8th November, 2016

Report No. SS-144/2016

lR; eso t;rs

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
MINISTRY OF RAILWAYS

Report on incidence of non

dropping of VPR of Track
Section controlling berthing
portion after the passage of
train , @ RH 38 in Palwal -
Rundhi section of Agra
Division,
North Central Railway

Report No.: SS-144/2016

8th November, 2016

Research Designs & Standards Organisation

Manak Nagar, Lucknow-226011

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INDEX

S. No. Contents Page No.

1. Event as reported by NCR 3- 4

2. Simulation of Test scenarios 4-6
3. Observations Simulated Test scenarios 6 - 10
4. Inference during Lab testing 10
5. Safety Case 10 - 11
6. Summary 11
7. Possibility of Incidence 12
8. Suggestion 12 15
9. Action Plan 15
10. Current Status 15

List of Annexure

Annex
1 CSTE/NCRs letter dt. 27.05.2016 16 - 17
2 CSE/NCRs letter dt. 26.06.2016 18
3 Letter to CEL dt 14.07.2016 19
4 Letter to GG Tronics dt 14.07.2016 20
5 Copy of safety case [ M/s CEL] 21 - 35

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1.0 North Central Railway vide letter [annexure-1] reported an unusual

incident of SSDAC.

1.1 Event as reported by Railway

1.1.1 VPR of Track Section controlling berthing portion of Signal didnt drop
after the passage of train 13008 on 24.06.2016. As a result, Signal was
showing GREEN with the train on berthing track portion of Automatic
Signal A76A @ RH 38 in Palwal - Rundhi section of Agra Division, North
Central Railway.

1.1.2 As per NCR report the wheel sensor (receiver portion) of M/s GG
Tronics SSDAC, was lying broken after being crushed by some boulder
on the train movement. It is reported that some miscreant has put
boulder on receiver coil and in between rail head creating such a
situation causing crushing of track device and creating such scenario.

1.2 Photos of the Unusual incidence (failure) reported by NCR

Broken Wheel Sensor

Broken Wheel Sensor

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Damaged mark on the Wheel

Sensor

Damaged broken centre

BOLT with BEND

Note: Although this observed scenario is already discussed in the safety case of M/s
CEL and other OEMs hazards log under the category of SABOTAGE while
designing the system. However, being a safety related issue and its criticality; it
has been taken-up as a special case, for detailed analysis/investigation.

2.0 Simulation of Test scenarios

Based on the incident reported by NCR, simulation tests were carried out in Signal lab at
RDSO for all approved axle counter systems.

2.1.1 M/s GGTronics make SSDAC [Indigenous]

2.1.2 M/s CEL Make SSDAC [Indigenous]

2.1.3 M/s Medha make SSDAC [Indigenous]

2.1.4 M/s Thales make SSDAC [Cross approved]

2.1.5 M/s Siemens make MSDAC [Cross approved]

2.1.6 M/s Frauscher make MSDAC [Cross approved]

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2.1 The various test scenarios were simulated on SSDAC/MSDAC of

existing approved vendors as detailed below:

2.2 Test scenarios (simulated)

2.2.1 Scenario 1:
Loosen the Track Device and tilt one side

2.2.2 Scenario 2 :
Put the Track Device on rail foot.

2.2.3 Scenario 3:
Put the Track Device below the rail foot.

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2.2.4 Scenario 4:
Take the Track Device receiver carefully 6 to 10 inches away.

2.2.5 Scenario-:
Take the track device receiver carefully and put the Track Device
inverted away from rail.

3 Observations On Simulated Test scenarios

Simulation tests were carried out in Signal lab at RDSO/Lucknow and observations
noticed on the various DAC systems are as below

3.1 M/s GG Tronicss Make SSDAC

Observations noticed on M/s GG Tronics make SSDAC

In M/s GG Tronicss SSDAC system VR does not drop in 2 conditions (scenarios)

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3.1.1 Condition -1 :
Sensor receiver taken beneath the foot of the rail or around 4 to 6
inches away from the Rail very carefully.

Result:
System does not go into error.
VR remains pick up (CLEAR) condition
No counting even when simulation of train movement
(through dummy wheel) takes place.

