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Case No. 01 ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC should conduct a

Yra v. Abao special registration as asked by the petitioners.
G.R. No. 30187, November 15, 1928
HELD: No. The right of suffrage invoked by petitioners
FACTS: Maximo Abao is a native of the municipality is not at all absolute. The exercise of the right of
of Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the proper age, he suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights is
transferred to Manila to complete his education. Abao subject to existing substantive and procedural
returned to Meycauayan to live. From May 10, 1927, requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute
until the present, Abao has considered himself a books and other repositories of law. Section 8, of the
resident of Meycauayan. When the 1928 elections R.A. 8189 (Voters Registration Act) ,explicitly provides
were approaching, he made an application for that, No registration shall, however, be conducted
cancellation of registration in Manila which was dated during the period starting one hundred twenty (120)
April 3, 1928, but this application was rejected by the days before a regular election and ninety (90) days
city officials for the reason that it was not deposited in before a special election. The 100-day prohibitive
the mails on or before April 4, 1928. Nevertheless period serves a vital role in protecting the integrity of
Abao presented himself as a candidate for municipal the registration process. Without the prohibitive
president of Meycauayan in the 1928 elections and periods, the COMELEC would be deprived of any time
was elected by popular vote to that office. The to evaluate the evidence on the application. If we
petitioner, Marcos Yra, the vice-president elect of compromise on these safety nets, we may very well
Meycauayan, Bulacan, challenges the right of the end up with a voters list full of flying voters,
respondent, Abao, the municipal president elect of overflowing with unqualified registrants, populated with
Meycauayan, to the position to which elected on the shadows and ghosts.
ground that the respondent is ineligible. The decision
in the lower court, Judge was in favor of the Case No. 03
respondent and declared the complaint as without Macalintal v. Commission on Elections
merit. Hence, the quo warranto proceeding before the G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abao was eligible to run for FACTS: Petitioner Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of
public office as he did not appear to be a registered the Philippine Bar, sought to declare certain provisions
voter in the municipality he is running at. of Republic Act No. 9189 entitled, "An Act Providing for
l A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified
HELD: Yes. The Election Law makes use of the terms Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating
"qualified voter in his municipality," and "qualified Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes" as
elector therein." To be a qualified voter, does not unconstitutional. Petitioner contended that Section
necessarily mean that a person must be a registered 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1,
voter. It is sufficient for the candidate to possess all of Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that
the qualifications prescribed in section 431 and none the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at
of the disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The least one year and in the place where he proposes to
fact that a candidate failed to register as an elector in vote for at least six months immediately preceding an
the municipality does not deprive him of the right to election.
become a candidate and to be voted for.||| One may
be a qualified voter without exercising the right to vote. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No.
Registering does not confer the right; it is but a 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are
condition precedent to the exercise of the right. immigrants or permanent residents in other countries
Registration regulates the exercise of the right of by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing
suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right. their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the
residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the
Case No. 02 Constitution.
AKBAYAN Youth, et. al. v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147066, 147179, March 26, 2001 HELD: No. The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189.
FACTS: Invoking this right, herein petitioners According to the Court, Section 2 of Article V of the
representing the youth sector seek to direct the Constitution is an exception to the residency
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article.
special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice
Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to versa; a person cannot be at the same time, both a
petitioners, around four million youth failed to register resident and an absentee. However, under existing
on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by election laws and the countless pronouncements of
the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains
8189. It was denied by the majority of the attached to his residence in the Philippines as
Commissioners, stating that, Section 8 of R.A. 8189 residence is considered synonymous with domicile.
explicitly provides that no registration shall be Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an overseas
conducted during the period starting one hundred Filipino to his residence in this country, the framers of
twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the Constitution considered the circumstances that
the Commission has no more time left to accomplish impelled them to require Congress to establish a
all pre-election activities. Hence, the instant petition for system for overseas absentee voting. Thus, Section 2,
Certiorari and Mandamus before the Supreme Court. Article V of the Constitution came into being to remove
any doubt as to the inapplicability of the residency


