla , offre spunti sui demoni e sulla loro evo-
cazione. La , infatti, presentata come unarte concernente i demoni materiali
e terrestri ( , 4,
69, p. 101), capace di fare apparire le loro immagini e di attirarli con varie operazioni
rituali al fine di provocare danni e sciagure o di conseguire benefici.
Il richiamo ai demoni poi centrale nella sesta, nella settima e nellottava sezione,
nelle quali sono descritte alcune pratiche evocative e divinatorie di tipo cerimoniale,
le quali, a nostro avviso, possono essere tutte ricondotte allambito della .
La sesta sezione verte infatti sul , consistente in unevocazione di demo-
ni malvagi ( [...], 6, 9091, p. 103) con
una pratica rituale volta a ottenere la loro obbedienza. Il compilatore descrive una ce-
rimonia notturna o comunque crepuscolare, in cui levocatore attira e sottomette al
suo controllo dei demoni di basso rango, con lausilio di vari fuochi circoscritti en-
tro un cerchio dal potere detentivo e con il ricorso a unignota formula incantatoria
(). In una prospettiva analoga, nella settima sezione, la lecanomanzia pre-
sentata come una tecnica mantica consistente nellevocazione dei demoni terrestri e
acquatici tramite luso cerimoniale di un bacino () riempito dacqua, apposi-
tamente preparato con atti rituali e formule dinvocazione. Questa pratica divinatoria
ritenuta inefficace, perch i demoni che vi sono coinvolti sono ritenuti fraudolenti.
Lottava sezione, relativa al patto caldaico, descrive un sinistro rito di natura goetica,
volto a evocare talune potenze () demoniche.
La seconda e la quinta sezione, invece, non presentano riferimenti ai demoni. Si
pu comunque affermare che, nellopuscolo, il tema dei demoni, pur non essendo
esclusivo, comunque ricorrente e predominante, tale da giustificarne in larga misura
il titolo e da rispecchiare una certa unit tematica della compilazione.
20 Si pu ricordare che Clemente Alessandrino, nel Protrettico ai Greci, presenta come i grandi de-
moni ( ), tra gli altri, Apollo, Demetra, Core, Plutone e lo stesso Zeus (cf. Clem. Al.,
Protr., II 41, 2, ed. O. Sthlin, Leipzig 1905, pp. 30, 2731, 1), divinit tradizionalmente implicate nei
culti misterici.
21 La qui presentata come unarte che noi, con riferimento a talune attuali categorie erme-
neutiche, classificheremmo nei termini di una magia cerimoniale destinativa, in quanto incentrata
sullo sfruttamento, da parte di un operatore-mittente, dei poteri di entit destinatarie superiori (in
questo caso i demoni malvagi) capaci di recepire il messaggio e di soddisfarne le richieste; cf. al ri-
guardo Weill-Parot 2002, 905: Nous disons que la magie est destinative quand elle fait appel un
destinataire, une intelligence extrieur (et suprieure): ses procd set ses rituels sadressent, sont
destins cette entit.
22 Riteniamo che non sia il caso dinsistere in una lettura tematica rigorosamente unitaria dei con-
tenuti dellopuscolo in chiave demonologica; tuttavia riteniamo che non si possa escludere del tutto
lipotesi che anche queste due sezioni siano state percepite dal compilatore come anchesse in qualche
Nelle pagine seguenti prenderemo in esame le varie opinioni sui demoni (-

) esposte nellopuscolo e cercheremo dindividuare i rilievi dottrinali demo-
nologici neoplatonici ai quali esse rimandano, prospettando talune corrispondenze
salienti.
3 Il sostrato neoplatonico delle dottrine

demonologiche riportate nellopuscolo
Come abbiamo gi accennato, le dottrine sui demoni esposte nellopuscolo restituisco-
no una pluralit di assunti dottrinali riconducibili al tardo platonismo, in particolar
modo al neoplatonismo (quale contesto in cui sono recuperate e rielaborate anche va-
rie prospettive teoriche di matrice medioplatonica), risalenti originariamente a varie
fonti e assemblati dal compilatore in un quadro panoramico dal carattere omogeneo.
Nella frastagliata tradizione del neoplatonismo e, pi in generale, nel platonismo
tardoantico, sulla scorta di precedenti e coeve tradizioni filosofiche e religiose, si
riscontra una notevole attenzione per il tema dei demoni. Le opere superstiti di nu-
merosi autori medio- e neoplatonici offrono un ricco e variegato panorama dottrinale
demonologico, il quale, in considerazione di quanto andato perduto o ci pervenu-
to soltanto in parte, doveva essere ancora pi ampio e articolato. Numerosi rilievi sui
demoni, per esempio, dovevano essere contenuti nelle opere consacrate agli Oracoli
caldaici e alla teurgia, redatte da Porfirio, da Giamblico, da Siriano, da Proclo e, sem-
bra, da Damascio. molto probabile, inoltre, che Proclo si sia soffermato sul tema
modo collegate al tema demonologico: la seconda, come vedremo in seguito, per via di una possibile
sovrapposizione di di e demoni; la quinta, come per esclusione, nella prospettiva di una distinzione
tra la e la .
23 Concentreremo la nostra attenzione fondamentalmente sulle dottrine relative ai demoni esposte
nella prima sezione dellopuscolo, ma senza trascurare quelle contenute nelle altre sezioni.
24 Riguardo alla presenza di tematiche demonologiche (e affini) in vari autori, contesti e correnti
dellantica filosofia greca, al di l di Platone e del platonismo, cf. per es. Rodrguez Moreno 1993 e
Rodrguez Moreno 1995 (sui filosofi presocratici), Rodrguez Moreno 1999 (sugli stoici); Dtienne 1963
(sul pitagorismo).
25 Sui vari sviluppi delle dottrine dei nel medio- e nel neoplatonismo, cf. Andres 1918, 311
322; Hopfer 1921, in part. 926 ( 27116) e 2830 ( 125134); Svoboda 1927, passim; E. R. Dodds
1963e, 294296; Beaujeu 1973/2002, 195201 (sul medioplatonismo); Ramos Jurado 1981, in part. 49
85; Bianchi 1990, in part. 5761; Donini 1990; Moreschini 1995; Rodrguez Moreno 1998; Dillon 2000,
98117 (sul medioplatonismo); Turcan 2003; Sorabji 2005, 403408; De Vita 2011; Innocenzi 2011 (con
particolare riferimento a Giamblico); Muscolino 2010 e Muscolino 2011 (con riferimento a Porfirio);
Timotin 2012, 85322; Margagliotta 2012 (su autori medioplatonici). Cf. anche Lewy 1956/2011, 259279
e 304309 (sulla demonologia caldaica, ripresa nel neoplatonismo).
26 Sulla ricezione e fruizione esegetico-speculativa degli Oracoli caldaici nellambito del neoplato-
dei demoni anche in altre opere o in parti di opere oggi perdute, e lo stesso possia-
mo pensare di altri filosofi, come Porfirio e Giamblico. Sappiamo inoltre da Porfirio
che Origene, sodale di Plotino, scrisse unopera oggi perduta Sui demoni, e da Fo-
zio sappiamo che il secondo dei quattro libri dei Paradoxa di Damascio consisteva in
una raccolta di brevi narrazioni straordinarie su entit demoniche. Varie dottrine
neoplatoniche sui demoni sono anche riportate da vari scrittori cristiani tardoantichi,
in contesti apologetici e polemici, nellambito del loro confronto con il tradizionale
paganesimo.
Nel platonismo tardoantico, i , quali figure dalla complessa storia religio-
sa nellambito della cultura greca, vengono distinti dagli di () e, sulla scia di
Platone, sono concepiti come specifiche entit intermediarie e mediatrici tra gli di e
nismo, cf. Saffrey 1981 e Saffrey 1984. Sul tema, rinviamo ai riferimenti bibliografici in Tardieu 2011
(che offre un ricchissimo repertorio bibliografico sugli studi relativi agli Oracoli caldaici a partire dalla
fine dellOttocento), in part. 743745, nonch alle recenti prospettive di Tanaseanu-Dbler 2013. Sul-
la questione di eventuali scritti di Damascio sugli Oracoli caldaici, cf. Hoffmann 1994, 589590. Per
un ampio quadro generale dei problemi storico-religiosi e dello status quaestionis sulla composizione
degli Oracoli caldaici, cf. Lanzi 20042005. Sulla cosmologia caldaica, cf. Seng 2009. Tra gli studi pi
recenti su aspetti e temi degli Oracoli caldaici si vedano anche i vari contributi raccolti in Seng and
Tardieu 2010.
27 Si pu ricordare lipotesi, avanzata da alcuni studiosi, che la Teologia Platonica di Proclo conte-
nesse anche una parte, perduta, dedicata agli di encosmici, alle anime universali e agli angeli, ai
demoni e agli eroi; cf. Saffrey and Westerink 1968/2003, lxlxiv. Lo stesso Proclo, inoltre, potrebbe
essersi soffermato sui demoni anche nella parte del suo commentario sul Parmenide, anchessa non
pervenutaci, nella sezione sul lemma 153b8155d1 della 2a ipotesi, relativamente alle parti del tem-
po, in cui il Licio ravvisava un riferimento alle classi degli angeli, dei demoni e degli eroi (cf. Saffrey
and Westerink 1968/2003, lxix, ultima sezione della tabella e nota 1). Altri rilievi sui demoni potevano
figurare in altre opere o parti di opere procliane oggi perdute.
28 Cf. Porph., Plot., 3, ed. L. Brisson et alii, Paris 1992, 2931, p. 136. Su ci cf. Lewy 1956/2011, 497508.
29 Cf. Phot., Bibl., cod. 130, ed. R. Henry, Paris 2003, t. II, 96 b 3940, p. 104: -
. Su ci cf. Ibez Chacn 2008, 325326; sui Paradoxa,
in generale, cf. Hoffmann 1994, 565566). In Damascio, altri rilievi sui demoni potevano figurare nel-
le parti perdute della Vita del filosofo Isidoro o Storia filosofica (nei cui frammenti superstiti il tema
presente) e in altre sue opere.
30 Sulla figura del nella religione greca antica, con particolare riferimento allepoca arcaica
e classica, cf. Hild 1881; Andres 1918; Owen 1931; Bianchi 1990; Riley 1999 (con ampi riferimenti alla
cultura biblica dellAntico e del Nuovo Testamento); Luck 1985/2006, 205281; Timotin 2012, 1336.
31 Come noto, nella cultura religiosa arcaica e classica la nozione di presenta una notevole
complessit e uno stretto legame con la nozione di . In vari contesti, la nozione di , priva
di predeterminate valenze positive o negative, pu indicare un qualche dio o una qualche dea (an-
che con riferimento a divinit olimpiche); pu alludere a unindistinta forza divina legata alla sorte
degli uomini, a un superiore potere numinoso che determina il loro destino; pu essere riferita a un
essere semidivino, inferiore agli di, come per es. le anime dei morti. Cf. al riguardo la voce e
linterconnessa voce in Liddell et al. 1940, 365366, con i riferimenti alle fonti, e il quadro
generale relativo alla nozione di nella letteratura greca fino a Platone in Timotin 2012, 1336.
32 Sul tema del in Platone, quale base teorica di ogni speculazione sui demoni nella tradizione
gli uomini, gerarchicamente subordinate ai primi e legate ai secondi in una comples-

sa dinamica relazionale. Come tali, i sono oggetto di varie speculazioni che
mirano a determinarne la natura, gli ordini, le prerogative, le funzioni e le attivit. Le
diverse prospettive teoriche dei filosofi medio- e neoplatonici in materia demonologi-
ca sembrano connesse, in vari modi, a plessi dottrinali di varie tradizioni filosofiche e
religiose diffuse nel mondo greco-romano tardoantico e legate tra loro in una comples-
sa rete dinterazioni. Particolarmente rilevante per le speculazioni neoplatoniche sui
demoni sembra lapporto degli Oracoli caldaici, in cui il tema demonologico ricopre
un ruolo significativo.
Nel neoplatonismo la demonologia non si sviluppa come un sistema dottrinale or-
ganico e unitario, bens, sulla base di alcuni assunti di matrice platonica ampiamente
condivisi, secondo una pluralit di linee di sviluppo ed elaborazioni teoriche talo-
ra alternative tra loro e contrastanti. Il , nella
raccolta del materiale proposto, lascia intravedere la complessit delle riflessioni neo-
platoniche sui demoni, con riferimento a una variet di rilievi dottrinali riconducibili,
direttamente o indirettamente, a una pluralit di posizioni, talora divergenti. Lautore
dellopuscolo, che attinge in buona parte le informazioni neoplatoniche da opere bi-
zantine, si limita a dichiarare le sue fonti nella sola prima sezione, in cui attribuisce le
opinioni greche sui demoni che vi sono esposte a i Porfirio e i Giamblico (
, 1, 2425, p. 99). Con tale espressione, di fatto, egli non
si riferisce in modo diretto o indiretto che sia esclusivamente a Porfirio e a Giam-
blico, ma anche, in una prospettiva pi generale, ad altri antichi accostabili
a Porfirio e a Giamblico per orientamento filosofico-religioso, cio ad altri filosofi pa-
gani neoplatonici anchessi noti in epoca bizantina. A questo riguardo, va notato che
platonica, ci limitiamo a rinviare a Timotin 2012, 3784 e a Rodrguez Moreno 1994, 186193.
33 Nella tarda antichit le speculazioni neoplatoniche in materia demonologica si evolvono in un pa-
norama culturale di straordinaria ricchezza e complessit, in cui i o una molteplicit di
figure analoghe ricoprono una posizione significativa in una variet di tradizioni: le correnti filoso-
fiche del medioplatonismo, del neopitagorismo e dello stoicismo, le varie sette gnostiche, le religioni
iraniche e orientali, la tradizione caldaica, lermetismo, le tradizioni magiche, astrologiche e al-
chemiche, lebraismo nei suoi sviluppi talmudici, apocalittici, precabbalistici, il cristianesimo nelle
sue varie proiezioni. Tali correnti manifestano una fitta rete di contatti e interazioni, scambi e ibrida-
zioni, fusioni e opposizioni, tra convergenze e divergenze, differenze e sovrapposizioni, continuit e
rotture, punti di accordo e motivi di polemica. Ci in un complesso di dinamiche in cui lalta cultu-
ra della riflessione filosofica doveva anche raccogliere e rielaborare vario materiale proveniente dalle
pi diffuse idee e credenze religiose popolari dellepoca. Il neoplatonismo, specialmente in alcuni suoi
autori e sviluppi, manifesta la sua apertura alle pratiche cultuali e alle basi dottrinali delle varie tra-
dizioni pagane diffuse nel mondo greco-romano. Significativa la tendenza, riscontrabile soprattutto
nel neoplatonismo ateniese, a sostenere con strategie ermeneutiche e speculative la concordia (-
) tra le varie teologie greche e barbare (mitologia omerica ed esiodea, orfismo, pitagorismo,
filosofia platonica, Oracoli caldaici), considerate come diverse esposizioni di una medesima sapienza
sacrale teologica secondo modi didascalico-espressivi differenti, ma convergenti nella manifestazione
di ununica verit (cf. Saffrey 1992b).
gli studiosi che si sono occupati dellopuscolo hanno individuato una variet di fonti
a esso sottese e ne hanno indicato una saliente negli scritti di Proclo. Zervos ricon-
duce le classi di demoni enumerate nellopuscolo alle concezioni di Giamblico e di
Proclo. Svoboda sostiene che queste classificazioni mostrano delle strette analogie
con quelle formulate nei commentari di Olimpiodoro allAlcibiade Primo e al Fedone,
ma anche, almeno in parte, con dei rilievi attestati in Proclo (con riferimenti ai com-
mentari sullAlcibiade Primo, sulla Repubblica e sul Timeo), come anche in Giamblico
(De mysteriis) e in Porfirio (La filosofia desunta dagli oracoli), e in ultima istanza, in
una prospettiva pi ampia, sostiene che la dottrina demonologica di Psello prende le
mosse dalla demonologia di Porfirio, come anche dalle dottrine di Proclo e di Giam-
blico. Bidez, dal canto suo, individua nei contenuti della parte iniziale dello scritto
alcune somiglianze con la demonologia esposta nei commentari di Proclo e di Olim-
piodoro allAlcibiade Primo, e ritiene che su tale parte vi sia anche una certa incidenza
se intendiamo bene del diverso quadro demonologico dellesegesi procliana degli
Oracoli caldaici. Gautier, nella sua ricostruzione delle fonti dellopuscolo, riguardo
ai contenuti della prima sezione, individua vari passi corrispondenti in Porfirio e an-
cor pi in Giamblico, ma ritiene che lanonimo autore dellopuscolo abbia fondamen-
talmente attinto a due opere di Proclo, il commentario sul Timeo e il commentario,
oggi perduto, sugli Oracoli caldaici. Come fonti delle altre sezioni, Gautier indica,
per la seconda, una lettera di Psello, i cui contenuti rimandano alla teologia caldaica;
per la terza, Clemente Alessandrino; per la quarta, la quinta e la settima, la versio-
ne rimaneggiata del De operatione daemonum, i cui contenuti, secondo lo studioso,
dipendono dal commentario procliano sugli Oracoli caldaici; per la sesta e lottava,
Giamblico e soprattutto Proclo. Limpossibilit della lettura delle opere neoplatoni-
che oggi perdute non consente raffronti e controlli incrociati con il nostro opuscolo e
34 Cf. Zervos 1919b, 126.

35 Cf. Svoboda 1927, 1017, 5556.
36 Cf. Bidez 1928, 111112. Cf. anche 156, in cui lo studioso presenta il 1 dellopuscolo come una in-
troduction, tire de Proclus probablement. Bidez, in una prospettiva pi vasta, sottolinea le analogie
tra il Quaenam sunt Graecorum opiniones de daemonibus e il De operatione daemonum, considerati
come scritti pselliani, e ritiene che questi attingano in parte alle stesse fonti e, in un certo modo, si
completino a vicenda.
37 Cf. Gautier 1988, 9295.
38 Cf. Gautier 1988, 92.
39 Per questa versione del De operatione daemonum, cf. Bidez 1928, 119131 e, sulla questione delle
due redazioni, 113118. Va notato che Gautier 1980, 125126, considera anche questa versione, al pari
di quella in forma di dialogo, come uno scritto pseudo-pselliano. I paragrafi 4, 5 e 7 dellopuscolo
, pi precisamente, sono riproduzioni pi o meno rimaneggiate e
abbreviate di parti di questa edizione del De operatione daemonum (cf. Gautier 1988, 9395).
40 Cf. Gautier 1988, 9295. Lo studioso, nelle note che corredano la sua traduzione del testo (cf.
94106), indica varie corrispondenze dei contenuti dellopuscolo con rilievi di opere di Giamblico,
Proclo, Porfirio, Olimpiodoro, di Plutarco di Cheronea. Vi sono anche rimandi agli Oracoli caldaici
(che lo studioso ritiene mediati dal relativo commentario procliano perduto) e agli scritti del Corpus
con le sue fonti bizantine, per cui, in vari casi, non si pu andare al di l di ragionevoli
congetture.
4 Elementi di demonologia neoplatonica

Riportiamo di seguito il testo greco della prima sezione dellopuscolo (1, 125, pp. 95
99), con una nostra traduzione italiana:
,
, ,
[5]
. ,
, ,
, , ,
, [10] -
, ,
, , , ,
,
. [15]
, , ,
, .
[20] ,
, ,
, , . -
,
. [25] .
La nostra dottrina, che attribuisce anche agli angeli atti di libero arbitrio e uninclinazione che
li fa tendere verso il divino, ma che ritiene anche che essi non siano non suscettibili di tendere
verso ci che peggiore, mostra, muovendo da ci, che i demoni sono decaduti dal loro ordine
angelico e hanno subito la caduta in una misura proporzionale alla dignit o allordine di cia-
scuno. La dottrina greca, invece, rigettando una tale inclinazione nelle entit che sono separate
dalla natura corporea, colloca lesistenza degli ordini demoniaci dopo lordinamento angelico e
pone tra questi ordini quelli intellettivi, quelli che sussistono secondo lintelletto e la ragione,
quelli solamente secondo la ragione; inoltre assegna ad altri [ordini demonici] anche la natura
irrazionale insieme a quella razionale, e relega gli ultimi tra i demoni nella sola irrazionalit e li
chiama materiali e punitori. Questa dottrina divide il mondo creato tra i demoni, perch [sostie-
ne che] esso rinvigorito e ravvivato da questi, e pone sotto il presidio di alcuni di essi il fuoco,
di altri laria, di altri lacqua e di altri la terra, e pone come climatarchi alcuni di questi, e altri
come protettori dei corpi e custodi della materia. Oltre a ci, i greci affermano che i demoni si
scagliano contro le nostre anime non per odio nei confronti degli uomini e per ostilit, ma per
punirle delle colpe che esse hanno commesso, e che le attirano in basso verso la materia non
Hermeticum, come anche a Michele Psello, al De operatione daemonum (opera che lo studioso ritiene
pseudo-pselliana), a Clemente Alessandrino, a Origene, a Omero e a Michele Glykas.
con il proposito di fare loro del male, ma affinch la turpitudine di quelle anime possa prendere
forma attraverso la loro relazione con quella [scil. con la materia]. Essi attribuiscono loro [scil. ai
demoni] unanimosit e unimplacabilit naturali, come alle pantere e ai leoni, e li considerano
come avvolti in corpi sottili, aerei e che oppongono poca resistenza fisica, non soltanto rotondi,
ma anche allungati, i quali partecipano poco della luce e molto delloscurit terrestre. Ricono-
scono a essi la conoscenza e la premonizione degli eventi futuri a partire da molteplici e diversi
[segni], soprattutto dalle configurazioni che riguardano gli astri. Queste cose affermano i Porfirio
e i Giamblico.
4.1 Demoni e angeli

La prima sezione si apre con la delineazione di una basilare differenza dottrinale tra
concezione greca e la concezione cristiana, relativamente alla natura dei demoni.
Nella visione cristiana i demoni sono concepiti come angeli caduti, i quali, in con-
trapposizione alla loro connaturale inclinazione verso la superiore dimensione del
divino, si sono rivolti verso ci che peggiore, cio verso il male, con un atto di deli-
berazione che ha comportato la decadenza dal loro ordine angelico e la loro degrada-
zione a demoni. Nella visione greca, invece, i demoni costituiscono un ordinamento
originario e immutabile, distinto da quello degli angeli e non derivato da questultimo
a seguito di una caduta (). I demoni, infatti, al pari degli angeli, sono concepiti
come esseri incorporei che, per propria natura, non sono soggetti a oscillazioni che
provochino mutamenti del loro stato ontologico e della posizione che essi ricoprono
nella scala gerarchica del reale.
Troviamo unesemplare formulazione neoplatonica dellimmutabilit di rango
propria sia degli angeli che dei demoni in un passo del De malorum subsistentia di
Proclo, in cui egli afferma che tali generi (come anche, su altri piani gerarchici, gli
di e gli eroi) non sono suscettibili di alcuna specie di trasmutazione, con specifica
esclusione di ogni cambiamento relativo al loro ordine (ordo, ) nella gerarchia
41 Su questo passo, cf. anche la traduzione francese di Gautier (1988, 9498) e quella latina di Migne
(1889, 875882), che abbiamo tenuto presenti.
42 Cf. Ps.-Psell., Graec. opin., 1, 17, p. 95 Gautier. Su tale sezione, cf. Svoboda 1927, 67; Grosdidier
de Matons 1976, 349.
43 Riguardo allorigine e alla natura dei demoni, lautore prospetta una posizione che restituisce gli
assunti che, secondo Greenfield, stanno a fondamento dellinsieme di credenze di quella che egli chia-
ma la tradizione ortodossa standard della demonologia tardobizantina: The standard orthodox tra-
dition of late Byzantine demonology was a complex, detailed and closely interwoven system of belief,
but at its heart lay two fundamental concepts upon which every other development and ramification
can be seen to have depended. The first of these concepts was that the Devil and the demons were,
by nature, angels; the second, that they fell from that divinely given rank and glory to become the
perversion of angelic nature that was understood to constitute a demonic being (Greenfield 1988,
78).
44 Per una prospettiva analoga, cf. Psell., Op., 37, p. 123, 1622 OMeara.
45 Cf. Procl., De mal. subs., II 20, ed. D. Isaac, Paris 2003, 512, p. 54.
del reale, in una visione in cui ciascuno di essi tale da conservare sempre il me-
desimo rango che ha ricevuto, nella modalit di una permanenza assolutamente
invariabile. Ci a differenza degli esseri che vengono subito dopo di essi (cio le
anime particolari degli uomini), che invece possono sia elevarsi verso i gradi supe-
riori, sia essere trascinati nel mondo della generazione. Questa tesi si trova anche
in Damascio, per il quale lintero genere demonico, intermedio tra le realt congiunte
alle enadi sovraessenziali e le realt mutevoli, immutabile (), cio non
soggetto ad alterazioni secondo il peggio e il meglio, ma sempre perfetto e non si
allontana dalla propria virt (), cio dal proprio status ontologico.
Nella scala del reale, secondo la dottrina greca, gli ordini dei demoni sono po-
sti dopo il diacosmo angelico ( ), cio sono posteriori
allintero ordinamento degli angeli. In questo contesto, la posteriorit indica una po-
sizione gerarchicamente pi bassa nella concatenazione ininterrotta e graduale della
processione () dei vari ordini ipostatici, i quali derivano e dipendono tutti dal
principio primo tramite diversi livelli di mediazione e partecipazione. Quale cifra di
un maggiore abbassamento e allontanamento dalla causa prima, la posteriorit va
dunque intesa in termini dinferiorit e di subordinazione. In questo caso, va notato
che la posteriorit dellordinamento dei demoni rispetto a quello degli angeli implica
lattiguit dei due ordinamenti, cio il loro essere direttamente concatenati tra loro, in
una successione senza gradi intermedi.
Il rilievo dellimmediata posteriorit dei demoni rispetto agli angeli, gi presen-
te in ambito medioplatonico, attestato in vari filosofi neoplatonici. Nel De mysteriis
46 Cf. Procl., De mal. subs., II 20, 59, p. 54 Isaac (trad. it. di L. Montoneri, RomaBari 1986, p. 157):
Dicta quidem enim genera omnia insusceptiva speciei transmutationis erant, dico autem transmutationis
que secundum ipsorum ordinem: semper enim unumquodque eundem ordinem quem accepit et salvare
natum est(Tutte le specie, delle quali finora s detto, non erano suscettibili di un qualunque genere
di mutamento: intendo dire con ci di un mutamento relativo al loro ordine, giacch ciascuna di esse
tale da conservare sempre lo stesso ordine che ha ricevuto); Procl., De mal. subs., II 17, 1415, p. 50
Isaac (trad. it. p. 154): demones [...] semper omnes in demonum ratione, et in eo qui sui ipsorum ordine
singuli ([] dei demoni, i quali permangono sempre nella loro condizione, ciascuno nellordine suo
proprio).
47 Cf. Procl., De mal. subs., II 20, 912, p. 54 Isaac.
48 Cf. Dam., In Phaed., II 94, 15, in part. 35, p. 339 ed. L. G. Westerink, Westbury 2009.
49 Sulla concezione degli angeli nel paganesimo greco, con riferimenti al neoplatonismo, cf. Cumont
1915. Sulla presenza degli angeli in alcuni contesti della filosofia greca anteriore al platonismo si veda,
con riferimento al pensiero presocratico, Rodrguez Moreno 1993, 8385 e Rodrguez Moreno 1995,
4344, e con riferimento a Platone, Rodrguez Moreno 1994, 195196.
50 In un frammento del Discorso Vero di Celso troviamo la successione di angeli e demoni, nellambito
di una pi articolata elencazione di esseri superiori che appare ordinata in modo gerarchico, in un
passo in cui il filosofo afferma che tutte le cose, siano esse opera di un dio o di angeli o di altri demoni
o di eroi ( ), ricevono la loro legge dal dio
supremo; cf. Cels., Aleth. Log. (ap. Orig., Cels.), VII 68, p. 194, 23, ed. R. Bader, StuttgartBerlin 1940.
Va notato che Dodds (1963, 295 e n. 4), con riferimento a questo passo, afferma che la classificazione
di Giamblico lo si riscontra nella classificazione dei generi superiori, in cui si distin-

guono, in successione ordinata, gli di, gli arcangeli, gli angeli, i demoni, gli arconti
(divisi in arconti governatori del mondo sublunare e in arconti preposti alla materia),
gli eroi, le anime. Limmediata posteriorit dei demoni rispetto agli angeli sostenu-
ta anche da Proclo, il quale fa anche propria la gerarchia di angeli, demoni ed eroi,
quali ordini accomunati dalla funzione di garantire la completezza e la coesione del
cosmo e la connessione tra gli di e gli uomini. Per altre testimonianze neoplatoniche
relative alla successione di angeli, demoni ed eroi, si pu rinviare a Olimpiodoro e a
Ermia di Alessandria, come anche a Ierocle di Alessandria. Linferiorit dei demoni
rispetto agli angeli anche ravvisabile in un frammento del Contro i Galilei dellimpe-
ratore Giuliano in cui prospettata una successione ordinata di di etnarchi, angeli,
di angeli, demoni ed eroi, attestata anche in Proclo, [...] is as old as Celsus.

51 In queste pagine accogliamo la tesi della paternit giamblichea della Risposta del maestro Abamon
alla Lettera di Porfirio ad Anebo e soluzione delle difficolt che essa contiene (nota con il titolo di De
mysteriis), ampiamente sostenuta nellambito degli studi critici. Riguardo ai dubbi avanzati da alcuni
studiosi sulla paternit giamblichea dello scritto, cf. per es. Sodano 1984, 738, il quale, comunque,
pur negando che lopera sia stata scritta da Giamblico, ne riconduce la stesura alla sua scuola (cf. in
part. 35).
52 Cf. Iamb., Myst., II 3, ed. H. D. Saffrey, A.-Ph. Segonds, A. Lecerf, Paris 2013, pp. 53, 1967, 23. Nella
questione sollevata da Porfirio, alla quale Giamblico risponde (cf. Iamb., Myst., II 3, pp. 52, 2053, 2
Saffrey/Segonds/Lecerf = Porph., Aneb., ed. H. D. Saffrey, A.-Ph. Segonds, Paris 2012, Fr. 28a, pp. 16
17), gli arcangeli sono posti dopo gli angeli, come intermedi tra questi ultimi e i demoni (cf. al riguardo
la nota di Saffrey e Segonds relativa al Fr. 28a, p. 16, in cui i due studiosi pensano che linversione tra
angeli e arcangeli sia dovuta a una distrazione di Porfirio o di Giamblico). Nella parte iniziale del De
mysteriis (cf. Iamb., Myst., I 3, p. 6, 12 ss. Saffrey/Segonds/Lecerf), il discorso si basa sulla distinzione
tra gli di, i demoni, gli eroi e le anime immacolate; in Iamb., De an., 26, p. 54, 23; 40, p. 68, 910 ed F.
Finamore, J. M. Dillon, LeidenBostonKln 2002, si riscontra invece la divisione dei generi superiori
alle anime umane in di, angeli, demoni ed eroi.
53 Cf. Procl., In Tim., ed. E. Diehl, Amsterdam 1965, III, pp. 165, 3166, 4; Procl., De mal. subs., II, 11
20, pp. 4254 e II 15, 1527, p. 48 Isaac (in part. II 16, 23, p. 49. Per la successione di angeli e demoni
in Proclo, cf. anche Procl., In Tim., I, p. 137, 726 Diehl (di, angeli, demoni); Procl., In Crat., 51, ed.
G. Pasquali, Leipzig 1908, p. 19, 5 (di, angeli, demoni); 118, p. 69, 1820 Pasquali (cause angeliche,
demoniche, eroiche, ninfee e simili); 137, p. 78, 2729 Pasquali (di, angeli, demoni, anime); 169, p.
93, 89 Pasquali (generi divini, angelici, demonici, particolari; 174, p. 98, 21 (angeli, demoni, eroi) e
p. 99, 14 Pasquali (di, generi angelici, demonici, eroici, uomini, animali, piante); Procl., Dec. dub.,
ed. D. Isaac, Paris 2003, X 62, 47, p. 131 (angeli, demoni, eroi, anime, quali ordini che esercitano la
provvidenza sulla scia delluno e governano il cosmo insieme agli di).
54 Cf. Olymp., In Alc., 22, 23, p. 16 ed. L. G. Westerink, Amsterdam 1956, in cui questa successione
ricondotta ai Caldei.
55 Cf. Herm., In Phrd., p. 153, 910 e p. 101, 13 ed. P. Couvreur, Paris 1901.
56 Cf. Hierocl., In CA, III 2, ed. F. G. A. Mullach, Paris 1883, pp. 423425, in part. p. 424. Il filosofo
prospetta lunit dellintero genere medio degli esseri razionali, il quale se abbiamo ben compreso
la sua tesi pu essere s diviso con il ricorso alle tre suddette nozioni, ma pu anche essere chiamato
nella globalit dei suoi componenti con ciascuno dei tre nomi in questione, con riferimento alle diverse
qualit che essi manifestano.
demoni e un particolare genere di anime atto a servire e ad aiutare le entit superiori.

Va anche notato che, da quanto sembra dalle testimonianze a nostra disposizione,
la serie di angeli, demoni ed eroi anche presente nella sapienza caldaica, ed da
questo contesto che i filosofi neoplatonici in primis Giamblico potrebbero averla
tratta.
4.2 Classificazioni degli ordini dei demoni

4.2.1 La prima classificazione
Nel prosieguo del paragrafo il compilatore riporta una classificazione tipologica degli
ordini dei demoni articolata in cinque gradi decrescenti, secondo le diverse modalit
della presenza, compresenza o assenza del carattere intellettivo e di quello razionale.
In sintesi, possiamo esprimere i diversi gradi di questo prospetto tassonomico distin-
guendo i demoni, a partire dallalto, in 1) intellettivi ( ),
2) intellettivi e razionali ( ), 3) razionali (
), 4) razionali e irrazionali ( -
), 5) irrazionali (
).
Non abbiamo trovato questa classificazione pentadica in alcun autore neoplatoni-
co o testo antico. Se tale assenza fosse confermata, dovremmo concludere che la fonte
di questa classificazione, ancora in qualche modo accessibile al tempo della redazio-
ne dellopuscolo, sia oggi perduta. Riteniamo, in ogni caso, che questa classificazione
rappresenti una pi estesa versione di una classificazione di tre ordini demonici che
troviamo nel pensiero procliano, nei termini di un passaggio da unarticolazione tas-
sonomica triadica a una pentadica che trova il suo fondamento nella legge della me-
diazione quale criterio dellunificazione del molteplice e della coordinazione di tutti
gli ordini graduali della scala del reale secondo una perfetta concatenazione conti-
nua. La divisione triadica cui alludiamo descritta da Proclo in un passo del suo com-
mentario sullAlcibiade Primo, in cui egli afferma che i demoni hanno ricevuto la loro
ipostasi primaria dalla Dea generatrice della vita (Rea), dalla quale hanno avuto in
57 Cf. Iul., C. Gal., ed. E. Masaracchia, Roma 1990, Fr. 26 (ap. Cyr., C. Iul.), 25, 143 A, p. 121; lultimo
genere di anime potrebbe indicare gli eroi, i quali figurano, insieme ai demoni e agli angeli, nel Fr. 33
(ap. Cyr., C. Iul.), 2224, 161 B, p. 129.
58 Cf. i rilievi relativi alle dottrine caldaiche in Psell., Op. 40, p. 150, 2023 OMeara; Op. 41, p. 152,
13 OMeara. Per i riferimenti agli angeli e ai demoni negli Oracoli caldaici e negli altri rilievi sulla
cultura caldaica nella filosofia neoplatonica e bizantina, cf. le testimonianze e i frammenti indicati in
Majercik 1989/2013, 1314; sugli angeli, cf. i frammenti 137 e 138 nelle ed. des Places e Majercik, e sui
demoni, cf. il gi citato Lewy 1956/2011, 259279 e 304309; Lanzi 2006, passim.
59 Cf. Ps.-Psell., Graec. opin. 1, 711, pp. 9597 Gautier. Su questa classificazione, cf. Svoboda 1927, 10
ss.
sorte unessenza psichica ( ) che si caratterizza in modo diverso nellam-

bito di una gerarchia di tre ordini demonici: i demoni superiori e pi perfetti secondo
il loro modo di sussistenza, infatti, hanno ricevuto unessenza psichica pi congenere
alla natura intellettiva ( ); i
demoni intermedi e di ordine secondario, invece, hanno ricevuto unessenza psichica
inferiore secondo il progressivo abbassamento della processione e pi congenere
alla natura razionale (
); i demoni di terzo rango, con i quali si conclude lordine demonico,
hanno unessenza psichica variegata, pi irrazionale e pi materiale (
-
). Possiamo dunque rilevare che in questa classificazione Proclo elabora una
distinzione tra demoni 1) maggiormente intellettivi, 2) maggiormente razionali, e 3) ir-
razionali, i quali possono essere visti come corrispondenti, rispettivamente, al primo,
al terzo e al quinto degli ordini di demoni della sopra indicata classificazione descrit-
ta nellopuscolo. I due ordini di questultima classificazione che non compaiono in
quella procliana sono quello intellettivo e razionale (il secondo) e quello razionale e
irrazionale (il quarto), i quali, come appare palese, rappresentano i due ordini inter-
medi che rinsaldano il legame, rispettivamente, tra il primo e il secondo ordine e tra il
secondo e il terzo ordine della classificazione triadica procliana, garantendo la conti-
nuit ininterrotta della gerarchia demonica. Questi due gradi intermedi dalla doppia
caratterizzazione, che trasformano la triade in una pentade, rappresentano degli or-
dini che manifestano unintrinseca funzione analoga a quella che, nella delineazione
procliana delle classi divine, propria degli di intelligibili e intellettuali, intermedi
tra gli di intelligibili e gli di intellettuali, o degli di ipercosmici ed encosmici, inter-
medi tra gli di ipercosmici e gli di encosmici. Siamo propensi ad avanzare lipotesi
che la divisione dei cinque ordini dei demoni descritta nellopuscolo possa restituire
60 Cf. Procl., In Alc., ed. A.-Ph. Segonds, Paris 2003, t. I, 68, 411, p. 55. Su questo passo procliano,
cf. Svoboda 1927, 14 (lo studioso individua in Olimpiodoro la fonte pi prossima della classificazione
riportata nellopuscolo); Rodrguez Moreno 1998, 180 (in cui la studiosa prospetta una lettura parzial-
mente diversa da quella che abbiamo delineato sopra). Proclo chiama in causa questa triplice divisio-
ne di essenza noerica (intellettiva), essenza razionale ed essenza irrazionale (immaginativa) anche
negli scolii sul Cratilo, in cui egli per, in un modo trasversale, la applica ai generi angelici, demonici
ed eroici (presentati tutti come demonici) (cf. Procl., In Crat., 128, p. 75, 976, 19, in part. 76, 416, e
129, pp. 76, 2077, 13 Pasquali, in cui lapplicazione di questa distinzione triadica sembra oscillare tra
i demoni e i tre generi demonici di angeli, demoni ed eroi).
61 Nellopuscolo, ciascuna delle cinque classi demoniche sembra presentata non come un solo
ordine, ma come un gruppo tipologicamente omogeneo di ordini.
62 Su queste classi divine in Proclo, cf. Reale 1989, 7377; Abbate 2008, 4560, 107163; Chlup 2012b,
119127. Per una lettura della dottrina procliana degli di intelligibili, intelligibili-intellettuali, intel-
lettuali, cf. anche Butler 2008, 2010, 2012 (studi adesso raccolti in Butler 2014, rispettivamente 93121,
122166, 167210). La distinzione tra queste tre classi di di, presente anche in altri filosofi neoplato-
nici, sembra ispirata alla sapienza caldaica o comunque elaborata con riferimento a questa; cf. al
riguardo le testimonianze di Psello (che forse attinge al commentario di Proclo sugli Oracoli caldaici,
una dottrina che originariamente era esposta in qualche scritto procliano oggi perduto
e che poteva risalire a Porfirio e a Giamblico.
Bisogna notare che in questa classificazione pentadica prestata una certa atten-
zione ai demoni appartenenti allordine pi basso, quelli caratterizzati dalla sola irra-
zionalit (). Di questi demoni, infatti, il compilatore offre una breve informa-
zione aggiuntiva, annotando che la dottrina greca li chiama materiali e punitori
( ). Abbiamo visto che lassociazione tra lirra-
zionalit e la materialit figura anche nella presentazione del terzo e ultimo genere di
demoni nella soprammenzionata classificazione triadica procliana. Il compilatore fa
riferimento ai demoni legati alla materia anche in altri luoghi dellopuscolo. Come
vedremo, uno di questi riferimenti ai demoni della materia rimanda a unaltra clas-
sificazione demonologica attestata nella tradizione neoplatonica e presente anche in
Proclo, la quale in parte sinterseca con quella triadica procliana sopra descritta, ed
chiamata in causa nellopuscolo soltanto con riferimento a due dei suoi gradi.
Notiamo, intanto, che nel neoplatonismo abbiamo altri richiami alle figure dei de-
moni irrazionali, oltre che nelle opere di Proclo, anche in altri filosofi, quali Giam-
in cui comunque vi una rielaborazione del pensiero caldaico in chiave neoplatonica) in Psell., Op.,
41, p. 151, 1825 e 40, p. 149, 79 OMeara (in questultimo passo, la classe intermedia tra gli intelligibili
e gli intellettuali data dalle entit divine connettive).
63 Si potrebbe anche tradurre in questo
modo: e agli ultimi tra i demoni [la dottrina greca] attribuisce la sola natura irrazionale. Riteniamo
degno di nota il ricorso al verbo che d lidea di un gettare da parte con disprezzo, di un
confinare come reietti, con riferimento, in questo caso, allassegnazione, carica di valenze spregiative,
di una propriet considerata come negativa, qual lassenza privativa della ragione.
64 Per altri luoghi in cui Proclo classifica i demoni materiali come ultimi nellordinamento demonico,
cf. Procl., In Crat., 128, p. 75, 2224 Pasquali, e Procl., In Alc., t. I, 72, 1014, p. 58 Segonds.
65 Cf. Ps.-Psell., Graec. opin., 1, 14, p. 97 ( , custodi della materia); 4, 69, p. 101 e 6, 93,
p. 103 ( , demoni materiali); 7, 123, p. 105 Gautier ( [scil.
], con riferimento agli spiriti-demoni che fanno parte dellordine materiale); riteniamo, in-
vece, che sia diverso il caso dei signori delle materie ( ) in 8, 136, p. 107, in quanto
le materie indicano i vari oggetti naturali (piante, pietre, etc.) utilizzati come strumenti cerimoniali
per linvocazione dei demoni nel rito del patto caldaico.
66 Cf. Procl., In Tim., III, pp. 157, 26159, 7 Diehl (in un contesto in cui la tesi dellesistenza dei demoni
irrazionali attribuita ai teurghi); Procl., In Tim. III, p. 237, 1022 Diehl (in cui Proclo parla della vita
irrazionale dei demoni, distinguendola da quella delle anime che cadono nel mondo della generazio-
ne; Proclo potrebbe qui riportare una dottrina di Siriano; cf. p. 236, 31 ss.); Procl., In Remp., ed. W.
Kroll, rist. Amsterdam 1965, I, p. 114, 2226 (si parla del genere dellirrazionalit, presentato come una
forma di vita del diacosmo dei demoni); In Remp. II, p. 337, 1319 Kroll (in cui lesistenza della stirpe
irrazionale dei demoni giustificata sulla base di Plat., Symp., 203a 1, ed. I. Burnet, Oxford 19001907,
t. II, in cui ricondotta al genere demonico anche la , la quale per Proclo unarte negativa).
blico, Ammonio figlio di Ermia, Olimpiodoro, Damascio. Inoltre, si pu anche

rilevare una marcata componente dirrazionalit nei demoni malvagi () di
cui parla Porfirio: tali demoni infatti, secondo il filosofo di Tiro, sono quelli che, a
differenza dei demoni buoni (), non dominano con la ragione il loro ,
bens piuttosto sono dominati da esso e, per questo motivo, sono trascinati dalle impe-
tuose passioni legate al loro involucro pneumatico. Si potrebbe sospettare, inoltre,
che anche il demone malvagio () o stupido () che, secondo Plotino,
il demone personale delle anime che si reincarnano nelle bestie, sia da questi con-
cepito come irrazionale. I demoni irrazionali, ancora, figurano anche negli Oracoli
caldaici, in cui si parla di cani irrazionali ( ), quali figure demoniche
impure e ostili.
4.2.2 La seconda classificazione
Lautore, inoltre, afferma che la dottrina greca divide il creato () tra i demo-
ni, assegnando a questi il presidio dei quattro elementi che lo costituiscono, in una
ripartizione ordinata per diverse classi demoniche: ad alcuni demoni assegnato il
fuoco, ad altri laria, ad altri lacqua e ad altri la terra ( ,
, , ). Abbiamo cos una classificazione gerarchica
quadripartita decrescente che annovera i demoni 1) del fuoco, 2) dellaria, 3) dellac-
qua, 4) della terra. Si profila, cos, un modello di classificazione elementale di matrice
neoplatonica di cui troviamo anche altre attestazioni, con delle varianti, nella cultu-
ra bizantina. In questa divisione, come emerge dalla comparazione con altri schemi
tassonomici analoghi, i quattro elementi rimandano anche alle diverse regioni cosmi-
67 Cf. Iamb., De myst., IV 1, p. 136, 1011; VI 5, p. 183, 610 Saffrey/Segonds/Lecerf.

