G.R. No.
L-19650 Unfortunately, the Palomar, the acting Postmaster General denied
Caltex Philippines, Inc., petitioner-appellee
Vs.
Enrico Palomar, in his capacity as The Postmaster General, respondent-
appellant
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FACTS:
In the year 1960, Caltex Philippines conceived and laid the ground
work for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil
products. The contest was entitled Caltex Hooded Pump Contest, which
calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters as hooded gas
pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specific period.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the
media for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of
communications, representations were made by Caltex with the postal
authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing. This was
formalized in a letter sent by Caltex to the Post master General, dated
October 31, 1960, in which Caltex, thru its counsel, enclosed a copy of the
contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not
violate the The Anti-Lottery Provisions of the Postal Law.
Caltexs request stating that the contest scheme falls within the purview of the
Anti-lottery Provision and ultimately, declined Clatexs request for clearance.
Caltex sought reconsideration, stressing that there being no
consideration involved in part of the contestant, the contest was not
commendable as a lottery. However, the Postmaster General maintained his
view that the contest involves consideration, or even it does not involve any
consideration it still falls as Gift Enterprise, which was equally banned by
the Postal Law.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory
relief?
2. Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex the appellee is within
the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law?
HELD:
I.
By express mandate of Section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of
Court which deals with the applicability to invoke declaratory relief which
states: Declaratory relief is available to person whose rights are affected by a
statute, to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the
statute and for a declaration of rights thereunder.
In amplification, conformably established jurisprudence on the matter, laid
down certain conditions:
1. There must be a justiciable controversy.
2. The controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse.
3. The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy.
4. The issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.
With the appellees bent to hold the contest and the appellants threat to issue
a fraud order if carried out, the contenders are confronted by an ominous
shadow of imminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences are
settled and stabilized by a declaration. And, contrary to the insinuation of the
appellant, the time is long past when it can rightly be said that merely the
appellees desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others
which admittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there
was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it
was translated into a positive claim of right which is actually contested.
Construction
Is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and
intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given
case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of
the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein
just reached is not without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19
N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged in promotional
advertising was advised by the county prosecutor that its proposed sales
promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales
promotion were conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal
prosecution, it was held that the corporation was entitled to maintain a
declaratory relief action against the county prosecutor to determine the
legality of its sales promotion plan.
II.
Is the Contest Scheme a Lottery?
Lottery
Extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance
e.g. policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles and fairs as well as
various forms of gambling.
Three Essential Elements:
1. Consideration
2. Prize
3. 3. Chance
No, according to the Supreme Court, the contest scheme is not a
lottery but it appears to be more of a gratuitous distribution since nowhere in
the rules is any requirements that any fee be paid, any merchandise be
bought, any services be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the
privilege to participate. Since, a prospective contestant has to do is go to a
Caltex Station, request for the entry form which is available on demand and
accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner. Because of
this, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which would
brand it as a lottery.
Moreover, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by
chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party
receiving the chance, but it does condemn as criminal scheme in which a
valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the
chance to draw a prize.
Is the scheme, as sales promotion which would benefit the sponsor in
the way of increased patronage be considered as a consideration and
thus violates the Postal Law?
No, the required element of consideration does not consist of the
benefit derived by the sponsors of the contest. The true test lies on whether
or not the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance of winning
and not whether or not those conducting the enterprise receiver something of
value for the distribution of the prize.
Is the Contest Scheme a Gift Enterprise?
Even if the term Gift Enterprise is not yet defined explicitly, there
appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities
that the term is common applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods
are sold for their market value but by way of inducement to purchase the
product, the purchaser is given a chance to win a prize.
And thus, the term of gift enterprise cannot be established in the case
at bar since there is not sale of anything to which the chance offered is
attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all
qualified contestant irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellees
products.
The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is that
every case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the
applicable statutory provision. It is only logical that the term under a
construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is
consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith.
In the end, the Supreme Court ruled out that under the prohibitive provision of
the Postal Law, gift enterprise and similar schemes therein contemplated are
condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration.
Finding non in the contest, it was ruled out that the appellee may not be
denied the use of the mails for the purpose thereof.
G.R. No. L-8451 December 20, 1957
Lesson Applicable: Exploitation of Natural Resources (Corporate Law)
FACTS:
October 4, 1954: Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of the City
of Davao, executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land in favor of the
 Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc.(Roman), a
corporation sole organized and existing in accordance with Philippine
Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a Canadian citizen, as actual
incumbent.
The Register of Deeds of Davao for registration, having in mind a previous
resolution of the CFI in Carmelite Nuns of Davao were made to prepare
an affidavit to the effect that 60% of the members of their corp. were
Filipino citizens when they sought to register in favor of their congregation
of deed of donation of a parcel of land, required it to submit a similar
affidavit declaring the same.
June 28, 1954: Roman in the letter expressed willingness to submit an
affidavit but not in the same tenor as the Carmelite Nuns because it had
five incorporators while as a corporation sole it has only one and it was
ownership through donation and this was purchased
As the Register of the Land Registration Commissioner (LRC) : Deeds
has some doubts as to the registerability, the matter was referred to the
Land Registration Commissioner en consulta for resolution (section 4 of