requirement in Section 1. It is precisely to avoid any Case No. 05

problems that could impede the implementation of its Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections
pursuit to enfranchise the largest number of qualified G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989
Filipinos who are not in the Philippines that the
Constitutional Commission explicitly mandated FACTS: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed
Congress to provide a system for overseas absentee governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January
voting. 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October
27, 1988, the league of Municipalities, Sorsogon
Case No. 04 Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its
Ututalum v. COMELEC President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his
G.R. Nos. 84843-44, January 22, 1990 personal capacity, filed with the Commission on
Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo's
FACTS: Petitioner Ututalum and private respondent, election and proclamation on the ground that he was
Arden S. Anni, were among the candidates in the 1987 not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the
May Congressional elections for the Second District of United States on January 20, 1983. Frivaldo answered
Sulu. In the said election, Petitioner Ututalum obtained that his naturalization was "merely forced upon himself
482 votes while respondent Anni received 35,581 as a means of survival against the unrelenting
votes out of the 39,801 voters. If the returns of Siasi persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents
were excluded, petitioner would have lead of 5,301 abroad." He added that he had returned to the
votes. Petitioner contends that returns from Siasi Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the
should be excluded on the ground that they appear to restoration of democracy. He also argued that the
be tampered with or falsified owing to the great challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in
excess of votes appearing in the said returns. This reality a quo warranto petition that should have been
was rejected by the Provincial Board of Canvass of filed within ten days from his proclamation, in
Sulu. Subsequently, based on another action filed accordance with Section 253 of the Omnibus Election
before them, COMELEC issued annulling the Siasi List Code. The League, moreover, was not a proper party
of Voters on the ground of massive irregularities because it was not a voter and so could not sue under
committed in the preparation and being statistically the said section.
improbable, and ordering a new registration of voters
for the local elections. Petitioner contends that the ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was
issue he raised referred to obvious manufactured a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on
returns, a proper subject matter for a pre- January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.
proclamation controversy and therefore cognizable by
the COMELEC; that election returns from Siasi should HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that he
be excluded from the canvass of the results since its deliberately took the oath of allegiance to the United
original List of Voters had already been finally States. Furthermore, if he really wanted to disavow his
annulled. American citizenship and reacquire Philippine
citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in
ISSUE: Whether or not the election returns from Siasi accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No.
should be excluded from the canvass of the results 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725,
since the original List of Voters had been finally Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act
annulled. of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that the Siasi methods, he nevertheless claims he has reacquired
returns do not show prima facie that on the basis of the Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation.
old List of Voters, there is actually a great excess of He claims that by actively participating in the elections
votes over what could have been legally cast in this country, he automatically forfeited American
considering that only 36,000 persons actually voted citizenship under the laws of the United States. Such
out of the 39,801 voters. It was also held that laws do not concern us here.
petitioner's cause of action is the padding of the Siasi
List of Voters, which, indeed, is not a listed ground for Case No. 06
a pre-proclamation controversy. To allow the Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC
COMELEC to do so retroactively would be to empower G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989
it to annul a previous election because of the
subsequent annulment of a questioned registry. The FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent were candidates
list must then be considered conclusive evidence of for the office of the Mayor of Baguio City during
persons who could exercise the right of suffrage in a Elections. In the said election, petitioner was elected
particular election. Furthermore, the preparation of a and proclaimed winner having garnered the highest
voters list is not a proceeding before the Board of number of votes while Respondent garnered the
Canvassers. A pre-proclamation controversy is limited second highest number of votes. Due to this,
to challenges directed against the Board of respondent filed a petition for quo warranto contesting
Canvassers, not the Board of Election Inspectors and the election of the petitioner on the ground that the
such challenge should relate to specified election latter is a naturalized Australian citizen and was
returns against which the petitioner should have made divested of his Philippine citizenship having sworn
verbal elections. allegiance to the Queen of Australia. Petitioner
opposes to the contrary. Section 42 of the Local
Government Code provides for the qualifications that
an elective official must be a citizen of the Philippines.


