1) Calimlim-Canullas v. Fortun, G.R. No.

L-57499, June 22, 1984

Facts:

Petitioner was married to Fernando and lived in a house built on a land owned by the
latters father. When his father died, Fernando inherited the land. Subsequently,
Fernando abandoned his family and began living with private respondent Daguines. He
then sold the land with the house to Daguines. Unable to take possession, Daguines
filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages against petitioner. The trial court
initially found in favor of Daguines but upon MR, declared the petitioner the owner and
the sale void.

Issue:

Is the sale of the house and lot to Daguines valid?

Ruling:

No, the sale is not valid.

The sale is null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy. Contracts whose
cause or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public
policy are void and inexistent from the very beginning.

The law emphatically prohibits spouses from selling property to each other subject to
certain exceptions. This is so because if transfers or conveyances between spouses are
allowed during marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic
policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by
one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution of marriage, which is the
cornerstone of family law. These prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage.

2) Rubias v. Batiller, G.R. No. L-35702, May 29, 1973

Facts:

Plaintiff-appellant Rubias bought from his father-in-law, Francisco Militante, the subject
land while he is handling the case of Militante before the Court of Appeals involving the
petition for registration of the same land. Plaintiff then instituted an action against
Rubias for the recovery of ownership and possession of the land which was dismissed
by both the trial court and the CA in view of the earlier decision of the CA.

Issue:

Is the sale of the land by Militante to Rubias valid?

Ruling:

No, the sale is not valid.

The purchase by a lawyer of the property in litigation from his client is categorically
prohibited by Article 1491, par. 5 of the Civil Code and that consequently, plaintiffs
purchase of the property in litigation from his client was void and could produce no legal
effect. This contract cannot be ratified.

The nullity of such prohibited contracts is definite and permanent and cannot be cured
by ratification. The public interest and public policy remain paramount and do not permit
of compromise or ratification.

3) Yu Tek and Co v. Gonzales, G.R. No. L-9935, Feb. 1, 1915

Facts:

Yu Tek and Co and Gonzales entered into a written contract whereby in consideration of
P3,000, the latter will deliver 600 piculs of sugar to the former. No sugar was delivered
and Yu Tek was also not able to recover the amount paid. Gonzales reasoned that their
real agreement was that he will secure the sugar from his crop which he raised from his
plantation and that due to the total failure of his crop, his obligation to deliver the sugar
was likewise extinguished because of the loss of the thing due.

Issue:

Was there a perfected contract of sale?

Ruling:

No, there is no perfected contract of sale. The contract in this case is merely an
executory contract, a promise of sale and not a sale.

If called upon to designate the article sold, the defendant could only say sugar. There
was no appropriation of any particular lot of sugar. Neither party could point to any
specific quantity of sugar. The sale having not been perfected, the risk is still with the
seller, hence the buyer may recover the amount paid.

4) National Grains Authority v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74470, Mar.
4, 1989

Facts:

Private respondent Leon Soriano offered to sell palay grains to NFA. For this purpose,
he submitted all the necessary to documents to qualify as a seller. His documents were
processed and was given a quota of 2,640 cavans. He then delivered 630 cavans to
NFA. When he demanded payment, he was informed that it was withheld pending
investigation that he is not a bonafide farmer. He was then informed that NFA cannot
accept the palay grains because he is not a bonafide farmer. Instead of withdrawing his
palay, he filed a case for specific performance/collection of money. RTC favored him
and upon appeal, the IAC affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend that the delivery of 630 cavans was merely to offer it for sale. Since
it did not go through the procurement process of NFA (rebagging) there was no
acceptance of offer.

Issue:

Was there a perfected contract of sale?

Ruling:

Yes, there was a perfected contract of sale.