Republic Act No. 1151)
LRC:
In view of the provisions of Section 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine
Constitution, the vendee was not qualified to acquire private lands in the
Philippines in the absence of proof that at least 60 per centum of the
capital, property, or assets of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator
of Davao, Inc., was actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens, there
being no question that the present incumbent of the corporation sole was
a Canadian citizen
ordered the Registered Deeds of Davao to deny registration of the deed of
sale in the absence of proof of compliance with such condition
action for mandamus was instituted by Roman alleging the land is held in
true for the benefit of the Catholic population of a place
ISSUE: W/N Roman is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands in the
Philippines pursuant to the provisions of Article XIII of the Constitution
HELD: YES. Register of Deeds of the City of Davao is ordered to register the
deed of sale
A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who
will always be one at a time), in some particular station, who are
incorporated by law in order to give them some legal capacities and
advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons
they could not have had.
In this sense, the king is a sole corporation; so is a bishop, or dens,
distinct from their several chapters
corporation sole
1. composed of only one persons, usually the head or bishop of the
diocese, a unit which is not subject to expansion for the purpose of
determining any percentage whatsoever
2. only the administrator and not the owner of the temporalities located in
the territory comprised by said corporation sole and such temporalities
are administered for and on behalf of the faithful residing in the diocese
or territory of the corporation sole
3. has no nationality and the citizenship of the incumbent and ordinary has
nothing to do with the operation, management or administration of the
corporation sole, nor effects the citizenship of the faithful connected with
their respective dioceses or corporation sole.
Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling
membership should be composed of Filipino citizens. (Register of Deeds
of Rizal vs. Ung Sui Si Temple)
undeniable proof that the members of the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith
within the territory of Davao are predominantly Filipino citizens
presented evidence to establish that the clergy and lay members of this
religion fully covers the percentage of Filipino citizens required by the
Constitution
 fact that the law thus expressly authorizes the corporations sole to receive
bequests or gifts of real properties (which were the main source that the
friars had to acquire their big haciendas during the Spanish regime), is a
clear indication that the requisite that bequests or gifts of real estate be for
charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, was, in the opinion of the
legislators, considered sufficient and adequate protection against the
revitalization of religious landholdings.
as in respect to the property which they hold for the corporation, they
stand in position of TRUSTEES and the courts may exercise the same
supervision as in other cases of trust
City of Baguio v. Marcos G.R. No. L-26100. February 28, 1969
Facts: In April 12, 1912, the director of lands in the CFI of Baguio
INSTITUTED the reopening of cadastral proceedings. In November 13, 1922,
a decision was RENDERED. The land involved was the Baguio Townsite
which was declared public land. In July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes petitioned to
reopen the civil case on the following grounds: 1) he and his predecessors
have been in continuous possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish
times; 2) his predecessors were illiterate Igorots, thus, were not able to file
their claim. On the contrary, F. Joaquin Sr., F. Joaquin Jr., and Teresita
Buchholz opposed Lutes reopening on the following grounds: 1) the
reopening was filed outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931; 2) the
petition to reopen the case was not published; and 3) as lessees of the land,
they have standing on the issue.
Issue: Whether or not the reopening of the peririon was filed outside the 40-
year period provided in RA 931, which was ENACTED on June 20, 1953
Held: The Supreme Court grabted the reopening of cadastral proceedings
Ratio: The title of RA 931 was An Act to Authorize the Filing in Proper Court
under Certain Conditions, of Certain Claims of Title to Parcels of Land that
have been Declared Public Land, by Virtue of Judicial Decisions RENDERED
within the 40 Years Next Preceding the Approval of this Act. Section 1 of the
Act reads as ..in case such parcels of land, on account of their failure to file
such claims, have been, or about to be declared land of the public domain by
virtue of judicial proceedings INSTITUTED within the 40 years next preceding
the approval of this act. If the title is to be followed, November 13, 1922 is
the date which should be followed, hence, would allow the reopening of the
case. If Section 1 is to be followed, the date of the institution of reopening of
the case which was April 12, 1912, the petition would be invalid.
StatCon maxim: The title is an indispensable part of a statute, and what may
inadequately be omitted in the text may be supplied or remedied by its title.
MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
SSANGYONG CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 170633; October 17, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless
steel products. One of its suppliers is the responded, an international trading
company with head office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in
Makati City, Philippines. The two corporations conducted business through
telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Respondent would
send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order to
petitioner; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature
on the faxed copy and sends it back to the respondent, again by fax.
Respondent filed a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In its complaint,
respondent alleged that defendants breached their contract when they
refused to open the letter of credit in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the
remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-
1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.
After respondent rested its case, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence
alleging that respondent failed to present the original copies of the pro forma
invoices on which the civil action was based. Petitioner contends that the
photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented by respondent Ssangyong to
prove the perfection of their supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in
evidence and do not fall within the ambit of R.A. No. 8792, because the law
merely admits as the best evidence the original fax transmittal. On the other
hand, respondent posits that, from a reading of the law and the Rules on
Electronic Evidence, the original facsimile transmittal of the pro forma invoice
is admissible in evidence since it is an electronic document and, therefore,
the best evidence under the law and the Rules. Respondent further claims
that the photocopies of these fax transmittals (specifically ST2-POSTS0401-
1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2) are admissible under the Rules on Evidence
because the respondent sufficiently explained the non-production of the
original fax transmittals.
Issue:
Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are
electronic evidence and admissible as such?
Held:
Electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original
document under the Best Evidence Rule, as long as it is a printout or output
readable by sight or other means, showing to reflect the data accurately.
Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be
considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the
Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an electronic data
message or an electronic document.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8792 defines the
Electronic Data Message refers to information generated, sent, received or