From the evidence adduced, it was found out that Case No. 08
citizenship requirements were not possessed by the Aquino v. COMELEC
petitioner during elections. He was disqualified from G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995
running as mayor and, although elected, is not now
qualified to serve as such. Respondent now contend FACTS: Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of
that he should be given the position a he has garnered Candidacy for the position of Representative for the
the second highest vote for said position. new Second Legislative District of Makati City stating
that he was a resident of the aforementioned district
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent, having for 10 months. Thereafter, a petition for disqualification
garnered the 2nd highest number of votes, can replace was filed against him causing him to amend the entry
the petitioner as mayor. regarding his residency, changing it to 1 year and 13
HELD: No. The simple reason is that he obtained only days. The Commission on Elections dismissed the
the second highest number of votes in the election, he petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the
was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio election of 8 May. Aquino won in the said election.
City. The fact that the candidate who obtained the Acting on a motion for reconsideration of the above
highest number of votes is later declared to be dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an
disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the
elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the
obtained the second highest number of votes to be Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and
declared the winner of the elective office. disqualified for the elective office for lack of
constitutional qualification of residence. Hence, the
Case No. 07 petition before the Supreme Court.
Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995 ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is eligible to run
for the position he seeks.
FACTS: Filing a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, HELD: No. Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos provided in the previous (1992) election indicates that he was a
required information that she is a resident for seven resident and a registered voter of San Jose,
months in the constituency where she seeks to be Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that
elected immediately preceding the election. election. Aquinos connection to the Second District
Thereafter, private respondent Montejo filed a Petition of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a
for Cancellation and Disqualification, contending that condominium unit in the area. The intention not to
petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement establish permanent home in Makati City is evident in
for residency (must have been a resident for not less his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one.
than one year). Petitioner thus amended her COC, The short length of time he claims to be a resident of
changing seven months to since childhood which Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and
was refused for reason that it was filed out of time. his claims of other residences in Metro Manila)
Hence, petitioner filed her amended COC with indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his
COMELEC in division. physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence
or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the Representative of the Second District of Makati City.
residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the
of the Constitution. Commission on Elections.

HELD: Yes. For election purposes, residence is used Case No. 09

synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections
qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996
in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in
the district for only 7 months, because of the following: FACTS: Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre seeks the
(a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; b) nullification of two resolutions issued by the
domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying
removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of him for the position he seeks to run, citing as the
abandoning the former residence and establishing a ground therefor, Section 40(a) of Republic Act No.
new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991) which
in the absence of clear and positive proof of the provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an
concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment
automatically gain the husbands domicile because the within two (2) years after serving sentence are
term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same disqualified from running for any elective local position.
thing in Political Law; .(d) even assuming that she In disqualifying the petitioner, the COMELEC held that
gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired it was established that he was found guilty by the
the right to choose a new one only after her husband Municipal Trial Court for violation of P.D. 1612,
died, her acts following her return to the country clearly (otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law) which was
indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of affirmed by the Regional Trial Court. Although there is
origin, as her domicile of choice. 'dearth of jurisprudence involving violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law of 1979 or P.D. 1612', the nature of the
offense under P.D. 1612 with which respondent was


