Lex prospicit, non respicit
VALEROSO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR 164815 February 22, 2008
Petitioner: PSINSP JERRY C VALEROSO
Respondent: The People of the Philippines
FACTS:
On July 10, 1996, SPO2 Antonio Disuanco of the Criminal Investigation Section Division, Central Police
District Command received a dispatch order which directed him and three (3) other personnel to
serve a warrant of arrest against petitioner in a case for kidnapping with ransom. After briefing, team
conducted necessary surveillance on petitioner, checking his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan and
Bulacan. Then, the team proceeded to the Integrated National Police Central Station in Culiat,
Quezon City, where they saw petitioner as he was about to board a tricycle. SPO2 Disuanco and his
team approached petitioner. They put him under arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights, and
bodily searched him. Found tucked in his waist was a Charter Arms, bearing Serial Number 52315
with five (5) live ammunition.
Petitioner was brought to the police station for questioning. A verification of the subject firearm at
the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that it was not issued to the petitioner
but to another person. Petitioner was then charged with illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition under PD No. 1866 as amended.
On May 6, 1998 trial court found petitioner guilty as charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of prision correccional in its maximum plus fine. Petitioner moved to reconsider but his motion was
denied. He appealed to the CA. On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed the RTC disposition.
SC affirmed CAs decision.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not retroactive application of the law is valid taken into account that the commission
of the offense was on July 10, 1996 wherein the governing law was PD 1866 which provides the
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
HELD:
(1) YES. RA 8294 amended PD 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with the trial
court. The law looks forward, never backward (prospectivity).Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new law
has a prospective, not retroactive, effect. However, penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a
habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect.(Exception and exception to the exception on
effectivity of laws).
Noscitur a sociis
Latin: that the meaning of a word may be known from accompanying words
A rule of interpretation or construction of an otherwise unclear statute, contract or estate
document (such as a trust or a will): that the meaning of an unclear word may be known from
accompanying words.
G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,vs.JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G.
ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
NATURE:
The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a prior decision rendered July 17, 2012
that JBCs action of allowing more than one member of the congress to represent the JBC to be
unconstitutional
FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of Representatives and
one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate
meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House
of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C.
Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this
practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. it should mean one representative each from
both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondent contends that the phrase a
representative of congress refers that both houses of congress should have one representative each,
and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory components of congress as part of the
bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have their respective powers in performance of their
duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members only
with only one representative from congress.
ISSUE:
Whether the JBCs practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives
making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the
constitution.
HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase a representative of
congress should be construed as to having only one representative that would come from either
house, not both. That the framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be
allotted for the legislative.
It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the
role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress non-legislative powers. An inter-
play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid
dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC
representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence,
the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution
mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
FALLO: The motion was denied.
Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsumstatutum. The best interpreter of a statute is the statute itse
lf.
Serana vs Sandiganbayan, GR 162059, January 22, 2008
Facts: Accused movant charged for the crime of estafa is a government scholar and a student regent
of the University of the Phillipines, Diliman, Quezon City. While in the performance of her official
functions, she represented to former President Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the
UP will be renovated and renamed as Pres. Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall and for which
purpose accused requested the amount of P15,000,000.00.
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person because as a UP student
regent, she was not a public officer due to the following: 1.) that being merely a member in
representation of the student body since she merely represented her peers; 2.) that she was a simple
student and did not receive any salary as a UP student regent; and 3.) she does not fall under Salary
Grade 27.
The Ombudsman contends that petitioner, as a member of the BOR is a public officer, since she had
the general powers of administration and exercise the corporate powers of UP. Compensation is not
an essential part of public office.
Moreover, the Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which
accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and corporate
powers in the university. It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only
through its board of directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations.
Issue: WON a government scholar and UP student regent is a public officer.
Held: Yes.
First, Public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested
with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the
benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. (Laurel vs Desierto)
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of
some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of
the public makes one a public officer.
Second, Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explicitly vest the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations. Hence, it is not only the salary grade that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees
of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is a public officer as contemplated
by P.D. No. 1606 the statute defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Third, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it
is merely incidental to the public office.
Hence, Petitioner is a public officer by express mandate of P.D.No. 1606 and jurisprudence.
Ratio legis est anima legis. The reason of the law is the soul of the law.
League of Cities v. Comelec
Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo,
City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and
enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting
plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities.
However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took
effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing
the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel,
the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal
Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the
24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th
Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to
approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities
filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a
common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in
RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also
approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June
2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007
without the Presidents signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each
respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the
share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same
amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective,
not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became
law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a
city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair
and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009,
for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any
statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage
of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government
Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not
extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection
clause.
The language of RA 9009 is plain, simple, and clear. Nothing is unintelligible or ambiguous; not a
single word or phrase admits of two or more meanings. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 by increasing the income requirement for the creation of cities. There are
no exemptions from this income requirement. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any
municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no
reason to go beyond the letter of the law. Moreover, where the law does not make an exemption,
the Court should not create one.[2]
Reddendo singula singulis is a Latin term that means by referring each to
each; referring each phrase or expression to its corresponding object. It is a rule
of construction used typically in distributing property. For example, when a will
says "I devise and bequeath all my real and personal property to A", the principle
of reddendo singula singulis would apply as if it read "I devise all my real
property, and bequeath all my personal property, to B", since the word devise is
appropriate only to real property and the term bequeath is appropriate only to
personal property.
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L.
ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council
of Manila, et.al vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE
TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation
engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened
Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a
hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as
defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and
the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as
it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is entitled
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING
CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-
MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were
committed by the lower court in its ruling:
(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable
and oppressive exercise of police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows operators of
all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the
Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit
to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to
the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the
City Council acting as agent of Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the
LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
A. The Ordinance contravenes
the Constitution
The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional
and repugnant to general laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of
the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity
of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
Requisites for the valid exerciseof Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the
Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that
the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident
that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can
work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal
rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation of the due process clause.
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral
values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are
within the scope of the City Councils police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment
thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the communitys social ills can be
achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions
rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their
conversion into businesses allowed under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the
accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments
will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself
eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of
sexual disease in Manila.
The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral
welfare of the community. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it
cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a
nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption.
If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can
instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any
violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or
revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees. In other
words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes,
the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a persons
fundamental right to liberty and property.
Modality employed is
unlawful taking
It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property
without just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A possessory taking occurs when the
government confiscates or physically occupies property. A regulatory taking occurs when the
governments regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking
if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with
reasonable expectations for use. When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice
all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property
economically idle, he has suffered a taking.
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the prohibited establishments three (3) months
from its approval within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of
the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the
area. The directive to wind up business operations amounts to a closure of the establishment, a
permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his
establishment to accommodate an allowed business, the structure which housed the previous
business will be left empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to
convert into allowed businesses are confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases
of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a taking of private
property.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance,
although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a wholesome property to a use which can
not reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation.
Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be
destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we
know them. The police powers of local government units which have always received broad and
liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.
Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down
establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending
upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city
authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The
Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured.
Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments tend to
disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare
of the community.
The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to
guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing
the due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from
carrying on their business.
B. The Ordinance violates EqualProtection Clause
In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial
establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists
for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on
substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the
Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less
noxious if located outside the area.
The standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is also discriminatory as
prostitution one of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banish is not a profession exclusive to
women. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus, the
discrimination is invalid.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant
to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely empowers local
government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses,
and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to
regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to
suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of such
establishments.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance
per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily
abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights
of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per
accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a
nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D.
499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate
area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of
commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair
shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is
that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers
of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law.
Conclusion