stored by electronic, optical or similar means, but not limited to, electronic
data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.
The phrase but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic
mail, telegram, telex or telecopy in the IRRs definition of electronic data
message is copied from the Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),
from which majority of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792 were taken. While
Congress deleted this phrase in the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the
drafters of the IRR reinstated it. The deletion by Congress of the said phrase
is significant and pivotal.
Moreover, when Congress formulated the term electronic data message, it
intended the same meaning as the term electronic record in the Canada
law. This construction of the term electronic data message, which excludes
telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with the
Electronic Commerce Laws focus on paperless communications and the
functional equivalent approach that it espouses. Facsimile transmissions are
not, in this sense, paperless, but verily are paper-based.
[I]n an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based
information or data that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed
at the receiving end. [I]n a virtual or paperless environment, technically,
there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality
are the same, in all respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the
laws definition of electronic data message, which, as aforesaid, is
interchangeable with electronic document, could not have included facsimile
transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-
based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct from each
other, and have different legal effects. While Congress anticipated future
developments in communications and computer technology when it drafted
the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and
telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development
as compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when
it defined the term electronic data message.
[T]he terms electronic data message and electronic document, as defined
under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile
transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as
electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the
Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.
136 SCRA 141 Political Law Separation of Powers SC Cannot
Legislate; Exception
Statutory Construction Determining the Purpose of the Law
Perfecto Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex
Mining Corporation who, while working at its copper mines underground
operations in Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in
that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Theircomplaint alleges that Philex,
in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately
failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men
working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant to
the Workmens Compensation Act before the Workmens Compensation
Commission. They also filed a separate civil case against Philex for damages.
Philex sought the dismissal of the civil case as it insisted that Floresca et
al have already claimed benefits under the Workmens Compensation Act.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philex is correct.
HELD: Yes. Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they
filed for benefits under the WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding
with a civil case before the regular courts. Conversely, if they sued before the
civil courts then they would also be estopped from claiming benefits under the
WCA.
HOWEVER, the Supreme Court ruled that Floresca et al are excused from
this deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then
they may have not availed of such a remedy. But, if in case theyll win in the
lower court whatever award may be granted, the amount given to them under
the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would go
strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be defeated.
Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The
spirit of the law insures mans survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare
said, the letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth life.
Justice Gutierrez dissenting
No civil suit should prosper after claiming benefits under the WCA. If
employers are already liable to pay benefits under the WCA they should not
be compelled to bear the cost of damage suits or get insurance for that
purpose. The exclusion provided by the WCA can only be properly removed
by the legislature NOT the SC.
G.R. No. L-30642 (April 30, 1985)
Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation
FACTS:
Several miners, who, while working at the copper mines underground
operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in
that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. The heirs of the deceased
claimed their benefits pursuant to the Workmens Compensation Act before
the Workmens Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before the
regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages, pointing out in the
complaint 'gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take
necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees working
underground'. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the
petitioners have already claimed benefits under the Workmens
Compensation Act, which, Philex insists, holds jurisdiction over provisions for
remedies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of the deceased have a right of selection between
availing themselves of the workers right under the Workmens Compensation
Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages
(actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence
or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively
of both actions.
RULING:
The court held that although the other petitioners had received the benefits
under the Workmens Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from
bringing an action before the regular court because they became cognizant of
the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the
deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had
petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations
by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under
the Workmens Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount
for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or
a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice.
The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before
the lower court, the payments made under the Workmens Compensation Act
should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., petitioner-appellant, vs. SOCIAL
SECURITY
COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.
G.R. No. L-16704. March 17, 1962
EN BANC, BARRERA, J.
Facts:
On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its Circular No.
22 of
the following tenor:
Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due
the System, will take into consideration and include in the Employee's
remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of
other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee's
remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions
will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month.
Herein, petitioner Victorias Milling Company protested against the circular as
contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7 dated October 7, 1957 expressly
excluding
overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers' and employees'
respective monthly premium contributions. They also raised the validity of the
circular for lack of authority on the part of the Social Security Commission to
promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication
in the
Official Gazette.
Issue:
Is Circular No. 22 a rule or regulation, as contemplated in Section 4(a) of
Republic
Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission "to adopt, amend and
repeal
subject to the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act?
Ruling:
No. There is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an
administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an
administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and
regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while
when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets
a pre-
existing law. While a rule is binding on the courts, an administrative
interpretation of
the law is at best merely advisory.
The provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term "compensation"
contained in Section 8 (f) of Republic Act No. 1161 which, before its
amendment,
reads as follows: .
(f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value
of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except (1) that part
of the remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month; (2)
bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and (3) dismissal and all other
payments which the employer may make, although not legally required to do
so.
Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of "compensation" to:
(f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value
of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except that part of
the remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the month.
Thus, prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay given
in
addition to the regular or base pay were expressly excluded, or exempted
from the
definition of the term "compensation", such exemption or exclusion was
deleted by
the amendatory law.Thereby, Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise
employers-
members of the System of
what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they
should include in determining the monthly compensation of their
employees upon
which the social security contributions should be based, and that such circular
did
not require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its
effectivity.
Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed.
Endencia v. David
GR L-6355-56, 31 August 1953 (93 Phil 696)
En Banc, Montemayor (p): 6 concur
Facts: Saturnino David, as a Collector of Internal Revenue collected income
taxes from Justices Endencia and Jugo, as Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court respectively. The lower
court held that under the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer,
85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo
and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and therefore
was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the
refund of said taxes. Respondent, through the Solicitor General contended
that the collection was done pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act 590 which
Congress enacted to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on
the salaries of judicial officers, if not to counteract the ruling on the Perfecto
Case.
Issue: Whether the Legislature may lawfully declare the collection of income
tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease
of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise.
Held: The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax on
the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his
salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise. The
interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the
exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in
enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be
interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition,
thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said
statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute
runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the
highest court of the land. In the case at bar, Section 13 of Republic Act 590
interpreted or ascertained the meaning of the phrase which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office, found in section 9, Article VIII of
the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of
interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an
invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the
Judiciary. The Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task
and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more
true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which
is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. Allowing the legislature
to interpret the law would bring confusion and instability in judicial processes
and court decisions.
Further, under the Philippine system of constitutional government, the
Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The
Executive department is charged with the execution or carrying out of the
provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws
belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret
and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can
determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and
ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of
the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two,
because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared
invalid and unconstitutional. Therefore, the doctrine laid down in the case of
Perfecto vs. Meer to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary
of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution, is
reiterated.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, affirming the ruling in Perferto v.
Meer and holding the interpretation and application of laws belong to the
Judiciary.
MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
Posted by kaye lee on 1:16 PM
G.R. No. 88211 September 15 1989
FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in
Hawaii, USA, sought to return to the Philippines. The call is about to request
of Marcos family to order the respondents to issue travel order to them and to
enjoin the petition of the President's decision to bar their return to the
Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive
power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase,
however, does not define what is meant by executive power although the
same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the President such
as appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices(Section 17), power to grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty making power(Section
21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section 22), informing
power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to
be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution.
Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor
judicial has to be executive.
IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of
the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief
to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless
violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-
crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period
only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a
petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and
void and unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of
calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint
visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy
over the military and the civilian character of the PNP
Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent
provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call
out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a
different category from the power to declare martial law and power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of
the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and
provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights
the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in
using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more
benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the
curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual
freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the
Court.
the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is
lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the
military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members
of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of.
Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not
destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
G.R. No. L-22228 February 27, 1969
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU) SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-PAFLU, AL FAJARDO
AND ALL THE OTHER MEMBERS AND OFFICERS OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-PAFLU v. THE