68 Cf. Ammon., In Porph., p. 99, 1920 e p. 100, 1720 ed. A. Busse, Berlin 1891, in cui il filosofo,
senza prendere posizione, riporta lidea di coloro i quali sostengono lesistenza di un genere di entit
demoniche irrazionali, considerate immortali da alcuni e mortali da altri, senza specificare chi siano
coloro che sostengono tali tesi.
69 Cf. Olymp., In Alc., 18, 10, p. 14 Westerink (il filosofo presenta come i demoni congiunti al
piano dellanima irrazionale che proprio delle realt divine celesti).
70 Cf. Dam., In Phaed., II 94, 45, p. 341 e II 99, 5, p. 342 Westerink.
71 Cf. Porph., Abst., II 38, 4, 15, p. 105, ed. J. Bouffartigue et M. Patillon, t. II, Paris 2003, nonch II
38, 2, 14, p. 104, in cui sono considerati buoni i demoni che dominano il secondo ragione
( ). Sul dei demoni, cf. infra, 4.4.
72 Cf. Plot., Enn., III 4 (15), 6, 1718, ed. P. Henry, H.-R. Schwyzer, Oxford 19641982, vol. 1, p. 288. Nel-
loptare per la traduzione del termine con stupido, seguiamo Faggin 1992, 409. Si potrebbe
anche rendere laggettivo con ottuso o con sciocco.
73 Cf. Or. chald., ed. . des Places, Paris 2003, Fr. 156 (ap. Procl., In Remp.), p. 104.
74 Lautore usa un termine del lessico cristiano, per indicare il cosmo nella sua totalit.
75 Cf. Greenfield 1988, 202211. Si pu ricordare, per es., la classificazione esadica dei generi dei de-
moni contenuta nel De operatione daemonum attribuito a Psello (Psell., De daem., ed. P. Gautier, Paris
che, come anche alle varie cose che vi sono contenute (popoli, uomini, territori, luoghi
naturali, animali, piante, etc.).
Lautore aggiunge che il creato rinvigorito e animato dai demoni preposti ai vari
elementi che lo costituiscono. La tesi medio- e neoplatonica sottesa a questo rilievo
quella secondo cui i demoni, subordinati alla sovranit degli di, sono preposti da
questi allamministrazione del cosmo in tutte le sue parti e componenti. Come atten-
denti e collaboratori degli di, i demoni concorrono, secondo la loro natura interme-
diaria, a diffondere la provvidenza divina in tutte le parti del cosmo, garantendone
il collegamento con il superiore mondo divino, la capillare vitalit, la perfetta com-
pletezza e lordine teleologico. Con il ricorso a una variet di termini tratti dal lessico
dellesercizio del potere politico, burocratico-amministrativo e militare, i demoni so-
no presentati come custodi e guardiani dei vari elementi e delle regioni cosmiche cui
sono assegnati, come signori, prsidi, ministri, governanti, prefetti, sovrintendenti o
anche servitori delle varie parti del mondo, dei suoi vari fenomeni e delle realt spe-
cifiche e particolari che vi sono contenute, sulla base di una corrispondenza tra il
livello ontologico delle parti del cosmo e il rango dei demoni.
1980, p. 153, 284294), in cui si distingono 1) il genere infuocato (), indicato anche con il ter-
mine barbaro di , quale classe dei demoni che si aggirano nellaria che ci sovrasta (cio
nello spazio aereo sublunare pi alto rispetto a noi, ma pur sempre lontano dalla luna); 2) il genere che
si aggira nellaria pi vicina a noi e che chiamato aereo (); 3) il genere terrestre (); 4) il
genere acquatico, con riferimento sia allacqua dolce che a quella salata ( ); 5) il
genere sotterraneo (); 6) il genere che odia la luce e che scarsamente dotato di sensibilit
( ). Si veda anche la medesima classificazione nella versione alternativa del-
lopera in Bidez 1928, 122123 (11, pp. 122, 13123, 3). Su tale classificazione demonologica, cf. Svoboda
1927, 910; Bidez 1928, 97100; Delatte and Josserand 1934, 222224 (con rimando a scritti di magia
diffusi nel mondo bizantino); Grosdidier de Matons 1976, 343; Russell 1984/1986, 41; Greenfield 1988,
203205; Maltese 1990, 238329 e Maltese 1995, 275277; Jordan 2008 (con riferimenti a contesti della
cultura magica e filosofica del mondo greco antico). Alcuni gradi di questa classificazione demono-
logica sono anche attestati in Psell., Op., 37, in part. pp. 125, 2326 OMeara, in cui figurano i demoni
aerei (), terrestri (), acquatici (), e in 45, in part. p. 158, 1316 e 22, in cui sono
menzionati i vari ordini di demoni collocati dai greci in varie parti del mondo, cio i demoni celesti
(), quelli posti nel Tartaro ( ), quelli intorno alla terra ( ), quelli legati
alle regioni sotterranee (), oltre a quelli legati alla materia.
76 Ritroviamo una terminologia di questo tipo nel 8 dellopuscolo, riguardo alle potenze demoniche
evocate nel patto caldaico: il maestro della vittima sacrificale offerta, i signori delle varie materie
utilizzate nel rito, il prefetto del giorno, il principe del tempo, il demone tetrarca (
, , , , ,
8, 136137, p. 107). Sul governo esercitato dai demoni in modo capillare sui vari esseri del cosmo, cf.
per es. Procl., Dec. dub., III 16, 512, p. 74 Isaac, in cui Proclo sostiene che, mentre gli di estendono
la propria provvidenza in modo trascendente e su tutti gli esseri, invece i demoni che esercitano
la provvidenza come intermediari degli di si divinono tra loro la sovranit sui vari esseri fin nei
minimi particolari (uomini, animali, piante, parti de corpo).
77 Va ricordato che nel pensiero medio- e neoplatonico, anche ogni singolo uomo affidato a un de-
mone personale che legato alla sua sorte. Esemplare, al riguardo, ci sembra un passo del De deo
Giamblico nel De mysteriis parla dei demoni generatori (), i quali so-
vrintendono agli elementi del cosmo ( ), ai corpi viventi particolari
e a tutte le altre realt cosmiche. Egli sostiene che i demoni che sono custodi delle
varie parti del cosmo ( ) hanno cos tanta cura () e dedi-
zione () per la parte di cui ciascuno di loro guardiano, che non sopporta-
no neppure un discorso avverso a queste parti e custodiscono nella sua immutabilit
leterna permanenza delle realt cosmiche, cos come lhanno ricevuta in affidamen-
to dallordine immutabile degli di. Proclo, nel suo commento al Timeo, parla dei
demoni generatori (), affermando che alcuni presidiano linsieme degli
elementi cosmici, altri le regioni geografiche, altri i popoli, altri vari generi di realt
cosmiche, altri ancora le cose individuali, in una prospettiva in cui la custodia dei
demoni si estende fino alla pi infima parte del cosmo. Ermia afferma che alcuni
generi di demoni ordinano e governano alcune parti del cosmo, altri alcune specie di
animali. Alla luce di questi assunti, potremmo affermare che nel neoplatonismo si
profila una demonizzazione integrale del cosmo (tutto in cosmo pieno di demoni),
sul pi ampio sfondo di una radicale teologizzazione della visione della realt (nulla
privo della presenza degli di).
Riguardo allelaborazione neoplatonica di modelli di classificazione sistematica
degli ordini demonici sulla base della loro rispettiva corrispondenza alle varie parti
Socratis di Apuleio, in cui il filosofo si sofferma su un genere dei demoni che si legano strettamente
ai singoli uomini seguendoli in tutti i risvolti delle loro vite; cf. Apul., De deo Socr., XVI, 154156, pp.
3537 ed. J. Beaujeu, Paris 2002, in cui, tra laltro, il demone personale viene presentato come pri-
vus custos, singularis praefectus, domesticus speculator, proprius curator, individuus arbiter. Su varie
proiezioni della dottrina del demone personale, cf. per es. Plot., Enn., III 4 (15), vol. I, pp. 283290 Hen-
ry/Schwyzer; Iamb., Myst., IX 110, pp. 201, 24211, 12 Saffrey/Segonds/Lecerf; Procl., In Alc., t. I, 71,
178, 6, pp. 5763 Segonds. Tra gli studi, cf. lampia presentazione del tema in Timotin 2012, 243322.
78 Cf. Iamb., Myst., III 15, p. 101, 2023 Saffrey/Segonds/Lecerf. Qualificati come generatori, questi
demoni sono legati alle varie parti e ai processi del mondo della generazione.
79 Cf. Iamb., Myst., VI 6, pp. 183, 25184, 5 Saffrey/Segonds/Lecerf.
80 Cf. Procl., In Tim., III, pp. 155, 30156, 2 Diehl. Riguardo al legame dei demoni con gli elementi,
Proclo, in una dissertazione sulla Repubblica, presenta il luogo demonico ( ) come
il luogo cosmico etereo sublunare, posto tra il cielo e la terra, il quale contiene i princpi della gene-
razione e della natura legata allumidit, cui sono associate laria, lacqua e la terra, quali elementi in
cui si compiono i processi di generazione tramite lumido e il calore; cf. Procl., In Remp., II, pp. 133,
815 Kroll.
81 Cf. Herm., In Phdr., p. 58, 1920 Couvreur.
82 Il rilievo della demonizzazione del mondo, in una chiave di lettura negativa, ben presente nel-
la cultura bizantina. Su ci, con particolare riferimento ai vari ambienti in cui si muove luomo, cf.
Guillou 2000, 49: [...] tout au long du Moyen-ge, les Byzantins, dvots ou non, hommes des cam-
pagnes ou des villes, analphabtes ou intellectuels, imaginaient que la mer, les rivires, les rochers,
les puits, les marais, les tangs, les forts, les monts boiss, les jardins, les tombeaux paens taient
peupls de dmons quils se devaient dviter prudemment ou de neutraliser par lintervention doffi-
ciers ecclsiastiques munis du code des prires adaptes ou de saints moines asctes, instruments de
la divinit.
del cosmo, in Damascio troviamo una classificazione dei demoni, in 1) celesti (-

), 2) eterei (), 3) aerei (), 4) acquatici (), 5) terrestri () e
6) sotterranei (), secondo una divisione che presentata come corrispon-
dente ai rispettivi di che li guidano ( ) e alle parti del cosmo
( ). Classi di demo-
ni riconducibili a schemi tassonomici di genere topico-elementale si trovano in filosofi
quali Porfirio, Giamblico, Proclo, Olimpiodoro. Va anche ricordato che unasso-
ciazione di entit demoniche ad alcuni elementi e parti del cosmo anche attesta-
ta negli Oracoli Caldaici, nei cui frammenti si parla dei cani dellaria, della terra e
dellacqua, guidati o, secondo unaltra possibile e complementare lettura del testo,
cacciati da una figura femminile che va identificata con Ecate ( -
), quali figure demoniche votate ad ammaliare le anime,
distogliendole dai riti iniziatici. Una classificazione simile anche attestata negli
inni orfici, in cui figurano i demoni del cielo, dellaria, dellacqua, della terra, del sot-
83 Cf. Dam., In Phaed., I 479, 12, p. 245, e II 96, 13, p. 341 Westerink.
84 Cf. Porph., Frag., ed. A. Smith, StuttgartLeipzig 1993, 321 F. (Phil. ex or., ap. Euseb., Praep. ev.), p.
369, 17 (demoni terrestri []).
85 Cf. Iamb., Myst. VI 6, p. 184, 67 Saffrey/Segonds/Lecerf (demoni dellaria [] e a quelli della
terra [ ]).
86 Cf. Procl., In Remp., II, p. 168, 20 Kroll (demoni del cielo []); In Remp., I, p. 92, 911 Kroll
(riferimento allEfesto demone, il quale sovrintende al fuoco materiale [ ] che sussiste sulla
terra); In Remp., I, p. 118, 27 e II, p. 183, 34 Kroll (demoni del fuoco []); In Remp., II, p. 187,
23 Kroll (demoni sotterranei []) e 89 (demoni marini []).
87 Cf. Olymp., In Grg., 40, 1, p. 200, 2627 ed. L. G. Westerink, Leipzig 1970 (demoni della terra [-
]). Un qualche legame con la natura elementale acquatica potrebbe anche avere, nella visione
neoplatonica, lentit demonica di nome Kausatha che Porfirio, secondo Eunapio di Sardi, avrebbe
scacciato da un bagno ( ) (cf. Eun., V. Soph., IV 1, 12, ed. G. Giangrande, Roma 1956, p. 9,
23); cf. al riguardo Festugire 2006, t. IV, 143, n. 4 (lo studioso presenta come demoni anche le due
figure fanciullesche che, secondo Eunapio, Giamblico avrebbe evocato presso i bagni caldi di Gadara,
con riferimento a due sorgenti chiamate luna Eros e laltra Anteros [cf. Eun., V. Soph., V 2, 17, pp. 13,
814, 16 Giangrande]; per una diversa lettura, in chiave teurgica, di questa testimonianza, cf. Shaw
1995, 125126). Cf. per anche Fabiano 2011, 286287, in cui la studiosa ritiene che il demone Kausatha
sia piuttosto legato allidea del calore e, pi in generale, che i demoni dei bagni rimandino, pi che
alla sfera acquatica, a quella del fuoco e del calore.
88 Or. chald., Fr. 91 (ap. Dam., In Phaed. II), p. 89 des Places; cf. anche Fr. 90 (ap. Psell., Exp. Or.
Chald.), 2, p. 88 des Places, in cui figurano i cani della terra ( ), che figurano anche nel
Fr. 135 (ap. Procl., In Alc.), 2, p. 99 des Places; Fr. 157 (ap. Psell., Exp. Or. Chald), p. 104 des Places,
in cui si parla di bestie della terra ( ). Nel neoplatonismo, questi cani sono identifi-
cati con i demoni di basso rango, irrazionali e materiali. Cf. anche il Fr. 92 (ap. Procl., In Tim.), p. 89
des Places, in cui si allude a entit acquatiche () che Proclo, nel riportare questo termi-
ne oracolare, identifica con degli di (cf. Procl., In Tim., III, p. 110, 36 Diehl), ma che, nel contesto
originario, dovevano piuttosto essere demoni (in questa direzione, cf. Festugire 2006, t. IV, 143, n. 4;
des Places 1971/2003, 138, n. 1 relativa al Fr. 92; Majercik 1989/2013, 177).
89 Cf. per es. Or. chald., Fr. 135 (ap. Procl., In Alc.), 13, p. 99 des Places.
tosuolo e del fuoco (

). Inoltre, nei papiri magici greci vi sono riferimenti
ai demoni del cielo () e dellaria (), della terra (,), del
sottosuolo (,, ) e delle profondit ( -
). Il compilatore, nel prosieguo dellopuscolo, fa riferimento ad alcune di queste
classi, menzionando i demoni della terra (, 4, 69, p. 101; [...],
7, 118119, p. 105) e i demoni dellacqua ( [scil.], i quali agiscono nella
, 6, 108110, p. 105).
Alla classificazione elementale il compilatore fa seguire unaltra distinzione tipo-
logica di demoni, indicando i demoni climatarchi e i demoni patroni dei corpi e custodi
della materia (
).
Per quanto concerne i climatarchi, cio i demoni cui assegnato il presidio di de-
terminate regioni geografiche, possiamo notare che, per quanto abbiamo potuto ap-
purare, nelle fonti neoplatoniche in nostro possesso questo epiteto ricorre in Proclo
e in Olimpiodoro, i quali per lo riferiscono non a una classe di demoni, bens a una
classe di di. Lattribuzione di questo epiteto ai demoni potrebbe essere dovuto a un
fraintendimento del compilatore o della fonte da lui utilizzata, ma anche legittimo
ipotizzare che essa in origine potesse essere presente in qualche opera neoplatonica,
in una prospettiva in cui un epiteto di una classe divina viene attribuito anche alla
rispettiva classe demonica posta al seguito di questultima, secondo una diretta corri-
spondenza di tipo mimetico. infatti significativo che Proclo, il quale sostiene come
vedremo la corrispondenza mimetica dei demoni agli di di cui sono al seguito, in
un passo del suo commento al Timeo parla anche dei demoni che sono custodi di
regioni ( [scil. i ] ).
Laltra classe di demoni menzionata, la quale se intendiamo bene sembra un
unico genere demonico classificato con due epiteti, corrisponde, a ben vedere, agli ul-
timi due gradi di una classificazione sistematica delle classi demoniche attestata nel
tardo neoplatonismo. In taluni autori neoplatonici, infatti, ritroviamo un ordinamento
gerarchico articolato, dallalto verso il basso, in demoni 1) divini-unitari, 2) intelletti-
vi, 3) psichici-razionali, 4) fisici-irrazionali, 5) corporei-eidetici, 6) materiali. Cos in
90 Cf. Orph. H., p. 2, 3233 ed. G. Quandt, Berlin 1955 (Inno di Orfeo a Museo).
91 Cf. PGM, ed. K. Preisendanz, Stuttgart 19721974, t. I, I 216, p. 12 (demoni dellaria); t. I, I 265, p. 14
(demoni della terra); t. I, I 254, p. 14 e t. I, IV 2089, p. 136 (demoni del sottosuolo); t. I, IV 2700, p. 158
(demoni dellaria, della terra, del sottosuolo); t. I, IV 30363046 (spiriti demonici del cielo o dellaria,
della terra, del sottosuolo); t. II, XXXVI 145147 (demoni della terra, del sottosuolo, delle profondit).
92 Cf. Procl., In Tim., I, p. 106, 11 Diehl; Procl., In Crat., 57, p. 25, 1415 Pasquali; Olymp., In Alc., 20,
1, p. 15 Westerink (secondo Olimpiodoro, i climatarchi sono una delle classi degli di encosmici della
terra []). Lattribuzione dellepiteto agli di nei tre passi sopra menzionati messa in evidenza
anche in Gautier 1988, 97, n. 5.
93 Cf. Procl. In Tim. III, p. 155, 3133 Diehl. I sono anche attestati in Psell., Op.,
37, p. 125, 13 OMeara.
Damascio, il quale, appunto, divide i demoni in 1) divini (), 2) intellettivi (),

3) psichici (), 4) fisici (), 5) corporei () e 6) sovrintendenti al-
la materia ( ), con riferimento alle tesi della dipendenza dei demoni dagli
di encosmici e del legame dei demoni con i vari piani del cosmo. Olimpiodoro, se-
condo il medesimo criterio, guardando ai gradi ipostatici presenti nelle realt celesti,
distingue tra i demoni 1) divini (), i quali ci collegano al carattere divino ()
delle realt celesti; 2) intellettivi (), i quali ci collegano allintelletto (); 3)
psichici (), legati alle nozioni comuni, in corrispondenza dellanima razionale
( ); 4) irrazionali (), i quali ci collegano alla componente irrazionale
celeste, in corrispondenza dellanima irrazionale ( ); 5) formali (
), i quali congiungono le nostre forme (corporee) alle forme celesti; 6) ma-
teriali (), i quali congiungono la materia di quaggi a quella celeste. Questa
classificazione si trova gi in Proclo, il quale delinea una distinzione tra 1) i demo-
ni divini (), posti alla sommit dellordinamento demonico e straordinariamente
simili agli di; 2) i demoni che partecipano della propriet intellettiva (
), i quali sono preposti alle ascese e alle discese delle anime, e
manifestano e distribuiscono a tutte le cose le operazioni divine; 3) i demoni che di-
stribuiscono alle realt secondarie le opere delle anime divine (
) e assicurano il legame tra queste e quelle;
4) i demoni che trasmettono alle cose generate e corruttibili le potenze attive proprie
delle nature universali ( -
); 5) i demoni corporeiformi (), i quali
congiungono tra loro i corpi eterni e quelli corruttibili; 6) i demoni che si occupano
della materia ( ), i quali congiungono le potenze proprie
della materia celeste alla materia di quaggi. Come si nota, i demoni patroni dei
corpi e custodi della materia corrispondono agli ultimi due gradi di questa classi-
ficazione. Si potrebbe pensare che il compilatore abbia agganciato questi demoni
e i climatarchi alle quattro classi di demoni della classificazione elementale per offri-
re, sulla base delle sue informazioni, una visione completa del governo dei demoni
sullintero cosmo.
94 Cf. Dam., In Phaed., I 478, 15, in part. 35, p. 245 Westerink; cf. anche In Phaed. II 95, 16, p. 339
Westerink, in cui Damascio distingue sei generi demonici, ponendo, nel loro ordine gerarchico, 1) il ge-
nere corrispondente allunit degli di, chiamato unitario e divino ( ); 2) il genere cor-
rispondente allintelletto che dipende dal dio, chiamato intellettuale (); 3) il genere corrispon-
dente allanima, chiamato razionale (); 4) il genere corrispondente alla natura, chiamato fisico
(); 5) il genere corrispondente al corpo, chiamato corporeo o corporeiforme (); 6)
il genere corrispondente alla materia, chiamato materiale ().
95 Cf. Olymp., In Alc., 17, 1019, 6 Westerink.
96 Cf. Procl., In Alc., t. I, 71, 172, 14, pp. 5758 Segonds. Questo modello tassonomico demonologico,
nel mondo bizantino, si trova in Psell., Op., 37, pp. 123, 22124, 5 OMeara, con altri riferimenti a questi
generi di demoni nel prosieguo del resoconto.
4.2.3 La classificazione topico-elementale, tra demoni e di. Una nota sul 2

dellopuscolo
Abbiamo gi ricordato che nella seconda sezione dellopuscolo (2, 2650, pp. 99101),
dedicata alle pratiche sacrificali, i demoni sono assenti. I destinatari dei vari sacrifici
passati in rassegna, infatti, sono esplicitamente indicati a pi riprese negli di (,
cf. 2, 34, 47, 50, pp. 99101). Secondo una linea di coerenza nella lettura del paragra-
fo, le entit menzionate allinizio della sezione con soggetto sottinteso e con agget-
tivi qualificativi legati a un sistema di classificazione topico-elementale, non sono
quindi i demoni di cui si parla nel 1 e nelle successive sezioni dellopuscolo, bens
i corrispettivi di, che nella tradizione neoplatonica, a un livello superiore ed esem-
plare, sono divisi secondo il medesimo ordine tassonomico dei demoni. Olimpiodoro,
per esempio, distingue gli di () in ipercosmici () ed encosmici (-
), e suddivide gli di encosmici in 1) celesti (), 2) eterei o pirici (-
), 3) aerei (), 4) acquatici (), 5) terrestri () e 6)
del Tartaro (). In Proclo troviamo la distinzione tra gli di che procedo-
no nellaria e alati ( ), gli di celesti (), gli di acquatici
() e gli di terrestri e pedestri ( ), sulla scia di una peculiare
interpretazione delle quattro specie del vivente del Timeo di Platone (39e 740a 2).
Riguardo al suddetto riferimento al testo del Timeo, in una prospettiva pi generale si
pu anche rilevare che, nellambito del platonismo, lelaborazione di un siffatto mo-
dello di classificazione degli di appare legata allesegesi relativa ai giovani di del
discorso cosmogonico del Timeo, presentati da Platone anche con il termine -
e identificati con i della tradizione mitologica greca, visti come entit infe-
riori al Demiurgo, alle quali questultimo affida il compito di completare il cosmo con
la generazione e la cura dei generi mortali dei viventi. Gi Alcinoo insiste sulla corri-
97 Cf. Ps.-Psell., Graec. opin., 2, 2632, p. 99 Gautier, in cui si parla di entit eteree (), aeree
(), sotterranee (), intermedie, cio acquatiche e quelle terrestri (). Nel prosieguo
del paragrafo figurano gli di paterni, gli di (sott.) ipercosmici e i cinque pianeti, Ade e Persefone, gli
di sobri, le baccanti e Dioniso.
98 Cf. Olymp., In Alc., 19, 1215, p. 15 Westerink. Altrove Olimpiodoro presenta una classificazione
pentadica delle realt encosmiche ( ), divise in celesti (), governate da Zeus, in
terrestri (), governate da Plutone, e in quelle che ricoprono una posizione intermedia tra le ce-
lesti e le terrestri ( ), cio le realt piriche (), le aeree () e le acquatiche
(), tutte e tre governate da Poseidone (cf. Olymp., In Grg., 47, 4, p. 245, 23246, 6 Westerink).
99 Cf. Procl., Theol. Plat., III 19, ed. H. D. Saffrey et L. G. Westerink, Paris 2003, vol. III, p. 66, 4
26. Nella visione procliana, questi ordini divini sidentificano con i generi degli di che sono generati
e sussistono a partire dalle quattro specie intelligibili che sono contenute nel Vivente intelligibile (o
Vivente in s), le quali sono concepite come i modelli originari e le cause comuni poste a capo di conca-
tenazioni gerarchiche di entit che procedono, dallalto verso il basso, dagli di fino agli esseri viventi
mortali. Su questa lettura del Timeo, cf. Procl., Theol. Plat., III 27, pp. 95, 1197, 22 Saffrey/Westerink.
100 Cf. Plat., Tim., 40d 6 ss., t. IV, Burnet.
spondenza di questi giovani di a ciascuno degli elementi, sottolineando che a tali di

sono sottomesse tutte le realt sublunari e terrestri e che, grazie ad essi, non vi alcu-
na parte del cosmo che sia priva dellanima e del vivente che superiore alla natura
mortale. Il suddetto modello di classificazione degli di anche attestato in contesti
non filosofico-neoplatonici. Artemidoro di Daldi riporta una divisione degli di in 1)
Olimpici (), chiamati anche eterei (), 2) celesti (), 3) terrestri
(), 4) marini () e 4.1) fluviali (), 5) sotterranei (), 6)
di che circondano tutti quelli sopra elencati ( ), con vari esempi per
ciascuna classe elencata, nellambito di una distinzione di fondo tra di intelligibili
() e di sensibili ().
A questo riguardo va notato che il 2 dellopuscolo un estratto da una lettera di
Psello sulla scienza sacrificale ( ), in cui, come destinatari dei sacrifi-
ci, sono indicati esplicitamente vari ordini di di. Lo stesso dato si riscontra anche in
due frammenti della Filosofia desunta dagli oracoli di Porfirio, trasmessi da Eusebio di
Cesarea, anche se a nostro avviso, riguardo al primo dei due frammenti, va rileva-
to che Eusebio, nellintrodurre il brano porfiriano, sembra parlare di sacrifici animali
che vanno offerti, secondo la Filosofia desunta dagli oracoli, sia a demoni che a di,
e invece, secondo il trattato porfiriano Sullastinenza dagli animali, solo ai demoni.
Riteniamo, quindi, che la fonte remota della tradizione bizantina riprodotta nel 2
101 Cf. Alcin., Intr., 15, 171, 1520, p. 35, ed. P. Louis, Paris 2002 . Su questo passo, cf. Timotin 2012,
120122, il quale lo legge come una digression dmonologique, sulla scorta della connessione isti-
tuita da Alcinoo (cf. Intr., 15, 171, 2026, p. 35) tra il brano del Timeo sopra citato e un passo del Sim-
posio di Platone (202 e), in cui si parla delle prerogative dei demoni. Segnaliamo per come in questo
brano del Didascalico, riguardo alla delineazione dei giovani di, si riscontri unoscillazione tra -
e (quali termini tenuti distinti in modo incerto), la quale forse potrebbe essere letta come
una demonizzazione di tali di, o come una divinizzazione dei demoni. In Proclo, i giovani di del
Timeo sono identificati con gli di encosmici; cf. su ci Opsomer 2003.
102 Cf. Artem., Onir., II 34, ed. R. A. Pack, Leipzig 1963, pp. 157, 4158, 13.
103 Cf. Gautier 1988, 9293. Secondo lo studioso, i contenuti di questa lettera sono improntati agli
Oracoli caldaici o, piuttosto, al commentario che Proclo scrisse su questi. Per il testo della lettera in
questione, cf. Psell., Op., 42, pp. 152, 25153, 18 OMeara. Sugli Oracoli caldaici in Michele Psello, cf.
des des Places 1966 e des Places 1971/2003, 4652; Seng 2012; OMeara 2013.
104 Cf. Porph., Frag., 314 F. e 315 F. (Phil. ex or., ap. Euseb., Praep. ev.), pp. 360362 e 362364 Smith.
Le varie prescrizioni di Apollo sui sacrifici, nei due frammenti, riguardano le modalit dei sacrifici
animali offerti agli di. Nei due frammenti vi sono riferimenti agli di celesti (), eterei e ae-
rei (, , con riferimento alletere e alle regioni inferiori
dellaria), terrestri (, ), marini (), sotterranei (). Su questi due
frammenti, con riferimenti ad altri scritti porfiriani, cf. Johnston 2010.
105 Cf. Porph., Frag., 314 F. (Phil. ex or., ap. Euseb., Praep. ev.), p. 360, 19 Smith. Se, infatti, nel primo
caso Eusebio si riferisse soltanto alle varie classi dei demoni, non si comprenderebbe la diversit che
egli rileva tra le posizioni porfiriane espresse nelle due opere. Riteniamo dunque probante la posizione
di fondo di Muscolino 2011, 101, il quale traduce: e (dice) di non sacrificare solo ai demoni n solo alle
potenze che popolano la terra, ma di sacrificare vittime anche agli dei del cielo e delle regioni eteree.
Su questosservazione di Eusebio, cf. Simonetti 2002, in part. 101102.
dellopuscolo sia una trattazione neoplatonica delle modalit dei sacrifici cruenti of-
ferti ai vari ordini di di (). Riguardo al fatto che gli di siano classificati secondo
il medesimo criterio topico-elementale che abbiamo riscontrato nel caso dei demoni,
va notato che, nellambito del neoplatonismo, riscontriamo la tesi secondo cui i de-
moni sono posti al seguito degli di e ne riproducono, nei propri ranghi gerarchici, gli
ordini, i caratteri e le prerogative. Sulla base della stretta associazione dei demoni agli
di, le divisioni tipologiche dei primi si articolano in diretta corrispondenza mimetica
di quelle dei secondi e i demoni assumono perfino i medesimi nomi degli di cui sono
subordinati. Al di l di questo rilievo, riguardo al tema dei sacrifici, va comunque
ricordato che, secondo Porfirio, gli autentici destinatari di questi sono i demoni mal-
vagi e non gli di. Tesi che, se nella tradizione neoplatonica poteva condurre, con
varie prospettive, a una nuova visione del culto divino e della destinazione delle vit-
time sacrificali, nella visione cristiana poteva rafforzare lidea della natura demo-
nica dei sacrifici e dei culti pagani, nella prospettiva di unidentificazione degli di
con i demoni quali angeli caduti, entit perverse e malvagie. Il compilatore inserisce
la sezione sui sacrifici agli di subito dopo quella sui demoni senza preoccuparsi di
soffermarsi sulla distinzione tra i primi e i secondi. Alla luce del titolo demonologico
dato allopuscolo, non del tutto chiaro se egli si ricolleghi a talune istanze della pri-
ma tradizione come siamo portati a pensare o piuttosto a sviluppi della seconda. Si
potrebbe comunque sospettare che, in questo contesto, nella mente del compilatore,
demoni e di in ultima istanza si sovrappongano e si confondano, alla luce della tesi
cristiana della loro identificazione.
4.3 I demoni tra punizioni e passioni

Unaltra dottrina greca sui demoni riportata nellopuscolo quella secondo cui que-
sti si scagliano contro le anime non per odio nei confronti degli uomini e per ostilit
106 Per una delineazione esemplare di tali istanze, presentate come coerenti con la funzione dinter-
mediazione tra gli di e gli uomini, propria dei demoni, cf. Procl., In Alc., t. I, 68, 1169, 9, pp. 5556
Segonds. Per Proclo, inoltre, come abbiamo avuto modo di ricordare (cf. supra), il pi elevato ordi-
ne dei demoni costituito dai demoni divini; tali demoni, per il diadoco, appaiono spesso come
di ( ) a causa della loro straordinaria somiglianza con questi ultimi, con i
quali hanno un rapporto di continuit diretta, in una visione generale secondo cui, nella stretta con-
catenazione dei vari ordini gerarchici del reale, il primo termine di ciascun ordine conserva la forma
di quello che lo precede; cf. Procl., In Alc., t. I, 71, 411, pp. 5758 Segonds. Sui rilievi secondo cui
i demoni, sulla scia di Platone, possono essere anche chiamati di e i demoni divini sono di
secondo il loro contatto () con questi, cf. Procl., Theol. Plat., I 26, vol. I, p. 115, 512 e 1920
Saffrey/Westerink.
107 Cf. Porph., Abst., II 42, 3, 15, p. 109 Bouffartigue/Patillon.
108 Pi in generale, sui vari aspetti e implicazioni delle dinamiche di sostituzione dei demoni agli
di nellambito delle speculazioni filosofiche pagane tardoantiche sulla religione e la mitologia, cf.
Turcan 2003.
( ), bens per punire le loro colpe, e le vincolano

alla materia non con il proposito di fare loro del male (
), ma per mandare a effetto la punizione che esse meritano con una corrispon-
denza tra la turpitudine delle anime e la natura infima dellordine del reale in cui
sono relegate, in una perfetta interconnessione di status morale e status ontologico.
Con questo rilievo, il compilatore sembra restituire una dottrina che, con riferimento
ai rapporti tra i demoni e gli uomini, esclude la malvagit dei demoni e attribuisce loro
il ruolo di esecutori di punizioni che vanno inquadrate nelleconomia generale della
giustizia metafisica che contraddistingue il perfetto e immutabile ordine del reale.
Nel neoplatonismo la dottrina che nega la presenza del male nei demoni, con-
trapposta alla pi diffusa dottrina che invece divide i demoni in buoni e malvagi,
attestata in Salustio e in Proclo. Salustio, con riferimento alla sua posizione filosofica
secondo cui nel cosmo non vi niente che sia malvagio per natura ( ) e
i mali si manifestano solo nella sfera delle attivit umane, afferma che la tesi del-
lesistenza di demoni malvagi va rigettata in quanto si rivela inconciliabile con la tesi
incontrovertibile della bont degli di. Contro la tesi che vi siano demoni malvagi,
egli argomenta che, nel caso in cui questi ricevano la loro potenza dagli di, allora
non potrebbero essere malvagi, dato che, secondo una salda nozione comune, tutti
gli di sono buoni e da essi non pu provenire alcun male; e nel caso in cui invece
la ricevessero da qualcosaltro, allora gli di non sarebbero i produttori di tutte le co-
se, o perch non potrebbero pur volendolo, o perch non vorrebbero pur potendolo,
prospettive che non si addicono entrambe a un dio. Proclo, dal canto suo, nel De ma-
lorum subsistentia rigetta lidea che il male, nella scala del reale, inizi a manifestarsi
nei demoni. Egli si contrappone a quanti a vario titolo attribuiscono delle passio-
ni ai demoni, a coloro che chiamano malvagi (mali, ) i demoni che corrompono
le anime e le conducono verso la materia e il mondo sotterraneo distogliendole dal
cammino celeste, e in generale a chi pensa che vi sia un genere malvagio di demoni,
seduttori, maligni e distruttori delle anime, caratterizzati da una natura suscettibile
di dividersi tra bene e male. A tali tesi, che attribuiscono ai demoni il male per na-
tura o per scelta, egli obietta che i demoni che sono considerati malvagi non possono
109 Questa tesi, che in Proclo riguarda anche gli angeli e gli eroi, costituisce unestensione ai generi
superiori di unistanza basilare della teodicea di matrice platonica, che esclude totalmente il male
dagli ordini divini.
110 Cf. Salust., De diis, XII 4, 13, p. 17 ed. G. Rochefort, Paris 2003.
111 Cf. Salust., De diis, XII 3, 15, p. 17 Rochefort. Riteniamo che Salustio confuti la tesi che esistano
alcuni demoni malvagi (tesi di varie tradizioni religiose e filosofiche pagane) e non che tutti i demoni
siano malvagi (tesi del cristianesimo). Comunque sia, si tratta di una differenza indifferente per la
nostra indagine.
112 Cf. Procl., De mal. subs., II 16, 117, 37, pp. 4951 Isaac. Su queste parti del testo, si veda la
traduzione italiana di Montoneri (1986, 153155), che abbiamo tenuto presente per talune scelte
espressive.
113 Cf. Procl., De mal. subs., II 16, pp. 4950 Isaac.
essere n malvagi per se stessi (sibi ipsis) n per altri (aliis). Per un verso, infatti, se i
demoni fossero malvagi per se stessi, allora dovrebbero essere tali o sempre, ma ci
impossibile perch non pu essere per costituzione malvagio ci che riceve lesisten-
za dagli di, oppure in quanto suscettibili di cambiare il proprio stato, ma anche ci
impossibile perch i demoni non mutano mai il proprio ordine. Per altro verso,
secondo Proclo, non neppure corretto considerare come buoni per se stessi e mal-
vagi per altri i demoni che conducono le anime verso il basso (appunto i demoni che
le trascinano nella materia e nella regione infera), perch ci equivarrebbe a consi-
derare come cattivi quei maestri ed educatori che, nel correggere i difetti altrui, non
permettono agli allievi dal profitto altalenante di conseguire una posizione superiore
ai loro meriti; oppure a chiamare malvagi coloro che sono preposti a non fare accede-
re ai luoghi sacri gli impuri per impedire loro di partecipare ai riti che vi si svolgono.
Per Proclo, quindi, non vanno chiamati malvagi n i demoni che conducono le anime
verso lalto, separandole dal luogo terreno, n i demoni che mantengono nella loro
debita condizione le anime non ancora capaci di ascendere, trattenendole nel luogo
terreno. Per il Licio, dunque, i demoni che castigano le anime e le purificano con i
tormenti escatologici, sono anchessi buoni sotto ogni aspetto, nella misura in cui
agiscono secondo la propria natura e svolgono la funzione che propria dellordine
al quale appartengono. Una posizione neoplatonica intermedia tra la teoria delle-
sclusiva bont dei demoni e la teoria della malvagit di alcuni demoni, attestata in
uno scolio contenuto nel ms. Parisinus graecus 1853, in cui, a proposito dei demoni,
si legge che essi sono buoni per natura, ma malefici in rapporto a noi, per via delle
purificazioni (cio dei tormenti catartici che questi infliggono alle anime umane).
In altre sezioni dellopuscolo, invece, il compilatore parla anche di demoni mal-
114 Proclo si riferisce in tal caso ai demoni per essenza ( ), cio ai demoni che sono tali
per originaria appartenenza allordinamento demonico, e non ai demoni per relazione ( )
o per analogia ( ). Su tali distinzioni (attestate anche in altri filosofi neoplatonici),
cf. per es. Procl., In Alc., t. I, 73, 775, 1, pp. 5961 Segonds.
115 Cf. Procl., De mal. subs., II 17, pp. 5051 Isaac.
116 Cf. per es. Procl., In Crat., 121, p. 71, 1923 Pasquali, in cui lo scolarca presenta tali demoni come
legati alla materia (); Procl., In Remp., II, pp. 182, 9183, 23 Kroll; Procl., In Crat., 160, p. 89,
59 Pasquali.
117 Per talune osservazioni sulla dottrina dei demoni nel De malorum subsistentia di Proclo, cf. Chlup
2012b, 209210. Va notato che altrove Proclo prospetta una contrapposizione tra demoni buoni (-
) e demoni malvagi () (cf. Procl., In Remp., II, pp. 187, 19188, 5 Kroll, in part. 187, 2223)
e in taluni passi parla di demoni buoni (cf. Procl., De mal. subs., II 21, p. 55, 17 Isaac; Procl., In
Crat., 73, p. 35, 2223 Pasquali; Procl., In Remp., II, p. 175, 7 Kroll). Potrebbe trattarsi di un retaggio
terminologico-concettuale che Proclo eredita da taluni suoi predecessori trapiantandolo in un diverso
quadro dottrinale.
118 Cf. Saffrey 1969, 64. Lo scolio in questione, intitolato , prospetta una gerarchica
di ordini articolata in di, angeli, demoni, eroi, anime e corpi, inquadrati nei loro caratteri distintivi
con riferimento al loro rapporto con il bene e il male. Saffrey (cf. 1969, 69) riconduce il contenuto di
questo e di altri scolii del suddetto manoscritto alla tradizione neoplatonica del V-VI secolo d.C.
vagi, attingendo a un diverso retaggio dottrinale ben attestato nella cultura greco-
romana e, in particolare, nel tardo platonismo. Nella quarta sezione, egli specifica
che i demoni materiali e terreni coinvolti nella sono malefici (, 4,
71, p. 101). Parimenti, nella sesta sezione, egli spiega che il rito del il quale
manifesta un carattere goetico consiste nellevocazione di demoni malvagi (-
[...] , 6, 9091, p. 103). Egli afferma che questo rito si compie
sul far della sera, quando il sole volge al tramonto e alla luce diurna subentrano le
tenebre notturne, poich soltanto in questa fase del giorno i demoni prestano ascolto
ai loro evocatori e, contestualmente, manifestano impeti e slanci della loro malvagit
() (6, 9198, p. 103). Inoltre, nella stessa sezione, egli riporta anche la noti-
zia secondo cui i greci pensano che, soprattutto nella stessa fase della rotazione del
sole in cui si compie questo rito, anche nel mare si manifesta lazione dannosa (-
) dei demoni con dei danni arrecati ai naviganti, la cui rovina () causata
non dallacqua, bens dai demoni che si trovano in questo elemento e che mettono in
opera la loro azione dannosa () (6, 107111, p. 105). Alla nocivit dei demoni,
nellambito dellopuscolo, pu anche essere ricondotto il rilievo secondo cui il genere
dei demoni evocati con la lecanomanzia assolutamente fraudolento (
): secondo quanto riporta il compilatore, infatti, tali de-
moni, attirati nel bacino dacqua, inizialmente emettono un mormorio privo di senso,
poi strepitano parole volutamente oscure riguardo alla predizione del futuro, per po-
tersi sottrarre allaccusa di essere menzogneri () con la scusa della mancanza
di chiarezza della loro voce (7, 118125, p. 105). Siamo cos al cospetto di responsi
119 Sulla figura del demone malvagio nella cultura greco-romana, cf. per es. Innocenzi 2011, 97129.
120 Laggettivo, imparentato con , pu anche essere reso con dannosi, offensivi, nocivi.
121 La descrizione di questo rito notturno presenta dei parallelismi con quanto si legge in un passo del
commentario di Olimpiodoro sul Gorgia, in cui il filosofo afferma che certi demoni terrestri ()
vanno in giro soprattutto con le tenebre, quando non vi la luce diurna, e talvolta i goeti, empi e odiosi
agli di ( ), attraggono con invocazioni rituali questo genere di
demoni (cf. Olymp., In Grg., 40, 1, pp. 200, 24201, 2 Westerink).
122 Riteniamo che la mendacia di questi demoni, la quale sembra muoversi tra una dissimulata igno-
ranza e una maliziosa malafede, si configuri come una forma di cattiveria. significativo, al riguardo,
che nellantica cultura ebraica, le pratiche divinatorie assimilabili alla lecanomanzia siano messe in
relazione secondo talune letture delle fonti in nostro possesso a prncipi (sarim) o demoni (shedim),
i quali danno delle risposte false; cf. Cavalletti 1958, 206207. Nellebraismo gli shedim sono i demoni
visti quali entit nefaste; cf. Dan 1980; Barbu and Rendu Loisel 2009, in part. 306, con riferimento alla
valenza del termine shed nelle fonti bibliche. Questo collegamento mostra come le varie tradizioni de-
monologiche antiche siano legate tra loro in una rete dinterazioni e ibridazioni. Va ricordato che, su
un altro versante della demonologia neoplatonica, Proclo sostiene che lintera classe dei demoni che
sono tali per essenza ( ) cio la classe dei vari ordini di demoni in senso proprio , al pari
degli di, totalmente non falsa (), nel senso che la classe demonica razionale totalmente
veridica, mentre quella irrazionale non atta ad accogliere il vero e il falso; secondo il Licio, i demoni
che nelle invocazioni sono ingannatori sono i demoni per relazione ( ), cio i demoni che
non sono propriamente tali, e per altro verso coloro che sono ingannati da veri demoni singannano a
demonici falsi e fuorvianti.

Nellambito del tardo platonismo, si riscontra unampia diffusione della dottrina
della divisione dei demoni in buoni e malvagi, verosimilmente formulata anche sul-
la scorta di influenze teologico-religiose dualiste di origine orientale. Calcidio divide i
demoni in buoni (boni) e cattivi (improbi), presentando i primi anche come santi e i se-
condi come impuri e corrotti. Porfirio delinea una distinzione tra i demoni malvagi,
fortemente nocivi per luomo, e i superiori demoni buoni, apportatori di benefici.
Giamblico contrappone i demoni malvagi, oltre che ai demoni buoni, soprattutto agli
di, attribuendo a questi due ultimi generi esclusivamente bont, verit, giustizia, pu-
rezza e, di contro, ai primi solamente malvagit, falsit, ingiustizia e turpitudine.
La stessa divisione di fondo sostenuta anche da filosofi neoplatonici pi tardi, co-
me Ermia e Olimpiodoro, i quali sostengono la dottrina secondo cui, nella gerarchia
del reale, la divisione tra il bene e il male, assente negli di e negli angeli quali entit
esclusivamente buone, si manifesta per la prima volta nella classe dei demoni. An-
che la sapienza caldaica insegnava, secondo Psello, la distinzione tra demoni buoni
e demoni malvagi.
causa di se stessi e non di questi demoni; cf. Procl., In Remp., I, p. 41, 1129 Kroll.
123 Non vi attestata, invece, la tesi della malvagit di tutti i demoni, che propria del cristianesimo.
124 Cf. Calc., In Tim., 133, ed. B. Bakhouche, Paris 2011, p. 370, 1014.
125 Sui demoni malvagi in Porfirio, cf. fondamentalmente Porph., Abst., II 37, 5, 143, 5, 4, pp. 104110
Bouffartigue/Patillon. Sulla terminologia utilizzata da Porfirio per indicare i demoni malvagi, cf. per
es. Abst., t. II, II 38, 4, 5, p. 105 (); II 39, 3, 23, p. 106 (); II 39, 5, 3, p. 106 (); II
45, 1, 3, p. 111 () Bouffartigue/Patillon; Porph., Aneb., Fr. 90, p. 80 Saffrey/Segonds ();
per i demoni buoni, cf. II 39, 5, 2, p. 106 (); II 41, 2, 56 ().
126 Sui demoni malvagi in Giamblico, cf. Iamb., Myst., II 7, p. 63, 510 Saffrey/Segonds/Lecerf (in
cui si profila una triplice distinzione dei demoni in buoni [], vendicatori [] e malvagi
[]); III 13, pp. 97, 598, 3 (sulla divinazione privata, legata ai demoni malvagi); III 31, p. 132,
710 e p. 133, 1134, 3 (sulla vera divinazione, la quale non legata ai cattivi demoni, bens agli di);
IV 7, pp. 142, 16143, 13 (sulla contrapposizione tra i demoni malvagi quali cause dei mali da un lato, e
i demoni buoni e gli di quali cause dei beni dallaltro); IX 7, p. 209, 12 (sul fatto che i demoni malvagi
non ricoprono mai funzioni egemoniche e non si rapportano ai demoni buoni come se avessero uguale
dignit); per la terminologia giamblichea relativa ai demoni malvagi, cf. per es. II 7, p. 63, 9 ();
IV 7, p. 142, 18 () e 2021 ( ).
127 Cf. Herm., In Phdr., p. 39, 1617 e p. 58, 1619 Couvreur; Olymp., In Grg., 7, 4, p. 53, 26 Westerink.
Una traccia della credenza nei demoni malvagi, inoltre, sembra essere presente anche in Plotino, in
un passo gi menzionato in cui egli sembra fare riferimento a un tipo di demone personale malvagio
e stupido (cf. supra).
128 Psello riporta la dottrina caldaica secondo cui nel genere demonico si profila una distinzione tra
una parte che possiede una potenza boniforme () e che aiuta le anime nelle ascese ieratiche
in contrasto con i loro oppositori, e una parte, chiamata bestiale e impudente, che invece trascina le
anime verso il basso, che protesa alla natura e assoggettata ai doni destinali, che incanta le anime e
punisce quelle prive della luce divina; cf. Psell., Op., 40, p. 150, 2632 OMeara. Nel brano citato, Psello
afferma anche che questa classe di demoni malvagi risiede nella cavit ( , da intendere
forse in senso di profondit). A questo riguardo, si potrebbe rinviare a un rilievo dellopuscolo in cui,
Il legame di questi demoni con la , ricordato nellopuscolo, ricontrabile

in vari autori neoplatonici e ha unattestazione esemplare in Porfirio, il quale nel De
abstientia afferma che tutta quanta la si compie mediante i demoni malvagi e
che coloro che tramite i rituali goetici compiono azioni malvagie ( [...]-
) onorano questi demoni e soprattutto il loro capo. I goeti sono presentati
da Porfirio in termini radicalmente negativi, come persone empie e impure, dedite al
male e assoggettate alle passioni, sventurate () in quanto intimamente
legate e sottomesse ai demoni malvagi, punite per la propria iniquit anche da que-
sti ultimi. Riteniamo, inoltre, che presentino un legame tipologico con le tecniche
riguardo alla lecanomanzia, il compilatore afferma che il bacino riempito di acqua divinatoria, con la
sua peculiare forma (concava) richiama il carattere della propensione dei demoni per le cavit (
) (cf. Ps.-Psell., Graec. opin., 7,
114115, p. 105 Gautier). In questo rilievo, che inserito in un contesto in cui si sottolinea la fraudolenza
dei demoni attirati con la lecanomanzia, si potrebbe dunque cogliere un rimando al tema caldaico dei
demoni bestiali e impudenti.
129 Cf. i gi citati passi di Procl., In Remp., II, p. 337, 1317 Kroll e di Olymp., In Grg., 40, 1, p. 201,
12 Westerink. Un termine di riferimento per la tesi del legame tra la e i demoni dato da un
passo del Simposio di Platone (203a 1), letto in una prospettiva in cui si sottolinea la negativit della
e la si collega specificamente ai demoni malvagi. Va ricordato che nel materiale raccolto nel-
lopuscolo, se la , in linea con gli insegnamenti neoplatonici, considerata come unarte legata
ai demoni malvagi, la , invece, considerata come una parte della scienza sacerdotale (-
), non messa in connessione con i demoni. Essa, infatti, investiga lessenza, la natura,
la potenza e la qualit di ogni realt sublunare (gli elementi e le loro parti, gli animali, le piante, etc.),
a partire da cui effettua le proprie operazioni (cf. Ps.-Psell., Graec. opin., 5, 7689, p. 103 Gautier). Su
tale distinzione, cf. Greenfield 1995, 120, n. 4. Questo profilo rimanda alla delineazione neoplatonica
dellarte ieratica quale sapere operativo basato sulla legge della simpatia universale e della concate-
nazione organica e interattiva dei vari piani del reale, in una prospettiva in cui i vari enti sublunari
sono collegati alle realt protologiche divine e, quali simboli di queste, manifestano intrinseche quali-
t e potenzialit, secondo precise corrispondenze (cf. per es. Procl., Hier., ed. J. Bidez, Bruxelles 1928).
Si tratta, dunque, di una scienza legata, piuttosto che ai demoni, alla manifestazione del potere de-
gli ordini divini nel mondo sublunare. Non riteniamo condivisibile la posizione di Svoboda 1927, 52,
secondo cui nellopuscolo la considerata come luvre des dmons, posizione che appare
basata su una lettura strettamente monotematica dei contenuti delloperetta in chiave demonologica.
130 Cf. Porph., Abst., II 41, 5, 14, p. 108 Bouffartigue/Patillon (in questo passo i demoni contrari
sono quelli opposti ai demoni buoni, citati poco prima, cf. II 41, 3, 3, p. 108). Sulla e sul suo
legame con i demoni malvagi in Porfirio, cf. Muscolino 2011, cxxxvi-cliv.
131 Per il legame tra gli sventurati () e i demoni malvagi, cf. anche Porph., Marc., XI, ed.
W. Ptscher, Leiden 1969, p. 18, 57, in cui si legge che luomo sventurato () non altro
che colui la cui anima dimora di demoni malvagi; ci in una prospettiva in cui, se per un verso
dio rafforza luomo che compie buone azioni, per altro verso luomo che compie azioni malvagie si
pone sotto legemonia di un demone malvagio (cf. Porph., Marc., XVI, p. 22, 56 e XXI, pp. 24, 27
26, 4 Ptscher). dunque luomo che sventurato in quanto dominato da un demone
malvagio, cio luomo che, scegliendo il male, si allontana dal divino e si lega a un demone cattivo
che ne condiziona le sorti (sul fatto che luomo causa dei propri mali per sua scelta, cf. Porph., Marc.,
XXIV, p. 28, 56 Ptscher).
132 Cf. Porph., Abst., II 42, 1, 15, p. 109 e II 45, 1, 13, 8, p. 111 Bouffartigue/Patillon.
goetiche anche le impure pratiche mantiche che Giamblico contrappone allautentica

divinazione teurgica di origine divina, considerandole come interconnesse allattivit
dei demoni maligni.
Ugualmente, nellambito del neoplatonismo i demoni malvagi sono visti come
causa di disastri e calamit. Secondo Porfirio, per esempio, tali demoni sono respon-
sabili di grandissimo danno per gli uomini, essendo causa di pestilenze, sterilit, si-
smi, siccit e mali simili; essi compiono soltanto cattive azioni, sono violenti e subdoli
e contro gli uomini compiono attacchi veementi e improvvisi, come agguati, talvolta
cercando di nascondersi, talvolta invece agendo apertamente con violenza. Nelle
fonti neoplatoniche in nostro possesso, i demoni cattivi sono anche presentati come
ingannatori, volti a traviare gli uomini con vane lusinghe e a impantanarli in passioni
smodate e impure, distogliendoli e allontanandoli in tal modo dal divino. Porfirio, per
esempio, afferma che i demoni malvagi, familiari con la falsit, ingannano gli uomini
con azioni prodigiose e li inducono ad avere idee errate sugli di con il proposito
di allontanarli da questi ultimi e di spingerli a rivolgersi verso di loro; e Giamblico,
nel quadro dei doni legati alle apparizioni delle diverse classi superiori, dichiara che
la presenza epifanica dei demoni appesantisce e castiga il corpo con morbi, nonch
con riferimento a un rilievo della sapienza caldaica cui abbiamo accennato frena
lascesa delle anime, trattenendole nella dimensione della natura corporea e sotto il
giogo della fatalit.
Nellambito di queste tematiche, sembra che nellopuscolo siano confluite dottri-
ne demonologiche diverse relative allo status dei demoni rispetto al bene e al male.
Per un verso, la negazione della misantropia dei demoni, quale istanza presentata in
termini generali e non limitatamente a una specifica classe demonica, sembra ricol-
legarsi a una visione che scagiona i demoni dal male; per altro verso, i richiami alle
azioni nefaste dei demoni malvagi, che troviamo nel prosieguo della compilazione,
sembrano invece attingere a una dottrina demonologica dualista. Il rilievo successivo
a quello della negazione dei propositi malevoli dei demoni consiste nellosservazione
che i greci attribuiscono ai demoni unanimosit e unimplacabilit naturali, para-
133 Cf. per es. Iamb., Myst., III 13, pp. 97, 598, 23 e III 31, pp. 131, 22134, 27 Saffrey/Segonds/Lecerf.
134 Cf. Porph., Abst., II 40, 1, 14, p. 106 e II 39, 3, 29, p. 106 Bouffartigue/Patillon.
135 Cf. Porph., Abst., II 42, 1, 12 e 45, p. 109 Bouffartigue/Patillon.
136 Cf. Porph., Abst., II 40, 1, 45, 8, pp. 106107 Bouffartigue/Patillon.
137 In questo caso Giamblico non fa distinzione tra demoni buoni e malvagi.
138 Cf. Iamb., Myst., II 6, p. 62, 27 Saffrey/Segonds/Lecerf e il gi citato Or. chald., Fr. 135 des Places.
Riguardo a questo tema, si potrebbe anche rimandare, nellambito della tradizione alchemica greca
tardo antica, a uno scritto attribuito a Olimpiodoro, in cui si legge che il demone Ofiuco (
) cerca di ostacolare in vari modi la ricerca e il conseguimento dellopera; cf. Olymp., Zos.,
28, ed. M. Berthelot, Ch.-. Ruelle, vol. I, Paris 1887, p. 86, 512. Sulla figura di Ofiuco, cf. Albrile
2008, p. 74, n. 80. Per un possibile altro richiamo allostilit dei demoni in tale scritto, cf. Olymp., Zos.,
28, p. 86, 1 e n. 1 Berthelot/Ruelle. Lidentificazione dellOlimpiodoro alchimista con lOlimpiodoro
neoplatonico una questione aperta.
gonabili a quella dei grandi felini (

