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No. 16-1294
Appellee,
v.
KELVIN MRQUEZ-GARCA,
Defendant, Appellant.
Before
July 5, 2017
SELYA, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Kelvin
I.
For this offense, the district court imposed a fresh 48-month term
term.
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district court convened a revocation hearing, at which the
range (GSR) at four to ten months, see id. 7B1.4(a). Because the
bottom of the GSR. The government asked for a sentence at the top
II.
one by one.
A.
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States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). But when a party has failed to
States v. Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d 223, 226 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not only
F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001). Because the appellant raises his
section 3583(e) claim for the first time on appeal, our review is
See United States v. Vargas-Dvila, 649 F.3d 129, 131 (1st Cir.
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3553(a)(2)(C). Although a sentencing court must consider each
States v. Dixon, 449 F.3d 194, 205 (1st Cir. 2006). Rather, the
court need only identify the principal factors upon which it relies
the risk that his recidivist behavior posed to the community, and
the need to deter future criminal conduct. The fact that the court
did not explicitly mention the rest of the section 3583(e) factors
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B.
issue with the court's reliance on the serious nature of his new
offense and the risk that his criminal behavior posed to the
itself.
and the need "to protect the public from further crimes of the
revocation sentence.1
1
To the extent that the appellant's contention can be read
as arguing that the court could not use his new offense conduct
both as a basis for sentencing him in connection with the new
offense and as a basis for sentencing him in connection with the
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C.
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D.
Del Valle-Rodrguez, 761 F.3d 171, 177 (1st Cir. 2014). Instead,
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Cir. 2016). This proposition has special bite when one considers
the celerity with which the appellant procured another gun while
analogous circumstances).
794 F.3d 162, 166 (1st Cir. 2015) (observing that sentencing court
"need only identify the main factors behind its decision"). For
district court did not commit plain error in explaining its reasons
E.
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for claims of substantive unreasonableness is "somewhat blurred."
similar assumption).
(1st Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 96
(1st Cir. 2008)). There are typically "a broad range of reasonable
F.3d at 92.
the short time that had elapsed between the appellant's release
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self-serving suggestion, this rationale goes well beyond a mere
release for less than a year when he was arrested on the felon-
stern, the court acted within the wide encincture of its discretion
of discretion.
III.
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