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary

SECRETARY OF LABOR, THE DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS and
power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is
incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally
bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy THE REGISTRAR OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no
justification for calling out the armed forces. FACTS: The Registration of Labor Organization (Registrar) rendered a

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, decision cancelling the SSSEAs Registration Certificate No. 1-IP169 for
the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II
of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a failure to submit the following:
breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The 1. Failure to furnish the Bureau of Labor Relations with copies of the reports
local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times,
the real authority belonging to the PNP
on the finances of that union duly verified by affidavits which its treasurer or

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake
treasurers rendered to said union and its members covering the periods from 1. Non-subversive affidavits of Messrs. Teodoro Sison, Alfonso Atienza,

September 24, 1960 to September 23, 1961 and September 24, 1961 to Rodolfo Zalameda, Raymundo Sabino and Napoleon Pefianco who were

September 23, 1962, inclusive, within sixty days of the 2 respective latter elected along with others on January 30, 1962.

dates, which are the end of its fiscal year; and

2. Names, postal addresses and non-subversive affidavits of all the officers

2. Failure to submit to this office the names, postal addresses and non- who were supposedly elected on October (1st Sunday), of its constitution and

subversive affidavits of the officers of that union within sixty days of their by-laws.

election in October (1st Sunday), 1961 and 1963, in conformity with Article IV

(1) of its constitution and by-laws. Alfredo Fajardo, president of the SSSEA moved for a reconsideration of said

decision and prayed for time, up to November 15, within which to submit the

On the following day, Manuel Villagracia, Assistant Secretary of the SSSEA requisite papers and data. An opposition thereto having been filed by one

filed with the Office of the Registrar, a letter enclosing documents that Paulino Escueta, a member of the SSSEA, upon the ground that the latter

supposed to comply with the abovementioned requirements, but the Registrar had never submitted any financial statement to its members, said motion was

found out that the following are still not complied with: heard on November 27, 1963. Subsequently, or on December 4, 1963, the

Registrar issued an order declaring that the SSSEA had failed to submit the

abovementioned requirements and granting the SSSEA 15 days from notice

to comply with said requirements, as well as meanwhile holding in abeyance affected by said cancellation, although its juridical personality and its statutory

the resolution of its motion for reconsideration. rights and privileges as distinguished from those conferred by the

Constitution would be suspended thereby.

ISSUE: Whether or not the effect of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 (Any To be registered, pursuant to Section 23(b) of Republic Act No. 875, a labor

labor organization, association or union of workers duly organized for the organization, association or union of workers must file with the Department of

material, intellectual and moral well being of its members shall acquire legal Labor the following documents:

personality and be entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by law to

legitimate labor organizations within thirty days of filing with the office of the (1) A copy of the constitution and by-laws of the organization together with a

Secretary of Labor notice of its due organization and existence and the list of all officers of the association, their addresses and the address of the

following documents, together with the amount of five pesos as registration principal office of the organization;

fee, except as provided in paragraph d of this section:) unduly curtails the

freedom of assembly and association guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. (2) A sworn statement of all the officers of the said organization, association

RULING: There is no incompatibility between Republic Act No. 875 and the or union to the effect that they are not members of the Communist Party and

Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Upon the other hand, the cancellation that they are not members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of

of the SSSEAs registration certificate would not entail a dissolution of said the Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method; and

association or its suspension. The existence of the SSSEA would not be


(3) If the applicant organization has been in existence for one or more years,
a copy of its last annual financial report.
Moreover, paragraph (d) of said-Section ordains that:
The registration and permit of a legitimate labor organization shall be
cancelled by the Department of Labor, if the Department has reason to
believe that the labor organization no longer meets one or more of the
requirements of paragraph (b) above; or fails to file with the Department
Labor either its financial report within the sixty days of the end of its fiscal
year or the names of its new officers along with their non-subversive affidavits
as outlined in paragraph (b) above within sixty days of their election; however,
the Department of Labor shall not order the cancellation of the registration
and permit without due notice and hearing, as provided under paragraph (c)
above and the affected labor organization shall have the same right of appeal
to the courts as previously provided.
G.R. No. 191017; November 15, 2011
CONSTANCIO F. MENDOZA, Petitioner, v. SENEN C. FAMILARA and
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
FACTS:
This petition questions the constitutionality of Section 2[1] of Republic Act No.
9164 (entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as amended,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991"). As other
barangay officials had done in previous cases, petitioner Constancio F.
Mendoza (Mendoza) likewise questions the retroactive application of the
three-consecutive term limit imposed on barangay elective officials beginning
from the 1994 barangay elections.
Mendoza was a candidate for Barangay Captain of Barangay Balatasan,
Oriental Mindoro in the 29 October 2007 Barangay Elections. As required by
law, Mendoza filed a certificate of candidacy. Prior thereto, Mendoza had
been elected as Barangay Captain of Barangay Balatasan for three (3)
consecutive terms.
On 26 October 2007, respondent Senen C. Familara (Familara) filed a
Petition to Disqualify Mendoza averring that Mendoza, under Section 2 of RA
No. 9164, is ineligible to run again for Barangay Captain of Barangay
Balatasan, having been elected and having served, in the same position for
three (3) consecutive terms immediately prior to the 2007 Barangay Elections.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not Section 2 [1] of RA No. 9164 is constitutional
II. Whether or not Section 2 [1] of RA No. 9164 may be applied
retroactively
HELD:
In COMELEC v. Cruz settles, the Court ruled that the constitutionality of the
three-consecutive term limit rule no retroactive application was made because
the three-term limit has been there all along as early as the second barangay
law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987 Constitution took effect; it was continued
under the Local Government Code and can still be found in the current law.
We find this obvious from a reading of the historical development of the law.
The first law that provided a term limitation for barangay officials was RA No.
6653 (1988); it imposed a two-consecutive term limit. After only six months,
Congress, under RA No. 6679 (1988), changed the two-term limit by
providing for a three-consecutive term limit. This consistent imposition of the
term limit gives no hint of any equivocation in the congressional intent to
provide a term limitation. Thereafter, RA No. 7160 - the LGC - followed,
bringing with it the issue of whether it provided, as originally worded, for a
three-term limit for barangay officials. We differ with the RTC analysis of this
issue.
Section 43 is a provision under Title II of the LGC on Elective Officials. Title II
is divided into several chapters dealing with a wide range of subject matters,
all relating to local elective officials, as follows: a. Qualifications and Election
(Chapter I); b. Vacancies and Succession (Chapter II); c. Disciplinary Actions
(Chapter IV) and d. Recall (Chapter V). Title II likewise contains a chapter on
Local Legislation (Chapter III).
These Title II provisions are intended to apply to all local elective officials,
unless the contrary is clearly provided. A contrary application is provided with
respect to the length of the term of office under Section 43(a); while it applies
to all local elective officials, it does not apply to barangay officials whose
length of term is specifically provided by Section 43(c). In contrast to this clear
case of an exception to a general rule, the three-term limit under Section
43(b) does not contain any exception; it applies to all local elective officials
who must perforce include barangay officials.
An alternative perspective is to view [Section] 43(a), (b) and (c) separately
from one another as independently standing and self-contained provisions,
except to the extent that they expressly relate to one another. Thus, [Section]
43(a) relates to the term of local elective officials, except barangay officials
whose term of office is separately provided under Sec. 43(c). [Section] 43(b), [T]his suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is