When NFA accepted the respondents offer by giving it a quota of 2,640 cavans, there
was already a meeting of minds between the parties. The object of the contract, being
the palay grains produced in Sorianos farmland and the NFA was to pay the same
depending upon its quality. The fact that the exact number of cavans of palay to be
delivered has not been determined does not affect the perfection of the contract. Article
1349 of the New Civil Code provides: ". . .. The fact that the quantity is not determinate
shall not be an obstacle to the existence of the contract, provided it is possible to
determine the same, without the need of a new contract between the parties." In this
case, there was no need for NFA and Soriano to enter into a new contract to determine
the exact number of cavans to be sold. Soriano can deliver so much of his produce as
long as it does not exceed 2,640 cavans.

5) Nool v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116635, July 4, 1997

Facts:

Appellant Conchita Nool mortgaged her two parcels of land with DBP. Failing to pay the
loan, the mortgaged was subsequently foreclosed, with DBP as the buyer of the land.
Appellee Anacleto Nool negotiated with DBP and bought the same. By virtue of such
sale, titles were issued in the name of appellee. Appellant claims that she merely sought
the help of appelle to redeem the land from DBP and as evidenced by their written
agreement contained in Exhibit C, she sold the land to appellant. And as evidenced by
Exhibit D she was to repurchase the property when she later on has the money.
Appellee refused to return the land, hence this case. Both the trial court and the CA
ruled in favor of the appellee hence this petition.

Issue:
a) Can the appellant sell the land to the appellee?
b) Can she enforce the contract of repurchase?

Ruling:

a) No, the appellant cannot validly sell the land to the appellee.

It is clear that at the time of the sale, the sellers no longer had any title to the land.
Appellee has already acquired the property from DBP at the time of the sale. Hence, the
sale was inoperative. Art. 1459 of the Civil Code provides that the vendor must have a
right to transfer ownership thereof at the time it is delivered. Here, appellant cannot
deliver the property anymore since it is already in the possession of the appelle having
bought it from DBP.

A person can only sell what he owns or what he is authorized to sell; the buyer can as a
consequence acquire no more than what the seller can legally transfer. No one can give
what he does not have Nemo dat quod non habet.

b) No, the contract of repurchase is void and unenforceable.

A contract of repurchase arising out of a contract of sale where the seller did not have
any title to the property "sold" is not valid. Since nothing was sold, then there is also
nothing to repurchase.

Furthermore, assuming arguendo that Exhibit D is a separate and distinct agreement,

it becomes a unilateral promise to sell which must be supported by a consideration
distinct from the price. Here, there was no proof that the agreement to repurchase was
supported by any consideration.

6) Diego v. Diego, G.R. No. 179965, Feb. 20, 2013

Facts:

Petitioner Nicolas Diego and his brother Rodolfo entered into an oral contract to sell
petitioners share, fixed at P500,000.00, over the familys Diego building. Rodolfo paid
P250,000 as downpayment and it was agreed that a deed of sale will be executed upon
payment of the balance. Rodolfo failed to pay the balance.

Meanwhile, respondent Eduardo, another sibling of the petitioner, failed to remit to him
his share over the rental income of the building. Instead, he gave it to Rodolfo.
Petitioner then filed a complaint with the trial court for the accounting of the rents and its
remittance to him. Respondents claim that petitioner had no more share over the rents,
having sold his share over the building to Rodolfo. Trial court dismissed the complaint
and ordered the petitioner to execute the deed of sale in favor of Rodolfo. In doing so,
the RTC held that the contract of sale was already perfected as early as 1993 when
partial payment was made and from then on, petitioner ceased to be a co-owner and is
no longer entitled to the fruits of the building. Upon appeal, CA affirmed the trial court,
holding that the only remaining right of the petitioner is to demand payment of the
balance of the purchase price. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Is the agreement between the brothers a contract of sale or a contract to sell?

Ruling:

The contract entered into by Nicolas and Rodolfo was a contract to sell.

The stipulation to execute a deed of sale upon full payment of the purchase price is a
unique and distinguishing characteristic of a contract to sell. It also shows that the
vendor reserved title to the property until full payment.