). Riteniamo probabile che anche in que-
sto passo il compilatore, con , intenda riferirsi ai demoni in generale, senza
preoccuparsi di specificare distinzioni di ordine. Questa testimonianza rimanda chia-
ramente a una posizione che riconosce la natura passionale dei demoni, la quale nel
tardo platonismo sostenuta da vari autori, in opposizione alla tesi che invece con-
sidera i demoni come esseri impassibili. Non siamo riusciti a rintracciare nelle fonti
neoplatoniche pervenuteci lo specifico rilievo dellattribuzione ai demoni di una pas-
sionalit impulsiva e aggressiva assimilabile agli istinti naturali di animali feroci e
predatori quali sono i grandi felini. A questo riguardo, riteniamo comunque opportu-
no richiamare lattenzione su un passo del De malorum subsistentia in cui Proclo, nel
difendere la tesi secondo cui negli eroi non vi il male, rimanda, in un significativo
esempio esplicativo, al caso dei leoni e delle pantere. Nella trama degli argomenti volti
ad affermare la suddetta tesi, il filosofo sostiene che lira, limpeto e ogni simile pas-
sione che detta malvagia, non si producono negli eroi per una perversione della loro
natura, la quale immutabile, e dunque non possono essere considerate come mali.
Se infatti per ciascun essere il male ci che contro natura, gli eroi non sono malva-
gi perch il loro modo di agire secondo la loro propria natura (secundum naturam),
sulla base dellassunto secondo cui, per ciascun essere, male ci che contrario alla
sua natura (preter sui ipsius naturam). Su questa stessa linea, infatti, non pu neppure
essere considerato come male il furore (furor) dei leoni e dei leopardi, perch in que-
sto genere di animali, che sono privi di ragione, il furore secondo natura. Lo stesso
vale nel caso delle passioni degli eroi, la cui natura irrazionale. Con riferimento a
139 Per lassociazione dei demoni a leoni e ad altri animali feroci nella cultura bizantina, cf. Green-
field 1988, 133134 e nota 441, con vari riferimenti alle fonti. Sulla manifestazione dei demoni nelle
forme di varie specie di animali (tra cui leoni) nella medesima tradizione culturale, cf. Delatte and
Josserand 1934, 220221.
140 Lattribuzione delle passioni ai demoni, gi presente in Senocrate (sulla cui demonologia cf. Schi-
bli 1993, in part. 144149), attestata in vari autori del tardo platonismo, tra cui Plutarco di Cheronea
e Calcidio.
141 Cf. Iamb., Myst., I 10, pp. 25, 1926, 7 Saffrey/Segonds/Lecerf; Procl., Dec. dub., III 15, 3338, p. 73
Isaac.
142 Cf. in part. Procl., De mal. subs., II 18, 2433, p. 52 Isaac (trad. it. di Montoneri 1986, p. 155): Si
autem in agendo hec unusquisque salvat se ipsum et sui ipsius naturam et eam que in omni desinen-
tiam quam ex eterno hereditavit, quomodo adhuc preter naturam ipsis hec agere? Secundum naturam
autem non enter erit malum, si malum unicuique preter sui ipsius naturam. Neque enim leonum neque
pardaleorum malum dices utique esse furorem, sed hominum quibus optimum ratio; alii autem secun-
dum rationem agere non bonum, cui esse secundum intellectum (Ma se agendo nel modo anzidetto
ciascuno di essi [scil. degli eroi] conserva se stesso e la natura che gli propria, insieme con la par-
te che nelluniverso ha ereditato dalleternit, come sarebbe per loro possibile agire contro la propria
natura? Ci che conforme a natura non realmente male, se male per ciascun essere la non con-
formit alla loro natura. Tu non dirai infatti che un male il furore nei leoni e nelle pantere, sibbene
negli uomini, nei quali lelemento migliore la ragione. Ma per altri esseri la cui realt conforme
queste osservazioni, si potrebbe avanzare lipotesi che, nellambito di alcuni sviluppi

della demonologia neoplatonica tardoantica o forse nellambito di alcuni risvolti del-
la fruizione bizantina di fonti riconducibili a tale contesto, questo parallelismo tra le
passioni degli eroi e quelle dei grandi felini sia stato in qualche modo applicato anche
ai demoni (quali entit prossime agli eroi, ancorch distinte da questi) o, almeno, a
una classe di demoni, e abbia contribuito a determinare la concezione della peculiare
natura del loro .
In ogni caso, in una prospettiva pi ampia, si pu anche rilevare che un acco-
stamento dei demoni alle belve feroci si trova in vari autori neoplatonici. Giamblico
afferma che i demoni malvagi, nelle loro apparizioni, si mostrano circondati di bestie
funeste, assetate di sangue e selvagge. Proclo fa riferimento allapparizione di un
demone solare dal volto leonino. Porfirio, nel descrivere i simboli di Ecate, parla
di un cero multicolore con una splendente fiamma apotropaica, presentandolo come
una tremenda immagine cesellata della da, capace di generare terrore nei cani in-
feri ( , ), i quali altro non sono che i
demoni, di cui Ecate la signora. Tali figure bestiali sono anche ricordate in un
oracolo riportato da Porfirio, in cui si legge che la terra governata dalla razza dei
cani scuri ( ) di Ecate, identificati dal filosofo con i demo-
ni malvagi (). Porfirio sostiene anche che il simbolo dei demoni il cane a
tre teste ( ), il quale il demone malvagio ( ) che si
trova nei tre elementi costituiti dallacqua, dalla terra e dallaria. Anche Proclo, con
riferimento alle pene escatologiche descritte da Platone nel mito di Er, parla di visioni
spaventose di demoni che somigliano a serpenti e a cani.
Questi rilievi neoplatonici vanno collegati alla tradizione caldaica, in cui i demo-
ni malvagi, come abbiamo visto, sono presentati come cani. In un frammento ora-
allintelligenza non sar un bene agire secondo ragione). Va notato che nel testo greco parallelo
di Isacco Sebastocratore, il termine corrispondente al latino furor (cf. Boese 1960, 198, nota
relativa a 18, 22/3).
143 Se tale collegamento dovesse risalire a una tradizione demonologica neoplatonica, si potrebbe
pensare che esso doveva riguardare i demoni irrazionali, volti a punire le anime con i tormenti.
144 Cf. Iamb., Myst., II 7, p. 63, 910 Saffrey/Segonds/Lecerf.
145 Cf. Procl., Hier., p. 150, 1516 Bidez. Un motivo simile si riscontra anche in uno scritto di Psello
riconducibile a fonti neoplatonico-caldaiche, in cui, con riferimento alle apparizioni demoniche, egli
parla di demoni dai tratti morfologici leonini; cf. Psell., Op., 37, p. 125, 35 OMeara.
146 Cf. Porph., Frag., 320 F. (Phil. ex or., ap. Euseb., Praep. ev.), p. 368, 916 Smith.
147 Sulla figura di Ecate come signora dei demoni, cf. Porph., Frag., 320 F., 326 F., 327 F. (Phil. ex or.,
ap. Euseb., Praep. ev.), pp. 367368, 375377, 378 Smith, in cui Ecate posta al comando dei demoni in
coppia con Serapide-Plutone. Su Ecate in vari ambiti della cultura greca tardoantica, cf. Calvo Martnez
1992, in part. 76 ss.
149 Si tratta di un riferimento a Cerbero, il cane dellAde.
151 Cf. Procl., In Remp., II, pp. 183, 30184, 1 Kroll.
colare trasmesso da Proclo, inoltre, i demoni che incantano le anime e le distolgo-

no dalle iniziazioni, sono descritti come cani opprimenti e implacabili (
[...]). E anche Psello, con riferimento al medesimo genere di demoni delle
dottrine caldaiche, afferma che esso chiamato bestiale e implacabile (
). Ora, laggettivo che, associato al carattere della bestialit, ricorre
in questi contesti caldaici, a nostro avviso si ricollega alla ferina attribuita
nellopuscolo ai demoni. Lidea ci sembra quella di un pathos impulsivo e violento,
assimilabile allistintiva aggressivit degli animali predatori, priva di freni inibitori
razionali. Una prerogativa, questa, che manifesta delle connotazioni negative e che
originariamente, come si nota dagli esempi riportati sopra, doveva essere attribuita,
da talune correnti neoplatoniche, ai demoni cattivi. Daltro canto, in talune prospetti-
ve neoplatoniche vi uno stretto legame, nei demoni e negli uomini, tra le passioni,
intrinsecamente irrazionali, e la fenomenologia del male. Al riguardo, non un caso
che i neoplatonici che attribuiscono anche ai demoni una natura passionale, ricondu-
cono la cattiveria di questi alle loro passioni. Esemplare la posizione di Porfirio, se-
condo cui, come abbiamo gi ricordato, sono malvagi quei demoni che non dominano
le proprie passioni pneumatiche.
4.4 Il corpo e laspetto dei demoni
Il successivo rilievo dellopuscolo riguarda i peculiari caratteri della corporeit dei de-
moni. Lautore dichiara che i greci concepiscono i demoni come avvolti in corpi (-
) sottili, aerei, che oppongono poca resistenza fisica, di forma sferica o allungata,
legati in larga misura alloscurit terrestre. Il verbo , utilizzato in questo
contesto per esprimere il tipo di legame dei demoni con i rispettivi corpi, indica un
essere vincolati ai corpi, come racchiusi in degli involucri. Questi corpi-involucri sot-
tili dei demoni rimandano alla pi generale dottrina neoplatonica del , inteso
come una sorta di struttura di supporto intermedia e mediatrice tra la materialit dei
corpi fisici e limmaterialit delle anime e degli enti incorporei, un involucro o veicolo
() di natura astrale, di cui si rivestono le anime nel loro unirsi ai corpi. I neo-
platonici utilizzano la nozione di -, oltre che con riferimento allanima
umana e alle sue dinamiche di discesa nel mondo della generazione e di ascesa al-
152 Cf. Or. chald., Fr. 135 (ap. Procl., In Alc.), 23, p. 99 des Places.
153 Cf. Psell., Op., 40, p. 150, 2632, in part. 2829 OMeara. Lespressione
considerata dagli studiosi come un frammento oracolare caldaico (cf. il Fr. 89 nelle edizioni degli
Oracoli caldaici a cura di des Places e di Majercik).
154 Sul corpo dei demoni nella cultura bizantina, cf. Greenfield 1988, in part. 199201; Maltese 1995.
155 Sulla dottrina neoplatonica dell/, nei suoi vari aspetti teorici e risvolti psicologico-
gnoseologici e teurgico-religiosi, cf. Di Pasquale Barbanti 1998; si vedano anche Trouillard 1957 (con
riferimento a Proclo); E. R. Dodds 1963e, 313321; Finamore 1985 (con riferimento a Giamblico).
le realt superiori, anche con riferimento alla peculiare corporeit di cui si rivestono
demoni. Il , pur essendo passibile di appesantirsi e ispessirsi nel suo connu-
bio con le componenti materiali e di perdere purezza nellassecondare le proiezioni
irrazionali dellimmaginazione e delle passioni, cui esso connesso, di per se stes-
so presenta la rarefatta consistenza di un leggero soffio. Da qui la delineazione del
come un corpo aereo, sottile, poco spesso e solido, privo, insomma, di una
vera massa corporea. Per Porfirio, la bont o la malvagit delle anime demoniche di-
pende dal modo in cui si rapportano al cui sono congiunte, cio se lo domina-
no o se piuttosto gli sono sottomesse. Anche lidea della natura aerea del corpo dei
demoni presente nel platonismo tardoantico.
Inoltre, secondo una dottrina neoplatonica, anche le apparizioni dei demoni ri-
cordate nellopuscolo a proposito dei riti goetici sono strettamente legate al loro
. Le visioni dei demoni e degli di, infatti, non sono percepite con la nostra vi-
sta, bens tramite una sorta dimpressione diretta del nostro in cui si produce
un simulacro colto dalla nostra immaginazione, la quale capace di agire in assenza
di stimoli sensibili. La dinamica di tale processo sembra compiersi in una sorta di con-
tatto interattivo del di cui sono rivestire le anime umane con quello dei demo-
ni. Questi ultimi, secondo suggestioni porfiriane, come se proiettassero sul proprio
involucro pneumatico, come immagini riflesse in uno specchio, una variet di forme
corrispondenti alle rappresentazioni prodotte dalla loro immaginazione. In tal modo
essi utilizzano il proprio involucro aereo come un sostrato plastico che permette la
loro manifestazione in una variet di forme, proiettate o impresse in esso. Tale ma-
nifestazione figurativa colta, in una sorta di corrispondenza di strutture e funzioni
pneumatiche, dalla facolt umana dellimmaginazione, direttamente connessa allin-
volucro pneumatico delle nostre anime, luogo interiore di incontro tra lincorporeo e il
corporeo. Per quanto concerne la variabilit delle forme assunte dai demoni, Proclo
sostiene che questi contengono nella propria identit ogni mutazione delle loro figu-
156 Limmaginazione (), infatti, connessa al in quanto costituisce una forma di

conoscenza intermedia tra la ragione e la sensazione. Per vari aspetti della dottrina del dei
demoni, cf. Simonini 1986/2006, 132136.
157 Cf. Il gi citato Porph., Abst., II 38, 4, 15, p. 105 Bouffartigue/Patillon.
158 Cf. per es. Apul., De deo Socr., XI, 144, p. 31 Beaujeu; Plot., Enn., III 5 (50), 6, 4042, vol. I, p. 299
Henry/Schwyzer (in cui Plotino riporta la posizione di coloro che credono che il demone, nella sua
sostanza, sia unito a un corpo di aria o di fuoco).
159 Cf. Ps.-Psell., Graec. opin., 4, 6972, p. 101 Gautier, in cui si legge che la fa apparire agli
epopti immagini dei demoni materiali e terreni ( ),
e offre agli spettatori delle parvenze, in forma dimmagine, di tali demoni (
).
160 Cf. Porph., Gaur., VI 1, p. 42, 610, ed. K. Kalbfleisch, Berlin 1895, ma anche Porph., Abst., II 39, 1,
58, p. 105 Bouffartigue/Patillon. Si vedano inoltre Herm., In Phrd., p. 69, 718 Couvreur (in cui si parla
anche delle voci dei demoni, non percepite con il nostro udito sensibile) e Iamb., Myst., III 14, pp. 98,
24101, 2 Saffrey/Segonds/Lecerf. Al riguardo, cf. le osservazioni di Simonini 1986/2006, 135136.
re ( ). Porfirio, riguardo al corpo pneumatico dei demoni,

dichiara che essi non hanno tutti ununica forma, bens si mostrano in una pluralit
di figure ( ). E Giamblico, in merito alle apparizioni ()
dei demoni, afferma che esse sono variegate () e si mostrano ora in una forma
() ora in unaltra, e le medesime apparizioni appaiono sia grandi che piccole.
Riguardo alle forme dei corpi dei demoni, rotondi oppure allungati, si pu riman-
dare ad alcune considerazioni di Proclo, secondo cui i demoni buoni e divini hanno
involucri sferici, mentre i demoni materiali hanno anche involucri che si muovono in
modo rettilineo. Anche gli di che si servono di corpi (gli di astrali) ricorrono a cor-
pi sferici, poich la forma sferica, per Proclo, connessa con il ritorno a se stessi.
Sembra cos profilarsi, secondo una connessione tra forma e tipo di movimento, una
differenza tra involucri sferici, propri dei demoni di alto rango, quali corpi verosimil-
mente dotati di un perfetto movimento circolare (come quello dei corpi divini celesti,
con riferimento agli astri fissi) che richiama lidea di , e involucri propri di
demoni di basso rango, i quali invece si muovono in linea retta (come avviene nei mo-
vimenti locali dei corpi sublunari) e verosimilmente come emerge da altri passi
hanno forme slanciate e allungate, connesse forse allidea di . Psello, inve-
ce, riporta la testimonianza di Porfirio relativa a Babutzicario-Bab, un demone fem-
minile notturno, caratterizzato da una sussistenza umbratile e da una forma allungata
( ).
Il rilievo dellopuscolo secondo cui i corpi sottili dei demoni partecipano poco del-
la luce e molto delloscurit terrestre, induce a pensare che, originariamente, tale
istanza doveva essere relativa agli involucri dei demoni di basso rango (terreni e ma-
teriali), caratterizzati da un offuscato e intorbidato dal contatto con il corpo
fisico.
161 Cf. Procl., In Crat., 75, p. 36, 1012 Pasquali.

163 Cf. Iamb., Myst., III 3, p. 53, 10 e p. 54, 911 Saffrey/Segonds/Lecerf.
164 Cf. Procl., In Crat., 73, p. 35, 2024 Pasquali e il relativo commento di Romano 1989, 147. Secondo
Proclo, anche i veicoli delle anime umane sono sferici, in corrispondenza della sfericit del cosmo; cf.
Procl., In Tim., II, p. 72, 1214 Diehl. Olimpiodoro, invece, ritiene che linvolucro () della nostra
anima sia ovale () per via di una distorsione, e non perfettamente sferico come gli involucri
celesti; cf. Olymp., In Alc., 16, 1215, p. 14 Westerink.
165 Sul rilievo topico del movimento circolare degli astri fissi e rettilineo delle realt sublunari, cf.
Procl., In Tim., III, p. 79, 1416 Diehl.
166 Cf. Psell., Op., 48, p. 163, 13 OMeara (= Porph. 471 F., p. 545 Smith). Su ci cf. Svoboda 1927,
5455.
167 Gli involucri pneumatici, in genere, sono descritti come luminosi; cf. per es. Iamb., Myst., III 14,
p. 99, 910 Saffrey/Segonds/Lecerf; Procl., Theol. Plat., III 5, vol. III, p. 19, 1011 Saffrey/Westerink.
168 Si segnala che, nellambito della cultura bizantina, unaltra raccolta di informazioni di matrice
neoplatonica sui caratteri e le forme dei corpi dei demoni si riscontra in Psell., Op., 37, pp. 124, 1113 e
1520, 2326 OMeara.
4.5 Demoni e divinazione
Lultimo dato della prima sezione riguarda il fatto che i greci attribuiscono ai demoni
la conoscenza () e, in particolare, la premonizione degli eventi futuri ( -
) a partire da vari segni, soprattutto dalle configurazioni astrali
( ). Tale conoscenza, chiaramente,
alla base delle pratiche di divinazione che coinvolgono in vari modi i demoni.
Nellambito del platonismo tardoantico, lattribuzione ai demoni del carattere sa-
liente della conoscenza si presenta come unistanza ben attestata, sulla scia del colle-
gamento etimologico tra e (periti, esperti) delineato da Plato-
ne nel Cratilo.
Il collegamento della mantica con i demoni, visti nella loro funzione ausiliaria
dintermediari tra gli di e gli uomini, gi prospettato nel Simposio di Platone (202
e 7203 a 4), in un passo basilare per la demonologia della successiva tradizione pla-
tonica. Apuleio, sulla scia di tale passo, dichiara che tramite i demoni ci perviene, tra
laltro, ogni presagio e messaggio divino, con riferimento alle varie pratiche divina-
torie, ricondotte tutte agli di celesti, ma amministrate diligentemente dai demoni.
Con rimando al medesimo brano platonico, Porfirio parla dei demoni trasportato-
ri che mettono in contatto gli di e gli uomini, portando in alto ai primi le preghiere
dei secondi e trasmettendo a questi ultimi, per mezzo delle pratiche mantiche (
), i consigli e le ammonizioni degli di. Proclo, allo stesso modo, sostie-
ne che i demoni comunicano agli uomini le conoscenze che provengono dagli di, e
che, al pari degli di, conoscono in anticipo con chiarezza le facolt e le azioni degli
uomini, avendo cognizione dei cicli escatologici e della distribuzione delle sorti delle
anime. Egli, inoltre, attribuisce ai demoni una peculiare conoscenza determinata
delle cose indeterminate, legata alla facolt divinatrice e simultanea alla conoscenza
delle realt superiori ad essi, con riferimento alla funzione provvidenziale che i de-
moni hanno ricevuto dagli di e che esercitano, come intermediari, sui vari esseri del
cosmo. Il riferimento dellopuscolo alla premonizione demonica del futuro legata
alle configurazioni degli astri, sembra rimandare a un quadro mantico-oracolare di ti-
po astrologico e oroscopico-zodiacale in cui sono direttamente implicati i demoni.
Un accenno alla conoscenza degli eventi futuri predetti dal corso degli astri, attribui-
ta ai demoni oltre che agli di, si trova in una testimonianza di Porfirio conservata
169 Cf. Plat., Crat., 398b 57, t. II, Burnet. Si veda per es. Calc., In Tim., 132, p. 368, 2531 Bakhouche
(in cui Calcidio si riferisce in particolare ai demoni delletere, chiamati angeli santi dagli Ebrei).
170 Cf. Apul., De deo Socr., VI, 133134, pp. 2627 Beaujeu.
172 Cf. Procl., In Crat., 79, p. 37, 1521 e 88, p. 43, 1115 Pasquali.
173 Cf. Procl., Dec. dub., III 15, 157, pp. 7274 Isaac.
174 Per taluni risvolti astrologici della demonologia bizantina, cf. Greenfield 1988, 220225.
da Giovanni Filopono. Non si pu escludere, inoltre, che il rilievo possa anche in

qualche misura rimandare a talune prospettive attestate nellambito dellastrologia
greca tardoantica, in cui, per esempio, si riscontra una significativa demonizzazione
del quadro zodiacale, con lattribuzione della XI casa al Buon Demone e della XII al
Cattivo Demone.
Abbiamo anche visto come nellopuscolo si riscontri il tema della natura ingan-
nevole di alcuni responsi dei demoni. Tale aspetto rimanda, in generale, al gi ricor-
dato tema neoplatonico della mendacia dei demoni malvagi, ma potrebbe anche es-
sere in qualche modo connessa al tema porfiriano dei limiti delle capacit divinatorie
degli stessi di e dei demoni, con specifico riferimento alla mancanza di una debita
conoscenza del moto destinale degli astri.
5 Qualche considerazione conclusiva

Nellambito del platonismo tardoantico, la demonologia, sviluppata con riferimento a
sollecitazioni di varie tradizioni religiose e filosofiche, si rivela una materia tanto rile-
vante quanto problematica. Le teorie demonologiche che abbiamo chiamato in causa
in queste pagine a titolo di exempla, lasciano emergere il rilievo che, nel neoplatoni-
smo, la riflessione filosofica sui demoni, al pari di altri ambiti speculativi con cui in-
trecciata, non si struttura come un sistema dottrinale unitario e omogeneo, bens si
articola in una pluralit di idee e di linee di sviluppo che, pur condividendo una piatta-
forma di traiettorie e assunti speculativi, si differenziano tra loro e talvolta si pongono
in fragrante contrapposizione reciproca. Come nota Turcan, con riferimento alle pro-
spettive demonologiche del tardo paganesimo greco-romano, la dmonologie est un
175 Cf. Porph., Frag., 340 F. (Phil. ex or., ap. Philop., Op. mundi), pp. 388389, in part. 2 e 910 Smith.
176 In questa direzione, cf. Ptol., Tetrab., III 10, ed. F. E. Robbins, Cambridge Mass./London 1964, pp.
274275; Vett. Val., Anth., II 6, pp. 6061 e II 7, p. 61; Firm., Math., II 16, ed. W. Kroll, F. Skutsch, K.
Ziegler, Leipzig 18971913, vol. I, 2, pp. 59, 2760, 2; II 17, vol. I, 2, p. 60, 1316; II 18, vol. I, 2, p. 60,
2223 e 23, pp. 60, 2661, 2. In tale tradizione, con il collegamento delle suddette case astrali e dei
loro rispettivi influssi con due contrapposte entit di natura demonica, si rilancia lidea dello stretto
legame tra i demoni e la sorte () buona o cattiva degli uomini, in tal caso strettamente legata alla
posizione degli astri e alla configurazione del tema natale.
177 Cf. il gi citato brano di Porph., Frag., 340 F (Phil. ex or., ap. Philop., Op. mundi), pp. 388389
Smith. Nei frammenti della Filosofia desunta dagli oracoli, Porfirio attribuisce di regola agli di la pre-
dizione degli eventi futuri sulla base della conoscenza del corso degli astri, e afferma anche che talvol-
ta gli stessi di non hanno unadeguata cognizione dei moti astrali e, interrogati, forniscono responsi
apertamente falsi.
178 Nel platonismo, le diverse teorie sui demoni, integrate in un modello dogmatico-sistematico di
fondo del sapere filosofico, sintrecciano in modo significativo con una variet di altri temi di ordine
metafisico-ontologico, gnoseologico, antropologico-psicologico, etico-religioso, magico-teurgico.
lieu de tensions et de contradictions dans le camp polythiste. Ci, aggiungiamo,

secondo orientamenti dissonanti e nodi di discordia tra autori che, in unottica pi
vasta, tendono pur sempre a riconoscersi reciprocamente come eredi di una medesi-
ma tradizione filosofica. Una tradizione che appare come una koin filosofica aperta,
dialogica, dinamica e frastagliata.
Ora, si pu notare che lautore dellopuscolo, nel presentare varie opinioni dei
greci sui demoni, assembla il materiale documentario di cui dispone in un quadro
generale che sul piano dottrinale si configura come unitario, senza cogliere in esso ele-
menti dincoerenza interna e senza preoccuparsi di evidenziare distinzioni tra diverse
prospettive teoriche. Le diverse dottrine sui demoni attestate nel tardo platonismo,
insomma, sembrano ricomposte in unit, ricondotte a un unico hellenikos logos, co-
me unico doveva essere, nella visione dellautore, il contrapposto logos cristiano (ho
hemeteros logos). Riguardo alle fonti dellopuscolo, abbiamo ricordato che vario ma-
teriale raccolto in esso deriva, senza significative rielaborazioni, dalla versione non
dialogica del De operatione daemonum attribuita, secondo Gautier, falsamente a Psel-
lo; altro materiale tratto da Psello o dalla tradizione di Clemente Alessandrino; al-
tro, verosimilmente, se non da Psello, in qualche modo dalle medesime fonti da cui lo
attinge questultimo: scritti di Proclo (un autore su cui concentrano la loro attenzio-
ne Gautier e Bidez) e, forse, di altri filosofi neoplatonici, i Porfirio e i Giamblico
cui rimanda il compilatore. Elementi di demonologia neoplatonica, inoltre, poteva-
no essere tratti da scritti di vari autori cristiani. Guardando ai peculiari caratteri della
compilazione dellopuscolo, siamo portati ad avanzare lipotesi che il suo autore abbia
potuto attingere parte del materiale sui demoni, piuttosto che direttamente da opere
di filosofi neoplatonici, da una variegata produzione letteraria bizantina di natura an-
tologica e compilativa, costituita da florilegi, scolii, raccolte di estratti o anche epitomi
di testi neoplatonici. Un letteratura secondaria e filtrata che, magari a discapito di
179 Turcan 2003, 49.

180 Riguardo a Proclo, si potrebbe anche pensare, sulla scia dei due studiosi sopra menzionati, al
perduto commentario sugli Oracoli caldaici, il quale, forse, ai tempi di Psello era ancora disponibile
(cf. per es. des Places 1971/2003, 4647, in cui lo studioso prospetta lidea che Psello abbia attinto la
sua conoscenza degli Oracoli caldaici direttamente da questo commentario o forse, in modo indiretto,
dalla confutazione del pensiero procliano elaborata da Procopio di Gaza nel VI secolo d.C.; per que-
stultima prospettiva cf. Westerink 1942b). Da Marino sappiamo che Proclo studi a fondo la sapienza
caldaica e vi consacr varie opere in cui si soffermava anche sulle prospettive esegetiche di Porfirio
e Giamblico (cf. Marin., Procl., 26, ed. H. D. Saffrey, A.-Ph. Segonds, C. Luna, Paris 2002, 1528, pp.
3031). Da questa testimonianza si pu dedurre che il commentario di Proclo doveva presentarsi come
una poderosa summa sul tema, la quale inglobava rilievi critici sulle posizioni esegetiche di Porfirio
e di Giamblico. Sicuramente essa doveva contenere vari riferimenti ai demoni; se questo scritto pro-
cliano era ancora in qualche modo disponibile nel mondo bizantino, poteva costituire una fonte per
risalire a molte tesi demonologiche porfiriane e giamblichee.
181 Sulle diverse forme di consultazione e di lettura delle fonti neoplatoniche nel mondo bizantino,
cf. Cacouros 2007c, in part. 193 ss.
una comprensione pi approfondita degli argomenti presi in esame, poteva favorire

dinamiche di selezione tematica e di sintesi dottrinale particolarmente efficaci per la
stesura di altri lavori di compilazione, come il nostro opuscolo.
In ogni caso, il costituisce pur sempre una
rilevante testimonianza della circolazione nella tarda cultura bizantina di segmenti
del pensiero neoplatonico, ovverosia di una tradizione filosofica che, conservatasi in
vari modi nella cultura dellOriente bizantino, avrebbe goduto, sulla scia di una profi-
cua e frastagliata translatio studiorum, di una nuova fioritura nel pensiero medievale
e successivamente nella cultura rinascimentale dellOccidente latino.
Fonti primarie
Alcin. Intr. Alcinoos, Enseignement des doctrines de Platon, texte introduit, tabli et comment par
J. Whittaker, traduit par P. Louis, Paris 2002 (1990).
Ammon. In Porph. Ammonius, In Phorphyrii Isagogen sive V Voces, edidit A. Busse (Commentaria
in Aristotelem Graeca IV, 3), Berlin 1891.
Apul. De deo Socr. Apule, Opuscules philosophiques. Fragments: Du Dieu de Socrate Platon et
sa doctrine Du monde, texte tabli, traduit et comment par J. Beaujeu, Paris 2002 (1973).
Artem. Onir. Artemidori Daldiani Onirocriticon libri V, recognovit R. A. Pack, Leipzig 1963.
Calc. In Tim. Calcidius, Commentaire au Time de Platon, T. I, dition critique et traduction
franaise, par B. Bakhouche, avec la collaboration del L. Brisson pour la traduction, Paris 2011.
Cels. Aleth. Log. R. Bader, Der des Kelsos, Stuttgart/Berlin 1940.
Clem. Al. Protr. Clemens Alexandrinus, Erster Band, Protrepticus und Paedagogus, Hrsg. von O.
Sthlin, Leipzig 1905.
Dam. In Phaed. The Greek Commentaries on Platos Phaedo, II. Damascius, edited with translation
by L. G. Westerink, revised second edition, Westbury 2009 (Amsterdam/Oxford/New York
1977).
Eun. V. Soph. Eunapii Vitae Sophistarum, G. Giangrande recensuit, Roma 1956.
Firm. Math. Iulii Firmici Materni Matheseos Libri VIII, 2 voll., ediderunt W. Kroll et F. Skutsch [vol. II
in operis societatem assumpto K. Ziegler], Leipzig 18971913.
Herm. In Phdr. Hermiae Alexandrini In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia, ad fidem Codicis Parisini 1810
denuo collati edidit et apparatu critico ornavit P. Couvreur, Paris 1901.
Hierocl. In CA Hieroclis Commentarius in Aureum Carmen, in Fragmenta Philosophorum Grcorum,
collegit, recensuit, vertit, annotationibus et prolegomenis illustravit, indicibus instruxit F. G. A.
Mullach, Paris 1883.
Iamb. De an. Iamblichus, De Anima, Texte, Translation, and Commentary by J. F. Finamore and J. M.
Dillon, Leiden/Boston/Kln 2002.
Iamb. Myst. Jamblique, Rponse Porphyre (De mysteriis), texte tabli, traduit et annot par H. D.
Saffrey et A.-Ph. Segonds, avec la collaboration de A. Lecerf, Paris 2013.
Iul. C. Gal. Giuliano Imperatore, Contra Galilaeos, Introduzione, testo critico e traduzione a cura di
E. Masaracchia, Roma 1990.
Marin. Procl. Marinus, Proclus ou sur le bonheur, texte tabli, traduit et annot par H. D. Saffrey et
A.-Ph. Segonds, avec la collaboration de C. Luna, Paris 2002 (2001).
Olymp. In Alc. Olympiodorus, Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato, Critical Text and Indices
by L. G. Westerink, Amsterdam 1956.
Olymp. In Grg. Olympiodori In Platonis Gorgiam Commentaria, edidit L. G. Westerink, Leipzig 1970.
Olymp. Zos. Olympiodore, Sur lart sacr, in Collection des anciens alchimistes grecs, par M.
Berthelot, avec la collaboration de Ch.-. Ruelle, vol. I, Paris 1887, 69104.
Or. Chald. Oracles chaldaques, texte tabli et traduit par . des Places, Paris 2003 (1971).
Or. Chald. The Chaldean Oracles, Text, Translation and Commentary, by R. Majercik, Westbury
2013 (Leiden 1989).
Orph. H. Orphei Hymni, iteratis curis edidit G. Quandt, Berlin 1955.
PGM Papyri Graecae Magicae. Die griechischen Zauberpapyri, herausgegeben und bersetzt von
K. Preisendanz, 2 tt., zweite, verbesserte Auflage [con il supporto e la collaborazione di vari
studiosi], Stuttgart 19721974 (19281931).
Phot. Bibl. Photius, Bibliothque, t. II ( Codices 84185). Texte tabli et traduit par R. Henry,
Paris 2003 (1960).
Plat. Crat. Platonis Opera, recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit I. Burnet, 5 tt., Oxford
19001907, t. I.
Plat. Symp. Platonis Opera, recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit I. Burnet, 5 tt., Oxford
19001907, t. II.
Plat. Tim. Platonis Opera, recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit I. Burnet, 5 tt., Oxford
19001907, t. IV.
Plot. Enn. Plotini Opera, ediderunt P. Henry & H.-R. Schwyzer, 3 tt., Oxford 19641982.
Porph. Abst. Porphyre, De labstinence. 3 tt., texte tabli et traduit par J. Bouffartigue et M. Patillon
[per i primi due tomi], texte tabli et traduit par M. Patillon et A.-Ph. Segonds avec le concours
de L. Brisson [per il terzo tomo], Paris 19771995 (2003).
Porph. Aneb. Porphyre, Lettre Anbon lgyptien, texte tabli, traduit et comment par H. D.
Saffrey et A.-Ph. Segonds, Paris 2012.
Porph. Frag. Porphyrii Philosophi Fragmenta, edidit A. Smith, fragmenta arabica D. Wasserstein
interpretante, Stuttgart/Leipzig 1993.
Porph. Gaur. Die neuplatonische, flschlich dem Galen zugeschriebene Schrift
, aus der Pariser Handschrift zum ersten Male, hrsg. K.
Kalbfleisch, in Abhandlungen der kniglichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Berlin
1895, Philosophische und historische Abhandlungen, (I), pp. 180.
Porph. Marc. Porphyrios, , griechischer Text, hrsg., bersetzt eingeleitet und
erklrt von W. Ptscher, Leiden 1969.
Porph. Plot. Porphyre, La vie de Plotin, II. tudes dintroduction, texte grec et traduction franaise,
commentaire, notes complmentaires, bibliographie, par L. Brisson et alii, Prface de J. Ppin,
Paris 1992.
Procl. Dec. dub. Proclus, Trois tudes sur la providence, t. I, Dix problmes concernant la
providence, texte tabli et traduit par D. Isaac, Paris 2003 (1977).
Procl. De mal subs. Proclus, Trois tudes sur la providence, t. III, De lexistence du mal, texte tabli
et traduit par D. Isaac, Note additionnelle par C. Steel, Paris 2003 (1982).
Procl. Hier. Proclus, , in Catalogue des Manuscrits
alchimiques grecs, VI, ptre sur la Chrysope. Opuscules et extraits sur lalchimie, la
mtorologie et la dmonologie, publis par J. Bidez, en appendice Proclus, Sur lart hiratique.
Psellus, Choix de dissertations indites, Bruxelles 1928, pp. 137151.
Procl. In Alc. Proclus, Sur le Premier Alcibiade de Platon, texte tabli et traduit par A.-Ph. Segonds,
2 tt., Paris 2003 (19851986).
Procl. In Crat. Procli Diadochi In Platonis Cratylum Commentaria, edidit G. Pasquali, Leipzig 1908.
Procl. In Remp. Procli Diadochi In Platonis Rem Publicam commentarii, edidit W. Kroll, 2 voll.,
Amsterdam 1965 (Leipzig 18991901).
Procl. In Tim. Procli Diadochi In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, edidit E. Diehl, 3 voll., Amsterdam
1965 (Leipzig 19031906).

Procl. Theol. Plat. Proclus, Thologie platonicienne, texte tabli et traduit par H. D. Saffrey et L. G.
Westerink, 6 voll., Paris 2003 (19681997).
Psell. De daem. P. Gautier, Le De daemonibus du Pseudo-Psellos, in Revue des tudes byzantines
38 (1980), 105194: 133194.
Psell. Op. Michaelis Pselli Philosophica Minora, vol. II. Opuscula psychologica, theologica,
daemonologica, ed. D. J. OMeara, Leipzig 1989.
Ps.-Psell. Graec. opin. P. Gautier, Pseudo-Psellos : Graecorum opiniones de daemonibus, in Revue
des tudes byzantines 46 (1988), 85107.
Ps.-Psell., Graec. opin. , in .
Michael Psellus, De operatione daemonum, cum notis Gaulmini, curante Jo. Fr. Boissonade,
accedunt inedita Opuscula Pselli, Nrnberg 1838 (rist. Amsterdam 1964), 3643.
Ps.-Psell. Graec. opin. - Ejusdem Pselli
Qunam sunt Grcorum opiniones de dmonibus, in J.-P. Migne (acc.), Patrologi cursus
completus, Series Grca, t. 122, Paris 1889, coll. 876881.
Ptol. Tetrab. Ptolemy, Tetrabiblos, edited and translated by F. E. Robbins, Cambridge Mass./London
1964 (1940).
Salust. De diis Saloustios, Des Dieux et du Monde, texte tabli et traduit par G. Rochefort, Paris
2003 (1960).
Vett. Val. Anth. Vettii Valentis Antiocheni Anthologiarum Libri novem, D. Pingree (ed.), Leipzig 1986.
Letteratura secondaria
Abbate, M. (2008). Il divino tra unit e molteplicit. Saggio sulla Teologia Platonica di Proclo.
Alessandria.
Albrile, E. (2008). Olimpiodoro, Commentario al libro di Zosimo Sulla forza, alle sentenze di
Ermete e degli altri filosofi. A cura di E. Albrile. Milano e Udine.
Andres, F. (1918). Daimon. In: Paulys Realencyclopdie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft.
Vol. Supplementband III. Stuttgart, coll. 267322.
Barbu, D. e A.-C. Rendu Loisel (2009). Dmons et exorcismes en Msopotamie et en Jude. In: I
Quaderni del Ramo d'Oro on-line 2, pp. 304366.
Beaujeu, J., cur. (1973/2002). Apule, Opuscules philosophiques. De dieu de Socrate, Platon et sa
doctrine, Du monde. 2a ed. Fragments, texte tabli, traduit et comment par J. Beaujeu. Paris.
Bianchi, U. (1990). Sulla demonologia del medio- e neoplatonismo. In: L'autunno del diavolo.
Diabolos, Dialogos, Daimon: convegno di Torino 17/21 ottobre 1988. A cura di E. Corsini e
E. Costa. Vol. I. Milano, pp. 5162.
Bidez, J. (1928). Catalogue des Manuscrits alchimiques grecs, VI, ptre sur la Chrysope. Opuscules
et extraits sur l'alchimie, la mtorologie et la dmonologie. Publis par J. Bidez, en appendice
Proclus, Sur l'art hiratique. Psellus, Choix de dissertations indites. Bruxelles.
Boese, H. (1960). Procli Diadochi Tria opuscula (de providentia, libertate, malo), Latine Guilelmo de
Moerbeka vertente et Graece ex Isaacii Sebastocratoris aliorumque scriptis collecta. Berlin.
Bowersock, G. W. (1990). Hellenism in Late Antiquity. Ann Arbor.
Bravo Garca, A. (2000). El Diablo en Bizancio. Metodologa, orientaciones y resultados de su
estudio. In: Seres Intermedios. ngeles, Demonios y Genios en el Mundo Mediterrneo. A cura
di A. Prez Jimnez e G. Cruz Andreotti. Mediterranea 7. Madrid e Mlaga, pp. 179215.
Butler, E. P. (2008). The Intelligible Gods in the Platonic Theology of Proclus. In: Mthexis 21,
pp. 131143.
Butler, E. P. (2010). The Second Intelligible Triad and the Intelligible-Intellective Gods. In: Mthexis
23, pp. 137155.
Butler, E. P. (2012). The Third Intelligible Triad and the Intellective Gods. In: Mthexis 25,
pp. 131150.
Butler, E. P. (2014). Essays on the Metaphysics of Polytheism in Proclus. New York.
Cacouros, M. (2007c). Survie culturelle et rmanence textuelle du noplatonisme Byzance.
lments gnraux lments portant sur la logique. In: The Libraries of the Neoplatonists.
Proceedings of the Meeting of the European Science Foundation Network Late Antiquity and
Arabic Thought. Patterns in the Constitution of European Culture held in Strasbourg, March
1214, 2004. A cura di C. D'Ancona. Leiden e Boston, pp. 177210.
Calvo Martnez, J. L. (1992). La Diosa Hecate: un paradigma de sincretismo religioso del helenismo
tardio. In: Florentia Iliberritana 3, pp. 7182.
Cavalletti, S. (1958). Qualche notizia sulla mantica giudaica. In: Studi e Materiali di Storia delle
Religioni 29.1, pp. 183214.
Cavallo, G. (2007b). Qualche riflessione sulla collezione filosofica. In: The Libraries of the
Neoplatonists. Proceedings of the Meeting of the European Science Foundation Network Late
Antiquity and Arabic Thought. Patterns in the Constitution of European Culture held in
Strasbourg, March 1214, 2004. A cura di C. D'Ancona. Leiden e Boston, pp. 155165.
Chlup, R. (2012b). Proclus. An Introduction. Cambridge.
Chuvin, P. (1991). Chronique des derniers paens. La disparition du paganisme dans l'Empire romain,
du rgne de Constantin celui de Justinien. 2e dition revue et corrige. Paris.
Covotti, A. (1898). Per la storia della letteratura bizantina. La filosofia di Michele Psello. In: Atti
della Reale Accademia di Scienze Morali e Politiche (Napoli) 29, pp. 381423.
Cumont, F. (1915). Les anges du paganisme. In: Revue de l'Histoire des Religions 71/72,
pp. 159182.
Dan, J. (1980). Samael, Lilith and the Concept of Evil in Early Kabbalah. In: Association for Jewish
Studies Revue 15, pp. 1740.
De Vita, M. C. (2011). Sul demone di Socrate: l'esegesi neoplatonica. In: . La filosofia
come esercizio del render ragione. Studi in onore di Giovanni Casertano. A cura di L. Palumbo.
Napoli, pp. 841863.
Delatte, A. e C. Josserand (1934). Contribution l'tude de la dmonologie byzantine. In: Annuaire
de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales 2, pp. 207232.
Des Places, . (1966). Le renouveau platonicien du XIe sicle: Michel Psellus et les Oracles
chaldaques. In: Comptes-rendus des sances de l'Acadmie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres
110.2, pp. 313324.
Des Places, ., cur. (1971/2003). Oracles chaldaques, texte tabli et traduit par . des Places. 4a ed.
Paris.
Dtienne, M. (1963). De la pense religieuse la pense philosophique. La notion de damn dans le
pythagorisme. Paris.
Di Pasquale Barbanti, M. (1998). Ochema-pneuma e phantasia nel neoplatonismo. Aspetti
psicologici e prospettive religiose. Catania.
Dillon, J. (2000). Seres intermedios en la Tradicin Platnica Tarda. In: Seres Intermedios.
ngeles, Demonios y Genios en el Mundo Mediterrneo. A cura di A. Prez Jimnez e
G. Cruz Andreotti. Mediterranea 7. Madrid e Mlaga, pp. 89117.
Dodds, E. R. (1963e). Proclus, The Elements of Theology, a Revised Text with Translation, Introduction
and Commentary. Oxford.
Donini, P. (1990). Nozioni di daimon e di intermediario nella filosofia tra il I e il II secolo d.C. In:
L'autunno del diavolo. Diabolos, Dialogos, Daimon: convegno di Torino 17/21 ottobre 1988. A
cura di E. Corsini e E. Costa. Vol. I. Milano, pp. 3750.
Edmonds III, R. G. (2004). The Faces of the Moon: Cosmology, Genesis, and the Mithras Liturgy. In:
Heavenly Realms and Earthly Realities in Late Antique Religions. A cura di R. S. Boustan e
A. Y. Reed. Cambridge, pp. 275295.
Fabiano, D. (2011). I demoni dei bagni tra acqua e fuoco. In: Dans le laboratoire de l'histoire des
religions. Mlanges offerts Philippe Borgeaud. A cura di F. Prescendi e Y. Volokhine. Avec la
collaboration de D. Barbu et Ph. Matthey. Genve, pp. 275288.
Fabietti, U. (1991/1994). Storia dell'antropologia. Bologna.
Faggin, G. (1992). Plotino, Enneadi. Porfirio, Vita di Plotino. Traduzione con testo greco a fronte,
introduzione, note e bibliografia di G. Faggin, Presentazione e iconografia plotiniana di G.
Reale, revisione finale dei testi, appendici e indici di R. Radice. Milano.
Festugire, A. J. (2006). Proclus, Commentaire sur le Time. 5 voll. Traduction et notes par A. J.
Festugire. Paris.
Finamore, J. F. (1985). Iamblichus and the Theory of the Vehicle of the Soul. Chico CA.
Gautier, P. (1980). Le De daemonibus du Pseudo-Psellos. In: Revue des tudes byzantines 38,
pp. 105194.
Gautier, P. (1988). Pseudo-Psellos: Graecorum opiniones de daemonibus. In: Reuve des tudes
byzantines 46, pp. 85107.
Greenfield, R. P. H. (1988). Traditions of Belief in Late Byzantine Demonology. Amsterdam.
Greenfield, R. P. H. (1995). A Contribution to the Study of Palaeologan Magic. In: Byzantine Magic.
A cura di H. Maguire. Washington (D. C.), pp. 117153.
Grosdidier de Matons, J. (1976). Psellos et le monde de l'irrationnel. In: Travaux et Mmoires 6,
pp. 325349.
Guillou, A. (2000). Le diable byzantin. In: . Miscellanea fr Peter Schreiner zu
seinem 60. Geburtstag. A cura di C. Scholz e G. Makris. Mit einem Geleitwort von H. Hunger.
Mnchen e Leipzig, pp. 4555.
Herrero de Juregui, M. (2007). Tradicin orfica y cristianismo antiguo. Madrid.
Hild, J.-A. (1881). tude sur les dmons dans la littrature et la religion des Grecs. Paris.
Hoffmann, P. (1994). Damascius. In: Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques. A cura di R. Goulet.
Vol. II. Paris, pp. 541593.
Hopfer, T. (1921). Griechisch-gyptischer Offenbarungszauber. Mit einer eingehenden Darstellung
der griechisch-synkretistischen Daemonen-glaubens und der Voraussetzungen und Mittel des
Zaubers berhaupt und der magischen Divination im besonderen. Vol. I. Leipzig.
Ibez Chacn, . (2008). La obra paradoxogrfica de Damascio (apud Phot. Bibl. cod. 130). In:
Cuadernos de Filologa Clsica. Estudios griegos e indoeuropeos 18, pp. 319334.
Innocenzi, F. (2011). Il daimon in Giamblico e la demonologia greco-romana. Macerata.
Johnston, S. I. (2010). Porphyry, Sacrifice, and the Orderly Cosmos: On the Philosophy to be
Derived from Oracles Fr. 314 and 315. In: Kernos 23, pp. 115132.
Jordan, D. (2008). Another Wretched Subject. The demons of the world. In: Greek Magic:
Ancient, Medieval and Modern. A cura di J. C. B. Petropoulos. London e New York, pp. 5863.
Kriaras, E. (1968). Psellos. In: Paulys Realencyclopdie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft.
Vol. Supplementband XI. Stuttgart, coll. 11241182.
Lanzi, S. (2001). Michele Psello, Oracoli Caldaici. Con appendici su Proclo e Michele Italo. Milano.
Lanzi, S. (20042005). La questione dei Giuliani e gli Oracoli caldaici: alcuni problemi
storico-religiosi. In: 12, pp. 145169.
Lanzi, S. (2006). Aion, Eros e Hades nei frammenti caldaici. In: Kervan 3, pp. 3549.
Lewy, H. (1956/2011). Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy. Mysticism, Magic and Platonism in Later
Roman Empire. Troisime dition par M. Tardieu, avec un supplment Les Oracles chaldaques
18912011. Paris.
Liddell, H. G. et al. (1940). A Greek-English Lexicon. Versione telematica.
Luck, G. (1985/2006). Arcana Mundi. Magic and the Occult in the Greek and Roman Worlds. A
Collection of Ancient Texts. 2a ed. Baltimore.
Majercik, R. (1989/2013). The Chaldean Oracles, Text, Translation and Commentary. 2a ed. Westbury.
Maltese, E. V. (1990). Il diavolo a Bisanzio: demonologia dotta e tradizioni popolari. In: L'autunno
del diavolo. Diabolos, Dialogos, Daimon: convegno di Torino 17/21 ottobre 1988. A cura di
E. Corsini e E. Costa. Vol. I. Milano, pp. 317333.
Maltese, E. V. (1995). Natura daemonum... habet corpus et versatur circa corpora: una lezione di
demonologia dal Medioevo greco. In: Il demonio e i suoi complici. Dottrine e credenze
demonologiche nella Tarda Antichit. A cura di S. Pricoco. Soveria Mannelli e Messina,
pp. 265284.
Mango, C. (1992). Diabolus Byzantinus. In: Dumbarton Oaks Papers 46, pp. 215223.
Margagliotta, G. M. A. (2012). Il Demone di Socrate nelle interpretazioni di Plutarco e Apuleio.
Nordhausen.
Montoneri, L. (1986). Proclo, La provvidenza e la libert dell'uomo. Roma e Bari.
Moore, P. (2005b). Iter Psellianum. A detailed listing of manuscript sources for all works attributed to
Michael Psellos, including a comprehensive bibliography. Toronto.
Moreschini, C. (1995). Il demone nella cultura pagana dell'et imperiale. In: Il demonio e i suoi
complici. Dottrine e credenze demonologiche nella Tarda Antichit. A cura di S. Pricoco. Soveria
Mannelli e Messina, pp. 75110.
Muscolino, G. (2010). La demonologia di Porfirio e il culto di Mitra. In: Mediaeval Sophia 7,
pp. 103123.
Muscolino, G. (2011). Saggio interpretativo. Magia, stregoneria, teosofia e teurgia. La
trasformazione del Neoplatonismo. In: Porfirio, La filosofia rivelata dagli oracoli, con tutti i
frammenti di magia, stregoneria, teosofia e teurgia. Monografia introduttiva di G. Girgenti,
Saggio interpretativo, traduzione, note e apparati di G. Muscolino. Milano, pp. cxviiccxi.
Renaissance. A cura di H. Seng. Heidelberg, pp. 4558.
Opsomer, J. (2003). La dmiurgie des jeunes dieux selon Proclus. In: Les tudes Classiques 71,
pp. 549.
pp. 133153.
Ramos Jurado, E. A. (1981). Lo platonico en el siglo V p. C.: Proclo. (Anlisis de las fuentes del
Comentario de Proclo al Timeo platnico en su libro V: Prlogo y Genealoga de los dioses).
Sevilla.
Reale, G. (1989). Introduzione a Proclo. Roma e Bari.
Riley, G. J. (1999). Demon, , . In: Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible. A
cura di K. van der Toorn, B. Becking e van der Horst P. W. Second extensively revised edition.
Leiden, Boston e Kln, pp. 235240.
Rodrguez Moreno, I. (1993). Aproximacin al estudio de los seres intermedios entre el hombre y la
divinidad en el mbito religioso y filosfico griego prearistotlico. In: Excerpta Philologica 3,
pp. 7186.
Rodrguez Moreno, I. (1994). Dmones y otros seres intermedios entre el hombre y la divinidad en
el pensamiento platnico. In: Fortunatae 6, pp. 185198.
Rodrguez Moreno, I. (1995). , y en la filosofa presocrtica. In: Habis 26,
pp. 2946.
Rodrguez Moreno, I. (1998). ngeles, dmones y hroes en el neoplatonismo griego. Amsterdam.
Rodrguez Moreno, I. (1999). Demonologa estoica. In: Habis 30, pp. 175187.
Romano, F. (1989). Proclo, Lezioni sul Cratilo di Platone. Catania e Roma.
Russell, J. B. (1984/1986). Lucifer. The Devil in the Middle Ages. Ithaca NY.
Saffrey, H. D. (1969). Nouveaux Oracles Chaldaques dans les scholies du Paris. Gr. 1853. In:
Revue de Philologie 43, pp. 5972.
Saffrey, H. D. (1981). Les Noplatoniciens et les Oracles Chaldaques. In: Revue des tudes
Augustiniennes 27, pp. 209225.
Saffrey, H. D. (1984). La thurgie comme phnomne culturel chez les noplatoniciens (IVeVe
sicles). In: 8, pp. 161171.
Saffrey, H. D. (1992b). Accorder entre elles les traditions thologiques: une charactristique du
Noplatonisme Athnien. In: On Proclus and his Influence in Medieval Philosophy. A cura di
E. P. Bos e P. A. Meijer. Leiden, New York e Kln, pp. 3550.
Saffrey, H. D. e L. G. Westerink (1968/2003). Introduction. In: Proclus, Thologie Platonicienne,
livre I. 2a ed. Texte tabli et traduit par H. D. Saffrey et L. G. Westerink. Paris.
Schibli, H. S. (1993). Xenocrates' Daemons and the Irrational Soul. In: Classical Quarterly 43.1,
pp. 143167.
Seng, H. (2009). , , . Drei Begriffe chaldaeischer Kosmologie und ihr
Fortleben. Heidelberg.
Seng, H. (2012). Chaldaeerrhetorik bei Michael Psellos. In: La retorica greca fra tardo antico ed et
bizantina: idee e forme. Convegno Internazionale, Napoli 2729 ottobre 2011. A cura di
U. Criscuolo. Napoli, pp. 355369.
Seng, H. e M. Tardieu (2010). Die Chaldaeischen Orakel: Kontext Interpretation Rezeption.
Heidelberg.
Shaw, G. (1995). Theurgy and the Soul. The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus. Pennsylvania.
Simonini, L. (1986/2006). Porfirio, L'antro delle Ninfe. Milano.
Sodano, A. R. (1984). Giamblico, I misteri egiziani. Abammone, Lettera a Porfirio. Introduzione,
traduzione, apparati, appendici critiche e indici di A. R. Sodano. Milano.
Sorabji, R. (2005). The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200600 AD. A Sourcebook. Vol. 1.
Psychology (with Ethics and Religion). Ithaca NY.
Svoboda, K. (1927). La dmonologie de Michel Psellos (dmonologie Michala Psella). Brno.
Tanaseanu-Dbler, I. (2013). Theurgy in Late Antiquity. The Invention of a Ritual Tradition. Gttingen
e Bristol.
Tardieu, M. (2011). Les Oracles chaldaques 18912011. In: Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy.
Mysticism, Magic and Platonism in Later Roman Empire. A cura di H. Lewy. Paris, pp. 731766.
Timotin, A. (2012). La dmonologie platonicienne. Histoire de la notion de daimn de Platon aux
derniers noplatoniciens. Leiden e Boston.
Trouillard, J. (1957). Rflexions sur l' dans les lments de Thologie de Proclus. In: Revue
des tudes Grecques 70, pp. 102107.
Turcan, R. (2003). Les dmons et la crise du paganisme grco-romain. In: Revue de Philosophie
ancienne 21.2, pp. 3354.
Weill-Parot, N. (2002). Les images astrologiques au Moyen ge et la Renaissance. Paris.
Westerink, L. G. (1942b). Proclus, Procopius, Psellus. In: Mnemosyne 10, pp. 275280.
Zervos, C. (1919b). Un philosophe noplatonicien du XIe sicle. Michel Psellos. Sa vie. Son uvre.
Lela Alexidze
Plethon on the Grades of Virtues: Back to Plato
via Neoplatonism?
1 Goals of the study

Among Christian philosophers of the Middle Ages, there are few thinkers who sin-
cerely loved and promoted ancient Greek philosophy, especially Platonism and Neo-
platonism. Two philosophers in Eastern Christian milieu, probably more than other
thinkers of their epochs, estimated very highly Platonic philosophy, and expressed
their sympathies to it in quite an unconventional, direct and uncompromised manner.
One was Ioane Petritsi, the twelfth century Georgian Neoplatonist, and the other was
the famous fourteenth-fifteenth century Greek Platonist Georgios Gemistos Plethon.
Both of them considered Plato or Proclus philosophies not only as the preparatory
courses for Christian theology, but esteemed them in their own rights, as theories,
which were valuable and ontologically true by themselves. Petritsis attitude toward
ancient Greek philosophy generally and to Plato and Neoplatonic philosophy in par-
ticular can be formulated briefly as follows: Petritsis Platonism is mainly of Neopla-
tonic (Proclean) character, and Proclus influence on his philosophy is considerable.
As for Plethon, it is known that his philosophy also has a Neoplatonic character. In
the present article, I shall focus my attention on one issue of Neoplatonic philosophy,
namely, on the theory of virtues as it is exposed by Plethon in his treatise on virtues,
and by his Neoplatonic predecessor, Porphyry, in his Sententia 32. As Plethon elab-
orated his own theory of virtues, it is interesting to know, whether Plethons theory
of virtues was substantially influenced by Porphyrys theory (which is based on Plot-
inus text on virtues) or not. The questions I shall try to answer, will be as follows:
How different and how similar are the above-mentioned theories on virtues? Can we
say that Plethons Platonism as far as his theory on virtues is concerned, is a Neopla-
tonic (Porphyrian) one? Furthermore, in the last part of this paper, we shall discuss
1 On Petritsis ancient Greek philosophical sources, including Proclus, see Alexidze 1997, Alexidze
2002b and Alexidze 2008b.
2 See, for example, Webb 1989, 216: his ontology has a distinctly Neoplatonic flavour. On the history
of interpretation of Plethons philosophy as a Platonic and Proclean one, starting from Gennadios
Scholarios until nowadays, see Bene 2014, 4344.
3 I have worked on this paper in Tbilisi. Unfortunately, many important publications on Plethon re-
mained anavailable for me, especially Tambrun 2006b, Woodhouse 1986c, Neri 2010 and others.
4 I would like to thank Georgina Fullerlove and Sergei Mariev for their generous help in my work on
this paper.
DOI 10.1515/9781501503597-010
222 | L. Alexidze
certain common characteristics and differences in the understanding of virtues by two

above mentioned medieval (Neo)Platonists: Plethon and Petritsi.
2 Relationship between vita contemplativa and vita

activa
The late antique and medieval Platonists made the choice between the contemplative
and active ways of life generally in favour of the first one. Neither the practical-po-
litical activity nor the grades of virtues in the social context were as important for
them as the theoretical-contemplative, intellectual activity and the spiritual self-
sufficiency of an individual. However, the innovative study by Domenic OMeara re-
vealed various aspects of political and social interests, ambitions and goals of an-
cient (pagan) Neoplatonists, which were less known to the scholarship before. This
interest of Neoplatonic philosophers definitely embraces also the political aspects
of virtues. However, I think that the contemplative way of life, directed toward the
highest realm of ontological (or even metaphysical) reality, was more valuable for an-
cient Neoplatonists than the political activity. Then the last one was considered by
them as an important and preparatory step but not the highest level of the whole
structure of virtues and of perfect life, as far as the political virtues concerned the
physical life, life in corpore of a person, as well as his life in the physically existent so-
ciety. Among the Platonists of late Middle Ages, it was Plethon, who clearly inspired
the tendency of rehabilitation of vita activa later continued by the Italian Renais-
sance philosophers. Plethons intention was a restoration of Platos authentic, origi-
nal theory, which included the philosophy not only of the contemplative but also of
the practical life and reforms, and lacked the ascetic tendencies of late antique and
medieval Platonism.
Plethons political theory and his theory on virtues are inter-related, as for Plethon
the virtues were important not only as a method leading to the individual spiritual self-
sufficiency and personal intellectual perfection but also as a way which could bring
5 The general aspects of the relationships between Plethons theory of virtues on the one hand, and
other theories of virtues, including Neoplatonic theories, on the other hand, are thoroughly analyzed
by Tambrun-Krasker in Georges Gmiste Plthon, Trait des vertus, pp. 3651, 6263. She focuses her
attention mostly on Plotinus, and on the later Neoplatonists (Proclus, Olimpiodorus). This allows us
to focus our attention mainly on our principal concrete task: the relationship between Porphyry and
Plethons theories of virtues. See also Tambrun 2005, 101117.
6 OMeara 2003.
7 Especially on the scale of virtues in Neoplatonism, including the scale of sciences as the school of
virtues, see OMeara 2003, 4060.
8 This issue I discussed in my Georgian publication: Alexidze 2012.
Plethon on the Grades of Virtues | 223
the whole nation to the realization of political, social, religious, agricultural, military
reforms, independence and freedom. Moreover, all this had not only ethical and polit-
ical meaning for Plethon, but was also ontologically and cosmologically significant,
because Plethon considered individual self-perfection and realization of political re-
forms as a fulfilment of a part of the divine providential plan, which is, as he believed,
eternally governed by the divine reason. Plethon was sure, on the one hand, that
the universal providential plan governs the world and that the world is eternally pre-
determined, and, on the other, he believed in human liberty. These two aspects of
ontological, cosmological and anthropological reality (including ethics and politics)
do not, in Plethons opinion, contradict to each other, but are in harmony with each
other. Then the liberty requires from a person, as Plethon acclaimed, the full spiritual
and practical activity based on the correct understanding of the divine providential
plan and the universal causal determination. Therefore, men are, in Plethons opin-
ion, free and at the same time not free, though it is a necessity (), not slavery
(), to which they are submitted. Thus, in Plethons opinion, liberty does not
9 On Pletons theory of providence and fate see Bargeliotes 1975. In principle, Plethons theory on
providence and fate has many common characteristics with theories of Proclus and also with Stoicism.
For Proclus theory on providence see Beierwaltes 1977, see also Beierwaltes 1985, 226253. For the
similarity between Proclus and Plethons theories on causation and providence cf. Bargeliotes 1975,
140141. Nevertheless, it was Plethon, not Neoplatonists or Stoics, who clearly elaborated the theory
of universal ontological causation also in the context of practical aspects of human ethics and national
politics. Moreover, for Plethon, not only the present condition of ethics and politics of an individual
and nation were important, but also their future destiny and reforms. On Plethons understanding
of fate, freedom, necessity, and liberty see also Hladk 2014, 144150, 167. For a detailed analysis of
differences between ancient Platonists and Plethon in their theories of fate see Bene 2014, 4171. Ac-
cording to Bene 2014, 41, while ancient Platonists defended in various ways (i) genuine contingency,
(ii) the compatibility of divine foreknowledge with contingency and responsible action, and (iii) the
autonomy of the rational human soul, Plethon advanced diametrically opposed views. First, he adopts
a necessitarian causal and modal theory. Second, he adduces divine knowledge as a proof of complete
causal determination. On determinism, necessity, and liberty in Plethon see also Schultze 1874, 214,
255259.
10 As Masai 1956a, 240 wrote, Plethon se propose donc de sauver, la fois, le dterminisme et la
libert humain.
11 . Plthon, Trait des Lois (II 6). Ed. C. Alexandre, traduction
par A. Pellissier. Paris 1858, 74 (French tr.: et lon peut dire quils sont libres et ne le sont pas, p. 75).
Also in: Georgius cognomento Gemistus sive Pletho, Ex libro de legibus, , in Jacques
Paul Migne (editor): Patrologiae cursus completus. Series graeca. T. 160, Paris 1866, col. 963 D; Masai
1956a, 240. For Plethon, liberty is happiness, and it means not to be slave of anybody, Masai 1956a,
242. And, as Keller says about Plethons understanding of fate and free will, for Plethon knowledge
of necessity is the truest liberty. Keller 1957, 363. See also Hladk 2014, 149 .
12 Masai 1956a, 240. God is necessity and there is no slavery () in him. See also Masai 1956a,
241.
224 | L. Alexidze
contradict to necessity, then God is the first necessity, existing by itself, and on Him
depends everything and there is no slavery in Him.
3 A short expos of Plethons theory of virtues

Virtue is for Plethon the state/disposition according to which we are good. A man (-
) needs virtues, because he is neither perfect nor good and always has a lack
of something. Virtue is a means by which we can attain a certain level of goodness and
become like God as far as it is possible for us, human beings. God is truly good; con-
sequently, He does not need virtues, because He is self-sufficient. On the contrary,
for man it is impossible not to need anything. How can man attain the likeness of
God? In Plethons opinion, as Taylor says, likeness to God can be attained by intellec-
tual activity only. This statement of Taylor is supported by Plethons understanding
of right thinking as the most important activity among gods and, correspondingly,
13 ,
. Plthon, Trait des Lois, 74 Alexandre. (French tr.: En effet, ce serait
videmment une erreur de dire que la libert est le contraire de la ncessit: car il faudrait alors appeler
esclavage la ncessit, p. 75). See also Masai 1956a, 240.
14 , , -
, , ;
. Plthon, Trait des Lois, 75 Alexandre. (French tr.: mais cette nces-
sit premire qui seule existe absolument et par soi, tandis que cest par elle que toutes choses exis-
tent, cette ncessit que nous appelons le bien absolu, Jupiter, quelle domination sera-t-elle donc
soumise? Car assurment, ce qui est domination ne peut tre en mme temps esclavage, p. 75). See
also Masai 1956a, 241.
15 . Georges Gmiste Plthon, Trait des vertus, A 1, p. 1, 1
Tambrun-Krasker (La vertu est la disposition selon laquelle nous sommes bons. French translation
of Plethons treatise on virtues hier and further by B. Tambrun-Krasker in Georges Gmiste Plthon,
Trait des vertus, p. 1928 Tambrun-Krasker, hier p. 19). Plethon discusses also different opinions
about virtues. On this issue in detail, as well as on Plethons theory of virtues generally see Hladk
2014, 4950, 151154, Arabatzis 2014, 8287 and Schultze 1874, 217263.
16 , . Georges
Gmiste Plthon, Trait des vertus, A 2, p. 1, 192, 1 Tambrun-Krasker. (French tr.: Dieu na rellement
pas de besoin: il est absolument parfait et se suffit autant que possible lui-mme, p. 19). This means,
that God does not possess virtues, then He is, if we may say so, the primary virtue the Goodness by
himself, the highest paradigm for our virtues. Discussing Plethons philosophy, we should remember
that the supreme God for him is Zeus who is the first cause (in other words, it is its own cause, not
caused by anything outside itself) and upon which everything else depends.
17 . Georges Gmiste Plthon, Trait des
vertus, A 2, p. 2, 12 Tambrun-Krasker (French tr.: mais il est tout fait impossible lhomme dtre
sans besoins, p. 19).
18 Taylor 1920, 96.
among us. Moreover, for Plethon, contemplation of beings is something wonderful

the Gods do, and it is also our best activity and the great happiness for us.
The importance of contemplation which is the basis of likeness of man with God,
makes evident the Neoplatonic character of Plethons philosophy, though there are
also certain differences between Plethons theory and Neoplatonic understanding of
virtues.
The main characteristic of Plethons theory of virtues, which makes evident the
difference between him and Neoplatonism, is that for Plethon man should remain as
man, and his likeness to God means rather to be a man in his best condition than to
transcend this condition and become the divine being. For Plethon, as it was for Plato,
the philosopher is in the service of the reformer. Therefore, the practical aspects of phi-
losophy are very important for Plethon. In other words, man should not neglect the
fact that he is composed of body and soul, and that he is a social, political being who
lives and must live together with other people. The likeness to God was for Plethon as
for all Platonists, the basis of human virtue, but it did not mean for him the detach-
ment from the body. Consequently, Plethons understanding of godlikeness of man
was quite different from that of Plato. As Masai explained,
Plthon vite les consequences du principe de limitation en faisant intervenir celui de loptimisme:
Dieu ne peut faire que le bien, et son monde ne peu tre que le meilleur des mondes. Par con-
19 Thus, in the third book of Laws (III, 34), Plethon wrote: , , ,

,
,
. Plthon, Trait des Lois, 140, 142 Alexandre. (French tr.: Surtout accordez-nous, o Dieux,
et maintenant et toujours, comme premire faveur, davoir de vous une juste ide; ce sera pour nous la
source de tous les biens. Car il ne peut y avoir en nous rien de plus beau ni de plus divin que la pense
en general, qui est lacte le plus divin de notre partie la plus divine, p. 141, 143).
20 , ,
, ,
, -
, , . Plthon,
Trait des Lois, 144 Alexandre. (French tr.: Mais la contemplation des tres est pour vous un des plus
grands biens attachs votre nature: ce doit donc tre aussi pour nous la meilleure des actions et le
comble de la flicits, surtout quand nous levons notre pens vers ce quil y a de plus grand et de
plus beau entre tous les tres, cest--dire, vers vous, et vers celui qui commande et vous et toutes
choses, Jupiter, le roi supreme, ensuite vers lensemble de lunivers et enfin vers la connaissance de
nous-mmes qui en faison partie, p. 145).
21 On this issue see also Hladk 2014, 23, 152, 155.
22 Masai 1956a, 243.
23 The consequence of this principle (that means, to be like God as far as possible) is explicitly
declared by Plato to run away from here, Plato, Theaetetus 176ab. Logically, this does not exclude
suicide, though it was denied by Plato. See Masai 1956a, 243.
226 | L. Alexidze
squence, il faut admettre que le corps est bon et que son union avec lme ne saurait tre
relement mauvaise.
Therefore, the mixture of two natures, of mortal and immortal, was a positive fact for
Plethon. Moreover, the unity of soul and body in a living man served, in Plethons
opinion, to the universal harmony. He believed that this unity was the result of divine
providence, made for the sake of universal harmony. That was the reason, why man,
in Plethons opinion, should not only not try to run away from the position he got by
destiny, but more than that, he should, by means of self-perfection in the virtues,
achieve the best condition of his selfhood, in regard to himself as well as in regard to
others (people and milieu). In Plethons theory, intellectual activity is, as we said, the
main characteristic of man as man and of his likeness to God, though the other levels of
virtues are very important for his self-perfection, too. Therefore, the whole complex of
virtues has for Plethon as a supreme goal not only the intellectual (spiritual) perfection
of an individual, as it was in Neoplatonism, but his perfection as of a unique being,
composed from body and soul, and as of political being as well. Hence, the difference
24 Masai 1956a, 246.

25 Should we see in such understanding of soul-body relationship certain influence of Christian tradi-
tion on Plethon (even if he were not glad to admit it)? As Hladk 2014, 156 writes, according to Plethon,
we should not neglect our body and should take care of it. The matter of which it is composed is good,
just like everything else created by God, who is goodness itself. If the body seems to be bad, it is not
because of its essence, but because it holds the last place among all the essences and therefore par-
ticipates the least in the good of them all.
26 ,
. -
, , , , -
, . Plthon,
Trait des Lois 266 Alexandre (Rsum des doctrines de Zoroastre et de Platon). French tr.: Quant
nous-mmes, notre me tant dune nature semblable aux Dieux, demeure immortelle et ternelle
dans lenceinte qui est la limite de notre monde. Toujours attache une envelope mortelle, elle est
envoye par les Dieux, tantt dans un corps, tantt dans un autre, en vue de lharmonie universelle
afin que lunion de la nature immortelle dans la nature humaine contribute lunit de lensemble,
p. 267.
27 Masai 1956a, 246. As Hladk 2014, 51 and 152 comments, in Plethons opinion, we cannot find out
what the nature of man is without previous understanding of the nature of the whole, that is, of the
nature of reality.
28 As Plethon said, God preserves our nature, including our mortal body, as long as possible. Ad-
dressing to the Sun, he wrote: , ,
. Plthon, Trait des Lois (III, 34), 166 Alexandre. (French tr.: Enfin tu presides encore la
partie immortelle de notre nature, et avec le concours de Saturne et des Titanes qui lui obissent, tu
formes lautre partie, savoir, notre corps mortel, et tu la conserves autant que le permet la destine
de chacun de nous, p. 167). See also Hladk 2014, 152.
29 , . Plthon, Trait des
Lois, 124 Alexandre. (French tr.: parce que lhomme, entre les autres devoirs de sa nature, doit vivre
comme un citoyen, comme un tre sociable, et non comme un solitaire, p. 125).
from the Neoplatonic theories is evident. Especially the concrete political context of
virtues was not as interesting for the ancient Neoplatonic philosophers as it was for
Plethon.
4 Four cardinal virtues in Plethons theory

Plethons theory is based on four cardinal virtues of Platos Republic. First, Plethon de-
scribes them in the ascending order. The first virtue concerns the upper part of mans
soul.
(1) Wisdom () is the virtue of man as man, that is, of his rational part. It
characterizes man in himself, in relation to himself.
(2) Justice () is concerned with what is external to man and is a virtue
in relation to other men.
(3) Courage () is the virtue in relation to the involuntary feelings and af-
fections. For Plethon, courage is the quality by which a man stands at his appointed
post in life as parent, friend, neighbour, citizen, and member of the divinely ruled uni-
verse. It is concerned with holding the animal part (that means, the irrational elements
of human nature, like fears and desires) of the composite being, man, in subjection to
the divine element. By courage, fears are controlled.
(4) Temperance/moderation () is mans virtue in relation to the vol-
30 , , -
, . Georges Gmiste Plthon, Trait des
vertus, A 1, p. 1, 9 11 Tambrun-Krasker. (French tr.: En tant que lhomme est en lui-mme, et quil
est, peut-on dire, un animal raisonnable, il possde une vertu, la prudence; cette capacit lui permet
dexercer la function qui lui est la plu propre, p. 19).
31 , ,
. Georges Gmiste Plthon, Trait des vertus, A 1, p. 1, 11
13 Tambrun-Krasker. (French tr.: En tant quil est en rapport avec autre chose, et si cest avec lun
quelconque des autres tres, il dispose de la justice qui permet chacun dentre nous, selon ce quil
est, dattribuer chaque tre, ce qui lui revient, p. 19).
32 , . Georges Gmiste Plthon,
Trait des vertus, A 1, p. 1, 1314 Tambrun-Krasker. (French tr.: si cest en relation avec lun des l-
ments qui lui appartiennent, et lgard des affections imposes par la violence, il dispose du courage,
p. 19).
33 Taylor 1920, 89.
34 Taylor 1920, 94.
228 | L. Alexidze
untary affections. It concerns the irrational part of himself and his desires. By tem-
perance/moderation, the desires are controlled.
The last two cardinal virtues concern the lower parts of mans soul. They help to
maintain the value of that what is good in us against what is bad.
Afterwards, Plethon also summarizes the four cardinal virtues in descending or-
der, starting from the lowest virtue and ending with the highest one.
5 The subdivisions of four cardinal virtues in

Plethons theory: the twelve specific virtues
Each cardinal virtue is divided into three parts. As a result, we have 12 specific virtues,
which represent the duties of man. These virtues, their names and characters, have
as sources Platos dialogues, and Aristotles and Stoic theories on virtues. Each virtue
is divided in three parts. We shall only mention these parts, without discussing them
in detail.
(4) Temperance/moderation () is self-sufficiency against the neces-
sities of life. The three parts of temperance serve to control three kinds of desire:
pleasure, money, and honour. These parts are: (a) orderliness/propriety (),
which is self-control against the desire for pleasure; (b) freedom/liberality (-

Tambrun-Krasker. (French tr.: et si cest lgard des affections volontaires, il dispose de la tem-
prance, p. 19).
36 Taylor 1920, 94.
37 Taylor 1920, 94.
38 .
Georges Gmiste Plthon, Trait des vertus, A 1, p. 1, 1516 Tambrun-Krasker. (French tr.: par ces deux
vertus, il sauvegarde toujours la valeur de ce quil y a de meilleur en nous contre le pire, p. 19).
39 Georges Gmiste Plthon, Trait des vertus, A 2, p. 4, 45 Tambrun-Krasker.
40 Taylor 1920, 86.
41 For the description of the 12 specific virtues in detail, with the analysis of the sources, see B.
Tambrun-Krasker in Georges Gmiste Plthon, Trait des vertus, 6482 Tambrun-Krasker, and Taylor
1920, 85100.
Tambrun-Krasker. (French tr.: la tmpernace; on la dfinie comme lautosuffisance pour les neces-
sits de la vie, p. 21). As Masai 1956a, 246247 wrote, the Neoplatonists did not estimate the virtues
of temperance as highly, as the Christian ascetics did. The Hellenic intellectualism always made the
Neoplatonic philosophers to make preference to the theoretical knowledge than to the exercise of tem-
perance. The purifying virtues were not an aim for them but rather means by which the soul can ascend
toward higher level of reality.
), which means self-control in the spending of money, (c) moderation (),

which is self-control in regard to the pursuit of fame.
(3) Courage () means to be unaffected by the violent affections of life. The
three parts of courage serve the control of involuntary affections. These parts are: (a)
nobility/nobleness (), which is the endurance of suffering of our choice and
of involuntary affections; (b) high spirit (), which is the endurance of affects
which come from the divine realm; (c) mildness/gentleness (), which is the
endurance of affects which come from men.
(2) Justice () consists in keeping (saving) oneself (ourselves) in relation
to the others. The three parts of justice include the relation to God, to human beings
generally, and to individuals. (a) Piety () is ones right attitude and activity
in relation to God. It helps to avoid atheism, on the one hand, and, on the other, the
superstition, which means the belief that God can be really influenced by prayer and
worship. (b) Citizenship / civil virtue () is the justice in ones relations with
43 , , , ,
, , ,
, . Georges Gmiste Plthon, Trait des vertus A 3, p.
4, 811 Tambrun-Krasker. (French tr.: or, nous avons trois sortes de besoins vitaux: les plaisirs, les
richesses et la gloire; chacune correspond une partie de la temperance qui ne conserve que ce qui
est suffisant et utile pour chaque besoin; pour les plaisirs, il sagit de la dcence, pour la richesse, de
la libralit, pour la gloire, de la moderation, p. 21). See also Taylor 1920, 87.
44 . Georges Gmiste Plthon,
Trait des vertus, A 3, p. 4, 1213 Tambrun-Krasker. (French tr.: Le courage se dfinit comme
limpassibilit dans les violentes affections de la vie, p. 21). See also Hladk 2014, 153.
45 , . Georges Gmiste Plthon, Trait des vertus,
A 3, p. 4, 1213 Tambrun-Krasker. (French tr.: la noblesse pour ce que nous choisissons; et deuxime-
ment, pour les affections indpendantes de notre volont, p. 21).
46 Georges Gmiste Plthon, Trait des vertus, A 3, p. 4, 22 Tambrun-Krasker. (French tr.: la force
dme pour celles qui viennent du divin, p. 21). This is a virtue of man, who, like Socrates, as Taylor
1920, 90 explains, is confident that nothing can harm him except baseness entering his soul by way
of false opinion. Such a man will believe that the blows of fortune have a purpose and are meant for
his good.
Tambrun-Krasker. (French tr.: la mansutude pour celles qui viennent des hommes, p. 21). As Taylor
1920, 93 resumes, this is forbearance of a great man in the face of malicious hostility, and it refers
to an attitude of mind.
48 . Georges
Gmiste Plthon, Trait des vertus, A 3, p. 5, 12 Tambrun-Krasker. (French tr.: La justice consiste
conserver ce que nous sommes par rapport chacun, p. 21).
49 , ,
. Georges Gmiste Plthon, Trait des vertus, A 3, p. 5, 24 Tambrun-Krasker. (French
tr.: Or, nous sommes des ouvrages de Dieu, et nous lui appartenons; nous avons aussi une sorte de
parent avec tous les hommes, mme si nous avons un comportemment different envers les uns et les
autres, p. 21). See also Taylor 1920, 94.
50 Georges Gmiste Plthon, Trait des vertus, B 12, p. 12, 2413, 9 Tambrun-Krasker. Taylor 1920,
230 | L. Alexidze
society, and (c) goodness/honesty () means ones dealing with individ-

ual/private things.
The three parts of (1) wisdom (), according as it amounts to knowledge of
human affairs, of nature and of God, are: (a) prudence/good counsel (); (b)
, which is the knowledge of physics/understanding of nature. It contributes
greatly to mans happiness, since it demands the activity of the highest part of his
nature and makes him part of the universe; (c) Worship of God/religiousness (-
). This is regarded as the synoptic view of all things. As Taylor comments,
mans task is to understand the causes and laws of natural phenomena and the rea-
95 discussed in detail the meaning of prayer for Pletho. As he stated, Plethon rejected the doctrine
of divine revelation, argued for a determinism incompatible with a belief in the efficacy of prayer as
held by the church and developed a system of ethics which is Platonic even when it seems to be most
Christian. See also Taylor 1921, 8788.
51 . Georges Gmiste Plthon, Trait des vertus, A 3, p. 5, 5 Tambrun-Krasker.
(French tr.: le civisme pour les biens communs, p. 23). See also Taylor 1920, 95, 97 and Hladk 2014,
153.
Tambrun-Krasker. (French tr.: lhonntet pour les biens privs, p. 21). See also Taylor 1920, 95, 97.
Plethon believed that a man should take care of himself and not to hope that with prayer he could
influence God. Theoretically, this point of view was based on Plethons belief in the divine providence
and universal causality. The practical result of this theory should be the activity of a man and not his
asceticism or passivity. As we already mentioned, in Plethons opinion, it was very important for in-
dividuals and generally for the nation, to understand properly the meaning of the divine providence
and the principles of causality which ruled in the world and history, in order to act and lead the social
and political life according to this knowledge. See also Hladk 2014, 153.
53 This is the intellectual qualification for the practical virtue, see Taylor 1920, 99. On the intellectual
character of Plethons ethics and his theory of virtues see Hladk 2014, 154, 167.
54 Hladk 2014, 153.
55 I suppose, in this case, we can think about the influence of the Stoic and also Neoplatonic the-
ories on Plethon. The knowledge of cosmology was very important in the curriculum of philosophy
in Neoplatonic schools. As Hofmann says, Simplicius commentary on Aristotles peri ouranou can be
regarded as spiritual return toward the divine principle. This way back to the principle has two mean-
ings: one is anagoge of the philosopher commentator, who ascends toward the primary causes in the
process of commenting upon the text of Aristotle, and the second one is the pedagogical aspect of this
elevation: teacher/commentator helps his students/readers of the commentary in accomplishing the
process of spiritual exercise ascending toward the primary causes through study of cosmology. On
this way, commentator/teacher, together with his students, achieves certain kind of sympatheia and,
therefore, unity with, on the one hand, first causes of the cosmos (that means, first, with its physical
principles and then, with its intelligible form/eidos), and, on the other, with its demiurge (that means,
with his knowledge, on the one hand, and his providential activity, on the other). This was, in Simpli-
cius opinion, a very necessary step on the way of man (philosopher) toward the state of likeness to God
and of our happiness. Hoffmann 2014. On Plethons theory of the hierarchy of theoretical disciplines
see Hladk 2014, 51: For Plethon ethics thus depends on physics and the latter, in turn, on theology.
56 Georges Gmiste Plthon, Trait des vertus, A 3, p. 5, 710 Tambrun-Krasker. See also Hladk 2014,
153.
son why things are good or evil for men. When he has reached a final, unifying view
by which the purpose, the goodness () of all is plain, he has attained the view
of God, the state of and that is the height of human happiness.
Therefore, it is evident that in Plethons opinion, for all levels of the four cardinal
virtues as well as for all twelve levels inside these virtues the practical aspects of hu-
man activity are very important. I mean by the word practical the political activity of
man (man as a member of a society) and his activity of a being composed of the soul
and body. Certainly, a man should make efforts to be like God with all possibilities
he has as a human being. Moreover, for attaining the highest level of virtues, man
should be able to recognise himself as a part of the cosmos. For this purpose, a knowl-
edge of physics is required. Without these more or less practical steps, the highest,
purely intellectual level could not be attained.
One more characteristic of Plethons theory of virtues in the context of the rela-
tionship between self and other is that, according to Plethon, the aim of virtues
is not to make one free from all kinds of otherness in order to become a true self, but
rather to assimilate, become a friend with others, while in the Neoplatonic the-
ories, the highest point of virtues is aimed at the transcending of otherness and the
attainment of unity within ones self as far as it is possible for a human being.
Let us now discuss Porphyrys theory of virtues focusing our attention mainly on
the context of self-other relationship.
6 A short expos of Porphyrys theory of virtues

On the basis of Plotinus text (Enn. 1, 2), though with certain modifications, Porphyry
discusses in the so-called Sententia 32 grades of virtues and their types. He makes clear
the difference between the four levels of human inner self-perfection, which represent
a way leading a human being to the maximally achievable perfect wisdom and identity
with the Intellect, as well as freedom from the external and accidental circumstances
and characteristics. At the same time, these are the ways leading a person to his inner
and true self and, thus, to his freedom.
These four levels of virtue, in ascending order, are the following: (1) civic (po-
57 Taylor 1920, 98.

58 Masai 1956a, 247.
59 For the differences between Plotinus and Pophyrys theories on the grades of virtues, with an in-
dication of their philosophical sources, see Dillon 1990, 92105.
60 For Porphyrys Sententiae I use here and further the Greek text edited by Lamberz: Porphyrii Sen-
tentiae ad intelligibilia ducentes, edidit E. Lamberz, Leipzig 1975, and English translation by J. Dillon in
Porphyre, Sentences. T. I, II. tudes dintroduction, texte grec et traduction franaise, commentaire,
avec une traduction anglaise de J. Dillon. Travaux dits sous la responsabilit de L. Brisson. Paris
2005, 796835.
232 | L. Alexidze
litical) virtues; (2) contemplative (theoretical) virtues, those of the person who
is raising himself up towards the contemplative state; (3) virtues of the man who al-
ready practices contemplation; (4) virtues of the intellect, in so far as it is intellect
and transcends the soul.
What is the function of each level?
(1) The civic virtues are based on moderation of the passion. They regulate
contacts with the community. Their function is to impose measure on the passions
for the performance of the activities which conform to nature. According to Por-
phyry, the four cardinal (Platonic) virtues (wisdom, justice, temperance/moderation,
and courage) are present on all four above-mentioned levels, though in different
ways, providing on each ascending level more and more autonomy and independence
for the soul and the rational principle within it from the influences of the body and
passions. On the highest level of virtues, these four types provide independence for
the rational, intellectual principle from the lower parts of the soul.
(2) The virtues of the higher level are contemplative (theoretical) virtues,
called also purifications. These are the virtues of the person who is making progress
towards the state of contemplation. They consist in detaching oneself from the things
of this realm; hence these are also termed purifications []. These virtues are those
of a soul which is in the process of abstracting itself (from the body) in the direction
of true being.
As Porphyry thinks, some kind of preparatory work for this condition should al-
ready be done on the level of civic virtues. While the civic virtues prepare us to live
61 ,
, , ,
. Porph. Sent. 32, p. 22, 1423, 3 Lamberz. English tr. in Porphyre, Sen-
tences, 2005, 809: The virtues of the human being at the civic level are one thing, and those of the
person who is raising himself up towards the contemplative state, and who is for this reason termed
contemplative, are another; and different again are those of the person who is already a perfected
contemplative and who already practices contemplation, and different yet again are those of the in-
tellect, in so far as it is intellect and transcends soul.
62 . Porph. Sent. 32, p. 23, 45 Lamberz. English tr. in
Porphyre, Sentences, 2005, 809.
63 . Porph.
Sent. 32, p. 30, 67 Lamberz. English tr. in Porphyre, Sentences, 2005, 813.
64 , , , .
65 -
[] . Porph. Sent. 32,
p. 24, 15 Lamberz. English tr. in Porphyre, Sentences, 2005, 810. From the point of view of soul-body
relationship, Plethons theory has more in common with Porphyrys understanding of purificatory
virtues than with the theory of the Stoics. As Brisson 2004, 280 wrote about Porphyrys understand-
ing of purificatory virtues, le sage stocien est celui qui a russi se detacher de ses passions avec
lesquelles il doit cependent vivre, alors que pour un platonicien ce nest quun tape, le but final tant
la contemplation de lintelligible, la fusion de lme avec lintellect.
freely in our corporeal condition and social life, the theoretical virtues help us to be-
come free from a certain otherness in us and concentrate on our inner unity. The
four cardinal virtues have their specific functions on the level of theoretical virtues.
As Porphyry explains,
at the purificatory level, wisdom consists in the souls not sharing any opinions with the body,
but acting on its own, and this is perfected by the pure exercise of the intellect; moderation
is the result of taking care not to assent to any of the passion; courage is not being afraid to
depart from the body, as if one were falling into some void of not-being; and justice is the result
of reason and intellect dominating the soul with nothing to oppose them.
We have already mentioned that the functions of the four cardinal virtues on each
of the four levels serve the main purpose of the level they represent. In the case of,
for example, theoretical virtues, they help the soul to live independently from
the body, because this is the main purpose of the contemplative level. As Porphyry
explains,
the disposition characteristic of the civic virtues is to be seen as the imposition of measure on
the passions, since it has as its aim living a human life in accordance with nature, while the
disposition that results from the contemplative virtues is manifested in total detachment from
the passions, which has, as its aim, assimilation to God.
(3) The third class of virtues represent the virtues of the soul as it is exercising in-
tellection. The necessity of these kinds of virtues becomes obvious already on the
level of civic or purificatory virtues, and Porphyry explains to us, why:
It is requisite, then, that once purified, the soul unite itself with what has engendered it; and in
consequence the virtue that is proper to it after its conversion consists in the acquaintance and
knowledge of being, not because it does not possess it in itself, but it is not capable of seeing what
is within itself without the cooperation of what is superior to it.
66 -
. Porph.
67 , ,
, ,
,
. Porph. Sent. 32, p. 24, 925, 6 Lamberz. English tr. in Porphyre,
Sentences, 2005, 810.
68 ,
, , . Porph.
Sent. 32, p. 25, 69. English tr. in Porphyre, Sentences, 2005, 810811.
69 ,
Porph. Sent. 32, p. 27, 79 Lamberz. English tr. in Porphyre, Sentences, 2005, 812.
70
234 | L. Alexidze
Thus, the virtues of the third level are the virtues of the soul turned towards intellect,
and filled with the contemplation of its own essence.
(4) The fourth kind of virtues is paradigmatic. Such virtues reside in the intel-
lect. Porphyry characterizes the paradigmatic virtues in the following way: They are
superior to those of the soul and are the paradigms of these, the virtues of the soul
being their likeness. At this level, intellect is that in which the paradigms enjoy a si-
multaneous existence.
After having presented such an ascending order of classification, Porphyry sum-
marizes his theory on the grades of virtues, this time in descending order. In sum, the
four classes of virtues are:
(4) those of the intellect, which act as paradigms and are intimately connected with its essence;
(3) those of the soul which has already turned its gaze towards intellect and is filled with it; (2)
those of the human soul which is purifying itself and which has been purified from the body and
its irrational passions; (1) and those of the human soul which is imposing order on the human
being by assigning measures to the irrational element and bringing about moderation of the pas-
sions.
Afterwards, Porphyry discusses the differences between the objectives of the virtues:
For the objectives that they are aiming at are different, as has been said, and generically distinct.
That of the civic virtues is to impose measure on the passions for the performance of activities
which conform to nature; that of the purificatory virtues is to separate completely from the pas-
sions that which has just taken on measure; that of the next level is to direct ones activity towards
intellect without any longer giving thought to separating oneself from the passions.
The last ones, the paradigmatic virtues, do not possess an activity directed towards
intellect for they are identical with its essence.
, , . Porph. Sent. 32, p.

27, 37 Lamberz. English tr. in Porphyre, Sentences, 2005, 811.
71 , ,
,
. Porph. Sent. 32, p. 28, 6 - 29, 3 Lamberz. English tr. in Porphyre, Sentences, 2005, 812.
72 , ,
, , -
, -
.
Porph. Sent. 32, p. 29, 830, 1 Lamberz. English tr. in Porphyre, Sentences, 2005, 812.
73 , , .

{}
. Porph. Sent. 32, p. 30, 531, 3 Lamberz. English tr. in Porphyre, Sen-
tences, 2005, 813.
74 , ,
. Porph. Sent. 32, p. 29, 810 Lamberz. English tr. in Porphyre, Sentences, 2005, 812.
Then, Porphyry classifies the types of men according to their virtues:
He who acts in accordance with the practical virtues is agreed to be a good man, he who acts in
accordance with the purificatory ones is a daemonic man, or even a good daemon, one who acts
only according to those which are directed towards intellect is a god, and one who practises the
paradigmatic virtues is a father of gods.
As a pragmatic and realistic man, Porphyry believes that the purificatory virtues are
very important for us, because they are the basis of ascent toward the higher levels
of virtues. Therefore, as he thinks, we must direct our attention most of all to the pu-
rificatory virtues, basing ourselves on the reflection that the attainment of these is
possible in this life, and that it is through these that an ascent may be made to the
more august levels.
That is why, as Porphyry says, we should examine how one can purify the soul
and to what limit such purification may be pushed.
Then Porphyry offers practical advice:
For a start, it is as it were the foundation and underpinning of purification to recognise that one is
a soul bound down in an alien entity of a quite distinct nature. In the second place, taking ones
start from this conviction, one should gather oneself together from the body even, as it were, in
a local sense, but at any rate adopting an attitude of complete disaffection with respect to the
body.
Then, after having described in detail, how we should free ourselves from passions
and bodily affections, Porphyry tries to make his theory of purification more trust-
worthy by means of ontological argumentation. Here one can clearly see, as typical in
Neoplatonic thought, a basic unity between ontology, ethics, and epistemology:
In sum, this intellectualized soul of the purified individual should be free from all these passions.
75 , -
, , -
. Porph. Sent. 32, p. 31, 48 Lamberz. English tr. in Porphyre, Sentences, 2005,
813.
76 ,
, . Porph. Sent. 32, p. 31, 911 Lamberz. English tr.
in Porphyre, Sentences, 2005, 813. As Brisson says, chez lhomme, limpassibilit ne peut donc tre
totale, car, en ce monde en tout cas, il faut, pour contempler, avoir un corps. Brisson 2004, 281. How-
ever, in Plethons theory of virtues, combination of soul and body played a more important role than
in that of Porphyry.
77 , . Porph. Sent. 32, p. 31,
1132, 1 Lamberz. English tr. in Porphyre, Sentences, 2005, 813.
78 -
.
, .
Porph. Sent. 32, p. 32, 38 Lamberz. English tr. in Porphyre, Sentences, 2005, 814.
236 | L. Alexidze
It should also wish that the part which is set in motion towards the irrational element in bodily ex-
periences should do so without sharing in any passion and without bestowing any attention upon
such activity, in just such a way that these motions should be {small} and straightway dissolved
by the proximity of the reasoning element. Thus no conflict will manifest itself, in consequence
of the progress of the process of purification, but from then on the mere presence of the reason
will suffice, which gains the respect of the inferior element, so that the inferior element itself will
actually come to feel indignation if it is set in motion at all, because it did not rest quiet in the
presence of its master, and will reproach itself for weakness.
Such is Porphyrys advice given to a man on his way toward freedom from otherness
and toward inner unity. It concerns human soul and includes the following steps:
moderation of the passions, purification from the participation in passions, maintain-
ing the purified condition through turning the soul towards intellect and, lastly, the
state of pure intellect, which contains all virtues paradigmatically. All this is pos-
sible only if one gathers oneself together within ones self, detaching ones self from
the body, and freeing ones self entirely from the passions. In other words, we can
succeed if we concentrate on the one within us. But what exactly happens with us
on the highest level of the virtues, when our soul, almost completely purified, aban-
dons itself (which means: becomes its true self) and turns toward intellect? This is
another problem of Neoplatonic mysticism, preceded by the rational steps and exer-
cises in spiritual elevation, which cannot be discussed in this paper. Let us finish the
exposition of Porphyrys theory of virtues with his words from the Sententia 25. They
hint on the mystical state of our being which is aimed at surpassing even the level of
pure intellect:
On the subject of that which is beyond Intellect, many statements are made on the basis of in-
tellection, but it may be immediately cognised only by means of a non-intellection superior to
intellection; even as concerning sleep many statements may be made in a waking state, but only
through sleeping can one gain direct knowledge and comprehension; for like is known by like,
because all knowledge consists of assimilation to the object of knowledge.
As Tambrun-Krasker stated, there are substantial differences between Neoplatonic

and Plethons understanding of contemplation. Thus, for Neoplatonists, contempla-
79 .
,
. -
, , ,
, , ,
. Porph. Sent. 32, p. 34, 1019 Lamberz. English tr. in Porphyre, Sentences, 2005, 815.
80 , -
, ,
, . Porph.
tion means to go back to the unity with the principle, while for Plethon, the difference
between the knower and the object of knowledge remains:
Plthon soppose aux nopltoniciens qui considrent la vie contemplative comme un retour
lunit indissocie du premier principe: pour Plotin, loeil ne fait quun avec lobjet de la vision.
Limage du spectacle suggre, au contraire, que le monde demeure bien un objet distinct de nous.
La dualit doit demeurer entre le connaissant et le connu. Plthon entend ainsi barrer la voie
tout type de mysticism. Sa conception de la vie contemplative ou thorique est purememnt
rationaliste.
From the point of view of the difference between the knower and the object of knowl-
edge, there is, as I think, certain similiraity between Plethons and Damascius under-
standing of knowledge. Then according to Damascius, by means of the intellectual
cognition, we know the object not as it is by itself but in the condition of its otherness,
in other words, we know it as far as it is knowable. Therefore, as Damascius says,
without difference, knowledge could not exist. The being cannot know itself if it is
absolutely one, and it cannot know the other, if it is not different at all.
7 Plethon and Porphyry: difference between their

theories of virtue
Let us briefly compare Porphyrys theory with Plethons theory of virtues. As we al-
ready mentioned, for Porphyry virtues (even the so-called political ones) had no
concrete political significance, at least, not so definite one, as in Plethons theory. The
virtues served the transformation of the individual self, the elevation of the self as
far as possible up to the divine level of the Intellect. Porphyrys aim was to learn and
to teach how to achieve self-concentration, which was the intellectual concentration
on the one within us and required maximally possible freedom from the plurality,
otherness and corporeal influences. It was otherwise in Plethon. For Plethon, man
81 Georges Gmiste Plthon, Trait des vertus, p. 6263 Tambrun-Krasker.