by its express terms, relates to all local elective officials without any substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in the first case
[decision in G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, 232
exception. Thus, the term limitation applies to all local elective officials without
SCRA 110 (1994)) invalidating the Contract of Lease between the Philippine
any exclusion or qualification.
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management
Corp. (PGMC)]. Petitioners maintain (1) that the Equipment Lease Agreement
All these inevitably lead to the conclusion that the challenged proviso has (ELA) is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges of a joint venture
been there all along and does not simply retroact the application of the three- which were found in the Contract of Lease nullified in the prior case; (2) that
term limit to the barangay elections of 1994. Congress merely integrated the the ELA did not have to be submitted to a public bidding because it fell within
the exception provided in E.O. No. 301, 1 (e); (3) that the power to
past statutory changes into a seamless whole by coming up with the
determine whether the ELA is advantageous to the government is vested in
challenged proviso.
the Board of Directors of the PCSO; (4) that for lack of funds the PCSO
cannot purchase its own on-line lottery equipment and has had to enter into a
With this conclusion, the respondents constitutional challenge to the proviso lease contract; (5) that what petitioners are actually seeking in this suit is to
based on retroactivity must fail. further their moral crusade and political agenda, using the Court as their
forum.
ISSUE:
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A.
Whether or not the ELA between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO,
and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. is invalid.
EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE,
HELD:
CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE
NO. Petition for prohibition, review and/or injunction was dismissed. Pertinent
CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN.
to the issue, the SC held:
WIGBERTO TAADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners,
xxx
vs.
(3) that the ELA is valid as a lease contract under the Civil Code and is not
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine
contrary to the charter of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office;
Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the PHILIPPINE GAMING
(4) that under 1(A) of its charter (R.A. 1169), the Philippine Charity
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Sweepstakes Office has authority to enter into a contract for the holding of an
Ponente: MENDOZA
FACTS:
on-line lottery, whether alone or in association, collaboration or joint venture
with another party, so long as it itselfholds or conducts such lottery; and
(5) That the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) in question did not have to
be submitted to public bidding as a condition for its validity.
RATIO:
E.O. No. 301, 1 applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies,
materials and equipment. It does not refer to contracts of lease of equipment
like the ELA. The provisions on lease are found in 6 and 7 but they refer to
the lease of privately-owned buildings or spaces for government use or of
government-owned buildings or spaces for private use, and these provisions
do not require public bidding. It is thus difficult to see how E.O. No. 301 can
be applied to the ELA when the only feature of the ELA that may be thought
of as close to a contract of purchase and sale is the option to buy given to the
PCSO. An option to buy is not of course a contract of purchase and sale.
Indeed the question is not whether compared with the former joint venture
agreement the present lease contract is [more] advantageous to the
government. The question is whether under the circumstances, the ELA is
the most advantageous contract that could be obtained compared with similar
lease agreements which the PCSO could have made with other parties.
Petitioners have not shown that more favorable terms could have been
obtained by the PCSO or that at any rate the ELA, which the PCSO
concluded with the PGMC, is disadvantageous to the government.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
PADILLA, concurring
I join the majority in voting for the dismissal of the petition in this case.
As to whether or not the ELA is grossly disadvantageous to the government, it
should be stressed that the matter involves, basically, a policy
determination by the executive branch which this Court should not ordinarily
reverse or substitute with its own judgment, in keeping with the time honored
doctrine of separation of powers.
VITUG, concurring
I most humbly reiterate the separate opinion I have made in Kilosbayan, Inc.,
et al., vs. Teofisto Guingona, Sr., etc., et al. (G.R. No. 113375, promulgated
on 05 May 1994).
Back to the core of the petition, however, the matter of the legal standing of
petitioners in their suit assailing the subject-contract appears to me, both
under substantive law and the rules of procedure, to still be an insuperable
issue. I have gone over carefully the pleadings submitted in G.R. No. 118910,
and I regret my inability to see anything new that can convince me to depart
from the view I have expressed on it in G.R. No. 113375.
FELICIANO, dissenting
With very great respect, it is submitted that the above conclusion has been
merely assumed rather than demonstrated and that what is in fact before this
Court does not adequately support such conclusion.
REGALADO, dissenting
I am constrained to respectfully dissent from the majority opinion premised on
the constitutional and procedural doctrines posed and interpreted in tandem
therein. I also regret that I have to impose on the majority with this virtual
turno en contra when I could have indicated my disaccord by just joining Mr.
Justice Davide in his commendably objective presentation of the minority
position. I feel, however, that certain views that have been advanced require
a rejoinder lest they lapse into the realm of unanimous precedents.
DAVIDE, dissenting
I register a dissenting vote.
I am disturbed by the sudden reversal of our rulings in Kilosbayan, Inc., et al.
