Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 383

Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 1 of 383

EXHIBIT A
Index of District Court Documents
Doc# Title Date Filed
Doc. 18 Answer to LNV's Complaint 1/26/2015
Doc. 59 Notice of Related Cases 6/18/2015
Doc. 60 Motion for Judicial Notice Slorp Case 6/18/2015
Doc. 64 Motion for Judicial Notice Lorraine Brown Case 6/23/2015
Doc. 64-1 Exhibit to Doc. 64 Criminal Plea 6/23/2015
Doc. 69 Notice of Constitutional Questions 6/29/2015
Doc. 69-1 Exhibit to Doc. 69 Greg Abbott Letters 6/29/2015
Doc. 80 Motion to Strike Michelle Conner Declaration 7/8/2015
Doc. 81 Motion for Judicial Notice LNV v. Madison 7/8/2015
Doc. 94 Objection to LNVs Motion for Summary Judgment 9/8/2015
Doc. 96 Affidavit of JoAnn Breitling in Support of Doc. 94 9/9/2015
Doc. 101 SurReply/Supplement to Doc. 94 9/25/2015
Doc. 102 Affidavit of Catherine Gebhardt 9/28/2015
Doc. 105 Objection to LNVs Objection to Doc. 96 9/29/2015
Doc. 121 Affidavit of Denise Subramaniam 1/28/2016
Doc. 123 Revised Notice of Constitutional Questions 1/28/2016
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 18 Filed 01/26/15 Page 1 of 19
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 2 of 383

Denise Subramaniam
Self-represented
13865 SW Walker Rd
Beaverton OR 97005
503-764-5300

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION

LNV CORPORATION Civil Case No. 3:14-cv-01836


Plaintiff,
v. DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO
DENISE SUBRAMANIAM LNV'S AMENDED COMPLAINT
pro per
Defendant JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT

1. Here comes Defendant Denise Subramaniam, representing herself, and hereby responds to Plaintiff,

LNV Corporation's ("LNV'') amended complaint and disputes LNV's claims as follows:

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2. This Court is in lack of of subject matter jurisdiction because the Plaintiff lacks standing to assert its

claim; and Plaintiff knows it lacks standing.

DOCTRINE OF UNCLEAN HANDS

3. The Plaintiff's complaint is further barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.

FACTSANDBACKGROUD

4. People's Choice Home Loan, Inc. ("PCHL") was not an "original lender" nor they did they fund a

$176,000.00 loan to me on or about February 11, 2004. I believed at the time that they were a
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 18 Filed 01/26/15 Page 2 of 19
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 3 of 383

"lender" and they had funded the loan due to certain misrepresentations and omissions knowingly

made with intent to deceive me specific to the parties and terms of the loan which caused me to enter

into a transaction without accurately realizing the risks, duties, or obligations incurred. I relied on

these misrepresentations as being true; and such reliance caused me to suffer fmancial and other loss.

The intentional omissions prevented me from learning about these deceptions; and also caused me to

suffer financial and other loss.

5. "Fraud in the Factum" is a type of fraud where misrepresentation causes one to enter a transaction

without accurately realizing the risks, duties, or obligations incurred. This can be when the maker or

drawer of a negotiable instrument, such as a promissory note, is induced to sign the instrument

without a reasonable opportunity to learn of its fraudulent character or essential terms.

6. The Adjustable Rate Note (''Note"), attached to Plaintiff's amended complaint as Exhibit 1 is not a

true and correct copy. It does not match the copy dated February 10, 2004 that I received at the

closing of the loan.

7. Differences between the copies of the Note in Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and the Note I signed and the copy

of it I was given at closing include but are not limited to: 1) the copy of the Note I received at closing

doesn't contain a final payoff date of March 1, 2034; 2) nor does it have the legal notices at the top of

the first page; 3) the copy of the Note provided to this court in Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 to their complaint

contains four pages whereas the copy of the Note I signed contains three pages.

8. The copy of the Deed of Trust ("DOT") filed in the county and attached to Plaintiff's Exhibit 2

appears to match the one I was given at closing and this does contain the March 1, 2034 payoff date,

however the DOT has only 15 pages and Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 contains 19 pages.

Page 2 of 19
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 18 Filed 01/26/15 Page 3 of 19
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 4 of 383

9. Pages 16 through 19 of Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 to their complaint appear to be a copy of the Note I

received at closed. (This copy of the Note I received had been included by me in exhibits attached to

my pleadings in case # 3: 12-cv-1681 which Plaintiff (one of the defendants in this prior case) has

knowledge of since they included a copy of my amended complaint in that case as their Exhibit 4 to

their present complaint.)

10. Two separate and distinctly different Notes raise questions about the enforceability of the Note and

the Deed of Trust.

11. The Uniform Residential Loan Application I signed during closing on February 11,2004 (and which

was the top most document in the pile of documents I was asked to sign that day) contains the terms

of the loan I had agreed to; namely: 6.99% Fixed Rate interest. The rate on the Note (both versions) is

not a fixed rate, something I did not notice during closing due to the fact that the closing date had

been continually moved back from its original schedule date on or around January 26, 2004 to

February 11,2004. This was most certainly done with intent because I had to leave for a six-month

overseas business trip within hours of closing; not only did this put me into a state of duress, it

prevented me from reviewing the mortgage documents for at least six months after signing them.

Attached as Exhibit A is a true and accurate copy of my loan application.

12. In reviewing this application while preparing this response I noticed for the first time that the broker

had incorrectly stated my employer as "Portland Corporate Management." I've never worked for a

company with that name.

13. In addition to two versions of the Note, of which only one was signed by me at closing (the one

included in Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 pages 16 through 19) two versions of the Truth in Lending Disclosure

Statement designated as "final" were signed on February 11,2004 by me, however I did not notice

this at closing. These two disclosures appear the same except one is very clear and looks like an

Page3 of19
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 18 Filed 01/26/15 Page 4 of 19
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 5 of 383

original document/form while the other looks like a very poor copy, on the top of that one is a header

that looks like it was faxed. (I remember the lady performing the closing- it was just the two of us

present at her office - kept going back and forth to the fax machine and coming back with other

documents for me to sign it was very confusing.) The copy that looks like the original is missing the

section about pre-payment penalty. I signed and initialed it. I was not expecting there to be a

prepayment penalty, because I insisted on no pre-payment penalty throughout the application process,

so this may have been done intentionally with the second faxed copy slipped into the stack of

documents I was still signing so I didn't notice that clause when I signed the faxed copy. Attached as

Exhibit B are true and accurate copies of these two TILA disclosures.

14. The interest rate on these Truth in Lending Disclosure Statements is 7.270% variable, while the

rate on the Note is 6.99% variable rate or ARM and the rate on the loan application is 6.99%

fixed rate. Had I not been put under duress I might have noticed these discrepancies at closing,

but I did not. Regardless, multiple conflicting terms raise questions about the enforceability of the

Note and the DOT.

15. The fact that the Truth in Lending Disclosures do not match the terms reflected on the Note(s)

evidences the fact that I did not receive TILA disclosure. This fact was discovered by me only

during the time I've been preparing my response to the Plaintitrs present complaint.

16. The fact that the terms reflected on the loan application do not match the terms on the Note(s)

evidences an attempt to intentionally deceive me in the origination of the loan and raises

questions about the enforceability of the Note and the DOT.

17. The original lender did not negotiate the Note to Residential Funding Company, LLC ("RFC") by

indorsing the Note to the order ofRFC and delivering possession thereto as claimed by Plaintiff

in its complaint; and Plaintiff knows or should know that this claim is untrue.

Page 4 of 19
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 18 Filed 01/26/15 Page 5 of 19
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 6 of 383

18. The documents LNV provided this court to evidence their claim of such, i.e. Exhibit 3 to their

complaint, contain forgeries, false signatures and false claims.

19. Plaintiff intentionally fails to provide this court with the assignment of DOT from PCHL to RFC

because it knows, or should know, that I challenged the authenticity of this assignment in my

pleadings in case# 3:12-cv-1681. Exhibit C attached herein is a copy ofthis assignment and the

substitution of trustee document filed in my county on the same date, March 18, 2006. These

documents were previously attached as Exhibit F to my response, as plaintiff in case# 3:12-cv-

1681, to defendant Northwest Trustee Service's (''NWTS") motion to dismiss [Document 32,

filed on 2/28113].

20. The Notice ofDefau1t filed in my county on 8/28/2006 by Cal-Western Reconveyance

Corporation in behalf of Litton Loan Servicing LP ("Litton") that was, unknown to me and my

attorney at the time, Elizabeth Lemoine, servicing the loan in behalf of GMAC-RFC (a true and

accurate copy of this notice is attached herein as Exhibit D which had been previously attached as

Exhibit A to my Objection to defendant MGC Mortgage Inc.'s ("MGC") motion to dismiss in

case# 3:12-cv-1681) specially states:

"Cal-Western Reconveyance Corporation as Trustee, hereby certifies that no assignment of


the trust deed by the trustee or by the beneficiary and no appointment of successor-trustee
have been made except as recorded in the mortgage records of the county or counties in
which the above described real property is situated"

21. On or before May 1, 2004 PCHL transferred my loan into the BSABS 2004-HE4 Bear Steams

Asset Backed Securities Trust (the "BSABS 2004-HE4 Trust" or "Trust"). May 1, 2004 was the

cut-off date for this Trust and my first communication with EMC Mortgage Corporation

("EMC") was around this time.

Page 5 of 19
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 18 Filed 01/26/15 Page 6 of 19
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 7 of 383

22. Unknown to me at the time EMC was the Seller into the BSABS 2004-HE4 Trust as well as the

"master servicer" for the BSABS 2004-HE4 Trust. Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I LLC

was the "depositor" and La Salle Bank, N.A was the Trustee for the Trust.

23. The above facts are testified to in the Declaration of William J. Paatalo filed in case# 3:12-cv-

1681. Plaintiffhas knowledge of these facts. A true and accurate copy of this declaration is

attached as Exhibit E.

24. As per the Declaration of William J. Paatalo the Trust's Pooling and Servicing Agreement

("PSA") required that the conveyance of the Mortgage be "construed as, an absolute sale thereof

to the Depositor or the Trustee, as applicable. It is, further, not the intention of the parties that

such conveyance be deemed a pledge thereof by the Seller to the Depositor, or by the Depositor

to the Trustee."

25. As evidenced by the default notice filed in my county on August 28, 2006 (Exhibit D herein) and

as per the sworn declarative testimony of Mr. Paatalo (Exhibit E herein) and the exhibits attached

to Mr. Paatalo's declaration in support of his testimony; the following is true:

a. PCHL, as per the BSABS 2004-HE4 Trust's PSA, released all beneficial interest in the

Note and DOT (collectively the Mortgage) when it was conveyed to EMC as the Trust's

"Seller"

b. EMC, as per the BSABS 2004-HE4 Trust's PSA, then released all beneficial interest in

the Mortgage when it was conveyed to Bear Steams Asset Backed Securities I LLC as

the "depositor" or La Salle Bank, N.A. and the Trust's trustee.

c. As evidenced by the default notice filed in my county on August 28, 2006 (Exhibit D

herein) and by the declarative testimony of Mr. Paatalo (Exhibit E herein) specific to "BP

Page 6 of 19
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 18 Filed 01/26/15 Page 7 of 19
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 8 of 383

Investigative Agency Exhibit D - EMC letter" no assignment of deed of trust was ever

filed in my county evidencing this "absolute sale" of my Mortgage from PCHL to EMC

and then to either Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I LLC as the "depositor'' or La

Salle Bank, N.A. as trustee of the BSABS 2004-HE4 Trust.

d. Additionally as evidenced by to "BP Investigative Agency Exhibit E - MERS capture"

some unknown conveyance of the Mortgage was apparently made in behalf of MERS,

but no assignment of DOT filed in my county reflects this transaction either.

26. THEREFORE, it would have been impossible for PCHL to have "negotiated the Note to

Residential Funding Company, LLC ("RFC") by indorsing the Note to the order ofRFC and

delivering possession thereto" as stated in Plaintiff's complaint page 2, paragraph 10.

27. In fact the mortgage documents filed in my county in 2006 and then in 2008 do not reflect

Plaintiff's claim.

28. An assignment of DOT filed in my county on June 28, 2006 (pages 6 and 7 of Exhibit C herein)

falsely states that PCHL "holder of a Deed of Trust (herein 'Asignor') ... does hereby grant, sell,

assign, transfer and covey, unto Homecomings Financial Network, Inc."

29. We know this is a false statement because PCHL conveyed as an absolute sale the Mortgage

(Note and Deed of Trust) to EMC prior to May 1, 2004; and then EMC in turn conveyed as an

absolute sale the Mortgage to either Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I LLC as the

"depositor" or La Salle Bank, N.A. as the "trustee" of the BSABS 2004-HE4 Trust.

30. On August 27,2008 an assignment of DOT was filed in my county falsely states: "For value

received, Homecomings Financial Network, Inc., the undersigned, hereby grants, assigns and

Page 7 of 19
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 18 Filed 01/26/15 Page 8 of 19
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 9 of 383

transfers to Residential Funding Company, LLC ... all beneficial interest under certain Deed of

Trust dated 02/10/2004 executed by Denise Subramaniam to/for: People's Choice Home Loan ... "

This assignment is attached herein as Exhibit H and was attached to my response and objection to

NWTS's motion to dismiss in case# 3: 12-cv-1681 as Exhibit A.

31. We know this is another false statement because the prior assignment to Homecomings Financial

Network, Inc. dated June 28, 2006 was a nullity (i.e. legally void.)

32. Hence it would follow that the next assignment of DOT which states: "RFC negotiated the Note

to Lender", would of necessity also be a nullity. (This assignment is merely alluded to in

Plaintiffs complaint page 3, paragraph 11 and one is left having to assume that "Lender" used

here somehow refers to Plaintiff, but Plaintiff is not a "lender.")

33. Paragraph 12 of page 3 of the Plaintiffs complaint states: "Lender" is currently in possession of

the Note." No matter what the Plaintiff claims it is in possession of, it is most certainly not a

negotiable instrument.

34. It is also certain that the Note the Plaintiff claims it is in possession of is not the "original" Note.

35. Paragraph 13 of page 3 of the Plaintiffs complaint states:

"Lender is the current beneficiary of the Trust Deed: (1) by virtue of being the current payee
and holder of the Note (performance of which the Trust Deed secured) indorsed to the order
of Lender, and (2) pursuant to a series of duly executed and publicly recorded assignments of
the Trust Deed, concluding with an assignment from RFC to Lender, executed on or about
March 10,2008, and recorded in the official records of Washington County, Oregon on
August 27, 2008, as Instrument Number 2008-073972 (a true and correct copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit 3)."

36. Defendant had previously attached a true and correct copy of this assignment within her Exhibit

A to her response and objection to NWTS's motion to dismiss in case# 3:12-cv-1681; and it is

PageS of 19
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 18 Filed 01/26/15 Page 9 of 19
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 10 of 383

attached herein as page 1 of her Exhibit H. Plaintiff also included a copy of this assignment in its

Exhibit 3 to its complaint.

37. Defendant's Exhibit H contains signature comparisons and facts pertaining to the signers of this

document and several other nearly identical assignments. The signatures on these documents are

robosigned and/or forgeries or false signatures.

38. The false statements, forgeries and false signatures on all the mortgage documents contained in

both Plaintiff's and Defendant's exhibits (where ever they both include the same documents) are

consistent with the crimes of convicted felon Lorraine Brown. (See "Defendant's Motion for

Judicial Notice of Information and Criminal Indictment and Plea Agreement of Lorraine

Brown.")

39. Plaintiff is a corporation owned by D. Andrew Beal. PlaintifiLNV and MGC share an address of

7195 Dallas Parkway, Plano Texas; however this address is for an empty lot. This evidenced by a

Google map on page 8 of Defendant's Exhibit H.

40. The Attorney General of Texas, Greg Abbott, wrote a letter to MGC dated October 4, 2010. As

per Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott's letter if affidavits and other documents, such as

deeds oftrust and appointments of substitute trustees were prepared by employees

referred to as "robosigners" who signed thousands of documents a month without reading

them; who signed affidavits which falsely claim personal knowledge of facts and which

falsely claim the affiant reviewed the attached documents; who notarized documents prior to

the signer signing or when the signer was not present before the notary; and who filed

affidavits with records attached that do not correctly reflect loan payments, charges and

advances; and such documents:

Page 9 of19
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 18 Filed 01/26/15 Page 10 of 19
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 11 of 383

"were utilized in establishing MGC Mortgage Inc.'s authority to conduct the sale or
obtain a court order for a sale, such use would have been in violation of Section
17.46(a) of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act; Section 392.304, Texas Debt
Collection Practices Act; Section 37.02. Texas Penal Code; Section 12.001, Texas
Property Code; Section 406.009, Texas Government Code; Texas Constitution
Article 16, Section 50; and/or Rule 736(1), Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and
the document and therefore the foreclosure sale would have been invalid." A true
and correct copy of this letter from Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott mailed to
Heal's MGC is attached herein as Exhibit I.

41. MGC is a corporation owned by D. Andrew Beal. MGC portrays itself as a mortgage servicer,

primarily for Plaintiff (LNV Corporation also owned by D. Andrew Beal), but it is not licensed as

such in Texas. D. Andrew Beat plays all kinds of games with his companies, most of which

merely exist on paper. Nothing is what it seems with Andy Beat's empire of sham corporations.

What is clear is that in my prior case # 3: 12-cv-1681 in this court that was wrongly dismissed

with prejudice both LNV and MGC were served summons, but only MGC made an appearance.

(This is a pattern of judicial abuse repeated numerous times in other civil lawsuits involving Beal

owned corporate entities.) In my earlier case Christopher Wright of Watt, Tieder, Hoffar &

Fitzgerald, L.L.P made an appearance only for MGC. All his pleading in this case were in

behalf ofMGC. In fact, in response to my claims about MGC and LNV both being

owned by D. Andrew Beal (who evaded service in this prior case) attorney Christopher

Wright stated in a pleading filed with this court that MGC and LNV were merely "affiliates"

associated through normal course of business. However in and email he sent to me on January 6,

2015 regarding an extension of time specific to case # 3:12-cv-1681 he stated:

"In response to to your email, and to follow up on my prior email that I could not agree to
your proposed stipulate, LNV Corporation ("LNV") will only agree to an extension of your
time to file a reply to LNV's opposition to your Rule 60 motion up through and
including January 20, 2015. But, as previously indicated LNV will not oppose your motion
for an extension of time to file a reply accordingly. LNV and I as counsel cannot
permissibly e-file any document for you, however. Please note that LNV agrees to this
extension without reference to, or review of, your medical records, which are
unnecessary, and LNV is amenable to granting the extension regardless. Please kindly do
not send LNV or I as counsel any unsolicited medical records in the future."

Page 10 of 19
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 18 Filed 01/26/15 Page 11 of 19
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 12 of 383

42. A screenshot of this email is attached as Defendant's Exhibit M. Attached herein as Defendant's

Exhibit N is a compilation of information specific to D. Andrew Beal owned corporations from

Secretary of State Corporation Divisions across the country. This exhibit shows that LNV and

MGC are not merely affiliated in the normal course of business but owned by the same

individual, D. Andrew Beal. Since Beal's MGC was warned by the Texas Attorney General (see

Defendant's Exhibit I) that using robsigned mortgage documents in foreclosure actions was in

violation of numerous Texas laws (including criminal penal codes) then it is certain LNV knows

that using such falsely fabricated mortgage documents in foreclosures is in violation of consumer

protection laws of all the States in this country, including Oregon.

43. In the 2nd paragraph of the 1st page of Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott's letter it states:

"We are certain you must be aware of the issues raised when Ally Financial, Inc and later
JP Morgan Chase and Bank of America, announced they were suspending foreclosures on
certain properties in 23 states. It appears that they had discovered through testimony of
their employees in private litigation that the employees, referred to as "robosigners" that
engaged in practices ... "

44. The practices described in the text that follows this quote above are consistent with those

identified in the criminal conviction of Lorraine Brown.

45. Ally Financial, Inc. ("Ally") bought GMAC. The mortgage documents Plaintiff claims give it

standing to foreclose are all produced by LPS/Fidelity owned entities (LPS and Fidelity were the

corporate vehicles identified by the United States as those used by Lorraine Brown in the

commission of her crimes. Almost all the signers of these mortgage documents are employees of

GMAC and its subsidiaries aka Ally.

46. Attached to Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 (which is a copy of one of two different Notes) are two suddenly

appearing allonges and a floating page with no designation as to what exactly it is supposed to

endorse. (It is not part of the Note.) Neither of these documents have a date. The floating

Page 11 of 19
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 18 Filed 01/26/15 Page 12 of 19
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 13 of 383

signature page is on page 5 of Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 and is signed by Dana Lantry Asst. Vice

President of PCHL. This endorsement appears to assign to:

"LaSalle Bank National Association as Trustee for certificateholders of Bear Stearns


Asset Backed Securities I LLC Asset Backed Certificates Series 2004-HE4."

47. This document further states:

"Payable to the order of [the line is blank with a canceled stamp at a 45% angle starting at
the line where the name of the party should be entered] Without Recourse People's
Choice Home Loan Inc."

48. The canceled stamp makes it clear this cannot be an enforceable instrument. And if this were

somehow a valid transfer to LaSalle Bank National Association as Trustee for the BSABS 2004-

HE4 Trust then Dana Lantry would have had to have signed it prior to May 1, 2004.

49. Dany Lantry also signed one of the two suddenly appearing allonges, page 6 ofPlaintiffs Exhibit

1 and the other suddenly appearing allonge is on page 7 of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 which is signed by

Jason J. Vecchio as Post Funding Manager of Residential Funding Company LLC.

50. This first allonge on page 6 of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 bearing the signature ofDany Lantry as Vice

President ofPCHL purports to transfer beneficial interest in the Note to Residential Funding

Company LLC. This would be a legal impossibility if she had already endorsed a transfer to

transfer to LaSalle Bank National Association as Trustee for the BSABS 2004-HE4 Trust prior to

May 1, 2004.

51. Both of these allonges are forgeries and/or false documents intended to deceive. We already

know that no assignments of DOT were ever filed in my county transferring the beneficial

interest in the DOT to any of the parties to the BSABS 2004-HE4 Trust.

Page 12 of 19
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 18 Filed 01/26/15 Page 13 of 19
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 14 of 383

52. Even if the floating Dana Lantry endorsement to LaSalle Bank N.A. was legitimate, which it is

not, if the Note and Deed of Trust are split, this causes a nullity. The security interest is lost and

the debt becomes unsecured. The Note alone confers no power of sale on the property.

53. Furthermore the testimony and evidence to support the testimony of Mr. Paatalo in his declaration

(Defendant's Exhibit E) shows my loan was current in November 2005 and in December 2005

and that it was then paid in full in December 2005.

54. The first assignment of deed of trust filed in my county on June 28,2006 (pages 6 and 7 of

Exhibit C herein) was also signed by Dana Lantry as Assistance Vice President ofPCHL. The

Dana Lantry signatures on these three mortgage documents differ enough to suggest that more

than one individual was signing as Dana Lantry. Comparisons of more Dana Lantry signatures on

other deed assignments across the country drive this point home even more. And Dana Lantry has

signed as an employee for at least six or seven different corporations. This is consistent with the

crimes of Lorraine Brown. Attached herein as Defendant's ExhibitJ are numerous mortgage

documents signed by Dana Lantry misrepresenting herself as an executive officer of Aames

Capital Corporation, Ames Funding Funding Corporation, Quality Mortgage USA, People's

Choice Home Loans, One Stop Mortgage. The documents in Exlu"bit 1 are only a sampling of

such documents.

55. SEC filings show that Dana Lantry was an employee of Aames Financial Corporation/DE in

2005. Attached as Defendant's Exhibit K is this SEC filing. No evidence exists that I could find

to show Dana Lantry as an actual employee ofPCHL in 2004 or 2005.

56. If Dana Lantry personally signed the floating signature page purporting the transfer the Note to

La Salle then she had to done it prior to May 1, 2004. If she personally signed the allonge

Plaintiff LNV provided this court on pages 5 and 6 of their Exhibit 1 attached to their complaint

Page 13 of 19
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 18 Filed 01/26/15 Page 14 of 19
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 15 of 383

then she had to have signed it between May 1, 2004 and December 31, 2005. Either way both

these transfer documents are invalid and neither are legal financial instruments.

57. The allonge on page 7 page 7 ofPlaintiffs Exhibit 1 states: "Pay to the order ofLNV

Corporation without recourse Residential Funding Company, LLC" and is signed by

Jason J. Vecchio as Post Funding Manager of Residential Funding Company, LLC.

58. This Jason J. Vecchio signature exactly matches identical allonges included with several

purported "original Notes" produced by Plaintiff in several other foreclosure related cases

across the country. A sampling of these cases includes:

a. Catherine Gebhardt: LNV Corporation v. Gebhardt, Case No. 3: 12-CV-468-


TAV-HBG, U.S. District Court Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville.
b. Denise Subramaniam: Subramaniam v. Beat eta/, Case No: 3:12-cv-01681-MO,
and LNVv. Subramaniam, Case No. 3:14-cv-01836 both in the U.S. District
Court District of Oregon, Portland Division
c. Tuli Molina Wohl: LVN Corporation v. Tuli Molina Woh/, Case No.1 CA-CV
11-0603, In the Court ofAppeals, State ofArizona Division One
d. Robynne A. Fauley: Pauley v. Washington Mutual eta/ (LNV), Case No. 3:13-
cv-00581-AC, U.S. District Court District of Oregon, Portland Division
e. Christopher and Marcia Swift: In the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District ofIllinios, Eastern Division; Case No. 12-35690
f. Rhonda L. Hardwick: LNV as assignee ofMERS Inc. as nominee for First
Capital Finaicia/ Services Corp. DBA Full Compass Lending v. Hardwick, Case
No. 51C01-1204-MF-00098; State ofIndiana County ofMartin in the Martin
Circuit Court.

59. The six individuals identified above are hereafter referred to collectively as the "Beal Victims."

There are many more Beal Victims fighting foreclosures perpetrated by Beal's MGC and LNV

with similarly forged and falsified mortgage documents.

60. An examination of four of these mortgage documents with seemingly identical Jason J. Vecchio

signatures was done by OMNI Document Examinations ("OMNI"). On December 4, 2014 they

Page 14 of 19
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 18 Filed 01/26/15 Page 15 of 19
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 16 of 383

produced a preliminary report of their evaluation. This Jason J. Vecchio endorsed allonge in the

present case and in the case ofRobynne A. Pauley were only produced and copies provided to us

(or photographed) after December 2, 2015. These two documents will be included in the ongoing

examination of mortgage documents by OMNI and their final report will include examination of

these two newly introduced Jason J. Vecchio endorsed allonges. Attached herein as Exhibit Lis

the OMNI preliminary report. Quoting from the opinion ofthe examiners:

"The characteristic within the questioned signature on the Item Q-1, an Allonge to a
Promissory Note for Chris Swift and Marcia Swift and the evidence within the comparison
documents, A-1, A-2 and A-3, Allonges for Tuli M Wohl, Rhonda L. Hardwick and
Catherine Gebhardt depicts that the signatures are duplicates of one another. In order to come
to a definitive opinion of whether one signature was written in ink or all4 signatures were
created using a stamp or by means of photocopying, we require the original questioned
document."

61. Photocopied or stamped signatures are not valid legal endorsements.

PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS A FARSE PERPETRATED AS A MEANS OF


SEEKING REVENGE AND RETALIATION

62. The Beal Victims as a group have been actively reporting the activities of the many Beal business

entities and specifically the activities ofBeal's MGC and LNV and their agent Dovenmuehle

Mortgage Inc. ("DMI") and the attorneys Beal hires who often appear to actively participate in

the participation ofBeal's fraud to government regulators, the media, the FBI and the U.S. Justice

Department. We also are actively reporting the activities of these Beal corporations online. After

an FBI agent walked into Beal Bank asking questions about his MGC his attorneys started to send

us threatening letters demanding we take down certain online postings; all these posts were

personal opinions based on our own experiences with the Beal entities; and everything we said

online is protected speech under the First Amendment to the constitution.

63. I received my first such demand letter on or around November 18, 2014. The letter is dated

November 14,2014 and Plaintiff's present cause of action was filed on November 21,2014. In

Page 15 of 19
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 18 Filed 01/26/15 Page 16 of 19
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 17 of 383

addition to me similar letters were sent to Beal Victims JoAnn Breitling, Catherine Gebhart and

Stuart Hamm. A few of these letters are included in Defendant's Exhibit N attached herein. Since

these initial letters threatening legal action ifwe don't comply to Beal's demands more continue

to be sent to us. Whenever we do comply to one demand more demands follow about other online

postings. This is harassment and an attempt to limit our constitutionally protected freedom of

speech.

64. In the case of JoAnn Breitling where she is self-represented Beal has four different attorneys

attacking her in different courts. This is abuse of process and abuse of the judicial system.

Attached herein as Defendant's Exhibit 0 is the most recent response JoAnn filed specific to

these activities.

65. Beat's employees communicated a few times with a third party, investigative reporter Brett Shipp

ofWFAA TV in Dallas Texas. Then his attorneys claim they made the Breitings various offers

through their communications with Brett Shipp when no formal offer was ever communicated to

the Breiltlings. (Brett Ship has been questioning numerous Beal Victims as well as employees of

Beat's corporations in regard to Beat's foreclosure practices and other business activities. He has

also been examining public records as part of an ongoing investigation.) Beal's attorneys have

often referred to Brett Shipp in communications as "her reporter" which is demeaning to both

JoAnn and to Brett Shipp who is highly recognized for his impartiality and honest in-depth

reporting within the media world. The Beal Victims are confident that when he completes his

investigation he will air another award winning story. From the WFAA Website:

"His most notable work oflate, the year-long inquiry into faulty natural gas couplings
linked to fatal explosions and serious injuries dating back to the 1980's. Brett's
investigation has led to a state order for removal of the fittings and the adoption of new
natural gas safety standards statewide.
His investigation resulted in his being awarded the two most coveted prizes in broadcast
journalism, the 2008 duPont Gold Baton and the 2008 George Foster Peabody Award. The

Page 16 of 19
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 18 Filed 01/26/15 Page 17 of 19
\ Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 18 of 383

seldom awarded Gold Baton from Columbia University was the ftrst ever given to a local
television reporter.
Brett has received three duPonts and three Peabodys since 2003 in recognition for stories
such as the alleged inhumane treatment of women and children immigrants at a federal
prison in Texas, the Fake Drug Scandal at the Dallas Police Department and the
mistreatment of injured workers by the Texas Workers Comp Commission which was
abolished as a result."

66. In the meantime those of us who have been most vocal about Beal's activities have had to endure

an onslaught of invasions into our personal privacy, threatening letters and baseless lawsuits, such

as the present one.

67. The Plaintiff (a Beal owned and operated) corporation does not have standing to foreclose on my

property; and Plaintiff knows this.

PLAINTIFF'S PRAYER FOR RELIEF SHOULD BE DENIED FOR LACK OF

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

68. In addition to all the reasons already stated herein as to why the Plaintiff lacks standing to

foreclose on my property, Plaintiff must show economic injury caused by Defendant's

actions.

69. Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 page 1 states:

"TRUE and ACTUAL CONSIDERATION (if any), ORS 93.030 Ten and
no/100 Dollars ($10)"

70. As per ORS 93.030 (2) states:

"All instruments conveying or contracting to convey fee title to any real estate, and all
memoranda of such instruments, shall state on the face of the instruments the true and
actual consideration paid for the transfer, stated in terms of dollars. However, if the actual
consideration consists of or includes other property or other value given or promised,
neither the monetary value nor a description of the other property or value need be stated
so long as it is noted on the face of the instrument that other property or value was either
part or the whole consideration."

Page 17 of 19
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 18 Filed 01/26/15 Page 18 of 19
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 19 of 383

71. Nothing is noted on the face of the instrument that any other consideration was given,

therefore the only consideration LNV can claim it gave for this purported conveyance is

$10 (Ten and no/00 Dollars).

72. Standing, sometimes referred to as standing to sue, is the name of the federal law doctrine

that focuses on whether a prospective plaintiff can show that some personal legal interest

has been invaded by the defendant.

73. I have never acknowledged a debt to the Plaintiff of any kind. I have never paid a penny

to the Plaintiff because they have never validated their claim of debt. The bottom line is

Andy Beal purchased worthless paper for $10 from a party that had no beneficial interest

in my property, nor did they hold any beneficial interest in any debt that may have at one

time been secured by my property. Beal, through his LNV is now attempting to foreclose

on my property with forged mortgage documents.

74. This court is lacking in subject matter jurisdiction to grant Plaintiff the relief they seek

and the doctrine of unclean hands further bars Plaintiff from such relief.

WHEREFORE Defendant prays this court dismiss Plaintiff's action with prejudice.

Respectfully,

Denise Subramaniam

Page 18 of 19
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 18 Filed 01/26/15 Page 19 of 19
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 20 of 383

Denise Subramaniam
Self-represented
13865 SW Walker Rd
Beaverton OR 97005
503-764-5300

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION

LNV CORPORATION Civil Case No. 3:14-cv-01836


Plaintiff,
v. MOTION FOR EXTENSION
DENISE SUBRAMANIAM OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSE
pro per
Defendant

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO

FILE RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

It is hereby ORDERED that Defendant be granted an extension of time until January 20, 2015 to file her

response to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.

Honorable Judge Michael Mosman

Date

Page 19 of 19
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 59 Filed 06/18/15 Page 1 of 17
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 21 of 383

Denise Subramaniam
Self-represented FILED18 ._TIJ..I '1514:57usre~
13865 SW Walker Rd
Beaverton OR 97005
503-764-5300

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION

LNV CORPORATION Civil Case No. 3:14-cv-01836


Plaintiff,
v. DEFENDANT'S NOTICE
DENISE SUBRAMANIAM OF RELATE CASES
pro per
Defendant

DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF DIRECTLY RELATED CASES

Pursuant to Federal Rule 40.2(a)(l) Defendant files this Notice of Directly Related Cases, and

respectively shows the court as follows:

A directly related case existed as Subramaniam v. Beal et al, Case No. 3:12-cv-01681-MO in this

court stemming from a wrongful foreclosure attempt on Defendant's property in 2012 by

Plaintiff, LNV Corporation ("LNV"); and Subramaniam v. Beal Case No: 3:2014cv01482. The

Honorable Judge Michael W. Mosman presided over the first case while the Honorable Judge

Michael H. Simon presided over the second. Plaintiff knows these are directly related cases

because it included Defendant's complaints in these two cases as exhibits attached to its

complaint in the present case.

Defendant's Notice of Related Case Page 1of16


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 59 Filed 06/18/15 Page 2 of 17
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 22 of 383

proceedings of this directly related case; and such violation resulted in the present foreclosure

action now in this court brought by Plaintiff, LNV against Defendant.