82 ,
, , ,
. Damascius, Trait des premiers principes. Volume II. De la Triade et de lUnifi.
Texte tabli par L. G. Westerink et traduit par J. Combs. Paris 1989. See also other texts from Dam-
ascius with the similar content: , , ,
. . ,
Damasc. De Princ. II, p. 150, 1722 Westerink-Combs. , ,
, ; ,
, . Damasc. De Princ. II, p.
151, 27 Westerink-Combs.
83 Alexidze 2011.
238 | L. Alexidze
was a composite of the soul and body. In his theory, the personal self of a man
had to be a part of the national identity, and the aim of the virtues was to transform
not only man but also the whole nation. The unity of the nation required the harmon-
isation of the different aspects of this complex organism. In addition, the unity of a
person required the harmonisation of the corporeal and spiritual elements rather than
the abolition of the corporeal ones. Therefore, Plethon considered the plurality in
the unity (not only on the national level, but also on the personal one) more posi-
tively than Porphyry or other Neoplatonists. The virtues in Plethons interpretation
were aimed at the happiness of man as a man (not god) as far as it could be attainable
in this life.
8 Petritsi and Plethon in the context of their

Platonism/Neoplatonism and understanding of
virtues
At the beginning of this article we mentioned Petritsi. I think, it is interesting to com-
pare Petritsi with Plethon, because, though they belonged to the different epochs,
these two philosophers, as no one else in the Byzantine and Georgian Christian world
in the Middle Ages, clearly expressed their sympathies for Platonic philosophy, al-
though in Plethons case it was Plato, while in Petritsis case it was first and foremost
Proclus. Both of them, Plethon and Petritsi, were certain that the study of Greek an-
tiquity and, in particular of ancient Greek philosophy, was very important as a back-
ground for the development of their national cultures. Both believed in the force of
the divine providence based on reason. Both Plethon and Petritsi considered gram-
mar to be the basis for the correct understanding of the meaning of a text. Both of
them, I think, tried to show the inner harmony of the Platonic philosophical tradi-
84 As Masai 1956a, 247 wrote, Plthon est un homme de la Renaissance, sensible a tous les plaisirs
de lesprit et du corps. Il ne croit pas aux dogmes chrtiens du pch original et de la grace.
85 As Arabatzis 2014, 73 states, Plethon is an anti-medieval spirit who opposes secular ethics to
the ascetic ideal. The first notion of a philosophical system in Plethon is found in his morals and,
more specifically, in his Treatise on Virtues. Plethons ethical metaphysics is a turn into onto-theology,
concentrating on the work of ethics rather than on the contemplation of moral ideas.
86 , , ,
,
,
. Georges Gmiste Plthon, Trait des vertus, B 14, p. 14, 1115 Tambrun-Krasker. (French tr.:
Mais il faut par tous les moyens fuir le mal, et pratiquer la vertu, pour devenir plutt que misrables,
le plus possible heureux et mme bienheureux en cette vie; lorsque nous terminerons notre vie, nous
prendrons la place qui revient et qui sied ceux qui dsormais ont vcu et nous serons encore plus
heureux, p. 27).
tion that means, of those philosophies, which they regarded as Platonic, as for ex-
ample, the Pythagorean tradition and the Chaldean Oracles. For both, Petritsi as well
as Plethon, Chaldean Oracles were important, but they did not try to show the har-
mony of their content with Christian theology, as Michael Psellos did. However, in
both their works, I think, the idea of a certain synthesis of religions is present. While
discussing the relationship between Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies, both of
them, Plethon and Petritsi, tried to show the priority of Plato. For both of them it was
important to understand the original meaning of ancient philosophical texts and to
interpret them according to inner criteria, independent from Christian authorities.
As for the theory of virtues, Petritsi did not explicitly discuss the four cardinal
virtues and generally the virtues, though we can say what was important in his opin-
ion for achieving unity in ourselves and becoming a true philosopher. The main goal
for a man, according to Petritsi, is to leave behind his corporeal life and all kinds of
affections and to live an intellectual life as much as it is possible. In Petritsis opin-
ion, only those people, who by means of self-concentration can free themselves from
corporeal interests and affections, will be able to achieve inner unity. (For Petritsi,
the life of Proclus was an example of virtuous life). They must go upwards, learning
disciplines, such as mathematic, geometry, physics, and music, and reach the level of
pure contemplative knowledge and the vision of the transcendent One (as far as this
is possible for man), transiting from the level of discursive reasoning (dianoia) to the
level of intellectual knowledge (noesis), and from the passive intellect to the active
one. The corporeal and political (social) aspects of the human being and existence
as well as the lower parts of the soul were not as important for Petritsi as they were
for Plethon. Therefore, I think that Petritsis understanding of human perfection and
virtues was more of a Neoplatonic character than that of Plethon.
87 Alexidze 2009, 24, 2728.

88 Petritsi thought that not only the philosophies of Pythagoras, Parmenides, Plato, and Proclus are
in harmony with each other, but also the wisdoms of Abraham, the Chaldeans, the Greeks, and Christ
(this one is the cornerstone) are in principle one and the same wisdom. Ioannis Petritzii Opera, II, Com-
mentaria in Procli Diadochi , editors S. Nutsubidse and S. Kauchtschis-
chvili. Tbilisi 1937, 208209 (in Georgian). German translation in Ioane Petrizi, Kommentar zur Ele-
mentatio theologica des Proklos, bersetzung aus dem Altgeorgischen, Anmerkungen, Indices und
Einletung von L. Alexidze and L. Bergemann, Amsterdam/Philadelphia 2009, 348349.
89 Alexidze 2009, 2225.
90 Alexidze 2014, 182183.
91 For Petritsi, the life of Proclus was an example of virtuous life. Ioannis Petritzii Opera, II 7 Nut-
subidze/Kauchtschischvili.
92 According to Petritsi, in this process the soul must make the object of cognition similar to itself
until there is no difference between the knower and the known (Ioannis Petritzii Opera, II, 7 Nut-
subidze/Kauchtschischvili). In some cases, Petritsi uses the Greek words dianoia and noesis without
translating them, in Greek form with Georgian transliteration.
93 Alexidze 2014, 183.
240 | L. Alexidze
9 Conclusion
In Plethons philosophy generally and in his theory of virtues in particular, as we said,
man as man (composite of soul and body) and as social (political) being played more
important role than in the theories of late antique or medieval Platonists. Moreover,
in a certain sense, we can also say, as I think, that Plethons theory of virtues was
not only in detail but also substantially quite different from Platos theory, too. Then
Plethon understood individuality as a composite of soul and body, while for Plato and
Neoplatonists the true self of man was, first and foremost, his soul, and even more
its best and highest aspect. Plethon did not regard body as a negative element
of human self, and paid much attention to the concrete context of a social and po-
litical activity of man in which he should be involved with all his capacities, spiritual
as well as corporeal ones. In other words, if we consider, like Platonists, mans soul
as his self and body as other, then we can say that for Plethon, mans otherness
in himself and mans relation to other men, too, were much more important than it
was for Neoplatonists and, in a certain sense, even for Plato. Moreover, considering
Plethons philosophy and in particular his theory of virtues from this point of view, we
can say that his theory implied not only features of ancient Platonism but, also, will-
ingly or unwillingly, Christian understanding of man as unity of soul and body, and
previewed typical for Italian Renaissance positive understanding of human soul-body
relationship and of vita activa.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Damascius, Trait des premiers principes. Volume II. De la Triade et de lUnifi. Texte tabli par L. G.
Westerink et traduit par J. Combs. Paris 1989
Ioannis Petritzii Opera, II, Commentaria in Procli Diadochi , editors S.
Nutsubidse and S. Kauchtschischvili. Tbilisi 1937 (in Georgian)
Ioane Petrizi, Kommentar zur Elementatio theologica des Proklos, bersetzung aus dem
Altgeorgischen, Anmerkungen, indices und Einletung von L. Alexidze and L. Bergemann,
Amsterdam/Philadelphia 2009
Plthon, Trait des Lois, ed. C. Alexandre, traduction par A. Pellissier. Paris 1858
Georgius cognomento Gemistus sive Pletho, de legibus, in J. P. Migne (editor): Patrologiae cursus
completus. Series graeca. T. 160, Paris 1866, col. 957974
Georgius cognomento Gemistus sive Pletho, de virtutibus, in J. P. Migne (editor): Patrologiae cursus
completus. Series graeca. T. 160, Paris 1866, col. 865882
Georges Gmiste Plthon, Trait des vertus. dition critique avec introduction, traduction et
commentaire par B. Tambrun-Krasker. Athens, Leiden, New-York, Kbenhavn, Kln 1987
Porphyrii Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes, edidit E. Lamberz. Leipzig 1975
Porphyre, Sentences. T. I, II. tudes dintroduction, texte grec et traduction franaise, commentaire,
avec une traduction anglaise de J. Dillon. Travaux dits sous la responsabilit de L. Brisson.
Paris 2005
Secondary Sources
Alexidze, L. (1997). Griechische Philosophie in den Kommentaren des Ioane Petrizi. In: Oriens
Christianus 81, pp. 148168.
Alexidze, L. (2002b). Zum Verhltnis zwischen Neuplatonischem und Christlichem im
Prokloskommentar des Ioane Petrizi. In: Metaphysik und Religion. Zur Signatur des
sptantiken Denkens. Akten des Internationalen Kongresses vom 13.17. Mrz 2001 in
Wrzburg. Ed. by T. Kobusch and M. Erler. Leipzig and Mnchen, pp. 429452.
Alexidze, L. (2008b). Ioane Petrizi und die antike Philosophie. (In Georgian, summary in German).
Tbilisi.
Alexidze, L. (2009). Antiquity in Fourteenth-Fifteenth Centuries Byzantine Humanism: Some
Parallels with Petritsi's Philosophy. In: Byzantine Studies in Georgia 2. (dedicated to
Academician Grigol Tsereteli). Ed. by N. Makharadze and M. Giorgadze. Vol. I. (In Georgian,
summary in English). Tbilisi, pp. 1930.
Alexidze, L. (2011). Die Stufen der Tugenden auf dem Weg zur Freiheit: Neuplatonische Paradigmen
in der byzantinischen Philosophie. In: Byzantine Studies in Georgia. Ed. by N. Makharadze and
N. Sulava. Vol. 3. (In Georgian, summary in German). Tbilisi, pp. 2129.
Alexidze, L. (2012). The Choice of a Platonist between Vita Contemplativa and Vita Activa: The
Experience of Georgios Gemistos Pletho. In: Caucasus between East and West. Historical and
Philological Studies in Honour of Zaza Aleksidze. Ed. by D. Chitunashvili. (In Georgian, summary
in English). Tbilisi, pp. 337348.
Alexidze, L. (2014). One in the Beings and One within Us: The Basis of the Union with the One in
Ioane Petritsi's Interpretation of Proclus' Elements of Theology. In: Georgian Christian Thought
and Its Cultural Context. Memorial volume for the 125th Anniversary of Shalva Nutsubidze.
Ed. by T. Nutsubidze et al. Leiden and Boston, pp. 175193.
Arabatzis, G. (2014). Plethon's Philosophy of the Concept. In: Georgios Gemistos Plethon. The
Byzantine and the Latin Renaissance. Ed. by J. Matula and P. R. Blum. Olomouc, pp. 73111.
Bargeliotes, L. (1975). Fate or Heimarmene according to Pletho. In: Diotima 3, pp. 137149.
Beierwaltes, W. (1977). Pronoia und Freheit in der Philosophie des Proklos. In: Freiburger
Zeitschrift fr Philosophie und Theologie 24, pp. 88111.
Beierwaltes, W. (1985). Denken des Einen: Studien zur neuplatonischen Philosophie und ihrer
Wirkungsgeschichte. Frankfurt am Main.
Bene, L. (2014). Constructing Pagan Platonism: Plethon's Theory of Fate and the Ancient
Philosophical Tradition. In: Georgios Gemistos Plethon. The Byzantine and the Latin
Renaissance. Ed. by J. Matula and P. R. Blum. Olomouc, pp. 4171.
Brisson, L. (2004). La doctrine des degrs de vertus chez les No-Platoniciens. Une analyse de la
Sentence 32 de Porphyre, de ses antecedents et de ses consquences. In: tudes
platoniciennes 1, pp. 271286.
Dillon, J. (1990). The Golden Chain. Studies in the Development of Platonism and Christianity.
Aldershot.
Hoffmann, P. (2014). Science thologique et foi selon le commentaire de Simplicius au De Caelo
d'Aristote. In: De l'antiquit tardive au Moyen ge. tudes de logique aristotlicienne et de
242 | L. Alexidze
philosophie grecque, syriaque, arabe et latine offertes Henri Hugonnard-Roche. Ed. by

E. Coda and C. M. Bonadeo. tudes Musulmanes XLIV. Paris, pp. 277363.
Keller, A. (1957). Two Byzantine Scholars and Their Reception in Italy. In: Journal of the Warburg
and Courtaud Institutes 20.3/4 (Jul. - Dec.) Pp. 363370.
Masai, F. (1956a). Plthon et le Platonisme de Mistra. Paris.
Neri, M., ed. (2010). Pletone Giorgio Gemisto: Trattato sulle virt. Testo Greco a fronte. Milano.
O'Meara, D. J. (2003). Platonopolis. Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity. Oxford.
Schultze, F. (1874). Georgios Gemistos Plethon und seine reformatorische Bestrebungen. Jena.
Tambrun, B. (2005). Plethons Abhandlung ber die Tugenden. In: Georgios Gemistos Plethon
(13551452) Reformpolitiker, Philosoph, Verehrer der alten Gtter. Ed. by W. Blum and
W. Seitter. Zrich and Berlin, pp. 101117.
Tambrun, B. (2006b). Plthon, le retour de Platon. French. Paris.
Taylor, J. W. (1920). Gemistus Pletho as a Moral Philosopher. In: Transactions and Proceedings of
the American Philological Association 51, pp. 84100.
Taylor, J. W. (1921). Georgius Gemistus Pletho's Criticism of Plato and Aristotle. Menasha (Wisconsin).
Webb, R. (1989). The Nomoi of Gemistos Plethon in the Light of Plato's Laws. In: Journal of the
Warburg and Courtaud Institutes 52, pp. 214219.
Woodhouse, C. M. (1986c). George Gemistos Plethon: the last of the Hellenes. Oxford.
Udo Reinhold Jeck
Europa entdeckt die mittelalterliche
byzantinisch-georgische Philosophie
Klaproth, Sjgren, Brosset und Creuzer ber Ioane Petrizi
1 Einleitung
(a) Proklos konzentrierte seine philosophische Theologie in der -
(Elementatio theologica, Institutio theologica). Dieser Traktat gilt als einer
der wichtigsten Texte sptantiker Philosophie. Er besitzt zudem eine umfangreiche
und komplexe Wirkungsgeschichte, die in ihrem gesamten Umfang und ihren diffizi-
len Verzweigungen noch zu groen Teilen im Dunkeln liegt: Teils im Original, teils in
bersetzungen wirkte diese Abhandlung im arabischen Kulturraum, im lateinischen
Mittelalter, in der Renaissance, in der Frhen Neuzeit und im Deutschen Idealis-
mus.
Es gab aber auch bedeutende Resonanzen bei den Byzantinern, die ihrerseits auf
kaukasische Philosophen einwirkten. Vor allem Ioane Petrizi, der als einer der bedeu-
tendsten Denker der mittelalterlichen Geistesgeschichte Georgiens gilt, lie sich auf
die proklische Philosophie ein. Sein berhmter Kommentar zur Institutio theologi-
Eine frhe Fassung dieser Abhandlung wurde am 29.11.2014 auf der Konferenz Philosophie und Theo-
logie im georgischen Mittelalter des Archivs fr kaukasische Philosophie und Theologie und der Ioane-
Petrizi-Gesellschaft, die Grigoli (Berbichashvili), Metropolit von Poti und Khobi, und Prof. Dr. Tengiz
Iremadze (Grigol-Robakidze-Universitt, Tbilisi) in Poti (Georgien) organisierten, auf Georgisch vor-
getragen. Ich danke vor allem meinem Kollegen Tengiz Iremadze, mit dem ich die hier vertretenen
Thesen mehrfach diskutieren konnte, fr weiterfhrende Hinweise.
1 Vgl. Dodds, Proclus, The Elements of Theology; Onnasch, Schomakers, Proklos, Theologische Grund-
legung.
2 Vgl. Bos and Meijer 1992; Gersh 2014c.
3 Vgl. Gnther 2007.
4 Vgl. Endress, Proclus Arabus.
5 Vgl. Vansteenkiste, Procli Elementatio theologica; Boese 1985; Berthold von Moosburg, Exp. super
Elem. theol. Procli VI, 18; Jeck, Tautz, Bray, Berthold von Moosburg, Exp. super Elem. theol. Procli VI,
7; Jeck 2011.
6 Vgl. Patrizi, Elementa theologica et physica.
7 Vgl. Portus, In Platonis Theologiam.
8 Vgl. Beierwaltes 1979, 2007.
9 Vgl. Angelou, Nicholas of Methone, Refutation.
10 Vgl. Iremadze 2009; Jeck 2010.
11 Vgl. Iremadze 2004d, 2007, 2011.
DOI 10.1515/9781501503597-011
244 | U. R. Jeck
ca liegt gegenwrtig nicht nur im georgischen Original, sondern seit kurzem auch
in deutscher bersetzung vor. Petrizis Denken hat die Philosophie des Westens er-
reicht. Bis dahin war es jedoch ein langer, schwieriger und steiniger Weg, dessen An-
fang im Mittelpunkt dieser Untersuchung stehen soll. Ihre zentrale Frage lautet des-
halb: Wer nahm in Europa, das heit, auerhalb des Kaukasus, Petrizi erstmals zur
Kenntnis?
(b) Im Hinblick darauf bemht sich diese Abhandlung um die Lsung eines bis-
her kaum beachteten philosophiegeschichtlichen Problems. Sie zeichnet nmlich die
Anstrengungen einiger europischer Gelehrter der ersten Hlfte des 19. Jhts. nach,
die sich aus unterschiedlichen Motiven fr die kaukasische Philosophie interessier-
ten und Nachrichten darber publizierten.
Sie warfen dabei das gesamte Gewicht ihrer wissenschaftlichen Autoritt in die
Waagschale und gerieten doch in Europa fast vllig in Vergessenheit. Vor allem nutz-
ten sie die gnstige historische Situation: Die damalige russische Fhrungsschicht
hielt die wissenschaftliche Erforschung des Kaukasus, der Kaukasier und ihrer Kul-
tur fr zwingend notwendig. Dafr besa sie mit der Petersburger Akademie der Wis-
senschaften ein ausgezeichnetes, international anerkanntes und vernetztes wissen-
schaftliches Instrument. Insofern wirkten nicht nur uneigenntzige wissenschaftli-
che, sondern auch handfeste politische Interessen bei der Erforschung des Kaukasus
mit.
(c) Diese hoch spezialisierten Forscher arbeiteten erfolgreich; zwar vermochten
sie nicht viel ber die kaukasische Philosophie und Petrizi zu eruieren, doch bleibt es
ihr historisches Verdienst, dass sie durch gelehrte Untersuchungen erstmals wichti-
ge, fr die Westeuroper bis dahin vllig unbekannte Tatsachen der von Byzanz be-
einflussten georgischen Philosophie des Mittelalters ans Licht zogen und ihren Wert
12 Vgl. Nutsubidse, Kauchtschischvili, Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria in Procli Diadochi

.
13 Vgl. Alexidze, Bergemann, Ioane Petrizi, Kommentar zur Elementatio theologica des Proklos.
14 Als kaukasische Philosophie gilt dabei jenes philosophische Denken der Hochkulturen des Kau-
kasus, das zunchst im Ausgang von sptantiken und byzantinischen Anregungen, dann aber unter
dem Einfluss anderer Strmungen zu einer eigenstndigen philosophischen Tradition heranwuchs,
die sich bis in die Gegenwart durch Originalitt, Produktivitt und Weitblick auszeichnet (vgl. Irem-
adze 2013, 714, 138).
15 Seit 1873 liegen jene Aktenstcke und Plne vor, die Leibniz Zar Peter dem Groen zur Grndung
der Akademie der Wissenschaften vorlegte (vgl. Guerrier 1873). Schon 1716 forderte Leibniz die Russen
zur Sammlung armenischer Bcher auf (vgl. Leibniz, Concept einer Denkschrift, 350: Es sollen auch
Bcher vorhanden sein in allerhand Sprachen slavonisch, teutsch, lateinisch und in den europischen
lebenden Sprachen als englisch, franzsisch, welsch, spanisch, sondern auch in griechisch, literal
und vulgar hebraeisch, arabisch, syrisch, chaldisch, aethiopisch, coptisch, armenisch und sinesisch
selbst.
16 Vgl. Baumgarten, Sechzig Jahre des Kaukasischen Krieges.
Die mittelalterliche byzantinisch-georgische Philosophie | 245
erkannten. Zu ihnen gehren Julius Klaproth, Anders Johann Sjgren, Marie Flicit
Brosset und Friedrich Creuzer.
2 Heinrich Julius Klaproth (1814)

(a) 1783 als Sohn des Chemikers Martin Heinrich Klaproth (17431817) geboren, wid-
mete sich Heinrich Julius Klaproth anders als sein Vater nicht den Naturwissenschaf-
ten, sondern trieb mit Erfolg ausgedehnte und schwierige Sprachstudien. Mit ihm
betrat ein Gelehrter die Bhne, der sich fr die Erforschung der georgischen Kultur wie
kaum ein zweiter eignete; sprachkundig, mutig und begeisterungsfhig vermittelte er
nach Lage der Quellen als erster einem greren Publikum in Europa Kenntnisse ber
Petrizi und seine Zeit. Klaproth erzielte diese Forschungsergebnisse allerdings nur da-
durch, dass er schon frh mit der akademischen Welt Russlands in Kontakt trat und
dort Fu fasste: 1804 stellte ihn die Akademie in Petersburg als Hilfskraft (Adjunkt)
mit dem Arbeitsgebiet orientalische Sprachen ein.
Wenig spter erhielt er den Auftrag zu einer Forschungsexpedition in den Kauka-
sus (1807/08). Klaproth hat diese Reise auf vielfltige Weise und in zahlreichen Publi-
kationen ausgewertet. Er hielt sich auch nicht lange mit der Vorbereitung des Drucks
auf, sondern verffentlichte schon in den Jahren 18121814 in Halle und Berlin beide
Bnde seines bedeutenden Reiseberichts. Dort teilte er wichtige Informationen ber
Georgien mit, die wegen ihrer Flle hier auch nicht annhernd zur Sprache kommen
knnen. Lediglich jener kurze Textabschnitt, der einen Bezug zur kaukasischen Philo-
sophie enthlt, besitzt in diesem Zusammenhang Bedeutung, da er wie schon gesagt
innerhalb einer Reflexion zur Geschichte Georgiens auch Petrizi erwhnt.
(b) Klaproth skizzierte zunchst die historische Situation Georgiens und seine
Beziehungen zu Byzanz im 11. Jht., wobei nicht alle Angaben den historischen Tat-
sachen entsprechen:
I. Im Jahr 1027 bernahm der georgische Knig Bagrat IV. (10271072) nach dem
17 Zu den biogr. Daten vgl. Meyers Konversations-Lexikon X, 196b197a; Brockhaus Konversations-

Lexikon X, 385b386a; Walravens, Julius Klaproth (17831835). Leben und Werk; Walravens, Julius Kla-
proth (17831835). Briefe und Dokumente; Walravens, Julius Klaproth. Briefwechsel mit Gelehrten.
18 Vgl. u. a. Klaproth, Beschreibung der Russischen Provinzen; Klaproth, Geographisch-historische Be-
schreibung des stlichen Kaukasus; Klaproth, Tableau historique, gographique, ethnographique et po-
litique du Caucase et des provinces limitrophes entre la Russie et la Perse; Klaproth, Vocabulaire et
grammaire de la langue gorgienne .
19 Vgl. Klaproth, Reise in den Kaukasus und nach Georgien III.
20 Vgl. Klaproth, Reise in den Kaukasus und nach Georgien II 37, 62238 (Geschichte von Georgien).
ber die Quellen, die Klaproth fr dieses Kapitel nutzte, vgl. 6264.
21 Vgl. Lordkipanidze 1987.
22 Zu Bagrat IV. vgl. Fhnrich 2010, 191193.
246 | U. R. Jeck
Tod seines Vaters Giorgi I. (10141027) die Regierungsgeschfte. Damals, so heit

es in Klaproths Bericht, verstarb auch der byzantinische Kaiser Basileios II. (976
1025). Den Thronwechsel in Konstantinopel innerhalb der makedonischen Dynastie
versuchten die Georgier auszunutzen, um die Herrschaft der Byzantiner abzuscht-
teln. Von Kaiser Basileios II. bernahm dessen Bruder Konstantin VIII. (10251028)
die Herrschaft, regierte jedoch nur kurz und fand in seinem Sohn Romanos III. (1028
1034) einen Nachfolger. Dieser integrierte Georgien erneut in den byzantinischen
Staatsverband, erhob Bagrat IV. zum Vasallen und gab ihm angeblich seine Toch-
ter zur Gemahlin. Schlielich verlieh er dem Georgier einen angesehenen Titel in
der politischen Hierarchie von Byzanz (curopalatus) und hndigte ihm wertvolle
Geschenke von hoher sakraler Bedeutung aus:
Dieser [] B a g r a t I V. bernahm, nach dem Tode seines Vaters (1027), die Regierung. Zu seiner
Zeit starb der Griechische Kaiser B a s i l i u s. Diesen Umstand hielten die Georgier fr gnstig, um
sich vom Griechischen Joche zu befreien, und fhrten dies Vorhaben wirklich aus. Allein nach
dem Tode des Kaisers Ko n s t a n t i n, des Sohnes L e o n, ward R o m a n o s Griechischer Kaiser, und
dieser nthigte den Knig Bagrat IV. sich ffentlich fr seinen Vasallen zu erklren. Um ihn (O:
ihm) desto mehr im Gehorsam zu halten, gab ihm der Kaiser seine Tochter E l e n a zur Gemahlin
und den Titel K u r a t- P a l a t i. Unter verschiedenen kostbaren und seltenen Sachen, die er ihm
bei dieser Gelegenheit schenkte, war auch ein Bild der Mutter Gottes, in dem sich ein Stck ihres
Grtels befand, und das jetzt im Besitz des Knigsohns D av i t h zu St. Petersburg ist.
II. In diesem historischen Kontext wirkte Petrizi, der, von Giorgi I. zu wissenschaftli-
chen Studien nach Byzanz geschickt, whrend der Regierungszeit Bagrats IV. in sein
Vaterland zurckkehrte und dort das Denken Platons sowie des Aristoteles ins Ge-
23 Vgl. Holmes 2005.

24 Zur Stammtafel der Makedonischen Dynastie (8671056) vgl. Ostrogorsky 1952, 458.
25 Vgl. folgende Regierungszeiten: Byzanz: Basileios II. (9761025) Konstantin VIII. (10251028)
Romanos III. (10281034); Georgien: Giorgi I. (10141027) Bagrat IV. (10271072).
26 Es handelte sich vielmehr um die Nichte des Kaisers (vgl. Silogava and Shengelia 2007, 76: []
Bagrati and Elena [the Emperors niece] []).
27 Vgl. Whitby 1987, 462488.
28 Klaproth, Reise in den Kaukasus und nach Georgien II 37, 173.
29 Zu den widersprchlichen Theorien ber die Biographie Petrizis vgl. Alexidze, Bergemann, Ioane
Petrizi, Kommentar zur Elementatio theologica des Proklos (Einleitung. Persnlichkeit, Leben und Wir-
kung Petrizis), 17.
30 Vermutlich kehrte Petrizi unter Dawit dem Erbauer (10731125) nach Georgien zurck (vgl. Alexid-
ze, Bergemann, Ioane Petrizi, Kommentar zur Elementatio theologica des Proklos [Einleitung. Persn-
lichkeit, Leben und Wirkung Petrizis], 2: Petrizi mu nach dem Jahr 1050 geboren worden sein. Er war
etwa 2530 Jahre alt, als er nach Konstantinopel reiste. Er soll dort ein Schler des Johannes Italos
gewesen sein. Nach der Verurteilung des Johannes Italos verlie Ioane Petrizi Konstantinopel. Er leb-
te dann einige Zeit im georgischen Kloster in Petrizoni und wirkte dort im geistigen Seminar. Nach
1106 kehrte er nach Georgien zurck und entfaltete sein Schaffen in der Zeit Davids des Erbauers im
Gelati-Kloster [West-Georgien], das von Knig David als Akademie fr theologische und literarische
Ttigkeit gegrndet worden war. Petrizi starb nach 1126 in der Zeit des Knigs Demeter I.).
orgische bersetzt haben soll. Zum Kommentar Petrizis zur Institutio theologica des
Proklos oder ihrer bersetzung finden sich allerdings keine Angaben:
Noch ist die Regierung des Knigs B a g r a t I V. darum merkwrdig, weil unter demselben der
Philosoph Jo a n n e P e t r i z i, der von dem Knige G i o r g i in wissenschaftlicher Hinsicht nach
Griechenland geschickt worden war, in sein Vaterland zurckkehrte und die Philosophien des
Platon und Aristoteles ins Georgische bersetzte.
III. Whrend der Regierungszeit Bagrats IV. wirkte auch noch ein anderer bedeutender
Intellektueller in Georgien: Dem Theologen Georgi Aphoni (Giorgi von Athos / Gior-
gi Atoneli, 10091065) schreibt der Bericht die erfolgreiche bersetzung biblischer
Schriften und geistlicher Dichtungen aus griechischen Vorlagen zu. Darber hinaus
erwhnt er auch die Verdienste dieses frommen Geistlichen um die Kultivierung der
Sprache Georgiens:
Zu derselben Zeit war auch Giorgi Aphoni wieder nach Georgien gekommen, welcher den Psalter
und andere geist-(174)liche und weltliche Lieder aus dem Griechischen ins Georgische bersetz-
te. Vorzglich bemhte sich dieser die Reinheit der Georgischen Sprache zu erhalten, und seine
Bemhungen waren nicht vergeblich.
IV. Klaproths Bericht schliet mit weiteren Bemerkungen zu Petrizi: Im Zeitalter Ba-
grats IV., so behauptete er, kehrten zahlreiche georgische Wissenschaftler aus Byzanz
zurck und demonstrierten ihre Fhigkeiten durch bersetzungen biblischer Texte ins
Georgische. Petrizi berragte sie jedoch alle durch seine sprachlichen Qualitten:
Denn obgleich unter der Regierung des Knigs B a g r a t I V. (O: II.) viele gelehrte Georgier aus
Griechenland zurckgekommen waren und ihre Gelehrsamkeit zeigen wollten, indem sie das al-
te und neue Testament in ihre Muttersprache gut zu bertragen suchten, so blieben doch ihre
31 Zu Petrizis Auseinandersetzung mit Platon und Aristoteles vgl. Iremadze 2004d, 17 und Iremadze
2011.
33 Vgl. Fhnrich 1994, 24: Giorgi Atoneli leistete eine gewaltige bersetzungsarbeit, von der ein gro-
er Teil in altgeorgischen Handschriften berliefert ist. Von den biblischen Bchern bertrug er den
Psalter, das Evangelium, die Paulusbriefe und die Apostelgeschichte ins Georgische. Bisweilen ber-
setzte er ein Werk mehrmals, um grtmgliche Nhe zum Original zu erreichen, z. B. bersetzte er den
Psalter zweimal aus dem Griechischen. Auer Teilen der Bibel bersetzte er Apokryphen, exegetische
Werke, dogmatische, liturgische und metaphrasierte hagiographische Werke sowie kirchenrechtliche
Arbeiten. Giorgi Atoneli verfasste auch originale Arbeiten. Am bekanntesten ist seine Hagiographie
Das Leben des Ioane und Ekwtime, die gleichzeitig eine wichtige Geschichtsquelle darstellt. Damit
dokumentiert er die georgische Klostergrndung auf Athos und schuf ein bleibendes Zeugnis gegen
die Versuche der Griechen, die Georgier vom Athos zu vertreiben. Auch poetische Arbeiten hat Giorgi
Atoneli geschrieben, davon sind aber nur wenige erhalten geblieben.
248 | U. R. Jeck
Bemhungen weit hinter denen des Jo a n n e P e t r i z i zurck, denn dieser bertraf alle seine Vor-
gnger an Gediegenheit und Reinheit der Sprache.
(c) Obwohl Klaproths Bericht jene geistige Bltezeit Georgiens widerspiegelt, die ei-
nen so bedeutenden Denker wie Petrizi hervorbrachte, erscheint er jedoch oberflch-
lich; er beschrnkt sich auf wenige Fakten und enthlt unbersehbare Irrtmer so-
wie einige Ungenauigkeiten; zur Vertiefung der Einsicht in Petrizis Wirken und sei-
ne Zeit bedurfte es daher weiterer Studien. Diese initiierten einige Jahrzehnte nach
Klaproth der finnische Sprachwissenschaftler Anders Johann Sjgren und der franz-
sische Kaukasologe Marie Flicit Brosset; sie erweiterten und vertieften das Wissen
ber den georgischen Philosophen, indem sie Unklarheiten beseitigten und fehlerhaf-
te Angaben durch Rckgang auf die Quellen richtig stellten.
3 Marie Flicit Brosset I (1837)

(a) Brosset ist gegenwrtig im Westen fast vllig unbekannt; seine Verdienste um
die Kenntnis des kaukasischen Geistes gerieten dagegen in Armenien und Georgi-
en niemals in Vergessenheit, sondern fanden vielmehr als Gegenstand zahlreicher
Forschungen eine angemessene Wrdigung. Schon die Biographie und Publikati-
onsliste dieses Kaukasologen und Orientalisten dokumentieren eindeutig, dass er die
Kultur des Kaukasus bei aller Differenziertheit als eine Ganzheit betrachtete. Daher
konzentrierte er sich nicht nur auf ein Moment in der Mannigfaltigkeit des kaukasi-
schen Geisteslebens, sondern wrdigte den kulturellen Reichtum dieser Region aus
dem Verstndnis ihrer Vielfalt, indem er darauf mit auerordentlicher Gelehrsamkeit
und bewundernswertem Kenntnisreichtum reagierte. Im Hinblick auf die kaukasische
Philosophie hielt er an seiner Strategie fest; er erforschte die Quellen des armenischen
und des georgischen philosophischen Denkens.
(b) Brosset wurde am 5.2.1802 in Paris geboren, das heit, in jener Metropole,
die durch ihre einzigartigen Forschungsinstitutionen fr die europische Orientalis-
tik des 19. Jhts. eine groe Bedeutung besa. Fast zwanzig Jahre jnger als Klaproth
gehrte er einer neuen Generation an; er blickte weiter und tiefer als sein berhmter
Vorgnger, studierte Theologie in Orlans und Paris, arbeitete sich in das Chinesische,
das Mandschu sowie das Tibetanische ein; seit 1824 konzentrierte er sich jedoch vor
allem auf die armenische und georgische Sprache.
Auch fr Brosset fhrte der Weg zu den Wissenschaften und Kulturgtern Kauka-

36 Vgl. Khantadze 1970. Auf. S. 194209 befindet sich eine Publikationsliste der Werke Brossets (n.
1270).
37 Zu den biogr. Daten vgl. Brockhaus Konversations-Lexikon III, 541b; Bouatchidze 1996.
siens ber die Petersburger Akademie der Wissenschaften, die ihn 1836, wie Klaproth,
zum Adjunkten ernannte; 1838 erreichte er den Status eines auerordentlichen und
1847 eines ordentlichen Mitglieds der Akademie der Wissenschaften mit dem Zustn-
digkeitsbereich armenische und georgische Literatur. Von 1847 bis 1848 reiste er dann
auf Regierungskosten nach Armenien und Georgien. Er kannte demnach die Lage
vor Ort genau. Brosset starb am 1.9.1880 in St. Petersburg und hinterlie eine stattli-
che Reihe von Publikationen, die sich sowohl auf Armenien als auch auf Georgien
beziehen. Darber hinaus bersetzte er wichtige originale Quellen aus Armenien
und Georgien, publizierte im Journal asiatique und trug zahlreiche Untersuchun-
gen zu den Verffentlichungen der Kaiserlichen Akademie in St. Petersburg bei.
(c) In diesem Zusammenhang knnen nicht alle erstaunlich zahlreichen und man-
nigfaltigen Aktivitten Brossets zur Sprache kommen; hier geht es primr darum, wel-
che Verdienste er sich im Hinblick auf die Entdeckung der kaukasischen Philosophie
erwarb und was er konkret ber Petrizi wusste.
Zunchst konnte oder wollte Brosset noch nicht viel ber den georgischen Phi-
losophen preisgeben. Seine fr das Studium des Georgischen besonders wichtige
Sprachlehre lments de la langue gorgienne, die 1837 in Paris erschien, enthlt
lediglich einen relativ kurzen Hinweis auf Petrizi, das heit, Brosset fasste dort nur
wenige Informationen ber die georgische Philosophie zusammen; er verwies auf
Petrizi allerdings unter der berschrift III. Grammaires:
1 Jean le Philosophe ou Ptritsi, commentateur de Platon, avait compos une grammaire que cite
Antoni Ier.
Ioane Petrizi heit bei Brosset Jean le Philosophe ou Ptritsi; er bezeichnete den
Georgier (wie Klaproth) ebenfalls nicht als Ausleger des Proklos, sondern betrachtete
38 Vgl. Brosset, Rapports sur un voyage archologique dans la Gorgie et dans lArmnie.
39 Vgl. Brosset, Catalogue de la bibliothque dEdchmiadzin; Brosset, Monographie des monnaies ar-
mniennes; Brosset, Les ruines dAni.
40 Vgl. Brosset, Chronique gorgienne; Brosset, Mmoires indits, relatifs a lHistoire et la Langue
gorgiennes; Brosset, LArt Libral, ou Grammaire Gorgienne.
41 Vgl. Brosset, Collection dhistoriens armniens; dArivank, Histoire chronologique; de Gantzac,
dOurha, Deux historiens armniens; Orblian, Histoire de la Siounie III.
42 Vgl. Tsarvitch Wakhoucht, Description gographique de la Gorgie; Brosset, Histoire de la Gorgie
I-III.
43 Vgl. Brosset, Notice sur la langue Gorgienne.
44 Vgl. Brosset, Bibliographie analytique.
45 Vgl. Brosset, lments de la langue gorgienne.
46 Vgl. Brosset, lments de la langue gorgienne, XI (IV. Philosophie, Lgislation).
47 Brosset, lments de la langue gorgienne, XI.
48 Brosset, lments de la langue gorgienne, XI, III. n. 1.
49 Brosset, lments de la langue gorgienne, XI, III. n. 1.
250 | U. R. Jeck
ihn vielmehr als Platonkommentator, der auch eine Grammatik erarbeitete, die dann
Antoni I. zitierte. Brosset schpfte seine Informationen augenscheinlich aus Angaben
von Anton I. Katholikos (17201788), ohne sie allerdings nher zu spezifizieren. Da-
raus lie sich noch nicht viel entnehmen, es handelte sich nur um einen ersten und
bescheidenen Anfang.
4 Anders Johann Sjgren I (1837)

(a) Den nchsten wichtigen Impuls gab der finnische Sprachforscher Anders Johann
Sjgren, der, am 8.5.1794 in Ithis (Finnland) geboren, am 18.1.1855 in St. Petersburg
verstarb. Die dortige Akademie der Wissenschaften ernannte auch ihn 1832 zum
Adjunkten und 1844 zu ihrem Mitglied. 1845 stieg er zum Direktor des ethnogra-
phischen Museums auf. Sjgrens Interesse galt der Erforschung des finnischen
Sprachstamms, aber er untersuchte auch die baltischen Sprachen. Vor allem aber
bemhte er sich um das Ossetische, das damals nicht nur ihn, sondern auch andere
Forscher brennend interessierte. Sjgren legte jedenfalls 1844 eine umfangreiche
Studie dazu vor.
Im Hinblick darauf reiste er im Auftrag der Petersburger Akademie in den Kau-
kasus, hielt sich im Jahre 1837 auch in Georgien auf und kehrte zu Beginn der Jah-
res 1838 nach Petersburg zurck. ber diese strapazise und nicht ungefhrliche
wissenschaftliche Expedition (voyage scientifique) berichtete er seinem akademi-
schen Vorgesetzen Philipp Krug (17641844) (Acadmicien effectif, Conseiller dtat
actuel) in einem Brief vom 20.10.1837 aus Mosdok (Nordkaukasus), der 1838 voll-
50 Vgl. Alexidze, Bergemann, Ioane Petrizi, Kommentar zur Elementatio theologica des Proklos (Einlei-
tung. Persnlichkeit, Leben und Wirkung Petrizis), 2: Petrizi soll weiterhin eine georgische Grammatik
verfat und Hymnen geschrieben haben.
51 Vgl. Ptsch 1975; Iremadze 2006; Hage 2007.
52 Zu den biogr. Daten vgl. Meyers Konversations-Lexikon XVI, 16ab; Brockhaus Konversations-
Lexikon XIV, 1010b.
53 Vgl. Sjgren, Ueber die finnische Sprache und ihre Litteratur.
54 Vgl. Sjgren, Livische Grammatik; Sjgren, Livisch-deutsches und deutsch-livisches Wrterbuch.
55 Vgl. Rosen, Ossetische Sprachlehre.
56 Vgl. Sjgren, Ossetische Sprachlehre.
57 Vgl. Sjgren, Ossetische Sprachlehre, IX Anm. *): Kurze Berichte ber meine Reisen und Beschfti-
gungen sind gedruckt im Bulletin scientifique publi par lAcadmie Impriale des Sciences de Saint-
Ptersbourg. Tome I. Nr. 1415. Tome II. Nr. 18 und 23 und Tome III. Nr. 1417.
58 Vgl. Sjgren, Ossetische Sprachlehre, IX: Bei allem dem hatte ich die Genugthuung den Kaukasus
mit der inneren Ueberzeugung verlassen zu knnen, dass ich alles nur mgliche geleistet hatte, und
ich kehrte im Anfange des Jahres 1838 nach Petersburg zurck []
59 Vgl. Krug, Forschungen in der lteren Geschichte Russlands.
60 Vgl. tat du personnel de lAcadmie Impriale des Sciences de St-Ptersbourg a la fin de lanne
stndig im Bulletin scientifique publi par lAcadmie Impriale des Sciences de Saint-
Ptersbourg erschien, und kam damit zugleich einer Verpflichtung gegenber der
Akademie nach.
Am 22.5.1837 brach Sjgren von Kuthais aus in Richtung nach G r u s i e n und T i f-
l i s auf, erreichte kurz darauf Tbilisi und nutzte dort seine Beziehungen, so dass
er auf diese Weise Kontakt zu einem alten Geistlichen erlangte, der ihm die eigene
interessante kleine Bibliothek von Grusinischen (O: Grusinichen) M a n u s c r i p t e n
zeigte. Danach gab Sjgren seine eigenen Vorurteile auf, denn nun erhielt er erstmals
Einsicht in die uralte Literatur Georgiens.
(b) Sjgren suchte den Kaukasus zwar primr im Hinblick auf seine ossetischen
Forschungen auf, aber er war zu gelehrt und philologisch sensibel, um nicht den Wert
der Informationen, die er in seinen Gesprchen in Tbilisi erlangte, in seinem vollen
Umfang zu erkennen. Vor allem berraschte ihn wohl die Existenz einer philosophi-
schen Tradition in Georgien. Seine unbefangenen Urteile darber blieben nicht feh-
lerfrei, aber sie zeigen einen berraschenden Weitblick. Deshalb gehren sie zu jenen
zentralen Dokumenten, die hier zur Sprache kommen mssen:
I. Sjgren fielen zunchst die bedeutenden theologischen Kenntnisse der Georgier
auf; diese Kaukasier besaen, wie er erstaunt bemerkte, zahlreiche bersetzungen der
Kirchenvter. Darber hinaus wussten sie auch von den griechischen Philosophen,
wobei besonders Aristoteles im Mittelpunkt stand, dessen Texte sie bersetzten und
kommentierten. Sjgren besa auch eine zeitliche Vorstellung von dieser Hochphase
der georgischen Geistesgeschichte: Sie ereignete sich parallel zur Zeit der westeuro-
1836, in Recueil des Actes de la sance publique de lAcadmie impriale des sciences de Saint-
Ptersbourg, XLII: III. Classe des sciences politiques, historiques et philologiques; 13. Histoire et An-
tiquits russes [] M. Philippe Krug, Acadmicien effectif, Conseiller dtat actuel [] M. Jean-Andr
Sjgren, Acadmicien extraordinaire, Conseiller de Cour.
61 Vgl. Sjgren, Lettre de M. Sjoegren a M. Krug.
62 Vgl. Sjgren, Lettre de M. Sjoegren a M. Krug, 219: In meinem Briefe an unsern Herrn Minister ha-
be ich bereits von meinen wichtigsten Reisen dieses Jahres ins Gebirge und nachher durch Imerethien
nach Tiflis wenigstens kurz berichtet; indessen drfte eine umstndlichere Beschreibung nicht ohne
Interesse sein, und da ich dazu eben hier eine nothgedrungene Musse habe, so nehme ich mir die
Freiheit, diesmal Ew. Excellenz damit aufzuwarten, und zugleich meine Verpflichtung zu einem aus-
fhrlicheren Berichte an die Akademie berhaupt zu erfllen. Mit Minister ist wahrscheinlich Graf
Sergej Semjonowitsch Uwarow gemeint (vgl. tat du personnel de lAcadmie Impriale des Sciences de
St.-Ptersbourg a la fin de lanne 1836, in Recueil des Actes de la sance publique de lAcadmie imp-
riale des sciences de Saint-Ptersbourg, XXXVII: PRSIDENT: M. Serge Ouvaroff, Conseiller priv,
Ministre de linstruction publique).
63 Sjgren, Lettre de M. Sjoegren a M. Krug, 268.
64 Sjgren. Lettre de M. Sjoegren a M. Krug, 269: Ich setzte noch denselben Morgen meine Reise nach
T i f l i s fort [] und bekam so Gelegenheit, bei einem alten Geistlichen auch eine interessante kleine
Bibliothek von Grusinischen (O: Grusinichen) M a n u s c r i p t e n zu besehen, und mich dadurch noch
mehr zu berzeugen, dass die Grusinische handschriftliche Literatur denn doch jetzt noch nicht so
ganz drftig ist.
252 | U. R. Jeck
pischen Scholastik, die damals ebenfalls Aristoteles favorisierte. Er fhrte daher die
Aristotelesrezeption der Georgier auf Einflsse jenes mittelalterlichen Aristotelismus
zurck, der damals im lateinischen Westens blhte; von einer byzantinischen Philo-
sophie und ihrer Beziehung zu Georgien wusste Sjgren noch nichts. Als Beweis fr
seine Hypothese nahm er die Tatsache, dass die kaukasischen Philosophen wie die
lateinischen Scholastiker zur Charakterisierung besonderer Eigenschaften zustzlich
bestimmte Beinamen trugen. Dabei unterlief ihm allerdings der Irrtum, dass er David
den Unbesiegbaren (Invincibilis) fr einen georgischen Philosophen des Mittelal-
ters hielt. Vermutlich hat er eine georgische bersetzung dieses sptantiken arme-
nischen Aristotelikers gesehen.
II. Aber Sjgren traf in Tbilisi nicht nur einen lteren georgischen Kleriker, son-
dern auch den wissenschaftlichen Nachwuchs. Das zahlte sich ebenfalls aus: Dabei
gelang ihm nmlich ein Manuskriptfund von groer Bedeutung. Sjgren hat ber die
Umstnde dieser Entdeckung im hier diskutierten Brief an Krug vom 20.10.1837 berich-
tet: In Tbilisi besa er nach eigenen Aussagen nicht ausreichend finanzielle Mittel,
um Handschriften oder Mnzen, die den Numismatiker Philipp Krug sicher interes-
siert htten, fr die Akademie zu erwerben. Aber seine Bemhungen blieben nicht
ganz erfolglos, denn er erhielt das Duplikat einer alten und seltenen Handschrift,
das er seinem Brief beifgte und fr dessen inhaltliche Prfung Sjgren Brosset, sei-
nen Kollegen und damals noch neuen Mitglied der Akademie, wrmstens empfahl.
Wer diese Handschrift verfasste, und was sie enthielt, gab er noch nicht preis. Die Mit-
teilung dieser Informationen behielt er sich fr spter vor, aber immerhin gilt: Mitte
1837 hielt erstmals ein europischer Gelehrter von Bedeutung ein Petrizi-Manuskript
in den Hnden!
65 Vgl. Sjgren, Lettre de M. Sjoegren a M. Krug, 270: Weit reichhaltiger ist die poetische Literatur,
so wie auch die theologische, worin die Grusiner auch verschiedene Uebersetzungen aus mehreren
Kirchenvtern besitzen. Allein eben solche gibt es auch von einigen alten Griechischen Philosophen.
Besonders scheint bei ihnen A r i s t o t e l e s in grosser Achtung gestanden zu haben, da es noch von
mehreren seiner verschiedenen Werke Uebersetzungen und sogar mit eigenen Commentarien gibt.
Da die blhende Epoche der Grusinischen Literatur berhaupt in dieselbe Zeit fllt, wo namentlich
die scholastische Philosophie mit Aristoteles an der Spitze in ganz Europa herrschte, so drfte beson-
ders diese auch in Grusien Eingang gefunden und die zahlreicheren Uebersetzungen von Aristotelis
Schriften veranlasst haben. Dies scheint sich noch dadurch zu besttigen, dass auch Grusinische Phi-
losophen ihren Namen gewisse Epitheten beilegten, die denen hnlich sind, welchen von den scho-
lastischen Philosophen Europas im Mittelalter gebraucht wurden. So kennt man z. B. noch von er-
haltenen Manuscripten einen solchen Grusinischen Gelehrten mit dem Beinamen Invincibilis. Zu
Davids Wirkungen vgl. Arevshatyan 2009.
66 Dabei handelte es sich um eine Abschrift (vgl. Anm. 82).
67 Brosset war, wie oben schon gezeigt, seit 1836 Adjunkt der Petersburger Akademie. Zum Status
des Adjunken vgl. Rglements et tat lAcadmie impriale des sciences. Rglements et tat octroys a
lAcadmie le 8 janvier 1836. Rglements de lAcadmie. Chapitre VI. Des acadmiciens extraordinaires
et des adjoints, 7080, in Recueil des Actes de la sance publique de lAcadmie impriale des sciences
de Saint-Ptersbourg, XVIIIXX.
Dieses wertvolle Geschenk stammte von Platon Ioseliani (18101875), einem jun-
gen Theologen, der Philosophie und Physik im theologischen Seminar zu Tbilisi
lehrte, umfangreiche Kenntnisse zur georgischen Geistesgeschichte besa und da-
her auch Petrizi nicht bersah. Sjgren rhmte ihn nicht ohne Grund als viel ver-
sprechendes wissenschaftliches Talent. Im Rahmen der bekannten georgischen Gast-
freundschaft erhielt Sjgren zum Abschied auch noch die Grammatik des Anton I. Ka-
tholikos geschenkt:
Ohne Geld, wie ich zuletzt in Grusien war, konnte ich an keine Einkufe weder von Manuscrip-
ten, noch von Mnzen (deren ich in Tiflis wiederum einige sah) denken. Indessen gelang es mir
doch, fr unsere Akademie wenigstens eine Dublette von einem alten und seltenen Manuscript
zu acquiriren, das ich die Ehre habe hierbei zu bersenden, und ber dessen Inhalt unser neues
Mitglied Herr B r o s s e t Auskunft geben wird. Das Manuscript ist ein Geschenk von einem gewis-
sen Josselian, Candidat der Theologie und Lehrer der Philosophie und Physik bei dem Tiflisschen
theologischen Seminario, einem jungen wackern Manne, von dem sich mit der Zeit noch Vieles
fr die Wissenschaft erwarten lsst, und dessen Bekanntschaft ich sehr bedauern musste nicht
frher gemacht zu haben. Von demselben erhielt ich auch fr mich selbst zum Andenken die
bereits fter gedachte Grammatik von A n t o n i j.
Sjgren erkannte wohl, dass ihn dieser Manuskriptfund wissenschaftlich berforder-

te. Zu seiner Auswertung bedurfte es eher eines erfahrenen Kaukasologen, den die Pe-
tersburger Akademie mit Brosset lngst besa. Darber hinaus bentigte diese Insti-
tution einen qualifizierten Wissenschaftler vor Ort. Wer konnte diese Aufgabe besser
erfllen als Ioseliani?
III. Sjgren berichtete in seinem Brief noch von weiteren Manuskripten. Darunter
befanden sich auch griechische Texte von Kirchenvtern aus dem Kloster Gelati, die
ihm Eugenij, der Exarch von Georgien, persnlich zeigte. Daher wre es sinnvoll,
so regte er an, dass Brosset (im Auftrag der Petersburger Akademie) die georgischen
68 Vgl. Ioseliani, A short history of the georgian church, VIII: Preface by the Translater [] Broad-
windsor, November 11th, 1865, IX: Preface by the Author [] Tiflis, 18th of November, 1835.
69 Vgl. Ioseliani, A short history of the georgian church, 109110: Among such men, to whom Geor-
gia is greatly indebted for light and knowledge, we may notice John Patricius (sic!), a scholastic phi-
losopher, surnamed Tchirtchimius,6 Stephen, and others. These learned men brought back into their
native land the creations of Greek intelligence; they translated into the Georgian language some of
the works of Plato, of Aristotle, of Porphyrius, of Damascius, (110) and of others, translations which
exist at present in manuscript; Ioseliani, A short history of the georgian church, 109 Anm. 6: The most
remarkable of his translations from the Greek is that of the philosophical works of Proclus Diadochus.
70 Vgl. Anm. 51.
71 Sjgren, Lettre de M. Sjoegren a M. Krug, 270.
72 Auch hier ist es sicherlich der Empfehlung Sjgrens zu verdanken, dass die Petersburger Akademie
Kontakte zu diesem hohen Geistlichen knpfte (vgl. Deutsche Vierteljahrs Schrift, 362: Kurze Notizen.
Russland. Die k. Akademie zu St. Petersburg hat [] den Exarchen von Georgien, Erzbischof E ug e n
[] zu(m) Korrespondenten ernannt).
254 | U. R. Jeck
Klster aufsuchen und ihre Manuskriptbestnde erforschen solle. Sjgren hielt sich
bis zum 20.6.1837 in Tbilisi auf und wollte selbst noch zum Studium der Handschriften
die alte Knigsstadt Mzcheta aufsuchen, aber der Versuch misslang.
5 Anders Johann Sjgren II (1838)