vs. Guingona, et al. (hereinafter referred to as the first lotto case) regarding
the application or interpretation of the exception clause in paragraph B,
Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO (R.A.. No. 1169), as amended by B.P.
Blg. 442, and on the issue of locus standi of the petitioners to question the
contract of lease involving the on-line lottery system entered into between the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC). Such reversal upsets the salutary
doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, and stare decisis. It puts to
jeopardy the faith and confidence of the people, specially the lawyers and
litigants, in the certainty and stability of the pronouncements of this Court. It
opens the floodgates to endless litigations for re-examination of such
pronouncements and weakens this Courts judicial and moral authority to
demand from lower courts obedience thereto and to impose sanctions for
their opposite conduct.
KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO
G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.
FACTS:
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement
(ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to
PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per
terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease
is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the
facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment
for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid
because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA
was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is
violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of
the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has
become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the
Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if
ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO
does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade.
Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the
contract
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have standing?
HELD:
NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the
standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real
parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved.
LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the
same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the
ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties
are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot
still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a
former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between
the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not
apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are
involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction
identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first
proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an
independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a
different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of
the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and
here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate
issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.
Peralta v. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. 95832. August 10, 1992]
28AUG
FACTS
Pursuant to Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) which conferred upon
the Commissioner of Civil Service toprescribe, amend and enforce suitable
rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of this Civil Service
Law, the Commission interpreted provisions of Republic Act No. 2625
amending the Revised Administrative Code and adopted a policy that when
an employee who was on leave of absence without pay on a day before or on
a day time immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, he is also
considered on leave of absence without pay on such Saturday, Sunday or
Holiday. Petitioner Peralta, affected by the said policy, questioned the said
administrative interpretation.
ISSUES
Whether or not the Civil Service Commissions interpretative construction is:
(1) valid and constitutional.
(2) binding upon the courts.
RULING
(1) NO. The construction by the respondent Commission of R.A. 2625 is
not in accordance with the legislative intent. R.A. 2625 specifically
provides that government employees are entitled to leaves of absence
with full pay exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays. The law
speaks of the granting of a right and the law does not provide for a
distinction between those who have accumulated leave credits and those
who have exhausted their leave credits in order to enjoy such right. Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.The fact remains that
government employees, whether or not they have accumulated leave
credits, are not required by law to work on Saturdays, Sundays and
Holidays and thus they can not be declared absent on such non-working
days. They cannot be or are not considered absent on non-working days;
they cannot and should not be deprived of their salary corresponding to
said non-working days just because they were absent without pay on the
day immediately prior to, or after said non-working days. A different rule
would constitute a deprivation of property without due process.
(2) NO. Administrative construction, is not necessarily binding upon the
courts. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside
by the judicial department if there is an error of law, or abuse of power or
lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with
either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. When an
administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a
statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the
administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory, for it is the
courts that finally determine what the law means.
The general rule vis-a-vis legislation is that an unconstitutional act is not a
law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had
never been passed.
But, as held in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter State Bank:
. . . . It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The
actual existence of a statute, prior to such determination is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate; and
particular conduct, private and official.