Additionally this present case is directly related to the following cases which all originate from

the same transaction and involve the same opposing party. These directly related cases are:

1. September 2012 - Catherine Gebhardt: LNVCorporation v. Gebhardt. Case No. 3:12-


CV-468-TA V-HBG, U.S. District Court Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville.
2. Tuli Molina Wohl: LNV Corporation v. Tuli Molina Wohl. Case No. 1 CA-CV 11-0603,
In the Court of Appeals, State of Arizona Division One
3. 2013 -Robynne A. Fauley: Fauley v. Washington Mutual et al (LNV). Case No. 3:13-cv-
00581-AC, U.S. District Court District of Oregon, Portland Division; and LNV v. Fauley;
Case No. CVJ 5040532: Clackamas County
4 .. June 2, 2011 - Christopher and Marcia Swift: In the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Northern District of/llinios, Eastern Division; Case No. 12-35690 (LNV Corp v
Swifts 2011-ch-00206; Circuit Court of] 61h Judical Kane Counnty fllinios LNV Corp v
Swifts
5. 2010-2013 -Rhonda L. Hardwick: LNVas assignee o[MERS Inc. as nominee for First
Capital Finaicial Services Corp. DBA Full Compass Lending v. Hardwick, Case No.
51COJ-1204-MF-00098; State oflndiana County of Martin in the Martin Circuit Court

Each of these cases arise from the same financial transaction between either MERS as an agent

or a GMAC related entity and LNV Corporation, in all these cases LNV produced and submitted

to a court as genuine an allonge to the note purportedly endorsed by Jason J. Vecchio a GMAC-

RFC employee. In each of these cases LNV produced and submitted to a court as genuine an

assignment of deed of trust purporting to convey beneficial interest to LNV; and these

assignments of deed of trust are purportedly signed by GMAC-RFC employees Michael Mead or

Betty Wright and notarized by GMAC-RFC employee Diane Meistad; and each was executed on

March 10, 2008; seven days prior to the incorporation ofLNV in Nevada. March 10, 2008 also

coincides with the date that commenced the demise of Bear Steams.

Defendant's Notice of Related Case Page 2of16


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 59 Filed 06/18/15 Page 3 of 17
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 23 of 383

Defendant spoke on the phone with Diane Meistad who confirmed these assignments of deed of

trust were all produced as part of a single financial transaction with LNV in 2008 that included

numerous loan packages. She also confirmed she was an employee of GMAC's Residential

Funding Company, LLC fka Residential Funding Corp. ("GMAC-RFC") and that Michael Mead

and Betty Wright were also employees of GMAC-RFC and that they signed documents related to

this very large transaction throughout many weeks.

The Jason J. Vecchio signatures on the allonges in each of these cases are identical. A

preliminary examination of four of these Jason J. Vecchio signatures and a report by OMNI

Document Examinations ("OMNI") dated December 4, 2014 shows that after an examination of

these allonges OMNI determined that the signatures of Jason J. Vecchio "submitted as genuine ...

were stamped signatures or photocopied signatures." In order to definitively determine whether

one of the signatures are genuine or if all are copies the original notes and allonges must be

produced for examination. This preliminary report casts doubt on the genuineness of the LNV

produced "original" notes in all the related cases.

Furthermore, LNV through their attorneys at Lender Processing Services aka Black Knight

Financial Services ("LPS") affiliated Anselmo Lindberg Oliver LLC fka Freedman Anselmo

Lindberg LLC, showed Marcia and Chris Swift what LNV alleged was their "original" note.

Defendant went with Robynne A. Pauley to the law offices of LPS affiliated RCO Legal in

Portland to examine what LNV alleged was her "original" note. Viewings of these two alleged

"original" notes revealed similar characteristics that identify them as forgeries.

This present case is also directly related to the case: Breitlings v. LNV et al; Case No. 3: 15-CV-

00703; U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas Dallas Division. The Breitlings'

Defendant's Notice of Related Case Page3of16


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 59 Filed 06/18/15 Page 4 of 17
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 24 of 383

case (and their many related the cases including: Breitlings v. LNV; Case No. 314-cv-03322 U.S.

District Court for the Northern District of Texas Dallas Division; LNV v. Breitlings; Case No.

DC-14-04053 in the Dallas Civil District Court of Texas; LNV v. Breitlings and all other

Occupants, Case No. JE-150007 lD, in the Justice of the Peace Court No. 2 Dallas County

Garland Texas; LNV v. Breitlings and all other occupants. Case No. CC-15-00911-C Dallas

County Court of Law, Court No. 3; Breitlings v. Ames and MGC. Case No. DC-10-02189 in the

Dallas Civil District Court of Texas; and Breitlings v. MGC. Case No. DC-11-07087 in the

Dallas Civil District Court of Texas) is directly related to the present case because it involves the

same party, LNV, and similar claims.

The Breitlings, like the other Beal victims named above, have experienced numerous instances

of mortgage servicing fraud from LNV's alleged mortgage servicer, MGC Mortgage Inc.

("MGC"). Both LNV and MGC are privately owned and operated by Daniel Andrew "Andy"

Beal. The parties named herein opposing Beal' s LNV in all these related cases are victims of

multiple instances of crimes that constitute a pattern of criminal activity perpetrated on them by

D. Andrew Beal and his corrupt business organization and his agents and attorneys that include

but are not limited to: financial fraud, forgery, unlawful debt collection, theft of property,

conspiracy to commit fraud, abuse of judicial process, fraud upon the court, improper influence,

coercion, intimidation, tampering with evidence, and many more acts of bad faith and criminal

intent extending over many years for purposes of the personal financial gain of Mr. Beal and to

the detriment of his victims.

Related party Catherine Gebhardt in Tennessee is about to be wrongfully evicted from her home

by LNV. Her troubles with Beal's MGC began in 2008 when she mailed a cashier's check made

Defendant's Notice of Related Case Page 4of16


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 59 Filed 06/18/15 Page 5 of 17
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 25 of 383

payable to MGC to 7195 Dallas Parkway, Plano Texas for $6,000 to be applied to her mortgage

to cover three months of payments. MGC claimed they never received that check, but when Ms.

Gebhardt was finally able to retrieve this check from her bank it shows the check was paid to

Beal Bank SSB on October 29, 2008. This was not the only payment MGC misappropriated and

Ms. Gebhardt complained to every government agency she could think of including her

Congressman because MGC refused to resolve the continuing problems with misappropriation of

her payments and was determined to move ahead with foreclosure based on its own trumped up

default. MGC's Erica Thomas wrote a letter dated June 23, 2011 to Ms. Gebhardt's

Congressman Roe's office where on page 2 paragraph 2 she states: "MGC has received no

payments since we acquired serving of the loan from GMAC Mortgage on or around July 1,

2009." This statement is conclusively false because Beal Bank SSB cashed Ms. Gebhardt's

$6,000 check on October 29, 2008. (See Exhibit A attached hereto) Many other false statements

exist in the Erica Thomas letter. She also fails to identify herself as an attorney in this letter.

Her Texas Bar# is 24042027. It appears from online evidence that Erica Thomas was not

actually on the payroll with MGC but employed via contract, most likely with Beal Bank. Erica

Thomas's one big lie in her aforementioned letter is demonstrative ofBeal's pattern of criminal

activity; especially when considered alongside a sampling of numerous consumer complaint

letters received by the Texas Attorney General's office describing the same pattern of criminal

activity. (See Exhibit B)

Beal victims, including Defendant, made numerous phone calls to IRS agents over a period of

months and it appears MGC does not have an IRS EIN number; i.e. it cannot have employees.

Beal victims have requested canceled checks made payable to MGC from their banks and every

retrieved check was paid to an entity other than MGC, this indicates that MGC does not have its

Defendant's Notice of Related Case Pages of 16


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 59 Filed 06/18/15 Page 6 of 17
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 26 of 383

own bank account, which also indicates that it does not have an IRS EIN number because one is

required for a business bank account. This begs the question, why would a mortgage servicing

company not have an IRS EIN number? The most logical answer is that it doesn't want to report

its earnings to the IRS and it's a shell corporation used to launder financial transactions. This

conclusion is supported by the fact that most of the Beal victims experience the exact same

problems with MGC misappropriating their payments and then using its self-made default to

foreclose on their properties using falsely fabricated and forged assignments of deed of trust,

allonges to the note, and forged notes. An examination of Beal victims IRS 1098 forms shows

that Beal's MGC and its LPS agent Dovenmuehle Mortgage Inc. ("DMI") appear to be falsely

under reporting the interest paid by Beal victims; Beal victims suspect that Beal falsely reports

losses to the IRS and other government agencies then launders overseas the excessive profits he

actually makes through his covert criminal activities that result in wrongful foreclosures on

thousands of properties across the county. Defendant wrote to the Illinois Attorney Registration

and Disciplinary Commission about DMI attorney Charles King and the phone call to Tennessee

State Bank where Charles King used caller-ID spoofing and misrepresented himself as a

government employee to inquire about a fed-wire transaction made by Ms. Gebhardt into a Bank

of America account as per MGC's instructions in a payoff letter sent to her and other Beal

victims. This Bank of America fed-wire account is a legacy global account with DMI as the

domestic intermediary to an undisclosed overseas recipient. Beal's discovery of this letter

through its being attached to legal pleadings filed on July 30, 2014 in the LNV v. Breitlings; Case

No. DC-14-04053 prompted Mr. Beal's surveillance of Defendant beginning on July 30, 2014.

Unfortunately the courts tend to believe organizations like MGC and LNV instead of examining

the evidence presented by Beal victims who have mostly ended up representing themselves after

Defendant's Notice of Related Case Page 6of16


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 59 Filed 06/18/15 Page 7 of 17
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 27 of 383

being financially drained by Beal's malicious litigation over many years and/or because their

own attorneys suspiciously began to sabotage their cases against them in favor of LNV. This

happened to Ms. Gebhardt; it also happened to the Breitlings and the Swifts. Sudden attorney

incompetence appears to be another pattern in Beal related cases. The parties opposing Beal' s

LNV in all these related cases are now all self-represented (and not by choice).

In LNV v. Breitlings; Case No. DC-I 4-04053 LNV named GMAC as a defendant. This is

indicative that LNV (i.e. Mr. Beal) had reason to believe GMAC may have a claim of beneficial

interest in the Breitlings' note and deed of trust. Wilshire was the last mortgage servicer the

Breitlings made payments to prior to Beal's MGC. Attached to this Notice as Exhibit C is a

copy of a limited power of attorney executed by Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings LLC

as "Owner" appointing as attorney-in-fact Wilshire Credit Corporation authorizing Wilshire to

execute certain documents and transactions for Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings LLC

which is endorsed with signatures of GMAC-RFC employees Jason J. Vecchio, Betty Wright,

Barbara Zahn and Steven Hanson and notarized by Mary E. Lueth. This indicates the transaction

through which LNV acquired the purported assignment of the Breitlings' deed of trust and the

purported conveyance of their note may have been within one of the packages included in the

very large deal that Diane Meistad told Defendant about in their phone conversation. Both

Defendant and Beal victims JoAnn and Samuel Breitling originally financed their property with

Norwest. Those mortgages were paid in full but Norwest failed to file a satisfaction of mortgage

in both these cases. LNV included as an exhibit to their complaint in LNV v. Breitlings: Case

No. DC-14-04053 documents showing that GMAC purchased Norwest.

Defendant's Notice of Related Case Page 7of16


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 59 Filed 06/18/15 Page 8 of 17
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 28 of 383

Additionally LNV showed to WF AA investigative reporter Brett Shipp what Beal alleged to be

the Breitlings' "original" note which contained characteristics that identify it as a forgery similar

to those characteristics identifying the aforementioned alleged Swift and Pauley "original" notes

as forgeries. (Interestingly, Beal refused to allow the Breitlings to view their purported

"original" note.)

Cases directly related to the present case are not limited to the ones noticed herein; amendments

to these Notices of Related Cases or additional Notices of Related Cases will be submitted as

appropriate.

Defendant and the other Beal victims have a common law and constitutional right to challenge

LNV's evidence presented to the court against them, especially when LNV has the burden of

proof and the result of this ligation/trial will be deprivation of these related parties' property.

Certainly the respective courts in these related cases would not want to be party to the derivation

of constitutional rights and/or party to a conspiracy to defraud these related parties' and thereby

wrongfully deprive them of their properties.

This matter is of outmost public interest to any American citizen who owns property as there can

be no public confidence in a judiciary that appears so biased towards financial institutions (and

the Beal entities are not truly financial institutions but shams designed to appear to be something

they not) that it trashes the constitutional rights of American homeowners and refuses to

acknowledge a preponderance of evidence that shows the Beal entities have submitted forged

documents to the courts and made false claims to the courts about their standing to foreclose on

the Beal victims properties; and that their claims of default are also fabricated and the result of

their own misdeeds and intentional misappropriation of their victims payments. If the respective

Defendant's Notice of Related Case Page 8of16


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 59 Filed 06/18/15 Page 9 of 17
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 29 of 383

courts hearing these related cases allow the Beal entities to get away with this blatant pattern of

criminal activity then no American homeowner is safe from a similar unwarranted and

unconstitutional court sanctioned criminal derivation of their property by any party who claims

to have standing and the capacity to forge the appropriate documents to make it appears that they

do when they do not. (All it takes to forge documents that look genuine is a computer and Adobe

Photoshop software.)

Pursuant to RCFC 42.1and18 U.S. Code 3663A the parties opposing Beal's LNV in these

related cases motion the courts presiding over these related cases for consolidation of these

related cases for the limited purposes of compelling Beal and his LNV to produce the alleged

"original" Swift, Hardwick, Pauley and Breitling notes already shown to the Swifts, to Robynne

A. Pauley and Denise Subramaniam, and to Brett Shipp, (and which all possess characteristics

that identify them as forgeries), in addition to the original notes for Tuli Molina Wohl, Rhonda

L. Hardwick, Catherine Gebhardt and Denise Subramaniam; and to tum these alleged "original"

notes over to the custody of the United States Bankruptcy Court For the Northern District of

Illinois Eastern Division and into the custody and care of Judge Donald R. Cassling and/or the

United States Attorney General, Lorretta Lynch, via the office at the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division, 219 S. Dearborn St., 5th Floor, Chicago, IL 60604 for the purposes of forensic

evaluation for authenticity by OMNI Document Examinations and Robin D. Williams at 205 W.

Wacker Drive, Suite 922, Chicago, IL 60606 and for purposes of further examination by the

United States as appropriate; and for purposes of deposing Robin D. Williams after examination

of these notes is complete so that his expert testimony as well as his report can be submitted as

expert testimony in each of the related cases.

Defendant's Notice of Related Case Page 9of16


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 59 Filed 06/18/15 Page 10 of 17
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 30 of 383

In addition to these notes the parties opposing Beal' s LNV in these related cases seek

examination of all documents relative to the transaction(s) and contract between GMAC-RFC

and/or other parties and LNV that gives rise to LNV's claim of conveyance and/or assignment(s)

of the aforementioned notes and deeds of trust; all documents and contracts specific to the

business relationship(s) between LNV and MGC; between LNV and/or MGC and Dovenmuehle

Mortgage Inc.; and between LNV and/or MGC and any and all Lender Processing Services

("LPS") aka Black Knight Financial Services affiliated entities; as well as an examination of the

LPS Desktop Database referred to in the Bret Maloney deposition in the Swift case by an expert

database examiner and/or the FBI. LNV submitted to courts affidavits of Bret Maloney in

several of the related cases which these courts relied on as truthful testimony. A comparison

Bret Maloney's testimony in the aforementioned deposition as well as a deposition in Harris v.

LNV. Case No. 3:12-CV-0552 in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee,

Nashville Division, and his many affidavits shows Maloney has committed perjury and his

testimony should be stricken. This is not just because he claimed to have never committed a

felony crime and the Beal victims discovered he had and have the criminal records to prove it,

but because of many inconsistencies with his testimony and statements he made which can be

proven false; if the Beal victims can ever in truth be heard by a court, (i.e. have meaningful

access to the judiciary, due process and equal protection of the laws.)

18 U.S. Code 3663A(a) states:

"Whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe that any person or enterprise
may be in possession, custody, or control of any documentary materials relevant to a
racketeering investigation, he may, prior to the institution of a civil or criminal
proceeding thereon, issue in writing, and cause to be served upon such person, a civil
investigative demand requiring such person to produce such material for
examination."

Defendant's Notice of Related Case Page 10of16


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 59 Filed 06/18/15 Page 11 of 17
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 31 of 383

Several of the parties opposing Beal's LNV in these related cases have filed Notices of

Constitutional Questions and collectively beseech the United States Attorney General to issue

such a civil investigative demand to Daniel Andrew Beal ("Beal") requiring him to produce the

aforementioned materials for examination. The parties opposing Beal's LNV in these related

cases have consistently claimed that they are individually and collectively victims of the crimes

of convicted felon Lorraine Brown and victims of a corrupt organization operated by Beal and by

his "racketeering activity" as defined by 18 U.S. Code 1961(1)(B) which states:

" ... 'racketeering activity' means any act which is indictable under any of the following
provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), ... section
1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1344 (relating
to financial institution fraud), ... section 1512 (relating to tampering with a witness,
victim, or an informant), section 1513 (relating to retaliating against a witness, victim, or
an informant), ... section 1957 (relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property
derived from specified unlawful activity), ... "

From the U.S. Attorneys' Criminal Resource Manual section 2173. Jury Instruction -- Criminally

Derived Property - 18 U.S.C. 1957(t)(2):

"The term 'criminally derived property' means any property constituting or derived
from, proceeds obtained from a criminal offense ... This term only requires that the
property be derived from a criminal offense. There is no definition of criminal offense.
Thus, there is no obligation that the property be derived from felonious conduct in
violation of state, federal or foreign law ... Thus, the government must prove only that
defendant knew that the property involved in the monetary transaction constituted, or
was derived from, [directly or indirectly], proceeds obtained by some criminal offense. It
need not prove that he/she knew the precise nature of the criminal offense from which
the proceeds derived."

The United States Attorney General already prosecuted and convicted Lorraine Brown (United

States ofAmerica v. Lorraine Brown, Case No. 3:12-cr-198-J-25 MCR, (M.D. Fla.) Lorraine

Brown was convicted of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud pursuant to 18 U.S. Code

Defendant's Notice of Related Case Page 11of16


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 59 Filed 06/18/15 Page 12 of 17
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 32 of 383

1341 and 1343) for the same activities Beal's LNV and MGC and Beal's LPS agents are using

specific to the parties opposing Beal's LNV in these related cases, i.e. falsely fabricating, forging

and robo-signing assignments of deed of trust, allonges to notes and affidavits and filing them in

county recorders offices via mail and wire transmissions; and or filing them with courts across

the country via mail and wire transmissions. Beal and the business entities within his corrupt

organization, that include but are not limited to his MGC and LNV, in each of the related cases

have further used such forged and robo-signed documents to initiate and perfect foreclosures

knowing this is a violation of numerous Texas (and other states') civil statutes and penal code.

This is evidenced by a letter sent to his MGC by the Attorney General of Texas dated October 4,

2010. Beal's MGC responded to the Texas Attorney General's letter in a letter dated October 21,

2010 by stating that his MGC had assured it was not using such documents in its Texas

foreclosures. (See Exhibit D for copies of these two letters.) Yet numerous Beal victims

including the parties opposing Beal's LNV in these related cases (one who resides in Texas)

claim Beal' s MGC and LNV are doing just that. (In addition to the seven Beal victims whose

litigation is being related hereby, at least five other Beal victims are from Texas out of an ever

growing group that now exceeds 40 victims from the additional states of California, Oregon,

Arizona, North Carolina, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Tennessee, Louisiana,

Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana and Michigan. The known Beal victims are certain that once

media reports about Beal thousands if not tens of thousands of Beal victims will come forward;

and their experiences with the Beal entities within his corrupt organization will be consistent

with the pattern of criminal activity these seven Beal victims have expressed through their court

pleadings.)

Defendant's Notice of Related Case Page 12of16


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 59 Filed 06/18/15 Page 13 of 17
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 33 of 383

Many Beal victims claim Beal's MGC misappropriated their payments then used these self-

serving misappropriations of their funds to falsely claim they had defaulted on their loans so as

to justify foreclosure actions where Beal's MGC and LNV then submit to courts as genuine these

false, forged and robo-signed documents, all the while knowing they are false, with intent to

deceive the courts and deprive the Beal victims of their property for Beal's personal gain.

Whether or not the alleged "original" notes and alleged assignments of deed of trust are genuine

rather than forgeries is material as to whether or not LNV has standing to foreclose on the Beal

victims' properties. Whether or not Beal's MGC committed intentional servicing fraud by

misappropriating payments and claiming false defaults against Beal victims so he could

fraudulently foreclose on their properties is also material as to whether or not LNV has standing

to foreclose. Likewise these facts are material as to whether or not Beal has committed a pattern

of felony crimes and engaged in a pattern of criminal activity defined as a pattern of

"racketeering activity" by 18 U.S. Code 1961(1) & (5). Facts specific to whether or not Beal,

his LNV, his LPS agents and his attorneys and other officers of the court have intentionally

thwarted justice, tampered with evidence, abused judicial process and engaged in a conspiracy to

deny the Beal victims their constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of law under

the fifth and fourteenth amendments are material as to whether or not the Beal victims have been

unconstitutionally deprived of their property and/or their liberty to make financial decisions

regarding their property (the largest single investment they have made in their lives); and

whether or not Beal operates a corrupt organization or "racketeering enterprise" as defined by 18

U.S. Code 1961 (4). Additionally the aforementioned facts are material as to whether or not

Beal and his LNV and his agents and/or his attorneys have violated 15 U.S. Code 1692 et al.

Defendant's Notice of Related Case Page 13of16


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 59 Filed 06/18/15 Page 14 of 17
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 34 of 383

The Beal victims have suffered significant financial losses and great emotional anguish and

distress extending over many years as a result of the crimes perpetrated against them by Beal, his

racketeering enterprise, his LPS agents and his attorneys.

18 U.S. Code 3663A(a)(2) states:

"For the purposes of this section, the term "victim" means a person directly and
proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense for which restitution
may be ordered including, in the case of an offense that involves as an element a
scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity, any person directly harmed by the
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern ... "

18 U.S. Code 3663A(a)(3) states:

"The court shall also order, if agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement, restitution to
persons other than the victim of the offense."

The Beal victims believe Beal should also pay restitution to the United States; specifically to the

courts due to his pattern of abuse and fraud upon the courts. This restitution should be directly

used to finance a program to ensure the constitutional rights to due process and equal protection

of law of parties like the Beal victims are not violated in the future because the courts lack funds.

18 U.S. Code 3663A(b)(l) states:

"The order of restitution shall require that such defendant in the case of an offense
resulting in damage to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense (A)
return the property to the owner of the property or someone designated by the owner;
or (B) if return of the property under subparagraph (A) is impossible, impracticable, or
inadequate, pay an amount equal to (i) the greater of (I) the value of the property on
the date of the damage, loss, or destruction; or (II) the value of the property on the date
of sentencing, less (ii) the value (as of the date the property is returned) of any part of
the property that is returned."

Defendant's Notice of Related Case Page 14of16


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 59 Filed 06/18/15 Page 15 of 17
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 35 of 383

In addition to restitution pursuant to 18 U.S. Code 3663A et al, (Mandatory Crime Victims

Restitution Act) victims of Beal's crimes are entitled to damages pursuant to 15 U.S. Code

1692 et al, (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act), including damages for emotional distress and

punitive damages, and to treble damages pursuant to 18 U.S. Code 1961 et al.

A recent decision by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Case No. 13-3402. Rick Slorp v.

Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss, et al Originating Case No.: 2:12-cv-00498 aptly represents the

interests of the Beal victims in their related cases and the facts to be determined by the courts

hearing these cases. Quoting from this Appellate decision:

The district court held that Slorp lacked standing because he sustained no injury as a
result of the assignment. In its view the foreclosure action "was filed because of his
default under the terms of the Note and Mortgage; not because of the creation ofthe
allegedly 'false 'Assignment. " Although the foreclosure action caused Slorp to incur
legal fees, the court stated, he incurred those fees because he defaulted, "not because of
the Assignment. " Thus the district court held that Slorp sustained no injury attributable
to the allegedly fraudulent assignment.
This analysis suffers from one key error: It mistakes the source of the injury alleged in
Slorp 's complaint. Slorp does not attribute his injuries to the false assignment of his
mortgage; rather, he attributes his injuries to the improper foreclosure litigation.
According to the complaint, Bank ofAmerica (through LSR) filed a foreclosure action
against Slorp despite its lack of interest in the mortgage; the defendants misled the trial
court by fraudulently misrepresenting Bank ofAmerica's interest in the suit; and Slorp
incurred damages when he was compelled to defend his interests. If Bank ofAmerica had
no right to file the foreclosure action, it makes no difference whether Slorp previously
had defaulted on his mortgage. Slorp 's suit to recover damages caused by Bank of
America's lawsuit satisfies each of the three components ofArticle III standing. That is
all that is required for count one, which alleged a violation of the FDCPA-afederal
statute. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2013) (stating that "standing
in federal court is a question offederal law, not state law"); see also Coyne v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 183 F3d 488, 495 (6th Cir. 1999). Slorp has established standing to seek
relief under the FDCPA, and the district court erred when it held otherwise.

One glaring difference is that most of the Beal victims NEVER DEF AUL TED ON THEIR

MORTGAGES! Beal's MGC fabricated false defaults by intentionally misappropriating Beal

victims' payments. Beal and his LNV and MGC also acted intentionally in bad faith to prevent

Defendant's Notice of Related Case Page 15of16


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 59 Filed 06/18/15 Page 16 of 17
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 36 of 383

Beal victims from refinancing their mortgages at lower rates, and refuses to report their good

payment history to credit reporting agencies which also prevents them from refinancing and

causes their credit score to drop by on average 100 points. Modification offers to Beal victims

were typically padded with extra fees and predatory rates making the costs so insanely high that

no one in their right mind would ever agree to them, but that too was by design, so Beal could

say "we offered them a settlement/modification by they turned it down."

Is this what any of the Honorable judges reading this, or anyone else, would want done unto

them? "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." Jesus of Nazareth - Luke 6:31;

Matthew 7: 12

Respectfully Submitted,

Denise Subramaniam

Defendant's Notice of Related Case Page 16of16


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 59 Filed 06/18/15 Page 17 of 17
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 37 of 383

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was

served upon all counsel of record, pro-se parties and the United States Attorney General and the

Attorney General of the State of Oregon via the Court's CMIECF system, email, and/or regular

mail, and/or certified mail with return receipt requested.

U.S. Department of Justice


Loretta Lynch,
U.S. Attorney General
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001
202-514-2000

Gabrielle D. Richards I Perkins Coie LLP


1120 NW Couch Street
10th Floor
Portland, Oregon 97209-4128
D. +1.503.727.2255
F. + 1.503.346.2255
urichards(a~perkinscoie.com

Respectfully Submitted,

Denise Subramaniam
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 1 of 36
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 38 of 383

Denise Subramaniam
Self-represented
13865 SW Walker Rd
Beaverton OR 97005
503-764-5300

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION

LNV CORPORATION Civil Case No. 3:14-cv-01836


Plaintiff,
v. DEFENDANT'S MOTION
DENISE SUBRAMANIAM FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE OF
pro per ADJUDICATIVE FACTS
Defendant

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE OF RICK SLORP V. LERNER,


SAMPSON & ROTHFUSS, ET AL

Comes now Defendant Denise Subramaniam, representing herself, pursuant to Federal Rule 201

Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts and hereby requests this Court take judicial notice of the

documents described herein in and in support states as follows:

1. THE DEFENDANT moves this Court to take judicial notice of:

Rick Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss, et al. Case No. 13-3402, United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Originating Case No.: 2:12-cv-00498. (Attached
as Exhibit A)

2. This case is similar to the present case in that it originated through a series of foreclosure

actions where the foreclosing party lacked standing to foreclose due to a forged

assignment of deed of trust. Quoting the Appellate justices:


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 2 of 36
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 39 of 383

The law firm of Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss (LSR) filed that foreclosure action
against Rick Slorp on behalf of its client, Bank ofAmerica. Because Countrywide had
originated Slorp 's mortgage, LSR attached to the complaint an assignment
purporting to assign an interest in Slorp 's mortgage to Bank ofAmerica. The state
court awarded judgment to Bank ofAmerica. Slorp subsequently retained counsel
who questioned the assignment's validity, and he sought to depose Shellie Hill, the
LSR employee who had executed the assignment on behalf of Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS). Bank ofAmerica promptly dismissed the
foreclosure action, and the state court vacated its judgment.

3. Slorp then filed an action against LSR, Hill, MERS, and Bank of America to recover the

attorney's fees he expended in the foreclosure action. The Appellate justices found:

The gravamen of the complaint was that the defendants engaged in unfair, deceptive,
and fraudulent debt-collection practices when they filed an illegitimate foreclosure
action against Slorp. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, and as that
motion was pending, Slorp sought leave to amend his complaint to add a civil claim
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), I8 USC.
1961-68. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and denied the motion for
leave to amend the complaint. We now affirm the dismissal of the original complaint
but reverse the district court's denial of the motion for leave to amend the complaint.
We remand the case to the district court with instructions to permit Slorp to amend
his complaint to add a RICO claim.

4. Slorp originally alleged that "filing and maintaining the foreclosure action with the use of

false statements and evidence constitute[d] a false, deceptive, and/or misleading practice

in an attempt to collect a debt." Slorp filed a motion for leave to file a second amended

complaint, together with his proposed second amended complaint. The proposed

complaint expanded the factual allegations and added a fifth count alleging a violation of

RICO, 18 U.S.C. 1961. The defendants opposed Slorp's request for leave to amend.

The district court denied Slorp' s motion for leave and dismissed the complaint.

5. The district court also concluded that Slorp had not suffered damages attributable to the

allegedly fraudulent assignment because his exposure to the foreclosure action resulted
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 3 of 36
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 40 of 383

from his default on the promissory note rather than any of the defendants' conduct. The

court then rejected each of Slorp's claims on the merits.

6. Ultimately the Appellate justices determined:

The district court held that Slorp lacked standing because he sustained no injury as a
result of the assignment. In its view the foreclosure action "was filed because of his
default under the terms of the Note and Mortgage; not because of the creation of the
allegedly 'false 'Assignment. " Although the foreclosure action caused Slorp to incur
legal fees, the court stated, he incurred those fees because he defaulted, "not because
of the Assignment. " Thus the district court held that Slorp sustained no injury
attributable to the allegedly fraudulent assignment.
This analysis suffers from one key error: It mistakes the source of the injury alleged
in Slorp 's complaint. Slorp does not attribute his injuries to the false assignment of
his mortgage; rather, he attributes his injuries to the improper foreclosure litigation.
According to the complaint, Bank ofAmerica (through LSR) filed a foreclosure action
against Slorp despite its lack of interest in the mortgage; the defendants misled the
trial court by fraudulently misrepresenting Bank ofAmerica's interest in the suit; and
Slorp incurred damages when he was compelled to defend his interests. If Bank of
America had no right to file the foreclosure action, it makes no difference whether
Slorp previously had defaulted on his mortgage. Slorp 's suit to recover damages
caused by Bank ofAmerica 's lawsuit satisfies each of the three components ofArticle
Ill standing. That is all that is required for count one, which alleged a violation of the
FDCPA-afederal statute. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2013)
(stating that "standing in federal court is a question offederal law, not state law'');
see also Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F3d 488, 495 (6th Cir. 1999). Slorp has
established standing to seek relief under the FDCPA, and the district court erred
when it held otherwise.

7. Federal Rule of Evidence 20l(c)(2) - Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts states:

"The court must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied
with the necessary information."

The necessary information is supplied herein as attached Exhibit A.

8. Defendant also filed a Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Fact in the Criminal

Indictment and Conviction of Lorraine Brown for Conspiracy to Commit Mail and Wire

Fraud in support of her Motion to Dismiss filed with this court on Friday March 6, 2015.
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 4 of 36
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 41 of 383

Collectively the Beal victims, specifically Beal victims as parties identified in her Notice

of Related Cases, have experienced as pro-se litigants that in spite of the language of the

law requiring courts to take judicial notice of adjudicative fact courts have routinely

ignored and even denied their motions for judicial notice. This violates federal rules of

evidence and constitutes a deprivation of our constitutional rights to due process and

equal protection of law.

9. Federal Rule 301 Presumptions in Civil Cases states:

" ... unless a federal statute or these rules provide otherwise, the party against
whom a presumption is directed has the burden ofproducing evidence to rebut
the presumption. But this rule does not shift the burden ofpersuasion, which
remains on the party who had it originally."

10. LNV as the plaintiff had the burden of proof or persuasion in the present case. LNV

submitted to the court various mortgage related documents including an assignment of

deed of trust and allonges to the note as evidence of its standing to foreclose on

Defendant's property. Defendant challenges the authenticity of these documents.

11. Deed assignments, since they are filed with the property recorders' office carry a

presumptive burden. Presumptions governed by Rule 301 are given the effect of placing

upon the opposing party (Defendant in the present case) the burden of establishing the

nonexistence of the presumed fact, once the party invoking the presumption establishes

the basic facts giving rise to it.

12. Adjudicative fact in the criminal indictment and conviction of Lorraine Brown for

conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud defeats the presumption that deed assignments

and other documents filed with a property recorders' office must be genuine.
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 5 of 36
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 42 of 383

Adjudicative fact in this criminal conviction it is that over 1 million fraudulently signed

and notarized mortgage-related documents were produced through the crimes of Lorraine

Brown and her co-conspirators and filed with property recorders' offices across the

country. This adjudicative fact defeats the presumption invoked by LNV.

13. Likewise judges in many federal and state courts seem to have a presumption that since

the homeowner "defaulted" on their mortgage they are not entitled to protection of the

law or to damages as a result of a continued onslaught of foreclosure attempts by parties

that lack standing to foreclose on their properties. Adjudicative fact in Rick Slorp v.

Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss. et al defeats this biased and unconstitutional presumption.

14. Defendant has consistently claimed, and the evidence supports her claim, that she

NEVER DEF AUL TED ON HER MORTGAGE! Defendant has also consistently

claimed LNV is not a party of interest to either her note or her deed of trust and therefore

has no standing to foreclose on her property.

15. Furthermore, Defendant has consistently claimed she is a victim of a crime and the

adjudicative facts in United States ofAmerica v. Lorraine Brown, Case No. 3:12-cr-198-

J-25 MCR, (M.D. Fla.) support this claim; and that she is entitled to restitution for the

damages she has suffered. This claim is supported by adjudicative fact in Rick S/orp v.

Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss, et al

Respectfully Submitted,

Denise Subramaniam
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 6 of 36
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 43 of 383

DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT A
Adjudicative Fact in Rick Slorp v. Lerner. Sampson & Rothfuss. et al
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 7 of 36
Case: 13-3402
Case: 15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-1 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: 63-2, PagePage:
44 of 1383 (1of29)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
100 EAST FIFTH STREET, ROOM 540
Deborah S. Hunt POTTER STEWART U.S. COURTHOUSE Tel. (513) 564-7000
Clerk CINCINNATl, OHIO 45202-3988 www.ca6.uscourts.gov

Filed: September 29, 2014

Mr. Troy John Doucet


Doucet & Associates
700 Stonehenge Parkway
Suite 2-B
Dublin, OH 43017

Re: Case No. 13-3402, Rick Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss, et al
Originating Case No.: 2:12-cv-00498

Dear Counsel:

The Court issued the enclosed Opinion today in this case.

Sincerely yours,

s/Bryant L. Crutcher
Case Manager
Direct Dial No. 513-564-7013

cc: Mr. Rick D. DeBlasis


Mr. John P. Hehman
Ms. Kimberlee Shay Rohr
Mr. James W. Sandy
Brad Jonathon Terman
Mr. James S. Wertheim

Enclosure

Mandate to issue
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 8 of 36
Case: Case: 13-3402
15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 45 of1383 (2 of 29)

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION


File Name: 14a0745n.06

No.13-3402

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

RICK A. SLORP, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
ON APPEAL FROM THE
v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
)
COURT FOR THE
LERNER, SAMPSON & ROTHFUSS; BANK OF )
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
AMERICA, N.A.; SHELLIE HILL; )
OHIO
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION )
SYSTEMS, INC., )
)
Defendants-Appellees. )

BEFORE: MOORE, GIBBONS, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. This case relates to alleged misconduct in a

separate state-court foreclosure action. The law firm of Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss (LSR) filed

that foreclosure action against Rick Slorp on behalf of its client, Bank of America. Because

Countrywide had originated Slorp's mortgage, LSR attached to the complaint an assignment

purporting to assign an interest in Slorp's mortgage to Bank of America. The state court

awarded judgment to Bank of America. Slorp subsequently retained counsel who questioned the

assignment's validity, and he sought to depose Shellie Hill, the LSR employee who had executed

the assignment on behalf of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS). Bank of

America promptly dismissed the foreclosure action, and the state court vacated its judgment.

Slorp then filed this action against LSR, Hill, MERS, and Bank of America to recover the

attorney's fees he expended in the foreclosure action. The gravamen of the complaint was that

the defendants engaged in unfair, deceptive, and fraudulent debt-collection practices when they
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 9 of 36
Case: Case: 13-3402
15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 46 of2 383 (3 of 29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

filed an illegitimate foreclosure action against Slorp. The defendants moved to dismiss the

complaint, and as that motion was pending, Slorp sought leave to amend his complaint to add a

civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.

1961-68. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and denied the motion for leave to

amend the complaint. We now affirm the dismissal of the original complaint but reverse the

district court's denial of the motion for leave to amend the complaint. We remand the case to the

district court with instructions to permit Slorp to amend his complaint to add a RICO claim.

I.
LSR filed a separate foreclosure action on behalf of Bank of America in the Franklin

County Court of Common Pleas in July 2010. Bank of America attached to its complaint a

promissory note dated December 14, 2007. The note named Countrywide Bank, FSB as the

lender and Slorp as the borrower. Bank of America also attached a mortgage that secured the

promissory note with Slorp's home. The poor printing quality renders the mortgage difficult to

read, but it lists Countrywide Bank, FSB as the lender and MERS as the lender's nominee.

Bank of America also attached a document, captioned "Assignment of Mortgage," which

states that MERS "does hereby assign to BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. 1 fka Countrywide

Home Loans Servicing, L.P .... all of its interest in that certain mortgage from Rick A.

Slorp ... to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for Countrywide Bank,

FSB." The assignment was executed on behalf of MERS, "as nominee for Countrywide Bank,

FSB, its successors and assigns," by Shellie Hill, who purported to be an assistant secretary and

vice president of MERS. The assignment was dated July 9, 2010, and was prepared by LSR.

1
Slorp alleges that BAC Home Loans Servicing was formerly known as Countrywide
Home Loans Servicing and is currently an arm of Bank of America, N.A.
-2-
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 10 of 36
Case: Case: 13-3402
15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 47 of3 383 (4 of 29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

After Slorp answered the foreclosure complaint, Bank of America moved for summary

judgment. The court of common pleas granted that motion. Slorp moved for relief from the

judgment in July 2011, and in February 2012 Slorp served Hill with a subpoena duces tecum,

demanding that she "appear at an evidentiary hearing and bring documents demonstrating her

relationship with [Bank of America] and its predecessors, documents demonstrating her

appointment as Assistant Secretary and Vice president of Defendant MERS, and other

documents related to the Assignment." One month later--on the day before Hill was scheduled

to testify at the evidentiary hearing-Bank of America voluntarily dismissed the foreclosure

action, and the state court vacated the judgment.

On June 7, 2012, Slorp filed this action in the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Ohio against LSR, Bank of America, Hill, and MERS. The four-count

complaint alleged a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C.

1692e; a violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (CSPA), Ohio Rev. Code

1345.02 and 1345.03; falsification in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2921.13; and civil

conspiracy to commit falsification.

According to the complaint, Hill "falsely executed" the assignment because Countrywide

Bank did not exist on July 9, 2010, and Hill was not an employee of MERS on that date. Hill

acted at the behest of LSR and with Bank of America's knowledge, said Slorp, and her "false

statement was made with the purpose to mislead the judge in the performance of her official

function within the foreclosure action." Slorp alleged that "filing and maintaining the

foreclosure action with the use of false statements and evidence constitute[d] a false, deceptive,

and/or misleading practice in an attempt to collect a debt." Slorp sought actual damages of

-3-
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 11 of 36
Case: Case: 13-3402
15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 48 of4 383 (5 of 29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

$8,934.44, treble damages of $26,803.32, statutory damages of $1,000, non-economic damages

of $5,000, and fees and costs.

Bank of America and MERS moved to dismiss Slorp's complaint, and LSR and Hill filed

a separate motion to dismiss on the same day. After the parties finished briefing those motions,

Slorp filed an amended complaint without first seeking the defendants' consent or the court's

leave. The parties held a pretrial conference two days later, and Slorp pledged to file a motion

for leave to amend within five days of that conference. Slorp then filed a motion for leave to file

a second amended complaint, together with his proposed second amended complaint. The

proposed complaint expanded the factual allegations and added a fifth count alleging a violation

of RICO, 18 U.S.C. 1961. The defendants opposed Slorp's request for leave to amend.

The district court denied Slorp's motion for leave and dismissed the complaint. The

court held that Slorp lacked standing to challenge the validity of the assignment because he was

not a party to the assignment. The district court also concluded that Slorp had not suffered

damages attributable to the allegedly fraudulent assignment because his exposure to the

foreclosure action resulted from his default on the promissory note rather than any of the

defendants' conduct. The court then rejected each of Slorp's claims on the merits.

Turning to Slorp's motion for leave to amend the complaint, the district court first noted

that the proposed amended complaint "provides no new factual allegations that would alter the

Court's analysis" of the merits of Slorp's claims. The court then denied the request for leave to

amend because it held that the RICO claim in the proposed amended complaint was not viable.

Slorp had not identified any injury caused by the assignment, the court stated, and he therefore

would not be able to obtain relief under RICO. Slorp timely appealed.

-4-
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 12 of 36
Case: Case: 13-3402
15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 49 of5 383 (6 of 29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

II.

We begin with standing. Article III of the United States Constitution limits the power of

the federal judiciary to the adjudication of certain "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S. Const. art.

III, 2, cl. 1. From this textual limitation and "the separation-of-powers principles underlying

that limitation," the federal courts have "deduced a set of requirements that together make up the

'irreducible constitutional minimum of standing."' Lexmark Int 'l, Inc. v. Static Control

Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386-88 (2014) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). Three components comprise this "irreducible constitutional minimum":

(1) the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact," (2) that injury must be "fairly traceable"

to the defendant's challenged conduct, and (3) it must be likely that the plaintiffs injury would

be redressed by the requested relief. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. At its essence, Article III

standing requires the plaintiff to have some personal and particularized stake in the dispute. See

Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818-19 (1997).

To determine whether Slorp had Article III standing, we focus on whether Slorp

sustained an injury that was traceable to the defendants' conduct-the first two of the three "core

components." This "inquiry often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted." Raines,

521 U.S. at 818-19 (internal quotation marks omitted). And so it does here.

The district court held that Slorp lacked standing because he sustained no injury as a

result of the assignment. In its view the foreclosure action "was filed because of his default

under the terms of the Note and Mortgage; not because of the creation of the allegedly 'false'

Assignment." Although the foreclosure action caused Slorp to incur legal fees, the court stated,

he incurred those fees because he defaulted, "not because of the Assignment." Thus the district

court held that Slorp sustained no injury attributable to the allegedly fraudulent assignment.

-5-
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 13 of 36
Case: Case: 13-3402
15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 50 of6 383 (7 of 29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

This analysis suffers from one key error: It mistakes the source of the injury alleged in

Slorp's complaint. Slorp does not attribute his injuries to the false assignment of his mortgage;

rather, he attributes his injuries to the improper foreclosure litigation. According to the

complaint, Bank of America (through LSR) filed a foreclosure action against Slorp despite its

lack of interest in the mortgage; the defendants misled the trial court by fraudulently

misrepresenting Bank of America's interest in the suit; and Slorp incurred damages when he was

compelled to defend his interests. If Bank of America had no right to file the foreclosure action,

it makes no difference whether Slorp previously had defaulted on his mortgage. 2 Slorp's suit to

recover damages caused by Bank of America's lawsuit satisfies each of the three components of

Article III standing. That is all that is required for count one, which alleged a violation of the

FDCPA-a federal statute. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2013) (stating

that "standing in federal court is a question of federal law, not state law"); see also Coyne v. Am.

Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 495 (6th Cir. 1999). Slorp has established standing to seek relief

under the FDCPA, and the district court erred when it held otherwise.

III.

Whether Ohio law countenances Slorp's state-law claims requires that we clarify the

circumstances under which a mortgagor can challenge the validity of an assignment that

purportsto assign the mortgagee's interest in the mortgage to another entity.

Much of the district court's analysis was taken from Livonia Properties Holdings, LLC v.

12840-12976 Farmington Road Holdings, LLC, where we held that a homeowner did not have

standing to challenge the validity of a home-loan assignment in an action contesting a

2
Although whether Slorp had defaulted is not pertinent to the actual legal issue, whether
Slorp had defaulted remains an issue in the case. Slorp did not concede default in his complaint,
and the defendants' assertions that he did default may not be considered by the district court in
connection with a motion to dismiss testing Slorp's allegations.
-6-
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 14 of 36
Case:Case: 13-3402
15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 7 383
51 of (8 of 29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

foreclosure. 399 F. App'x 97, 102 (6th Cir. 2010). The type of standing we discussed in Livonia

Properties is a common-law analogue of statutory standing, wholly unrelated to Article III

standing. It is entirely a creature of state contract law and is assessed in conjunction with the

merits of the claim, not as a threshold issue. Assignments are contracts and, as a general matter,

are regulated by the common law of contracts. See 6A C.J.S. Assignments 123 (2014). A

person who is neither a party to the contract nor in privity with the parties, and who is not a

third-party beneficiary of the contract, is said to lack "standing" to enforce the contract's terms

and to challenge its validity. See Kaplan v. Shure Bros., Inc., 266 F.3d 598, 602-03 (7th Cir.

2001) (analyzing contractual privity as an issue of state-law standing); City of Akron v. Castle

Aviation, Inc., No. 16057, 1993 WL 191966, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. June 9, 1993) ("As a general

rule a non-party may not assert contract rights unless it is a third-party beneficiary under the

contract or such standing is conferred by statute."). Livonia Properties was one of innumerable

cases recognizing that this general contract principle extends to assignments, subject to various

caveats and exceptions. See also, e.g., Druso v. Bank One ofColumbus, 705 N.E.2d 717, 721-22

(Ohio Ct. App. 1997).

We analyze the district court's holding in more detail than might ordinarily be necessary

because our Livonia Properties opinion has confounded some courts and litigants, see, e.g., Etts

v. Deutsche Bank Nat'/ Trust Co., No. 13-11588, 2014 WL 645358, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 19,

2014) (noting that the inexact use of the term "standing" to denote a homeowner's eligibility to

challenge certain aspects of a foreclosure made it "unclear whether Defendants are challenging

Plaintiffs' standing under Article III of the Constitution, under the Michigan statutory scheme, or

both"), and has generally received more attention than an unpublished opinion might warrant.

-7-
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 15 of 36
Case: Case: 13-3402
15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 52 of8 383 (9 of 29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

A.
The district court held, and the defendants now maintain, that Slorp lacked standing to

assert his claims because an individual who is not a party to an assignment may not attack the

assignment's validity. We differ with this interpretation of Livonia Properties. The sweeping

rule that the district court extrapolated from Livonia Properties dwarfs our actual holding in that

case. The district court in Livonia Properties stated that an individual "who is not a party to an

assignment lacks standing to challenge that assignment," and our Livonia Properties opinion

quoted and endorsed that general statement, perhaps inartfully. 399 F. App'x at 102. But we

quickly limited the scope of that rule, clarifying that a non-party homeowner may challenge the

validity of an assignment to establish the assignee's lack of title, among other defects. Id (citing

6A C.J.S. Assignments 132); see also Carmack v. Banko/NY. Mellon, 534 F. App'x 508, 511-

12 (6th Cir. 2013) ("Livonia's statement on standing should not be read broadly to preclude all

borrowers from challenging the validity of mortgage assignments under Michigan law."). Thus a

non-party homeowner may challenge a putative assignment's validity on the basis that it was not

effective to pass legal title to the putative assignee. See Conlin v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys.,

714 F.3d 355, 361 (6th Cir. 2013); Livonia Props., 399 F. App'x at 102; see also Woods v. Wells

Fargo Bank, NA., 733 F.3d 349, 353-54 (1st Cir. 2013); 6A C.J.S. Assignments 132 ("The

debtor may also question a plaintiffs lack of title or the right to sue.").

There was no dispute in Livonia Properties that the assignor had assigned title to the

assignee; rather, the homeowner lacked "standing" to assert that the assignment was not properly

recorded and suffered from technical defects that prevented the assignee from establishing record

chain of title under Michigan law. In this case, by contrast, Slorp alleges that Bank of America,

the putative assignee, held neither his mortgage nor the attendant promissory note when it filed

-8-
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 16 of 36
Case:Case: 13-3402
15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 53 of9 383 (10 of 29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

the foreclosure action because the parties lacked the authority to assign his mortgage to Bank of

America when they purported to do so. That distinction makes all the difference. See Conlin,

714 F.3d at 361 (stating that a third party may challenge an assignment if that challenge would

render the assignment void). Because Slorp alleges that the assignment was fraudulent and that

Bank of America therefore did not hold title at the time of the foreclosure, 3 Livonia Properties

does not bar his suit-in fact, it supports it.

B.
Livonia Properties also does not govern Slorp's standing to assert the statutory claims

that he alleged in his complaint. Livonia Pr.operties discusses the defenses that are available to

homeowners who face foreclosure-i. e., the circumstances in which a homeowner may impede

foreclosure by attacking the assignment of the mortgage. See 399 F. App'x at 102-03 (relying in

large part on 6A C.J.S. Assignments 132, which is captioned "Defenses"). That opinion says

nothing about when a homeowner may bring suit to seek redress for fraudulent or deceptive acts

in connection with a foreclosure.

Insofar as Ohio law affects Slorp' s standing to bring the CSPA, falsification, and

conspiracy claims, the relevant law is the statutes that create those causes of action. Like the

federal courts, Ohio courts distinguish between constitutional and statutory standing. Ohio's

constitutional standing doctrine resembles its federal counterpart. See Fed. Home Loan Mortg.

3
In Slorp's memorandum in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss, he stated
that he "has not attacked the validity of the assignment." The district court's opinion quoted this
statement, which could be interpreted as an admission that the assignment was valid and
effective. But this interpretation would belie the allegations of fraud in Slorp's complaint, and
when that language is read in context, it is clear that he does dispute the validity of the
assignment. The statement relates to his requested relief rather than his allegations: He states
that he does not presently seek a declaration of the invalidity of the assignment; he only seeks
damages for the defendants' prior fraudulent conduct. This interpretation comports with the
allegations in the complaint and the arguments in his briefs, all of which maintain that the
assignment was invalid.
-9-
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 17 of 36
Case: Case: 13-3402
15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 54 of10383 (11of29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 979 N.E.2d 1214, 1218-20 (Ohio 2012). By contrast, the Ohio state

courts repeatedly have held that statutory standing is a question to be resolved with reference to

the specific language of the applicable statute rather than to abstract standing principles. See,

e.g., Ohio Valley Assocd. Builders & Contractors v. DeBra-Kuempel, 949 N.E.2d 582, 585-87

(Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (discussing statutory standing and stating that the "only issue" is whether

the plaintiff was an "interested party" as defined in the relevant statute, "common-law standing

notwithstanding"); Rose-Gulley v. Spitzer Akron, Inc., No.21778, 2004 WL 1736982, at *3 (Ohio

Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2004) (holding that plaintiff lacked standing to assert CSPA claim because she

was not a "consumer" within the meaning of that statute). "To incorporate common-law

standing principles when the legislature has specifically authorized a party to bring suit is simply

inappropriate." Ohio Valley Associated Builders & Contractors v. Indus. Power Sys., Inc.,

941 N.E.2d 849, 856 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010).

Accordingly, to determine whether Slorp had standing to bring CSPA, falsification, and

conspiracy claims against the defendants, we look only to the language of those statutes. See

Kuempel, 949 N.E.2d at 586-87 ("[C]ommon-law standing requirements, such as establishing a

'personal stake' in a case, do not apply when the issue is statutory standing under [a statute].").

The principles outlined in Livonia Properties are irrelevant here.

IV.

Because Slorp has Article III standing and Livonia Properties does not bar his claim, we

tum to the merits. Slorp alleged four causes of action in his initial complaint: a violation of the

FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. 1692e; a violation of the CSPA, Ohio Rev. Code 1345.02 and 1345.03;

falsification in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2921.13; and civil conspiracy to commit

falsification. We take each claim in turn.

-10-
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 18 of 36
Case: 13-3402
Case: 15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2
ID: 10528084,Filed: 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 55 of11
383 (12 of 29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

A.

The district court held that Slorp's FDCPA claim was time-barred because he failed to

file suit within the one-year statute of limitations. Slorp acknowledges that an FDCPA action

generally must be brought "within one year from the date on which the violation occurs,"

15 U.S.C. 1692k(d), but asks us to apply the continuing-violation doctrine to rescue his claim.

Slorp also maintains that Bank of America, LSR, and Hill committed a second, unprecluded

violation of the FDCPA when Hill submitted an affidavit to the district court affirming that she

was authorized to execute the assignment. We agree with the district court.

1.

The continuing-violation doctrine provides that violations "which occur beyond the

limitations period are actionable where a plaintiff challenges not just one incident of unlawful

conduct but an unlawful practice that continues into the limitations period." Haithcock v. Frank,

958 F.2d 671, 677 (6th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). This court

historically recognized two distinct categories of continuing violations, serial and systemic, each

of which constituted a narrowly limited exception to the general rule that the limitations clock

begins to run at the time of the act that gives rise to the claim. See LRL Props. v. Portage Metro

Haus. Auth., 55 F.3d 1097, 1105 (6th Cir. 1995). In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.

Morgan, however, the Supreme Court effectively eliminated the serial continuing-violation

doctrine when it held that "discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even

when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges." 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002). We

have since held that "plaintiffs are now precluded from establishing a continuing violation

exception by proof that the alleged acts of discrimination occurring prior to the limitations period

-11-
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 19 of 36
Case:Case: 13-3402
15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 12383
56 of (13 of 29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

are sufficiently related to those occurring within the limitations period." Sharpe v. Cureton,

319 FJd 259, 268 (6th Cir. 2003).

Although we continue to recognize systemic continuing violations, Slorp's invocation of

the continuing-violation doctrine in the FDCPA context is problematic. Courts have been

"extremely reluctant" to extend the continuing-violation doctrine beyond the context of Title VII,

Nat'! Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 480 F.3d 410, 416 (6th Cir. 2007)

(internal quotation marks omitted), and we have never applied the continuing-violation doctrine

to an FDCPA claim.

At least one court of appeals has stated in dicta that a defendant's collection activities

might amount to a continuing violation of the FDCPA. See Solomon v. HSBC Mortg. Corp.,

395 F. App'x 494, 497 n.3 (10th Cir. 2010). But that case included FDCPA claims related to an

allegedly baseless foreclosure action, and the court concluded that the deceptive acts alleged in

the complaint, including the foreclosure action, were discrete acts rather than continuing

violations. Id. at 497. No court of appeals has held that debt-collection litigation (or a

misleading statement made in connection with that litigation) is a continuing violation of the

FDCPA. See Schaffhauser v. Citibank (S.D.) NA., 340 F. App'x 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2009) (per

curiam) (holding that ongoing debt-collection litigation does not constitute a continuing violation

of the FDCPA); Naas v. Stolman, 130 FJd 892, 893 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that the FDCPA's

statute of limitations begins to run when the debt-collection suit is filed rather than when the trial

court issues its judgment).4

4
Most district court decisions have held that the continued prosecution of a collection suit
is not a continuing violation under the FDCPA. See, e.g., McDermott v. Marcus, Errico, Emmer
& Brooks, P.C., 911 F. Supp. 2d 1, 46-47 (D. Mass. 2012); Ball v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC,
No. 1: 12-CV-0604, 2012 WL 1745479, at *5 (N.D. Ohio May 16, 2012); Wilhelm v. Credico,
Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1009 (D.N.D. 2006); Egbarin v. Lewis, Lewis & Ferraro LLC, No.
-12-
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 20 of 36
Case: 13-3402
Case: 15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 57 of13
383 (14 of 29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

Application of the continuing-violation doctrine to FDCPA claims would be inconsistent

with the principles underlying the Supreme Court's limited endorsement of that doctrine in

Morgan. In Morgan the Court differentiated between discrete acts and continuing violations.

"Discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are

easy to identify," and each of those discrete acts "constitutes a separate actionable unlawful

employment practice." 536 U.S. at 114 (internal quotation marks omitted). Only those discrete

acts that occurred within the limitations period are actionable; "[a]ll prior discrete discriminatory

acts are untimely filed and no longer actionable." Id at 114-15. Claims of hostile work

environment, by contrast, "are different in kind from discrete acts. Their very nature involves

repeated conduct." Id at 115. "It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct

contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own." Id.

Liability attaches to a discrete act as soon as that act occurs, whereas liability for a hostile work

environment depends upon "proof of repeated conduct extending over a period of time." Id. at

120 n.12. A plaintiff therefore may assert a claim for hostile work environment based on a series

of component acts provided that just one of those acts occurred within the filing period. Id. at

117. All of the acts that comprise a claim for hostile work environment, "including those that

would otherwise fall outside of the filing period," are deemed timely if one of those acts

occurred within the limitations window. Sasse v. US. Dep 't of Labor, 409 F.3d 773, 782 (6th

Cir. 2005) (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117).

The institution and maintenance of the debt-collection suit in this case is much more akin

to a discrete act of discrimination than a hostile work environment. As a general matter, when a

debt collector initiates a deceptive, abusive, or otherwise unfair lawsuit, there is no doubt that the

3:00-CV-1043, 2006 WL 236846, at *9 (D. Conn. Jan. 31, 2006) (collecting cases); Calka v.
Kueker, Kraus & Bruh, LLP, No. 98-CV-0990, 1998 WL 437151, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1998).
-13-
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 21 of 36
Case:Case: 13-3402
15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 58 14
of 383 (15 of 29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

FDCPA claim-insofar as it is viable-accrues on that date. Although the subsequent

prosecution of that suit may exacerbate the damages, the continued accrual of damages does not

diminish the fact that the initiation of the suit was a discrete, immediately actionable event. 5

To be sure, an individual will not always recognize that the debt-collection suit is

deceptive or unfair on the date it is filed. Here, for example, Slorp may have learned that the

assignment was fraudulent-and that the foreclosure action was illegitimate-after the

limitations period expired. But tolling doctrines such as fraudulent concealment and the

discovery rule exist to address such situations. The continuing-violation doctrine is concerned

with whether the initial act gives rise to an actionable claim rather than whether the tortfeasor

concealed that claim. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 120 n. 12.

Accordingly, the district court correctly held that the continuing-violation doctrine cannot

rescue Slorp's FDCPA claim from the limitations clock.

2.

In Slorp's proposed amended complaint he alleged that the defendants again violated the

FDCPA when they opposed Slorp's motion for relief from the judgment. We disagree.

A plaintiff who alleges several FDCPA violations, some of which occurred within the

limitations period and some of which occurred outside that window, will be barred from seeking

relief for the untimely violations, but that plaintiff may continue to seek relief for those

violations that occurred within the limitations period. See Purnell v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC,

303 F. App'x 297, 301 (6th Cir. 2008). But the violations that occur within the limitations

5
Courts are divided on whether the relevant date for purposes of the accrual of an FDCPA
claim is the date on which the suit is filed or the date on which the defendant is served. See Ruth
v. Unifund CCR Partners, 604 F.3d 908, 914 (6th Cir. 2010). Because Bank of America's
foreclosure action was filed and served more than one year before Slorp filed suit, we need not
resolve that dilemma.
-14-
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 22 of 36
Case: Case: 13-3402
15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 59 of15
383 (16 of 29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

window must be discrete violations; they cannot be the later effects of an earlier time-barred

violation. Id. at 302 (citing Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 628 (2007),

superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5).

Even if the defendants misrepresented their interests in Slorp's mortgage when they

opposed his motion for relief, their opposition to Slorp's motion is not independently actionable

because it merely gave "present effect" to deceptive conduct that had occurred outside the

limitations window. See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 628. The defendants' deceptive conduct, as

alleged in the complaint, consisted of their initiation of unfair, misleading, and abusive legal t
process against Slorp and their concurrent docketing of a fraudulent assignment. The defendants ..t
'~
!
did not commit a fresh violation of the FDCPA each time they filed pleadings or memoranda ~

reaffirming the legitimacy of their state-court suit; rather, those were the continuing effects of I
[
i
their initial violation. "[S]uch effects in themselves have no present legal consequences." See I
I
id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Ledbetter held that the plaintiff was not denied equal pay

each time she received a paycheck reflecting a discriminatory pay disparity. 6 Id. It follows that
I
Slorp was not deceived or abused anew each time the defendants reaffirmed their deceptive

statements throughout the litigation. Amendment of the complaint to allege a second violation of

the FDCPA therefore would have been futile.

B.
The district court dismissed the CSPA claim against LSR-the only defendant named in

count two--because there was no "consumer transaction." The CSPA prohibits an unfair,

deceptive, or unconscionable act or practice by a supplier "in connection with a consumer

6
Although Congress subsequently enacted a statute superseding Ledbetter and resetting
the statute of limitations each time an employee receives a paycheck reflecting a discriminatory
pay disparity, that statute does not disturb Ledbetter's interpretation of the continuing-violation
doctrine more generally. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 214-15 (2010).
-15-
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 23 of 36
Case:Case: 13-3402
15-35963, Document
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 60 of16383 (17 of 29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

transaction." Ohio Rev. Code 1345.02(A), 1345.03(A). The statute defines a consumer

transaction as "a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or other transfer of an item of goods,

a service, a franchise, or an intangible, to an individual for purposes that are primarily personal,

family, or household, or solicitation to supply any of these things." 1345.0l(A). The statute

expressly excludes from this definition transactions between financial institutions, as defined in

section 5725.01, and their customers. 1345.0l(A). The district court applied this exception to

preclude Slorp's CSPA claim against LSR.

In his reply brief Slorp concedes that Anderson v. Barclay's Capital Real Estate,

989 N.E.2d 997 (Ohio 2013), bars CSPA claims related to the servicing of residential mortgag~

loans. He also concedes that Bank of America is a mortgage servicer. His sole argument on

appeal is that neither Anderson nor any other case or statute bars CSPA claims against the law

firms that represent mortgage servicers in foreclosure litigation.

We need not determine whether the CSPA countenances claims against law firms

engaged in mortgage litigation because the state-court foreclosure action was not a "consumer

transaction." The CSPA defines a consumer transaction as "a sale, lease, assignment, award by

chance, or other transfer of an item of goods, a service, a franchise, or an intangible, to an

individual for purposes that are primarily personal, family, or household, or solicitation to supply

any of these things." 1345.0l(A). This definition does not encompass a lawsuit: Lawsuits do

not involve the transfer of goods or services for personal purposes. Slorp therefore cannot bring

a CSPA claim arising from the state-court foreclosure litigation.

When a debt collection agency files a lawsuit to enforce a debt stemming from a

consumer transaction, the consumer may bring suit against the debt collection agency under the

CSPA. Celebrezze v. United Research, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 1260, 1262 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). This

-16-
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 24 of 36
Case: Case: 13-3402
15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 61 of17383 (18 of 29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

is because "[s]ince the Act provides consumer protection through all phases of the transaction,

the seller cannot relieve itself of its duty to act fairly by assigning its claim to an agent or

assignee and having that assignee conduct practices prohibited by the Act. Such a narrow

construction of [Ohio Rev. Code ] 1345.0l(C) would defeat the purpose of the Act." Id. Here,

LSR brought an allegedly deceptive lawsuit on behalf of Bank of America, a mortgage servicer.

The Ohio Supreme Court recently held that the servicing of residential mortgages is not a

consumer transaction under the CSPA "because there is no 'transfer of an item of goods, a

service, a franchise, or an intangible, to an individual."' Anderson, 989 N.E.2d at 1001 (quoting

Ohio Rev. Code 1345.0l(A)). Because the lawsuit was in furtherance of the servicing of a

residential mortgage, which is not a consumer transaction, the lawsuit is not an act in furtherance

of a consumer transaction as in Celebrezze and the lawsuit may not be regulated under the

CSPA.

Slorp also contends that LSR is liable under the CSPA because "violating the FDCPA has

been determined by an Ohio district court to violate the CSPA, and that decision was made

available for public inspection under Ohio Revised Code 1345.05(A)(3)." For that proposition

he cites Becker v. Montgomery, Lynch, No. 02-874, 2003 WL 23335929 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 26,

2003 ). Becker stated that "any violation of any one of the enumerated sections of the FDCPA is

necessarily an unfair and deceptive act or practice" in violation of the CSPA. Id. at *2. That

interpretation of the CSPA overlooks substantial disparities in the language of the two statutes,

and Becker thus paints with too broad a brush. Although conduct that violates the FDCP A often

will violate the CSPA as well, neither the courts nor the parties should simply assume that the

two statutes are coterminous without examining whether the alleged conduct is expressly

prohibited under each statute.

-17-
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 25 of 36
Case: 13-3402
Case: 15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 62 of18
383 (19 of 29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

Thus the district court properly dismissed Slorp's CSPA claim.

c.
Slorp alleged that Hill and LSR violated the Ohio falsification statute, Ohio Rev. Code

2921.13, when Hill falsely represented that she was authorized to execute the assignment on

behalf of MERS. The district court dismissed Slorp's falsification claim because neither Hill nor

LSR had been charged with criminal falsification. Section 2921.13 is a criminal statute. It

provides that a person is guilty of a misdemeanor if the person knowingly makes a false

statement, or knowingly affirms the truth of a prior false statement, in various circumstances,

including when the statement is made in an official proceeding, the statement is made to mislead

a public official in performing his or her official function, or the statement is sworn before a

notary public. Ohio Rev. Code 2921.13(A). But the statute also establishes a civil remedy:

"A person who violates this section is liable in a civil action to any person harmed by the

violation for injury, death, or loss to person or property incurred as a result of the commission of

the offense." Id. 2921.13(G).

Ohio courts have held that criminal charges are a condition precedent to the institution of

a civil cause of action under section 2921.13(G). In Hershey v. Edelman, for example, the court

refused to recognize civil liability under section 2921.13(G) absent criminal charges or criminal

proceedings under section 2921.13. 932 N.E.2d 386, 392 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010). That holding is

consistent with the statutory language, which provides a civil remedy for losses that result from

"the commission of the offense." Ohio Rev. Code 2921.13(G) (emphasis added). Use of the

word "offense" makes clear that civil liability is predicated on criminal guilt. The effect of the

statute is to provide restitution to victims of the criminal offense; it does not create civil liability

absent criminal conviction. Dismissal of Slorp' s falsification claim therefore was appropriate.

-18-
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 26 of 36
Case:Case: 13-3402
15-35963, Document
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 19383
63 of (20 of 29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

D.
Slorp also alleged that the defendants engaged in a civil conspiracy when they agreed to

execute the fraudulent assignment and to falsify court documents. Yet Slorp's appellate brief

does not directly address his conspiracy claim and implicitly acknowledges that the claim is

derivative of his falsification claim-that is, Slorp concedes that the conspiracy count must be

dismissed if the falsification count is dismissed. Because we affirm the dismissal of the

falsification count, we also affirm the dismissal of this count as a matter of course.

v.
We turn to count five, which Slorp unsucc~ssfully sought to add to his complaint. Slorp

requested leave to amend his complaint to allege a civil violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. 1962,

1964. The district court denied the motion for leave to amend upon concluding that amendment

of the complaint would be futile. In the district court's view, Slorp "failed to adequately allege

an injury resulting from the Assignment at issue here," and "[c]onsequently, Plaintiff has failed

to state a RICO claim upon which relief can be granted."

The denial of a motion for leave to amend the complaint ordinarily is reviewed for abuse

of discretion. Dubuc v. Green Oak Twp., 312 F.3d 736, 743 (6th Cir. 2002). When denial is on

the basis of futility, however, the decision is reviewed de nova. Id.

The germane provision of RICO makes it unlawful for a person employed by or

associated with an enterprise that affects interstate commerce to conduct or participate in the

conduct of the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C.

1962(c). The statute provides a civil remedy that allows an individual to recover treble damages

for injuries to that person's business or property sustained by reason of the RICO violation. 18

U.S.C. 1964(c).

-19-
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 27 of 36
Case:Case: 13-3402
15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 64 of20383 (21of29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

The defendants argue that amendment of the complaint would be futile for three

independent reasons: (1) Slorp cannot recover RICO damages because his injuries are

attributable to his own default rather than to the defendants' initiation of foreclosure

proceedings; (2) Slorp's proposed amended complaint does not identify a pattern of racketeering

activity because he does not allege a plausible scheme or artifice to defraud; and (3) Slorp does

not allege sufficient facts to support the existence of an enterprise. We take one at a time.

A.