(a) Sjgren datierte seinen Brief an Krug aus Mosdok auf den 20.10.1837. Am 7.1.1838 traf
er wieder in Petersburg ein. Nur wenige Wochen spter, am 9.2.1838, berichtete er im
Bulletin scientifique unter der berschrift Muses erneut ber das Petrizi-Manuskript
und die denkwrdigen Umstnde seiner Erwerbung fr die Akademie. Das Thema lie
ihn offensichtlich nicht los. Der Artikel trug den Titel Manuscrit Gorgien offert en don
au muse asiatique.
(b) Dieser Bericht besteht aus drei Teilen, die in diesem Zusammenhang detail-
liert zur Sprache kommen sollen:
I. Zunchst ging Sjgren, wie in seinem Brief vom 20.10.1837, erneut auf Platon
Ioseliani ein: Er beschrieb den Georgier als jenen Theologen sowie Philosophie- und
73 Vgl. Sjgren, Lettre de M. Sjoegren a M. Krug, 270271: Dass sogar alte classische Originalhand-
schriften sich ehemals in Grusien befunden haben mgen, ist mehr als wahrscheinlich, zumal da ich
selbst bei dem gelehrten Exarchen E ug e n i j ein kleines Heft auf Pergament gesehen habe, welches
Bruchstcke aus verschiedenen Kirchenvtern im Griechischen enthielt, <das> in dem Gelathischen
Kloster gefunden und nach Tiflis gesandt worden war, wahrscheinlich weil man sich am Orte selbst auf
so etwas nicht verstand. Es wre (271) gewiss ein sehr wnschenswerthes und verdienstliches Unter-
nehmen, wenn ein vollkommener und lange gebter Kenner des Grusinischen, wie unser Herr B r o s -
s e t, ganz Grusien in der besondern Absicht bereisen knnte, um alle in den dortigen Klstern etwa
noch befindlichen alten Manuscripte genau zu untersuchen.
74 Vgl. Sjgren, Lettre de M. Sjoegren a M. Krug, 271: Indem ich bemht war meine verschiedenarti-
gen schriftlichen Sammlungen noch mglichst zu vervollstndigen, verlngerte sich mein Aufenthalt
in Tiflis bis zum 20 Juni. Auf der Rckreise war ich gesonnen, das nur 18 Werst davon diesseits gelege-
ne M t z c h e t h i (die ehemalige Hauptstadt Grusiens) zu besuchen, wo sich ebenfalls ausser anderen
Merkwrdigkeiten eine kleine Bibliothek von alten Manuscripten befinden soll, die mir der Protohie-
rej des Ortes, dessen Bekanntschaft ich zuflliger Weise in Ku t h a i s gemacht, zu zeigen versprochen
hatte [] Zum Unglck waren auch der Protohierej sowohl als der dortige Klostervorsteher verreist,
und ich musste daher unverrichteter Sachen meine weitere Reise fortsetzen.
75 Vgl. die Notiz Philipp Krugs zu Sjgren an Krug, 20.10.1837, in Sjgren, Lettre de M. Sjoegren a M.
Krug, 272: Der Schreiber dieses Briefes ist am 7. Januar auch wirklich glcklich hier angekommen []
76 Vgl. Sjgren, Manuscrit Georgien, 335336. Der Text kam 1846 erneut zum Abdruck (vgl. Dorn, Das
Asiatische Museum, 550551: Beilage Nr 120 [Aus dem Bull. sc. Bd. III S. 335.] Manuscrit gorgien offert
en don au muse asiatique. Rapport de M. Sjoegren [lu le 9 fvrier 1838.]). Die beiden Druckfehler des
Erstdrucks von 1838 sind korrigiert. Zu B. Dorn vgl. Dorn, Beitrge; Abaschnik 2004.
77 Es handelt sich wahrscheinlich ebenfalls um einen Brief. Im Text heit es nmlich weiter unten:
[] wovon ich hier auch eine Abschrift beigelegt habe (vgl. Anm. 82). Diese Beilage kam allerdings
nicht zum Abdruck.
Physiklehrer in Tbilisi, der ihm dort eine bedeutende Handschrift als Geschenk fr die
Akademie bergab. Sjgren kam diesem Auftrag gern nach. Er blieb auch unverndert
bei seiner uerst positiven Einschtzung dieses jungen georgischen Gelehrten: Nicht
nur im Hinblick auf die zuknftige Erforschung der Literatur Georgiens versprach er
sich viel von Ioseliani; auch die Akademie, so meinte er, knnte von den Qualitten
dieses viel versprechenden georgischen Wissenschaftlers profitieren:
In meinem Briefe aus Mosdok hatte ich bereits gemeldet, dass ein geborner Grusiner Namens
Jo s s e l i a n, (336) Candidat der Theologie und Lehrer der Philosophie und Physik bei dem theo-
logischen Seminar zu Tiflis, mir ein sehr seltenes grusinisches Manuscript eingehndigt hatte
um es unserer Akademie als ein Geschenk zu berreichen. Indem ich nun den mir so geworde-
nen Auftrag mit besonderem Vergngen erflle, halte ich es fr eine Pflicht, den jungen wackern
Mann, von dessen Eifer und Thtigkeit fr die georgische Literatur in Zukunft sich recht Vieles
noch erwarten lsst, in dieser Hinsicht der Akademie bestens zu empfehlen, da ich berzeugt
bin, dass derselbe gewiss auch alle wissenschaftliche Auftrge, womit die Akademie ihn etwa
beehren mchte, gern bernehmen und solche nach seiner besten Einsicht auszurichten sich
bestreben werde.
II. Nach dieser einleitenden Empfehlung ging Sjgren nun erstmals genauer auf Inhalt
und Verfasser des Manuskripts ein: Es handelte sich um eine bersetzung des theo-
logische(n) System(s) des Platonischen Philosophen Prokloss Diadochoss, das
heit, der Elementatio theologica bzw. der Institutio theologica. Als Translator gab
er den bekannten und berhmten grusinischen Philosophen Johan Petritzi an
und datierte ihn in die zweite Hlfte des zehnten Jahrhunderts. Dieses theologisch-
philosophische Werk verfgte ber 211 Kapitel. Hinsichtlich des Inhalts besa
Sjgren durch Ioseliani, mit dem er augenscheinlich korrespondierte, eine Zusam-
menfassung. Aber das Manuskript enthielt nicht nur eine Proklos-bersetzung, son-
dern zudem einen Kommentar mit spezifischen Auslegungen dieses Philosophen, die
auch die eigenen berzeugungen des georgischen Denkers erkennen lassen:
Was sein jetzt zum Geschenk dargebrachtes Manuscript nher betrifft, so enthlt es dem Titel
nach: d e s P l a t o n i s c h e n P h i l o s o p h e n P r o k l o s s D i a d o c h o s s t h e o l o g i s c h e S y s t e -
m e , bersetzt von dem bekannten und berhmten grusinischen Philosophen J o h a n P e t r i t-
z i , der in der zweiten Hlfte des X. Jahrhunderts lebte. Das theologisch philosophische Werk
ist in 211 Kapitel eingetheilt, von deren Inhalte mir J o s s e l i a n spter eine allgemeine Uebersicht
schriftlich mittheilte (O: mttheilte), und wovon ich hier auch eine Abschrift beigelegt habe. Der
Uebersetzer hat jedem Kapitel auch eigene Erluterungen beigefgt, die als Belege, wie derselbe
seinen Autor und dessen System aufgefasst hat und von seinen eigenen philosophischen Ansich-
78 Sjgren, Manuscrit Georgien, 335336.

256 | U. R. Jeck
ten fr denjenigen, der diesem Manuscripte ein besonderes Studium widmen wollte, ein eigent-
hmliches Interesse gewhren mssen.
III. Der Bericht schliet mit biographischen Informationen zu Proklos, die allerdings
keine Neuigkeiten enthalten. Sjgren entnahm sie vielleicht einem Handbuch zur Ge-
schichte der Philosophie: Proklos hie wegen seiner Herkunft Lykios und fhrte
zudem den Titel Diadochos, weil er Syrianos in der platonischen Akademie nach-
folgte. Dieser bedeutende Neuplatoniker des 5. Jhts. verfasste zahlreiche Schriften.
Manche davon blieben nicht erhalten, andere noch unpubliziert. Zu den gedruckten
Schriften zhlte jedoch auch die Institutio theologica, das heit, jene Vorlage, die Pe-
trizi ins Georgische bersetzte. Welche Drucke Sjgren meinte ob die Ausgabe des
Aemilus Portus oder die Edition Creuzers , teilte er nicht mit. Allerdings verwies
er darauf, dass es schon lange eine lateinische bersetzung der Institutio theologica
von Francesco Patrizi gab. Vielleicht wollte er durch diesen Hinweis auch verhin-
dern, dass es zu Verwechslungen zwischen Petrizi und Patrizi kam:
Der Original-Verfasser P r o k l o s, nach seinem Vaterlande Lykios, sonst aber auch Diadochos ge-
nannt, weil er von seinem Lehrer der Philosophie Syrianos zu seinem Nachfolger auf dem phi-
losophischen (O: phisosophischen) Lehrstuhle zu Athen ernannt wurde, lebte, wie bekannt, im
V. Jahrhundert und war einer der ausgezeichnetsten Neu - Platoniker, von dessen vielen und
verschiedenartigen Schriften ein grosser Theil verloren gegangen, andere auch unedirt, manche
aber auch bereits gedruckt sind. Diess ist auch namentlich der Fall mit dem Werke, wovon das
gegenwrtige Manuscript eine grusinische Uebersetzung ist, und schon 1583 wurde davon unter
dem Titel: Institutio theologica auch eine lateinische Uebersetzung von F r a n c i s c u s P a t r i c i u s
in Ferrara gedruckt. Emis le 22 fvrier 1838.
6 Marie Felicit Brosset II (1838)

(a) Die Petrizi-Handschrift, die Sjgren der Akademie in Petersburg verschaffte, blieb
nicht unbeachtet. Brosset untersuchte sie nher und berichtete einige weitere Einzel-
heiten darber innerhalb einer greren Abhandlung, in der er sich nun auch detail-
lierter als frher ber Petrizi uern konnte. Diese Informationen erschienen 1838 in
den Forschungsberichten der Akademie von St. Petersburg. Brosset publizierte dort

83 Zu den biographischen Daten vgl. Chlup 2012c.
84 Vgl. Anm. 7.
85 Vgl. Anm. 101.
86 Vgl. Anm. 6.
88 Vgl. Brosset, Discours prononc, 65178.
nicht nur einen berblick ber die Geschichte der georgischen Literatur, sondern
legte darber hinaus einen umfangreichen Katalog vor, der einerseits Angaben zu l-
teren und neueren georgischen Drucken enthlt, andererseits aber auch ungedruckte
Manuskripte beschreibt. In einem Vorwort positionierte er Hinweise zur Herkunft
seiner Informationen und ging dabei auch auf Petrizi ein.
I. Zunchst berichtete Brosset ber den georgischen Philosophen in der zweiten
Sektion seines Katalogs. Er nahm dort eine zeitliche Einordnung Petrizis in die mit-
telalterliche georgische Geschichte vor:
[] Ioan Patric, (126) dit Petritsi, et Stphan, mort en 1069: tous au temps (O: tems) de Bagrat
III, de son fils Giorgi II et de son petit-fils Bagrat IV.
II. Den zweiten Hinweis gab Brosset unter Rckgriff auf jene Petrizi-Handschrift, die
Sjgren kurz zuvor der Akademie vermittelt hatte. Er findet sich in der elften Sektion,
die auch die Philosophie umfasst. Obwohl Brosset die Person und die wissenschaft-
liche Leistung Petrizis nur mit wenigen Stzen charakterisierte, konnte er jetzt inhalt-
lich weit ber seine bisherigen uerungen hinaus mehr Details mitteilen, das heit,
er verbesserte die eigenen ersten Hinweise: (A) Petrizi (Ioan Ptritsi) erscheint in
dieser Notiz nun nicht mehr als ein Platon-Kommentator, sondern als jener georgische
Philosoph, der (B) ein Werk des Proklos mit dem Titel Buch der Elemente (Livre des
lments) bzw. Die Prinzipien der Theologie und der Philosophie (les principes de la
thologie et de la philosophie) aus dem Griechischen bersetzte und sich damit gro-
en Ruhm erwarb. (C) Auf dem Titelblatt des Manuskriptes, das Brosset vorlag, hie
Petrizi daher auch aus georgischer Perspektive unser groer Gelehrter (notre grand
89 Vgl. Brosset, Discours prononc, 67117: Histoire et littrature de la gorgie.

90 Vgl. Brosset, Discours prononc, 119178: Catalogue de livres gorgiens tant imprims que manu-
scrits, anciens et modernes.
91 Vgl. Brosset, Discours prononc, 119: NB. Ayant donn dans les Elments de langue gorgienne
(p. VI XX) un tableau systmatique o sont mentionns un grand nombre douvrages, je ne parlerai
peint ici des livres dj indiqus, moins de pouvoir y joindre de nouvelles notices. Ceux qui forment
le fonds du prsent catalogue appartiennent en grande partie la bibliothque de S. A. R. le Tzar-
vitch Thimouraz Giorgivitch et ont t classs par lui-mme. Cest dans un but dutilit publique
que le prince a bien voulu composer cet crit et en permettre la publication. Les autres livres ont t
ajouts daprs le catalogue dune autre bibliothque, compose de 239 articles, que lon ma dit avoir
t en la possession dun prince Tzitzichwili. Je marquerai ceux-ci de la lettre (T); une autre collec-
tion douvrages traduits du russe en gorgien, appartenant un thawad Awalichwili, sera marque
(A). Enfin mes lectures ou mes rapports avec les Gorgiens de Ptersbourg mont fait connatre quel-
ques autres livres, qui seront marqus dune toile *. On na rien chang la rdaction du catalogue
principal, qui sert de base celui-ci; si lon y ajoute quelque note, ella sera marque de linitiale B.
92 Vgl. Brosset, Discours prononc, 122127: IIe Section: Livres de pit, par divers saints pres gor-
giens inspirs de dieu.
93 Brosset, Discours prononc, 125126 .
94 Vgl. Brosset, Discours prononc, 155159: XIe section. Livres de grammaire, de rhtorique, de phi-
losophie et de morale.
258 | U. R. Jeck
docteur). (D) Der Georgier bersetzte nicht nur die Schrift des Proklos vollstndig in
einem sehr bemerkenswerten georgischen Stil, sondern legte auch einen Kommentar
dazu vor:
128. Livre des lments [] i. e. les principes de la thologie et de la philosophie, par Procl Dia-
dochos; traduit du grec par Ioan Ptritsi, notre grand docteur. Tous les chapitres sont dabord
traduits compltement en un style gorgien trs remarquable; viennent ensuite des explications
philosophiques (O: philolophiques), par le mme.
Brosset przisierte zudem die Hinweise Sjgrens ber die Herkunft jener Handschrift
im Besitz der Petersburger Akademie und teilte insofern auch ein wenig mehr mit:
Es handelte sich wahrscheinlich um eine Abschrift, die der Proto-Diakon Egnati Io-
sliani, der Sohn des Priesters Onsim anfertigte und am 17.9.1794 vollendete. Nach
dem Urteil Brossets handelte sich um ein sehr sorgfltig abgefasstes Manuskript, das
Platon Ioseliani, Professor in Tbilisi, der Petersburger Akademie bergab:
* LAcadmie en possde un exemplaire, achev le 17 septembre 1794 par Egnati Ioslian, proto
diacon, fils du prtre Onsim. Manuscrit trs soign, donn par M. Platon Ioslian, professeur
Tiflis.
Weitere Informationen zu Petrizi legte Brosset in seinem Katalog zu den Quellen der
georgischen Philosophie leider nicht vor.
7 Friedrich Creuzer (1848)

(a) Brosset nutzte jene Petrizi-Handschrift, welche die Petersburger Akademie von
Platon Ioseliani unter Vermittlung Sjgrens erlangte. Doch das blieb nicht die einzi-
ge Reaktion auf die kaukasologischen Erkenntnisse des finnischen Sprachforschers.
Weil er diese Hinweise in deutscher Sprache publizierte, erreichte seine Mitteilung
zu Petrizi im Bulletin scientifique von 1838 auch Friedrich Creuzer, der sich fr Prok-
los und dessen Rezeptionsgeschichte brennend interessierte. Creuzer trat primr als
Mythologe und gelehrter Altertumswissenschaftler in Erscheinung. Vor allem sein
Handbuch Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Vlker, besonders der Griechen erlang-
te groen Ruhm. Creuzer konzentrierte sich aber nicht nur darauf, sondern widme-
te seine Arbeitskraft vor allem der Erforschung des Neuplatonismus: Er stellte Plotin
95 Brosset, Discours prononc, n.128, 157.

96 Vgl. Anm. 68.
97 Brosset, Discours prononc, 157.
98 Vgl. Stark, Friedrich Creuzer; Engehausen 2008; Jamme 2008.
99 Vgl. Creuzer, Symbolik und Mythologie.
sowie Proklos ins Zentrum seiner Anstrengungen, edierte 1822 die Institutio theo-
logica neu und druckte dort auch Nachrichten ber ihre Rezeptionsgeschichte ab.
Doch dabei blieb es nicht: Creuzer lieen dieser proklische Traktat und die mit ihm
verbundenen Probleme nicht los; er suchte brigens lebenslang nach unbekannten
Materialien zur Geschichte des Neuplatonismus, studierte Berichte ber neu aufge-
fundene Manuskripte oder Editionen neuplatonisch inspirierter Denker und reagierte
ffentlich darauf.
(b) Als er 1848 in einer Autobiographie mit dem Titel Aus dem Leben eines alten
Professors ber die frhe Periode seiner wissenschaftlichen Auseinandersetzung mit
dem Neuplatonismus berichtete, teilte er daher auch neuere Informationen zur Wir-
kungsgeschichte der Institutio theologica mit, indem er aus verschiedenen Nachrich-
ten einen kurzen Text formte und dieses Konzentrat in Gestalt einer Anmerkung dem
Bericht ber die eigenen frheren Bemhungen um diesen proklischen Traktat bei-
fgte:
2) Ueber den Titel und das Buch selbst trage ich hier gelegentlich Einiges nach:
Fabrottus bemerkt zum Prooemium der Institutiones des Theophilus p. 7. ed. Reiz: Institutiones
sunt cuiusque scientiae prima cunabula et elementa, , , . Eiusmodi
est Procli , .
Es wird auch als theologisches Capitel bezeichnet; wie ein von Ang. Mai herausgegebenes Bruch-
stck zeigt: Procopii Gazaei fragmentum: -
(Siehe Class. auctorr. e codd. Vatic. ed. A. Mai (125) Tom. IV, p. 274 sq.);
woraus sich ergibt, dass neben Nikolaus von Methone auch Prokopius von Gaza dieses Buch be-
stritten hatte.
Auch Johannes Petrizi, ein Georgischer Philosoph des 10. Jahrhunderts, hatte jedes Capitel der
Grusinischen Uebersetzung dieser Schrift mit Anmerkungen ausgestattet. Die Handschrift ist
jetzt Eigenthum der Petersburger Akademie (S. Bulletin de lAcad. des Sciences de St. Peters-
bourg 1838, p. 335 sq.).
(c) Diese kryptische Notiz zur Institutio theologica des Proklos erschliet sich nicht
unmittelbar, sondern bedarf vielmehr einer detaillierten Analyse:
I. Hinsichtlich ihres Titels verwies Creuzer zunchst auf eine Sentenz aus dem
Promium zur Ausgabe der Institutiones des Theophilos von Charles Annibal Fabrot
(15801659). Dadurch lie sich die Bedeutung des Terminus Institutiones erkl-
ren: Werke mit diesem Titel informieren nmlich ber die ersten Topoi und Elemente
einer jeden Wissenschaft, das heit, sie gelten im Hinblick darauf als Einleitungen
100 Vgl. Beierwaltes 1972b, 83, 103104, 157159, 183.

101 Vgl. Creuzer, Procli Institutio theologica.
102 Vgl. Creuzer, Aus dem Leben eines alten Professors.
103 Vgl. Creuzer, Aus dem Leben eines alten Professors, 124125 Anm. 2.
104 Vgl. Reitz, Ctus, Theophili Antecessoris Paraphrasis graeca institutionum caesarearum I.
260 | U. R. Jeck
(), Elementarstoff () und Elementarunterricht (), wie

sich aus dem theologische Elementarunterricht des Proklos, der als Katechese oder
Vermittlung () zu gelten hat, klar erkennen lsst. Aus der Funktion der
Institutiones des Theophilus ergab sich fr Creuzer deutlich, dass Proklos mit seiner
Institutio theologica eine propdeutische Absicht verband.
II. Weitere Informationen zur Wirkungsgeschichte der Institutio theologica ver-
dankte Creuzer Angelo Mai, der 1831 neben zahlreichen anderen, bis dahin unpubli-
zierten Handschriften, auch eine fragmentarisch berlieferte Abhandlung des Proko-
pios von Gaza verffentlichte, die eine Kritik an Proklos enthlt. Dieser Text hat
seitdem groe Beachtung gefunden und sogar zu heftigen Kontroversen gefhrt.
Creuzers Reaktion in den Heidelberger Jahrbchern des Jahres 1835 stand am Anfang
dieser Auseinandersetzungen. Den Titel der damals erst-
mals publizierten Abhandlung bersetzte Creuzer 1848 mit theologisches Capitel
und unterstrich damit, dass neben Prokopios auch Nikolaos von Methone gegen die
Theologie des Proklos polemisch auftrat.
III. Um den Proklos-Kommentar des Nikolaos von Methone hat sich Creuzer auf
vielfache Weise bemht. Er wies in seiner Edition der Institutio theologica darauf
hin, sammelte dort Informationen ber noch vorhandene Handschriften und regte
seinen Schler Johann Theodor Voemel zu einer Edition an. Creuzer und sein Kreis,
zu dem auch Carl Ullmann gehrte, haben sich auf diese Weise groe Verdienste
um die Erschlieung der byzantinischen Philosophie des Mittelalters erworben.
IV. Erst zum Schluss seiner Bemerkungen verwies Creuzer auf den Proklos-
Kommentar des Ioane Petrizi und ordnete ihn in die Reihe der neuen Materialien
zur Institutio theologica des Proklos ein. Von Johannes Petrizi wusste er allerdings
105 Vgl. Reitz, Ctus, Theophili Antecessoris Paraphrasis graeca institutionum caesarearum I, 7 Anm. t:
Institutiones sunt cujusque scienti prima cunabula, & elementa, , , ,
ejusmodi est Procli , , Straboni , . Hinc
, i. [?], . Hesychio. incipientes. FABR. I.
106 Vgl. Mai, Procopii gazaei fragmentu.
107 Vgl. Drseke 1895b, 1897b, 1898; Stiglmayr 1899b.
108 Vgl. Creuzer, Classicc. Auctores e codd. Vaticc., 34: Von p. 202 bis 275. werden Briefe des Pro-
copius von Ganza als eine Zugabe zu den sechzig bisher mehrmals edirten beigegeben nebst einem
Fragment aus einer polemischen Schrift desselben gegen die theologischen Stze des Proclus al-
so einer Schrift desselben Inhalts, wie die von Hrn. Voemel zuerst herausgegebene Streitschrift des
Nicolaus von Methone, Francof. ad M. 1825, welche dem Hrn. A. Mai unbekannt geblieben zu seyn
scheint.
109 Vgl. Pape, Griechisch-Deutsches Handwrterbuch I, 1310b: , [] u. sonst oft fr
kurze Uebersicht, in der die Hauptpunkte zusammengefat sind, das letzte Ergebni []
110 Vgl. Podskalsky 1976e, 509523; Kapriev 2005, 216; Trizio 2014a, 201208.
111 Vgl. Anm. 9.
112 Vgl. Creuzer, Prooemium partis tertiae, in Creuzer, Procli Institutio theologica, XIIXVII.
113 Vgl. Voemel, Nikolaos von Methone, Refutatio.
114 Vgl. Ullmann, Nicolaus von Methone, Euthymius Zigabenus und Nicetas Choniates.
nur das, was Sjgren zehn Jahre vorher (1838) im Bulletin scientifique ber den Georgi-
er mitgeteilt hatte. Petrizi erscheint bei ihm ebenfalls als ein Denker aus dem 10. Jht.,
der die georgische (grusinische) bersetzung des proklischen Traktats vollstndig
kommentierte. Zudem verwies Creuzer auf die oben genannte Petrizi-Handschrift aus
dem Besitz der Petersburger Akademie der Wissenschaften und gab auch seine Quelle
fr diese Information sehr genau an (Bulletin de lAcad. des Sciences de St. Peters-
bourg 1838, p. 335 sq.). Creuzer brachte demnach nichts wesentlich Neues vor,
sondern schpfte lediglich aus Sjgrens Angaben, ohne diesen allerdings namentlich
zu erwhnen.
Wie gelangte Creuzer zu diesen Informationen? Darber lassen sich nach augen-
blicklicher Quellenlage lediglich Vermutungen anstellen. Zwei Wege erscheinen mg-
lich: (A) Einerseits besa Creuzer schon Anfang der 20er Jahre des 19. Jhts. Kontakte,
die bis in das Zentrum der Petersburger Akademie reichten. Er verffentlichte 1818 in
Heidelberg zusammen mit dem bedeutenden Philologen Gottfried Herrmann (1772
1848) Briefe ber Homer und Hesiodus vorzglich ber die Theogonie. Zu diesem Text
erschien dann 1819 in St. Petersburg gedruckt bey der Kaiserlichen Akademie der
Wissenschaften ein Werk mit dem Titel ber das Vor-Homerische Zeitalter. Ein An-
hang zu den Briefen ber Homer und Hesiod von Gottfried Hermann und Friedrich Creu-
zer. Als Verfasser zeichnet am Ende des relativ kurzen Textes Graf Sergej Semjono-
witsch Uwarow (17861855), der in Gttingen studierte und 1818 Prsident der Akade-
mie der Wissenschaften in Petersburg wurde. Vielleicht erhielt Creuzer von ihm den
entscheidenden Hinweis. (B) Anderseits erschien das Bulletin scientifique nicht nur in
St. Petersburg, sondern auch in Leipzig im Verlag von Leopold Voss, der auch ande-
re wichtige wissenschaftliche Publikationsorgane verlegte, so dass jeder Gebildete in
Deutschland leicht auf diese Zeitschrift zurck greifen konnte.
8 Ausblick
Dennoch gilt: Anders als die verschlsselte und spezialistische Fachliteratur nur we-
nig bekannter Kaukasologen erreichten Creuzers Schriften eine weite Verbreitung und
insofern eine grere Anzahl von Lesern. Darunter befanden sich sicherlich auch Phi-
losophen oder Philosophiehistoriker, die Proklos und den Neuplatonismus nher er-
forschten. Dennoch reagierte gem gegenwrtiger Quellenlage niemand auf diese
interessante Mitteilung ber Petrizi und die Rezeption der Institutio theologica im mit-
telalterlichen Georgien. Warum? Dafr gibt es nachvollziehbare Grnde:
(a) Creuzer besa durch seine enorme Kenntnis des Neuplatonismus eine groe
115 Vgl. Anm. 76.

116 Vgl. Creuzer, Hermann, Briefe ber Homer und Hesiodus.
117 Vgl. Uwarow, ber das Vor Homerische Zeitalter.
262 | U. R. Jeck
Sensibilitt fr die Dokumente dieser philosophischen Bewegung. Er suchte perma-

nent Nachrichten darber und nutzte diese Quellen fr die Rekonstruktion altorien-
talischer Mythologien. Whrend einerseits Denker wie Hegel und Schelling dieses
Verfahren sehr schtzten, stie Creuzers Mythenforschung andererseits auch auf hef-
tigen Widerstand. Spter sank das Ansehen seiner spekulativen Konstruktionen der
antiken Mythologien noch mehr. Die nachfolgenden Mytheninterpreten gingen ande-
re Wege; Creuzers Schriften galten als berholt und gerieten zunehmend in Verges-
senheit.
(b) Als sorgfltiger Philologe und Kenner des Neuplatonismus erkannte und wr-
digte Creuzer die Bedeutung der byzantinischen und georgischen Proklos-Kommen-
tare. Doch auch auf diesem Gebiet erwies sich der Geist der Zeit als ungnstig. Seine
Editionsarbeiten an den berlieferten Texten der Neuplatoniker schtzten gegen Mitte
des 19. Jhts. nur noch wenige. Proklos geriet in Verruf: Ludwig Feuerbach denunzier-
te Hegel damals als deutsche(n) Proclus, Arthur Schopenhauer, der anders als
Creuzer um 1850 zunehmend an Einfluss gewann, polemisierte gegen Proklos und
kritisierte vor allem die Institutio theologica. Mit Creuzers Mythenkonzeption warf
man zugleich auch die wertvollen philosophiehistorischen Einsichten des originellen
Gelehrten ber Bord.
(c) Byzantinistik und Kaukasologie existierte zu Creuzers Zeiten als Wissenschaft
nur in Anstzen. Es gab im Westen kaum Interesse an jenen kaukasischen Kulturen,
die einst unter dem Einfluss von Byzanz standen. Wer die Entwicklung des byzanti-
nischen Imperiums fr eine Verfallsgeschichte hielt, glaubte auch nicht an die Be-
deutsamkeit ihrer kulturellen Derivate im Kaukasus. Darunter litt zunchst die Er-
forschung der byzantinischen Philosophie, die sich angeblich in einer unfruchtbaren
Nachahmung der Antike erschpfte. Wer wollte eine derart unoriginelle Philosophie
studieren? Und warum sollt man dann noch nach ihren Einflssen im Kaukasus su-
chen? Das Desinteresse der Mehrzahl der damaligen Philosophiehistoriker an der ge-
orgischen Kultur wirkte sich insofern verhngnisvoll aus, ihnen blieb die Philosophie
einer ganz eigentmlichen Welt verborgen.
118 Vgl. Jeck 2004, 535542; Jeck 2013.

119 Vgl. Howald 1926.
120 Vgl. Feuerbach, Grundstze der Philosophie der Zukunft, 293294: Hegel ist nicht der deutsche
oder christliche Aristoteles er ist der deutsche Proklus.
121 Vgl. Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, 48: Ein ausfhrliches und besonders luku-
lentes Beispiel giebt folgende Vernnftelei des faden Schwtzers Proklus, in seiner I n s t i t u t i o t h e o -
l o g i c a, 76.
Abkrzungen
Anm. Anmerkung
Aufl. Auflage
Ausg. Ausgabe
bearb. bearbeitet
begr. begrndet
bes. besonders
biogr. biographisch
coll. collaboration
CPTMA Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi
durchges. durchgesehen
durchgearb. durchgearbeitet
eingel. eingeleitet
Elem. Elementationem
erkl. erklrt
Exp. Expositio
erw. erweitert
Hrsg. Herausgeber
hrsg. herausgegeben
rev. revidiert
theol. theologicam
u. und
u. a. unter anderem
v. von
vgl. vergleiche
vollst. vollstndig
Primrliteratur
Alexidze, L., Bergemann, L., Ioane Petrizi, Kommentar zur Elementatio theologica des Proklos.
bersetzung aus dem Altgeorgischen, Anmerkungen, Indices und Einleitung. Hrsg. v. L.
Alexidze, L. Bergemann (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie 47), Amsterdam/Philadelphia 2009.
[Alexidze, Bergemann, Ioane Petrizi, Kommentar zur Elementatio theologica des Proklos]
Angelou, A. D.,
. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus Elements of Theology. A critical edition
with an introduction on Nicholas life and works by A. D. Angelou (Corpus Philosophorum Medii
Aevi. Philosophi Byzantini 1), Leiden 1984. [Angelou, Nicholas of
Methone, Refutation]
Baumgarten, G., Sechzig Jahre des Kaukasischen Krieges mit besonderer Bercksichtigung des
Feldzuges im nrdlichen Daghestan im Jahre 1839. Nach russischen Originalen deutsch
bearbeitet v. G. Baumgarten, Leipzig 1861. [Baumgarten, Sechzig Jahre des Kaukasischen
Krieges]
Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli (Corpus Philosophorum
Teutonicorum Medii Aevi [CPTMA] VI, 18), Hamburg 19842014. [Berthold von Moosburg, Exp.
super Elem. theol. Procli VI, 18]
264 | U. R. Jeck
Brockhaus Konversations-Lexikon. Vierzehnte vollst. neubearb. Aufl. Neue rev. Jubilums-Ausg.

Dritter Band, Leipzig 1908. [Brockhaus Konversations-Lexikon III]
Zehnter Band, Leipzig 1908. [Brockhaus Konversations-Lexikon X]
Vierzehnter Band, Leipzig 1908. [Brockhaus Konversations-Lexikon XIV]
Brosset, L., Bibliographie analytique des ouvrages de M. Marie-Flicit Brosset, membre de
lAcademie impriale des sciences de St. Ptersbourg, 18241879, St. Ptersbourg 1887.
[Brosset, Bibliographie analytique]
Brosset, M. F., Notice sur la langue Gorgienne, in Journal asiatique (1827), 351364. [Brosset,
Notice sur la langue Gorgienne]
Brosset, M. F., Chronique gorgienne traduit par M. Brosset jeune, Paris 1830. [Brosset, Chronique
gorgienne]
Brosset, M. F., Mmoires indits, relatifs a lHistoire et la Langue gorgiennes, Paris 1833.
[Brosset, Mmoires indits, relatifs a lHistoire et la Langue gorgiennes]
Brosset, M. F., LArt Libral, ou Grammaire Gorgienne, par. M. Brosset, Paris 1834. [Brosset, LArt
Libral, ou Grammaire Gorgienne]
Brosset, M. F., lments de la langue gorgienne par M. Brosset jeune, membre adjoint de
lAcadmie Impriale de Russie et membre du conseil de la Socit Asiatique de Paris, ouvrage
publi aux frais de la Socit Asiatique, Paris 1837. [Brosset, lments de la langue gorgienne]
Brosset, M. F., Discours prononc a lassemble gnrale de lAcadmie des Sciences par Mr. Brosse,
Academicien extraordinale, in Recueil des Actes de la sance publique de lAcadmie impriale
des sciences de Saint-Ptersbourg, tenue le 29 Dcembre 1837, St. Petersbourg/Leipzig 1838,
S. 65178. [Brosset, Discours prononc]
Brosset, M. F., Catalogue de la bibliothque dEdchmiadzin, publi par M. Brosset, St.-Ptersbourg
1840. [Brosset, Catalogue de la bibliothque dEdchmiadzin]
Brosset, M. F., Monographie des monnaies armniennes par M. Brosset, St. Ptersbourg 1839.
[Brosset, Monographie des monnaies armniennes]
Brosset, M. F., Histoire de la Gorgie depuis lantiquit jusquau XIX e sicle. Trad. du Gorgien par
M. Brosset. 1re partie., Histoire ancienne, jusquen 1469 de J.-C., S.-Ptersbourg 1849. [Brosset,
Histoire de la Gorgie I]
M. Brosset. IIe Partie. Histoire moderne. IIe livraison, compremant: 10 Chronique de Sekhnia
Tchkhidz. 20 Chronique de Papouna Orblian. 30 Vie dErcle II, par Oman Kherkboulidz. 40
Histoire moderne de la Gorgie. 50 Additions X XVII, St.-Ptersbourg 1857. [Brosset, Histoire
de la Gorgie II]
M. Brosset. Introduction et Tables des matires, St.-Ptersbourg 1858. [Brosset, Histoire de la
Gorgie III]
Brosset, M. F., Rapports sur un voyage archologique dans la Gorgie et dans lArmnie, excut en
18471848 par M. Brosset, St.-Ptersburg 18491851. [Brosset, Rapports sur un voyage
archologique]
Brosset, M. F., Les ruines dAni, capitale de lArmnie sous les rois Bagratides, aux X e et XIe s,
histoire et description, par M. Brosset, St.-Ptersbourg 18601861. [Brosset, Les ruines dAni]
Brosset, M. F., Collection dhistoriens armniens. Th. Ardzrouni, X e S., Histoire des Ardzrouni; Arakel,
de Tauriz, XVIIe S, Livre dhistoires; Iohanns de Dzar, XVIIe S., Histoire de laghovanie; traduits
par M. Brosset, S.-Ptersbourg 1874. [Brosset, Collection dhistoriens armniens]
Bulletin scientifique publi par lAcadmie Impriale des Sciences de Saint-Ptersbourg. Tome III,
Saint - Ptersbourg/Leipzig 1838. [Bulletin scientifique]
Calzolari, V., Barnes, J., Luvre de David lInvincible et la transmission de la pense grecque dans la
tradition armnienne et syriaque. Commentaria in Aristotelem Armeniaca Davidis Opera Vol. I.
Textes runis et dits par V. Calzolari et J. Barnes (Philosophia Antiqua 116), Leiden/Boston
2009. [Calzolari, Barnes, Davidis Opera I]
Creuzer, F., . Procli Successoris
Platonici Institutio theologica. Graece et latine ad codicum fidem emendavit, integravit,
latinamque Aemilii Porti translationem refinxit et suam annotationem subjecit Fridericus
Creuzer, Francofurti ad Moenum MDCCCXXII (1822) = Initia philosophiae ac theologiae ex
platonicis fontibus ducta sive Procli Diadochi et Olympiodori in Platonis Alcibiadem
Commentarii ex codd. mss. nunc primum graece edidit itemque eiusdem Procli Institutionem
theologicam integriorem emendatioremque adjecit Fridericus Creuzer. Pars tertia, Francofurti
ad Moenum, MDCCCXXII (1822). [Creuzer, Procli Institutio theologica]
Creuzer, F., (Rez.) Classicc. Auctores e codd. Vaticc. edit. cur. A. Maio (Beschluss.), in Heidelberger
Jahrbcher der Literatur 28, 3 (1835), 3336. [Creuzer, Classicc. Auctores e codd. Vaticc.]
Creuzer, F., Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Vlker, besonders der Griechen, Darmstadt/Leipzig
18101812; 2. Aufl., Darmstadt 18191821; 3. Aufl., ebd. 18361843. [Creuzer, Symbolik und
Mythologie]
Creuzer, F., Aus dem Leben eines alten Professors. Mit literarischen Beilagen und dem Portrt des
Verfassers (Friedrich Creuzers Deutsche Schriften, neue und verbesserte. Fnfte Abtheilung.
Erster Band), Leipzig/Darmstadt 1848. [Creuzer, Aus dem Leben eines alten Professors]
Creuzer, F., Hermann, G., Briefe ber Homer und Hesiodus vorzglich ber die Theogonie von
Gottfried Hermann und Friedrich Creuzer, Professoren zu Leipzig und Heidelberg. (Mit
besonderer Hinsicht auf des Ersteren Dissertatio de Mythologia Graecorum und auf des
Letzteren Symbolik und Mythologie der Griechen.), Heidelberg 1818. [Creuzer, Hermann, Briefe
ber Homer und Hesiodus]
dArivank, M., Histoire chronologique par Mkhithar dArivank, XIIIe S., traduite de larmnien, sur le
manuscrit du Muse Asiatique par M. Brosset (Mmoires de lAcadmie impriale des sciences
de St.-Ptersbourg, VIIe Srie. Tome XIII. No 5), St. Ptersbourg 1869. [dArivank, Histoire
chronologique]
de Gantzac, K.; dOurha, O., Deux historiens armniens: Kiracos de Gantzac, XIIIe S., Histoire
dArmnie; Oukhtans dOurha, X e S., Histoire en trois parties; traduits par M. Brosset. ,
St.-Ptersbourg 18701871. [de Gantzac, dOurha, Deux historiens armniens]
Deutsche Vierteljahres Schrift. Drittes Heft. Im Verlag und unter Verantwortlichkeit der J. G. Cotta
schen Buchhandlung. Stuttgart/Tbingen. 1839. [Deutsche Vierteljahres Schrift]
Dodds, E. R., . Proclus, The Elements of Theology, a
revised text with translation, introduction and commentary by E. R. Dodds, Oxford 1933. 2. Aufl.
mit Addenda et Corrigenda 1963. [Dodds, Proclus, The Elements of Theology]
Dorn, B., Beitrge zur Geschichte der kaukasischen Lnder und Vlker aus morgenlndischen
Quellen. III Erster Beitrag zur Geschichte der Georgier (Gelesen am 20. August 1841), in
Mmoires de l'Academie impriale des sciences de Saint-Ptersbourg. Sixime srie. Sciences
politiques histoire et philologie. Tome VI. St.-Ptersbourg 1844, 325443. [Dorn, Beitrge]
Dorn, B., Das Asiatische Museum der kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu St. Petersburg.
Von dem Director desselben Bernh. Dorn, St. Petersburg 1846. [Dorn, Das Asiatische Museum]
Endress, G., Proclus Arabus. Zwanzig Abschnitte aus der Institutio theologica in arabischer
bersetzung. Eingel., hrsg. u. erkl. v. G. Endress (Beiruter Texte und Studien 10),
Beirut/Wiesbaden 1973. [Endress, Proclus Arabus]
Feuerbach, L., Grundstze der Philosophie der Zukunft, in Kritiken und Abhandlungen II (18391843)
(Werke in sechs Bnden. Hrsg. v. Erich Thies), Frankfurt am Main 1975, 247322. [Feuerbach,
Grundstze der Philosophie der Zukunft]
266 | U. R. Jeck
Ioseliani, P., A short history of the georgian church. Translated from the russian of P. Ioselian, and
edited with additional notes by the Rev. S. C. Malan, Vicar of Broadwindsor, Dorset, London
MDCCCLXVI (1866). [Ioseliani, A short history of the georgian church]
Jeck, U. R., Tautz, I. J., Bray, N., Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem
theologicam Procli. Propositiones 160183. Hrsg. v. U. R. Jeck u. I. J. Tautz. Prolegomena u.
Indices v. N. Bray (CPTMA VI, 7), Hamburg 2003. [Jeck, Tautz, Bray, Berthold von Moosburg, Exp.
super Elem. theol. Procli VI, 7]
Kauchtschischvili, S., Procli Diadochi . Versio Hiberica. Textum Hibericum
edidit commentariisque instruxit S. Kauchtschischvili (Ioannis Petrizii Opera. Tomus I), Tbilisiis
1940. [Kauchtschischvili, Procli Diadochi ]
Klaproth, H. J., Reise in den Kaukasus und nach Georgien unternommen in den Jahren 1807 und 1808,
auf Veranstaltung der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu St. Petersburg, enthaltend
eine vollstndige Beschreibung der Kaukasischen Lnder und ihrer Bewohner, von Julius von
Klaproth, Kaiserl. Russischem Hofrathe und Mitgliede der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu St.
Petersburg. Erster Band, Halle/Berlin 1812. [Klaproth, Reise in den Kaukasus und nach
Georgien I]
Klaproth, H. J., Reise in den Kaukasus und nach Georgien unternommen in den Jahren 1807 und 1808,
auf Veranstaltung der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu St. Petersburg, enthaltend
eine vollstndige Beschreibung der Kaukasischen Lnder und ihrer Bewohner, von Julius von
Klaproth, Hofrathe und correspondirendem Mitgliede der kniglichen Societt zu Gttingen.
Zweiter Band, Halle/Berlin 1814. [Klaproth, Reise in den Kaukasus und nach Georgien II]
Klaproth, H. J., Beschreibung der Russischen Provinzen zwischen dem Kaspischen und schwarzen
Meere. Von Julius v. Klaproth, Berlin 1814. [Klaproth, Beschreibung der Russischen Provinzen]
Klaproth, H. J., Geographisch-historische Beschreibung des stlichen Kaukasus, zwischen den
Flssen Terek, Aragwi, Kur und dem Kaspischen Meere. Von Julius v. Klaproth, Weimar 1814.
[Klaproth, Geographisch-historische Beschreibung des stlichen Kaukasus]
Klaproth, H. J., Tableau historique, gographique, ethnographique et politique du Caucase et des
provinces limitrophes entre la Russie et la Perse. Par M. Klaproth, Paris/Leipzig 1827. [Klaproth,
Tableau historique, gographique, ethnographique et politique du Caucase et des provinces
limitrophes entre la Russie et la Perse]
Klaproth, H. J., Vocabulaire et grammaire de la langue gorgienne. Par M. J. Klaproth. Ouvrage
publi par la Socit Asiatique. Premire partie, contenant le vocabulaire gorgien-franais et
franais-gorgien, Paris 1827. [Klaproth, Vocabulaire et grammaire de la langue gorgienne]
Krug, P., Forschungen in der lteren Geschichte Russlands. Von Philipp Krug, St. Petersburg 1848
(ND Leipzig 1969/70). [Krug, Forschungen in der lteren Geschichte Russlands]
Leibniz, G. W., Concept einer Denkschrift Leibnizs ber die Verbesserung der Knste und
Wissenschaften im Russischen Reich (1716), in Guerrier, W., Leibniz in seinen Beziehungen zu
Russland und Peter dem Grossen. Eine geschichtliche Darstellung dieses Verhltnisses nebst
den darauf bezglichen Briefen und Denkschriften, St. Petersburg/Leipzig 1873. n. 240,
348360. [Leibniz, Concept einer Denkschrift]
Mai, A.,
(Eiusdem Procopii gazaei fragmentum ex codice vaticano 1069. p. 61), in: (A.
Mai), Classicorum auctorum e Vaticanis codd. editorum Tomus IV complectens scripta aliquot
Oribasii, Procopii, Isaei, Themisthii, Porphyrii, Philonis, Aristidis et alia quaedam curante
Angelo Mai Vaticanae Bibliothecae Praefecto, Romae MDCCCXXXI (1831), 274275. [Mai,
Procopii gazaei fragmentum]
Meyers Konversations-Lexikon. Ein Nachschlagewerk des allgemeinen Wissens. Fnfte, gnzlich
neubearb. Aufl. Zehnter Band, Leipzig/Wien 1895. [Meyers Konversations-Lexikon X]
Meyers Konversations-Lexikon. Ein Nachschlagewerk des allgemeinen Wissens. Fnfte, gnzlich

