Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Contents
Acknowledgements x
v
PROOF
vi Contents
Index 297
PROOF
1
Introduction: Executive Politics in
Times of Crisis
Martin Lodge and Kai Wegrich
Who gets what, when and how this question defines the central
concern of political science in general, and of public policy and admin-
istration in particular.1 Why are particular issues on the agenda? How do
political masters interact with their bureaucratic servants? How is the
delivery of public services designed and operated? How are rules drafted,
monitored and enforced and by whom? How do diversified systems
of governing seek to achieve cooperation? What drives institutional
design, and what are the implications of performance management
and pay for performance systems for responsiveness, competence and
productivity in public services?
This catalogue of perennial questions is at the heart of this book. How-
ever, this book is not just about reconsidering these questions. This book
seeks to introduce a different perspective to these questions one that
emphasizes the importance of executive politics. The term executive pol-
itics has gained widespread currency in recent years, although mostly
in the context of US political science. The term combines an inter-
est in the politics of bureaucracy (Carpenter 2001, Lewis 2008, Wood
and Waterman 1994) with an interest in the politics of the executive
branch, especially the role of political leadership (i.e. the Presidency)
(Moe and Howell 1999), and an interest in the ways in which coalitions
are made and broken (Laver and Shepsle 1996). In the European context,
executive politics brings together those scholars interested in compar-
ative public administration (i.e. in the relationship between politics
and administration as well as questions of administrative design) and
those interested in comparative government (i.e. in the composition of
political executive institutions).
A focus on executive politics stresses the importance of the political
factor in the research of administrative (or managerial) phenomena.
1
PROOF
2 Introduction
(ii) The politics of the executive and the bureaucracy. Among the key
contributions to the politics of bureaucracy are textbooks by Guy
Peters (now in the sixth edition, 2009) and Edward Page (1992).
The latter in particular highlighted how political constitutional
rules (e.g. electoral systems, allocation of responsibilities between
levels of government, interest-group universe and suchlike) shape
institutional varieties of politicsadministration relationships. Sim-
ilarly, the historical growth of administrative organization within
national political systems points to distinct political patterns,
driven by emerging states increasing centralization and their need
to organize and administer tax collection and the military (Mayntz
1985: 1732; see also Silberman (1993), who pointed to diverse path
dependencies generated through key choices during so-called criti-
cal junctures, especially regarding the recruitment of senior public
servants). The notion of credible commitment has similarly shaped
ideas regarding institutional design, especially in relation to del-
egation to regulatory agencies (Levy and Spiller 1994). Here, the
focus has been on addressing time inconsistency problems caused
by distinct political system characteristics (i.e. the risk of govern-
ments seeking to reverse an earlier decision at a future point in
time). Furthermore, the literature on control over bureaucracy has
developed along various tracks, ranging from an interest in police
patrols, fire alarms and deck-stacking devices to a concern with
different control modes on the lines of grid-group cultural the-
ory (Hood 1996, 1998) and an interest in national patterns (Page
and Wright 1999, 2007). Similarly, the proliferation of regulatory
agencies across the globe has raised issues of tensions between
a new type of administrative autonomy and accountability and
(political) control. Finally, the literature on the core executive
(Dunleavy and Rhodes 1990, Rhodes 1995) has pointed to the rela-
tional and fluid power that characterizes the politics at the top,
which cannot be accounted for by static variants of prime min-
isterial government, cabinet government and departmentalism.
Instead, core executive studies focus on co-ordination, the way in
which exchange relationships are characterized by locational struc-
tural power, and the way in which a core executive approach
can be developed comparatively. Similarly, the work on coalition
formation and breakdown offers a number of (mostly heuristic)
insights into political strategies (Laver and Shepsle 1996).
(iii) The politics of governance and policy. One further core interest in
executive politics is in how governments seek to influence the
behaviour of society (through steering) and in how public services
PROOF
6 Introduction
order to protect and develop an agencys profile has been one of the
key growth industries in recent thinking about bureaucracy (Carpen-
ter 2010, Maor 2011). The themes of reputation and blame avoidance
address both political science and public administration-related inter-
ests in tracing how political interests have an impact on administrative
features, such as agency design or communicative and policy strategies
(see Hood 2010).