3.1.2 Condition-2 :
Wheel sensor (RX) is removed from the rail in CLEAR state and taken
away about 6 inches and kept inverted position with great caution. VR
remains in picked up condition. (This was possibly the scenario which
happened in NCR case)

Pulse shape noticed @ Lab

Result:
When movement with Dummy wheel on the rail was done the
VR remains in picked up condition ().

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3.2 M/s CELs Make SSDAC

Observations noticed on M/s CEL make SSDAC
M/s CELs SSDAC system VR does not drop in 1 condition (scenario)
3.2.1 Condition
Sensor receiver is taken away and kept beneath the foot of the rail or
around 4 to 6 inches with very carefully.

Observations [Result]:
System does not go into error.
VR remains in picked up (CLEAR) condition
No counting takes place even with simulation of train movement with
Dummy wheel.

3.3 M/s Thaless Make SSDAC

Observations noticed on M/s Thales make SSDAC
M/s Thaless SSDAC system VR does not drop in 1 condition (scenario)

3.3.1 If both the RX sensors are taken away together very carefully beneath
the foot of the rail or around 4 to 6 inches away

System does not go into error.

VR remains in picked up (CLEAR) condition
No counting takes place even with simulation of train movement with Dummy
wheel.

However happening of this scenario is highly remote and cannot

happen/simulated in the field due to its design feature of using two
separate track sensors (splitted track sensor)

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3.4 M/s Medhas Make SSDAC

Observations noticed on M/s MEDHA SSDAC

3.4.1 In M/s Medha make SSDAC no such scenario was possible and if any such
scenarios are created by any means, system goes into Error mode within 2
seconds.

M/s MEDHAs SSDAC

3.5 M/s Siemenss Make MSDAC

Observations noticed on M/s Siemens MSDAC

3.5.1 Sensor is removed from rail & Kept on foot of the rail.
System normally goes to error.
However if it is done very carefully, then system remains in clear condition
i.e VR remains in picked up condition.
If movement is done with dummy wheel counting does not take place.

Track sensor of M/s Siemens

However, this scenario is very difficult to simulate in the field

due to its cable connection to the track sensor and its mounting
arrangements with sensors (mechanical mounting arrangements with
track sensors)

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3.6 M/s Frauschers Make MSDAC

Observations noticed on M/s Frauschers Axle Counter

3.6.1 Testing on M/s Frauschers Axle Counter

If sensor is removed from rail claw & kept on the foot of the rail, immediately VR
drops.

4.0 From the above tests/simulations carried out in the RDSO/Lab considering
the wheel sensors are removed from the Rail and kept at ground carefully
in CLEAR condition, it is observed that the reported situation is prevailing
in the systems of two OEMs i.e. M/s CEL and M/s GGTronics.

Accordingly for further understanding , the safety documents of OEMs were also
scrutinized in addition to tests/simulations done in Signal lab.

5.0 Safety Case

5.1 Scrutiny of safety case
5.1.1 M/s CEL:
In the safety case (CEL.s DAC SAD 01 doc) of M/s CEL, Sahibabad this scenario
pertaining to axle detectors has been deliberated under the category of
sabotage.
The relevant important para of the safety case pertaining to this isuues is as
under

There is a possibility of sabotage leading to UNSAFE side Failure if axle

sensors are systematically removed from rails and kept outside with
intact flux linkage.
( Annexure- 5)

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5.2 M/s GGTronics

There is no direct discussion on such condition in their safety document
however under operation and maintenance table 2-5 certain design features
are discussed for external meddling of the cables/equipments etc.

5.3 M/s Thales

In the safety documents of M/s Thales this issues is highlighted in generic

form in Safety Application Condition - 36 i.e Unauthorized Access and it
states that

It is the responsibility of the operator to ensure that the fail-safe equipment is

protected from unauthorized access.
Sabotage and unauthorized shall be prevented

6.0 Summary
All the tests have been conducted by creating carefully the similar (to the
extent) situation (As reported in NCR) in RDSO/Signal lab.

However from the tests, it is observed that similar situation could be created
in M/s GGT and CELs make SSDAC.

In case of Thales and Siemens it was possible with lot of care. In Thales the
sensors are in 2 pieces which reduces the possibility of occurrence of such
incidence hence no change is required. In Siemens practically it was very
difficult to simulate in the field due to mechanical mounting arrangements
with track sensors, hence no change is required.

In case of Medha and Frauscher make SSDAC practically it could not be

simulated / created.