neubearb. Aufl. Sechzehnter Band, Leipzig/Wien 1897. [Meyers Konversations-Lexikon XVI]
Nutsubidse, S., Kauchtschischvili, S., Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria in Procli Diadochi
. Textum Hibericum edidierunt commentariisque instruxerunt S. Nutsubidse et S.
Kauchtschischvili (Ioannis Petrizii Opera. Tomus II), Tbilisiis 1937 [Nutzubidse,
Kauchtschischvili, Ioane Petrizi, Commentaria in Procli Diadochi ]
Onnasch, E.-O., Schomakers, B. (Hrsg.), Proklos, Theologische Grundlegung. Stoicheisis
theologik. Hrsg. v. E.-O. Onnasch u. B. Schomakers, Hamburg 2015. [Onnasch, Schomakers,
Proklos, Theologische Grundlegung]
Orblian, S., Histoire de la Siounie par Stphannos Orblian, traduite de lArmnien par M. Brosset.
Premire livraison. Histoire de la Siounie, Saint-Ptersbourg 1864. [Orblian, Histoire de la
Siounie I]
Orblian, S., Histoire de la Siounie par Stphannos Orblian, traduite de lArmnien par M. Brosset.
Seconde livraison. Introduction, Saint-Petersbourg 1866. [Orblian, Histoire de la Siounie II]
Pape, W., Griechisch-Deutsches Handwrterbuch v. W. Pape. In drei Bnden, deren dritter die
Griechischen Eigennamen enthlt. Erster Band. A K. Zweite berall berichtigte u. vermehrte
Auflage, Braunschweig 1849. [Pape, Griechisch-Deutsches Handwrterbuch I]
Patrizi, F., Procli Lycii Diadochi Platonici Philosophi Eminentissimi. Elementa theologica, et physica.
Opvs omni admiratione proseqvendvm. Qvae Franciscvs Patricivs de graecis, fecit latina,
Ferrariae MDLXXXIII (1583), 1r55v. [Patrizi, Elementa theologica et physica]
Portus, A., Procli
Svccessoris Platonici Philosophi Institutio Theologica, qu continet capita 211, in
. Procli Svccessoris Platonici
In Platonis Theologiam Libri Sex. Per milivm Portvm, Francisci Fil. Ex Grcis Facti Latini, et in
Gratiam Platonic Philosophi studiosorum ex Illustriimi, Celsiimique Principis ac Domini,
Dn. Friderici, Dn. Joannis Adolphi Filii, Bibliothec Gottorpian Grc ac Latin, nunc primum in
lucem editi. Accessit Marini Neapolitani libellus de Vit Procli. item Conclusiones LV. secundum
Proclum; quas olim Rom Illustris Picvs Mirandvla disputandas exhibuit. nec non Index rerum &
verborum locupletissimus, Hamburgi M.DCXVIII. (1618), 415a--502b (Portus, Procli In Platonis
Theologiam)
Recueil des Actes de la sance publique de lAcadmie impriale des sciences de Saint-Ptersbourg,
tenue le 30 Dcembre 1836, St. Ptersbourg/Leipzig 1837. [Recueil des Actes de la sance
publique de lAcadmie impriale des sciences de Saint-Ptersbourg]
Reitz, G. O, Ctus, J., . Theophili Antecessoris
Paraphrasis graeca institutionum caesarearum: cum notis integris P. Nannii, J. Curtii, D.
Gothofredi, H. Ernstii, et C. A. Fabroti, ac selectis quamplurimorum eruditorum observationibus,
cum editis tum ineditis. Lectionum varietates ex primariis editionibus et pithoeano ms. inseruit,
novam versionem cincinnavit, suasque animdversiones et addidit Gul.
Otto Reitz, J. Ctus: qui & fragmenta theophilina nunc primum collecta, & titulos grcos de V. S.
ac de R. J. denuo recognitos, nec non XX. excursus varii argumenti, cum glossario theophilino
atque copiosissimis tam rerum quam auctorum indicibus subjunxit. Tomus Primus, Hagae
Comitis MDCCLI (1751). [Reitz, Ctus, Theophili Antecessoris Paraphrasis graeca institutionum
caesarearum I]
Rosen, G., Ossetische Sprachlehre nebst einer Abhandlung ber das Mingrelische, Suanische und
Abchaische v. Georg Rosen. Vorgelegt der Knigl. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin am
24. October 1844 und 6. Februar 1845, Lemgo/Detmold 1846. [Rosen, Ossetische Sprachlehre]
Schopenhauer, A., Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. Zweiter Band. Ergnzungen zum ersten Buch
(Arthur Schopenhauers smmtliche Werke. Hrsg. v. Julius Frauenstdt. Zweite Aufl., Neue Ausg.
3), Leipzig 1922. [Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung]
268 | U. R. Jeck
Sjgren, A. J., Voyages scientifiques. 7. Lettre de M. Sjoegren a M. Krug (lu le 15 dcembre 1837), in
Bulletin scientifique publi par lAcadmie Impriale des Sciences de Saint-Ptersbourg. Tome
III, Saint - Ptersbourg/Leipzig 1838, Nr. 14, 219224, Nr. 15, 231240, Nr. 16, 247256, Nr. 17,
268272. [Sjgren, Lettre de M. Sjoegren a M. Krug]
Sjgren, A. J., Manuscrit Georgien offert en don au muse asiatique. Rapport de M. Sjoegren (lu le
fvrier 1838), in Bulletin scientifique publi par lAcadmie Impriale des Sciences de
Saint-Ptersbourg. Tome III, Saint - Ptersbourg/Leipzig 1838, 335336 [Sjgren, Manuscrit
Georgien]
Sjgren, A. J., I , das ist: Ossetische Sprachlehre, nebst kurzem ossetisch-deutschen
und deutsch-ossetischen Wrterbuche, v. Andr. Joh. Sjgren, St. Petersburg 1844. [Sjgren,
Ossetische Sprachlehre]
Sjgren, A. J., Ueber die finnische Sprache und ihre Litteratur. Vom And. Joh. Sjgren Amanuensis
Extraordinarius an der Kayserlichen Universitts-Bibliothek zu Abo, St. Petersburg 1821.
[Sjgren, Ueber die finnische Sprache und ihre Litteratur]
Sjgren, A. J., Livische Grammatik nebst Sprachproben. Im Auftrage der Kaiserlichen Akademie der
Wissenschaften bearbeitet und mit einer historisch-ethnographischen Einleitung versehen v. F.
J. Wiedemann (Joh. Andreas Sjgrens Gesammelte Schriften. Band II. Theil I), St. Petersburg
1861. [Sjgren, Livische Grammatik]
Sjgren, A. J., Joh. Andreas Sjgrens livisch-deutsches und deutsch-livisches Wrterbuch. Im
Auftrage der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften bearbeitet v. F. J. Wiedemann (Joh.
Andreas Sjgrens Gesammelte Schriften. Band II. Theil II), St. Petersburg 1861. [Sjgren,
Livisch-deutsches und deutsch-livisches Wrterbuch]
Stark, K. B., Friedrich Creuzer, sein Bildungsgang und seine wissenschaftliche wie akademische
Bedeutung (Rede zum Geburtsfeste des hchstseligen Grossherzogs Karl Friedrich von Baden
und zur akademischen Preisvertheilung am 23. Nobember 1874), Heidelberg 1874. [Stark,
Friedrich Creuzer]
Tsarvitch Wakhoucht, Description gographique de la Gorgie, par le Tsarvitch Wakhoucht,
publie daprs loriginal autographe, par M Brosset, S.-Ptersbourg 1842. [Tsarvich
Wakhoucht, Description gographique de la Gorgie]
Ullmann, C., Nicolaus von Methone, Euthymius Zigabenus und Nicetas Choniates, oder die
dogmatische Entwickelung der griechischen Kirche im zwlften Jahrhundert, in Theologische
Studien und Kritiken. Eine Zeitschrift fr das gesammte Gebiet der Theologie, in Verbindung mit
D. Gieseler, D. Lcke und D. Nitzsch, hrsg. v. D. C. Ullmann u. D. F. W. C. Umbreit. 1833. Sechster
Jahrgang. Zweiter Band. Jahrgang 1833 drittes Heft, Hamburg 1833, 647743. [Ullmann,
Nicolaus von Methone, Euthymius Zigabenus und Nicetas Choniates]
Uwarow, S. S., ber das Vor Homerische Zeitalter. Ein Anhang zu den Briefen ber Homer und
Hesiod von Gottfried Hermann und Friedrich Creuzer, St. Petersburg 1819 (Zweite Ausgabe. St.
Petersburg 1821). [Uwarow, ber das Vor Homerische Zeitalter]
Vansteenkiste, C., Procli Elementatio theologica translata a Guilelmo de Moerbeke (textus ineditus),
in Tijdschrift voor Philosophie 13 (1951), 263302, 491531. [Vansteenkiste, Procli Elementatio
theologica]
Voemel, J. Th., Nikolaos von Methone,
. Nicolai Methonensis Refutatio institutionis theologicae
Procli Platonici primum edidit annotationemque subjecit J. Th. Voemel, Francofurti ad Moenum
MDCCCXXV (1825) = Initia philosophiae ac theologiae ex platonicis fontibus ducta sive Procli
Diadochi et Olympiodori in Platonis Alcibiadem Commentarii. Eiusdem Procli Institutio
theologica et Nicolai Methonensis refutatio. Pars quarta, Francofurti ad Moenum MDCCCXXV
(1825). [Voemel, Nikolaos von Methone, Refutatio]
Walravens, H., Julius Klaproth (17831835). Leben und Werk (Orientalistik-Bibliographien 3),
Wiesbaden 1999. [Walravens, Julius Klaproth (17831835). Leben und Werk]
Walravens, H., Julius Klaproth (17831835). Briefe und Dokumente (Orientalistik-Bibliographien 4),
Wiesbaden 1999. [Walravens, Julius Klaproth (17831835). Briefe und Dokumente]
Walravens, H., (Hrsg.), Julius Klaproth (17831835). Briefwechsel mit Gelehrten, groenteils aus dem
Akademiearchiv in St. Petersburg. Mit einem Namenregister zu Julius Klaproth: Briefe und
Dokumente, Wiesbaden 2002. [Walravens, Julius Klaproth. Briefwechsel mit Gelehrten]
Sekundrliteratur
Abaschnik, V. A. (2004). Johann Albrecht Bernhard Dorn (18051881) aus Coburg als Professor der
Orientalistik in Charkow und Sankt Petersburg. In: Coburger Geschichtsbltter 12
(JanuarJuni), S. 2639.
Arevshatyan, S. (2009). David the Invincible in Armenia and other Countries: the Fate of his
Legacy. In: L'uvre de David l'Invincible et la transmission de la pense grecque dans la
tradition armnienne et syriaque. Commentaria in Aristotelem Armeniaca Davidis Opera Vol.
1. Hrsg. von V. Calzolari und J. Barnes. Philosophia Antiqua 116. Leiden und Boston, S. 175180.
Beierwaltes, W. (1972b). Platonismus und Idealismus. Philosophische Abhandlungen 40. Frankfurt
a. M.
Beierwaltes, W. (1979). Proklos. Grundzge seiner Metaphysik. Zweite, durchges. u. erw. Aufl.
Philosophische Abhandlungen 24. Frankfurt a. M.
Beierwaltes, W. (2007). Procliana. Sptantikes Denken und seine Spuren. Frankfurt a. M.
Untersuchungen und Texte zur berlieferung der Elementatio theologica. Heidelberg.
Bos, E. P. und P. A. Meijer, Hrsg. (1992). On Proclus and his Influence in Medieval Philosophy. Leiden.
Bouatchidze, G. (1996). La vie de Marie Brosset. Nantes.
Chlup, R. (2012c). Proclus. An Introduction. Cambridge.
Drseke, J. (1895b). Nikolaos von Methone als Bestreiter des Proklos. In: Theologische Studien
und Kritiken 68, S. 589616.
Drseke, J. (1897b). Prokopios' von Gaza Widerlegung des Proklos. In: Byzantinische Zeitschrift 6,
S. 5591.
Drseke, J. (1898). Zu Nikolaos von Methone. In: Zeitschrift fr Wissenschaftliche Theologie 41,
S. 402411.
Engehausen, F. (2008). Creuzers Leben im Spiegel seiner Autobiographie. In: Friedrich Creuzer
17711858. Philologie und Mythologie im Zeitalter der Romantik. Begleitband zur Ausstellung in
der Universittsbibliothek Heidelberg. 12. Februar 8. Mai 2008. Hrsg. von F. Engehausen,
A. Schlechter und J. P. Schwindt. Archiv und Museum der Universitt Heidelberg. Schriften 12.
Heidelberg u. a., S. 2540.
Fhnrich, H. (1994). Grammatik der altgeorgischen Sprache. Hamburg.
Fhnrich, H. (2010). Geschichte Georgiens. In: Handbook of Oriental Studies. Handbuch der
Orientalistik (section eight, Central Asia). Hrsg. von D. Sinor und N. Di Cosmo. Bd. 21. Leiden.
Gersh, S., Hrsg. (2014c). Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance. Cambridge.
Guerrier, W. (1873). Leibniz in seinen Beziehungen zu Russland und Peter dem Grossen. Eine
geschichtliche Darstellung dieses Verhltnisses nebst den darauf bezglichen Briefen und
Denkschriften. St. Petersburg und Leipzig.
Gnther, H.-C. (2007). Die bersetzungen der Elementatio Theologica des Proklos und ihre
Bedeutung fr den Proklostext. Leiden.
Hage, W. (2007). Das orientalische Christentum. Stuttgart.
270 | U. R. Jeck
Holmes, C. (2005). Basil II and the Governance of Empire 9761025. Oxford.

Howald, E., Hrsg. (1926). Der Kampf um Creuzers Symbolik. Eine Auswahl von Dokumenten. Tbingen.
Iremadze, T. (2004d). Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus. Zur Rezeption der Proklischen
Moosburg Joane Petrizi. Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie 40. Amsterdam und Philadelphia.
Iremadze, T. (2006). Die Rezeption der Aristotelischen Logik im georgischen Denken der Neuzeit:
Anton Bagrationi und seine Aristoteles-Studien. In: Georgica. Zeitschrift fr Kultur, Sprache
und Geschichte Georgiens und Kaukasiens 29, S. 135143.
Iremadze, T. (2007). Die Philosophie der Selbstreflexivitt bei Joane Petrizi. In: Philosophy
Theology Culture. Problems and Perspectives (Jubilee volume dedicated to the 75th
anniversary of Guram Tevzadze). Hrsg. von T. Iremadze, T. Tskhadadze und G. Kheoshvili.
Tbilisi, S. 6678.
Iremadze, T. (2009). Joane Petrizi. In: Philosophenlexikon. Hrsg. von S. Jordan und B. Mojsisch.
Stuttgart, S. 285286.
Iremadze, T. (2011). Zur Rezeption und Transformation der Aristotelischen und Proklischen
Ursachenmodelle bei Joane Petrizi. In: Archiv fr mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur 17,
S. 96111.
Iremadze, T. (2013). Philosophy at the Crossroads of Epochs and Cultures. Tbilisi.
Jamme, C. (2008). Gttersymbole. Friedrich Creuzer als Mythologe und seine philosophische
Wirkung. In: 200 Jahre Heidelberger Romantik. Hrsg. von F. Strack. Heidelberger Jahrbcher 51.
Berlin, Heidelberg und New York, S. 487498.
Jeck, U. R. (2004). Platonica orientalia. Aufdeckung einer philosophischen Tradition. Frankfurt a. M.
Jeck, U. R. (2010). Erluterungen zur georgischen Philosophie. Tbilisi.
Jeck, U. R. (2011). Weisheit im Schatten Apollons. Der Prokloskommentar des Berthold von
Moosburg als Einfhrung in die Philosophie und Geschichte des Platonismus. In: Archiv fr
mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur 17, S. 112170.
Jeck, U. R. (2013). Zeruane Akerene. Zu Friedrich Creuzers Re konstruktion der persischen
Mythologie. In: Mythos Geist Kultur. Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Christoph Jamme.
Hrsg. von K. Andermann und A. Jrgens. Mnchen, S. 1326.
Kapriev, G. (2005). Philosophie in Byzanz. Wrzburg.
Khantadze, C. A. (1970). Marie Brosset et la Karthvelologie europenne et russe. Tbilisi.
Lordkipanidze, M. (1987). Georgia in the 11th12th centuries. Tbilisi.
Ostrogorsky, G. (1952). Geschichte des byzantinischen Staates. Zweite, durchgearb. Aufl.
Byzantinisches Handbuch im Rahmen des Handbuchs der Altertumswissenschaft. Begr. v. W.
Otto. Erster Teil. Zweiter Band. Mnchen.
Ptsch, G. (1975). Anton I. (17201788), Katholikos. In: Kleines Wrterbuch des Christlichen
Orients. Hrsg. von J. Afalg und P. Krger. Wiesbaden, S. 17.
Podskalsky, G. (1976e). Nikolaos von Methone und die Proklosrenaissance in Byzanz (11./12. Jh.)
In: Orientalia Christiana Periodica 42, S. 509523.
Silogava, V. und K. Shengelia (2007). History of Georgia: from the Ancient Times through the Rose
Revolution. Tbilisi.
Stiglmayr, J. (1899b). Die Streitschrift des Prokopios von Gaza gegen den Neuplatoniker Proklos.
In: Byzantinische Zeitschrift 8, S. 263301.
to the Renaissance. Hrsg. von S. Gersh. Cambridge, S. 182215.
Whitby, M. (1987). On the Omission of a Ceremony in Mid-Sixth Century Constantinople: Candidati,
Curopalatus, Silentiarii, Excubitores and Others. In: Historia 36, S. 462488.
Selected Bibliography
Abbate, M. (2008). Il divino tra unit e molteplicit. Saggio sulla Teologia Platonica di Proclo.
Alessandria.
Albrile, E. (2008). Olimpiodoro, Commentario al libro di Zosimo Sulla forza, alle sentenze di Ermete
e degli altri filosofi. Ed. by E. Albrile. Milano and Udine.
Alexidse, L. (2002). Dionysius Areopagita in den mittelalterlichen Kommentaren zur Elementatio
theologica des Proclus. In: Selbst Singularitt Subjektivitt. Vom Neuplatonismus zum
Deutschen Idealismus. Ed. by T. Kobusch, B. Mojsisch, and O. F. Summerell. Amsterdam,
pp. 111130.
Alexidze, L. (1997). Griechische Philosophie in den Kommentaren des Ioane Petrizi. In: Oriens
Christianus 81, pp. 148168.
Alexidze, L. (2002b). Zum Verhltnis zwischen Neuplatonischem und Christlichem im
Prokloskommentar des Ioane Petrizi. In: Metaphysik und Religion. Zur Signatur des
sptantiken Denkens. Akten des Internationalen Kongresses vom 13.17. Mrz 2001 in
Wrzburg. Ed. by T. Kobusch and M. Erler. Leipzig and Mnchen, pp. 429452.
Alexidze, L. (2007). Ioane Petritsi in the Context of Eleventh-Twelfth Century Byzantine Philosophy.
In: Byzantine Studies in Georgia. Ed. by N. Makharadze and T. Dolidze. Tbilisi, pp. 237252.
Alexidze, L. (2008b). Ioane Petrizi und die antike Philosophie. (In Georgian, summary in German).
Tbilisi.
Alexidze, L. (2009). Antiquity in Fourteenth-Fifteenth Centuries Byzantine Humanism: Some
Parallels with Petritsi's Philosophy. In: Byzantine Studies in Georgia 2. (dedicated to
Academician Grigol Tsereteli). Ed. by N. Makharadze and M. Giorgadze. Vol. I. (In Georgian,
summary in English). Tbilisi, pp. 1930.
Alexidze, L. (2011). Die Stufen der Tugenden auf dem Weg zur Freiheit: Neuplatonische Paradigmen
in der byzantinischen Philosophie. In: Byzantine Studies in Georgia. Ed. by N. Makharadze and
N. Sulava. Vol. 3. (In Georgian, summary in German). Tbilisi, pp. 2129.
Alexidze, L. (2012). The Choice of a Platonist between Vita Contemplativa and Vita Activa: The
Experience of Georgios Gemistos Pletho. In: Caucasus between East and West. Historical and
Philological Studies in Honour of Zaza Aleksidze. Ed. by D. Chitunashvili. (In Georgian, summary
in English). Tbilisi, pp. 337348.
Alexidze, L. (2014). One in the Beings and One within Us: The Basis of the Union with the One in
Ioane Petritsi's Interpretation of Proclus' Elements of Theology. In: Georgian Christian Thought
and Its Cultural Context. Memorial volume for the 125th Anniversary of Shalva Nutsubidze.
Ed. by T. Nutsubidze et al. Leiden and Boston, pp. 175193.
Alexidze, L. and L. Bergemann (2009a). Ioane Petritsi. Kommentar zur Elementatio theologica.
bersetzung aus dem Altgeorgischen, Anmerkungen, Indices und Einleitung. Amsterdam.
Allen, M. J. B. (1998). Synoptic Art. Marsilio Ficino: On the History of Platonic Interpretation. Firenze.
Allen, M. J. B., V. Rees, and M. Davies, eds. (2002). Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His Philosophy, His
Legacy. Leiden.
Aly, W. (1957). Prokopios 20, Sophist aus Gaza. In: Paulys Realencyclopdie der classischen
Altertumswissenschaft. Vol. XXIII, 1. Stuttgart, cols. 259273.
Amato, E. (2010). Sul discusso plagio della Refutatio Procli Institutionis theologicae di Procopio di
Gaza ad opera di Nicola di Metone: nuovi apporti della tradizione manoscritta. In: Medioevo
Greco 10, pp. 512.
Amato, E. and I. Ramelli (2006). Filosofia rhetoricans in Niceforo Cumno: l'inedito trattato Sui corpi
primi e semplici. In: Medioevo Greco 6, pp. 140.
Anastasi, R. (1975). Psello e Giovanni Italo. In: Siculorum Gymnasium 28, pp. 525538.
DOI 10.1515/9781501503597-012
272 | Selected Bibliography
Andres, F. (1918). Daimon. In: Paulys Realencyclopdie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft.

Vol. Supplementband III. Stuttgart, cols. 267322.
Angelou, A. D. (1984c). Introduction on Nicholas' Life and Works, in Nicholas of Methone,
Refutation of Proclus' Elements of Theology. In: Nicholas of Methone. Refutation of Proclus'
Elements of Theology. Leiden, pp. IXLXIV.
Angold, M. (1995). Church and Society in Byzantium under the Comneni 10811261. Cambridge.
Anton, J. P. (1994). The Aristotelianism of Photius's Philosophical Theology. In: Aristotle in Late
Antiquity. Ed. by L. P. Schrenk. Washington, pp. 158183.
Anton, J. P. (1997). Neoplatonic elements in Arethas' Scholia on Aristotle and Porphyry. In:
Arabatzis, G. (2002). Blme du philosophe, loge de la vraie philosophie et figures rhtorique: le
rcit d'Anne Comnne sur Jean Italos revisit. In: Byzantinische Zeitschrift 95, pp. 403415.
Arabatzis, G. (2014). Plethon's Philosophy of the Concept. In: Georgios Gemistos Plethon. The
Byzantine and the Latin Renaissance. Ed. by J. Matula and P. R. Blum. Olomouc, pp. 73111.
Athanassiadi, P. (1999). The Chaldaean Oracles: Theology and Theurgy. In: Pagan Monotheism in
Late Antiquity. Ed. by P. Athanassiadi and M. Frede. Oxford.
Athanassiadi, P. (2002). Byzantine Commentators on the Chaldaean Oracles: Psellos and Plethon.
In: Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources. Ed. by K. Ierodiakonou. Oxford, pp. 237252.
Aubineau, M. (1971). Georges Hiromnemon ou George Pachymrs, commentateur du
Pseudo-Denys? In: Journal of Theological Studies 22, pp. 541544.
Aujolat, N. (1998). The pneuma and the luminous body of the soul according to the Prologue of
John Philoponus Commentaire sur le De Anima d'Aristote. In: Byzantinoslavica 59, pp. 123.
Baggarly, J. D. (1970). A parallel between Michael Psellus and the Hexaemeron of Anastasius of
Sinai. In: Orientalia Christiana Periodica 36, pp. 337347.
Balibar, . (2006). Note sur l'origine et les usages du terme monothisme. In: Critique 704705,
pp. 1945.
Baltes, M. (2002). Die philosophische Lehre des Platonismus. Von der Seele als der Ursache aller
sinnvoller Ablufe. Vol. 6. Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt.
Baltzly, D. (2002). What goes up: Proclus against Aristotle on the fifth element. In: Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 80, pp. 261287.
Barber, C. and D. Jenkins, eds. (2006). Reading Michael Psellos. Leiden.
Barbu, D. and A.-C. Rendu Loisel (2009). Dmons et exorcismes en Msopotamie et en Jude. In: I
Quaderni del Ramo d'Oro on-line 2, pp. 304366.
Bargeliotes, L. (1975). Fate or Heimarmene according to Pletho. In: Diotima 3, pp. 137149.
Beaujeu, J., ed. (1973/2002). Apule, Opuscules philosophiques. De dieu de Socrate, Platon et sa
doctrine, Du monde. 2nd ed. Fragments, texte tabli, traduit et comment par J. Beaujeu. Paris.
Beierwaltes, W. (1972a). Johannes von Skythopolis und Plotin. In: Studia Patristica XI/2. Ed. by
F. L. Cross. Berlin, pp. 37.
Beierwaltes, W. (1972b). Platonismus und Idealismus. Philosophische Abhandlungen 40. Frankfurt
a. M.
Beierwaltes, W. (1977). Pronoia und Freheit in der Philosophie des Proklos. In: Freiburger
Zeitschrift fr Philosophie und Theologie 24, pp. 88111.
Beierwaltes, W. (1979). Proklos. Grundzge seiner Metaphysik. Zweite, durchges. u. erw. Aufl.
Philosophische Abhandlungen 24. Frankfurt a. M.
Beierwaltes, W. (1985). Denken des Einen: Studien zur neuplatonischen Philosophie und ihrer
Wirkungsgeschichte. Frankfurt am Main.
Beierwaltes, W. (1987). Das seiende Eine. Zur neuplatonischen Interpretation der zweiten
Hypothesis des platonischen Parmenides: das Beispiel Cusanus. In: Proclus et son influence.
Ed. by G. Boss and G. Seel. Zrich, pp. 287297.
Beierwaltes, W. (1997). Dionysius Areopagites: ein christlicher Proklos? In: Platon in der
abendlndischen Geistesgeschichte. Ed. by T. Kobusch and B. Mojsisch. Darmstadt, pp. 71100.
Beierwaltes, W. (2005). Cusanus. Reflexin metafsica y espiritualidad. Pamplona.
Beierwaltes, W. (2007). Procliana. Sptantikes Denken und seine Spuren. Frankfurt a. M.
Beierwaltes, W. and R. Kannicht (1968). Plotin-Testimonia bei Johannes von Skythopolis. In:
Hermes 96, pp. 247251.
Benakis, L. (1987a). Neues zur Proklos-Tradition in Byzanz. In: Proclus et son influence. Ed. by
Benakis, L. (1997). Nikephoros Choumnos (12501327), ber die Seele gegen Plotin. In:
Benakis, L. (2008). Einleitung. In: Michael Psellos: Kommentar zur Physik des Aristoteles. Athens,
3*64*.
Bene, L. (2014). Constructing Pagan Platonism: Plethon's Theory of Fate and the Ancient
Philosophical Tradition. In: Georgios Gemistos Plethon. The Byzantine and the Latin
Renaissance. Ed. by J. Matula and P. R. Blum. Olomouc, pp. 4171.
Berchmann, R. M. (2005). Porphyry Against the Christians. Leiden.
Bernard, F. (2011). Exchanging logoi for aloga: cultural capital and material capital in a letter of
Michael Psellos. In: Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies 35, pp. 134148.
Beyer, H.-V. (1978). Eine Chronologie der Lebensgeschichte des Nikephoros Gregoras. In:
Jahrbuch der sterreichischen Byzantinistik 27, pp. 127155.
Bianchi, U. (1990). Sulla demonologia del medio- e neoplatonismo. In: L'autunno del diavolo.
Diabolos, Dialogos, Daimon: convegno di Torino 17/21 ottobre 1988. Ed. by E. Corsini and
E. Costa. Vol. I. Milano, pp. 5162.
Bidez, J. (1928). Catalogue des Manuscrits alchimiques grecs, VI, ptre sur la Chrysope. Opuscules
et extraits sur l'alchimie, la mtorologie et la dmonologie. Publis par J. Bidez, en appendice
Proclus, Sur l'art hiratique. Psellus, Choix de dissertations indites. Bruxelles.
Bidez, J. (1954). Arthas de Csare editeur et scholiaste. In: Byzantion 9, pp. 391408.
Biriukov, D. (2013). Nicholas of Methone and his Polemics against Proclus in the Context of the
Early Byzantine Theological and Philosophical Thought. In: Saint Emperor Constantine and
Christianity, II. Conference Commemorating the 1700th Anniversary of the Edict of Milan. 31 May
2 June 2013. Ed. by D. Bojcovic. Nis, pp. 181188.
Blumenthal, H. J. (1996). Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity. Interpretations of the De
Anima. London.
Louvain.
Bos, E. P. and P. A. Meijer, eds. (1992). On Proclus and his Influence in Medieval Philosophy. Leiden.
Bowersock, G. W. (1990). Hellenism in Late Antiquity. Ann Arbor.
Bravo Garca, A. (2000). El Diablo en Bizancio. Metodologa, orientaciones y resultados de su
estudio. In: Seres Intermedios. ngeles, Demonios y Genios en el Mundo Mediterrneo. Ed. by
A. Prez Jimnez and G. Cruz Andreotti. Mediterranea 7. Madrid and Mlaga, pp. 179215.
Brisson, L. (2004). La doctrine des degrs de vertus chez les No-Platoniciens. Une analyse de la
Sentence 32 de Porphyre, de ses antecedents et de ses consquences. In: tudes
platoniciennes 1, pp. 271286.
Browning, R. (1975). Enlightenment and Repression in Byzantium in the Eleventh and Twelth
Centuries. In: Past and Present 69, pp. 1123.
Burnet, J. (1902). Arethas and the Codex Clarkianus (Plato, Phaedo, 96ac). In: Classical Review
16, p. 276.
Butler, E. P. (2008). The Intelligible Gods in the Platonic Theology of Proclus. In: Mthexis 21,
pp. 131143.
Butler, E. P. (2010). The Second Intelligible Triad and the Intelligible-Intellective Gods. In: Mthexis
23, pp. 137155.
Butler, E. P. (2012). The Third Intelligible Triad and the Intellective Gods. In: Mthexis 25,
pp. 131150.
Butler, E. P. (2014). Essays on the Metaphysics of Polytheism in Proclus. New York.
Bydn, B. (2011). Theodore Metochites. In: Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Ed. by
Bydn, B. (2012). A case for creationism: Christian cosmology in the 5th and 6th centuries. In: The
Many Faces of Byzantine Phiosophy. Ed. by B. Bydn and K. Ierodiakonou. Athens, pp. 79107.
Bydn, B. (2013). Photios on the Non-Synonymy of Substance: Amphilochia 138. In: Aristotle's
Categories in the Byzantine, Arabic and Latin Traditions. Ed. by S. Ebbesen, J. Marenbon, and
P. Thom. Copenhagen, pp. 934.
Bydn, B. (2014a). Nikephoros Gregoras' Commentary on Synesius, De insomniis. In: On
Prophecy, Dreams and Human Imagination. Ed. by D. A. Russell and H.-G. Nesselrath. Tbingen,
pp. 163188.
Cacouros, M. (2000a). Deux pisodes inconnus dans la rception de Proclus Byzance aux
XIIIeXIVe sicles. In: Proclus et la Thologie Platonicienne. Ed. by A.-P. S. et C. Steel. Leuven,
pp. 589627.
Cacouros, M. (2000c). Eustrate de Nice. In: Dictionnaire de Philosophes Antiques. Ed. by
R. Goulet. Vol. III. Paris, pp. 378388.
Cacouros, M. (2006). La philosophie et les sciences du Trivium et du Quadrivium Byzance de 1204
1453 entre tradition et innovation: Les textes et l'enseignement, le cas de l'cole du Prodrome
(Ptra). In: Philosophie et sciences Byzance de 1204 1453. Ed. by M. Cacouros and
M. H. Congourdeau. Leuven, pp. 151.
Cacouros, M. (2007c). Survie culturelle et rmanence textuelle du noplatonisme Byzance.
lments gnraux lments portant sur la logique. In: The Libraries of the Neoplatonists.
Proceedings of the Meeting of the European Science Foundation Network Late Antiquity and
Arabic Thought. Patterns in the Constitution of European Culture held in Strasbourg, March
1214, 2004. Ed. by C. D'Ancona. Leiden and Boston, pp. 177210.
Calvo Martnez, J. L. (1992). La Diosa Hecate: un paradigma de sincretismo religioso del helenismo
tardio. In: Florentia Iliberritana 3, pp. 7182.
Carab, V. A. (2010). Pletho Apostata. Giessen.
Cavalletti, S. (1958). Qualche notizia sulla mantica giudaica. In: Studi e Materiali di Storia delle
Religioni 29.1, pp. 183214.
Cavallo, G. (2007a). Qualche riflessione sulla collezione filosofica. In: The Libraries of the
Neoplatonists. Ed. by C. D'Ancona. Leiden, pp. 155166.
Celenza, C. (2002). Late Antiquity and Florentine Platonism. The Post-Plotinian Ficino. In: Marsilio
Ficino: his Theology, his Philosophy, his Legacy. Ed. by M. J. B. Allen, V. Rees, and M. Davies.
Leiden, pp. 7197.
Cesaretti, P. (1991a). Allegoristi di Omero a Bisanzio: Ricerche ermeneutiche (XIXII secolo). Milano.
Champion, M. W. (2014). Explaining the Cosmos: Creation and Cultural Interaction in Late-Antique
Gaza. Oxford and New York.
Chelidze, E. (1994/1995). The Life and Activities of Ioane Petritsi. In: Religion 3/4/5/6. (In
Georgian), 113126 (1994), 7689 (1995).
Chlup, R. (2012a). Proclus: An Introduction. Cambridge.
Chrestou, K. P. (2005a).
. . In: 25, pp. 117175.
Chrestou, K. P. (2005c).
. . In:
10, pp. 1374.
Christov, I. (2015). Neoplatonic Elements in the Writings of Patriarch Photius. In: The Ways of
Byzantine Philosophy. Ed. by M. Kneevi. Alhambra, pp. 289309.
Chuvin, P. (1991). Chronique des derniers paens. La disparition du paganisme dans l'Empire romain,
du rgne de Constantin celui de Justinien. 2e dition revue et corrige. Paris.
Clucas, L. (1981b). The Trial of John Italos and the Crisis of Intellectual Values in Byzantium in the
Colomer, E. (1975). De la Edad Media al Renacimiento. Ramn Llull, Nicols de Cusa, Juan Pico della
Mirandola. Barcelona.
Corrigan, K. and L. M. Harrington (2015). Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. In: The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. by E. N. Zalta. Spring 2015. url:
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/pseudo-dionysius-areopagite/.
Covotti, A. (1898). Per la storia della letteratura bizantina. La filosofia di Michele Psello. In: Atti
della Reale Accademia di Scienze Morali e Politiche (Napoli) 29, pp. 381423.
Crapulli, G. (1969). Mathesis universalis. Genesi di una idea nel XVI secolo. Roma.
Crouzel, H. (1990a). La doctrine orignienne du corps ressuscit. In: Les fins dernires selon
Origne. Vol. VI. Aldershot, pp. 191192.
Crouzel, H. (1990b). Le thme platonicien du vhicule de l'me chez Origne. In: Les fins
dernires selon Origne. Vol. III. Aldershot, pp. 225237.
Cufalo, D. (2007). Scholia graeca in Platonem. Vol. I. Pleiadi 5. Roma.
Cumont, F. (1915). Les anges du paganisme. In: Revue de l'Histoire des Religions 71/72,
pp. 159182.
Cvetkovi, V. (2015). The Transformation of Neoplatonic Philosophical Notions of Procession
(proodos) and Conversion (epistrophe) in the Thought of St. Maximus the Confessor. In: The
Ways of Byzantine Philosophy. Ed. by M. Kneevi. Alhambra, pp. 171184.
Dain, A. (1954). La transmission des textes littraires classiques. In: Dumbarton Oaks Papers 8,
pp. 3347.
d'Amico, C. (2009). La recepcin del pensamiento de Proclo en la obra de Nicols de Cusa. In:
Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofa 26, pp. 107134.
Dan, J. (1980). Samael, Lilith and the Concept of Evil in Early Kabbalah. In: Association for Jewish
Studies Revue 15, pp. 1740.
De Vita, M. C. (2011). Sul demone di Socrate: l'esegesi neoplatonica. In: . La filosofia
come esercizio del render ragione. Studi in onore di Giovanni Casertano. Ed. by L. Palumbo.
Napoli, pp. 841863.
De Andia, Y. (2015). Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and Maximus the Confessor. In: The Oxford
Handbook of Maximus the Confessor. Ed. by P. Allen and B. Neil. Oxford, pp. 177193.
De Garay, J. (2012). La recepcin de Proclo en Nicols de Cusa. In: Universalit della Ragione.
Pluralit delle Filosofie nel Medioevo. Ed. by A. Musco et al. Vol. II.2. Palermo, pp. 789796.
De Garay, J. (2013). The Reception of Proclus in Pletho and Ficino. In: The Theodosian Age (A.D.
379455). Power, Place, Belief and Learning at the End of the Western Empire. Ed. by
R. Garca-Gasco, S. Gonzlez, and D. H. de la Fuente. Oxford, pp. 175182.
De Garay, J. (2014). The Work of Proclus and its Reception in Byzantium. In: Mapping Knowledge.
Cross-Pollination in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Ed. by C. Burnett and P. Mantas.
London, pp. 2538.
De Vogel, C. J. (1985). Platonism and Christianity: a mere antagonism or a profound common
ground? In: Vigiliae Christianae 39, pp. 162.
De Vries-van der Velden, E. (1999). Les amitis dangereuses: Psellos et Lon Paraspondylos. In:
Byzantinoslavica 60, pp. 315350.
Del Campo Echevarra, A. (2012). La teora platnica de las Ideas en Bizancio (siglos IXXI). Madrid.
Delatte, A. and C. Josserand (1934). Contribution l'tude de la dmonologie byzantine. In:
Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales 2, pp. 207232.
Delli, E. (2007b). Entre compilation et originalit. Le corps pneumatique dans l'oeuvre de Michel
Demetracopoulos, J. (2002). Georgios Gennadios II-Scholarios' Florilegium Thomisticum: His Early
Abridgment of Various Chapters and Quaestiones of Thomas Aquinas' Summae and his
Anti-Plethonism. In: Recherches de Thologie et Philosophie mdivales 69, pp. 117171.
Demetracopoulos, J. (2003). Further Evidence on the Ancient, Patristic, and Byzantine Sources of
Barlaam the Calabrian's Contra Latinos. In: Byzantinische Zeitschrift 96, pp. 83122.
Demetracopoulos, J. (2006). Georgios Gemistos-Plethon's Dependence on Th. Aquinas' Summa
contra Gentiles and Summa Theologiae. In: Archiv fr mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur
12, pp. 276341.
Demetracopoulos, J. (2011a). Barlaam of Calabria. In: Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Ed. by
Demetracopoulos, J. (2011b). Nikephoros Gregoras. In: Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy.
Ed. by H. Lagerlund. Dordrecht, pp. 897899.
Demetracopoulos, J. (2011c). Palamas transformed. In: Greeks, Latins and intellectual History
12041500. Ed. by M. Hinterberger and C. Schabel. Leuven, pp. 263372.
Des Places, . (1957). Deux tmoins du texte des Lois de Platon: Eusbe, vque de Csare de
Palestine; Arthas, archevque de Csare de Cappadoc. In: Wiener Studien: Zeitschrift fr
Klassische Philologie, Patristik und lateinische Tradition 70, pp. 254259.
Des Places, . (1966). Le renouveau platonicien du XIe sicle: Michel Psellus et les Oracles
chaldaques. In: Comptes-rendus des sances de l'Acadmie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres
110.2, pp. 313324.
Des Places, . (1971). Oracles Chaldaques. Paris.
Dtienne, M. (1963). De la pense religieuse la pense philosophique. La notion de damn dans le
pythagorisme. Paris.
Di Pasquale Barbanti, M. (1998). Ochema-pneuma e phantasia nel neoplatonismo. Aspetti
psicologici e prospettive religiose. Catania.
Dillon, J. (1990). The Golden Chain. Studies in the Development of Platonism and Christianity.
Aldershot.
Dillon, J. (2000). Seres intermedios en la Tradicin Platnica Tarda. In: Seres Intermedios.
ngeles, Demonios y Genios en el Mundo Mediterrneo. Ed. by A. Prez Jimnez and
G. Cruz Andreotti. Mediterranea 7. Madrid and Mlaga, pp. 89117.
Dillon, J. (2014a). Dionysius the Areopagite. In: Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the
Dillon, J. and S. K. Wear (2007). Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition: Despoiling
the Hellenes. Aldershot.
Dodds, E. R. (1963a). Introduction. In: Proclus. The Elements of Theology. Ed. by E. R. Dodds.
3rd ed. Oxford, pp. ixxlvii.
Donini, P. (1990). Nozioni di daimon e di intermediario nella filosofia tra il I e il II secolo d.C. In:
L'autunno del diavolo. Diabolos, Dialogos, Daimon: convegno di Torino 17/21 ottobre 1988.
Ed. by E. Corsini and E. Costa. Vol. I. Milano, pp. 3750.
Drrie, H. and M. Baltes (1998). Der Platonismus in der Antike. Vol. 5. Stuttgart.
Drseke, J. (1895b). Nikolaos von Methone als Bestreiter des Proklos. In: Theologische Studien
und Kritiken 68, pp. 589616.
Drseke, J. (1897a). Prokopios' von Gaza Widerlegung des Proklos. In: Byzantinische Zeitschrift 6,
pp. 5591.
Drseke, J. (1898). Zu Nikolaos von Methone. In: Zeitschrift fr Wissenschaftliche Theologie 41,
pp. 402411.
Duffy, J. (1999). Bitter Brine and Sweet Fresh Water. The Anatomy of a Metaphor in Psellos. In:
Novum Millenium: Studies in Byzantine History and Culture Dedicated to Paul Speck, 19
December 1999. Ed. by C. Sode and S. A. Takcs. London, pp. 8996.
Duffy, J. (2002a). Hellenic Philosophy in Byzantium and the Lonely Mission of Michael Psellos. In:
Duffy, J. (2006a). Dealing with the Psellos Corpus: From Allatius to Westerink and the Biblioteca
Teubneriana. In: Reading Michael Psellos. Ed. by C. Barber and D. Jenkins. Leiden and Boston,
pp. 112.
Dyck, A. R., ed. (1986). Psellos, The Essays on Euripides and George of Pisidia and on Heliodorus and
Achilles Tatius. Vienna.
Dzielska, M. (1986). Apollonius of Tyana in Legend and History. Rome.
Edmonds III, R. G. (2004). The Faces of the Moon: Cosmology, Genesis, and the Mithras Liturgy. In:
Heavenly Realms and Earthly Realities in Late Antique Religions. Ed. by R. S. Boustan and
A. Y. Reed. Cambridge, pp. 275295.
Edwards, M. J. (1990). Atticizing Moses? Numenius, the Fathers and the Jews. In: Vigiliae
Christianae 44, pp. 6473.
Elsner, J. (2009). Beyond Compare: Pagan Saint and Christian God in Late Antiquity. In: Critical
Inquiry 35, pp. 655683.
Emilsson, E. K. (2007). Plotinus on Intellect. Oxford.
Engehausen, F. (2008). Creuzers Leben im Spiegel seiner Autobiographie. In: Friedrich Creuzer
17711858. Philologie und Mythologie im Zeitalter der Romantik. Begleitband zur Ausstellung in
der Universittsbibliothek Heidelberg. 12. Februar 8. Mai 2008. Ed. by F. Engehausen,
A. Schlechter, and J. P. Schwindt. Archiv und Museum der Universitt Heidelberg. Schriften 12.
Heidelberg et al., pp. 2540.
Fabiano, D. (2011). I demoni dei bagni tra acqua e fuoco. In: Dans le laboratoire de l'histoire des
religions. Mlanges offerts Philippe Borgeaud. Ed. by F. Prescendi and Y. Volokhine. Avec la
collaboration de D. Barbu et Ph. Matthey. Genve, pp. 275288.
Falcon, A. (2001). Corpi e movimenti. Il De Caelo di Aristotele e la sua fortuna nel mondo antico.
Napoli.
Ferrari, F. (2011). La dottrina delle idee nel medioplatonismo. In: Eidos-Idea. Platone, Aristotele e
la tradizione platonica. Ed. by F. Fronterotta and W. Leszl. Sankt Augustin, pp. 233246.
Finamore, J. F. (1985). Iamblichus and the Theory of the Vehicle of the Soul. Chico CA.
Flasch, K. (2001). Nikolaus von Kues. Geschichte einer Entwicklung: Vorlesungen zur Einfhrung in
seine Philosophie. (Sonderausgabe). Frankfurt am Main.
Frank, R. M. (1987). The Use of the Enneads by John of Scythopolis. In: Le Muson 100,
pp. 101108.
Garca Bazn, F. (1991). Orculos caldeos con una seleccin de testimonios de Proclo, Pselo y M.
Itlico. Madrid.
Grtner, H. (1969). Charikleia in Byzanz. In: Antike und Abendland 15, pp. 4769.
Garzya, A. (19661967). On Michael Psellus' Admission of Faith. In:
35, pp. 4146.
Gautier, P. (1974a). loge funbre de Nicolas de la Belle Source par Michel Psellos moine
l'Olympe. In: 6, pp. 969.
Gautier, P. (1980). Le De daemonibus du Pseudo-Psellos. In: Revue des tudes byzantines 38,
pp. 105194.
Gersh, S. (1978a). From Iamblichos to Eriugena: An investigation of the prehistory and evolution of
the pseudo-Dionysian tradition. Leiden.
Gersh, S. (2014a). George Gemistos Plethon. In: Interpreting Proclus. Ed. by S. Gersh. Cambridge,
pp. 216225.
Gersh, S., ed. (2014c). Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance. Cambridge.
Gifford, E. H. (1902). Arethas and the Codex Clarkianus. In: Classical review 16, pp. 391393.
Gigineishvili, G. (2007). The Platonic Theology of Ioane Petritsi. Piscataway (NJ).
Gigineishvili, L. (2014). Ioane Petritsi's Preface to his Annotated Translation to his book of Psalms.
In: Georgian Christian thought and its cultural context: memorial volume for the 125th
Anniversary of Shalva Nutsubidze (18881969). Ed. by T. Nutsubidze, C. B. Horn, and B. Louri.
Leiden and Boston, pp. 196235.
Giocarinis, K. (1964). Eustratius of Nicaea's Defense of the Doctrine of Ideas. In: Franciscan
Studies. Franciscan Studies 24 24, pp. 159204.
Golitsis, P. (2007). Nicphore Blemmyde lecteur du commentaire de Simplicius la Physique
d'Aristote. In: The Libraries of the Neoplatonists. Ed. by C. D'Ancona. Leiden and Boston,
pp. 243256.
Golitsis, P. (2008). Georges Pachymre comme didascale. Essai pour une reconstitution de sa
carrire et de son enseignement philosophique. In: Jahrbuch der sterreichischen
Byzantinistik 58, pp. 5368.
Golitsis, P. (2010). Copistes, lves et rudits : la production de manuscrits philosophiques autour
de Georges Pachymre. In: The Legacy of Bernard de Montfaucon: Three Hundred Years of
Studies on Greek Handwriting. Ed. by A. Bravo Garca, I. Prez Martn, and J. Signes Codoer.
Bibliologia 31. Turnhout, pp. 157170, 75776.
Golitsis, P. (2015 (forthcoming)). Michel d'phse. In: Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques.
Ed. by R. Goulet. Paris.
Golitzin, A. (2007). Dionysius the Areopagite in the Works of Gregory Palamas. On the Question of a
Christological Corrective and related Matters. In: Scrinium 3, pp. 83105.
Gouillard, J. (1976b). La religion des philosophes. In: Travaux et mmoires 6, pp. 305324.
Gouillard, J. (1985a). Le procs officiel de Jean l'Italien. Les Actes et leurs sous-entendus. In:
Gounaridis, P. (2006). Le procs de Jean dit Italos rvis. In: Historein 6, pp. 3547.
Graeser, A. (1972). Plotinus and the Stoics. Leiden.
Greenfield, R. P. H. (1988). Traditions of Belief in Late Byzantine Demonology. Amsterdam.
Greenfield, R. P. H. (1995). A Contribution to the Study of Palaeologan Magic. In: Byzantine Magic.
Ed. by H. Maguire. Washington (D. C.), pp. 117153.
Grosdidier de Matons, J. (1976). Psellos et le monde de l'irrationnel. In: Travaux et Mmoires 6,
pp. 325349.
Gudemann, A. and W. Kroll (1916). Ioannes Philoponus. In: Paulys Realencyclopdie der
classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Ed. by G. Wissowa and W. Kroll. Vol. IX, 2. Stuttgart,
pp. 17641795.
Guilland, R. (1926). Essais sur Nicphore Grgoras. Paris.
Guillou, A. (2000). Le diable byzantin. In: . Miscellanea fr Peter Schreiner zu
seinem 60. Geburtstag. Ed. by C. Scholz and G. Makris. Mit einem Geleitwort von H. Hunger.
Mnchen and Leipzig, pp. 4555.
Guldentops, G. (2005). Plato's Timaeus in Simplicius' In de Caelo. A Confrontation with Alexander.
In: Platons Timaios als Grundtext der Kosmologie in Sptantike, Mittelalter und Renaissance.
Ed. by T. Leinkauf and C. Steel. Leuven, pp. 195212.
Gnther, H.-C. (2007). Die bersetzungen der Elementatio Theologica des Proklos und ihre
Bedeutung fr den Proklostext. Leiden.
Hage, W. (2007). Das orientalische Christentum. Stuttgart.