As noted by Sharon Gilad (Chapter 9), reputational concerns are not
just important for the study of agency leadership, they also illumi-
nate the way in which agencies enact particular practices. Reputational
concerns are critical in understanding different executive strategies,
and they therefore also influence the politics of policy instrument
choice (see Lodge and Wegrich, Chapter 7). It has been widely argued
that the past decades have seen broad changes away from redistribu-
tion towards regulation and audit (Power 1997) and discipline-oriented
policy approaches (Majone 1997, Moran 2003, Roberts 2010). Such
broad changes in approach are said to also influence the overall policy
instrument mix, with a shift away from direct production and finance-
based tools towards more indirect instruments based on information
and authority. Again, such instrument mixes have direct implications
for relationships within the executive and the way political choices are
being executed.
One key instrument of the state the budget has arguably witnessed
considerable attention across public administration and political science
literatures. For example, the interest in the budgetary behaviour of pub-
lic agencies has given rise to considerable interest in the bureau-shaping
model of bureaucratic behaviour (Dunleavy 1991, James 2003). As with
all instruments of the state, the operation of executive politics depends
on the way in which political authority is legitimized and therefore per-
formed. As Aaron Wildavsky noted some time ago (Wildavsky 1988),
incrementalism in budgetary politics required a particular societal con-
sensus (that then was reflected in partisan legislative politics). Once this
consensus had broken down, the old ways of incremental budgetary pol-
itics were no longer viable. Philipp Krause (Chapter 8) highlights how
the study and practice of budgeting has developed over time, especially
in the context of changing political climates.
Part II of this volume considers the direct context of crises. This
volume regards crises as a key factor shaping contemporary executive
politics. Of course, the word crisis (in singular and plural form) has
gained such widespread currency that it can be accused of lacking
analytical mileage. We define crisis as a fundamental questioning or
PROOF
Martin Lodge and Kai Wegrich 11
Conclusion
Notes
1. The question is generally attributed to Harold Laswells seminal 1936 book on
Politics: Who Gets What, When and How.
2. This would also include an interest in public service motivations and the idea
of the psychological contract that informs employment relations (Rousseau
1996).
References
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Boin, A, McConnell, A and t Hart, P (eds) (2008) Governing after Crisis.
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Carpenter, D (2001) Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy. Princeton, NJ, Princeton
University Press.
Carpenter, D (2010) Reputation and Power. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University
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Harvester Wheatsheaf.
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Administration, 68(1): 328.
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Dunsire, A (1978) The Execution Process; Vol.1, Implementation in a Bureaucracy.
Oxford, Martin Robertson.
Gulrajani, N and Moloney, K (2012) Globalizing public administration, Public
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Hallerberg, M, Strauch, R and von Hagen, J (2009) Fiscal Governance. Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press.