convicted certainly involves moral turpitude drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
Furthermore, petitioner claimed that Section 40 (a) of stop payment. The presence of the second element
the Local Government Code does not apply to his case manifests moral turpitude. A conviction for violation of
inasmuch as the probation granted him by the MTC on B.P Blg. 22 "imports deceit" and "certainly relates to
December 21, 1994 which suspended the execution of and affects the good moral character of a person."
the judgment of conviction and all other legal
consequences flowing therefrom, rendered Case No. 11
inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well. Moreno v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 168550, August 10, 2006
1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves FACTS: Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Moreno
moral turpitude. from running for an elective position on the ground that
2. Whether or not the grant of probation affects the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime
Section 40 (a)'s applicability. of Arbitrary Detention. Moreno filed an answer averring
that the petition states no cause of action because he
HELD: was already granted probation also arguing that under
1. Yes. Fencing is defined in Section 2 of P.D. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law),
1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) is the act of any the final discharge of the probation shall operate to
person who, with intent to gain for himself or restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a
for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability
acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall for any fine imposed. Moreno argues that the
buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any disqualification under Sec. 40 (a) of the Local
article, item, object or anything of value which Government Code (LGC) applies only to those who
he knows, or should be known to him, to have have served their sentence and not to probationers
been deprived from the proceeds of the crime because the latter do not serve the adjudged
of robbery or theft." Moral turpitude is sentence.
deducible from the third element.
2. The legal effect of probation is only to suspend ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be
the execution of the sentence. Petitioner's disqualified because he did not serve the adjudged
conviction of fencing which we have sentence having been granted probation and finally
heretofore declared as a crime of moral discharged by the trial court.
turpitude and thus falling squarely under the
disqualification found in Section 40 (a), HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that an order
subsists and remains totally unaffected placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but
notwithstanding the grant of probation. is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of
sentence. The grant of probation to petitioner
Case No. 10 suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of
Villaber v. Commission on Elections imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of
G.R. No. 148326, November 15, 2001 suspension from public office. During the period of
probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from
FACTS: During an election, Petitioner Villaber and running for a public office because the accessory
respondent Cagas were rival candidates for a penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold
congressional seat. Cagas filed a petition to disqualify for the duration of the probation. During the period of
Villaber and to cancel the latter's certificate of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty
candidacy for the reason that Villaber was convicted imposed upon him by the court but is merely required
by the Regional Trial Court for violation of Batas to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the
Pambansa Blg. 22 and was sentenced to suffer one probation order.
(1) year imprisonment. Under Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code, he was disqualified to run for Case No. 12
any public office. Villaber countered mainly that his Grego v. COMELEC
conviction has not become final and executory and that G. R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997
it cannot be the basis for his disqualification since
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral FACTS: Before the subject election, Basco was
turpitude. removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff upon a
finding of serious misconduct in an administrative
ISSUE: Whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 complaint. Thereafter, he ran as a candidate for
involves moral turpitude. Councilor position three consecutive term. It was this
latest re-election which is the subject of the present
HELD: Yes. The elements of the offense under petition on the ground that he is disqualified under
Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 are: 1. The accused makes, Section 40(b) of the LGC of 1991. Under said section,
draws or issues any check to apply to account or for those removed from office as a result of an
value; 2. The accused knows at the time of the administrative case are disqualified to run for any
issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds elective local position. However, the respondent
in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of contends that the petitioner is not entitled to said relief
the check in full upon its presentment; and 3. The because Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code
check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank may not be validly applied to persons who were
for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have dismissed prior to its effectivity. To do so would make
been dishonored for the same reason had not the


it retroactive legislation which would impair vested but of the United States which was granted causing the
rights. cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 40(b) of the Local under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code, persons
Government Code of 1991 apply retroactively to those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for
removed from office before it took effect on January 1, any elective position.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is qualified
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that its refusal to to hold office as Vice-Mayor on the grounds that he has
give retroactive application to the provision of Section dual citizenship.
40(b) is already a settled issue and there exist no
compelling reason for the Court to depart therefrom. HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that dual
That the provision of the Code in question does not citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
qualify the date of a candidates removal from office arises when, as a result of the concurrent application
and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
the Court from applying the law prospectively. A simultaneously considered a national by the said
statute, despite the generality in its language, must not states. On the other hand, the latter is a situation
be so construed as to overreach acts, events or where a person simultaneously owes loyalty to two or
matters which transpired before its passage. more states. By filing a certificate of candidacy when
he ran for his present post, private respondent elected
Case No. 13 Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his
Reyes v. COMELEC American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of
G.R. No. 120905, 120940, March 7, 1996 candidacy sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he
FACTS: Petitioner Renato U. Reyes was the might have as a dual citizen.
incumbent mayor of the municipality of Bongabong
when an administrative complaint was filed against Case No. 15
him with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by Dr. Lopez v. COMELEC
Ernesto Manalo. A temporary restraining order was G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008
issued by the trial court on February 7, 1995, upon
request by the petitioner, enjoining FACTS: Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan from proceeding with candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay
the case. As a result, the decision of Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo. Days before the election,
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan could not be respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition for the
served upon Reyes. After expiration of the temporary disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he is an
restraining order, an attempt was made to serve the American citizen, hence, ineligible from running for any
decision upon petitioners counsel in Manila but it was public office. Petitioner argued that he is a dual citizen,
futile. Meanwhile, on March 20, 1995, petitioner filed a a Filipino and at the same time an American, by virtue
certificate of candidacy with the Office of the Election of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known as
Officer of the COMELEC in Bongabong. On March 24, the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
1995, private respondent Rogelio de Castro, as 2003. He returned to the Philippines and resided in
registered voter of Bongabong, sought the Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all
disqualification of petitioner as candidate for mayor. the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman. After
the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed,
ISSUE: Whether or not Reyes is disqualified for the petitioner emerged as the winner. On February 6,
position he seeks to be elected. 2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution
granting the petition for disqualification, stating that
HELD: Here, although petitioner Reyes brought an petitioner was not able to regain his Filipino citizenship
action to question the decision in the administrative in the manner provided by law. According to the poll
case, the temporary restraining order issued in the body, to be able to qualify as a candidate in the
action he brought lapsed, with the result that the elections, petitioner should have made a personal and
decision was served on petitioner and it thereafter sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.
became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed This, petitioner failed to do. His motion for
to appeal to the Office of the President. He was thus reconsideration having been denied, petitioner
validly removed from office and, pursuant to 40 (b) of resorted to the present petition, imputing grave abuse
the Local Government Code, he was disqualified from of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for
running for reelection. disqualifying him from running and assuming the office
of Barangay Chairman.
Case No. 14
Mercado v. Manzano ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of a certificate of
G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999 candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of
foreign citizenship.
FACTS: Petitioner Mercado and private respondent
Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that petitioner
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought
proclamation of private respondent was suspended in American citizenship and renounced his Filipino
view of a pending petition for disqualification alleging citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-
that that Manzano was not a citizen of the Philippines acquiring Filipino citizenship. More importantly, the