Hankey, W. J. (2002). Aquinas and the Platonists. In: The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages.
Ed. by S. Gersh and M. J. F. M. Hoenen. Berlin, pp. 279324.
Hankins, J. (1990a). Bessarion's Debt to Proclus in Book II of the Calumniator. In: Plato in the
Italian Renaissance. Vol. 2. Leiden and New York, pp. 441444.
Hankins, J. (1990b). Plato in the Italian Renaissance. Vol. I. Leiden.
Hathaway, R. F. (1969). Hierarchy and the definition of order in the letters of Pseudo-Dionysius: a
study in the form and meaning of the Pseudo-Dionysian writings. The Hague.
Heisenberg, A. (1926). Das Problem der Renaissance in Byzanz. In: Historische Zeitschrift 133,
pp. 393412.
Herrero de Juregui, M. (2007). Tradicin orfica y cristianismo antiguo. Madrid.
Hevelone-Harper, J. (2005). Disciples of the Desert: Monks, Laity and Spiritual Authority in
Sixth-Century Gaza. Baltimore.
Hild, J.-A. (1881). tude sur les dmons dans la littrature et la religion des Grecs. Paris.
Hoffmann, P. (1987a). Simplicius' Polemics. In: Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian
Science. Ed. by R. Sorabji. London, pp. 5783.
Hoffmann, P. (1987b). Sur quelques aspects de la polmique de Simplicius contre Jean Philopon.
In: Simplicius. Sa vie, son uvre, sa survie. Ed. by I. Hadot. Berlin, pp. 183221.
Hoffmann, P. (2014). Science thologique et foi selon le commentaire de Simplicius au De Caelo
d'Aristote. In: De l'antiquit tardive au Moyen ge. tudes de logique aristotlicienne et de
philosophie grecque, syriaque, arabe et latine offertes Henri Hugonnard-Roche. Ed. by
E. Coda and C. M. Bonadeo. tudes Musulmanes XLIV. Paris, pp. 277363.
Holmes, C. (2005). Basil II and the Governance of Empire 9761025. Oxford.
Hopfer, T. (1921). Griechisch-gyptischer Offenbarungszauber. Mit einer eingehenden Darstellung
der griechisch-synkretistischen Daemonen-glaubens und der Voraussetzungen und Mittel des
Zaubers berhaupt und der magischen Divination im besonderen. Vol. I. Leipzig.
Hunter, R. (2005). Philip the Philosopher on the Aithiopika of Heliodoros. In: Metaphor and the
Ancient Novel. Ed. by M. P. S. Harrison and S. Fragoulidis. Groningen, pp. 123138.
Hussey, J. M. (1960). Ascetics and Humanists in Eleventh-Century Byzantium. London.
Ibez Chacn, . (2008). La obra paradoxogrfica de Damascio (apud Phot. Bibl. cod. 130). In:
Cuadernos de Filologa Clsica. Estudios griegos e indoeuropeos 18, pp. 319334.
Ierodiakonou, K., ed. (2002a). Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources. Oxford.
Ierodiakonou, K. (2002c). Psellos' Paraphrasis on Aristotle's De interpretatione. In: Byzantine
Ierodiakonou, K. (2002d). The Anti-logical Movement in the Fourteenth Century. In: Byzantine
Philosophy and Its Ancient Sources. Ed. by K. Ierodiakonou. Oxford, pp. 219236.
Ierodiakonou, K. (2005a). Metaphysics in the Byzantine Tradition: Eustratios of Nicaea on
Universals. In: Quaestio 5, pp. 6782.
Ierodiakonou, K. (2005b). The Byzantine Reception of Aristotle's Categories. In: Synthesis
philosophica 39, pp. 731.
Ierodiakonou, K. (2011a). John Italos. In: Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Ed. by
H. Lagerlund. Dordrecht.
Ierodiakonou, K. (2011b). Logic, Byzantine. In: Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Ed. by
Ierodiakonou, K. and G. Zografidis (2010). Early Byzantine Philosophy. In: The Cambridge History
of Philosophy in Late Antiquity. Ed. by L. P. Gerson. Vol. 2. Cambridge, pp. 843868.
Innocenzi, F. (2011). Il daimon in Giamblico e la demonologia greco-romana. Macerata.
Iremadze, T. (2004c). Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus. Zur Rezeption der Proklischen
Moosburg Joane Petrizi. Amsterdam.
Iremadze, T. (2006). Die Rezeption der Aristotelischen Logik im georgischen Denken der Neuzeit:
Anton Bagrationi und seine Aristoteles-Studien. In: Georgica. Zeitschrift fr Kultur, Sprache
und Geschichte Georgiens und Kaukasiens 29, pp. 135143.
Iremadze, T. (2007). Die Philosophie der Selbstreflexivitt bei Joane Petrizi. In: Philosophy
Theology Culture. Problems and Perspectives (Jubilee volume dedicated to the 75th
anniversary of Guram Tevzadze). Ed. by T. Iremadze, T. Tskhadadze, and G. Kheoshvili. Tbilisi,
pp. 6678.
Iremadze, T. (2009). Joane Petrizi. In: Philosophenlexikon. Ed. by S. Jordan and B. Mojsisch.
Stuttgart, pp. 285286.
Iremadze, T. (2011). Zur Rezeption und Transformation der Aristotelischen und Proklischen
Ursachenmodelle bei Joane Petrizi. In: Archiv fr mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur 17,
pp. 96111.
Iremadze, T. (2013). Philosophy at the Crossroads of Epochs and Cultures. Tbilisi.
Irigoin, J. (19851986). Deux traditions dissymtriques: Platon et Aristote. In: Annuaire du Collge
de France: rsums des cours et travaux 86, pp. 683699.
Jamme, C. (2008). Gttersymbole. Friedrich Creuzer als Mythologe und seine philosophische
Wirkung. In: 200 Jahre Heidelberger Romantik. Ed. by F. Strack. Heidelberger Jahrbcher 51.
Berlin, Heidelberg, and New York, pp. 487498.
Jeck, U. R. (2004). Platonica orientalia. Aufdeckung einer philosophischen Tradition. Frankfurt a. M.
Jeck, U. R. (2010). Erluterungen zur georgischen Philosophie. Tbilisi.
Jeck, U. R. (2011). Weisheit im Schatten Apollons. Der Prokloskommentar des Berthold von
Moosburg als Einfhrung in die Philosophie und Geschichte des Platonismus. In: Archiv fr
mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur 17, pp. 112170.
Jeck, U. R. (2013). Zeruane Akerene. Zu Friedrich Creuzers Re konstruktion der persischen
Mythologie. In: Mythos Geist Kultur. Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Christoph Jamme.
Ed. by K. Andermann and A. Jrgens. Mnchen, pp. 1326.
Jenkins, D. (2006a). Psellos' Conceptual Precision. In: Reading Michael Psellos. Ed. by C. Barber
and D. Jenkins. Leiden and Boston, pp. 131151.
Joannou, P. (1956). Christliche Metaphysik in Byzanz I. Die Illuminationslehre des Michael Psellos
und Joannes Italos. Ettal.
Johnson, A. P. (2013). Religion and Identity in Porphyry of Tyre. The Limits of Hellenism in Late
Antiquity. Cambridge.
Johnston, S. I. (2010). Porphyry, Sacrifice, and the Orderly Cosmos: On the Philosophy to be Derived
from Oracles Fr. 314 and 315. In: Kernos 23, pp. 115132.
Jordan, D. (2008). Another Wretched Subject. The demons of the world. In: Greek Magic: Ancient,
Medieval and Modern. Ed. by J. C. B. Petropoulos. London and New York, pp. 5863.
Kaldellis, A. (1999). The Argument of Psellos' Chronographia. Leiden.
Kaldellis, A. (2005). The Date of Psellos' Theological Lectures and Higher Religious Education in
Constantinople. In: Byzantinoslavica 68, pp. 143151.
Kaldellis, A., ed. (2006). Mothers and Sons, Fathers and Daughters. The Byzantine Family of Michael
Psellos. Notre Dame (Indiana).
Kaldellis, A. (2007). Hellenism in Byzantium. The Transformations of Greek Identity and the Reception
of the Classical Tradition. Cambridge.
Kaldellis, A. (2011). The date of Psellos' death, once again: Psellos was not the Michael of
Nikomedeia mentioned by Attaleiates. In: Byzantinische Zeitschrift 104, pp. 651664.
Kaldellis, A. (2012). Byzantine Philosophy inside and out: Orthodoxy and dissidence in
counterpoint. In: The Many Faces of Byzantine Philosophy. Ed. by B. Bydn and
K. Ierodiakonou. Athen, pp. 129151.
Kapriev, G. (2005). Philosophie in Byzanz. Wrzburg.
Kazhdan, A. and A. W. Epstein (1985). Change in Byzantine Culture in the Eleventh and Twelfth
Centuries. Berkley, Los Angeles, and London.
Keller, A. (1957). Two Byzantine Scholars and Their Reception in Italy. In: Journal of the Warburg
and Courtaud Institutes 20.3/4 (Jul. - Dec.) Pp. 363370.
Kneevi, M. (2015). Authority and Tradition. The Case of Dionysius Pseudo-Areopagite in the
Writing On Divine Unity and Distinction by Gregory Palamas. In: The Ways of Byzantine
Philosophy. Alhambra, pp. 375389.
Kolovou, F. (2010). Der Mythos im Imitatio-Konzept des Michael Psellos. In: Imitatio Aemulatio
Variatio. Ed. by A. Rhoby and E. Schiffer. Vienna, pp. 165173.
Kontouma, V. (2015). The Fount of knowledge between conservation and creation. In: John of
Damascus. New Studies on his Life and Works. Ed. by V. Kontouma. Farnham. Chap. V, pp. 35.
Kristeller, P. O. (1987). Proclus as a Reader of Plato and Plotinus, and his Influence in the Middle
Ages and in the Renaissance. In: Proclus, lecteur et interprte des anciens. Ed. by J. Ppin and
H. D. Saffrey. Paris, pp. 191211.
Lamberton, R. (1989a). Homer the Theologian: Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading and the Growth of
Lanzi, S. (20042005). La questione dei Giuliani e gli Oracoli caldaici: alcuni problemi
storico-religiosi. In: 12, pp. 145169.
Lanzi, S. (2006). Aion, Eros e Hades nei frammenti caldaici. In: Kervan 3, pp. 3549.
Lauritzen, D. (2015). Introduction. In: John of Gaza. Description du Tableau cosmique. Ed. by
D. Lauritzen. Paris.
Lauritzen, F. (2007a). A Courtier in the Women's Quarters: The Rise and Fall of Psellos. In:
Byzantion 77, pp. 251266.
Lauritzen, F. (2007b). Psellos and the Nazireans. In: Revue des tudes Byzantines 65, pp. 359364.
Lauritzen, F. (2008a). Psello discepolo di Stetato. In: Byzantinische Zeitschrift 101, pp. 715725.
47, pp. 285291.
Lauritzen, F. (2011). Stethatos' Paradise in Psellos' Ekphrasis of Mt. Olympos (Orat. Min. 36
Littlewood). In: Vizantijskij Vremennik 70, pp. 139150.
Lauritzen, F. (2012). Psellos the hesychast: a neoplatonic reading of the Transfiguration on Mount
Tabor. In: Byzantinoslavica 70, pp. 167180.
Lauritzen, F. (2013). Psellos and neo-Platonic mysticism. The secret meaning of the Greek alphabet
(Opusc. phil I 36, 335642). In: Platonismus und Esoterik in byzantinischen Mittelalter und
italienischer Renaissance. Ed. by H. Seng. Heidelberg, pp. 2943.
Lauritzen, F. (2014). Psellos and Plotinos. In: Byzantinische Zeitschrift 101.2, pp. 5366.
Lavagnini, B. (1974). Filippo-Filagato promotore degli studi di greco in Calabria. In: Bolletino della
Badia greca di Grottaferrata 28, pp. 312.
Lemerle, P. (1971). Le premier humanisme byzantin. Notes et remarques sur enseignement et culture
Byzance des origines au Xe sicle. Paris.
Lewy, H. (1956). Chaldaen Oracles and Theurgy. Cairo.
Linguiti, A. (2011). Dottrina delle idee nel neoplatonismo. In: Eidos-Idea. Platone, Aristotele e la
tradizione platonica. Ed. by F. Fronterotta and W. Leszl. Sankt Augustin, pp. 247261.
Lossky, V. (2009). Teologa mstica de la Iglesia de Oriente. Barcelona.
Louth, A. (1993). St. Denys the Areopagite and St. Maximus the Confessor: a question of influence.
In: Studia Patristica 27, pp. 166174.
Louth, A. (2002). St John Damascene. Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology. Oxford.
Louth, A. (2008). The Reception of Dionysius in the Byzantine World: Maximus to Palamas. In:
Modern Theology 24, pp. 585599.
Luck, G. (1985/2006). Arcana Mundi. Magic and the Occult in the Greek and Roman Worlds. A
Collection of Ancient Texts. 2nd ed. Baltimore.
Luna, C. (2001). Trois tudes sur la tradition des commentaires anciens la Metaphysique d'Aristote.
Leiden, Boston, and Kln.
Luzzatto, M.-J. (2010). Codici tardoantichi di Platone ed i cosidetti Scholia Arethae. In: Medioevo
greco 10, pp. 77110.
Mac, C., C. Steel, and P. D'Hoine (2009). Bessarion lecteur du Commentaire de Proclus sur le
Parmnide. Avec une dition de ses scholies aux livres II et III. In: Byzantion 79, pp. 240279.
Makris, G. (2000). Zwischen Hypatios von Ephesos und Lorenzo Valla. Die areopagitische
Echtheitsfrage im Mittelalter. In: Die Dionysius-Rezeption im Mittelalter: Internationales
Kolloquium in Sofia vom 8. bis 11. April 1999. Ed. by C. C. Bojadiev. Turnhout, pp. 439.
Maltese, E. V. (1987). Damascio in Psello. In: Studi italiani di filologia classica, Terza serie 5, p. 66.
Maltese, E. V. (1990). Il diavolo a Bisanzio: demonologia dotta e tradizioni popolari. In: L'autunno
del diavolo. Diabolos, Dialogos, Daimon: convegno di Torino 17/21 ottobre 1988. Ed. by
E. Corsini and E. Costa. Vol. I. Milano, pp. 317333.
Maltese, E. V. (1995). Natura daemonum... habet corpus et versatur circa corpora: una lezione di
demonologia dal Medioevo greco. In: Il demonio e i suoi complici. Dottrine e credenze
demonologiche nella Tarda Antichit. Ed. by S. Pricoco. Soveria Mannelli and Messina,
pp. 265284.
Mango, C. (1992). Diabolus Byzantinus. In: Dumbarton Oaks Papers 46, pp. 215223.
Margagliotta, G. M. A. (2012). Il Demone di Socrate nelle interpretazioni di Plutarco e Apuleio.
Nordhausen.
Mariev, S. (2013). Der Traktat De natura et arte des Kardinals Bessarion. In: Inter graecos
latinissimus, inter latinos graecissimus. Ed. by C. Mrtl, K. Kaiser, and T. Ricklin. Berlin und
New York, pp. 367389.
Mariev, S. (2015). Theoretical Eudaimonia in Michael of Ephesos. In: Quaestio 15, pp. 5562.
Mariev, S. (2016). Plotinus in the Phlorentios of Nikephoros Gregoras. In: Koinotaton Doron. Ed. by
A. Berger et al. Berlin, pp. 101108.
Mariev, S., M. Marchetto, and K. Luchner, eds. (2015). Bessarion: ber Natur und Kunst / De Natura
et Arte. GriechischLateinischDeutsch. Hamburg.
Martone, L. I. (2008). La conoscenza di Fozio della filosofia neoplatonica: la Collezione filosofica e
la questio 75 ad Anfilochio. In: Antonianum 83, pp. 227246.
Matula, J. (2011). Arethas of Caesarea. In: Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy
between 500 and 1500. Ed. by H. Lagerlund. Dordrecht, pp. 9799.
Mayer, A. (1911). Psellos, Discourse Improvised by the Hypertimos Psellos to the Bestarchs Pothos
who asked Him to Write about the Style of the Theologian (Psellos' Rede ber den rhetorischen
Character des Gregorios von Nazianz). In: Byzantinische Zeitschrift. Ed. by A. Mayer. Vol. 20,
pp. 27100.
McCormick, M. (1987). Byzantium's Role in the Formation of Early Medieval Civilization: Approaches
and Problems. In: Illinois Classical Studies 12.2, pp. 208220.
Mchedlidze, M. (1999). The Main Principle of Ioane Petritsi's Exegetical Method. In: Works by
young researchers of the Philological Faculty (3), Dedicated to the 120th anniversary of the birth
of Academician Korneli Kekelidze. Ed. by L. Geguchadze. (In Georgian). Tbilisi, pp. 132138.
Mchedlidze, M. (2011). For a Triadic Vision of divine Nature (Michael Psellos, john Italos, Nicholas of
Methone, Ioane Petritsi). In: Philosophy in Global Change, Jubilee Volum Dedicated to the 65th
Anniversary of Burkhard Moisisch. Ed. by T. Iremadze, H. Schneider, and K. J. Schmidt. (In
Georgian). Tbilisi.
Meeusen, M. (2012). Salt in the holy water: Plutarch's Quaestiones naturales in Michael Psellus' De
Omnifaria Doctrina. In: Plutarch in the Religious and Philosophical Discourse of Late Antiquity.
Ed. by L. Roig Lanzillotta and I. Muoz Gallarte. Leiden, pp. 101121.
Melikishvili, D. (1999). Introduction to Petritsi's Life and Works. In: Ioane Petritsis Comments on
Proclus' Elements of Theology (A Translation in modern Georgian, Introduction and
Commentary). Tbilisi.
Menchelli, M. (2015). Nota storico-tradizionale al Commento al Timeo di Proclo nelle et macedone,
comnena, paleologa tra supporti librari e documentari. In: Studia Graeco-Arabica 5,
pp. 145164.
Mercati, G. (1931). Notizie di Procoro e Demetrio Cidone, manuele Caleca e Teodoro Meliteniota: ed
altri appunti per la storia della teologia e della letteratura bizantina del secolo XIV. In: Studi e
Testi 56, pp. 264266.
Miles, G. (2009). The Representation of Reading in Philip the Philosopher's Essay on Heliodorus.
In: Byzantion 79, pp. 292305.
Miles, G. (2014). Living as a Sphinx: Composite Being and Monstrous Interpreter in the ``Middle
Life'' of Michael Psellos. In: Conjunctions: Body and Mind from Plato to the Enlightenment.
Ed. by D. Kambaskovic-Sawers. Dordrecht.
Mojsisch, B. (1991). Nichts und Negation. Meister Eckhart und Nikolaus von Kues. In: Historia
philosophiae mediiaevi. Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Festschrift fr
Kurt Flasch zu seinem 60. Geburtstag. Ed. by B. Mojsisch and O. Pluta. Vol. II. Amsterdam,
pp. 675693.
Monfasani, J. (2006). Pletho's date of death and the burning of his Laws. In: Byzantinische
Zeitschrift 98.2, pp. 459463.
Monfasani, J. (2012a). Cardinal Bessarion's Greek and Latin Sources. In: Knotenpunkt Byzanz.
Ed. by A. Speer and P. Steinkrger. Berlin, pp. 469480.
Monfasani, J. (2012b). Cardinal Bessarion's own Translation of the In calumniatorem Platonis. In:
Academia 14, pp. 721.
Monfasani, J. (2013). The Pre- and Post-History of Cardinal Bessarion's 1469 In Calumniatorem
Platonis. In: Inter graecos latinissimus, inter latinos graecissimus: Bessarion zwischen den
Kulturen. Ed. by C. Mrtl, C. Kaiser, and T. Ricklin. Berlin, pp. 347366.
Moore, P. (2005c). Iter Psellianum: a detailed listing of manuscript sources for all works attributed to
Michael Psellos, including a comprehensive bibliography. Toronto: Pontificial Institute of
Mediaeval Studies.
Moraux, P. (1963). Quinta essentia. In: Paulys Realencyclopdie der Classischen
Altertumswissenschaft, Siebenundvierzigster Halbband. Vol. 24/1. Stuttgart, cols. 11711263,
14301432.
Moreschini, C. (1995). Il demone nella cultura pagana dell'et imperiale. In: Il demonio e i suoi
complici. Dottrine e credenze demonologiche nella Tarda Antichit. Ed. by S. Pricoco. Soveria
Mannelli and Messina, pp. 75110.
Morlet, S., ed. (2011). Le trait de Porphyre contre les chrtiens. Un sicle de recherches, nouvelles
questions. Paris.
Mtchedlidze, M. (2014). As the mountains of God and the eternal mountains: Ioane Petritsi's
reasoning on the agreement of Plato with David the Prophet. In: Studies in the Humanities 3.
(In Georgian, with an extensive summary in English), pp. 168184.
Mueller-Jourdan, P. (2005). Typologie spatio-temporelle de l'Ecclesia byzantine. Leiden.
Muscolino, G. (2010). La demonologia di Porfirio e il culto di Mitra. In: Mediaeval Sophia 7,
pp. 103123.
Muscolino, G. (2011). Saggio interpretativo. Magia, stregoneria, teosofia e teurgia. La
trasformazione del Neoplatonismo. In: Porfirio, La filosofia rivelata dagli oracoli, con tutti i
frammenti di magia, stregoneria, teosofia e teurgia. Monografia introduttiva di G. Girgenti,
Saggio interpretativo, traduzione, note e apparati di G. Muscolino. Milano, pp. cxviiccxi.
Nasemann, B. (1991). Theurgie und Philosophie in Jamblichs De mysteriis. Stuttgart.
Niarchos, C. G. (19831984). Nicholas of Methone's Criticism on Proclus Theory of participated or
unparticipated Intelligence (nous). In: 1314, pp. 324345.
Niarchos, C. G. (1985). The Concept of Participation according to Proclus, with reference to the
Criticism of Nicholas of Methone. In: Diotima 13, pp. 7894.
Nikolaou, T. (1982). Georgios Gemistos Plethon und Proclus. Plethon's Neoplatonismus am Beispiel
seiner Psychologie. In: Jahrbuch der sterreichischen Byzantinistik 32, pp. 387399.
O'Meara, D. J. (1992b). Plotinus. In: Catalogus Translationum et Commentariorum: Mediaeval and
Renaissance Latin Translations. Ed. by P. O. Kristeller, F. E. Cranz, and V. Brown. Vol. VII.
Washington (D. C.), pp. 5573.
O'Meara, D. J. (2003). Platonopolis. Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity. Oxford.
Renaissance. Ed. by H. Seng. Heidelberg, pp. 4558.
O'Meara, D. J. (2014e). Proclus in Psellos' Philosophical Synthesis. In: Interpreting Proclus. From
Antiquity to the Renaissance. Ed. by S. Gersh. Cambridge, pp. 165181.
Opsomer, J. (2003). La dmiurgie des jeunes dieux selon Proclus. In: Les tudes Classiques 71,
pp. 549.
pp. 133153.
Papaioannou, S. (2011). Michael Psellos on friendship and love: erotic discourse in
eleventh-century Byzantium. In: Early Medieval Europe 19, pp. 4361.
Papaioannou, S. (2013b). Michael Psellos. Rhetoric and Authorship in Byzantium. Cambridge.
Parry, K. (2006b). Reading Proclus Diadochus in Byzantium. In: Reading Plato in Antiquity. Ed. by
Ppin, J. (1964). Thologie cosmique et thologie chretinne. Paris.
Ppin, J. (1982). The Platonic and Christian Ulysses. In: Neoplatonism and Christian Thought.
Ed. by D. J. O'Meara. Norfolk (VA), pp. 318.
Perczel, I. (2003). God as monad and henad: Dionysius the Areopagite and the Peri Archon. In:
Origeniana Octava. Leuven, pp. 11931209.
Pereira, M. J. (2011). Maximus the Confessor. In: Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Ed. by
H. Lagerlund. Dordrecht, p. 734.
Perl, E. D. (2007). Theophany: The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite. Albany.
Podolak, P. (2007). Giovanni di Scitopoli interprete del Corpus Dionysiacum. In: Augustinianum 47,
pp. 335381.
Podskalsky, G. (1977). Theologie und Philosophie in Byzanz. Der Streit um die theologische Methodik
in der sptbyzantinischen Geistesgeschichte (14./15. Jh.), seine systematischen Grundlagen und
seine historische Entwicklung. Mnchen.
Polemis, I., ed. (2006). Theodoros Metochites Poem 10. Introduction, Critical Edition, Translation and
Notes. Amsterdam.
Rabouin, D. (2009). Mathesis universalis: l'ide de mathmatique universelle d'Aristote
Descartes. Paris.
Ramos Jurado, E. A. (1981). Lo platonico en el siglo V p. C.: Proclo. (Anlisis de las fuentes del
Comentario de Proclo al Timeo platnico en su libro V: Prlogo y Genealoga de los dioses).
Sevilla.
Reale, G. (1989). Introduzione a Proclo. Roma and Bari.
Resigno, A. (2004). Alessandro di Afrodisia. Commentario al De Caelo di Aristotele, Frammenti del
primo Libro. In: Amsterdam. Chap. Introduction, pp. 53138.
Retucci, F. (2008). Her f sprichet ein heidenischer meister in dem buoche, daz d heizet daz lieht
der liehte: Eckhart, il Liber de causis e Proclo. In: Studi sulle fonti di Meister Eckhart. Ed. by
L. Sturlese. Vol. I. Fribourg, pp. 135165.
Rhoby, A. (2007). Aspekte des Fortlebens des Gregor von Nazianz in byzantinischer und
postbyzantinischer Zeit. In: Theatron: Rhetorische Kultur in Sptantike und Mittelalter. Ed. by
M. Grnbart. Berlin and New York, pp. 409417.
Richard, A. (2003). Cosmologie et thologie chez Grgoire de Nazianze. Paris.
Ricklin, T. (1998). Der Traum der Philosophie im 12. Jahrhundert. Traumtheorien zwischen
Constantinus Africanus und Aristoteles. Leiden, Boston, and Kln.
Rigo, A. (1997). Il Corpus pseudo-dionisiano negli scritti di Gregorio Palamas (e di Barlaam) del
13361341. In: Denys l'Aropagite et sa postrit en Orient et en Occident. Ed. by Y. de Andia.
Paris, pp. 519534.
Rigo, A. (2001). Giovanni Italo. In: Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani. Vol. 56. Roma, pp. 6267.
Riley, G. J. (1999). Demon, , . In: Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible.
Ed. by K. van der Toorn, B. Becking, and van der Horst P. W. Second extensively revised edition.
Leiden, Boston, and Kln, pp. 235240.
Risch, F. X. (1999). Gregor von Nyssa. ber das Sechstagewerk. Stuttgart.
Rist, J. (1964). Mysticism and Transcendence in Later Neoplatonism. In: Hermes 92, pp. 213225.
Ritter, A. M. (1997). Gregor Palamas als Leser des Dionysius Ps.-Areopagita. In: Denys l'Aropagite
et sa postrit en Orient et en Occident. Ed. by Y. de Andia. Paris, pp. 565579.
Robinson, J. (2016). Dionysius against Proclus: the Apophatic Critique in Nicholas of Methone's
Refutation of the Elements of Theology. In: Proclus and His Legacy. Ed. by D. Layne and
D. Butorac. Forthcoming. Berlin.
Rodrguez Moreno, I. (1993). Aproximacin al estudio de los seres intermedios entre el hombre y la
divinidad en el mbito religioso y filosfico griego prearistotlico. In: Excerpta Philologica 3,
pp. 7186.
Rodrguez Moreno, I. (1994). Dmones y otros seres intermedios entre el hombre y la divinidad en
el pensamiento platnico. In: Fortunatae 6, pp. 185198.
Rodrguez Moreno, I. (1995). , y en la filosofa presocrtica. In: Habis 26,
pp. 2946.
Rodrguez Moreno, I. (1998). ngeles, dmones y hroes en el neoplatonismo griego. Amsterdam.
Rodrguez Moreno, I. (1999). Demonologa estoica. In: Habis 30, pp. 175187.
Roilos, P. (2004). Unshapely Bodies and Beautifying Embellishments: The Ancient Epics in
Byzantium, Allegorical Hermeneutics, and the Case of Ioannes Diakonos Galenos. In: Jahrbuch
der sterreichischen Byzantinistik 64, pp. 231246.
Roilos, P. (2005). Amphoteroglossia: A Poetics of the Twelfth-Century Medieval Greek Novel.
Cambridge (MA).
Romano, F. (1989). Proclo, Lezioni sul Cratilo di Platone. Catania and Roma.
Rorem, P. (1993). Pseudo-Dionysius: a Commentary on the Texts and an Introduction to Their
Influence. Oxford.
Rorem, P. and J. Lamoreaux (1998). John of Scythopolis and the Dionysian Corpus. Oxford.
Rorem, P. and J. C. Lamoreaux (1998b). John of Scythopolis and the Dionysian Corpus: annotating the
Areopagite. New York and Oxford.
Runciman, S. (1970). Byzantium and the Renaissance. Tucson.
Russell, J. B. (1984/1986). Lucifer. The Devil in the Middle Ages. Ithaca NY.
Saffrey, H. D. (1960). Aristote, Proclus, Bessarion: A propos de l'Un transcendental. In: Atti del XII
Congresso internazionale di filosofia. Firenze, pp. 153158.
Saffrey, H. D. (1969). Nouveaux Oracles Chaldaques dans les scholies du Paris. Gr. 1853. In: Revue
de Philologie 43, pp. 5972.
Saffrey, H. D. (1981). Les Noplatoniciens et les Oracles Chaldaques. In: Revue des tudes
Augustiniennes 27, pp. 209225.
Saffrey, H. D. (1982). New Objective Links between the Pseudo-Dionysius and Proclus. In:
Neoplatonism and Christian Thought. Ed. by D. J. O'Meara. Norfolk, pp. 6474.
Saffrey, H. D. (1984). La thurgie comme phnomne culturel chez les noplatoniciens (IVeVe
sicles). In: 8, pp. 161171.
Saffrey, H. D. (1992a). Accorder entre elles les traditions thologiques: Une caractristique du
noplatonisme athnien. In: On Proclus and his Influence in Medieval Philosophy. Ed. by
E. P. Bos and P. A. Meijer. Leiden, pp. 3550.
Saffrey, H. D. (2007). Retour sur le Parisinus graecus 1807, le manuscript A de Platon. In: The
Libraries of the Neoplatonists. Ed. by C. D'Ancona. Leiden, pp. 328.
Sandy, G. N. (2001). A Neoplatonic Interpretation of Heliodorus' Ethiopian Story. In: . La
belle saison de l'hllenisme. tudes de littrature antique offertes au Recteur Jacques
Bompaire. Ed. by A. Billault. Paris, pp. 169178.
Sasaki, C. (2003). Descartes's Mathematical Thought. Dordrecht.
Schamp, J. (1996). La localisation chez Photios. Traduction commente de Questions
Amphilochios 145. In: Aristotelica Secunda. Ed. by A. Motte and J. Denooz. Lige, pp. 265279.
Schefer, B. (2001). La mdiation de l'me chez Marsile Ficin. In: Marsile Ficin. Les platonismes la
Renaissance. Ed. by P. Magnard. Paris, pp. 1327.
Schibli, H. S. (1993). Xenocrates' Daemons and the Irrational Soul. In: Classical Quarterly 43.1,
pp. 143167.
Schmitt, C. B. (1996). Perrenial Philosophy: From Agostino Steuco to Leibniz. In: Journal of the
History of Ideas 27.4, pp. 505532.
Scholten, C. (1996). Antike Naturphilosophie und christliche Kosmologie in der Schrift De opificio
mundi des Johannes Philoponos. Berlin.
Schreiner, P. (1989). Renaissance in Byzanz? In: Kontinuitt und Transformation der Antike im
Mittelalter. Ed. by W. Erzgrber. Sigmaringen, pp. 389390.
Schultze, F. (1874). Georgios Gemistos Plethon und seine reformatorische Bestrebungen. Jena.
Schwaderer, I. (2007). Selbstapologie und Legitimation: Das Leitbild Gregor von Nazianz in den
theologischen Schriften des Michael Psellos. In: Formen und Funktionen von Leitbildern.
Ed. by J. Hahn and M. Vielberg. Stuttgart, pp. 285298.
Segonds, A. P. (1987). Proclus: Astronomie et Philosophie. In: Proclus, lecteur et interprte des
anciens. Ed. by J. Ppin and H. D. Saffrey. Paris, pp. 319334.
Seng, H. (2009). , , . Drei Begriffe chaldaeischer Kosmologie und ihr
Fortleben. Heidelberg.
Seng, H. (2012). Chaldaeerrhetorik bei Michael Psellos. In: La retorica greca fra tardo antico ed et
bizantina: idee e forme. Convegno Internazionale, Napoli 2729 ottobre 2011. Ed. by
U. Criscuolo. Napoli, pp. 355369.
Seng, H. and M. Tardieu (2010). Die Chaldaeischen Orakel: Kontext Interpretation Rezeption.
Heidelberg.
evenko, I. (1962). tudes sur la polmique entre Thodore Mthochite et Nicphore Chumnos.
Bruxelles.
Shaw, G. (1995). Theurgy and the Soul. The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus. Pennsylvania.
Sherwood, P. (1957). Denys l'Aropagite, IV: Influence du Pseudo-Denys en Orient. 4. Saint Maxime
le Confesseur. In: Dictionnaire de Spiritualit. Vol. 3, pp. 295299.
Sicherl, M. (1960). Michael Psellos und Iamblichos' De Mysteriis. In: Byzantinische Zeitschrift 53,
pp. 819.
Silogava, V. and K. Shengelia (2007). History of Georgia: from the Ancient Times through the Rose
Revolution. Tbilisi.
Siorvanes, L. (1996). Proclus. Neo-platonic Philosophy and Science. New Haven.
Sorabji, R. (2005). The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200600 AD. A Sourcebook. Vol. 1.
Psychology (with Ethics and Religion). Ithaca NY.
Sorabji, R. (2012). Preface: Waiting for Philoponus. In: Aeneas of Gaza: Theophrastus, tr. by J.
Dillon and D. Russell, with Zacharias of Mythilene: Ammonius, tr. by S. Gertz. London,
pp. VIIXXX.
Steel, C. (1999). Proclus comme tmoin du texte du Parmnide. In: Tradition et traduction. Le
textes philosophique et scientifiques grecs au Moyen ge Latin. Ed. by R. Beyers et al. Leuven,
pp. 281303.
Steel, C. (2005). Proclus' Defence of the Timaeus against Aristotle's Objections. In: Platons
Timaios als Grundtext der Kosmologie in Sptantike, Mittelalter und Renaissance. Ed. by
T. Leinkauf and C. Steel. Leuven, pp. 163193.
Steel, C. (2014). William of Moerbeke, translator of Proclus. In: Interpreting Proclus: From Antiquity
Stephanou, P. . (1949b). Jean Italos, philosophe et humaniste. Rome.
Stiglmayr, J. (1899b). Die Streitschrift des Prokopios von Gaza gegen den Neuplatoniker Proklos.
In: Byzantinische Zeitschrift 8, pp. 263301.
Svoboda, K. (1927). La dmonologie de Michel Psellos (dmonologie Michala Psella). Brno.
Tambrun, B. (2005). Plethons Abhandlung ber die Tugenden. In: Georgios Gemistos Plethon
(13551452) Reformpolitiker, Philosoph, Verehrer der alten Gtter. Ed. by W. Blum and
W. Seitter. Zrich and Berlin, pp. 101117.
Tanaseanu-Dbler, I. (2013). Theurgy in Late Antiquity. The Invention of a Ritual Tradition. Gttingen
and Bristol.
Tardieu, M. (2011). Les Oracles chaldaques 18912011. In: Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy.
Mysticism, Magic and Platonism in Later Roman Empire. Ed. by H. Lewy. Paris, pp. 731766.
Tatakis, B. (2003a). Byzantine Philosophy (trans. N. J. Moutafakis). Indianapolis and Cambridge.
Taylor, J. W. (1920). Gemistus Pletho as a Moral Philosopher. In: Transactions and Proceedings of
the American Philological Association 51, pp. 84100.
Taylor, J. W. (1921). Georgius Gemistus Pletho's Criticism of Plato and Aristotle. Menasha (Wisconsin).
Tempelis, E. (1999). , ,
. In: 1, pp. 5061.
Terezis, C. (1995). La critique de Nicolas de Mthone la thorie de Proclus concernant le schma:
Manence Procession Conversion. In: Byzantion 65, pp. 455466.
Terezis, C. (1997). Le libre arbitre chez Nicolas de Mthone. In: Byzantion 67, pp. 565569.
Tevzadze, G. (1996). The History of Medieval Philosophy. (In Georgian). Tbilisi.
Timotin, A. (2012). La dmonologie platonicienne. Histoire de la notion de daimn de Platon aux
derniers noplatoniciens. Leiden and Boston.
Trnen, M. (2007). Union and Distinction in the Thought of St Maximus the Confessor. Oxford.
Toulouse, S. (2001). Les thories du vhicule de l'me dans le noplatonisme: gense et volution
d'une doctrine de la mdiation entre l'me et le corps. PhD thesis. cole pratique des hautes
tudes.
Treadgold, W. T. (1980). The nature of the Bibliotheca of Photius. Washington (D. C.)
Treadgold, W. T., ed. (1984). Renaissances before the Renaissance: cultural revivals of late antiquity
and the Middle Ages. Stanford (California).
Trizio, M. (2007a). Byzantine Philosophy as a Contemporary Historiographical Project. In:
Recherches de Theologie et Philosophie Mdivales, pp. 247294.
Trizio, M. (2011). Dissensio philosophorum. Il disaccordo tra Platone e Aristotele nei commenti
filosofici di Eustrazio di Nicea. In: ed. by L. classica nel pensiero medievale. Turnhout,
pp. 1738.
Trizio, M. (2012). Ancient Physics in the Mid-Bizantine Period: The Epitome of Theodore of Smyrna,
Consul of The Philosohers under Alexios I Komnenos (10811118). In: Bulletin de philosophie
mdivale 54, pp. 7799.
Trizio, M. (2013). Escaping through the Homeric Gates. John Italos' Neoplatonic Exegesis of
Odyssey 19.562567 Between Synesius and Proclus. In: Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione
Filosofica Medievale 24, pp. 6983.
Trouillard, J. (1957). Rflexions sur l' dans les lments de Thologie de Proclus. In: Revue
des tudes Grecques 70, pp. 102107.
Trouillard, J. (1959). La Monadologie de Proclus. In: Revue Philosophique de Louvain 57,
pp. 309320.
Trouillard, J. (1972). L'Un et l'me selon Proclos. Paris.
Turcan, R. (2003). Les dmons et la crise du paganisme grco-romain. In: Revue de Philosophie
ancienne 21.2, pp. 3354.
Van den Berg, R. M. (2001). Proclus' Hymns. Essays, Translations, Commentary. Leiden.
Van Deun, P. and P. Mueller-Jourdan (2015). Maxime Le Confesseur. In: La thologie byzantine et sa
tradition. Ed. by C. G. Conticello. Vol. I/1. Turnhout, pp. 387510, 430433.
Van Winden, J. C. (1997). The Early Christian Exegesis of Heaven and Earth in Genesis 1.1. In:
Arche. A Collection of Patristic Studies. Leiden, pp. 94106.
Verrycken, K. (1990). The Development of Philoponus' Thought and its Chronology. In: Aristotle
Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and their Influence. Ed. by R. Sorabji. London,
pp. 233274.
Verrycken, K. (2010). John Philoponus. In: The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity.
Ed. by L. P. Gerson. Vol. II. Cambridge, pp. 733755.
Vlker, W. (1961). Der Einfluss des Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita auf Maximus Confessor. In: Texte
und Untersuchungen 77, pp. 331350.
Von Balthasar, H. U. (1988). Kosmische Liturgie: das Weltbild Maximus' des Bekenners. 3rd ed.
Einsiedeln.
Von Ivnka, E. (1964). Platon Christianus. bernahme und Umgestaltung des Platonismus durch die
Vter. Einsiedeln.
Watts, E. (2005). An Alexandrian Christian response to fifth-century Neoplatonic influence. In: The
Philosopher and Society in Late Antiquity. Ed. by A. Smith. Swansea, pp. 215229.
Webb, R. (1989). The Nomoi of Gemistos Plethon in the Light of Plato's Laws. In: Journal of the
Warburg and Courtaud Institutes 52, pp. 214219.
Weill-Parot, N. (2002). Les images astrologiques au Moyen ge et la Renaissance. Paris.
Weisser, U. (1980). Das Buch ber das Geheimnis der Schpfung von Pseudo-Apollonios von
Tyana. Berlin.
Westerink, L. G. (1942a). Proclus, Procopius, Psellus. In: Mnemosyne 10, pp. 276277.
Westerink, L. G. (1959). Exzerpte aus Proklos' Enneadenkommentar bei Psellos. In: Byzantinische
Zeitschrift 52, pp. 110.
Westerink, L. G. (19861991). Le texte du trait des Premiers Principes. In: Damascius: Trait des
premiers principes. Ed. by L. G. Westerink. Vol. 1. 3 vols. tr. J. Combs. Paris.
Westerink, L. G. (1990). Das Rtsel des untergrndigen Neuplatonismus. In: Philophronma:
Festschrift fr Martin Sicherl zum 75. Geburtstag. Von Textkritik bis Humanismusforschung.
Ed. by D. Halfinger. Paderborn, pp. 105123.
Whitby, M. (1987). On the Omission of a Ceremony in Mid-Sixth Century Constantinople: Candidati,
Curopalatus, Silentiarii, Excubitores and Others. In: Historia 36, pp. 462488.
Whitman, J., ed. (2000). Interpretation and Allegory: Antiquity to the Modern Period. Leiden.
Whittaker, J. (1967). Moses Atticizing. In: Phoenix 21, pp. 196201.
Whittaker, J. (1975). Proclus, Procopius, Psellus and the Scholia on Gregory of Nazianzus. In:
Vigiliae Christianae 29, pp. 309313.
Whittaker, J. (1991). Arethas and the Collection Philosophique. In: Paleografia e codicologia
greca. Ed. by D. Harlfinger and G. Prato. Vol. I. Alexandria, pp. 513521.
Wilberding, J. (2006). Introduction to Plotinus' Cosmology. A Study of Ennead II.1 (40). Text,
Translation, and Commentary. Oxford.
Wildberg, C. (1988). John Philoponus' Criticism of Aristotle's Theory of Aether. Berlin and New York.
Wilson, N. G. (1996a). Scholars of Byzantium. London and Cambrigde.
Woodhouse, C. M. (1986b). George Gemistos Plethon: the last of the Hellenes. Oxford.
Zervos, C. (1919a). Un philosophe noplatonicien du XIe sicle. Michel Psellos. Sa vie. Son uvre.

Sergei Mariev Byzantine Perspectives On Neoplatonism

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Sergei Mariev Byzantine Perspectives On Neoplatonism

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Byzantine Perspectives on Neoplatonism

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

2017 Walter de Gruyter Inc., Boston/Berlin

Sergei Mariev and Monica Marchetto

Flavia Buzzetta, Valerio Napoli

Udo Reinhold Jeck

Selected Bibliography | 271

4 Suda, d 1170 , ed. Adler 1928.

18 Cf. von Balthasar 1988.

acquainted with the Christian Neoplatonism of Ps.-Dionysios the Areopagite. In his

22 Rorem 1993, 170171; 215 and de Vogel 1985, 39.

shows traces of the influence of Neoplatonic commentaries. Some other questions

Psellos was a polymath who bequeathed to posterity an enormous literary heritage.

titude as a reflection of an ultimately unresolvable tension between the heritage of

56 Trizio 2014a, 187.

the Refutatio of N i c h o l a s o f M e t h o n e. This work was motivated by Nicholas of

N i k e p h o r o s G r e g o r a s (12601358/61), a pupil of Theodoros Metochites, is

85 On his life and the problems of dating cf. Beyer 1978.

with a view to neutralizing Neoplatonic tendencies discernible in his writings. The

Adler, A. (1928). Suidae Lexicon. Vol. 14. Lipsiae.

Golitsis, P. (2007). Nicphore Blemmyde lecteur du commentaire de Simplicius la Physique

Porphyrios and Proklos do so explicitly. John Philoponos mounts a vigorous attack

1.2 Proklos and John Philoponos

25 Cf. Plotinos, Enn., II.2.1, 2023 (Engl. tr., p. 43).

41 Proklos, In Tim., II 47, 49 (engl. tr. by D. Baltzly, Cambridge, 2007, p. 97).

1.3 John Philoponos and Simplikios

1.4 Patristic Literature

Gregory of Nyssa also seems to be making a reference to the Aristotelian doctrine of

79 Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, In Hex., PG 44, 80.4654: ,

2.1 Michael Psellos

Philop. In De anima I, 55.2557.1 Hayduck: Psellos, Opusc. 13 (p.

radiant body ( / ) enmattered pneuma ( ) the body which has

3) In Opusc. 50, which Benakis referred to as auctoris tractationem de quinta es-

107 Cf. Benakis 2008, 180, apparatus criticus.

113 Cf. Moraux 1963, 1232.

2.2 John Italos

124 Cf. John Italos, , ed. G. Cereteli/N. Ketschakmadze,

elements found in in order to point out the contradictions indicated by

ken of as resembling the mathematical (

a mathematical relationship; nevertheless, we cannot restrict ourselves to a mathematical consider-

The textual tradition of Proklos commentary on Alcibiades I shows remarkable simi-

5 Cf. Luna 2001.

15 On this see Ierodiakonou 2005a.

Proklos, In I Alc., 247, 911, p. Eustr. In I EN, p. 4, 3338 Heylbut:

27 See also Prokl. In Parm., 1071, 2531, p. 41, 1942, 24 Steel: ,

(1) Eustr. In I EN, p. 59, 3460, 3 Heylbut:

34 On this, see Trizio 2009a, 99108.

metaphors. This leads me to conclude by framing Eustratios peculiar hermeneutic

ments of his position. As a Consul of the Philosophers ( ) in

offer provisional observations on Psellos thought in general, and in particular to

2 Psellos the Platonist

particular, the unusually abrupt transition from apparently neutral presentation of

33 OMeara 1998b, 436.

as play for the philosopher ( ). It is, perhaps, this spirit of

51 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 44, 3237, p. 159.

59 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 44, 114, p. 158.

3 Psellos the Christian

69 Psellos, Ph. M. I, 42, 138141, p. 152.

74 Maltese 1994b, 296297.

82 Psellos, Theol. I, 26, 3135, p. 104.

92 Psellos, Theol. I, 26, 5356, p. 104.

). Finally, Psellos returns to speaking in his own person