Helmke, G and Levitsky, S (2004) Informal institutions and comparative politics:
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PROOF
14 Introduction
Index
Aberbach, Joel, 4, 202, 26, 35, 445 bureaucracy, 1, 35, 810, 1937, 41,
accountability, 5, 7, 31, 42, 46, 74, 88, 467, 557, 634, 66, 67, 69, 746,
901, 95, 102, 131, 140, 150, 191, 86, 99115, 118, 1201, 1234,
291, 2945 12833, 140, 149, 189, 204, 206
adaptation, 105, 1589, 16870, 266, Bush, George W., 423, 457, 49, 52,
268, 273, 2759 55, 181, 187, 190, 21213
administrative reform, 2, 4, 79, 28,
56, 635, 6876, 813, 88, 95, Carpenter, Daniel, 1, 10, 15960, 169,
100, 1023, 105, 1078, 11314, 171
120, 143, 240 Cartel Party, 712
administrative space, 31, 102, 266 catch-all party, 71
ageing population, 2, 213, 2845, Central and East European Countries
294 (CEECs), 9, 99108, 110, 11315
agency/cies, 45, 810, 20, 2433, 36, Channel Tunnel, 240, 245, 247, 249,
4260, 65, 723, 857, 89, 912, 2515, 2578
96, 103, 121, 125, 1278, 136, Chile, 1456
140, 1579, 161, 166, 168, 170, Christensen, Tom, 2, 100, 107, 129
181, 1845, 187, 206, 232, 269, civil service
2767, 279, 2901 career, 42
austerity, 127, 130, 142, 148, 150, 152, reform, 47, 108
199200, 20910, 212, 227, 233, training, 26
284, 287, 289 classical budgeting, 13741, 143,
1467
climate change, 2, 19, 28, 58, 213,
better regulation, 292 235, 26470, 2725, 2779,
Bezes, Philippe, 8, 6376, 85, 120, 2845, 2878, 290, 294
2023 coalition, 1, 5, 567, 634, 69, 122,
blame, 7, 10, 65, 74, 76, 122, 125, 2012, 2045, 2078, 21213,
1323, 159, 179, 182, 185, 192, 269, 271, 273
2056, 25960, 2858 cognitive bias, 159, 169, 243
Boin, Arjen, 11, 17994, 209, 22931, collaboration, 6, 179, 1814, 188,
2345, 244, 260, 286 1914, 251, 276
Boston, 245, 2489, 253 comitology, 20, 323
Britain, British, 56, 678, 133, 1369, competence-agency, 42, 478
145, 147, 1501, 158, 161, 1657, competence, competency-civil service,
2223, 226, 232, 23940, 242, 4, 9, 23, 27, 42, 47, 56, 118, 128,
2457, 249, 2513, 2556, 258, 276
260 concorde, 240, 2436, 24951, 253,
budget 2558
office, 13940, 14253 concorde fallacy, 2434
reform, 139, 143, 145, 14752 control (over Bureaucracy), 5
297
PROOF
298 Index
Jennings, Will, 12, 158, 23961 OECD, 28, 92, 102, 127, 1378, 144,
1467, 14952, 218, 292
Keohane, Robert, 19, 25 Olsen, Johan P., 4, 31, 64, 129, 266
Krause, Philip, 10, 13653 olympics, 23940, 243, 245, 24751,
2535, 2578
Laegreid, Per, 20, 27, 100, 107, 129 optimism bias, 239, 243, 254
Layering, 1067 organization, International, 9, 1920,
leadership, 1, 3, 10, 26, 28, 58, 678, 25, 2731, 35, 37, 103, 137, 146
76, 17981, 187, 193, 2023, 205, outsourcing, 2, 11, 96, 243, 252, 254,
212, 221, 226, 229, 232, 234, 247, 295
274, 276
Leftwich, Adrian, 8991 Page, Edward C., 5, 201
Painter, Martin, 30, 104
legacy/legacies, 3, 30, 889, 100, 103,
Parrado, Salvador, 11, 197213
1056, 234, 249
participation, 65, 88, 90, 92, 94,
Leninist Bureaucracy, 99
1302, 210
Lewis, David E., 1, 9, 34, 4160, 69,
performance budgeting, 1436
73, 146
performance management, 1, 7, 746,
Lodge, Martin, 113, 201, 234, 57,
92, 106, 122, 128, 240
65, 734, 81, 100, 107, 11834,
performance pay, 8
171, 198, 204, 240, 243, 261,
Peters, Guy B., 5, 203, 30, 423, 58,
28495