Court's 2000 ruling in Valles has been superseded by Case No. 17

the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 in 2003. R.A. No. 9225 Caasi v. COMELEC
expressly provides for the conditions before those who G.R. No. 88831, November 8, 1990
re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public
office in the Philippines. Petitioner re-acquired his FACTS: Merito Miguel was sought to be disqualified
Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law for the position of municipal mayor to which he was
explicitly provides that should one seek elective public elected on the ground that he is a green card holder,
office, he should first "make a personal and sworn hence, a permanent resident of the United States of
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before America, not of Bolinao. Miguel admitted that he holds
any public officer authorized to administer an oath". a green card issued to him by the US Immigration
Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. While Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident
it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green
and began to discharge the functions of Barangay card for convenience in order that he may freely enter
Chairman, his victory cannot cure the defect of his the United States for his periodic medical examination
candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a
not validate the election of a disqualified candidate permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he
because the application of the constitutional and voted in all previous elections.
statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter
of popularity. ISSUE: Whether a green card is proof that the holder
is a permanent resident of the United States
Case No. 16
Rodriguez v. COMELEC HELD: Miguels immigration to the United States in
G.R. No. 120099, July 24, 1996 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and
residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the
FACTS: Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private United States merely to visit his children or his doctor
respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr. were both there; he entered the limited States with the intention
candidates for an elective official position of Quezon to have there permanently as evidenced by his
Province in the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez won application for an immigrants visa. Based on that
and was proclaimed duly-elected governor. However, application of his, he was issued by the U.S.
Marquez challenged Rodriguez' victory via petition for Government the requisite green card or authority to
quo warranto before the COMELEC stating that reside there permanently. To be qualified to run for
Rodriguez left the United States where a charge, filed elective office in the Philippines, the law requires that
on November 12, 1985, is pending against the latter the candidate who is a green card holder must have
before the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent waived his status as a permanent resident or
insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand immigrant of a foreign country. Therefore, his act of
theft of personal property. Rodriguez is therefore a filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the
"fugitive from justice" which is a ground for his Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his
disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the
Local Government Code (R.A. 7160), so argued United States. The waiver of his green card should be
Marquez. manifested by some act or acts independent of and
done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in
ISSUE: Whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from this country. Without such prior waiver, he was
justice and thus should be disqualified. disqualified to run for any elective office.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that a "fugitive from

justice" includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after
being charged, flee to avoid prosecution." The
definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the
compelling factor that animates one's flight from a
particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be
an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when
there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already
instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of
conviction.||| Intent to evade on the part of a candidate
must therefore be established by proof that there has
already been a conviction or at least, a charge has
already been filed, at the time of flight. Not being a
"fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez
cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial