1.
Ty vs CA
GR No. 127406, November 27, 2000
FACTS:
Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna Villanueva in a civil
ceremony in March 1977 in Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in
August 1977. Both weddings were declared null and void ab initio for lack of
marriage license and consent of the parties. Even before the decree nullifying the
marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty herein petitioner on April 1979 and had
their church wedding in Makati on April 1982. The decree was only issued in
August 1980. In January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have his
marriage with petitioner be declared null and void. AC ruled that a judicial
declaration of nullity of the prior marriage with Anna must first be secured before
a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. However, SC found that the
provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case
for doing so would prejudice the vested rights of the petitioner and of her
children.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.
HELD:
SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be awarded to the
wife who sought damages against the husband for filing a baseless complaint
causing her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation
and alienation from her parents. Aside from the fact, that petitioner wants her
marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is likewise suing to
maintain her status as legitimate wife. To grant her petition for damages would
result to a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or
common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd.
Moreover, Philippine laws do not comprehend an action for damages between
husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation.
Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes is declared
valid and subsisting and the award of the amount of P15,000 is ratified and
maintained as monthly support to their 2 children for as long as they are of minor
age or otherwise legally entitled thereto.
2. Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael Case Digest
Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael
G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001
Facts: Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered
owners of two lots in Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of Zosima, Francisco
and his mother-in-law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of
rights, in which the latter waived her share of the property. Thereafter,
Francisco registered the lot in his name. Having no children to take care of him
after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia, the latters cousin
Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, to take care of his house and store.
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between
Cirila and Francisco. Leticia said that the previous party was lovers since they slept
in the same room while Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila was his
mistress. On the other hand, Cirila said she was mere helper and that Francisco
was too old for her.
A few months before Franciscos death, he executed an instrument denominated
Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in which he ceded a portion of the lot together
with is house to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. The
deed stated that the donation was being made in consideration of the faithful
services she had rendered over the past ten years. Thereafter, Francisco died and
the respondents filed a complaint against Cirila for declaration of nullity of a deed
of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession and damages. Respondents, who
are nieces, nephews and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco, alleged that
Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void
under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Issue: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late
Francisco Comille be declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Ruling: Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that two
persons lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the
inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by one in favor of the other is
void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Therefore, respondents having proven by preponderance of evidence that Cirila
and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the
donation inter vivos is considered null and void.
1
3. Ayala Investment v. CA, G.R. No. 118305, February 12, 1988
FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50,300,000 loan from
petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent
Alfredo Ching made himself jointly answerable to the debt as added security.
Upon PBMs failure to pay the loan, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against
PBM and respondent Ching in the CFI of Pasig.
After trial, the court rendered decision in favor of AIDC ordering PBM and Alfredo
Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of the loan with
interests. Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued a writ of execution and
thereafter, the deputy sheriff caused the issuance and service upon respondent
spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on three of their conjugal properties.
Respondent spouses then filed an injunction contending that subject loan did not
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Nevertheless, a certificate of
sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder for the property.
ISSUE: WON the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is
considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
HELD: No. Petition is DENIED.
RATIO: The loan obtained by the husband from AIDC was for the benefit of PBM
and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching.
PBM has a personality which is distinct from that of Chings family despite their
being stockholders of the said company. The debt incurred by Ching is a corporate
debt and the right of recourse to respondent as surety is only to the extent of his
corporate stocks.
If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband
acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be
categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor
and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a
husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof must be presented to establish
benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
4. Go vs CA
Family Code Article 73 Exercise of Profession of Either Spouse
In 1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted with Nancy Go for the latter
to film their wedding. After the wedding, the newlywed inquired about their
wedding video but Nancy Go said its not yet ready. She advised them to return
for the wedding video after their honeymoon. The newlywed did so but only to
find out that Nancy Go can no longer produce the said wedding video because the
copy has been erased.
The Ongs then sued Nancy Go for damages. Nancys husband, Alex Go, was
impleaded. The trial court ruled in favor of the spouses Ong and awarded in their
favor, among others, P75k in moral damages. In her defense on appeal, Nancy Go
said: that they erased the video tape because as per the terms of their
agreement, the spouses are supposed to claim their wedding tape within 30 days
after the wedding, however, the spouses neglected to get said wedding tape
because they only made their claim after two months; that her husband should
not be impleaded in this suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nancy Go is liable for moral damages.
HELD: Yes. Her contention is bereft of merit. It is shown that the spouses Ong
made their claim after the wedding but were advised to return after their
honeymoon. The spouses advised Go that their honeymoon is to be done abroad
and wont be able to return for two months. It is contrary to human nature for
any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their wedding; the
fact that the Ongs filed a case against Nancy Go belies such assertion. Considering
the sentimental value of the tapes and the fact that the event therein recorded
a wedding which in our culture is a significant milestone to be cherished and
remembered could no longer be reenacted and was lost forever, the trial court
was correct in awarding the Ongs moral damages in compensation for the mental
anguish, tortured feelings, sleepless nights and humiliation that the Ongs suffered
and which under the circumstances could be awarded as allowed under Articles
2217 and 2218 of the Civil Code.
Anent the issue that Nancy Gos husband should not be included in the suit, this
argument is valid. Under Article 73 of the Family Code, the wife may exercise any
profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband.
In this case, it was shown that it was only Nancy Go who entered into a contract
with the spouses Ong hence only she (Nancy) is liable to pay the damages
awarded in favor of the Ongs.
2

5. Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.
G.R. No. L-28589, February 29, 1972
Concepcion, C.J.
FACTS:
Spouses Rafael Zulueta and Telly Albert Zulueta, with their daughter boarded a
PANAM plane from Honolulu to Manila, the first leg of which was Wake Island.
While on stopover, Mr. Zulueta found the need to relieve himself and after finding
the terminals comfort rooms full, he walked down the beach to do his business.
Meanwhile, the flight was called and Mr. Zuluetas absence was noticed. Heading
towards the ram, plaintiff remarked, You people almost made me miss your
flight. You have a defective announcing system and I was not paged.
Instead of allowing plaintiff to board the plane, however, the airport manager
stopped plaintiff and asked him to surrender his baggages for inspection. Refusing
to comply with the order, plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane. His wife
and daughter were able to proceed but were instructed to leave their baggages
behind.
Plaintiff instituted present petition for recovery of damages against respondents
for breach of contract. The defendants, however, maintain that plaintiffs reason
for going to the beach was not to relieve himself but because he had a quarrel
with his wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiff is entitled to damages for breach of contract.
HELD:
YES, plaintiff is entitled to damages. Firstly, plaintiffs testimony about what he did
upon reaching the beach is uncontradicted. Furthermore, there is absolutely no
direct evidence about said alleged quarrel. If such was true, surely, plaintiff would
not have walked back from the beach to the terminal before the plane had
resumed its flight to Manila, thereby exposing his presence to the full view of
those who were looking for him.
Anent the request of the common carrier to inspect the bags of plaintiff, it
appears that Captain Zentner received information that one of the passengers
expressed a fear of a bomb on board the plane. As a result, he asked for the
plaintiffs bags to verify the bomb. Nevertheless, this claim is unfounded. The
Captain failed to explain why he seemingly assumed that the alleged
apprehension of his information was justified. Plaintiff himself intimated to them
that he was well known to the US State Department and that the Captain was not
even aware of the informants name or any circumstances which may substantiate
the latters fear of a certain bomb.
Defendants further argue that plaintiff was also guilty of contributory negligence
for failure to reboard the plane within the 30 minutes announced before the
passengers debarked therefrom. This may have justified a reduction of the
damages had plaintiff been unwittingly left by the plane, owing to the negligence
of PANAM personnel, or even, wittingly, if he could not be found before the
planes departure. It does not, and cannot have such justification in the case at
bar, plaintiff having shown up before the plane had taken off and he having been
off-loaded intentionally and with malice.
With all the foregoing, it is clear that plaintiff is entitled to damages from
respondent company.
6. Wong vs. IAC
GR No. 70082, August 19, 1991
FACTS:
Romario Henson married Katrina on January 1964. They had 3 children however,
even during the early years of their marriage, the spouses had been most of the
time living separately. During the marriage or on about January 1971, the
husband bought a parcel of land in Angeles from his father using the money
borrowed from an officemate. Sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered an
agreement with Anita Chan where the latter consigned the former pieces of
jewelry valued at P321,830.95. Katrina failed to return the same within the 20
day period thus Anita demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued in
September 1972, check of P55,000 which was dishonored due to lack of funds.
3
The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed action for collection of the sum of
money against Katrina and her husband Romarico. The reply with counterclaim
filed was only in behalf of Katrina. Trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs then a
writ of execution was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the
name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at
public auction to Juanito Santos and the other two with Leonardo Joson. A month
before such redemption, Romarico filed an action for annulment of the decision
including the writ and levy of execution.
ISSUE: WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can be
satisfied through the conjugal property.
HELD:
The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered into the business
deal with Anita. The husband had nothing to do with the business transactions of
Katrina nor authorized her to enter into such. The properties in Angeles were
acquired during the marriage with unclear proof where the husband obtained the
money to repay the loan. Hence, it is presumed to belong in the conjugal
partnership in the absence of proof that they are exclusive property of the
husband and even though they had been living separately. A wife may bind the
conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for support of the
family. The writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico and the
execution of judgments extends only over properties belonging to the judgment
debtor. The conjugal properties cannot answer for Katrinas obligations as she
exclusively incurred the latter without the consent of her husband nor they did
redound to the benefit of the family. There was also no evidence submitted that
the administration of the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by
Romarico before said obligations were incurred. In as much as the decision was
void only in so far as Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned, Spouses
Wong may still execute the debt against Katrina, personally and exclusively.
7. HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. et. al. v. SERVACIO and GO
FACTS:
Gaviola and Protacio, Jr. entered into a contract ofsale of a parcel of land. 23 years
later, Protacio, Jr executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver affirming
under oath that it was his father Protacio Go, Sr.(Married to Marta Go) who
purchased the said property. Subsequently, Protacio Go together with his son Rito
Go sold a portion of the property to herein respondent Ester Servacio. On March
2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio
refused to heed their demand; hence this case for the annulment of sale of the
property. The contention of the petitioner was that following Protacio, Jr.s
renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the
property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property
between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void pursuant to Article 130 of the
Family Code. Servacio and Rito countered thatArticle 130 of the Family Code was
inapplicable; that the want of the liquidation prior to the sale did not render the
sale invalid, because the sale was valid to the extent of the portion that was finally
allotted to the vendors as his share; and that the sale did not also prejudice any
rights of the petitioners as heirs, considering that what the sale disposed of was
within the aliquot portion of the property that the vendors were entitled to as
heirs.
The RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and
Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr. Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed
the validity of the sale of the property. Aggrieved, the petitioners went all the
way up to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether Article 130 of the Family Code was applicable.
HELD:
The appeal lacks merit.
Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family Code,any disposition of
the conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be
made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void. Upon Martas
death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1)
of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio,
Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the
conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of
Martas share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any
specific portion of Martas share without an actual partition of the property being
first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had
was an ideal orabstract quota in Martas share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell
4
his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of
his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, the
sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-
owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were
thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Martas
share. Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the
applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership
is without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the
recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who
substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the
DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of
the co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra] In the
meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her
vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to her.
8. NICDAO CARIO VS YEE CARIO
Posted by kaye lee on 10:00 PM
G.R. No. 132529 February 2 2001
[Article 147 Family Code-Property Regime of Union Without Marriage; Article 148
- Rules on Co-ownership regarding polygamous/bigamous marriages, adulterous
or concubinage relationships; Article 40 - Judicial Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage]
FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao in 1969 without marriage license.
They had two children. He then married Susan Yee on November 10 1992, with
whom he had no children in their almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back in
1982.
He passed away on November 23 1992. The two Susans filed with the RTC of
Quezon City the claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining
to the deceased from various government agencies. Nicdao collected a total of
P146,000 while Yee received a total of P21,000.
Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired by Nicdao,
collectively denominated as "death benefits." Yee admitted that her marriage
with the SPO4 took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a
judicial declaration of nullity, the marriage between Nicdao and the SPO4. She
however claimed that she became aware of the previous marriage at the funeral
of the deceased.
In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the
CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao.
RULING:
No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cario falls under the Article 148
of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous or
polygamous marriages, adulterous or concubinage relationships.
Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her
marriage to the deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to the
properties acquired with the deceased through their actual joint contribution.
Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Hence,
they are not owned in common by Yee and the deceased, but belong to the
deceased alone and Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate
succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal
heirs. And, Yee, not being the legal wife, is not one of them.
As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null
and void due to absence of a valid marriage license. Nicdao can claim the death
benefits by the deceased even if she did not contribute thereto. Article 147
creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling Nicdao to share one-half of
the benefits. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the first marriage, she can
claim one-half of the disputed death benefits and the other half to the deceased'
to his legal heirs, by intestate succession.
The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has
been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage
between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40, if a party who is previously married
wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial
decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said
second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. However, for
5
purposes other than to remarry, no prior and separate judicial declaration of
ISSUE:
nullity is necessary.
1. WON Manila Railroad Company is liable for damages
9. LILIUS, ET AL. vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
2. WON the sums of money fixed by the court a quo as indemnities for
G.R. No. L-39587
damages proper
March 24, 1934
1. Injuries sustained by Lilius
FACTS: Lilius was driving with his wife and daughter for sightseeing in Pagsanjan
2. for injuries sustained by wife and child
Laguna. It was his first time in the area and he was entirely unacquainted with the
3. for loss of domestic service of wife to husband
conditions of the road and had no knowledge of the existence of a railroad
HELD: The judgment appealed from is affirmed in toto, with the sole modification
crossing. Before reaching the crossing in question, there was nothing to indicate
on interest to be added on the indemnity in favor of Lilius.
its existence and, it was impossible to see an approaching train. At about seven or
1. YES
eight meters from the crossing the plaintiff saw an autotruck parked on the left
Upon examination of the oral as well as of the documentary evidence, this court is
side of the road. Several people, who seemed to have alighted from the said
of the opinion that the accident was due to negligence on the part of the
truck, were walking on the opposite side. He slowed down and sounded his horn
defendant-appellant company alone, for not having had on that occasion any
for the people to get out of the way. With his attention thus occupied, he did not
semaphore at the crossing to serve as a warning to passers-by of its existence in
see the crossing but he heard two short whistles. Immediately afterwards, he saw
order that they might take the necessary precautions before crossing the railroad;
a huge black mass fling itself upon him, which turned out to be locomotive No.
and, on the part of its employees the flagman and switchman, for not having
713 of the MRCs train. The locomotive struck the plaintiffs car right in the center.
remained at his post at the crossing in question to warn passers-by of the
The 3 victims were injured and were hospitalized.
approaching train
Lilus filed a case against MRC in the CFI. Answering the complaint, it denies each