65, 69, 74, 83, 104, 120, 198, 201,
205, 209, 220, 227, 230, 232
Mair, Peter, 712, 287 Poland, 67, 108, 113
Majone, Giandomenico, 10, 121, 124, policy fiasco/oes, 242, 260
240, 293 policy instruments, 6, 10, 11834, 288
managerialism, 6376, 857, 93 policy tools, 11821, 1235, 129,
Maor, Moshe, 10, 15960 1313
Mayntz, Renate, 5, 71, 120, 132, 289 political advisors, 69, 128, 205
mega-event/project, 12, 23961 political parties, 669, 104, 109, 205,
Meyer-Sahling, Jan-Hinrik, 9, 99115 269
mitigation, 165, 266, 26870, 2726, political-bureaucratic relationship,
2789 205, 306
Moe, Terry, 1, 31, 34, 434, 57, 158 politicization, 9, 4160, 65, 69, 714,
Moran, Michael, 10, 12, 133, 240, 242, 104, 106, 11314, 186, 194, 223,
256, 2601 227, 246, 248
Pollitt, Christopher, 2, 28, 100, 104,
narrative, 64, 217, 21925, 228, 2305 107, 127, 129, 148, 220, 240
NATO-Approach (policy instruments), post-bureaucracy, 118, 12930, 1323
6, 10, 11834, 288 Post-New Public Management
Neo-liberal, neo-liberalism, 856, 220, (Post-NPM), 4, 81, 87, 100, 107,
2278, 233 129
New Public Management (NPM), 4, privatization, 11, 46, 72, 74, 86, 103,
44, 63, 81, 85, 100, 129, 143, 220, 2245, 233
240, 252, 293 professionalization, 41, 67, 82, 84
New Zealand, 69, 73, 103, 145 Public Finance, 13653, 227, 288
non-governmental organizations Public Service Bargains (PSB), 4, 21,
(NGOs), 85, 912, 234 23, 34, 1248, 2901
nudge, 125, 129 Putnam, Robert, 212, 26, 34
PROOF
300 Index
regulatory agencies, 45, 2730, 323, Suleiman, Ezra, 2, 201, 41, 434, 567
45, 121, 157, 161 Sunk Cost error, 243, 2556, 25860
Regulatory Impact Assessment, 127 Sydney Opera House, 240, 2456, 250,
regulatory state, 121, 124, 133, 240, 252, 2578
244, 252, 254, 256, 25860, 293
reputation, 910, 15772, 184, 2478, t Hart, Paul, 11, 201, 17994, 198,
251, 2556, 259, 270, 273, 275, 241, 2434, 260
2789, 287 transparency, 74, 102, 291
resilience, 186, 234 treasury, 46, 52, 58, 131, 136, 13840,
responsiveness, 1, 6, 9, 83, 157, 143, 145, 149, 1512, 2034, 222,
15960, 166, 16970 239, 251
Rhodes, RAW, 3, 5, 1112, 151, 198, turf, 191, 265, 267, 272, 275, 288, 293
21820, 223, 230, 235, 266
Riggs, Fred, 82, 86 United Kingdom (UK), 6870, 723,
risk, 56, 8, 47, 68, 74, 1223, 1323, 140, 145, 152, 162, 165, 171, 199,
1589, 1628, 171, 1834, 197, 203, 2057, 213, 226, 228, 232,
219, 222, 224, 2413, 2525, 244, 255, 279
2589 United States (US), 89, 34, 4160,
management, 158, 224 6770, 73, 75, 122, 1367,
Roberts, Alasdair, 8, 10, 74, 1478, 266 13940, 144, 146, 183, 186, 188,
Rockman, Bert, 212, 445, 74, 243, 192, 197, 204, 212, 2445
255
Weber, Max, 4, 202, 24, 32, 648, 101
Sabel, Charles, 31 Weberian bureaucracy, 100, 103, 114
Scharpf, Fritz W., 120, 132, 201, 209, Wegrich, Kai, 113, 57, 81, 11834,
2657, 288, 291 198, 28495
scope creep, 244, 246, 248, 250, 2579 welfare state, 6, 63, 70, 120, 122, 124,
Scotland, 251, 254, 258 198, 205, 265, 285, 28890, 293
Silberman, Bernard, 5, 24, 66, 68 Wildavsky, Aaron, 10, 1368, 1401,
Slovenia, 103, 108, 113, 226 1445, 1501, 209
Spain, 28, 56, 197, 199200, 2023, World Bank, 28, 88, 92, 101, 292
2056, 208, 210, 212, 227, 279
steering, 56, 30, 64, 75, 935, 120, Yesilkagit, Kutsal, 9, 1937, 104
124, 132, 2201, 2245, 2323,
240, 289, 2914 Zeitlin, Jonathan, 31