Practically the possibility of happening such failure is remote due to

Wheel being detected before sensor is hit and placed at a distance.
Vibrations due to movement-Pulsating.

7.0 Although the possibility of this kind of incidence is highly remote in practical
conditions however having known based on the scenarios created in RDSO Signal lab ,
M/s GGTronics , Bangalore & M/s CEL, Sahibabad were advised vide letter dt
14.07.2016 to submit their comments along with their action plan to mitigate the
scenario- reported by NC Railway.

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8.0 Suggestions
8.1 Mitigation Plan 1
Provisions of stainless strip clamp as proposed by GGT
This is a temporary arrangement to mitigate the issue.
Using Spring Clamp :
Spring type clamp can be fixed to hold the Tx and Rx Wheel sensors. Hence,
falling of Rx wheel sensor can be avoided in damage condition. Spring clamp
will be fixed to the center bolt for higher tension.

Disadvantage
1. It is a difficult to fix at site because first balast needs to be removed and
then it may be clamped from bottom of the rail.
2. It attracts pilferage.
3. Maintenance of axle detector becomes cumbersome and requires
additional time.

8.2 Mitigation Plan 2

Use of Industrial Switch as proposed by GGT & CEL:

Availability / Presence of the wheel sensor will be proven by the Limit switch
which makes the contact between Rail and wheel sensor.

Disadvantage:
1. It will require trials to ensure the functionality/workability of Switch.

2. There is a possibility of non-functioning of switch contact due to stuck-up

state and may lead to failures.

3. This will hamper the reliability.

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8.3 Mitigation Plan 3

Focusing of the flux density
Covering the receiver coil by metal plate around the RX sensors to increase the
sensitivity.
This action does not mitigate the whole situation but, can mitigate the possibility
of noticed failure.

Photo-M/S GG TRonics proposed sensor Photo- M/S CEL existing Sensor

A photograph of newly developed Rx Coil using metal plate (M/s GG Tronicss axle
detector)
However, M/s CEL Rx is already having this arrangement. RX coil chipped to see
aluminum.

Disadvantage:
Primarily there is no disadvantage due to this arrangement however this needs to be
tried in field after a proto type is developed by GG Tronics.

8.4 Mitigation Plan 4

Receiver in 2 pieces
Receiver in two parts like Thales make, will reduce the probability of observed failure
because happening of such incidence with splitt sensors is very remote.

Disadvantage:

1. This change may affect the reliability in Indigenous products. (Thales

mechanical design is very robust).

2. This change will require climatic testing as well as extensive trials before
permitting for global use.

M/s CEL make Axle counter M/s GGT make Axle counter
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8.5 Mitigation Plan 5

Controlling the upper limit of Supervisory/Level detector
(As suggested by GGT)
Controlling the upper limit of Supervisory, because it is observed during testing in
RDSO/Signal lab that when the RX sensor is taken down the flux / Rx
voltage/supervisory voltage increases.

Disadvantage:

1. Primarily there is no disadvantage due to this arrangement.

2. This change will require field trials before permitting for global use.

9.0 Action Plan

1. Both the firms have been advised to develop a prototype axle detector to overcome the
problem.

2. Once prototype is developed it will be tested in lab and will be put on field trial.

3. In addition to above the new system will be revalidated for hardware/softaware fail safety
by Independent agency before approving for regular use.

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10.0 Current Status:

10.1 M/s GGTronics:-

After the reporting of incidence, several round of testings were done in the signal
lab and at site to simulate and observe the condition.

Based on the observations during the various testings and suggestion given by
RDSO M/s GGTronics demonstrated their modified software S003 and axle
detector 21/22.09.16.

In the new software and axle detector following main changes have been
incorporated:
(i) softawre upgaradtion S003 was already under process to improve the
reliability, same is further modified to mitigate this condiotion.

(ii) Focuusing of flux by covering the RX coils with metallic shielding

(iii) Controlling the upper limit of Supervisory/Level detector. (A hardware

change)

10.2 M/s CEL:-

M/s CEL has designed a circuit for additionally taking care of the situation wher
the axle detectors / sensors are deliberately and carefully removed away from
the rail. This circuit is demostrated at RDSO lab and needs to be validated and
trialed out at field.

--------------------x---x--------------------

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Annexure-1

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Annexure-2

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Annexure - 3

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Annexure - 4

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Annexure-5

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