All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal
privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power
to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.

Petition Denied.

Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. Where thelaw does not disti
nguish, we ought not to distinguish. .

Party-list Representatives:AMORES v HRETGR 189600, 6/29/2010SUMMARY:

Petition to declare Villanueva as ineligible to hold office as representative of CIBAC for being
overage to representyouth. Change of affiliation must be made six months before elections. Youth
sector is represented by 25 30.

FACTS:

5/14/2009: Petition for certiorari challenging the assumption of office of one Emmanuel Joel
Villanueva asrepresentative of CIBAC in the HoR.

Petitioner argues: Villanueva was 31 at the time of filing of nomination, beyond the age limit of 30
which was the limitimposed by RA 7941 for "youth sector". Villanueva's change of affiliation from
Youth Sector to OFW and families not affected six months priorto elections.

Respondent argues: RA 7941 requirement for "age" for youth sector representative only applicable
to first three electionsafter the party list act. There was no resultant change in affiliation.

ISSUE:

Whether the requirement for youth sector representatives apply to respondent Villanueva

RULING:

Villauneva ineligible to hold office as a member of HoR representing CIBAC

HELD:

Villanueva's arguments are invalid. The law is clear. If representative of youth sector, should be
between 25to 30. Villanueva is ineligible to also represent OFW. Sectoral representation should be
changed SIX MONTHS prior to election.