and every allegation thereof and, by way of special defense, alleges that the Lilius,
Although it is probable that the defendant-appellant entity employed the
with the cooperation of his wife and coplaintiff, negligently and recklessly drove
diligence of a good father of a family in selecting its aforesaid employees,
his car, and prays that it be absolved from the complaint.
however, it did not employ such diligence in supervising their work and the

discharge of their duties. The diligence of a good father of a family, which the law
The CFI decided in favor of Lilius. The 2 parties appealed said decision, each
requires in order to avoid damage, is not confined to the careful and prudent
assigning errors on said judgement.

6
selection of subordinates or employees but includes inspection of their work and that permanently disfigure her face and that the fractures of both her legs

supervision of the discharge of their duties. permanently render it difficult for her to walk freely, continuous extreme care

being necessary in order to keep her balance in addition to the fact that all of this

2. a. With respect to the plaintiffs appeal, the first question to be decided is that unfavorably and to a great extent affect her matrimonial future.

raised by Lilius relative to the insufficiency of the sum of P5,000 which the trial

court adjudicated to him by way of indemnity for damages consisting in the loss of c. Lilius also seeks to recover the sum of P2,500 for the loss of what is called

his income as journalist and author as a result of his illness. As to the amount of Anglo-Saxon common law consortium of his wife, that is, her services, society

P10,000 claimed by Lilius as damages for the loss of his wifes services in his and conjugal companionship, as a result of personal injuries which she had

business, which services consisted in going over his writings, translating them into received from the accident now under consideration.

foreign languages and acting as his secretary, in addition to the fact that such

services formed part of the work whereby he realized a net monthly income of Under the law and the doctrine of this court, one of the husbands rights is to

P1,500, there is no sufficient evidence of the true value of said services nor to the count on his wifes assistance. This assistance comprises the management of the

effect that he needed them during her illness and had to employ a translator to home and the performance of household duties. However, nowadays when

act in her stead. women, in their desire to be more useful to society and to the nation, are

demanding greater civil rights and are aspiring to become mans equal in all the

b. Taking into consideration the fact that the wife in the language of the court, activities of life, marriage has ceased to create the presumption that a woman

which saw her at the trial young and beautiful and the big scar, which she has complies with the duties to her husband and children, which the law imposes

on her forehead caused by the lacerated wound received by her from the upon her, and he who seeks to collect indemnity for damages resulting from

accident, disfigures her face and that the fracture of her left leg has caused a deprivation of her domestic services must prove such services. In the case under

permanent deformity which renders it very difficult for her to walk, and taking consideration, apart from the services of his wife as translator and secretary, the

into further consideration her social standing, neither is the sum adjudicated to value of which has not been proven, Lilius has not presented any evidence

her for patrimonial and moral damages, excessive. showing the existence of domestic services and their nature, rendered by her

prior to the accident, in order that it may serve as a basis in estimating their

As to the indemnity in favor of the child neither is the same excessive, taking into value.