In Slorp's proposed amended complaint he alleges numerous injuries sustained as a result

of the defendants' RICO violations: Slorp had to defend himself against the improper foreclosure

action, faces "potential multiple liability from others who may claim an interest in the mortgage

or note," possesses a "cloud[ed]" title to his home because the fraudulent assignment continues

to be recorded with the Franklin County Recorder, and had to deal with a wrongful foreclosure

action. Most of these damages are speculative, uncertain, and undefined. Cf Berg v. First State

Ins. Co., 915 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that loss of security and peace of mind are

not recoverable injuries under RICO). Slorp faces no imminent threat of potential double

liability because Bank of America voluntarily dismissed its state-court foreclosure action and has

shown no intent to revisit that decision. Slorp also identifies no monetary costs associated with

the clouded title. But the attorney's fees he paid in connection with the foreclosure action are

real and quantifiable damages, and our analysis therefore focuses on whether those fees were

injuries to Slorp's business or property incurred by reason of the defendants' alleged RICO

violation. See 18 U.S.C. 1964(c).

The first component of this inquiry concentrates on the term "business or property." In

Jackson v. Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc., the en bane court held that a RICO

-20-
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 28 of 36
Case: Case: 13-3402
15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 65 of21383 (22 of 29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

victim cannot recover damages for personal injuries flowing from a RICO violation. 731 F.3d

556, 564-70 (6th Cir. 2013) (en bane). Whether damages caused by the victim's specific injury

are recoverable under 1964(c) depends on "the origin of the underlying injury." Id at 565.

While "personal injuries and pecuniary losses flowing from those personal injuries fail to confer

relief under 1964(c)," id at 565-66, injuries to property and at least some pecuniary losses

flowing from those property injuries do confer relief under 1964(c).

The question, then, is whether Slorp's complaint alleges personal injuries or injuries to

property. According to the proposed RICO count, the defendants used various schemes to

mislead both Slorp ~d the state court and thus attempted fraudulently to deprive Slorp of his

home through an illegitimate foreclosure sale. Those schemes revolved around a fraudulent

mortgage assignment and a related foreclosure action. Thus, if we look to "the origin of the

underlying injury" to determine whether it relates to property, Slorp has alleged quintessential

property injuries: The object of the alleged scheme to defraud was to obtain title to Slorp's home

(i.e., real property) through foreclosure.

Of course, the specific injury for which Slorp seeks to recover is not an injury to his

home-he did not lose title as a result of the foreclosure action and therefore cannot obtain

damages on that claim. Rather, his alleged injury was the attorney's fees he incurred in

connection with that foreclosure action. Under Jackson, however, that is beside the point.

Jackson held that the pecuniary losses flowing from those personal injuries were not recoverable

because "an award of benefits under a workers' compensation system and any dispute over those

benefits are inextricably intertwined with a personal injury giving rise to the benefits." 731 F.3d

at 566. Thus it is the source of the injury that matters, and accordingly pecuniary losses flowing

from a property injury are recoverable under 1964(c) if they are similarly intertwined with that

-21-
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 29 of 36
Case:Case: 13-3402
15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 66 of22383 (23 of 29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

property injury. Cf Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985) (stating that a

RICO plaintiff can recover only if "he has been injured in his business or property by the

conduct constituting the violation"); Isaak v. Trumbull Sav. & Loan Co., 169 F.3d 390, 397 (6th

Cir. 1999) (permitting RICO plaintiff to recover damages resulting from plaintiffs purchase of

an interest in a campground). Slorp suffered an injury to his home as a result of the defendants'

alleged scheme: The defendants initiated foreclosure proceedings and obtained a judgment

awarding them the right to take possession of Slorp's house. That direct property injury is not

quantifiable because the state court ultimately vacated the judgment and permitted Slorp to retain

his house, and unquantifiable injuries are not recoverable. See Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,

370 F.3d 602, 614 (6th Cir. 2004). But the attorney's fees he incurred were pecuniary losses

intertwined with the property injury and therefore are recoverable under 1964(c).

This inquiry flows into the second component of 1964(c) damages analysis, which asks

whether the injuries were sustained "by reason of' the alleged RICO violation. The phrase "by

reason of' incorporates a statutory-standing requirement into 1964(c), prohibiting a private

RICO plaintiff from recovering for derivative or passed-on injuries. See Id. at 613-14. This

statutory-standing requirement is not at issue here because there is no dispute about whether

Slorp is the proper party to assert these claims. But in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection

Corp., the Supreme Court held that the phrase "by reason of' also incorporates a proximate-

cause requirement into 1964(c). 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992). "[W]hile a RICO plaintiff and

defendant may have a direct and not a derivative relationship, the causal link between the injury

and the conduct may still be too weak to constitute proximate cause-because it is insubstantial,

unforeseeable, speculative, or illogical, or because of intervening causes." Trollinger, 370 F.3d

at 614.

-22-
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 30 of 36
Case: Case: 13-3402
15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 67 of23383 (24 of 29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

The defendants argue that "it was his mortgage default ... which caused Slorp to have to

defend the foreclosure action, not anything contained within the Assignment." But the factual

premise of this argument contradicts the factual allegations in Slorp's complaint and overlooks

our obligation to assume the veracity of those allegations. Slorp alleges that the assignment was

fraudulent and that the defendants had no right to foreclose on his house. If the defendants were

not authorized to initiate the foreclosure proceedings, Slorp's injuries were caused by their fraud

rather than his own alleged default.

According to the complaint, Hill was an authorized agent of neither MERS nor

Countrywide, and she therefore lacked the authority to assign the mortgage to Bank of America.

Assuming that to be true, as we must, Bank of America wrongfully initiated foreclosure

proceedings against Slorp, and his damages were proximately caused by the defendants'

institution of fraudulent foreclosure proceedings that led Slorp to incur attorney's fees. The

allegedly fraudulent assignment allowed the defendants to perpetrate and conceal the fraud by

precluding the state court from ascertaining whether the defendants were the proper parties to

initiate the foreclosure proceedings. On those facts it was the defendants' alleged

misrepresentations rather than Slorp's default that led to his injuries. Had the proper mortgagee,

whoever that is, elected to initiate its own foreclosure proceedings against Slorp, he would have

faced double liability, and the defendants' fraudulent assignment would have led to the

anomalous and unlawful result of two separate mortgagees-{)ne real and one fraudulent-

foreclosing on Slorp's house. The fact that the legitimate mortgagee has not initiated foreclosure

proceedings only reinforces the conclusion that the defendants' allegedly fraudulent foreclosure

led to Slorp's injuries.

-23-
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 31 of 36
Case:Case: 13-3402
15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 24383
68 of (25 of 29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

To be sure, Slorp's injuries will vanish if the defendants prove that Bank of America was

the legitimate mortgagee. But this case came to the district court on a motion to dismiss, and in

that posture the court was required to accept the veracity of Slorp's factual allegations. Slorp

alleges injuries to his property that were proximately caused by the defendants' allegedly

baseless initiation of foreclosure proceedings and the fraudulent assignment of his mortgage. He

is thus entitled to recover damages for those injuries unless he fails to satisfy his evidentiary

burden, either on summary judgment or at trial.

B.
A successful RICO plaintiff must establish that the defendants engaged in a "pattern of

racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. 1962(c); see also In re ClassicStar Mare Lease Litig.,

727 F.3d 473, 484 (6th Cir. 2013). LSR and Hill contend that Slorp has not identified a pattern

of racketeering activity because he has not alleged a plausible scheme or artifice to defraud.

To establish a pattern ofracketeering activity, the plaintiff must allege at least two related

acts of racketeering activity that amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.

Brown v. Cassens Transp. Co., 546 F.3d 347, 354 (6th Cir. 2008). The RICO statute enumerates

dozens of crimes that constitute racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C. 1961(1). Among these

crimes are mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343-the two predicate

crimes that Slorp alleged in his proposed amended complaint. Mail and wire fraud consist of

(1) a scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) use of the mails or interstate wire communications in

furtherance of the scheme; and (3) intent to deprive a victim of money or property. United States

v. Turner, 465 F.3d 667, 680 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Daniel, 329 F.3d 480, 485 (6th Cir.

2003). "A scheme to defraud is any plan or course of action by which someone intends to

deprive another of money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,

-24-
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 32 of 36
Case: Case: 13-3402
15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 69 of25383 (26 of 29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

or promises." United States v. Faulkenberry, 614 F.3d 573, 581 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal

quotation marks and alterations omitted).

LSR first argues that Slorp's allegations are insufficient because he cannot show that he

relied on the defendants' alleged misrepresentations. But "a plaintiff asserting a RICO claim

predicated on mail fraud need not show, either as an element of its claim or as a prerequisite to

establishing proximate causation, that it relied on the defendant's alleged misrepresentations."

Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 661 (2008). LSR's first argument stumbles

right out of the gate.

LSR also contends that "Slorp must allege sufficient plausible facts to indicate that LSR

and Ms. Hill made a material misrepresentation of fact to Slorp that was calculated or intended to

deceive Slorp." Slorp has done just that. Slorp's complaint alleges that LSR and Hill filed a

state-court complaint against him misrepresenting that his mortgage had been assigned to Bank

of America. He further alleges that LSR executed a fraudulent assignment and served it on Slorp

in connection with the foreclosure action. According to Slorp, these material misrepresentations

were intended to deceive both Slorp and the state court. Slorp therefore has alleged precisely

what LSR demands of him.

c.
LSR also argues that Slorp has not alleged sufficient facts to support the existence of an

enterprise. "The RICO statute makes it unlawful for 'any person ... associated with any

enterprise ... to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's

affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity."' In re ClassicStar, 727 F.3d at 490 (quoting

18 U.S.C. 1962(c)) (alterations in original). An enterprise "includes any individual,

-25-
" Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 33 of 36
Case: Case: 13-3402
15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 70 of26383 (27 of 29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals

associated in fact although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. 1961(4).

An "association-in-fact enterprise" is "a group of persons associated together for a

common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,

583 (1981). The association-in-fact enterprise must be separate and distinct from the pattern of

racketeering activity in which it engages, but the enterprise could have been formed solely for

the purpose of engaging in the racketeering activity. Ouwinga v. Benistar 419 Plan Servs., Inc.,

694 F.3d 783, 793-94 (6th Cir. 2012). The enterprise "must have at least three structural

features: a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and longevity

sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise's purpose." Boyle v. United States,

556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009). The enterprise need not have a hierarchical structure or chain of

command, members of the group need not have fixed roles, the group need not have a name, and

the enterprise may engage in "spurts of activity punctuated by periods of quiescence." Id at 948.

Slorp has adequately alleged the existence of an enterprise that satisfies these basic

criteria. He alleged that the defendants conspired to draft and execute a false assignment and to

use the assignment in foreclosure proceedings to seize Slorp's property. He further alleged that

the defendants used the mails and wires several times in furtherance of this scheme, and he

alleged that the same defendants have engaged in similar malfeasance in other foreclosure

proceedings, all with the aim of obtaining title to several properties that are not rightfully theirs.

The alleged association-in-fact enterprise thus had a purpose and sufficient longevity, and its

members had lasting relationships with one another. The defendants may introduce evidence to

rebut any of these allegations, including the existence of an enterprise that was separate and

-26-
t
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 34 of 36
Case:Case: 13-3402
15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 71 of27383 (28 of 29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

distinct from the racketeering activity, but the allegations in Slorp's complaint are sufficient to

survive a motion to dismiss. 7

Accordingly, the district court erred when it determined that amendment of Slorp's

complaint to include a RICO count would be futile.

VI.

We affirm the dismissal of Slorp's FDCPA, CSPA, falsification, and civil conspiracy

claims. But we reverse the district court's denial of the motion for leave to amend the complaint

and remand this action to the district court to permit Slorp to pursue the RICO claim.

7
LSR's brief relies in large part on VanDenBroeck v. CommonPoint Mortgage Co., 210
F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2000), but that case has been abrogated by both Bridge and Boyle.
-27-
t.. ..
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 35 of 36
Case:Case: 13-3402
15-35963, Document:
07/31/2017, 61-2 Filed:
ID: 10528084, 09/29/2014
DktEntry: Page:
63-2, Page 72 of28383 (29 of 29)
No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

SUTTON, J., concurring. I join all of the majority opinion but part V. As to that, I agree

with the majority that the district court's decision denying Slorp leave to add a civil RICO claim

should be reversed. As the majority explains, the district court erred by concluding that Slorp

suffered no cognizable injury, and that mistaken conclusion was the reason it denied leave to

amend as futile. Rather than proceed to address the potential viability of other RICO claims in

this setting, I would leave it at that, and let the district court address those claims in the first

instance.

-28-
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 36 of 36
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 73 of 383

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was

served upon all counsel of record, pro-se parties and the United States Attorney General and the

Attorney General of the State of Oregon via the Court's CM/ECF system, email, and/or regular

mail, and/or certified mail with return receipt requested.

U.S. Department of Justice


Loretta Lynch,
U.S. Attorney General
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001
202-514-2000

Gabrielle D. Richards I Perkins Coie LLP


1120 NW Couch Street
10th Floor
Portland, Oregon 97209-4128
D. +1.503.727.2255
F. + 1.503 .346.225 5
grichards(u;perkinscoie.com

Respectfully Submitted,

Denise Subramaniam
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64 Filed 06/23/15 Page 1 of 6
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 74 of 383

FILD23 . .flt~ '1512:151.iSDC-ORP


Denise Subramaniam
Self-represented
13865 SW Walker Rd
Beaverton OR 97005
503-764-5300

UNITED ST ATES DISTRICT COURT


DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION

LNV CORPORATION Civil Case No. 3:14-cv-01836


Plaintiff,
v. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
DENISE SUBRAMANIAM JUDICIAL NOTICE OF
pro per INFORMATION AND CRIMINAL
Defendant INDICTMENT AND PLEA
AGREEMENT OF LORRAINE BROWN

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE OF INFORMATION AND


CRIMINAL INDICTMENT AND PLEA AGREEMENT OF LORRAINE BROWN

Comes now Defendant, Denise Subramanima, representing herself, and moves this court

pursuant to Federal Rule 201 Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts to take judicial notice of the

documents described herein in and in support states as follows:

1. THE DEFENDANT moves this Court to take judicial notice of:

Information regarding Lorraine Brown, United States ofAmerica v. Lorraine Brown.


Case No. 3:12-cr-198-J-25 MCR. (MD. Fla.) (See "Exhibit A" attached hereto.)

Plea Agreement of Lorraine Brown, United States ofAmerica v. Lorraine Brown. Case
No. 3:12-cr-198-J-25 MCR, (MD. Fla.) (See "Exhibit B" attached hereto.)
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64 Filed 06/23/15 Page 2 of 6
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 75 of 383

2. Federal Rule of Evidence 201 - "Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts" states:

(a) Scope. This rule governs judicial notice of an adjudicative fact only, not a
legislative fact.
(b) Kinds of Facts That May Be Judicially Noticed. The court may judicially notice a
fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it:
(I) is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or
(2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.
(c) Taking Notice. The court:
(I) may take judicial notice on its own; or
(2) must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with
the necessary information.

3. In the present case the court is supplied with the adjudicative fact to be noticed, i.e.

Defendant's exhibits A and B.

4. Lorraine Brown was indicted and convicted of for "Conspiracy to Commit Mail and Wire

Fraud" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 18 1341 and 18 U.S.C. 18 1343.

5. Defendant is a victim of the crimes of Lorraine Brown and her co-conspirators.

Defendant claims the owner of Plaintiff LNV Corporation ("LNV"), Daniel Andrew

Beal, is a co-conspirator in the crimes of Lorraine Brown; as are Beal's "LPS" agents

Northwest Trustee Services and Dovenmuehle Mortgage Inc.; and his LPS attorneys

RCO Legal, Codilis & Stawiarski, Shapiro & Kirsch, and other law firms Beal uses

against the pro-se litigants in the noticed related cases. Lender Processing Services

("LPS") aka Black Knight Financial Services was a corporate vehicle identified by the

United States as being used in the commission of the crimes of Lorraine Brown. Beal' s

employee, Bret Maloney, and employees of Northwest Trustee Services: Yvonne

"Vonnie" McElligott, Jeff Stenman, and others in deposition testimony have verified that
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64 Filed 06/23/15 Page 3 of 6
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 76 of 383

the mortgage related documents they use in foreclosures, and specifically those pertaining

to the Defendant's mortgage and the mortgages for the other pro-se litigants in the

noticed related cases were in fact produced through the use of the "LPS Desktop"

software. This software was developed when Lorraine Brown was in control of LPS and

the business processes she used for her criminal conspiracy would have been built into

the software. The products of this software would of necessity therefore be products of

the crimes of Lorraine Brown; and in fact Defendant and each of the other pro-se litigants

in the noticed related cases have and do claim that the mortgage related documents

(specifically assignments of deed of trust; assignments of mortgage; allonges to notes etc)

are in fact forged documents consistent with the crimes of Lorraine Brown and her co-

conspirators.

6. Adjudicative facts in the criminal conviction of Lorraine Brown include:

a. Lorraine Brown had co-conspirators.


b. Lorraine Brown's co-conspirators have not yet been prosecuted for their crimes.
c. Lorraine Brown committed her crimes through Lender Processing Services,
("LPS")
d. At the direction of Brown and other co-conspirators employees of LPS began
forging and falsifying signatures of mortgage-related documents and filed them
with property recorders offices across the country.
e. Lorraine Brown's co-conspirators used other unauthorized employees to sign
mortgage-related documents on their behalf knowing that the documents would be
notarized as if the co-conspirator has signed the document, when he/she had not.
f. Between 2003 and 2009 it is estimated that over I million fraudulently signed and
notarized mortgage-related documents were produced through the crimes of
Lorraine Brown and her co-conspirators and filed with property recorders' offices
across the country.

7. Adjudicative facts from the Lorraine Brown criminal conviction are relevant to the

present case and to litigation between LNV (and other business entities controlled by D.
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64 Filed 06/23/15 Page 4 of 6
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 77 of 383

Andrew Beal) and the other pro-se litigants in the noticed related cases and many other

"Beal victims" for the following reasons:

a. LNV and MGC (both owned and controlled by Andy Beal) and their agents (LPS
Service Providers Nortwest Trustee Services, RCO Legal, Codilis & Stawairski,
Dovenmuhlhe and others) have forged and falsified mortgage-related documents
and filed them with property recorders' offices across the country; and/or have
knowingly used such forged documents in foreclosure cases with intent to deceive
courts.
b. Defendant in the present case, and the other Beal victims claim that their
mortgage related records are the products of the crimes of Lorraine Brown and
her co-conspirators; and they provided the courts with evidence to substantiate
these claims.
c. The courts continue to accept these forged and falsified mortgage-related
documents as genuine (ignoring evidence to the contrary) and routinely grant
summary judgments or dismissals in favor of LNV and parties like it.
d. The United States Attorney General has determined that parties who forge and
falsify mortgage-related documents and file them with property recorders' offices
across the country are guilty of the federal criminal offence of mail and wire
fraud. (Lorraine Brown was convicted by the United States.)
e. The United States has already proven the criminal conspiracy exists.
f. The United States has already proven Lorraine Brown had co-conspirators; and
since those co-conspirators haven't yet been indicted or convicted it stands to
reason they may still be committing crimes consistent with her criminal
conspiracy.
g. Defendant in the present case, and the other Beal victims claim that Daniel
Andrew "Andy" Beal is one of Lorraine Brown's co-conspirators and that he
knowingly uses the products of Brown's crimes stored in the LPS Desktop
computer software with intent to deceive courts and thereby wrongfully deprive
Defendant and others of their property. Beal's employee, Bret Maloney, admitted
in a deposition the Beal enterprise entities and their agents use the LPS Desktop.
h. A Beal employee, Jim Chambless, admitted in an email to he sent to WF AA
investigative reporter, Brett Shipp, to fabricating mortgage-related documents to
"cure" a break in the chain of title to Breitlings' property. This email was
forwarded to the Breitlings for their comment.
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64 Filed 06/23/15 Page 5 of 6
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 78 of 383

8. Federal Rule 301 Presumptions in Civil Cases states:

" ... unless a federal statute or these rules provide otherwise, the party against whom a
presumption is directed has the burden of producing evidence to rebut the
presumption. But this rule does not shift the burden of persuasion, which remains on
the party who had it originally."

9. LNV as the plaintiff had the burden of proof or persuasion in the present case. LNV

submitted to the court various mortgage related documents that included deed

assignments, the deed of trust the note with endorsements and allonges to the note as

evidence of its standing to foreclose on Defendant's property. Defendant challenges the

authenticity of these documents. However deed assignments, since they are filed with the

property recorders' office carry a presumptive burden. Presumptions governed by Rule

301 are given the effect of placing upon the opposing party (Defendant in the present

case the burden of establishing the nonexistence of the presumed fact, once the party

invoking the presumption establishes the basic facts giving rise to it.

10. Adjudicative fact in the criminal indictment and conviction of Lorraine Brown for

conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud defeats the burden of presumption that deed

assignments and other documents filed with a property recorders' office must be genuine.

Adjudicative fact in this noticed criminal conviction establishes that over 1 million

fraudulently signed and notarized mortgage-related documents were produced through

the crimes of Lorraine Brown and her co-conspirators and these false and forged

documents were filed enmass with property recorders' offices across the country;

THEREFORE courts cannot assume the genuineness of such records.

11. THE DEFENDANT moves this Court to take Judicial Notice of Brown's information and

Plea Agreement because the documents confirm that LPS employees and others engaged
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64 Filed 06/23/15 Page 6 of 6
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 79 of 383

in a massive fraud scheme in the preparation of millions of mortgage-related documents,

including Mortgage Assignments, and Mortgage Allonges and DEFENDANT contends

that the Mortgage Assignments and Mortgage Allonges prepared and filed by LPS in her

case, bearing the purported signatures of Jason J. Vecchio, Michael Mead, Diane M.

Meistad, and others are such fraudulent mortgage assignments and allonges.

I 2. The documents attached hereto as Exhibits "A'' and "B'' may be accessed online from

PACER under United States of America v. Lorraine Brown, Criminal Docket# 3:12-cr-

00 I 98-HLA-MCR-I.

I 3. Timely written notice of this request is hereby given by email and postal mail service

upon Plaintiffs counsel as required by law.

14. WHEREFORE, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201 THE DEFENDANT moves

this Court to take Judicial Notice of the Information and Plea Agreement of Lorraine

Brown United States o[America v. Lorraine Brown, Case No. 3: 12-cr-198-J-25 MCR,

(M.D. Fla.) without hearing and for such other and further relief as this Court deems just

and proper under the circumstances.

Denise Subramaniam, Pro-per


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 1 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 80 of 383

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Case No. 3:12-cr- \ 18 ...--:s- c.:S M '- ~

v.
Count 1: 18 U.S.C. 371

LORRAINE BROWN

INFORMATION

The United States Attorney charges:

COUNT ONE
(Conspiracy to Commit Mail and Wire Fraud)

Background

At all times material herein, unless otherwise specified:

1. LORRAINE BROWN, a resident of Georgia, founded DocX LLC

(hereinafter, "DocX") in the 1990s in Ohio. In the early 2000s, Brown relocated

the bulk of DocX's operations to Alpharetta, Georgia (the Alpharetta operations

of DocX LLC are referred to herein as "DocX" regardless of the time frame).

2. In mid-2005, Jacksonville, Florida based Fidelity National Financial,

Inc. ("FNF") purchased DocX from Brown and her partners. Through corporate

reorganizations within FNF, DocX later fell under ownership of Fidelity National

Information Services, Inc. ("FNIS"). In mid-2008, FNIS spun off a number of

business lines into a new publicly-traded entity, Lender Processing Services, Inc.

("LPS"), based in Jacksonville, Florida. At that time, DocX was rebranded as

EXHIBIT

A
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 2 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 81 of 383

"LPS Document Solutions, a Division of LPS." Following this spin-off, Brown was

the President and Senior Managing Director of LPS Document Solutions, which

constituted DocX's operations in Alpharetta. At all times relevant to this

Information, Brown was the chief executive of the DocX operations.

3. DocX's main clients were residential mortgage servicers (the

"servicers"), which typically undertake certain actions for the owners of

mortgage-backed promissory notes. These duties include, among others,

accepting and recording mortgage payments, paying taxes and insurance from

borrower escrow accounts, and conducting or supervising the foreclosure

process when necessary.

4. Servicers hired DocX to perform a number of these actions,

including assisting in creating and executing mortgage-related documents filed

with recorders' offices. The majority of documents created and recorded by DocX

between 2003 and 2009 were lien releases, which evidence payment in full of a

mortgage-backed note. DocX also executed mortgage assignments, which

purport to transfer the note's ownership interest. Mortgage assignments were

typically created during the foreclosure process, and the volume of these

documents dramatically increased at DocX during the foreclosure crisis of 2007

to 2009. DocX also signed lost note and lost assignment affidavits related to

mortgage documents.

2
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 3 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 82 of 383

5. From at least March 2003 through November 2009, Brown

marketed DocX as an outsourcing solution to mortgage servicers for filing and

recording mortgage documents throughout the United States. Brown

represented to clients that DocX had robust quality control procedures in place to

ensure a thorough and proper signing, notarization, and recordation process. As

a result of these representations, clients hired DocX.

6. When hiring DocX to sign documents, servicers typically issued

special corporate resolutions delegating document execution authority to

specific, authorized, and trained personnel at DocX. The DocX employees who

were given express signing authority from DocX's clients and who, as

represented by Brown, were purportedly trained to ensure that the clients'

documents were properly created, signed, and notarized were called "Authorized

Signers." These documents were then generally recorded by DocX with the

appropriate local property recorders' offices throughout the country.

3
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 4 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 83 of 383

The Conspiracy and its Objects

7. From in or about 2005 through in or about October 2009 at

Jacksonville in the Middle District of Florida, Alpharetta, Georgia, and elsewhere

throughout the United States,

LORRAINE BROWN,

the defendant herein, did knowingly and willfully combine, conspire, confederate

and agree with others to commit certain offenses, to wit:

a. execute and attempt to execute a scheme and artifice to

defraud, and to obtain money and property by means of material false and

fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, by utilizing the United

States mail and private and commercial interstate carriers, for the purpose of

executing such scheme and artifice, in violation of Title 18, United States Code,

Section 1341; and,

b. execute and attempt to execute a scheme and artifice to

defraud, and to obtain money and property by means of material false and

fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, by transmitting and causing

to be transmitted by means of wire communications in interstate and foreign

commerce, writings, signs, visual pictures, and sounds, for the purpose of

executing such scheme and artifice, in violation of Title 18, United States Code,

Section 1343.

4
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 5 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 84 of 383

Manner and Means of the Conspiracy and Scheme and Artifice

8. The manner and means by which Brown, co-conspirators, and

others sought to accomplish the purposes and objectives of the conspiracy

include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. Beginning in or about 2005, employees of DocX, at the

direction of Brown and others, began forging and falsifying signatures on the

mortgage-related documents that they had been hired to prepare and file with

property recorders' offices throughout the United States.

b. Unbeknownst to DocX's clients, the Authorized Signers were

instructed by Brown and other DocX employees to allow other, unauthorized,

DocX employees to sign, and to have the document notarized as if the actual

Authorized Singer had executed the document.

c. Brown also hired temporary workers to sign as Authorized

Signers. These temporary employees worked for much lower costs and without

the quality control represented by Brown to DocX's clients. In fact, some of

these temporary workers were able to sign thousands of documents a day.

These mortgage-related documents were fraudulently notarized by DocX

employees even though the Authorized Signer did not actually sign the

document.

d. These unauthorized signing and notarization practices

allowed DocX, Brown, and others to generate greater profit and make more

money.

5
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 6 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 85 of 383

e. After these false documents were signed and notarized,

DocX filed them through the mails or by electronic methods with local county

property records offices. Many of these documents, particularly mortgage

assignments and lost note or assignment affidavits, were later relied upon in

court proceedings, including property foreclosures and in federal bankruptcy

court. Brown knew that these property recorders, as well as those who received

the documents such as courts, title insurers, and homeowners, relied on these

documents as genuine.

f. Brown and others also took various steps to conceal their

actions from detection from clients, LPS corporate headquarters, law

enforcement authorities, and others.

Overt Acts

9. On or about August 13, 2008, Brown caused to be delivered to

Jacksonville, Florida, by commercial interstate carrier from DocX, an Assignment

of Mortgage filed with the Clerk of Circuit Court, Duval County, Florida, which

Assignment of Mortgage had been executed on August 12, 2008, with false and

fraudulent signatures of Authorized Signers and which bore a false and

fraudulent notarization attestation.

10. On or about February 23, 2009, Brown caused a DocX business

client to make a payment by electronic funds transfer of $357, 185.60, in

6
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 7 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 86 of 383
.

interstate commerce, from a financial institution in Iowa to a DocX account held

at a financial institution in Georgia.

In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.

ROBERT E. O'NEILL
United States Attorney

By: '7!1~~-
MARKB.DEVEREAUX

MAC D. HEAVENER, Ill


Assistant United States Attorney
Deputy Chief, Jacksonville Division

DENIS MclNERNEY
Chief, Fraud Section - Criminal Division
United States Dept. of Justice

By:

7
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 8 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 87 of 383

.......:..
Li -u~
~ .i. . u~...,,,
.,._.,. ......- <{'
~~. ~ ~ ,,,.
~'

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

V.

LORRAINE BROWN

PLEA AGREEMENT

Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (c), the United States of America by and through

United States Attorney for the Middle District of Florida Robert E. O'Neill and United

States Department of Justice Criminal Division - Fraud Section Chief Denis Mcinerney

(hereinafter also referred to as "the Government" or the "United States"), and the

defendant Lorraine Brown with defendant's attorney f\11ark Rosenblum, Esq., agree as

follows:

A Particularized Terms

1. Count Pleading To

The defendant shall enter a plea of guilty to Count One of the Information.

Count One charges the defendant with Conspiracy to Commit Mail and Wire Fraud, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. 371.

2. Maximum Penalties

Count One carries a maximum sentence of up to five (5) years

imprisonment, a fine of up to a fine of up to $250,000 or twice the gross pecuniary gain

or twice the gross pecuniary loss occasioned by the offense, a term of supervised

Defendant's Initials~ AF Approval 6.iJ-


* EXHIBIT

I a
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 9 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 88 of 383

release of not more than three (3) years, and a special assessment of $100, said

special assessment to be due on the date of sentencing. With respect to certain

offenses, the Court shall order the defendant to make restitution to any victim of the

offense, and with respect to other offenses, the Court may order the defendant to make

restitution to any victim of the offense, or to the community, as set forth below.

3. Elements of the Offense

The defendant acknowledges understanding the nature and elements of

the offense with which defendant has been charged and to which defendant is pleading

guilty. The elements of Count One are:

First: That two or more persons, in some way or manner,


agreed to try to accomplish a common and unlawful
plan to commit mail fraud or wire fraud, as charged in
the information;

Second: The Defendant knew the unlawful purpose of the plan and
willfully joined in it; and

One of the conspirators committed an overt act in


furtherance of the conspiracy.

4. No Further Charges

If the Court accepts this plea agreement, the United States Attorney's

Office for the Middle District of Florida and the United States Department of Justice

agree not to charge defendant with committing any other federal criminal offenses

known to the Government at the time of the execution of this agreement related to the

conduct giving rise to this plea agreement.

c_~/
Defendant's Initials~ 2
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 10 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 89 of 383

5. Mandatory Restitution to Victim of Offense of Conviction

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3663A(a) and (b), defendant agrees to make full

restitution to any victims of the offense, as determined by the Court at sentencing.

6. Acceptance of Responsibility - Three Levels

At the time of sentencing, and in the event that no adverse information is

received suggesting such a recommendation to be unwarranted, the United States will

not oppose the defendant's request to the Court that the defendant receive a two-level

downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to USSG 3E1 .1 (a).

The defendant understands that this recommendation or request is not binding on the

Court, and if not accepted by the Court, the defendant will not be allowed to withdraw

from the plea.

Further, at the time of sentencing, if the defendant's offense level prior to

operation of subsection (a) is level 16 or greater, and if the defendant complies with the

provisions of USSG 3E1 .1 (b), the United States agrees to file a motion pursuant to

USSG 3E1 .1 (b) for a downward adjustment of one additional level. The defendant

understands that the determination as to whether the defendant has qualified for a

downward adjustment of a third level for acceptance of responsibility rests solely with

the United States Attorney for the Middle District of Florida, and the defendant agrees

that the defendant cannot and will not challenge that determination, whether by appeal,

collateral attack, or otherwise.

Defendant's Initials~ 3
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 11 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 90 of 383

7. Forfeiture of Assets

The defendant agrees to forfeit to the United States immediately and voluntarily

any and all assets and property, or portions thereof, subject to forfeiture, pursuant to 18

U.S.C. 981 and 28 U.S.C. 2461 (c), whether in the possession or control of the United

States or in the possession or control of the defendant or defendant's nominees. The

property and the amount of proceeds to be forfeited to the United States will be

determined by the Court at or before the sentencing hearing. The defendant agrees

and consents to the forfeiture of these assets pursuant to any federal criminal, civil,

and/or administrative forfeiture action. The defendant also hereby agrees that the

forfeiture described herein is not excessive and, in any event, the defendant waives any

constitutional claims that the defendant may have that the forfeiture constitutes an
14/,!JLJ
excessive fine. The defendant agrees that the United States shall, at its option, be

entitled to the forfeiture of any property (substitute assets) of the defendant up to the
/f).tJ[)
value of the money judgment.

The defendant admits and agrees that the conduct described in the Factual

Basis below provides a sufficient factual and statutory basis for the forfeiture of the

property sought by the Government. Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 32.2(b)(1 ), the

United States and the defendant request that at the time of accepting this plea

agreement, the court make a determination that the Government has established the

requisite nexus between the property subject to forfeiture and the offense(s) to which

defendant is pleading guilty and enter a preliminary order of forfeiture. Pursuant to

Rule 32.2(b)(4), the defendant agrees that the preliminary order of forfeiture shall be

final as to the defendant at the time it is entered, notwithstanding the requirement that it

be made a part of t~ence and be included in the judgment.


Defendant's Initials /Iv----- 4
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 12 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 91 of 383

The defendant agrees to forfeit all interests in the properties described

above and to take whatever steps are necessary to pass clear title to the United States.

These steps include, but are not limited to, the surrender of title, the signing of a

consent decree of forfeiture, and signing of any other documents necessary to

effectuate such transfers.

Defendant further agrees to take all steps necessary to locate property

and to pass title to the United States before the defendant's sentencing. To that end,

defendant agrees to fully assist the Government in the recovery and return to the United

States of any assets, or portions thereof, as described above wherever located. The

defendant agrees to make a full and complete disclosure of all assets over which

defendant exercises control and those which are held or controlled by a nominee. The

defendant further agrees to be polygraphed on the issue of assets, if it is deemed

necessary by the United States.

The defendant agrees that the United States is not limited to forfeiture of

the property described above. If the United States determines that property of the

defendant identified for forfeiture cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;

has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party; has been placed

beyond the jurisdiction of the Court; has been substantially diminished in value; or has

been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without difficulty; then the

United States shall, at its option, be entitled to forfeiture of any other property (substitute

assets) of the defendant up to the value of any property described above. This Court

shall retain jurisdiction to settle any disputes arising from application of this clause. The

Defendanfs Initials*- 5
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 13 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 92 of 383

defendant agrees that forfeiture of substitut~ assets as authorized herein shall not be

deemed an alteration of the defendant's sentence.

Forfeiture of the defendant's assets shall not be treated as satisfaction of

any fine, restitution, cost of imprisonment, or any other penalty this Court may impose

upon the defendant in addition to forfeiture.

8. Concurrent Sentencing

The United States agrees not to oppose any argument by the Defendant

with the sentencing Court that any sentence imposed by the Court run concurrent with

any sentences imposed by any state courts for state criminal charges generally based

upon the conduct underlying the instant plea. Should there be a sentence imposed by

any other state court, it is the parties' intention that any sentence ordered by the Court

in this case be served prior to any remaining time on any such state terms of

imprisonment. This agreement in no way limits the Court's authority to render whatever

!awful sentence it deems appropriate in this case.

9. Cooperation with Ongoing Prosecutions of Others

Defendant agrees to cooperate fully with the United States in the

investigation and prosecution of other persons or entities, and to testify, subject to a

prosecution for perjury or making a false statement, fully and truthfully before any

federal court proceeding or federal grand jury in connection with the charges in this

case and other matters. Such cooperation includes a full and complete disclosure of all

relevant information, including production of any and all books, papers, documents, and

Defendant's Initials _tr_ 6


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 14 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 93 of 383

other objects in defendant's possession or control, and to be reasonably available for

interviews which the United States may require.

B. Standard Terms and Conditions

1. Restitution. Special Assessment and Fine

The defendant understands and agrees that the Court, in addition to or in

lieu of any other penalty, shall order the defendant to make restitution to any victim of

the offense(s), pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3663A, for all offenses described in 18 U.S.C.

3663A(c)(1) (limited to offenses committed on or after April 24, 1996); and the Court

may order the defendant to make restitution to any victim of the offense(s), pursuant to

18 U.S.C. 3663 (limited to offenses committed on or after November 1, 1987),

including restitution as to all counts charged, whether or not the defendant enters a plea

of guilty to such counts, and whether or not such counts are dismissed pursuant to this

agreement. On each count to which a plea of guilty is entered, the Court shall impose a

special assessment, to be payable to the Clerk's Office, United States District Court,

and due on date of sentencing. The defendant understands that this agreement

imposes no limitation as to fine.

2. Supervised Release

The defendant understands that the offense(s) to which the defendant is

pleading provide(s) for imposition of a term of supervised release upon release from

imprisonment, and that, if the defendant should violate the conditions of release, the

defendant would be subject to a further term of imprisonment.

Defendant's Initials~ 7
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 15 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 94 of 383

3. Sentencing Information

The United States reserves its right and obligation to report to the Court

and the United States Probation Office all information concerning the background,

character, and conduct of the defendant, to provide relevant factual information,

including the totality of the defendant's criminal activities, if any, n()t limited to the

count(s) to which defendant pleads, to respond to comments made by the defendant or

defendant's counsel, and to correct any misstatements or inaccuracies. The United

States further reserves its right to make any recommendations it deems appropriate

regarding the disposition of this case, subject to any limitations set forth herein, if any.

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3664(d)(3) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d)(2)(A)(ii),

the defendant agrees to complete and submit, upon execution of this plea agreement,

an affidavit reflecting the defendant's financial condition. The defendant further agrees,

and by the execution of this plea agreement, authorizes the United States Attorney's

Office to provide to, and obtain from, the United States Probation Office, the financial

affidavit, any of the defendant's federal, state, and local tax returns, bank records and

any other financial information concerning the defendant, for the purpose of making any

recommendations to the Court and for collecting any assessments, fines, restitution, or

forfeiture ordered by the Court.

4. Sentencing Recommendations

It is understood by the parties that the Court is neither a party to nor

bound by this agreement. The Court may accept or reject the agreement, or defer a

decision until it has had an opportunity to consider the presentence report prepared _by

Defendant's Initials~ 8
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 16 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 95 of 383

the United States Probation Office. The defendant understands and acknowledges that,

although the parties are permitted to make recommendations and present arguments to

the Court, the sentence will be determined solely by the Court, with the assistance of

the United States Probation Office. Defendant further understands and acknowledges

that any discussions between defendant or defendant's attorney and the attorney or

other agents for the Government regarding any recommendations by the Government

are not binding on the Court and that, should any recommendations be rejected,

defendant will not be permitted to withdraw defendant's plea pursuant to this plea

agreement. The Government expressly reserves the right to support and defend any

decision that the Court may make with regard to the defendant's sentence, whether or

not such decision is consistent with the Government's recommendations contained

herein.

5. Defendant's Waiver of Right to Appeal

The defendant agrees that this Court has jurisdiction and authority to

impose any sentence up to the statutory maximum and expressly waives the right to

appeal defendant's sentence on any ground, including the ground that the Court erred

in determining the applicable guidelines range pursuant to the United States Sentencing

Guidelines, except (a) the ground that the sentence exceeds the defendant's applicable

guidelines range as determined by the Court pursuant to the United States Sentencing

Guidelines; (b) the ground that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum penalty; or

(c) the ground that the sentence violates the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution;

provided, however, that if the Government exercises its right to appeal the sentence

Defendant's Initials:&._ 9
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 17 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 96 of 383

imposed, as authorized by 18 U.S.C. 3742(b), then the defendant is released from his

waiver and may appeal the sentence as authorized by 18 U.S.C. 3742(a).

6. Middle District of Florida and Criminal Division Agreement

It is further understood that this agreement is limited to the Office of the

United States Attorney for the Middle District of Florida and the United States

Department of Justice Criminal Division - Fraud Section and cannot bind other federal,

state, or local prosecuting authorities, although these offices will bring defendant's

cooperation, if any, to the attention of other prosecuting officers or others, if requested.

7. Filing of Agreement

This agreement shall be presented to the Court, in open court or in

camera, in whole or in part, upon a showing of good cause, and filed in this cause, at

the time of defendant's entry of a plea of guilty pursuant hereto.

8. Voluntariness

The defendant acknowledges that defendant is entering into this

agreement and is pleading guilty freely and voluntarily without reliance upon any

discussions between the attorneys for the Government and the defendant and

defendant's attorney and without promise of benefit of any kind (other than the

concessions contained herein), and without threats, force, intimidation, or coercion of

any kind. The defendant further acknowledges defendant's understanding of the nature

of the offense or offenses to which defendant is pleading guilty and the elements

thereof, including the penalties provided by law, and defendant's complete satisfaction

with the representation and advice received from defendant's undersigned counsel (if

Defendant's Initials~ 10
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 18 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 97 of 383

any). The defendant also understands that defendant has the right to plead not guilty or

to persist in that plea if it has already been made, and that defendant has the right to be

tried by a jury with the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine

the witnesses against defendant, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, and

the right to compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses to testify in defendant's

defense; but, by pleading guilty, defendant waives or gives up those rights and there will

be no trial. The defendant further understands that if defendant pleads guilty, the Court

may ask defendant questions about the offense or offenses to which defendant

pleaded, and if defendant answers those questions under oath, on the record, and in

the presence of counsel (if any), defendant's answers may later be used against

defendant in a prosecution for perjury or false statement. The defendant also

understands that defendant will be adjudicated guilty of the offenses to which defendant

has pleaded and, if any of such offenses are felonies, may thereby be deprived of

certain rights, such as the right to vote, to hold public office, to serve on a jury, or to

have possession of firearms.

9. Factual Basis

Defendant is pleading guilty because defendant is in fact guilty. The

defendant certifies that defendant does hereby admit that the facts set forth in the

attached "Factual Basis," which is incorporated herein by reference, are true, and were

this case to go to trial, the United States would be able to prove those specific facts and

others beyond a reasonable doubt.

Defendant's Initials~ 11
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 19 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 98 of 383

10. Entire Agreement

This plea agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the

Government and the defendant with respect to the aforementioned guilty plea and no

other promises, agreements, or representations exist or have been made to the

defendant or defendant's attorney with regard to such guilty plea.

Defendant's Initials~ 12
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 20 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 99 of 383

11. Certification

The defendant and defendant's counsel certify that this plea agreement

has been read in its entirety by (or has been read to) the defendant and that defendant

fully understands its terms.

DATED this /j day of November, 2012.

ROBERT E. O'NEILL
United States Attorney

~WiRrf;.~
Defendant
By:~~~Assistant United States Attorney

~ ~HEAVENER,111
Attorney for Defendant Assistant United States Attorney
Deputy Chief, Jacksonville Division

DENIS MclNERNEY
Chief, Fraud Section - Criminal Division
United States Dept. of Justice

By:

Defendant's Initials~ 13
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 21 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 100 of 383

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. Case No. 3:12

LORRAINE BROWN

PERSONALIZATION OF ELEMENTS

1. Do you admit that at least from 2005 and continuing thereafter until in or

about October 2009, in Duval county, in the Middle District of Florida, Alpharetta,

Georgia, and elsewhere, that two or more persons, in some way or manner, agreed to

try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan to commit mail and wire fraud, as

charged in the information?

2. Do you admit you knew the unlawful purpose of the plan and willfully

joined in it?

Defendant's Initials t 14
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 22 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 101 of 383

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. Case No. 3:12

LORRAINE BROWN

FACTUAL BASIS

At a trial of this case, the United States would be prepared to prove beyond

reasonable doubt the following facts:

BACKGROUND

Brown. DocX. and LPS

The defendant, Lorraine Brown (hereinafter "Brown"), founded DocX LLC in the

1990s in Ohio. As discussed more fully below, DocX LLC was involved in the

preparation and recordation of mortgage-related documents throughout the country. In

the early 2000s, Brown relocated the bulk of DocX LLC's operations to Alpharetta,

Georgia - a suburb of Atlanta. (The Alpharetta operations of DocX LLC are referred to

herein as "DocX" regardless of the timeframe and corporate ownership.)

In mid-2005, Jacksonville, Florida-based Fidelity National Financial, Inc. ("FNF")

purchased DocX from Brown and her partners for approximately $6 million. Through

corporate reorganizations within FNF, DocX later fell under ownership of Fidelity

National Information Services, Inc. ("FNIS"). In mid-2008, FNIS spun off a number of

business lines into a new publicly-traded entity, Lender Processing Services, Inc.

Defendant's Initials~
I Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 23 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 102 of 383

I
i
l
("LPS"), based in Jacksonville, Florida. At that time, DocX was rebranded as "LPS

Document Solutions, a Division of LPS." Following this spin-off, Brown was the

President and Senior Managing Director of LPS Document Solutions, which constituted

DocX's operations. At all times relevant to this statement of facts, Brown was the chief

executive of DocX.

DocX's Operations

DocX's main clients were residential mortgage servicers (the "servicers''), which

typically undertake certain actions for mortgage lenders. These duties include, among

others, accepting and recording mortgage payments, paying taxes and insurance from

borrower escrow accounts, and conducting or supervising the foreclosure process when

necessary.

DocX maintained a proprietary system called the Recorders Information

Database ("RID"), which contained the various filing requirements and fees imposed by

each of the thousands of county recorders' offices throughout the United States. DocX's

servicer-clients could pay for access to the RID database. Clients could also hire DocX

to assist in creating and executing mortgage-related documents filed with recorders'

offices. The majority of documents created and recorded by DocX between 2003 and

2009 were lien releases, which evidence payment in full of a mortgage-backed note.

DocX also executed mortgage assignments, which purport to transfer the note's

ownership interest. Mortgage assignments were typically created during the foreclosure

process, and the Volume of these documents dramatically increased at DocX during the

foreclosure crisis of 2007 to 2009. DocX also signed lost note and lost assignment

affidavits related to mortgage documents.

Defendant's Initials ~ ./ 2
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 24 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 103 of 383

From at least March 2003 through November 2009, Brown marketed DocX as an

outsourcing solution to mortgage servicers for filing and recording mortgage documents

throughout the United States. Brown represented to clients that DocX had robust quality

control procedures in place to ensure a thorough and proper signing, notarization, and

recordation process. As a result of these representations, clients hired DocX.

When hiring DocX to sign documents, servicers typically issued special corporate

resolutions delegating document execution authority to specific, authorized, and trained

personnel at DocX. The DocX employees who were given express signing authority

from OocX's clients and who, as represented by Brown, were purportedly trained to

ensure that the clients' documents were properly created, signed, and notarized were

called "Authorized Signers." These documents were then generally recorded by DocX

with the appropriate local property recorders' offices throughout the country.

In exchange for this service, DocX was paid a fee by its clients that varied from

approximately $5 to $15 per document depending upon, among other items, the type of

document and client. Between 2003 and 2009, DocX generated approximately $60

million in gross revenue.

Defendant's Initials~ 3
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 25 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 104 of 383

THE SCHEME

False Signing and Fraudulent Notarization

Beginning in or about 2003 and continuing through November 2009, employees

of DocX at the direction of Brown and others, began forging and falsifying signatures on

the mortgage-related documents that they had been hired to prepare and file with

property recorders' offices throughout the United States. Unbeknownst to the clients,

the Authorized Signers were instructed or authorized by Brown to allow other DocX

employees, who were not Authorized Signers, to sign and notarize the mortgage-related

documents as if the actually executed by the Authorized Signer.

For example, one of Brown's co-conspirators who was a member of Brown's

senior management team, after being named an Authorized Signer for a client, sent an

e-mail to a colleague stating that she actually had no intention of ever signing a single

document. Rather, Brown's co-conspirator planned on using other employees to sign

the documents on her behalf, knowing that those documents would also be notarized as

if the co-conspirator herself had actually signed the document. Thus, even through

clients were told that a senior DocX manager would be preparing and signing the client

documents, there was never any intention to do so.

Brown implemented these signing practices at DocX to enable DocX (and Brown)

to generate greater profit. Specifically, DocX was able to create, execute, and file larger

volumes of documents using these signing and notarization practices. More documents

meant more money. To further increase profits, DocX also hired temporary workers to

sign as Authorized Signers. These temporary employees worked for much lower costs

and without the quality control represented by Brown to DocX's clients. In fact, some of

Defendant's Initials--- 4
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 26 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 105 of 383

these temporary workers were able to sign thousands of documents a day.

After these documents were falsely signed and fraudulently notarized, Brown

authorized DocX employees to send them through the mails or by electronic methods

for recording with local county property records offices across the nation. Many of these

documents - particularly mortgage assignments, lost note affidavits, and lost

assignment affidavits - were later relied upon in court proceedings, including property

foreclosures and federal bankruptcy actions. Brown understood that these property

recorders, courts, title insurers, and homeowners, relied upon the documents as

genuine.

Indeed, on at least one occasion, in or around 2005 an official with a county

recorder's office in California called DocX after noticing that DocX submitted a number

of documents obviously falsified signatures. The official told DocX employees that these

documents were fraudulent. DocX then re-filed these documents with that county after

properly signing and notarizing them. Brown was aware of this incident.

The exact number of documents created by DocX with fraudulent signature and

notarizations is presently unknown. It is estimated, however, that between 2003 and

2009 well over 1 million such documents were executed and filed with property

recorders' offices across the nation.

Efforts to Conceal

While engaging in this scheme to charge fees to DocX clients for products and

services that the clients never received, Brown and others took various steps to conceal

their actions from detection.

Defendant's Initials~ 5
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 27 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 106 of 383

Brown and her co-conspirators took actions to conceal the fake signatures and

false notarization. For example, Brown's co-conspirator, at Brown's direction and

authorization, trained new DocX signers to mimic the actual signatures of the

Authorized Signers, and then tested them on their ability to do so before signing client

documents. To assist in the scheme, samples of the actual Authorized Signers'

signatures were taped to the signing tables. To provide an additional layer of sham

authenticity, the documents were then falsely notariz13d. Brown authorized or directed

these practices.

Additional acts of concealment were taken. After certain DocX employees raised

concerns about the legality of the signing practices, Brown developed official-looking, in-

house sigriing policies purporting to delegate signing authority from the Authorized

Signers to other DocX employees. Starting in 2003, the policy was called "Facsimile

Signature." In early 2009, the practice was labeled "Surrogate Signing."

Brown and her co-conspirators also concealed their conduct from clients,

instructing DocX employees to hide their signing practices during client visits. Further,

Brown hid DocX's signing practices from LPS's corporate headquarters. For example,

in mid-2009, LPS auditors visited Alpharetta to conduct a risk assessment of DocX.

Prior to the visit, Brown provided documents to the auditors describing the process

DocX used in executing documents. Brown deliberately concealed from the auditors

that the above-described signing practices were being used at that time.

Further Acts of Deception and Attempted Cover-Up

In October 2009, an individual sent a letter to LPS corporate headquarte~s in

Jacksonville, Florida alleging fraud and forgery in the execution of documents related to

Defendant's Initials c& ./ 6


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 64-1 Filed 06/23/15 Page 28 of 28
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 107 of 383

his mortgage by DocX. Upon receipt of the letter, LPS corporate representatives

confronted Brown. Brown falsely stated that she was unaware of DocX's signing

. practices and blamed the conduct on two "rogue" employees. Shortly thereafter, LPS

terminated Brown's employment.

Even after she was fired, Brown attempted to conceal her role in the scheme.

Specifically, on February 9, 2010, Brown was interviewed by an agent with the Federal

Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). During that interview, Brown made several material

false statements to the FBI, including the following: (i) at no time did Brown instruct any

individual at DocX to pursue the "Surrogate Signing" practices for the business; (ii)

Brown was unaware of DocX's "Surrogate Signer'' program and was never informed by

her management staff that they were engaging in such activity with their clients'

financial documentation; and (iii) Brown did not learn of DocX's use of the "Surrogate

Signer" program until LPS corporate personnel first contacted her in October 2009.

Ms. Brown knowingly made these false statements to the FBI in an effort to further

conceal her role in the scheme.

Defendant's Initials c.gr 7


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 1 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 108 of 383

FILED29 JlJ.l '1515:23..LSDC~P

Denise Subramaniam
Se If-represented
13865 SW Walker Rd
Beaverton OR 97005
503-764-5300

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION

LNV CORPORATION Civil Case No. 3:14-cv-01836


Plaintiff,
v. DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF
DENISE SUBRAMANIAM CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
pro per
Defendant

DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS

1
2 Here comes Defendant Denise Subramaniam, representing herself, and incorporates

3 herein all her prior pleadings in these two noticed related cases Subramaniam v. Beal et al, Case

4 No. 3:12-cv-01681-MO and Subramaniam v. Beal Case No: 3:2014cv01482 and all her

5 pleadings in the present case; she also incorporates herein the Notice of Constitutional Questions

6 filed by the other pro-se litigants opposing LNV Corporation ("LNV") in the noticed related

7 cases; and Pursuant to Federal Rules 28 U.S.C. 2403 and 5. l(a)(l) she hereby makes notice of

8 the following constitution questions:

9 Defendant challenges the constitutionality Title 18 U.S.C. 4 which states:

10 "Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a


11 court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the
12 same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United
13 States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both."
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 2 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 109 of 383

14 In other noticed related cases specifically in LNV Corporation v. Gebhardt. Case No.

15 3:12-CV-468-TAV-HBG and LNVv. Breitlings: Case No. DC-14-04053 in the Dallas Civil

16 District Court of Texas and Breitlings v. LNV; Case No. 314-cv-03322 the MGC/LNV/Beal

17 victims as pro-se litigants opposing LNV in foreclosure related cases filed motions for judicial

18 notice of the criminal indictment and conviction of Lorraine Brown by the United States for

19 "Conspiracy to Commit Mail and Wire Fraud". United States o[America v. Lorraine Brown,

20 Case No. 3:12-cr-198-J-25 MCR, (MD. Fla.) In each case these pro-se litigants in the noticed

21 related cases attached to their motions the necessary information to be noticed. Their motions

22 were pursuant to Federal Rule 201(c)(2) which states:

23 "The court must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied
24 with the necessary information."
25

26 In each of these cases the presiding judge either ignored or denied these motions for

27 judicial notice of adjudicative fac. The statue seems clear in its language that judges do not

28 have discretion but MUST take judicial notice of such adjudicative fact; THEREFORE these

29 judges appear to have abused their discretion in these cases. In noticed related case for debtors

30 Christopher and Marcia Swift In the United States Bankruptcy Court (or the Northern District

31 oflllinios. Eastern Division; Case No. 12-35690; presiding judge Donald R. Cassling told the

32 Swifts at a pre-trial hearing on April 28, 2015:

33 "THE COURT: No, I do not want to take judicial notice of those cases."
34

35 (See Exhibit A attached hereto which is page 100 of 163 pages of the transcript for this hearing -

36 for brevity only this page and the cover page of the transcript is provided but the entire transcript

37 is available for inspection by the court if requested.)

Page 2 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 3 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 110 of 383

38 In LNV Corporation v. Gebhardt, Case No. 3: 12-CV-468-TAV-HBG, U.S. District Court

39 Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville, Judge Thomas A. Varian appears to have violated

40 this federal rule by denying Appellant's motion for judicial notice of adjudicative fact.

41 Defendant, Gebhardt, the Breitlings, Rhonda Hardwick, the Swifts, Tuli Molina, Kelly Randle,

42 Cammy Depew, Rebekah Gentry-Youngblood, David Gates, Robynne A. Fauley and dozens of

43 other Beal victims too fearful of Beal' s retaliation to be publically named herein are also victims

44 of the crimes of Lorraine Brown and her co-conspirators.

4S Daniel Andrew "Andy" Beal, owner of PlaintiffLNV, his attorneys, his employees and

46 his agents and their employees commit the same crimes for which Lorraine Brown was convicted

47 and incarcerated. In the court cases of many of the aforementioned Beal victims and in the

48 noticed related cases motions for judicial notice of the adjudicative facts in the criminal

49 indictment and conviction of Lorraine Brown for conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud were

so filed pursuant to 18 U.S. Code 371 and which are relevant to facts specific to standing where

Sl LNV is attempting to deprive or has already unconstitutionally deprived Defendant and the other

S2 pro-se litigants opposing LNV in the noticed related cases of their property; and in many these

S3 cases the judges whether state or federal abused judicial discretion and ignored or denied these

S4 motions for judicial notice of the criminal conviction of Lorraine Brown. Such abuse of judicial

SS discretion may cause, or has caused, a deprivation of these pro-se litigant's constitutional rights

S6 to due process and equal protection of law under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the

S7 United States Constitution.

S8 Adjudicative facts in the criminal conviction of Lorraine Brown include:

S9 a. Lorraine Brown had co-conspirators.

60 b. Lorraine Brown's co-conspirators have not yet been prosecuted for their crimes.

Page 3 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 4 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 111 of 383

61 c. Lorraine Brown committed her crimes through Lender Processing Services,


62 ("LPS")
63 d. At the direction of Brown and other co-conspirators employees of LPS began
64 forging and falsifying signatures of mortgage-related documents and filed them
65 with property recorders offices across the country.
66 e. Lorraine Brown's co-conspirators used other unauthorized employees to sign
67 mortgage-related documents on their behalf knowing that the documents would be
68 notarized as if the co-conspirator has signed the document, when he/she had not.
69 f. Between 2003 and 2009 it is estimated that over 1 million fraudulently signed and
70 notarized mortgage-related documents were produced through the crimes of
71 Lorraine Brown and her co-conspirators and filed with property recorders' offices
72 across the country.

73 Adjudicative facts from the Lorraine Brown criminal conviction are relevant to the

74 present case and to litigation between LNV (and other business entities controlled by D. Andrew

75 Beal) and the other pro-se litigants in the noticed related cases and many other "Beal victims" for

76 the following reasons:

77 a. LNV and MOC (both owned and controlled by Andy Beal) and their agents (LPS
78 Service Providers Nortwest Trustee Services, RCO Legal, Codilis & Stawairski,
79 Dovenmuhlhe and others) have forged and falsified mortgage-related documents
80 and filed them with property recorders' offices across the country; and/or have
81 knowingly used such forged documents in foreclosure cases with intent to deceive
82 courts.
83 b. Defendant in the present case, and the other Beal victims claim that their
84 mortgage related records are the products of the crimes of Lorraine Brown and
85 her co-conspirators; and have provided the courts with evidence to substantiate
86 their claims.
87 c. The courts continue to accept these forged and falsified mortgage-related
88 documents as genuine (ignoring adjudicative fact to the contrary) and routinely
89 grant summary judgments or dismissals in favor of LNV and parties like it.
90 d. The United States Attorney General has determined that parties who forge and
91 falsify mortgage-related documents and file them with property recorders' offices
92 across the country are guilty of the federal criminal offence of mail and wire
93 fraud. (Lorraine Brown was convicted by the United States.)
94 e. The United States has already proven the criminal conspiracy exists.
95 f. The United States has already proven Lorraine Brown had co-conspirators; and
96 since those co-conspirators haven't yet been indicted or convicted it stands to
97 reason they may still be committing crimes consistent with her criminal
98 conspiracy.

Page 4 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 5 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 112 of 383

99 g. Defendant in the present case, and the other Beal victims claim that Daniel
100 Andrew "Andy" Beal is one of Lorraine Brown's co-conspirators and that he
101 knowingly uses the products of Brown's crimes stored in the LPS Desktop
102 computer software with intent to deceive courts and thereby wrongfully deprive
103 Defendant and others of their property. Beal's employee, Bret Maloney, admitted
104 in a deposition the Beal enterprise entities and their agents use the LPS Desktop.
105 h. A Beal employee, Jim Chambless, admitted in an email to he sent to WF AA
106 investigative reporter, Brett Shipp, to fabricating mortgage-related documents to
107 "cure" a break in the chain oftitle to Breitlings' property. This email was
108 forwarded to the Breitlings for their comment.
109

110 In each of the noticed related cases the pro-se litigants opposing LNV detailed how deed

111 assignments, affidavits, purported allonges to their Notes and even the Notes themselves had

112 been robo-signed, forged and falsified in a manner consistent with the crimes of Lorraine Brown,

113 and how LNV and it owner, D. Andrew Beal, knew these deed assignments, purported allonges

114 to their Notes and even the Notes themselves had been forged and falsified; and he admitted to

115 investigative reporter Brett Shipp through his employee Jim Chambless, Senior Marketing

116 Communications Specialist at Beal Bank, that he not only uses such falsely fabricated documents

117 but that he creates them to cure breaks in the chain of title and he alleges it is legal to do this.

118 No matter what LNV and its owner, Daniel Andrew "Andy" Beal, claim publically the

119 evidence shows he knows foreclosing on properties using robo-signed, forged and falsified

120 mortgage related documents such as deed assignments, affidavits, purported allonges to Notes

121 and forged Notes is a crime. He knows this because in a letter dated October 4, 2010 sent by the

122 Texas Attorney General to MGC Mortgage Inc. ("MGC") also owned by Daniel Andrew "Andy"

123 Beal. (See Exhibit B attached hereto.) In this letter the Texas Attorney General makes it clear to

124 MGC that foreclosing using "robosigned" (i.e. forged documents with false signatures and false

125 statements pertaining to the grantor/grantee or assignor/assignee). mortgage related documents

126 was a violation of a host of Texas civil statutes and Texas penal code. Attorney Peter G.

Page 5 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 6 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 113 of 383

127 Weinstock of Hunton & Williams LLP in a letter dated October 31, 2010 stated: "MGC does not

128 use 'robosigners' in its foreclosure process." (See Page 2, number 1 of this letter in Defendant's

129 Exhibit B.) If this is/was true then why do we now have so many LNV/MGC/LPP/Beal victims

130 claiming otherwise and showing evidence to courts that indicates otherwise? In the same

131 paragraph of his letter, Weinstock also states: "MGC has reached out to virtually all the law

132 firms it employs for such purposes. The vast majority have responded. They have indicated that

133 they also do not use such practices either."

134 If this is/was true then why has Defendant, the Breitlings, the Swifts, Gebhardt and the

135 other Beal victims in the noticed related cases shown to their respective courts evidence that

136 mortgage related documents submitted to these courts by Beal' s LNV or LPP Mortgage Ltd.

137 ("LPP") or MGC and/or by Beal's LPS agent Dovenmuehle Mortgage Inc. ("DMI") and/or

138 Beal's LPS affiliated attorneys are indeed "robosigned" and/or falsified and otherwise forged?

139 Defendant's prior related case, Subramaniam v. Beal et al, Case No. 3:12-cv-01681-MO,

140 resulted from a non-judicial foreclosure action brought against her with a trustee sale of her

141 property scheduled in September 2012 by Defendant LNV, its LPS affiliated attorney RCO

142 Legal PS fka Routh Crabtree Olsen PS ("RCO") and its "trustee" counterpart LPS affiliated

143 Northwest Trustee Services ("NWTS"). (Note both RCO and NWTS are owned by attorney

144 Stephen Routh, who like Beal knows he is using robosigned and forged documents in

145 foreclosures.)

146 LPS affiliated RCO and NWTS were hired by LNV /Beal in the noticed related cases LNV

147 v. Fauley; Case No. CV15040532 and Fauley v. Washington Mutual et al (LNV), Case No. 3:13-

148 cv-00581-AC. RCO attorney John Thomas personally showed Defendant and Beal victim

Page 6 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 7 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 114 of 383

149 Robynne A. Pauley what he purported was the "original" Pauley Note which Defendant and Ms.

150 Pauley determined by their observation of certain characteristics on the document that is was not

151 the "original" Note but a forgery. Other Beal victims have observed similar characteristics on

152 alleged "original" Notes shown to them by LNV, attorneys hired by Beal/LNV, and/or other Beal

153 employees. Whether or not these purported "original" Notes are forgeries is not only material as

154 to whether or not LNV has standing to foreclose, but is material as to whether or not the owner

155 ofLNV, Daniel Andrew Beal, and the attorneys he hires and the owners and employees ofDMI

156 are committing first degree felony crimes of forgery of financial instruments with intent to

157 defraud for personal gain.

158 On page 2, number 2 of attorney Weinstock's letter he states: "DMI advised MGC that

159 DMI does not conduct foreclosures with affidavits with such characteristics." (The

160 characteristics referred to are those characteristics consistent with "robosigning" as specified in

161 the Texas Attorney General's October 4, 2010 letter to MGC which are also the characteristics

162 defined by the United States in the criminal conviction of Lorraine Brown as being the products

163 of her crimes.) If this is/was true then why have the Beal victims in the noticed related cases

164 articulated instances where DMI (and MGC/LNV /Beal) have in fact submitted affidavits

165 produced by robosigners? In the Breitling case LNV submitted to the court an affidavit of

166 Edward J. Bagdon to support its motion for summary judgment in LNV v. Breitlings; Case No.

167 DC-14-0405. The Beal victims collectively researched Edward J. Bagdon and located more than

168 100 mortgage related documents signed by him. A comparison of 57 of these signatures show a

169 high probability that at least five different individuals made these signatures. Additionally

170 Edward J. Bagdon signed these documents as a top executive officer of numerous different

171 financial institutions when he was in fact not employed by any of them, but was an employee of

Page 7 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 8 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 115 of 383

172 DMI. (Interestingly in his affidavit submitted to the court by the LPS affiliated law firm, Codilis

173 & Stawiarski, in the Breitling case he fails to identify any employer.) This behavior by Edward

174 J. Bagdon is consistent with the manner and means used by Lorraine Brown in the commission

175 of her crimes where the United States claimed and the judges of the U.S. District Court for the

176 Middle District of Florida determined Brown and her co-conspirators allowed other individuals

177 to mimic their signatures and sign mortgage related documents without the requisite authority to

178 do so. This collection of signatures consistent with "robosigning" purportedly made by Edward

179 J. Bagdon, an employee ofDMI, also disputes Beal/MGC attorney Weinstock's statement on

180 page 2, number 2 of his letter: "DMI advised MGC that DMI does not conduct foreclosures with

181 affidavits with such characteristics."

182 Edward J. Bagdon's affidavit in the Breitlings' case is dated June 17, 2014. (See LNV v.

183 Breitlings: Case No. DC-14-0405.) This affidavit is included in Defendant's Exhibit C attached

184 hereto. This exhibit also includes a comparison of the 57 Edward J. Bagdon signatures on

185 mortgage related documents made between 1993 and 2014. The Breitlings had included this

186 comparison in their own exhibits to show Edward J. Bagdon is in fact a "robosigner" whose

187 activities are consistent with the activities identified as being criminal in the October 4, 2010

188 letter sent to MGC by the Texas Attorney General's office; and by the United States as being an

189 act of conspiracy in a scheme and artifice to defraud in its criminal conviction of Lorraine

190 Brown.

191 Lorraine Brown was incarcerated for her crimes in June 2012. So this Edward J. Bagdon

192 affidavit produced in June 2014 along with the magically appearing Jason J. Vecchio and Dana

193 Lantry endorsed allonges produced and submitted to this court in November 2014 by

194 LNV/Beal's Perkins Coie attorneys in the present case and the noticed related Pauley case could

Page 8 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 9 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 116 of 383

195 only have been produced by Brown's co-conspirators. (The United States identified unknown

196 co-conspirators in their conviction of Brown.)

197 Daniel Andrew "Andy" Beal stands to gain the most personally from the use ofthis

198 Edward J. Bagdon "robosigned" affidavit in the Breitlings' case; and the false and forged Jason

199 J. Vecchio and Dana Lantry endorsed allonges in the present case; and the false and forged Jason

200 J. Vecchio allonges and forged Notes in the other noticed related cases. He is the sole owner of

201 Beal Bank SSB, Beal Bank USA, Beal Financial Services, Beal Service Corporation and the

202 many subsidiaries of these entities including but not limited to LNV, MGC, LPP, CLMG

203 Corporation ("CLMG"), CXA Corporation ("CXA") and its many clones (i.e. CXA Corp. CXA-

204 1 to CXA-32 Corp. etc); BRE Inc, ("BRE") its many clones (i.e. BRE-1 to BRE-20 Inc. etc);

205 Southgate Master Fund LLC ("Southgate"); Bemont Investments LLC ("Bemont"); BPB

206 Investments LC, and hundreds of other shell corporations.

207 Daniel Andrew "Andy" Beal is the sole beneficiary of the gains from the foreclosures he

208 perfects using these false and forged documents. His crimes go beyond those of Lorraine Brown

209 in that he not only knowingly uses the products of her crimes; he falsely produces his own forged

210 documents consistent with the conspiracy acts and intentionally uses them to deceive courts and

211 to thereby intentionally deprive Defendant and the other Beal/LNV victims in the noticed related

212 cases of their property without due process.

213 The United States convicted Lorraine Brown of a felony cognizable by a court of the

214 United States (i.e. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida). Defendant

215 and the Beal/LNV victims in the other noticed related cases have told the various courts (i.e.

216 judges) that they are victims of the crimes of Lorraine Brown and that the assignments of deed of

Page 9 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 10 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 117 of 383

217 trust or mortgage, the Mortgage Notes, the allonges and the affidavits produced by LNV are

218 forgeries consistent with the crimes of Lorraine Brown and her co-conspirators and that the

219 owner of LNV, Daniel Andrew Beal, as well as the LPS attorneys and agents he hires are

220 Brown's co-conspirators.

221 Title 18 U.S.C. 4 states:

222 "Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a


223 court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the
224 same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United
225 States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both."

226 Defendant and the Beal/LNV victims in the other noticed related cases have been telling

227 persons with civil authority including judges, their local police, their district attorneys, their state

228 attorneys, and the FBI about these crimes since 2012 and they have been consistently

229 IGNORED!

230 Title 18 U.S.C. 4 is unconstitutional in that it doesn't mandate a judge to take any

231 specific action once they become aware of"the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a

232 court of the United States." The statute instructs all citizens they MUST tell a judge about the

233 crime or they will be guilty of a crime themselves and "shall be fined under this title or

234 imprisoned not more than three years, or both."

235 Defendant and the Beal/LNV victims in the other noticed related cases are certain that if

236 any of them were to forge a negotiable instrument with intent to defraud for personal gain, the

237 same judges who tum a deaf ear and blind eye to LNV /Beal doing so, would most definitely

238 report their crimes to the FBI or local law enforcement for investigation and prosecution.

239 Because Title 18 U.S. C. 4 permits judicial discretion this statue results in arbitrary and biased

Page 10 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 11 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 118 of 383

240 enforcement that violates the constitutional rights of Defendant and the Beal/LNV victims in the

241 other noticed related cases. Defendant and the other LNV /Beal victims are deprived of their

242 right to equal protection of the law under the fourteenth amendment to the United States

243 Constitution; and because these crimes can and do result in deprivation of the Beal/LNV victims'

244 property and their liberty to fully enjoy their property often for many years; it also deprives them

245 of their right to due process under the fifth and the fourteenth amendments to the United States

246 Constitution.

247 Constitutional Question 1

248 Is it an unconstitutional deprivation of due process and equal protection of law for a state

249 or federal judge to ignore the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United

250 States (because Title 18 U.S.C. 4 apparently gives them discretion to do so); and is it

251 unconstitutional for judges to fail to take action to ensure a criminal investigation by law

252 enforcement is initiated; when a judge's failure to do so can and does result in deprivation oflife,

253 liberty and property for the victims of the unreported crime?

254 Constitutional Question 2

255 When a state or federal judge becomes aware of an actual commission of a felony

256 cognizable by a court of the United States and fails to take action to ensure that a criminal

257 investigation by appropriate law enforcement is initiated could/should that judge be fined or

258 imprisoned under Title 18 U.S.C. 4; and if not wouldn't this then be unconstitutional because it

259 would create an unequal application of the law (i.e. citizens suffer consequences for violating

260 Title 18 U.S.C. 4, but judges who violate Title 18 U.S.C. 4 and thereby commit a crime

Page 11of37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 12 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 119 of 383

261 would not be punished; (it is well established that judicial immunity does not extend to

262 prosecution for a crime); and if that judge's failure to act pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. 4

263 deprived victims of these unreported crimes of their constitutional rights to due process and

264 equal protection oflaw wouldn't this then also violate that judge's constitutionally mandated

265 oath of office to uphold the Constitution of the United States?

266 Constitutional Question 3

267 In the situation portrayed by Constitutional Question 2 when a judge fails to take action

268 to ensure that a criminal investigation by law enforcement is initiated pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C.

269 SJ:; and that judge becomes aware of the crime through litigation in a civil action where a victim
270 of that crime is a party to the litigation and asserts he/she is such a victim and pursuant to rules of

271 evidence shows evidence of such to the court; and these crimes involve the forging of mortgage

272 related instruments intended to deceive a court as to the title interests of real property; but that

273 judge ignores such evidence of the crime and ultimately summarily rules against the interests of

274 the crime victim without a trial on the merits; and the result of that summary ruling deprives that

275 crime victim of their property and their financial liberty and greatly diminishes that crime

276 victim's quality of life; would this judicial decision be unconstitutional; and would this judge's

277 order therefore be void because it was derived from an unconstitutional deprivation of the crime

278 victim's rights to due process and equal protection oflaw?

279 If a court's decision is plainly contrary to a statute or the constitution, the court will be

280 held to have acted without power or jurisdiction, making the judgment void. United States v.

281 Indoor Cultivation Equip., 55 F.3d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1995).

Page 12 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 13 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 120 of 383

282 A judgment may not be rendered in violation of constitutional protections. The validity

283 of a judgment may be affected by a failure to give the constitutionally required due process

284 notice and an opportunity to be heard. Earle v. McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398; See also

285 Prather v Loyd, 86 Idaho 45, 382 P2d 910.

286 The limitations inherent in the requirements of due process and equal protection of the

287 law extend to judicial as well as political branches of government, so that a judgment may not be

288 rendered in violation of those constitutional limitations and guarantees. Hanson v. Denckla. 357

289 US 235, 2 L Ed 2d 1283, 78 S Ct 1228.

290 Every person is entitled to an opportunity to be heard in a court of law upon every

291 question involving his rights or interests, before he is affected by any judicial decision on the

292 question. Earle v McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398.

293 A judgment of a court without hearing the party or giving him an opportunity to be heard

294 is not a judicial determination of his rights. Sabariego v Maverick. 124 US 261, 31LEd430, 8 S

295 Ct 461, and is not entitled to respect in any other tribunal.

296 Defendant and the other BeaVLNV victims in the other noticed related cases are

297 instructed via Title 18 U.S.C. 4 that they must report crimes to their local law enforcement,

298 and they have done so. But their local law enforcement told them they need to go to the FBI, and

299 again they have done so. Because the Beal/LNV victims live in so many different states and

300 cities their individual reports fail to give local FBI offices an understanding of the magnitude of

301 the Beal enterprise crimes. Also because the crimes are "foreclosure related" local police and

302 sheriffs departments don't take the reports seriously and have told Defendant and the other

Page 13 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 14 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 121 of 383

303 Beal/LNV victims or that this is a civil matter for the courts (i.e. they put the onus on judges to

304 do the right thing); and then judges in turn routinely fail to take these crimes seriously.

305 This is a serious matter of public interest. Title 18 U.S.C. 4 mandates citizens with

306 knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States (Beal

307 is doing exactly the same thing Lorraine Brown was convicted and imprisoned for doing and

308 worse) yet when citizens do as Title 18 U.S.C. 4 mandates and make the crime known to fil!!!!

309 judge or other person(s) in civil or military authority under the United States, nothing is done

310 investigate or put a stop to the crimes consistent with this criminal conspiracy (already identified

311 as a criminal conspiracy in United States o[America v. Lorraine Brown). The lives of the

312 victims of these crimes are destroyed; their credit is wrongfully damaged; their shelter is

313 wrongfully taken from them, their entire life work effort and financial security is stolen from

314 them at the very point in their lives when they are most vulnerable and least likely to recover

315 from such a horrendous loss - often when they can no longer work and must live on a limited

316 retirement or disability income. Had they had not become victims of this horrifying crime they

317 . would have had the liberty to sell their property and use their equity to buy a smaller less

318 expensive property and live their retirement debt free; but their liberty to make such choices was

319 stolen from them by Beal/LNV. Daniel Andrew Beal perpetrates his crimes with intent to steal

320 homes from some of our most vulnerable citizens, the elderly, the disabled, minorities, single

321 mothers; he destroys lives and displaces families so he can gamble away millions of dollars a

322 year. (See Defendant's Exhibit D attached hereto.)

323 Beal also uses his ill-gotten wealth earned from his corrupt organization's criminal

324 activities to pay thousands of attorneys to obstruct justice and/or thwart justice and/or commit

325 fraud upon the court in Defendant's case and the cases of the other LNV /Beal victims in the

Page 14 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 15 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 122 of 383

326 noticed related cases. Brown was not convicted of criminal forgery because she herself did not

327 use the false and forged instruments she produced with intent to personally enforce such

328 instruments for her own personal gain. (In law if one forges a signature of otherwise alters an

329 instrument the act is not considered felony forgery until someone with knowledge that the

330 instrument is forged attempts to enforce the instrument for his/her personal gain. Daniel Andrew

331 Beal has such knowledge and intentionally seeks to enforce such forged instruments, as he has in

332 Defendant's case, and in the other noticed related cases.

333 Pertinent sections of ORS 165.013(] )(a) (Forgery in the first degree) state:

334 "A person commits the crime of forgery in the first degree if the person violates
335 ORS 165.007 (Forgery in the second degree) the written instrument is or purports
336 to be any of the following:
337 (B) Part of an issue of stock, bonds or other instruments representing
338 interests in or claims against any property or person;
339 (C) A deed, will, codicil, contract or assignment;
340 (E) A public record;

341 Pertinent sections of 165.007(l)(a) & (b) (Forgery in the second degree) state:

342 "A person commits the crime of forgery in the second degree if, with intent to
343 injure or defraud, the person falsely makes, completes or alters a written
344 instrument; or utters a written instrument which the person knows to be forged."

345 ORS 165.013(3) (Forgery in the first degree) states:

346 "Forgery in the first degree is a Class C felony. [1971 c.743 153; 1993 c.680
347 25; 2005 c.761 1]"

348 Pertinent sections of 18 US. Code 495 (COUNTERFEITING AND FORGERY

349 specific to contracts, deeds, and powers of attorney states:

350 "Whoever falsely makes, alters, forges, or counterfeits any deed, power of
351 attorney, order, certificate, receipt, contract, or other writing, for the purpose of
352 obtaining or receiving, or of enabling any other person, either directly or

Page 15 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 16 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 123 of 383

353 indirectly, to obtain or receive from the United States or any officers or agents
354 thereof, any sum of money; or
355 Whoever utters or publishes as true any such false, forged, altered, or
356 counterfeited writing, with intent to defraud the United States, knowing the same
357 to be false, altered, forged, or counterfeited; or
358 Whoever transmits to, or presents at any office or officer of the United States, any
359 such writing in support of, or in relation to, any account or claim, with intent to
360 defraud the United States, knowing the same to be false, altered, forged, or
361 counterfeited-
362 Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both."

363 Both Oregon and U.S. code is clear about the definition of forgery and that it is a crime.

364 Courts are offices of the United States. Judges are officers of the United States. As such when

365 courts are defrauded the United States is defrauded. LNV/Beal has in Defendant's case and in

366 the other noticed related cases presented to judges, as officers of the United States, false, altered

367 and forged assignments of deed or mortgage; Mortgage Notes, allonges to Mortgage Notes and

368 affidavits. He does this with intent to defraud these judges knowing they would rely on these

369 false, altered and forged instruments as being genuine; and that through this predictable judicial

370 reliance the probability is high that these judges will grant LNV /Beal summary judgment rulings

371 that directly harms Defendant and the other LNV/Beal victims who are also prose litigants in the

372 other noticed related cases by unjustly and unconstitutionally depriving them of their property.

373 The United States is also harmed the because it erodes the public's confidence in our judiciary as

374 a branch of the United States; which in tum undermines public confidence in the government of

375 the United States as a whole. The individual judges who were deceived are also harmed because

376 fraud makes their judgments void; and too many void judgments tarnish a judge's reputation.

377 Whenever mass incidents of judicial abuse of discretion and blatant violations of due

378 process and equal protection of law are rampant, with judges who ignore evidence and statute

Page 16 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 17 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 124 of 383

379 and grant summary judgments favoring very wealthy financial institutions (and wealthy parties

380 like LNV and Beal who pretend to be financial institutions and use fraud to gain the bulk of their

381 wealth), the public loses faith in our judiciary's impartiality and its willingness to perform its

382 constitutionally dictated duty to uphold the United States Constitution. The United States also

383 loses credibility among foreign governments and the public of foreign countries. For centuries

384 the United States has been the shining example of what a democratic form of government should

385 be; a beacon of hope to the oppressed everywhere and a form of government that inspires those

386 living in non-democratic nations to fight for their own human rights and to establish a

387 democratic form of government in their own countries that mimics our form of government.

388 This shining image the United States has enjoyed for centuries is tarnished when the United

389 States government appears to allow wealthy parties like LNV/Beal to violate laws, commit

390 cognizable crimes and to thereby steal property from citizens with government sanction through

391 what appears to be a corrupt and biased judiciary.

392 Defendant wishes to make it clear that she does not believe all or even most judges are

393 corrupt, although she and the other LNV/Beal victims have good cause to believe that at least

394 some judges in the noticed related cases (specifically in the LNV v. Breitlings and the LNV v.

395 Gebhardt cases) may be corrupt and that the obvious appearance of such impropriety warrants an

396 investigation by the FBI; however many factors, not the least of which is a lack of funding,

397 coupled with a surge of non-criminal pro-se litigants defending their property title rights in

398 courts has overwhelmed the judicial system. However this is not an excuse to unconstitutionally

399 deprive those pro se masses flooding the courts of their property without due process and equal

400 protection of law. Throwing these cases out of our courts as quickly as possible with summary

401 judgments is not the solution to the problem, and has the potential to exponentially increase court

Page 17 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 18 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 125 of 383

402 costs when these cases are re-opened and judgments vacated as being void due to their

403 unconstitutional basis.

404 At least one federal judge recognizes the constitutional problems inherent in abuse of

405 summary judgments by his federal judge colleagues. The Honorable Mark W. Bennett in his

406 essay: "From the 'No Spittin', No Cussin' and No Summary Judgment' Days of Employment

407 Discrimination Litigation to the 'Defendant's Summary Judgment Affirmed Without Comment'

408 Days: One Judge's Four-Decade Perspective" 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 685 (2012-2013) writes:

409 "Nearly seventy-five years after its birth, the time has come to bury summary judgment.
410 The funeral should be swift, dignified, and joyous. The autopsy would reveal that the
411 cause of death was abuse and overuse by my federal judge colleagues. Summary
412 judgment abuse and overuse occurs in all types of cases, but is especially magnified in
413 employment discrimination cases ... Unfortunately, my colleagues have become
414 increasingly unfriendly to plaintiffs' employment discrimination claims. I believe there
415 are six primary reasons for this "unfriendliness" or what many scholars have observed
416 as "hostility": 1) too many frivolous employment discrimination lawsuits; 2) an
417 overworked federal judiciary; 3) increased sophistication of employers; 4) increasingly
418 subtle discrimination; 5) implicit bias in judicial decisions; and 6) a shift among judges
419 from trial judging to case managing ... The time has come to recognize that summary
420 judgment has become too expensive, too time-consuming for the parties and the
421 judiciary, and too likely to unfairly deprive parties-usually plaintiffs---of their
422 constitutional and statutory rights to trial by jury. I am willing to throw out the baby
423 with the bathwater because the culture of unjustly granting summary judgment is far
424 too ingrained in the federal judiciary to reverse course. There is simply no empirical
425 evidence that summary judgment is efficient or fair. Failing elimination of summary
426 judgment, dramatic modifications to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 1 Procedure
427 should be made to help eliminate its disparate and unfair impact."

428 Apparently the same "unfriendliness" observed by the Honorable Mark W. Bennett and

429 what and scholars call "hostility" of judges towards plaintiffs' in employment discrimination

430 claims is also reflected toward homeowners fighting off fraudulent foreclosures on their homes.

431 In fact Ms. Gebhardt pointed out in a motion she filed to recuse Judge Varlan because he

432 appeared to be biased against her that his record showed he had not even once ruled in favor of a

Page 18 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 19 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 126 of 383

433 homeowner and that he had a tendency to rule unfavorably in other civil rights cases, mostly

434 employment discrimination cases. When the judiciary shows blatant bias and discrimination

435 against crime victims in danger of losing their homes to fraud the emotional damage further

436 inflicted these victims is severe; the crime victims are being treated by the courts as if they are

437 the criminals. Actually, criminals have more access to the courts that these crime victims. This

438 is not supposed to happen in the United States. The public interest is served by protecting our

439 constitutional rights to due process and assuring equal and fair justice, quoting from "Access to

440 the Courts: An Essay (or the Georgetown University Law Center Conference on the

441 Independence ofthe Courts" by David S. Udell and Rebekah Diller, respectively, Director and

442 Counsel of the Justice Program of the Brennan Center for Justice at the New York University

443 School of Law:

444 "In this Essay, we argue that the gap between America's promise of equal justice and
445 the reality of justice on the ground is substantial, and growing. Meaningful access to the
446 courts--consisting of representation by counsel, the ability to physically enter court and
447 understand and participate in the proceedings, and the opportunity to have claims heard
448 is increasingly out of reach for many Americans. First, there are not enough lawyers
449 available to represent low-income people in civil legal matters, resulting in four-fifths
450 of the civil legal needs of low-income individuals going unmet. Second, in the criminal
451 justice system, where the right to counsel for the indigent is constitutionally guaranteed,
452 attorneys are commonly underpaid, under-supervised, under-resourced and, ultimately,
453 unable to provide effective representation. Third, for people with physical or
454 psychiatric disabilities, court buildings and court procedures pose obstacles that may be
455 insurmountable. Fourth, for people with limited English proficiency, the lack of
456 translation and interpreting services in many of the nation's courts also poses barriers
457 that are often overwhelming. Fifth, the role of the courts is increasingly circumscribed
458 by laws and by court decisions that eliminate whole categories of claims from the
459 courts' jurisdiction. Sixth, increased and often mandatory reliance on alternative
460 dispute resolution has placed judicial review out of reach for an increasing number of
461 people. These six factors, we argue, daily threaten the ability of our courts to perform
462 their essential functions: providing predictable and fair dispute resolution, acting as a
463 check on the legislative and executive branches, protecting the most vulnerable from
464 the excesses of majoritarianism, and reaffirming the citizenry's faith in the legitimacy
465 of the courts and of government in general. Finally, we conclude by offering a set of
466 policy solutions aimed at stabilizing our courts, promoting their independence, and
467 fulfilling the promise of equal justice."

Page 19 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 20 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 127 of 383

468 If federal judges were not left to their own devices (which has proved in at least these

469 seven noticed related cases to have had an unconstitutional disparate and biased impact) and

470 were instead mandated by Title 18 U.S.C. 4 to report the crimes of Daniel Andrew "Andy"

471 Beal that are consistent with the crimes identified by the United States as being acts of a criminal

472 conspiracy in United States ofAmerica v. Lorraine Brown to their local FBI offices as Title 18

473 U.S.C. 4 implies but does not explicitly mandate; then the FBI would respect the authority of

474 these judges and immediately investigate these criminal activities; whereas local FBI field

475 offices have apparently ignored the many reports made to them by LNV/Beal victims who reside

476 in multiple states because these local FBI field offices are unable to connect each local report to

477 Daniel Andrew "Andy" Beal and his corrupt organization and to a larger pattern of such crimes

478 occurring across the country. Also like the local police and sheriffs' offices, local FBI field

479 offices are likely to consider these reports as civil and not criminal because they involve

480 foreclosures and refer these crime victims, as they have in fact done, back to the courts where

481 these crime victims have experienced a vicious catch-22 cycle in attempting to and being barred

482 from access the courts to voice their complaints.

483 This unconstitutional failure of Title 18 U.S.C. 4 to mandate judicial action by judges to

484 report crimes has a disparate and unfair impact on the victims of such crimes already traumatized

485 and financially damaged by the crimes perpetrated against them; and who are then further

486 traumatized and victimized by the very judiciary they trusted to give them justice.

487 Were the FBI to investigate Daniel Andrew "Andy" Beal and his corrupt organization

488 they would discover that Beal's criminal conspiracy expands Brown's criminal conspiracy to

489 include falsified claims of mortgage default and subsequent theft of property for his own

Page 20 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 21 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 128 of 383

490 personal gain via intentional use the products of Brown's crimes (i.e. forged mortgage related

491 documents) and new forged mortgage related documents created as a result of Beal's personal

492 instruction. Beal intentionally used these forged mortgage related documents to wrongfully

493 foreclose on properties. He submitted such forged mortgage related documents to courts in

494 foreclosure complaints he initiated against Beal victims in the noticed related cases and against

49S other Beal victims not yet named. Beal had first caused these forged mortgage related documents

496 to be filed via his MGC and other Beal enterprise entities into county land recorders offices

497 across the county through the mail and through wire transmissions, with intent to deceive judges

498 knowing that courts would then rely on these forged mortgage related documents as being

499 genuine. Beal did this with intent to wrongfully foreclose on properties, while denying his

SOO victims their constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of law, and to thereby steal

SOl these properties for his own personal gain through his deception, i.e. fraud upon the courts and at

S02 the expense of Defendant and the other Beal/LNV victims in the noticed related cases.

S03 Defendant never in defaulted on her mortgage. Litton wrongfully attempted to

S04 foreclose on Defendant's property in 2006/2007. Litton's attorneys told Defendant's attorney

SOS that their client had no financial incentive to call off the trustee sale. In a letter dated October 25,

S06 2006 from my attorney, Elizabeth Lamoine, to Litton's Mr. Gallardo she wrote:

S07 " ... when we proposed a settlement with your company on August 30, 2006, Mr.
S08 Benny Hibler informed me that your company had no 'incentive' to settle, as the
S09 equity our client possessed in the residence was 'more than adequate' to satisfy
S10 the amount you sought in the sale."

Sll (See the 2nd paragraph of Defendant's Exhibit E.) Ms. Lemoine had proved to Litton that

S12 Defendant had not missed a single payment that EMC Mortgage Inc, ("EMC") claimed she had

S13 missed; i.e. there was never a genuine default.

Page 21of37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 22 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 129 of 383

514 Unknown to Defendant and her attorney in 2006/2007 Litton and/or GMAC-RFC

515 (Residential Funding Company LLC fka Residential Funding Corporation, subsidiaries of

516 GMAC) had filed a substitution of trustee document and an assignment of Defendant's deed of

517 trust falsely purporting to transfer beneficial interest to GMAC-RFC from People's Choice

518 Home Loans in 2006. This is a legal impossibility because People's Choice had no beneficial

519 interest in Defendant's deed of trust in 2006, because based on expert testimony available to the

520 court People's Choice had sold all beneficial interest in Defendant's deed of trust to the BSABS

521 2004-HE4 Bear Steams Asset Backed Securities Trust (the "BSABS 2004-HE4 Trust" or "Trust"

522 prior to May 1, 2004. Defendant discovered these false and forged documents that Litton and

523 GMAC-RFC caused to be filed with Washington County Recorder's office via wire transmission

524 only in 2012; and she discovered that her loan was sold into the BSABS 2004-HE4 Trust in

525 November 2012.

526 Defendant attached as "Exhibit F" to her objection to MGC's motion to dismiss in her

527 related case Subramaniam v. Beal et al, Case No. 3:12-cv-01681-MO a copy ofthis assignment

528 of deed of trust filed on June 28, 2006 and pointed out several reasons why this document was a

529 forgery consistent with the crimes of Lorraine Brown. Defendant attached as Exhibit G a copy

530 of the information specific to the criminal indictment and plea agreement of Lorraine Brown (at

531 that time Defendant, a pro-se litigant, did not know in 2012 she could/should have filed a motion

532 for judicial notice.) It didn't matter because apparently judges think they have discretion to

533 ignore or deny motions for judicial notice of adjudicative fact pursuant to Federal Rule 201 (c)(2)

534 in spite of the language of the rule: "The court must take judicial notice ..."

Page 22 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 23 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 130 of 383

535 Judge Michael Wise Mosman summarily dismissed Defendant's claims in Subramaniam

536 v. Beal with prejudice without ever adjudicating any of her claims. Like with the other Beal

537 victims, Defendant's claims have never been heard by any court.

538 From US v. One Star Class Sloop, No. 08-1152 (1st Cir. 2008):

539 "[A]n abuse of discretion occurs when a material factor deserving significant
540 weight is ignored, when an improper factor is relied upon, or when all proper and
541 no improper factors are assessed, but the court makes a serious mistake in weighing
542 them." Coutin v. Young & Rubicam P.R., Inc., 124 F.3d 331, 336 (1st Cir. 1997)
543 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Within this rubric, "an error of law
544 is always tantamount to an abuse of discretion." Torres-Rivera, 524 F.3d at 336.
545 "An abuse of discretion occurs when a material factor deserving significant
546 weight is ignored, when an improper factor is relied upon, or when all proper and
547 no improper factors are assessed, but the court makes a serious mistake in weighing
548 them ....

549 Certainly whether or not an assignment of deed of trust is genuine or a forgery is material

550 to the standing of a party seeking to foreclosure on property via that instrument. Subramaniam v.

551 Beal arose from an attempt to foreclose and sell Defendant's property in September 2012. The

552 present case (LNV v. Subramaniam) arises from the same party "LNV" now attempting a judicial

553 foreclosure using the same forged instruments with the addition of newly forged instruments;

554 and claims that rejudicata bars Defendant from relief she would have had in 2012 and that her

555 fraud claims discovered in 2012 are now time barred because Judge Mosman dismissed her

556 claims with prejudice.

557 This type of legal maneuvering is a pattern in LNV foreclosure related cases specific to

558 the LNV /Beal victims in the noticed related cases; and it is designed to obstruct justice and to

559 deprive the LNV /Beal victims of their constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of

560 law.

Page 23 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 24 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 131 of 383

561 Judge Mosman made no reference in his written order that addressed any of Defendant's

562 claims in her pro se pleadings in Subramaniam v. Beal; the primary thrust behind Judge

563 Mosman's decision seems to have come from MGC and Northwest Trustee Services ("NWTS")

564 arguments along the line of "we didn't get away with it (i.e. the non-judicial foreclosure wasn't

565 perfected) so no harm done and case should be dismissed."

566 Material factors deserving significant weight were ignored by Judge Mosman who made

567 no determination specific to title of Defendant's property which was a central issue in dispute

568 between the parties in Subramaniam v. Beal in 2012; and is now in 2015 the central issue in

569 dispute between the parties in LNV v. Subramaniam.

570 Constitutional Question 4

571 Is Federal Rule 56 as it is written and used unconstitutional in that it has become an over-

572 used method for federal judges to clear their dockets; making it a breeding ground for judicial

573 bias, discrimination and judicial abuse of discretion that denies far too many citizens meaningful

574 access to the courts and violates their constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of

575 law as it has the for the Defendant in the present case, and the other LNV /Beal victims in the

576 noticed related cases?

577 "These phrases [due process] in the constitution do not mean the general body of the law,

578 common and statute, as it was at the time the constitution took effect; for that would seem to

579 deny the right of the legislature to amend or repeal the law. They refer to certain fundamental

580 rights, which that system of jurisprudence, of which ours is a derivative, has always recognized."

Page 24 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 25 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 132 of 383

581 Brown v. Levee Com'rs, 50 Miss. 468. "Due process oflaw, as used in the constitution, cannot

582 mean less than a prosecution or suit instituted and conducted according to the prescribed forms

583 and solemnities for ascertaining guilt, or determining the title to property." Embury v. Conner, 3

584 N.Y. 511, 517, 53 Am.Dec. 325. And see, generally, Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 104, 24

585 L.Ed. 616.

586 "A judgment is a void judgment if the court that rendered the judgment acted in a manner

587 inconsistent with due process." Klugh v. US., D.C.S.C., 610 F. Supp. 892, 901.

588 "Res judicata consequences will not be applied to a void judgment which is one which,

589 from its inception, is a complete nullity and without legal effect," Allcock v. Allcock, 437 N.E.2d

590 392 (Ill.App.3 Dist. 1982).

591 Pro se litigants, as well as those represented by counsel, are entitled to meaningful access

592 to the courts.' Sufficient access to the courts, a right protected by the due process clause of the

593 fourteenth amendment6 and the first amendment, guarantees to all persons use of the judicial

594 process to redress alleged grievances. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977); Wolffv.

595 McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488 (1969).

596 A judgment may not be rendered in violation of constitutional protections. The validity

597 of a judgment may be affected by a failure to give the constitutionally required due process

598 notice and an opportunity to be heard. Earle v. McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398. See also

599 Restatements, Judgments 4(b). Prather vLoyd, 86 Idaho 45, 382 P2d 910.

Page 25 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 26 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 133 of 383

600 Meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental constitutional right. See Bounds v.

601 Smith. 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969). The importance

602 of the right of access has long been recognized by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Chambers v.

603 Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907). The right of access protects a litigant's

604 interest in using the judicial process to attain redress of grievances. See Bounds v. Smith, 430

605 U.S. 817, 825 (1977); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 579; Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969). For

606 pro se litigants, the right guarantees all the means necessary to ensure an adequate hearing on all

607 alleged grievances. See Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 110 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (per curiam),

608 affd sub nom. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam). In Rabin v. Dep't of State,

609 No. 95-4310, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15718 the court noted that prose plaintiffs should be

610 afforded "special solicitude." One commentator has submitted that no judicial effort is too great

611 if it tends toward just resolution of all pro se claims. See Flannery & Robbins. The

612 Misunderstood Pro Se Litigant: More than a Pawn in the Game, 41 Bklyn. L. Rev. 769, 772

613 (1975).

614 The present case and the noticed related cases before this court and other courts involve

615 civil litigation stemming from criminal activities. In each of the noticed related cases LNV /Beal

616 and Beal's attorneys have demonstrated a pattern of legal maneuvering designed to prevent

617 discovery and have these cases summarily dismissed or decided in favor ofLNV/Beal without

618 any discovery or judicial fact finding because if Defendant and the other LNV/Beal victims were

619 permitted discovery (a necessary ingredient for due process to occur) and judges actually paid

620 attention to the facts uncovered during discovery there would be no question about the criminal

Page 26 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 27 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 134 of 383

621 nature of LNV/Beal's activities in regard to Beal's claims against properties belonging to

622 Defendant and the other LNV /Beal victims in the noticed related cases.

623 As in Defendant's case a self-serving false claim of default started the ball rolling toward

624 foreclosure in the noticed related case of LNV Corporation v. Gebhardt. Catherine Gebhardt

625 sent a cashier's check for $6,000 made payable to MGC Mortgage Inc. at the address GMAC

626 gave her (i.e. 7195 Dallas Parkway, Plano, TX 75024) after GMAC told her MGC would be

627 taking over the servicing of her mortgage. This $6,000 payment represented three months of

628 payments of Gebhardt's mortgage. MGC claimed they never received this check. Yet in late

629 2013 Gebhardt finally obtained a copy of the paid check from her bank; and it shows

630 conclusively that the money was indeed paid on October 29, 2008 to Beal Bank SSB. (Beal

631 Bank SSB and LNV and MGC are all solely owned by Daniel Andrew "Andy" Beal.) In a letter

632 dated June 23, 2011 sent to Gebhardt's Congressman Roe's office written by attorney Erica

633 Thomas who doesn't disclose in the letter she is an attorney (her Texas Bar Card Number is

634 24042027), but who misrepresents herself as a Vice President ofMGC makes numerous false

635 claims about the Gebhardt loan. Specific to this $6,000 payment that cleared on October 29,

636 2008 as was conclusively paid to Beal Bank SSB; Erica Thomas on page 2 paragraph 1 of this

637 letter states:

638 "MGC has received no payments since we acquired servicing of loan form GMAC on
639 or around July 1, 2009."

640 So what happened to Gebhardt's $6,000? That is a question certainly worthy of an

641 answer through fact finding, i.e. discovery. After all LNV sued Gebhardt for "breach of

642 contract" in LNV v. Gebhardt and the breach claimed by LNV was that Gebhardt's defaulted on

Page 27 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 28 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 135 of 383

643 the mortgage contract. This evidence indicates that it was actually LNV /MGC/Beal that

644 breached the contract in October 2008 and not Gebhardt.

645 The returned cashier's check conclusively shows the $6,000 was paid to Beal Bank SSB.

646 MGC made other false claims of missed payments in addition to this one in the Gebhardt case.

647 That MGC misappropriated this payment is conclusive based on the evidence. That MGC used

648 this misappropriated payment to claim Gebhardt defaulted on her mortgage when she in fact had

649 not, is conclusive based on the evidence. It can be inferred that MGC/Beal did this with intent so

650 it could initiate a non-judicial foreclosure sale of Gebhardt's property because the LPS affiliated

651 law firm of McCurdy & Candler served a foreclosure notice on Gebhardt on or around May 16,

652 2009. Gebhardt thwarted this attempt of fraudulent foreclosure on her property by filing a

653 lawsuit in August 2009: Gebhardt v GMAC Mortgage et al case 2009-059-I, in the Circuit Court

654 for Sevier County Tennessee. Like so many victims, in 2009 Gebhardt had no idea about the

655 level of fraud being perpetrated on her; she only knew that she had made payments to MGC that

656 were never credited to her loan; that GMAC told her to make payments to MGC in October 2008

657 then a few months later GMAC told her the servicing transfer to MGC did not succeed and she

658 was to make payments to GMAC again; but GMAC then claimed she was in default because

659 MGC claimed she had never paid them.

660 Even though Gebhardt didn't understand why this was happening, Daniel Andrew

661 "Andy" Beal, owner of MGC and LNV, knew exactly what he was doing. He intended to steal

662 Gebhardt's property and get a federal court to sanction his theft. To do this he had to first create

663 a default so he could deceive a court into believing Gebhardt had failed to make payments on her

664 mortgage so LNV/Beal could then unconstitutionally confiscate her property. MGC in behalf of

Page 28 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 29 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 136 of 383

665 LNV (.i.e. Daniel Andrew "Andy" Beal) knowingly made false claims of default with intent to

666 deprive Gebhardt of her property without due process or equal protection of the law by

667 intentionally deceiving the court so Beal could unconstitutionally confiscate her property for his

668 own personal gain and to the detriment of Gebhardt. (See Defendant's Exhibit F for a copy of

669 Gebhardt's $6,000 check and Erika Thomas' letter.) (Note: It is highly unlikely that attorney

670 Erica Thomas was actually on MGC's payroll as an employee. Attorney Erica Thomas was most

671 likely working as an independent contractor paid by Beal Bank as such and not as an employee

672 paid with a W2 form.)

673 Unfortunately Gebhardt's case is not an isolated incident. The same pattern of

674 misappropriated payments, false claims of default, then threats of foreclosure, sham modification

675 offers and eventual foreclosure actions or breach of contract complaints by Beal's MGC and/or

676 LNV and/or LPP has and is repeated with the noticed related cases and with numerous other

677 MGC/LNV/Beal victims across the country.

678 Were the FBI to investigate Daniel Andrew "Andy" Beal and his corrupt business

679 organization it is highly probable they will discover Beal, his agents or his attorneys have bribed

680 judges as well as attorneys who were hired to represent Beal victims; and that Beal is falsely

681 reporting his earnings to the IRS and to the FDIC then laundering his ill-gotten proceeds

682 overseas. (LNV /Beal victims have evidence to show Beal is laundering money as defined by 18

683 US. Code 1956.) Facts in the noticed related cases Breitlings v. LNV, Case No. 3:15-CV-

684 00703; LNV Corporation v. Gebhardt, and the Swift bankruptcy case is indicative of bribery or

685 improper influence of counsel representing Beal/LNV victims (i.e. attorneys Douglas Taylor,

686 J.D. Milks and Paul Bach); and facts in the Breitlings v. LNV case is indicative that Beal/LNV

Page 29 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 30 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 137 of 383

687 attorneys Jeffrey Hardaway with Codilis & Stawiarski PC and Luke Madole of Buckley Madole,

688 PC had secret conversations with at least two judges, Texas state judge Dale Tillery and Dallas

689 county judge Jerry Cooper, respectively, for purposes of influencing the decisions of these

690 judges to favor LNV.

691 The crimes described herein committed by D. Andrew Beal and his agents and his

692 attorneys and others involved in his corrupt organization qualify as "racketeering activity" as

693 defined by 18 US. Code 1961 et al. (i.e. 18 US. Code Chapter 96 - RACKETEER

694 INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS).

695 18 U.S. Code l 964(a) states:

696 "The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and
697 restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders,
698 including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest,
699 direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future
700 activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting
701 any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged
702 in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering
703 dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the
704 rights of innocent persons."

705 18 U.S. Code 1964(a) states:

706 "The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. Pending final
707 determination thereof, the court may at any time enter such restraining orders or
708 prohibitions, or take such other actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory
709 performance bonds, as it shall deem proper."

710 Defendant and the other LNV/Beal victims in the noticed related cases have been seeking

711 protection from the recognizable crimes being perpetrated against them for many years; and the

712 district courts of the United States are failing to restrain violations of 18 U.S. Code 1961 et seq.

713 by LNV/LPP/Beal (i.e. the Beal organization and its numerous corporate entities) and failing to

Page 30 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 31 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 138 of 383

714 make due provision for the rights of innocent persons. Instead of protecting the rights of

715 innocent persons who are victims of cognizable crimes, (specifically those crimes for which the

716 United States convicted Lorraine Brown for pursuant to 18 U.S. Code 371 in United States of

717 America v. Lorraine Brown. Case No. 3:12-cr-198-J-25 MCR. (MD. Fla.); and for altering and

718 forging deeds, assignments of deeds, mortgage contracts, allonges mortgage contracts and utters

719 or publishes as true any such false, forged, altered, or counterfeited writing, with intent to

720 defraud the United States, knowing the same to be false, altered, forged, or counterfeited

721 pursuant to 18 U.S. Code 495; and for committing first degree forgery, i.e. with intent to injure

722 or defraud, makes, completes or alters a written instrument representing interests in or claims

723 against any property or person, deed, contract or assignment, public record, or utters a written

724 instruments which the person knows to be forged pursuant to ORS 165.013(1)(a); and for

725 engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity pursuant

726 to 18 U.S. Code 1957 which are "racketeering activity" pursuant to 18 U.S. Code 1961(1)),

727 these courts are further victimizing these crime victims by unconstitutionally granting

728 LNV/LPP/Beal summary judgments without ever adjudicating genuine questions of title raised

729 by all the LNV/Beal victims in the noticed related cases.

730 Furthermore, violations of 18 U.S. Code 371; 18 U.S. Code 495; and 18 U.S. Code

731 1957 should be cognizable to any federal court judge as "racketeering activity" pursuant to _ll

732 U.S. Code 1961(1) regardless of whether a prose litigant specifies these violations in their

733 pleadings or not. A federal judge especially has an obligation under the United States

734 Constitution to protect the public from crime and to protect the constitutional rights of pro se

735 litigants; particularly when they are victims of a crime.

Page 31of37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 32 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 139 of 383

736 Constitutional Question 5

737 Does a judge who abuses his/her judicial discretion (i.e. Judge Mosman in the present

738 case and in the noticed related case Fauley v. Washington Mutual et al (LNV), Case No. 3:13-cv-

739 00581-AC also before his court where Judge Mosman similarly ordered a summary dismissal,

740 Judge Thomas A. Varlan in the noticed related case LNV Corporation v. Gebhardt, Case No.

741 3:12-CV-468-TAV-HBG who granted summary judgment to LNV against the preponderance of

742 the evidence and against the law and where he states in his own orders that title is UNCLEAR;

743 and where he has repeatedly denied Gebhardt's many motions for relief from his summary

744 judgment due to fraud upon the court and tampering with evidence by both LNV and court

745 employees; Judge Donald R. Cassling in the noticed related case Switt Chapter 13 bankruptcy,

746 Case No. 12-35690 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

747 Eastern Division who denied the Swifts an adequate continuance to find a new attorney then

748 dismissed their bankruptcy without allowing the Swifts to be heard (i.e. in violation to their

749 constitutional due process and equal protection of law rights) and Judge Dale Tillery who did the

750 same to the Breitlings in the noticed related case LNVv. Breitlings, Case No. DC-14-04053 in

751 the 134th Dallas District Court of Texas leaving both of these LNV/Beal victims ill prepared to

752 represent themselves in such complex cases involving title to their properties and where LNV's

753 owner Daniel Andrew Beal has billions of dollars at his disposal to hire an army of attorneys

754 against them to prevent discovery, to obstruct justice, to intentionally derive these pro se

755 LNV /Beal victims of their constitutionally guaranteed rights to due process and equal protection

756 of the law, to commit fraud upon the court by submitting forged instruments, which these

757 officers of the court knew or should have know are forged instruments, as evidence of debt and

758 their client's standing to foreclose on the properties of these LNV /Beal victims to collect LNV' s

Page 32 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 33 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 140 of 383

759 claimed debt which all these LNV/Beal victims have steadfastly denied is not a valid debt, and

760 then to secure summary judgments favoring LNV by improperly influencing the court; Judges

761 both federal and state in the noticed related cases; and Commissioner Judge Michael L. Barth of

762 the Maricopa County Superior Court of Arizona who likewise granted LNV a summary

763 judgment in the noticed related case LNV Corporation v. Tuli Molina Wohl. Case No. 1 CA-CV

764 11-0603, in the Court of Appeals, State of Arizona Division One originating from Cause No.

765 CV2011-009999 in the Superior Court in Maricopa County Arizona which resulted in the

766 unconstitutional derivation of LNV /Beal victim Tuli Molina's property and a substantial loss of

767 her quality of life and her liberty as a result), in such cases knowingly and willfully participate in

768 a criminal conspiracy to defraud when they are presented with instruments in their court that are

769 purported by LNV/Beal to be evidence of a valid debt and evidence ofLNV/Beal's standing to

770 foreclose on property to collect such debt, which may in fact be forged instruments, and that

771 these forged instruments are likely the products of a convicted felon or her co-conspirators

772 judicially determined to have committed the offense of mail and wire fraud pursuant to 18 U.S.

773 Code 371, United States v. Lorraine Brown, and was criminally convicted of such in favor of

774 the United States; and when the pleadings of these prose crime victims and the exhibits they

775 attach to their pleadings should be cognizable to any federal judge as acts consistent with the

776 crimes of Lorraine Brown and her co-conspirators; and that these pleadings and exhibits give

777 evidence of further criminal acts of forgery along with acts consistent with engaging in monetary

778 transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity pursuant to 18 U.S. Code

779 1957 and which any federal judge should recognize as "racketeering activity" pursuant to ll

780 U.S. Code 1961(1); and yet that federal judge fails to_report these racketeering crimes and

781 instead awards the perpetrators with an unconstitutional summary judgment without ever

Page 33 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 34 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 141 of 383

782 adjudicating facts specific to title of the property; and that summary judgment has the effect of

783 depriving these crime victims of their property, their liberty to enjoy the financial rewards of

784 their life-long earnings they invested into their properties or their good credit; and such summary

785 judgment has the effect of greatly diminishing the quality of life enjoyed by these crime victims,

786 is that judge then a culpable criminal co-conspirator with LNV /Beal and devoid of judicial

787 immunity and liable for restitution to the victims of these crimes?

788 As every effective parent knows, the way to rear a child to become a conscientious adult

789 who respects rules and the rights of others is to foster a sense of personal accountability within a

790 child and to establish fair rules and to enforce those rules with uniform, fair and consistent

791 consequences for violations of those rules.

792 The financial incentive (consequences) for violating the rules in these cases is upside

793 down. As shown when Litton's Mr. Benny Hibler told Defendant's attorney in 2006, Elizabeth

794 Lamoine, that Litton:" ... had no 'incentive' to settle, as the equity our client (Defendant in the

795 present case) possessed in the residence was 'more than adequate' to satisfy the amount you

796 sought in the sale."

797 The criminals in these cases have no financial incentive to stop their crimes because they

798 the can and do get away with their crimes most of the time; specifically because judges allow

799 them to get away with their crimes most of the time; and even when they are caught the penalties

800 awarded to individual consumers are so minute and insignificant in comparison to the $Billions

801 in undue rewards they reap from continuing their crimes that they constitute no deterrent, i.e. no

802 financial incentive to do the right thing rather than the wrong thing.

Page 34 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 35 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 142 of 383

803 A major factor behind federal judges' motivation to as quickly as possible grant summary

804 judgments in these cases (besides possible personal bias and improper influence) is the desire to

805 clear their dockets to cut court costs. This perception by federal judges is misplaced and in the

806 end has the potential to dramatically increase court costs and open the floodgates to future re-

807 hearings of all the old cases where they unconstitutionally ordered summary judgments without

808 any determination as to title of the property. Unconstitutional judgments are void judgments and

809 judgments secured through fraud upon the court are also void. No statute of limitation exists on

810 vacating such void judgments.

811 Judges are public servants. They have a duty not only to uphold the Constitution of the

812 United States but to make wise fiscal decisions. Instead of attempting to cut comers in ways that

813 deny average citizens access to the courts; deprive them of their constitutionally guaranteed

814 rights to due process and equal protection of the law; and that violate their constitutionally

815 mandated oath of office to uphold the Constitution of the United States; and that erodes public

816 confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary these judges would be better government servants

817 stewards of our great Constitution were they to acknowledge the upside down financial

818 incentives inherent in these cases.

819 Defendant and the other LNV/Beal victims have all suffered unimaginable damages as

820 result of being victimized by the crimes of LNV /Beal and the other Beal organization criminal

821 entities. Most of them have suffered irreparable damage to their credit, (average cost=

822 $500,000); irreparable damage to their health and loss of income as a result; (Defendant's actual

823 cost>= $3,000,000; cost for other victims varies); extreme and prolonged emotional distress

824 (average cost= $1,000,000); prolonged deprivation of their liberty to not only enjoy their

Page 35 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 36 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 143 of 383

825 property but their lives because as pro se litigants nearly every waking moment is spent doing

826 legal research and writing to defend themselves in courts where most judges don't even read

827 their pleadings and this causes them to miss out on family events and most of the simple

828 pleasures one enjoys in life (computing a cost on this deprivation is something a professional

829 must calculate to provide adequate restitution.) The list goes on. Yet the courts and judges have

830 routinely denied these victims restitution; and this contributes to the inability for Defendant and

831 the other LNV /Beal victims in the noticed related cases to find counsel - attorneys willing to

832 take on their cases know they cannot without funds adequate to sustain the onslaught of

833 summary judgment motions that history tells them will be filed by LNV/Beal attorneys to delay

834 discovery and a thwart a trial on the merits. LNV/Beal by its own wrongdoing creates an unfair

835 and biased judicial environment where the financial incentive is for continuing the crimes.

836 The United States Supreme Court (Defendant and the other LNV /Beal victims in the

837 noticed related cases are committed to taking our grievances to the United States Supreme Court

838 if we must to get justice) and the United States Attorney General have a fiduciary and

839 Constitutional duty to examine the Constitutional abuses rampant with the biased, arbitrary and

840 punitive affects of the over use of federal Rule 56 by federal judges and attorneys who represent

841 excessively wealthy clients like LNV/Beal against pro se parties like Defendant and the other

842 LNV/Beal victims in the noticed related cases who are in jeopardy of unconstitutionally losing

843 their properties, their liberty to enjoy their properties and their quality of life or have already lost

844 such as a result of the disparate and unfair impact caused by Rule 56.

845 The United States Supreme Court and the United States Attorney General have a

846 fiduciary and Constitutional duty to examine the constitutionality of Title 18 U.S.C. 4 when

Page 36 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 37 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 144 of 383

847 crime victims like Defendant and the other LNV /Beal victims in the noticed related cases are

848 caught in a perpetual catch-22 situation because Title 18 U.S.C. 4 mandates they report the

849 crimes to a judge, yet the judges fail to report the crimes to law enforcement and law

850 enforcement claims their cases are civil and sends them back to the courts; while the crimes

851 continues; their damages as a result of the crimes increase; and the public loses faith in the

852 judiciary and views the judges as participants in the crimes.

853 As parents of sorts, the United States Supreme Court and the United States Attorney

854 General has the challenge of reining in wayward judges and bring a sense of fairness back to the

855 judiciary; which is vested by the public and where the public is dependent on federal judges

856 especially to honor their constitutionally mandated oath of office to uphold the Constitution of

857 the United States; and too many of these judges are instead violating the constitution rights of

858 due process and equal protection of law.

859 Defendant never defaulted on her mortgage. Gebhardt and most of the other LNV /Beal

860 victims in the noticed related cases never defaulted on their mortgages. The horrors that have

861 happened to them; through no fault of their own, can happen to any American homeowner at any

862 time if the judiciary doesn't tum around the "financial incentive" and call a crime what it is:

863 "CRIME" and hold those perpetrating these crimes accountable for restitution to the victims of

864 their crimes and prosecute them to the fullest extent of the law.

865 Respectfully,

866
867 Denise Subramaniam

Page 37 of 37
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69 Filed 06/29/15 Page 38 of 38
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 145 of 383

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was

served upon all counsel of record, pro-se parties and the United States Attorney General and the

Attorney General of the State of Oregon via the Court's CM/ECF system, email, and/or regular

mail, and/or certified mail with return receipt requested.

U.S. Department of Justice


Loretta Lynch,
U. S. Attorney General
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001
202-514-2000

Gabrielle D. Richards I Perkins Coie LLP


1120 NW Couch Street
10th Floor
Portland, Oregon 97209-4128
D. +1.503.727.2255
F. + 1.503.346.2255
e:richards(amerkinscoie.com

Respectfully Submitted,

Denise Subramaniam
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 5 of 31
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 146 of 383

r,~,
~
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
GREG ABBOTT

October 4, 2010

MOC Mortgage, Inc.


7195 Dallas Parkway
Plano, TX 75024

RE: MGC Mortgage, Inc. Foreclosures in Texas

Gentlemen:

Recent troubling developments about the veracity of claims made on documents used by
Ally Financial, Inc., in its foreclosure filings have led to an inquiry by our office as to the
full harm Texas homeowners have suffered.

We are certain that you must be aware of the issues raised when Ally Financial, Inc., and
later JP Morgan Chase and Bank of America, announced that they were suspending foreclosures
on certain properties in 23 states. It appears that they had discovered, through testimony of their
employees in private litigation, that the employees, referred to as "robosigners," had engaged in
practices concerning the execution of affidavits which were used in foreclosure litigation, among
which were these:

Signing thousands of documents per month


Signing documents without reading them
Signing affidavits which falsely claim personal knowledge of facts
Signing affidavits which falsely claim the affiant reviewed the attached documents
Notarizing documents prior to signing by the signer
Notarizing documents when the signer was not present before the notary
Filing affidavits with records attached that do not correctly reflect loan payments, charges
and advances

We are aware that MGC Mortgage, Inc. services a significant number of mortgage loans
in the State of Texas. It is likely that affidavits and other documents, such as assignments of
deeds of trust and appointments of substitute trustees, with the issues described, above may have
been used in connection with foreclosures in the State of Texas. Regardless of whether the
foreclosure was a nonjudicial one or a judicial one in connection with a home equity loan, home
equity line of credit or reverse mortgage, if any of the practices described above were utilized in
establishing MGC Mortgage, Inc.'s authority to conduct the sale or obtain a court order for a
sale, such use would have been a violation of Section 17.46(a) of the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act; Section 392.304, Texas Debt Collection Act; Section 37.02, Texas Penal Code;
Section 12.001, Texas Property Code; Section 406.009, Texas Government Code; Texas
Constitution Article 16, Section 50; and/or Rule 736(1), Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and the
document and therefore the foreclosure sale would have been invalid.

POST OFFICE Box 12548, AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711-254& TEL:(Sl2) 463-2100 WEB: WWW.Tl!XASATTORNEVGENERAL.GOV
An Equal Employmmi Oppommlly Emplo)'flr /'rimed"" Rnycld Paper
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 6 of 31
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 147 of 383

MGC Mortgage
October 4. 2010
Page2

We are also aware that after the practices described above came to light, Ally Financial,
Inc., JP Morgan Chase and Bank of American voluntarily suspended all foreclosures in twenty-
three states in which foreclosures are conducted solely through a judicial process, in order to
determine which foreclosures may have been tainted by illegitimate affidavits. The State of
Texas hereby demands that in the State of Texas, MGC Mortgage, Inc. immediately suspend all
foreclosures, all sales of properties previously foreclosed upon, and alJ evictions of persons
residing in previously foreclosed upon properties, until MGC Mortgage, Inc. has done the
following:

1. Identify all MGC Mortgage, Inc. employees or agents who "robosigned," as


described above, affidavits and other documents which were recorded in the State
of Texas;

2. Identify all foreclosures in the State of Texas in connection with which an


affidavit or other document with the characteristics listed above was used as part
of the foreclosure process;

3. Describe the measures taken by MGC Mortgage, Inc. to ensure that affidavits and
other documents are executed in compliance with Texas law;

4. Describe the measures taken by MGC Mortgage, Inc. to comply with the
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act in connection with foreclosures;

5. Identify all other loan servicers and/or MERS for whom the above described
employees or agents signed affidavits;

6. Provide assurances that all MGC Mortgage, Inc. foreclosures of properties in the
State of Texas which relied upon affidavits with the characteristics described
above will be rectified and the procedures by which they will be rectified;

7. Provide assurances that all future MGC Mortgage, Inc. foreclosures of properties
in the State of Texas will be done with legally correct documentation; and

8. Identify all MGC Mortgage, Inc. employees or agents who are or who signed as
officers of other non~related entities.

Please provide your response on or before October 15, 2010.

Chief, Consumer Protection and


Public Health Division
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 7 of 31
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 148 of 383

HUNTON & Wll.Llt\MS LLP


F(JlJNTAIN fL1\( r:
!4.15 ROSS AVENUl'
SIJITF 3700
11'\l.LAS. l'E\,\S 75202-~799

TEL 114 979 3000


~AX 214 8Sll 0011

PETER WEINSTOCK
DIRECT DIAL: 214 468 3395
EMAIL: pweinsto<:k(a;hunton.com

October 31, 2010

Mr. Paul D. Carmona, Chief


Consumer Protection and Public Health Division
Attorney General of Texas Office
P.O. Box 12548
Austin, Texas 78711-2548

Re: MGC Mortgage, Inc. ("MGC")

Dear Paul:

I am writing this letter on behalf of MOC in response to the October 4, 2010 letter (the
"Letter") from the Attorney General of Texas (the "Texas AG") and as a follow up to my
October 15, 2010 letter. In our telephone conversation on October 11, 20 l 0, you stated that it
would be acceptable to the Texas AG for MGC to respond to the Letter on or before
November I, 2010. We are now providing this letter as the requested response on behalf of
MOC.

MGC was established in February 2008 and, in its history, has foreclosed on 159 residential
loans in Texas and has 64 residential Texas loan foreclosures in progress. In the two weeks
since the date of my last letter, MOC has worked diligently to obtain the files from its
subservicers and outside foreclosure counsel. Of the 223 files, MGC has obtained complete
files for 184 of them. MOC has not yet received complete documentation on the other 39
files. MGC has reviewed all 184 of its completed files for every foreclosure or foreclosure in
process. MOC wHI advise the Texas AG once it completes its review of the 39 pending files
after receipt of the missing documentation.

You should also know that MGC has been proactive in working with Texas homeowners with
delinquent or potentially delinquent residential mortgage loans. To do so, earlier this year,
MOC engaged Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc. ("OM!"), which is one of the leading residential
loan servicing companies in the country, to subscrvicc MGC's loans and to assist MGC in
executing on its loan modification program.

Furthermore, MOC services residential loans that were acquired from the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") as receiver for New South Federal Savings Bank, Irondale,

ATLANTA AUSTIN BANGKOK BEIJING BRUSSELS CllARl.OlfE DALL\S HOUSTON LONDON LUS ANGELES
MtLE,\N MIAMI NEW YOR!i. NORFOLK RALEIGH RICHMOND S.'\N FRANCISCO W ASlllNGTON
\vww ,humon.com
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 8 of 31
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 149 of 383

HUNIDN&
WILLlAMS
Mr. Paul D. Carmona
Octobt--r 31, 20 l 0
Page 2

Alabama ("New South") in December 2009. 'Ine New South loans have been serviced (or
subscrviced) by Cenlar since 2004. Based on review of Ccnlar's performance and
capabilities, MGC elected to continue working with Cenlar as subs<..'l'Vicer.

Set forth below are MGC's responses to the Letter. For your convenience, I have reproduced
in bold text below the enumerated requests set forth in the Letter.

1. Identify all MGC Mortgage, Inc. employees or agents who .. robosigned,"


as described above, affidavits and other documents which were recorded in the State of
Texas. MGC docs not use "robosigners" in its foreclosure process. MGC has reached out to
virtually all of the law finns that it employs for such purposes. The vast majority have
responded. They have indicated that they also do not 1.'Ilgage in robosigning. MGC has been
advised by DMI and Cenlar that they do not use such practice either. DMI has also stated that
it has spoken with virtually all law firms that it retains for foreclosures, and that such firms do
not engage in robosigning.

2. Identify all foreclosures in the State of Texas in connection with which an


affidavit or other document with the characteristics listed above was used as part of the
foreclosure process. No complett.-d or in-process foreclosures in the State of Texas were
identified as being conducted in connection with an affidavit or other document with the
foreclosure characteristics listed in the Letter. DMJ advised MGC that DMI does not conduct
foreclosures with affidavits with such characteristics. Ccnlar does not execute documents on
behalf of MGC.

3. Describe the measures taken by MGC Mortgage, Inc. to ensure that


affidavits and other documents are executed in compliance with Texas Jaw. MGC has
adopted written policies providing for foreclosure of residential properties. MGC also
requires that information provided in foreclosure documents be verified for accuracy and that
an authorized member of management reviews the documents to be executed before doing so.
MGC understands that DMI and Cenlar follow similar processes.

4. Describe the measures taken by MGC Mortgage, Inc. to comply with the
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act in connection with foreclosures. MOC has adopted
written policies for compliance with the Servicernembers Civil Relief Act ("SCRA"). Upon
nottfication from a borrower seeking SCRA relief: MOC uses n::asonable means to validate
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 9 of 31
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 150 of 383

HUNTON&
WIWAMS
Mr. Paul D. Carmona
October 31, 2010
Page 3

the order and determine whether the obligation is a qualifying debt pursuant to the SCRA.
Upon validation, the appropriate benefits afforded the borrower are instituted and the loan is
coded as a loan subject to the SCRA. Before proceeding with the filing of a foreclosure
action, every loan is reviewed for active military status of a borrower. If a borrower is
identified as being on active military status or the loan is identifit..-'d as being subject to the
SCRA, the foreclosure is put on hold until expiration of the SCRA benefit or until MOC
makes a determination on a case-by-case basis to seek court relief from SCRA provisions. It
is MGC's understanding that DMI and Cenlar also have prm:edures designed to avoid
foreclosures in violation of SCRA.

5. Identify aJI other loan servicers and/or MERS for whom the above
described employees or agents signed affidavits. None.

6. Provide assurances that all MGC Mortgage, Inc. foreclosures of


properties in the State of Texas which relied upon affidavits with the characteristics
described above will be rectified and the procedures by which they will be rectified. As
discussed above, no completed or in-process foreclosures in the State of Texas were identified
as being conducted in connection with an affidavit or other document with the characteristics
listed in the Letter. Accordingly, MOC does not believe that any of its foreclosures need to be
rectified as a result of an affidavit or other document with the characteristics listed in the
Letter.

7. Provide assurances that all future MGC Mortgage, Inc. foreclosures of


properties in the State of Texas will be done with legally correct documentation. As
discussed above, MOC has adopted written policies for the execution of legal documents in
compliance with Texas law. MOC has systems and procedures designed to provide for the
implementation of such policies by DMI and Cenlar.

8. Identify all MGC Mortgage, Inc. employees or agents who are or who
signed as officers of other non-related entities. MOC does not service loans for unrelated
entities.

Pursuant to the Texas Open Records Act, we hereby request confidential treatment for the
information contained in this letter. The information contained herein constitutes privileged
and confidential information, proprietary in nature, that is not available to the public from any
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 10 of 31
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 151 of 383

HUNTON&
WILUAMS
N1r.PaulD.Cannona
October 31, 20 I 0
Page 4

other source. Disclosure of this infonnation to the public, including competitors of MOC,
would provide such competitors and others with information about the current and future
business plans of MGC. From this infonnation, competitors could make inferences about the
operations and competitive strategies of MGC, which could potentially result in altering the
competitors' own competitive strategies and relationships to the detriment of MGC.

We request that if, notwithstanding the foregoing, the Texas AG's office should dctennine
preliminarily to make available to the public any of the infonnation in this letter, it will
inform us prior to any such release.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact Robert Ackermann at (469) 467~
5342 or me at (214) 468-3395.

Peter G. Weinstock

cc: Mr. Robert Ackermann

70256.000212 EMF_US 3293 ll25v5


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 11 of 31
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 152 of 383

DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT C
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 12 of 31
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 153 of 383

CAUSE NO. DC-14-04053

LNV CORPORATION, IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF


ITS SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS,
PLAINTIFF

vs.

SAMUEL G. BREITLING, DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
JO ANN BREITLING,
GMAC MORTGAGE, LLC FKA
NORWEST MORTGAGE, INC.,
PINNACLE REAL TY ADVISORS, INC.,
AND PALISADES ACQUISITION V, LLC
DEFENDANTS 134rn JUDICIAL DISTRICT

BUSINESS RECORDS AFFIDAVIT

Before me, the undersigned notary, on this day, personally appeared


EcJward J. Bag.don ,a
person whose identity is known to me. After I
administered an oath to his/her, upon his/her oath, he/she said:

I. "My name is Edward J. Bagdon . I am over the age of 21 years, of


sound mind, capable of making this affidavit, fully competent to testify to the matters stated
herein. I have obtained personal knowledge of events described below through my review of
business records during the normal course of business.

...b
2. I am the _ _.A...,ut ....O ze_d_S_i.....QO_e_r_ _ _ _ _ for LNV CORPORATION. As such.
....ri.....
I have access to the records for LNV CORPORATION. LNV CORPORATION maintains these
records in the regular course of its business. I am qualified to attest to these records by virtue of
my duties and have reviewed the documents sought to be admitted.

3. Attached to this affidavit are forty-five (45) pages of records maintained by LNV
CORPORATION.

4. I am familiar with the record-keeping process as it existed when the entry was made.
These business records are now kept by LNV CORPORATION in the regular course of its
business. These business records were generated pursuant to a course of regularly conducted
business activity and such records are created by or from information transmitted by a person
with knowledge, at or near the time of the event. The records attached to this affidavit are the
___________ originaLorexacLduplicates oftheocigina.L'-'-------------- - -------------------------------------------------- --

C&S 14-0070

EXHIBIT "A"
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 13 of 31
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 154 of 383

THE STA TE OF _ m
__.1........o_o_ls.____
COUNTY OF ---L-8~ke----

BEFORE ME, the undersigned notary public, on this day personally appeared
Edward .I Ba~on as Authorized Signer of LNY
CORPORA TION,{gnown to il19 (or proved to me on the oath of ) or
(through description of identity card or other document to be the
person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that
he/she executed the same on behalf of said corporation for the purposes and consideration therein
expressed.

Given under my hand and seal of office this ll day of_J}_,__\)()..t,=-=--=---------


2014.

-
Not ry P blic, Sta of lllfOOIS
Notar ' Printed Nam.esenia Alonzo-Nino
My commission expires: 9-1~- a.y
YESCNIA ALONZO-NINO
OFFICIAL SEAL
Notary Public, State of Illinois
My Commission Expires
September Hl. 2014

C&S 14-0070 2
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 14 of 31
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 155 of 383

DOVD.'MUEHLE MORTGAGE. JNC.

B): ~II
Edward Bagdon, Its As

From 1993 instrument From 1993

AMSOUTll BANK SUCCHS OR BY MERGE .PlRST


DOVENMUEIILE MORTCA.CE, 1NC., A Delawre AMERICAN TIO L ~
Corporation
BY: --~-~-Hr--~------
EDWARD J. DON, Vice President

From 1994
BY: _..!_0_-J..fV'.~,\~\.,:;_I.--=-?. :__Q_..,_V-<..,;__._,.;4.;.._'-"'"'1-
HRUCE E. BORSOM. Vice President

From 2000

EDWARDJ. BAGDO~.

BY;-~-~-~-------~-~-----
WILLIAM B. CORCORAN. Assistant Secretary

From 2000
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 15 of 31
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 156 of 383

PEOPLES BANK ANO TRUST, FORMERLY


KNOWN AS NEW SOUTH BANK FOR SA lNGS BY
DOVENMUEHLE MORTGAGE, INC.
ATTORNEY-JN-FAC (P 'A RE ED ON
9127/1999,J 00 2, AGE737.)
BY:~~~=:ll"""'+-f..__~~~~~~~~~
ON, Assistanl Vice President

BY: _ _ __,_~
&_...._ ____, - -
WILLIAM n. CORCORAN, Assistant Secretary

From 2000
PEOPLES BANK AND TRUST, FORMERLY
KNOWN AS NEW SOUTH BANK POR SAVINGS BY
DOVENMUEHLE MORTGAGE, INC., ITS
ATIORNBY-IN-FACT (POA E ORDED ON
9/27/1999, JN OOK D GE 737.)
BY:~~....:...=--"~-r+-.H-~~~~~~~

WILLIAM B. CORCORAN, As&istant Secretary

From 2000
PEOPLES BANK AND TRUST, FORMERLY
KNOWN AS NEW SOUTH BANK FOR SAVINGS BY
DOVENMUEllLE MORTGAGE, INC. ITS
ATTORNEY IN FACT, PO RECORDED 9
BK 82, PG J
BY:~~~::::::::'1t"f--....:ff.J.~I--~~~~~

WILLIAM B. CORCORAN, Assistant Secretary

From 2000
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 16 of 31
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 157 of 383

Davcnmuehle Mortgage, Inc. as attorney- in Facl fox


The Peoples Bank and Trust Company for DeSoto
county, recorded 09/24/99 jn book 82, 737.

:: ~ehru~~0-0+1-~~~~~~~~~ l>OVf:NMUf'.BLt'. MOR'fG1\Gf:, JNC., AS M'TORm:Y-IN-f'l\C:1' FtlR


THE P~;QPJ,S BANK AND TRUST COMPANY FOR l>F~SOTO
Edward J. Bagdo COUNTY, MS Rf:COR[lf:ll 09/'rl/99, BOOK 82, PllG~: 731.
President
STATE Of' 1llJr.ois
COUNTY or Cook

Peoples Bank and Trust, formerly known as New South


Bank for Savings by Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc. its
Attorney in Fact Neshoba County Recorded 09/27/1999
Book A-237 Page

On
DOVENMUEHLE MORTGAGE, INC., AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT FOR
By : THE PEOPLES BANK AND TRUST COMPANY FOR DESOTO
COUNTY, MS RECORDED 09/27/99, BOOK 82, PAGE 737.
Edward Asst. Vice
President
STATE Of Illin
COUNTY OF Cook By :
Edward J. Ba don
President
STATE OF Illinois
COUNTY OF Cook

Publi~
Sworn to and subscribed on
in anrt foT' thR
Cl~~~~ beforenfme,T11 Greg
C':olln~l""t,. I
;nni "-

THE PEOPLES BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, S/B/M NEW-SOOTH


BANK, S.B., F/K/A NEW SOOTH BANK FOR SAVINGS,
F.S.B., BY DOVENMUEHLE MORTGAGE, INC., AS
ATTORNEY-IN-b'AC'f FOR DESOTO COUN'l'Y, MS, l?IJRSOANT TO
A POWER OF ATTORNEY fU:CORPED ON 09/27/99, IN BOOK
82, PAGE 737

On June 06, 2002 .

By,-~Presid.<1nt
STATE OF Il.l.inoi~

COUNTY OF Cook -

Sworn to and aubacribed on


P.ublic in and for the Count:
. ~afore me, Gre~
ok, State of Il.l.ino.i

AMSOUTH BANK

On

By :
Edward J. Bagdo President
STATE OF Illinois f
COUNTY OF Cook '
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 17 of 31
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 158 of 383

CAROLINA FIRST BANK


On .January

ay : DOVENMUEHLE MO~TGAGE, INC., AS A~TORNEY-IN-E'ACT FOR


&iwa.
THE PEOPLES BANK AND TRUST COMPANY DESOTO COUNTY,
MS, RECORDED ON 9/27/99, SOOK 82, PAGE 7
, L.1.~ On May

By
Vice
Pro.siden
STATg OF Illinois
COUNTY OE' Cook

IN WITNESS WHEREOF 1 the undersigned , by the of.


duly Executed as a free act and deed
,,.,..,..the
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRA.TION
(MERS)

By :
certifying Officer

STATE OF Illinois
COUNTY OF Cook CAROLINA FIRST BANK.

On .January

Sy :
Ed.wa

, L ..I.~
ALLEGACY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, F/K/
REYNOLDS CAROLINA FED~RJU. CRtDlT
By ONION

PEOPLE'S BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, F/K/A NEW SOUTH


BANK FOR SAVINGS, BY DOVENMUEHLE MORTGAGE, INC., ITS
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, AS RECORDED FOR DESOTO MS,
RECORDED 9/27/1999, BOOK 92, PAGE 7

On June
ay

STATE OF Illinois
COUNTY OF Cook
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 18 of 31
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 159 of 383

DOVENMUEHLE MORTGAGE, INC., AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT I


THE PEOPLES BANK AND TROST COMPANY DESO'fO COUNTY,
MS, RECORDED ON 9/27/99 BOOK 82, PAGE 37.

On
By
?resident

Sworn to and subscribed o ,,j~~ ,


before me.
Notarv Public in and for ~~ii~of Cook, Sta1

ALLEGACY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, ~/K/A


REYNOLDS CAROLINA FEDERAL CRE
By UNION

Edwa President
,.
'

this
Notary
l~day
u
::o;a rPrl F.tiw;a rn
of
ic in and Oi t
~"'ii ~80~o County
.T _ 'R.::i nrlnri Vi t"'P P'r"""Q i rt ... rit- ni'

Cook,

--4-- :ii-

Z!ONS FIRST

On
By
E Vice President
STATE OF Illinois
COUNTY OF Cook 'IRST BANK, RECORDED 11/20/2001 IN BOOK

By
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 19 of 31
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 160 of 383

BOOK : PAGE INSTRUMENT NO. 161037

STATE Idaho COUNTY : TETON

ZIONS FIRST

On March
By
Edwar Pre.5ident

executed by their duly authorized officers.