To allow all the affected government employees, similarly situated as

petitioner herein, to claim their deducted salaries resulting from the past
enforcement of the herein invalidated CSC policy, would cause quite a heavy
financial burden on the national and local governments considering the length
of time that such policy has been effective. Also, administrative and practical
considerations must be taken into account if this ruling will have a strict
restrospective application. The Court, in this connection, calls upon the
respondent Commission and the Congress of the Philippines, if necessary, to
handle this problem with justice and equity to all affected government
employees.

Lopez publisher and owner of Manila Chronicle and Gatbonton (Editor)

v. Court of Appeals and Cruz (1970)
Ponente: Fernando, J.
 Facts:
o January 1956 Front-page story on the Manila Chronicle Fidel Cruz,
sanitary inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands, sent distress signals to
US Airforce planes which forwarded such message to Manila
o An American Army plane dropped emergency sustenance kits on the beach
of the island which contained, among other things, a two way radio set. Using
the radio set Cruz reported to the authorities in Manila that the locals were
living in terror due to a series of killings committed on the island since
Christmas of 1955.
o Philippine defense forces (scout rangers) were immediately deployed to the
babuyan claro. They were led by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion who discovered
that Cruz only fabricated the story about the killings to get attention. Cruz
merely wanted transportation home to Manila.
o Major Encarnacion branded the fiasco as a hoax the same word to be
used by the newspapers who covered the same
o January 13, 1956 - This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, edited by
Gatbonton devoted a pictorial article to it. It claimed that despite the story of
Cruz being a hoax it brought to light the misery of the people living in that
place, with almost everybody sick, only 2 individuals able to read and write
and food and clothing being scarce
o January 29, 1956 - This Week Magazine in the "January News Quiz" made
reference to Cruz as a health inspector who suddenly felt "lonely" in his
isolated post, cooked up a story about a murderer running loose on the island
of Calayan so that he could be ferried back to civilization. Called it Hoax
of the year
o In both issues photos of a Fidel Cruz were published but both photos were of a
different person of the same name Fidel G. Cruz former mayor, business
man, contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan
o January 27, 1957 published statements correcting their misprint and
explained that confusion and error happened due to the rush to meet the Jan
13th issues deadline
o Cruz sued herein petitioners for libel in CFI Manila. Cruz won and was
awarded P11,000 in damages (5k actual, 5k moral, 1k attorneys fees)
o CA affirmed CFI decision hence this case
Issue:
o WON petitioners should be held liable for their error in printing the
wrong Fidel Cruzs photo in relation to the hoax of the year?
o WON such error is sufficient ground for an action for libel to prosper?
Held:
Yes they are liable but damages awarded to Cruz is reduced to
P1,000.00
Ratio:
1. Mistake is no excuse to absolve publishers because libel is harmful on its
face by the fact that it exposes the injured party to more than trivial ridicule,
whether it is fact or opinion is irrelevant.
o Citing Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui libel is "malicious defamation, expressed
either in writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, ..., tending to
blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or
 reputation, or publish the alleged or natural defects of one who is alive, and
thereby "pose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule,"
o Citing standard treatise of Newell on Slander and Libel "Publication of a
person's photograph in connection with an article libelous of a third person, is
a libel on the person whose picture is published, where the acts set out in the
article are imputed to such person."
o In this case 3rd person was Cruz his picture being published beside the
article imputes him as the purveyor of the hoax of the year
2. Libel cannot be used to curtail press freedom however it also can not claim
any talismanic immunity form constitutional limitations
o State interest in press freedom citing Justice Malcolm: Full discussion of
public affairs is necessary for the maintenance of good governance Public
officials must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comments on official
actsof course criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as
an individual is less than the state, so must expected criticism be born for the
common good.
o So long as it was done in good faith, the press should have the legal right to
have and express their opinions on legal questions. To deny them that right
would be to infringe upon freedom of the press.
o Last word on the subject Citing Quisumbing v. Lopez: Press should be
given leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively
perform their important role in our democracy
o Freedom of the press ranks high in the hierarchy of legal values
o TEST of LIABLITY must prove there was actual malice in publishing the
story/photo! (Note: but this was not done in this case)
4. Citing Concepcion, CJ. Correction of error in publishing does not wipe
out the responsibility arising from the publication of the original article
o Correction = Mitigating circumstance not a justifying circumstance!
Dissent: Dizon, J.
o Manila Chronicle should be absolved because:
o No evidence of actual malice
o The article does not ascribe anything immoral or any moral turpitude to Cruz
o The negligence performed by Manila Chronicle is this case should be
considered excusable negligence
Equal Protection Oil Deregulation Law
Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the
government has always been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The
government created laws accommodate these innovations in the oil industry.
One such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180.
This law allows that any person or entity may import or purchase any
quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic
source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil
facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement,
subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails the
constitutionality of the law. He claims, among others, that the imposition of
different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum
products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7%
tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and
discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry
who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined
petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined crude
products and 7% on refined crude products.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.
attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players
belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our
downstream oil industry is an idle dream.
RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated
against the new players insofar as it placed them at a competitive
disadvantage vis--vis the established oil companies by requiring them to
meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter.

HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it

violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It violated that provision because
it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free competition. It cannot be
denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an
oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the
only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the
lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of
existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore
works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff
differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their
competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players
that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by
building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who
will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge
disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing
on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable
because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart
before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be