consideration the fact that the lacerations received by her have left deep scars

7

Furthermore, inasmuch as a wifes domestic assistance and conjugal
companionship are purely personal and voluntary acts which neither of the
spouses may be compelled to render, it is necessary for the party claiming
indemnity for the loss of such services to prove that the person obliged to render
them had done so before he was injured and that he would be willing to continue
rendering them had he not been prevented from so doing
NOTES:
However, in order that a victim of an accident may recover indemnity for damages
from the person liable therefor, it is not enough that the latter has been guilty of
negligence, but it is also necessary that the said victim has not, through his own
negligence, , contributed to the accident.
It appears that Lilius took all precautions which his skill and the presence of his
wife and child, driving his car at a speed which prudence demanded according to
the circumstances and conditions of the road, slackening his speed in the face of
an obstacle and blowing his horn upon seeing persons on the road. If he failed to
stop, look and listen before going over the crossing, in spite of the fact that he
was driving at 12 miles per hour after having been free from obstacles, it was
because, his attention having been occupied in attempting to go ahead, he did not
see the crossing in question, nor anything, nor anybody indicating its existence, as
he knew nothing about it beforehand. The first and only warning, which he
received of the impending danger, was two short blows from the whistle of the
locomotive immediately preceding the collision and when the accident had
already become inevitable.
10. GO vs YAMANE
Petitioners: Spouses JOSEPHINE MENDOZA GO & HENRY GO
Respondent: LEONARDO YAMANE
FACTS:
Lot in Baguio City is registered in the name of Muriel Yamane, wife of Leonardo
Yamane. Atty. De Guzman who handled a case for wife and her sisters levied the
said property to satisfy the lien for attorneys fees.
The RTC of Baguio City held that the subject parcel of land was the paraphernal
property of Muriel Yamane and not the conjugal property of the spouses.
Leonardo Yamane, husband filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
The case was brought to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court
contends that, property acquired during marriage is presumed to be conjugal,
unless the exclusive funds of one spouse are shown to have been used for the
purpose.
Husbands name appeared on the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and the
Deed of Absolute Sale. Both documents indicate that Muriel was married to
Leonardo Yamane.
ISSUE:
Whether the nature of the property is conjugal or paraphernal
HELD:
Property purchased by spouses during the existence of their marriage is
presumed to be conjugal in nature, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or to the wife. (Article 160)
The nature of a property, whether conjugal or paraphernal, is determined by law
and not by the will of one of the spouses.
The mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse does not destroy
its conjugal nature. Conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal
obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage of benefit is shown
to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.
8
The CA committed no error in declaring that the parcel of land belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Spouses Muriel and Leonardo Yamane. They acquired it
from Eugene Pucay on February 27, 1967, or specifically during the marriage. We
then follow the rule that proof of the acquisition of the subject property during a
marriage suffices to render the statutory presumption operative. It is clear
enough that the presently disputed piece of land pertains to the conjugal
partnership.
The contract or transaction between Atty. De Guzman and the Pucay sisters
appears to have been incurred for the exclusive interest of the latter. Muriel was
acting privately for her exclusive interest when she joined her two sisters in hiring
the services of Atty. De Guzman to handle a case for them. Accordingly, whatever
expenses were incurred by Muriel in the litigation for her and her sisters' private
and exclusive interests, are her exclusive responsibility and certainly cannot be
charged against the contested conjugal property. This piece of land may not be
used to pay for her indebtedness, because her obligation has not been shown to
be one of the charges against the conjugal partnership.
The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. In this case, therefore,
the property -- being conjugal in nature -- cannot be levied upon. Petition is
DENIED.
11. Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, G.R. No. 164201, Dec. 10, 2012
FACTS: Petitioner EfrenPana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others were accused of
murder. Efren was acquitted but Melecia and another person was found guilty and
was sentenced to the penalty of death and to pay each of the heirs of the victims,
jointly and severally for civil indemnity and damages.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the
issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the
names of Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on
execution were issued.
Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming
that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of
Melecia.
ISSUE: WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied
and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecias civil liability in the murder
case.
HELD: Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the
wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged
to the partnership.
The payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon the spouses may be
enforced against the partnership assets if the spouse who is bound should have
no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTCs finding that Melecia has no exclusive
property of her own, the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in
the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets
after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been
covered.
12. Carlos vs. Abelardo
GR No. 146504, April 4, 2002
FACTS:
Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo, his son-in-law for
recovery of the $25,000 loan used to purchase a house and lot located at
Paranaque. It was in October 1989 when the petitioner issued a check worth as
such to assist the spouses in conducting their married life independently. The
seller of the property acknowledged receipt of the full payment. In July 1991, the
petitioner inquired from spouses status of the amount loaned from him, the
spouses pleaded that they were not yet in position to make a definite settlement.
Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to the extent of making
various death threats against petitioner. In 1994, petitioner made a formal
demand but the spouses failed to comply with the obligation. The spouses were
separated in fact for more than a year prior the filing of the complaint hence
spouses filed separate answers. Abelardo contended that the amount was never
intended as a loan but his share of income on contracts obtained by him in the
construction firm and that the petitoner could have easily deducted the debt from
9
his share in the profits. RTC decision was in favor of the petitioner, however CA
reversed and set aside trial courts decision for insufficiency of evidence.
Evidently, there was a check issued worth $25,000 paid to the owner of the
Paranaque property which became the conjugal dwelling of the spouses. The wife
executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did not sign.
ISSUE: WON a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be charged
against the conjugal partnership.
HELD:
Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not deny that the
same served as their conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence, the
spouses are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan. Abelardos
contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share in the construction firm is
untenable since there was no proof that he was part of the stockholders that will
entitle him to the profits and income of the company.
Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in
the amount of $25,000 plus legal interest including moral and exemplary damages
and attorneys fees.
13. Guiang v. CA
Facts:
Over the objection of private respondent Gilda Corpuz and while she was in
Manila seeking employment, her husband sold to the petitioners-spouses Antonio
and Luzviminda Guiang one half of their conjugal peoperty, consisting of their
residence and the lot on which it stood. Upon her return to Cotabato, respondent
gathered her children and went back to the subject property. Petitioners filed a
complaint for trespassing. Later, there was an amicable settlement between the
parties. Feeling that she had the shorer end of the bargain, respondent filed an
Amended Complaint against her husband and petitioners. The said Complaint
sought the declaration of a certain deed of sale, which involved the conjugal
property of private respondent and her husband, null and void.
Issue:
Whether the sale was void or merely voidable and was ratified by the amicable
settlement
Held:
Respondent's consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally
inexistent or absent. The nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence
of private respondent's consent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code
requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3)
consent, the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar.
Neither can the "amicable settlement" be considered a continuing offer that was
accepted and perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124.
The order of the pertinent events is clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a
complaint for trespassing against private respondent, after which the barangay
authorities secured an "amicable settlement" and petitioners filed before the MTC
a motion for its execution. The settlement, however, does not mention a
continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance of such a continuing offer.
Its tenor was to the effect that private respondent would vacate the property. By
no stretch of the imagination, can the Court interpret this document as the
acceptance mentioned in Article 124.
14. THELMA A. JADER-MANALO vs. NORMA FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA
G.R. No. 147978. January 23, 2002.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Thelma A. Jader-Manalo made an offer to buy the properties of the
respondents from the husband of Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa, respondent
Edilberto Camaisa. After some bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon
the purchase price and terms of payment. The agreement handwritten by the
petitioner was signed by Edilberto, with assurance from him that he would secure
his wifes consent. Petitioner was later on surprised when she was informed that
respondent spouses were backing out of the agreement. Hence, she filed a
complaint for specific performance and damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without
the wife's written consent.
10
HELD:
Under Art. 124 of the Family Code: In the event that one spouse is incapacitated
or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void.
The properties subject to the contract in this case were conjugal; hence, for the
contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must be
obtained. Respondent Norma Camaisa did not give her written consent to the
sale. Even granting that respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for
the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent to the
sale is required by law for its validity. She may have been aware of the
negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties, however that is not
sufficient to demonstrate consent.
15. HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO,
G.R. No. 153802
March 11, 2005
FACTS: Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8, 1967.
During their marriage the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at San
Pablo City from a certain Dalida. The subject property was declared for tax
assessment purposes The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in
favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his
wife.
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one
Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners
Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San
Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan from petitioner. As
security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage
constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The abovementioned
transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took
place without the knowledge and consent of respondent.[
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the
extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as
the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without the property being
redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof by executing an
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to the subject
property, Miguela learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Brion to
clean its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion
allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject
property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San
Pablo City a Civil Case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale,
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer
for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the latters Answer
with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision declaring the said
documents null and void and further ordered the defendant is ordered to
11
reconvey the property subject of this complaint to the plaintiff, to pay the plaintiff consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the

the sum representing the value of the car which was burned, the attorneys fees, disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . .

moral and exemplary damages.

The appellate court affirmed the trial courts Decision, but deleted the award for In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of

damages and attorneys fees for lack of basis. Hence, this petition the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of

ISSUE: the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale.

1. WON THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON

THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED Respondent and the late Marcelino. were married on August 8, 1967. In the

SHARE. absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal

partnership of gains governed the property relations between respondent and

2. WON THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN her late husband. With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988,

OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made

TO THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY. applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established before its

effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or

HELD: the petition is denied. other laws.

1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part: The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of

respondent and the late Marcelino even in a suppletory manner. The regime of

ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband

shall belong to both spouses jointly. . . . and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from

their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute community of property wherein

the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership

powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in

or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership

of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property

12
relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should

Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of

by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being

prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the of the family as a unit.[

Family Code is silent on the matter. The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal

The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei

and consent of his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies,

subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express must prove). Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late

provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or Marcelino to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt

written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does

conjugal property shall be void. not persuade this Court. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held

liable for the payment of the principal obligation.

The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the NOTES:

spouse who makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial,

rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law petitioner vigorously asserted that the subject property was the exclusive

does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial

the appellate court are correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage court was it alleged that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the

on the subject property for lack of respondents consent. family. Even on appeal, petitioner never claimed that the family benefited from

2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, [T]he conjugal partnership shall be the proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court

liable for: . . . below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him

to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive

(1) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. A party may change his legal

the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . . theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not require

presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to

properly meet the issue raised in the new theory.

13

16. Tarrosa v. De Leon, G.R. No. 185063, July 23, 2009
FACTS: On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the Peoples
Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to
Sell for the purchase on installment of a lot situated in Quezon City. On April 24,
1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon. They had two children, Danilo and Vilma.
On June 22, 1970, PHHC executed a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio upon
full payment of the price of the lot. TCT was issued on February 24, 1972 in the
name of Bonifacio, single. On January 12, 1974, Bonifacio sold the lot to his
sister, Lita, and her husband, Felix Tarrosa. The Deed of Sale did not bear the
written consent and signature of Anita. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.
Three months later, Tarrosa spouses registered the Deed of Sale. Anita, Danilo,
and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit allegeing that Bonifacio was still the owner of
the lands. Tarrosa spouses averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his
exclusive property because he was still single when he acquired it from PHHC.
They further alleged that they were not aware of the marriage between Bonifacio
and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale.
The RTC ruled in favor of Anita De Leon et al stating that the lot in question was
the conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita. The CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the property that Bonifacio has purchased on installment before the
marriage although some installments were paid during the marriage would be
considered conjugal property
HELD: Yes. The subject lot which was once owned by PHHC and covered by the
Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio
and Anita. The title to the property was only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully
paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full payment was made more than
2 years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In effect, the property was
acquired during the existence of the marriage. Hence, ownership to the property
is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.
17. ALAIN M. DIO v. MA. CARIDAD L. DIO
FACTS:
January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. On May 2001, petitioner
filed an action for Declaration of Niullity of Marriagw against respondent citing
psychological incapacity under article 36. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed
in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her
responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and
gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further
alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and
hurt him. The trial court declared their marriage void ab initio.
The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be
issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. It later
altered it to A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147
of the Family Code
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the
parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code
HELD:
The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City
that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or
Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and
respondent in the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be
present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article
147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and
respondent.
14
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies
only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment
under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family
Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article
36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed by
absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need
to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment
could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-
ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article
3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the
liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the
rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of
parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and
the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil
Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, [p]artition
may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x.
It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
18. Valdes vs Regional Trial Court, G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996
In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article
147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. They begot 5
children. In 1992, Valdez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity. The trial court granted the petition,
thereby declaring their marriage null and void. It also directed the parties to start
proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article
147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and
52 of the same code.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision. She asserted that the
Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in "unions without marriage.
In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification: "Consequently,
considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the
property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the
parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will
own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that matter in equal
shares. In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the
plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code
shall apply."
Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which was denied. Valdes
appealed, arguing that: (1) Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases
where the parties are psychological incapacitated; (2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in
relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the
family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a
marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses;
(3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab
initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be
read consistently with Article 129.
Issues:
Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the
case at bar.
Held:
Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of
the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to
15
marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. Under this property regime,
property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be 19. JOSEFINA FRANCISCO vs. MASTER IRON WORKS & CONSTRUCTION
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the CORPORATION and ROBERTO ALEJO
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A
G.R. No. 151967 :: 16 February 2005 :: Callejo, Sr., J.
party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted Facts:
in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal
partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included Josefina Castillo, married to Eduardo Francisco, bought two parcels of residential
in the co-ownership. land and a house thereon. The Register of Deeds issued TCTs in the name of
Josefina Castillo Francisco married to Eduardo G. Francisco. Eduardo had
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when written an Affidavit of Waiver stating that before his marriage to Josefina, the
they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the latter purchased two parcels of land, including the house constructed thereon,
property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of with her own savings and that he was waiving whatever claims he had over the
money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
property. The property was mortgaged to Leonila Cando with marital conformity
respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however,
of Eduardo.
are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to
another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the When Eduardo failed to pay for the 7,500 bags of cement worth P768,750.00
case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in from Master Iron Works, the court issued a writ of execution levying the two
bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
parcels of land owned by Josefina. Before Josefina could commence presenting
manner already heretofore expressed.
her evidence against MIWCC, Josefina filed a petition to annul her marriage to
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the Eduardo on the ground that the latter had a subsisting marriage to one Carmelita
parties' common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor Carpio when the two were married. Said annulment was granted by the RTC.
precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must
Issue:
be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental and consequential
matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private Whether or not the subject properties were paraphernal property of Josefina and
respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal can not be held liable for the Eduardos personal obligations.
shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the
property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the
Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of the
Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of Held:
either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property
NO, THE PROPERTIES ARE NOT THE PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY OF JOSEFINA AND
regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the
CAN BE HELD TO ANSWER FOR EDUARDOS OBLIGATIONS.
contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that
exists between common-law spouses. Although it is true that the properties cannot be held as conjugal for the
cohabitation between Eduardo and Josefina are bigamous, the latter failed to
The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), adduce preponderance of evidence that she contributed money, property or
(4) and 95) of Article 43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable
industry in the acquisition of the subject property and hence, is not a co-owner of
marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 14 of the Code,
such. Also, the Court doubted that when she acquired the property at 23 years of
i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of
a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. age, she had enough funds to pay for it. Her claim that the funds for the property

16
were provided by her mother and sister, the Court believed, was just an
afterthought.
20. ABRENICA VS ABRENICA GR 180572 06.18.12
FACTS
P and R were law firm partners. R filed a case against P d to return partnership
funds representing profits from the sale of a parcel of land and sought to recover
from petitioner retainer fees that he received from two clients of the firm and the
balance of the cash advance that he obtained.
P filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that the sheriff had levied on
properties belonging to his children and petitioner Joena. Joena filed an Affidavit
of Third Party alleging that she and her stepchildren owned a number of the
personal properties sought to be levied and that it was under their ACP.
A Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was issued on 3 January 2008 in favor of the law
firm for the Ps properties.
*P has been previously married to another woman but their marriage has already
been dissolved.
ISSUE
WON Joena had the right to the claim?
RATIO
NO. Two of these stepchildren were already of legal age when Joena filed her
Affidavit. As to one of the children, parental authority over him belongs to his
parents. Absent any special power of attorney authorizing Joena to represent
Erlandos children, her claim cannot be sustained.
Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the community property the
property acquired before the marriage of a spouse who has legitimate
descendants by a former marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of that
property. Thus, neither these two vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the
second marriage.
HELD
Petition denied.
21. Quiao v. Quiao, G.R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012
FACTS: Brigido Quiao (petitioner) and Rita Quiao (respondent) contracted
marriage in 1977. They had no separate properties prior to their marriage. During
the course of said marriage, they produced four children. In 2000, Rita filed a
complaint against Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting with another woman.
Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the legal separation
of the parties pursuant to Article 55. Save for one child (already of legal age), the
three minor children remains in the custody of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.
The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them
subject to the respective legitimes of their children; however, Brigidos share of
the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of
their children in accordance to par. 9 of Article 129 of the FC.
A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by
the trial court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the
writ was partially executed.
After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the
RTC to define Nets Profits Earned. In answer, the court held that the phrase
denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the
separate properties of each of the spouses and debts.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision
stating that NET PROFIT EARNED shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of
Article 102 of the FC. However, it later reverted to its original Order, setting aside
the last ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governs the
couples property relations.
HELD: Yes. Brigido and Rita tied the knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of
exchange of martial vows, the operative law was the NCC and since they did not
agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between them is the
17
system of relative community or the conjugal partnership of gains. Under this
to the petitioners Fuentes spouses through the help of Atty. Plagata who would
property relation, the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of
their separate property and the income from their work and industry. The prepare the documents and requirements to complete the sale. In the agreement
husband and wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal
between Tarciano and Fuentes spouses there will be a Php 60,000 down payment
partnership of gains.
and Php 140,000 will be paid upon the removal of Tarciano of certain structures
on the land and after the consent of the estranged wife of Tarciano, Rosario,
22. BEUMER V. AMORES
would be attained. Atty. Plagata thus went about to complete such tasks and
G.R. 195670 December 3, 2012
claimed that he went to Manila to get the signature of Rosario but notarized the
Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J document at Zamboanga . The deed of sale was executed January 11, 1989. As
FACTS: time passed, Tarciano and Rosario died while the Fuentes spouses and possession
Petitioner. a Dutch national, assails the decision of CA which affirmed the decision and control over the lot. Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and
of RTC Negros Oriental. Petitioner and Filipina respondents marriage was nullified
Rosario filed a case to annul the sale and reconvey the property on the ground
by basis of the formers psychological incapacity. Petitioner thus filed for
Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership praying for distribution of the properties that the sale was void since the consent of Rosario was not attained and that
acquired during their marriage which include 4 lots of land acquired through
Rosarios signature was a mere forgery. The Fuentes spouses claim that the action
purchase and 2 lots by inheritance. RTC ruled that all parcels of land be given to
the respondent, tools and equipment in favour of the petitioner and the two has prescribed since an action to annul a sale on the ground of fraud is 4
houses on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties. years from discovery.
ISSUE:

Is the petitioner entitled to assail the decision of the RTC and CA? The RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses ruling that there was no forgery,

HELD: that the testimony of Atty. Plagata who witnessed the signing of Rosario must be

The petition lacks merit. Firstly, foreigners may not own lands in the Philippines. given weight, and that the action has already prescribed.
However, there are no restrictions to the ownership of buildings or structures on
lands of foreigners. As such, the two houses on Lots 1 and 2142 are considered
co-owned by the parties. On the other hand, the CA reversed the ruling of the CA stating that the action has
not prescribed since the applicable law is the 1950 Civil Code which provided that
the sale of Conjugal Property without the consent of the other spouse is voidable
23. Fuentes v. Conrado Roca, G.R. 178902, April 2010
and the action must be brought within 10 years. Given that the transaction was in

FACTS: On, Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square meter lot in 1989 and the action was brought in 1997 hence it was well within the prescriptive

Zambales from his mother. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot period.

18

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on the document of consent to her husband
Tarcianos sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged;
2. Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to
the spouses already prescribed; and
3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring
the action to annul that sale.
RULING:
1. The SC ruled that there was forgery due to the difference in the signatures of
Rosario in the document giving consent and another document executed at the
same time period. The SC noted that the CA was correct in ruling that the heavy
handwriting in the document which stated consent was completely different from
the sample signature. There was no evidence provided to explain why there was
such difference in the handwriting.
2. Although Tarciano and Rosario was married during the 1950 civil code, the sale
was done in 1989, after the effectivity of the Family Code. The Family Code
applies to Conjugal Partnerships already established at the enactment of the
Family Code. The sale of conjugal property done by Tarciano without the consent
of Rosario is completely void under Art 124 of the family code. With that, it is a
given fact that assailing a void contract never prescribes. On the argument that
the action has already prescribed based on the discovery of the fraud, that
prescriptive period applied to the Fuentes spouses since it was them who should
have assailed such contract due to the fraud but they failed to do so. On the other
hand, the action to assail a sale based on no consent given by the other spouse
does not prescribe since it is a void contract.
3. It is argued by the Spouses Fuentes that it is only the spouse, Rosario, who
can file such a case to assail the validity of the sale but given that Rosario was
already dead no one could bring the action anymore. The SC ruled that such
position is wrong since as stated above, that sale was void from the beginning.
Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite
that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to
their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under
Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and
disposal.
24. Ravina vs Abrille
FACTS:
Mary Ann and Pedro Villa-Abrille were husband and wife. They had four children
(herein respondents). The properties involved in this case are: (1982) Lot 7
acquired by the spouses during their marriage; Lot 8 acquired by Pedro when he
was still single; House built on lot 7 and 8 built from their joint efforts and the
proceeds of a loan from DBP.
(1991) Pedro got a mistress. Pedro offered to sell the house and two lots to
petitioners Ravina. Mary Ann objected. Pedro still sold the properties without
her consent. Pedro, with the connivance Ravina and some Civilian Armed Forces
(CAFGU) transferred all the belongings from the house to an apartment and
prevented Mary Ann and the kids from entering the house.
Thus, Mary Ann and the children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale, Specific
Performance and Damages before RTC Davao. During the trial, Pedro declared
that the house was built with his own money. Petitioner Ravina testified that they
bought the house and lot from Pedro upon examination of the title.
RTC The sale of: Lot 7 void as to representing share of Mary Ann; Lot 8
void as to representing share of Mary Ann who did not consent; house void as
19
to ; pay Mary Ann the value of belongings that were lost; pay moral and
exemplary damages and the cost of suit.
CA sale of Lot 8 valid; sale of Lot 7 null and void; ordered Pedro to return the
value of the consideration to Ravina; ordered Ravina to reconvey the house and
Lot to spouses Pedro and Mary Ann; ordered Pedro and Ravina to pay Mary Ann
moral and exemplary damages.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether Lot 7 is an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal property.
(2) Whether sale of Lot 7 by Pedro was valid considering the absence of Mary
Anns consent.
HELD:
(1) Presumed to be Conjugal property of spouses Pedro and Mary Ann.
(2) Annullable with five years
RATIO:
(1) Petitioner Ravina asserts that Lot 7 was exclusive property of Pedro, it being
acquired by Pedro thru barter or exchange with his another exclusive property.
The Court is not persuaded. No evidence was adduced to show that the subject
property was acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the
conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject
property is exclusively owned by Pedro. The fact is, Lot 7 was acquired in 1982
during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. Likewise, the house built thereon is
conjugal property, having been constructed through the joint efforts of the
spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house. Article
160 of the New Civil Code provides, "All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or to the wife."
(2) Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the
same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the
consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouses inability,
the authority of the court. Article 124 of the Family Code, the governing law at
the time the assailed sale was contracted, is explicit:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property
shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper
remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in
the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition
or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either
or both offerors.
The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years to
annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is
thus clear that alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property by
the husband without the consent of the wife is null and void.
Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband,
without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is
void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife,
thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the
wife who is given five (5) years from the date the contract implementing the
decision of the husband to institute the case.
Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale within
five (5) years from the date of sale and execution of the deed. However, her action
to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house and lot and does not include
the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and
which he can dispose of freely without Mary Anns consent.
20
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, we deny the instant petition for lack of merit. The
Decision dated February 21, 2002 and the Resolution dated October 7, 2003 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54560 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners. SO ORDERED.
DOCTRINE: Sale of one spouse of conjugal property with the knowledge of the
spouse sale is null and void; Sale of one spouse of conjugal property with
knowledge but without consent of the other spouse sale is annullable, within
five years, by the non-consenting spouse.
25. CAMILLO F. BORROMEO, petitioner, vs. ANTONIETTA O DESCALLAR,
respondent.
FACTS:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar. They
fell in love and live together. They bought a house and lot and an Absolute Deed
of Sale was issued in their names. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was
presented for registration, it was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an
alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently,
his name was erased but his signature remained and the property was issued on
the name of the Respondent alone. However their relationship did not last long
and they found new love.
Jambrich met the petitioner who was engaged in business. Jambrich indebted the
petitioner for a sum of money and to pay his debt, he sold some of his properties
to the petitioner and a Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment was issued in his favor.
However, when the Petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment it found
out that said land was registered in the name of Respondent. Petitioner filed a
complaint against respondent for recovery of real property.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Jambrich has no title to the properties in question and may not
transfer and assign any rights and interest in favor of the petitioner?
2. Whether or not the registration of the properties in the name of respondents
make his the owner thereof.
RULINGS:
1. The evidence clearly shows that as between respondent and Jambrich, it was
Jambrich who possesses the financial capacity to acquire the properties in
dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the properties, Jamrich was the source