A stipulation in the contract, "[w]here the vendor promises to execute a deed of

absolute sale upon the completion by the vendee of the payment of the
price," indicates that the parties entered into a contract to sell.

Jurisprudence has established that where the seller promises to execute a deed
of absolute sale upon the completion by the buyer of the payment of the price,
the contract is only a contract to sell.

The absence of a formal deed of conveyance is a strong indication that the parties did
not intend immediate transfer of ownership, but only a transfer after full payment of the
purchase price.

The need to execute a deed of absolute sale upon completion of payment of the
price generally indicates that it is a contract to sell, as it implies the reservation of
title in the vendor until the vendee has completed the payment of the price.

5) Pichel v. Alonzo, G.R. No. L-36902, Jan. 30, 1982

Facts:

Respondent Alonzo was awarded by the government a piece of land in accordance with
RA 477. The award was cancelled in 1965 on the ground that it was alienated to
another contrary to law. In 1972, Alonzos rights were reinstated. In 1968, Alonzo and
his wife sold to Pichel the fruits of the coconuts which may be harvested in the land from
1968-1976 fo P4,200. Pichel started harvesting on 1972. Alonzo filed a complaint to
annul the sale for non-payment of the price. The trial court rendered judgment holding
that the agreement was really a contract of lease on the land and that the sale is null
and void.

Issue:
Is the agreement a lease or a sale?

Ruling:

The agreement is a contract of sale.

essential elements of a sale. The subject matter of the contract of sale in

It has all the
question are the fruits of the coconut trees on the land during the years from September
15, 1968 up to January 1, 1976, which subject matter is a determinate thing. Under
Article 1461 of the New Civil Code, things having a potential existence may be the
object of the contract of sale. And in Sibal vs. Valdez, 50 Phil. 512, pending crops which
have potential existence may be the subject matter of the sale. Here, the Supreme
Court, citing Mechem on Sales and American cases said which have potential existence
may be the subject matter of sale. Here, the Supreme Court, citing Mechem on Sales
and American cases said:

Mr. Mechem says that a valid sale may be made of a thing, which though not yet actually
in existence, is reasonably certain to come into existence as the natural increment or
usual incident of something already in existence, and then belonging to the vendor, and
the title will vest in the buyer the moment the thing comes into existence. (Emerson vs.
European Railway Co., 67 Me., 387; Cutting vs. Packers Exchange, 21 Am. St. Rep. 63)
Things of this nature are said to have a potential existence. A man may sell property of
which he is potentially and not actually possess. He may make a valid sale of the wine
that a vineyard is expected to produce; or the grain a field may grow in a given time; or
the milk a cow may yield during the coming year; or the wool that shall thereafter grow
upon sheep; or what may be taken at the next case of a fisherman's net; or fruits to grow;
or young animals not yet in existence; or the goodwill of a trade and the like. The thing
sold, however, must be specific and Identified. They must be also owned at the time by
the vendor. (Hull vs. Hull 48 Conn. 250 (40 Am. Rep., 165) (pp. 522-523).

6) EDCA v. Santos, G.R. No. 80298, April 26, 1990

Facts:

A person passing himself as Professor Jose Cruz placed an order by telephone for 406
books payable on delivery. EDCA delivered the books as ordered for which Cruz issued
a check. Cruz then sold 120 books to the respondents. Sensing that something is
amiss, EDCA investigated Cruz and found out that he was an impostor. An entrapment
ensued and it was found out that he sold the books to the respondents. EDCA forced
their way to the respondents bookstore and seized the books without a warrant.
Respondents sued to recover the books and obtained a favorable decision from MTC to
CA.

Issue:

Was EDCA unlawfully deprived of the books?

Ruling:

No.

Ownership has already passed to Cruz when the books were delivered. The fact that
the check bounced does not erase the fact that the sale has already been perfected.

The respondents, having obtained the books in good faith, may not be deprived of the
same.