of funds used to purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct the house.
Jambrich was the owner of the properties in question, but his name was deleted
in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of legal constraints. Nevertheless, his
signature remained in the deed of sale where he signed as a buyer. Thus, Jambrich
has all authority to transfer all his rights, interest and participation over the
subject properties to petitioner by virtue of Deed of Assignment. Furthermore,
the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couples
cohabitation does not help the respondent. The rule of co-ownership applies to a
man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage, but otherwise capacitated to marry each other does not
apply. At the case at bar, respondent was still legally married to another when she
and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship and no co-
ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to
prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to able
to lay claim to any portion of it.
2. It is settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only
a means of confirming the existence with notice to the world at large. The mere
possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the
mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name
does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner.
26. Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286 April 14, 2004
FACTS: On 13 October 1988, Eusebia Retuya filed a complaint before the trial
court against her husband Nicolas Retuya, Pacita Villanueva and Nicolas son with
Pacita, Procopio Villanueva. Eusebia sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and
Pacita of several properties (subject properties), claiming that such are her
conjugal properties with Nicolas. Plaintiff Eusebia, is the legal wife of defendant
Nicolas, having been married on October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful wedlock, they
begot five (5) children. Spouses Retuya resided at Mandaue City. During their
marriage, they acquired real properties and all improvements situated in
21
Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu. Nicolas is the co-owner of a parcel of land
situated in Mandaue City which he inherited from his parents Esteban Retuya and
Balbina Solon as well as the purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately
eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City. Some of the properties earn income
from coconuts leased to corporations
In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with
defendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate
son. Nicolas, then, was the only person who received the income of the
properties. Pacita, from the time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas,
has no occupation. She had no properties of her own from which she could derive
income. From the time Nicolas suffered stroke until the present, his illegitimate
son is already the one who has been receiving the income of his properties
Settlement between parties was asked but not met. Trial court in favor of Eusebia
Natuya. Petitioners appealed. Eusebia died, and was then substituted by her heirs.
CA upheld trial courts decision
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties acquired during the marriage
between Eusebia and Procopio are conjugal
HELD: YES, they are conjugal. Petition denied; decision of CA affirmed
RATIO: The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property
relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the
effectivity of Family Code.
Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall
apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage,
the presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden of proof is on the party
claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement
that the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the
marriage before they are presumed conjugal.
Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita started
cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were
married on 16 December 1996. Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was
purchased on 4 October 1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly
during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia.
Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the Family
Code is that all these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.
29. G-Tractors, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-57402, February 28, 1985
FACTS: Luis R. Narciso, legally married to Josefina Narciso, is a businessman
engaged in business as a producer and exporter of Philippine mahogany logs and
operates a logging concession at del Gallego, Camarines Sur. G-Tractors, Inc. is a
domestic corporation engaged primarily in the business of leasing heavy
equipments such as tractors, bulldozers, and the like.
Luis entered into a Contract of Hire of Heavy Equipment with G-Tractors under the
terms of which the latter leased to the former tractors for the purpose of
constructing switchroads and hauling felled trees at the jobsite of Narciso's
logging concession at del Gallego, Camarines Sur. The contract provided for
payment of rental for the use of said tractors. Luis Narciso failed to pay; G-Tractors
instituted an action urging Luis to pay a certain amount (P155,410.25),
representing the unpaid rentals. G-Tractors accepted his offer for a compromise
agreement, stating the mode of payment (installment plan); Luis failed to comply;
G-Tractors filed a motion for execution; Luis asked for suspension of the motion
stating that he still has a pending loan with a banking institution; request for
suspension denied. Levy was accordingly made by the City Sheriff of QC on certain
personal properties of the spouses at their residence in Quezon City. Auction sale
was held, and G-Tractors was awarded with the sale of such. Luis then offered to
redeem such properties for the same amount; accepted; a Deed of Reconveyance
was executed by G-Tractors.
On February 12, 1975, the Sheriff of Quezon City made a levy on "all rights,
interest, title, participation which the defendant Luis R. Narciso" may have over a
parcel of residential land of the Registry of Deeds of QC which parcel of land is
allegedly the conjugal property of the spouses Luis and Josefina. Sheriff sold at
22
public auction to the highest bidder for cash. Certificate of Sale was then issued to
G-Tractors as the highest bidder for P180,000.
On March 31, 1976, Josefina and Luis filed a complaint in CFI of Quezon City for
"declaration of nullity of levy on execution and auction sale of plaintiff's conjugal
property with damages and injunction", claiming that the conjugal property of the
plaintiffs-spouses could not be made liable considering that the subject matter
was never used for the benefit of the conjugal partnership or of the family
career or profession or suffers losses in a legitimate business, the conjugal
partnership must equally bear the indebtedness and the losses, unless he
deliberately acted to the prejudice of his family.
The sale at public auction belonging to the conjugal partnership of gains of the
Narcisos in order to satisfy the judgment debt of the private respondent Luis R.
Narciso was validly and legally made in accordance with law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conjugal property of the spouses can be held
answerable for the debt of the husband

HELD: YES, the conjugal property of the spouses can be held answerable for the
debt of the husband. CAs decision reversed and set aside

RATIO:

Article 161 of the New Civil Code provides that the conjugal partnership shall be
liable for:

(1) All the debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership

His account with petitioner G-Tractors, Inc. represents rentals for the use of
petitioner's tractors which he leased for the purpose of constructing switchroads
and hauling felled trees at the jobsite of the logging concession at del Gallego,
Camarines Sur which is not his exclusive property but that of his family. There is
no doubt then that his account with the petitioner was brought about in order to
enhance the productivity of said logging business, a commercial enterprise for
gain which he had the right to embark the conjugal partnership.

It is very clear, therefore, that the obligations were contracted in connection with
his legitimate business as a producer and exporter in mahogany logs and certainly
benefited the conjugal partnership.

The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership and as long as he

believes he is doing right to his family, he should not be made to suffer and
answer alone. So that, if he incurs an indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of his

23