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, NA


On March
By
Vice Prel!lident
STATE OF Illinois
COUNTY OF Cook

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Allied Home Mortgage Corporation bas caused this instrumer
to be executed by its duly authori2:ed officers the 13th day of September, 2005

OOVENMUEHLE MORTGAGE COMPANY, L.P.,


IN WITNESS WHEREOF , the undersigned 'by the BY OOVENMUEHLE MORTGAGE, INC. IT
duly Executed as a free act a deed th sy : GENERAL PARTNER 1501 WOODFI 0
SUITE 400E, 0 60173

STATE OF Illinois
COUNTY or Cook
l\~
>o ,
Yesenia Alonzo-Nino, a Notary
te of Illinois, personally appeared
= M . !lF.RT.T. Ml"l'R'l'r.Jt.r.~ C-OMPJl.NV _ f, _ P. _ RV
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 20 of 31
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 161 of 383

Signed this 23 day of March. 2006.

By-4f--....,,,..--+-r-+-~~~~~~~~~
Typed J.Bagdon
Position: Vice President

STATE OF ILLINOIS, COOK COUNTY, SS:

By

k{i,..lo1 , Geraldine Bolosky, a Notary


ike, State of Illinois, personally appeared
f ALLEGACY FEDERAL CREDIT UJ:l~ON, ~rso~all~

TIB - THE

On August

By ;
Edwa

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I the undersigned he off


Executed as a free act and deed foreqo

On

By
Edwa !?resident
STATE OF Illinois
COUNTY or Lake

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as


nominee for the beneficial owner
Mortgage Access Corp. d/b/a Weichert r ancial
Services
On May
By
Edw Vice President
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 21 of 31
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 162 of 383

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRA'rION


NOMINEE FOR THE BENEFICIAL OWNER
OBA LEADER FINANCIAL av ES
On August

By :
Edwar Authorized Siqner
STATE OF Illinois
COON'l'Y OF Lake rtificate of Satisfaction be recorded and
ent be canceled of record. ,..,..

By

ABOVE SAID MORTGAGE WAS RE-RECORDED ON 11/06/2007 UNDER 00Cf2007064753 00138


BK 2794 PG 2969.

Sy

Edw
STATE OF Illinois
COUNTY OF Lake

Peraonally appeared before me on f'1l?i/.ntt' ,


GERALDINE BOLOSKY, a Notary
Public in and for the County of Lak~f Illinois, personally appeared
~l"iwAlrt"I .T R;:1nrlnn v; ra Prae-i rfan+- n~ D.T.T t"~arv lMl"l"'li:tDaT t'-O'C'T\T'T' rn..tT""-1 ___ .,.....,.__ 1 1 ....

By

on'-ll\~, Yesenia Alonzo-Nino, a Notary


f Lake~f Illinois, personally appeared
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~---1.~t~o_f_AL~L_E_G_A_C_Y_F_E_D_E......,RA~ CREDIT UNION, Fersonally

ALLEGACY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, F/K/A


REYNOLDS CAROLINA FEDERAL CREDIT
By UNION 1 CORPORATE~~VE SUITE~
LAKE ZURICH ~

on~~~f'.>o.
5tate oinois,
Yavnoshan, a Notary Public
personally appeared Edward
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 22 of 31
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 163 of 383

AIG FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK 360,


LAKE ZURICH, .IL 6004 7

or.. January

By
Edwa n Vice ?resident
' instrument be canceled of record.

By

on
~tate
~~ Candi Kasten, a Notary Public
of Illinois, personally appeared Edward
~CACY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, personally known to
t this Certificate of Satisfaction be recorder;i'
ty instru.~cnt be canceled of record.

By
By
edwar

on1 I(()'
IQ , Candi Kasten, a Notary Public
State of Illinois, per3onally appeared Edward on tt/i1/lp0Elena Greenberg, a Notary
f KanE;t State of Illinois, personally appeared
,LEGACY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, personally known to t of ALLEGACY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, personally
. - . .
.. - ,_ - ..........
~ -

Property Address : 2225 AVl':HIJE K co. BLUH'S, TA 51501

IN WITNESS WHEREOF , the undersigned , by the officer duly authorized ,


F.xecuted as a free act and deed the foregoing instrwoent. .lf'

sworn to and subscribed on.e'~'tefore me, O. Yavnoshan, a Notary l'Ublic in


and for the County of Lake, State oC Illinois, personally appeared Edvard J. Bagdon
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 23 of 31
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 164 of 383

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION


SYSTEMS, INC. AS SOLE NOMINEE FOR
By THE BENEFICIAL OW R W DAY

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIAT!ON, BY DOVENMUEH!.E


MORTGAGE, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, AS ITS ATTORNEY
Yesenia Alonzo-Nino, a Notary IN FACT, PURSUANT TO A POWER OF ATTOSINEY RECORDED
Tl 1; 11*\_; a -o..,.cu"'i1'\:l l 1" :1r.ru!i..,:1tr,p.rl CONCURRENTLY WITH THE RELEASE IN DESOT
/HSS!SSIPl"!

On March 16,

By
Ectwai:d

lN WITNESS WHEREOF , the undersigned , by


Executed as a fteo act and deod the

MU'Wl\L Oli' OMAHA

on January

By
J::dward
STATE OF Illinois
COONTY OF W.ke

Sworn to and subscrib<11d on l) ll~ ,


before 1118, 'ie5enia l\lonzo-Nino, a Notary
PUJ)lic in and for the County of ~State of Illinois, Zdwarct J. Saqoon Authorized
.qionPr of Mll'!"tJAL OF OWUiA BANK personally appeared, personally known to me (or proved

MUTUAL OF OMAHA BANK


On May 08,

By
Edward
STATE OF Illin
COUNTY OF Kane

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION


SYSTEMS, INC. AS SOLE NOMINEE FOR
By THE BENEFICIAL 0 R W DAY

STATE OF Illinois
COUNTY OF Lake

Personally appeared before me on Ofil,..,7LJJ. Yesenia Alonzo-Nino, a Notary


Public in and for the County of Lake,tate of Illinois, personally appeared
Edward J. Bagdon Vice President of MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS,
INC. AS SOLE NOMINEE FOR THE BENEFICIAL OWNER NEW DAY ~!NAN~I~L . LLC.,
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 69-1 Filed 06/29/15 Page 24 of 31
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 165 of 383

IN WITNESS WHEREOF , the under:siqned , by the officer dull


Executed as a free act and deed the foreqoing inst

MUTUAL OF OMAHA BANK


On March

By MUTUAL OF OMAHA BANK


Edward J.
STATE O~ Illinois
On May 08,
COUNTY OF Kane
By
Edward

COUNTY OF Kane

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS,


NOMINEE FOR THE BENEFICIAL OWNER LNV CO

On July 30, 2012

Ey :
By
Edward J. t. Secretary

.rciina, in =uuA ioJu 1 rc~c ~vv~, "u~


:ted that this Certificate of Satisfaction e
security instn~.'t'.ent be canceled of rec

Ely

E::iw Vice President

1 '?!I~ , Laura Dugger, a Notary Pub:lc


ite of !~lnois, personally appeared Edward
\CY ftDERAL CREDIT UNION, personally known to

/6-lcr/3 , Laura Dugger, a Notary Public


e of IJ:finois, P~!~~~~~!...a~P.:~:~~ Edward

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION


SYSTEMS, INC., h
By BOX 2026, FLI

STATE OF Illinois
COUNTY OF Lake

ON.:>~~~~' before me, ANTOINETTE M. DOLECKI,


the~ Lake, State o~ Illinois, personally
a Notary Public in and for
appea~ed Edward J. Bagdon
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 80 Filed 07/08/15 Page 1 of 20
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 166 of 383

FILED 8 ._TI_l '15 9 :051.JSDC-!F


Denise Subramaniam
Self-represented
13865 SW Walker Rd
Beaverton OR 97005
503-764-5300

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION

LNV CORPORATION Civil Case No. 3: 14-cv-01836


Plaintiff, ~ E- PA c/E t>
v. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DENISE SUBRAMANIAM STRIKE DECLARATION OF
pro per MICHELLE CONNER
Defendant

MOTION TO STRIKE DECLARATION OF MICHELLE CONNER IN SUPPORT OF


LNV'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

Defendant incorporates herein all her pleadings in this case; her Notice of Directly Related

Cases; her Notice of Constitutional Questions as well as the Notices of Constitutional Questions

filed by the other LNV /Beal victims in the noticed related cases; and in her noticed related cases;

and moves this court pursuant to Federal Rule 12 and Rules 607 and 608 and Rule 403 to strike

the declaration of purported Senior Vice President of MGC Mortgage Inc. ("MGC"), Michelle

Conner because it is false perjured testimony.

Michelle Conner is not on the Texas Franchise Tax, Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts as a

Senior Vice President for MGC. (See Defendant's Exhibit A attached herein.) Senior Vice

President ofMGC, Bret Maloney on July 11, 2014, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the

Defendant' Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 1of8


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 80 Filed 07/08/15 Page 2 of 20
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 167 of 383

Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division, Case No: 12-35690 at 10:00 AM gave testimony

by deposition; and on page 28 of the transcript of this testimony he claims he is the ONLY

Senior Vice President for MGC. (See Defendant's Exhibit B attached herein- for brevity and to

reduce costs only the first three pages that identify the case and parties and page 28 are included

in this excerpt of the deposition - the entire deposition is available either in PACER or

Defendant can provide it in electronic format upon request.) This earlier Bret Maloney

testimony impeaches the declaration testimony of Michelle Conner.

Additionally, Michelle Conner does not have "personal knowledge" of Defendant's mortgage as

she claims. She only regurgitates the same false and legally impossible assertions specific to the

assignment of Defendant's deed of trust and allonges to the "alleged" true and accurate copy of

Defendant's Note that LNV makes in its foreclosure claims against Defendant's title to her

property. These claims are in dispute and Ms. Conner's testimony by declaration adds not a

shred of new evidence to substantiate LNV' s claims.

Ms. Conner makes many false claims in her declaration testimony, but one worthy of note is that

she claims Defendant did not pay the full monthly payment due on April 1, 2007. (Is she

implying Defendant made a partial payment?) She states in her declaration:

"Attached as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of a document generated from MGC's
computer systems, showing the status and partial history of the Loan ('Loan Status
Report')"

This exhibit (Doc 54-4) does not show a specific missing payment for April 1, 2007; the exhibit

instead makes a blanket generalized claim that the full amount of Defendant's loan was due as of

April 1, 2007. This is not by even the farthest stretch of the imagination a "partial payment

history" as Ms. Conner claims it is. And it is most certainly not "true and accurate."

Defendant' Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Pagel ofB


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 80 Filed 07/08/15 Page 3 of 20
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 168 of 383

First Defendant's payments were due on the 12th of each month and not on the 1st. Second

Defendant was in an active Chapter 13 bankruptcy in April 2007. Apparently Ms. Conner is not

aware of that fact either; hence more evidence she does not have personal knowledge of

Defendant's mortgage as she claims. Thirdly, and most important, Defendant made many

monthly payments on her mortgage beyond the April 1, 2007 date Ms. Conner claims she failed

to make a payment. One such payment was made by personal check written payable to Litton

Loan Servicing ("Litton"). This check(# 215) for $1,168.00 equal to one month's mortgage

payment as per her bankruptcy plan cleared through Defendant's bank on March 24, 2008

almost a year past the date Ms. Conner claims she stopped making payments. (See Defendant's

Exhibit Ca true and accurate copy of page 2of7 of her bank statement from March 1, 2008 to

March 31, 2008 referencing the aforementioned transaction. Defendant has blacked out personal

private data not relevant to this transaction.) Until she received the letter from Litton stating that

MGC had acquired her loan, Defendant continued to make regular monthly payments by check to

Litton after March 24, 2008. A recent audit of Defendant's bank statements show that Litton

never attempted to cash the checks she had mailed after this March 24, 2008 payment.

As the evidence in Defendant's Exhibit C shows she continued to make payments on her

mortgage long after the April 1, 2007 date Ms. Conner claims she stopped paying on her

mortgage.

Defendant notes herein that Litton had deceptively hidden from her the party for which it was

collecting payments, i.e. GMAC-RFC (GMAC subsidiary Residential Funding Company LLC),

a party she now knows never had standing to collect payments from her.

Defendant' Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page3 ofB


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 80 Filed 07/08/15 Page 4 of 20
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 169 of 383

Further evidence that Ms Conner does not have the personal knowledge she falsely claims in her i
declaration to have regarding Defendant's mortgage is the fact that she also doesn't know that on

April 10, 2013 MGC and/or one of Beal's LPS agents caused to be filed with the Washington

County Recorder's office a "Rescission of Notice of Default" recorded as Document# 2013-


I
032226 which states that the default on Defendant's mortgage had been "cured." Elsewhere it

stated that the default described in Notice of Default had been removed, paid, and overcome so

that said Trust Deed should be reinstated. Legally, there are only two ways to halt a foreclosure

in Oregon:

1. ORS 86. 755(2) provides that a foreclosure trustee may "postpone" the scheduled sale date

for one or more periods, totaling not more than 180 days from the original sale date.

2. ORS 86. 753 permits foreclosure sales to be "discontinued." However, this statute only

authorizes discontinuance where the default described in the Notice of Default is "cured"

by the borrower's payment of the arrearages.

Defendant has consistently claimed she never had a debt with Plaintiff, LNV or its MGC or any

other Beal entity or with any Beal agent because no legal transfer of her Note and deed of trust to

any Beal entity ever occurred. Because this was a primary claim made in her related case filed in

September 2012, Subramaniam v. Beal et al: Case No: 3:12-cv-01681, and since she never made

a single payment to MGC as a result of her steadfast claim which is supported by ample

evidence; the only conclusion a reasonable person could make is that the Beal/LNV/MGC parties

conceded to Defendant's claims that she had no debt with them and thus "cured" their false claim

of default via the 2013 "Rescission of Notice of Default".

Defendant' Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page4 ofB


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 80 Filed 07/08/15 Page 5 of 20 Jt
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 170 of 383
!
I
LNV now makes a new false claim of debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. and in yet

another attempt to deceive this court. In doing so it has re-opened the Pandora's box. LNV/Beal
I
!
i
shows its malicious intent to defraud based on the same false evidence it attempted to use in I
I
2012 to defraud this court. This act re-opens the statute of limitations on all Defendant's earlier
t
claims because this new predicate act of fraudulent foreclosure by LNV /Beal using forged I
instruments purporting to transfer title of Defendant's property causes Defendant new injury i
I
consistent with LNV/Beal's earlier predicate act that caused her injury in 2012; and which I!

together with each of these two acts and another in 2011 and similar acts perpetrated against the I
LNV/Beal victims in the noticed related cases, constitutes a pattern of fraud and RICO activities. II
Defendant has claimed since 2012 that three separate and conflicting sets of terms had been
Ii
I'
deceptively added into the Note that she signed; that it originated through fraud in the factum

because of this intentional misrepresentation and other misrepresentations and omissions made

with intent to deceive her and to cause her harm, which she relied on and which in fact did cause

her harm; and that therefore the alleged "Note" was not an enforceable instrument; and that it

was a legal impossibility for LNV to be the "holder" of the "original" Note as it claims; and yet

Ms. Conner spews forth the same false claims already made by LNV which are and have been

disputed by Defendant as if somehow by this new person (Ms. Conner) repeating the same

falsehoods it will somehow make them less false. Ms. Conner states in her declaration:

"The Loan is evidenced by the Adjustable Rate Note in the amount of $176,000.00, dated
February 10, 2004 and signed by Defendant (the 'Note'). Attached as Exhibit 1 is a true
and correct copy of the Note and the subsequent allonges to the Note. The original lender
on the Note is People's Choice, and the borrower is Defendant ... People's Choice
transferred the Note to Residential Funding Company, LLC ('RFC') by endorsing the
Note to the order of RFC in an allonge and delivering the Note and allonge to RFC. Ex. 1,
p. 6. RFC, in tum, transferred the Note to LNV by endorsing it to the order ofLNV in an
allonge and delivering the Note and allonges to LNV. Ex. 1, p. 7. Through the allonges,
LNV became the holder of the Note ... On or about March 10, 2008, RFC assigned its

Defendant' Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Pages ofB


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 80 Filed 07/08/15 Page 6 of 20
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 171 of 383

beneficial interest in the Trust Deed to LNV. A true and correct copy of the Corporation
Assignment of Deed of Trust executed by RFC ('Trust Assignment') and the Oregon State
Recorder's cover sheet for the recordation thereof is attached hereto as Exhibit 3."

This "Trust Assignment" and the allonges which Ms. Conner falsely claims gives LNV standing

to enforce Defendant's deed of trust through sell of her property are the very same "Trust

Assignment" and the allonges that Defendant and the other LNV /Beal victims claim are forgeries

and seek to have examined further by OMNI Document Examinations ("OMNI") for

authenticity. (An examination was already completed by OMNI of several identical allonges

specific to the noticed related cases, and identical to the one Ms. Conner claims delivers the Note

and allonges to LNV in the present case, which is signed by Jason J. Vecchio, a former employee

of GMAC-RFC; and whose signature on such allonge has already determined by OMNI to be

stamped or photocopied signatures.)

Defendant has also claimed that the deed of trust filed in her county is not the deed of trust she

signed at the closing of her mortgage; yet Ms. Conner, as if no dispute exists over the validity of

the deed of trust recorded in Washington County, states in her declaration:

"Attached as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of the Deed of Trust, dated February 10,
2004, signed by Defendant, and recorded in Washington County, Oregon on March 1,
2004 as Instrument Number 2004-019937 (the 'Trust Deed')"

None of Ms. Conner's claims are true. Like all MGC's purported employees, Ms. Conner is of

questionable character with no qualms about repeating lies and making statements under oath

about matters of which she has no personal knowledge because her boss asked her to do so.

Ms. Conner's declaration testimony adds nothing ofrelevance to LNV's claims. Ms. Conner's

testimony fails to meet the test for relevant evidence under Rule 401 and if the court permits this

testimony to stand it violates Defendant's constitutional right to question the witness and

Defendant' Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 6of8


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 80 Filed 07/08/15 Page 7 of 20
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 172 of 383

discredit and impeach her hearsay testimony. Ms. Conner offers nothing more than her

questionable claim that she is a "Senior Vice President" ofMGC (discredited by evidence in

Defendant's Exhibits A, Band C attached hereto) which is not sufficient to support a finding that

she has personal knowledge of the matter pursuant to Rule 602. She does not qualify as an

expert witness pursuant to Rule 703. Pursuant to Rules 607 and 608 Defendant attacks Ms.

Conner's credibility as a witness. Other witnesses alleging to be employed by MGC have similar

problems with truthfulness (Bret Maloney; Jeff Tschirhart, Erica Thomas, and Grant Hamilton

are only a few examples.) Ms. Conner's testimony is hearsay and not admissible pursuant to

Rule 802. The "evidence" she provides has been previously submited by LNV.

Ms. Conner's testimony needlessly presents cumulative evidence, (i.e. evidence of which the

parts reinforce one another, producing an effect stronger than any part by itself.) Defendant

moves the court pursuant to Rule 403 to exclude this testimony because its probative value is

substantially outweighed by a danger of it causing unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,

misleading the jury, causing undue delay, and wasting the time.

The declaration of Michelle Conner should be stricken in its entirety; or the court should call this

witness to the stand so Defendant can cross-examine her under oath as Defendant is entitled

pursuant to Rule 614. Defendant reserves the right to attack the declarant's credibility pursuant

to Rule 806 and to call the declarant as a witness and to examine her statements as if on cross-

examination. Anything less would be a deprivation of her constitutional rights to due process

and equal protection of law. While exercised more frequently in criminal than in civil cases, the

authority of the judge to call witnesses is well established. McCormick 8. p. 14: Maguire,

Weinstein. et al., Cases on Evidence 303-304 (5th ed. 1965); 9 Wigmore 2484.

Defendant' Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 7 of 8


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 80 Filed 07/08/15 Page 8 of 20
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 173 of 383

Because Ms. Conner's declaratory testimony refers to the "original" Note, its allonges and the

suspect assignments of deed of trust; Defendant requests pursuant to Rule 1002 that these

original writings/documents be produced in order to prove their contents and prove or disprove

Ms. Conner's testimony about them. Pursuant to Rule 1003 Defendant and the other LNV/Beal

victims in the noticed related cases raise a genuine question about the authenticity of LNV's

"original" Notes, allonges and assignments of deed referenced by Ms. Conner's testimony and

under these circumstances it is unfair to admit duplicate copies of these documents. Rule 901

requires authentication of evidence; to satisfy the requirement of Rule 901 the proponent

(Plaintiff LNV) must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the

proponent claims it is.

THEREFORE, Defendant moves the court to either strike the declaration of Michelle Conner in

its entirety or to call her before the court as a witness and thereby allow Defendant the ability to

cross examine and impeach her testimony

Respectfully Submitted,

Denise Subramaniam

Defendant' Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases PageBofB


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 80 Filed 07/08/15 Page 9 of 20
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 174 of 383

DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT A
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 80 Filed 07/08/15 Page 10 of 20
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 175 of 383

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was

served upon all counsel of record, pro-se parties and the United States Attorney General and the

Attorney General of the State of Oregon via the Court's CM/ECF system, email, and/or regular

mail, and/or certified mail with return receipt requested.

U.S. Department of Justice


Loretta Lynch,
U.S. Attorney General
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001
202-514-2000

Gabrielle D. Richards I Perkins Coie LLP


1120 NW Couch Street
10th Floor
Portland, Oregon 97209-4128
D. +l.503.727.2255
F. + 1.503.346.2255
grichards@perkinscoie.com

Respectfully Submitted,

Denise Subramaniam
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 80 Filed 07/08/15 Page 11 of 20
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 176 of 383
9 Wmdow on State Government Glenn Hagar Tow Comptroller of Public Accounts

Taxable Entity Search Results

* Officers and Directors


Taxable Entity Search

MGC MORTGAGE, INC.


Report Year: 2014

Return to' Taxahle Entity Search Results

Officer and director information on this site is obtained from the most recent Public Information Report (PIR) processed by the
Secretary of State (SOS). PIRs filed with annual franchise tax reports are forwarded to the SOS. After processing, the SOS sends the
Comptroller an electronic copy of the information, which is displayed on this web site. The information will be updated as changes
are received from the SOS.

You may order a copy of a Public Information Report from open records@cpa state tx us or Comptroller of Public Accounts, Open
Government Division, PO Box 13528, Austin, Texas 78711.

VICE PRES! ALLISON MARTIN


6000 LEGACY DRIVE
PLANO , TX 75024
SVP BRET MALONEY
6000 LEGACY DRIVE
PLANO , TX 75024
SVP DOUGLAS KROISS
6000 LEGACY DRIVE
PLANO , TX 75024
CHIEF INFO GARY POWERS
6000 LEGACY DRIVE
PLANO, TX 75024
SVP GARY POWERS
6000 LEGACY DRIVE
PLANO , TX 75024
VICE PRES! GRANT HAMILTON
6000 LEGACY DRIVE
PLANO, TX 75024
DIRECTOR JACOB CHERNER
6000 LEGACY DRIVE
PLANO , TX 75024
CHIEF EXEC JACOB CHERNER
6000 LEGACY DRIVE
PLANO , TX 75024
11.U1r.
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 80 Filed 07/08/15 Page 12 of 20
U-IJ.'-'J.J.J.J'-' l L'-''-'VUJ.J.I. ...... 1.U.LUJ "-'J..J.1'-''-'J.J U-IJ.U J..JJ.1'-''-'l.VIJ

Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 177 of 383
PRESIDENT JACOB CHERNER
6000 LEGACY DRIVE
PLANO , TX 75024
SVP JAMES ERWIN
6000 LEGACY DRIVE
PLANO , TX 75024
VICE PRES/ JEFF TSCHIRHART
6000 LEGACY DRIVE
PLANO , TX 75024
ASSISTANT JEREMY COBB
6000 LEGACY DRIVE
PLANO , TX 75024
SVP KENT TWITCHELL
6000 LEGACY DRIVE
PLANO , TX 75024
ASSISTANT MELISSA SASSINE
6000 LEGACY DRIVE
PLANO , TX 75024
SVP MICHELLE CONNER
6000 LEGACY DRIVE
PLANO , TX 75024
ASSISTANT OLIVIA RAHN
6000 LEGACY DRIVE
PLANO , TX 75024
ASSISTANT RENITA HOLLAND
6000 LEGACY DRIVE
PLANO, TX 75024
SVP ROBERT ACKERMANN
6000 LEGACY DRIVE
PLANO , TX 75024
CHIEF FINA SCOTT THOMAS
6000 LEGACY DRIVE
PLANO , TX 75024
EXECUTIVE STEVE HARVEY
6000 LEGACY DRIVE
PLANO , TX 75024
VICE PRES/ STUART MILES
6000 LEGACY DRIVE
PLANO , TX 75024
SVP TIMHTAYLOR
6000 LEGACY DRIVE
PLANO , TX 75024
SECRETARY TIMHTAYLOR
6000 LEGACY DRIVE
PLANO , TX 75024
ASSISTANT TOLLIE GOODWIN
6000 LEGACY DRIVE
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 80 Filed 07/08/15 Page 13 of 20
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 178 of 383
PLANO , TX 75024
ASSISTANT WADE TOLMAN
6000 LEGACY DRIVE
PLANO , TX 75024

Glenn Hegar, Texas Comptroller Window on State Government Contact Us


Privacy and Security Policy I Accessibility Policy I Link Policy I Public Information Act I Compact with Texans
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 80 Filed 07/08/15 Page 14 of 20
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 179 of 383

DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT B
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 80 Filed 07/08/15 Page 15 of 20
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 180 of 383

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT


FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
IN RE:
Judge Carol A. Doyle
CHRISTOPHER T. SWIFT and)
MARCIA A. SWIFT, No. 12-35690

Debtors. Chapter 13

RULE 30(B) (6) DEPOSITION OF


BRET MALONEY
JULY 11, 2014
10:00 A.M.
Called as a witness herein, pursuant to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure of the United States Bankruptcy
Court, pertaining to the taking of depositions, before
WENDY M. STRICKLER, C.S.R., License No. 084-003257,
qualified and commissioned for the State of Illinois,
taken at 900 Jorie Boulevard, Suite 150, Oak Brook,
Illinois.

COUNSEL PRESENT:
SULAIMAN LAW GROUP, by
MR. PAUL M. BACH and
MS. PENNY BACH
900 Jorie Boulevard
Suite 150
Oak Brook, Illinois 60523

appeared on behalf of the Debtors;


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 80 Filed 07/08/15 Page 16 of 20
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 181 of 383
Bret Maloney
July 11, 2014

2
1 COUNSEL PRESENT: (Contd.)
2 FREEDMAN, ANSELMO, LINDBERG, by
MR. CHRIS IARIA
3 1771 W. Diehl Road
Suite 120
4 Naperville, Illinois 60563
5 appeared on behalf of the Defendant.
6

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19

20
21
22

23
24

County Court Reporters, Inc.


630.653.1622
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 80 Filed 07/08/15 Page 17 of 20
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 182 of 383
Bret Maloney
July 11, 2014

3
1 I ND E X
2 WITNESS: PAGE
3 BRET MALONEY
4 Examination by Mr. Bach 4
Examination by Ms. Bach 108
5 Examination by Mr. Iaria 122
6
7
E X H I B I T S
8
Deposition Ex. No. 1 5
9 Deposition Ex. No. 2 38
Deposition Ex. No. 3 40
10 Deposition Ex. No. 4 43
Deposition Ex. No. 5 61
11 Deposition Ex. No. 6 63
Deposition Ex. No. 7 74
12 Deposition Ex. No. 8 74
Deposition Ex. No. 9 74
13 Deposition Ex. No. 10 83
Deposition Ex. No. 11 90
14 Deposition Ex. No. 12 91
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

County Court Reporters, Inc.


630.653.1622
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 80 Filed 07/08/15 Page 18 of 20
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 183 of 383
Bret Maloney
July 11, 2014

28
1 and I appreciate that.

2 A basic question is that I have is before

3 you got involved and obviously I can see from your

4 card that you are a senior vice president -- I am

5 guessing that's what SVP stands for, correct?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Could be special vice president, but I didn't

8 think that they would do that to you. But I assume that

9 you are pretty high up in the chain of command,

10 correct?

11 A. Within MGC, yes.

12 Q. How many -- I will ask this question. How

13 many senior vice presidents are there?

14 A. Under MGC, I am the only one.


15 Q. Okay. And you have default management because

16 that's basically what -- Are there any other functions

17 besides that that someone else takes care of or do you

18 take care of all the vice presidential type things, or

19 are there other vice presidents that takes of other

20 things which are not a senior vice president?

21 A. There is another vice president who is vice

22 president of operations and compliance, and then there

23 is my CCO who would be above me.

24 Q. Okay. Mr. Beal has a position there, too?

County Court Reporters, Inc.


630.653.1622
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 80 Filed 07/08/15 Page 19 of 20
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 184 of 383

DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT C
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 80 Filed 07/08/15 Page 20 of 20
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 185 of 383
I
l
Page 2 of 7
t
Statement Period I
03/01/08 throu1h 03/31/08
DlO P PE
Enclosures 1
OE 43 I
~ficurl, Ftures FREE with your ....._ Qleck Card
.~;f~,_.
Account Number

I
f
, .._ against unauthorized use if card bl Iott or skllen.,fraud monitoring and guaranteed credit. Zero
:111bffftj fDr fraudulent transactlon1 when reported within 60 days from statement date. Free ontine t
:..,_lftl alerts - prevent overdraft and ~r irregular ~ivity
.:.i,'J'''
~: .

I
I
t

I
~

I
1troail.
amow.t .,~* e--:
11
Credits
Balance
AmoQ.i ot . iih*awaht/Debita
Statement EadiAg Balance
l
".-... ~ Balance
. . . . . CBarge if
I
!

I
..
Clll2
I
1111'1


* cli84Sk Date Banlt
Number Amount ($) Posted Reference
03/10~
213
!15*
1, 03/24~

'\
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 1 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 186 of 383

Denise Subramaniam
Self-represented
13865 SW Walker Rd
Beaverton OR 97005
503-764-5300

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION

LNV CORPORATION Civil Case No. 3:14-cv-01836


Plaintiff,
v. DEFENDANTS OBJECTION TO
DENISE SUBRAMANIAM PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
pro per SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant

DEFENDANTS OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR


SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant incorporates herein all her pleadings in this case; her Notice of Directly Related

Cases; her Notice of Constitutional Questions as well as the Notices of Constitutional Questions

filed by the other LNV/MGC/Beal victims in the noticed related cases; and in her noticed related

cases; and her motion to compel Plaintiff LNV Corporation (LNV) to produce its business

license and the agreement between Residential Funding Company LLC aka Residential Funding

Corporation (GMAC-RFC) that included the alleged conveyance of deeds of trust/mortgages

for Defendants property and all the other LNV/MGC/Beal victims with instruments endorsed by

GMAC-RFC employees Diane M. Meistad and Betty Wright or Michael Mead executed on

March 10, 2008 before LNV was incorporated in the State of Nevada and before LNV could

have acquired a Nevada business license allowing it to legally transact business. Plaintiff also

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 1 of 12


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 2 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 187 of 383

incorporates her Affidavit already filed in support of her motion to compel and in support of this

objection, and states the following:

In response to Plaintiff LNVs claim in their motion for summary judgment and memorandum in

support of the motion Defendant disputes LNVs claims that:

This is a straightforward case about the Defendants failure to repay her home loan and
LNVs right, as the holder of the corresponding note and trust deed, to seek judicial
foreclosure. (Page 1 Paragraph 2 of LNVs motion.)

This is NOT a straightforward case; and Defendant DID NOT fail to repay her home loan.

Defendant has endured ten (10) years of unimaginable mental anguish and distress because the

home loan (i.e. mortgage) was:

1. Originated in fraud.
2. Securitized in fraud.
3. Serviced in fraud with intent to foreclose on Defendants property without good cause,
first by EMC Mortgage Inc. (EMC) then by Litton Loan Servicing (Litton) which
informed Defendant by letter that her mortgage servicing would be transferred to MGC
Mortgage Inc. (MGC). The letter contained no information about where to send
payments. Defendant also received a delinquent property tax notice and paid the taxes to
make them current. Her property taxes were supposed to be paid through her mortgage
escrow account Her attorney, Todd Trierweiler, advised her because shed already
experienced misappropriation of payments not make further payments until he could
determine who she should be making payments to. He wrote a series of letters to MGC
beginning in March 2009 which he identified as qualified written requests pursuant to
RESPA; MGC failed to respond as required by RESPA. In May 2010 MGC sent Mr.
Trierweiler the same false and convoluted payment history EMC had given Defendants
first attorney, Elizabeth Lemoine in 2006 which she had proved to be false. An
accounting of Defendants actual payments and bank statements show she was in fact a
payment ahead rather than in default. MGC never had standing to collect payments from
Defendant so she has never made payments to them. (See Defendants Exhibit A attached
hereto.)
4. Conveyed in fraud first to Residential Funding Company LLC aka Residential Funding
Corporation (GMAC-RFC) in 2006; then to Plaintiff LNV in 2008.
5. These fraudulent conveyances were then recorded in fraud with Defendants county land
recorders office via mail and/or wire transmission with intent to foreclose on
Defendants property without good cause.
6. Resulting in repeated fraudulent foreclosure attempts beginning in 2006.

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 2 of 12


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 3 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 188 of 383

Defendant agrees in part with LNVs claim that in February 2004 she refinanced her home

mortgage; however Defendants motivation was to reduce her interest rate and she retained more

than 30% equity in her home. She had been induced by Peoples Choice through several

misrepresentations to sign a trust deed with without accurately realizing the risks, duties, or

obligations incurred. However until LNV can demonstrate that it is in fact the holder of the Note

and Trust Deed then this issue is not ripe for a judicial determination. In 2006 Litton Loan

Servicing (Litton), the party that first attempted to foreclose on Defendants property on a

trumped up claim of default made by the prior servicer EMC Mortgage Inc. (EMC), told

Defendants attorney Elizabeth Lemoine that their client had no incentive to call off the trustee

sale after Ms. Lemoine had proved Defendant never defaulted on her loan because the amount of

equity Defendant had in her property satisfied what their client wanted. See Defendants Exhibit

B attached herein. Defendant denies Plaintiff LNVs claim:

In April 2007, more than eight years ago, Defendant defaulted on the note and trust deed
by failing to make her monthly payment when it was due.

In fact Defendant continued to make payments to Litton, until at least March 24, 2008. (See

Defendants Exhibit C attached herein.) Also see Defendants motion to strike the declaration of

Michelle Conner in support of LNVs motion for summary judgment [Doc 80 page 20 of 20].

Michelle Conner does not show up in the Texas Comptrollers list of Officers and Directors for

MGC Mortgage. [Doc 80 pages 11 19 of 20]. If Michelle Conner truthfully had personal

knowledge of Defendants loan as she claims under penalty of perjury then she would have

known about Defendants March 24, 2008 payment on her mortgage.

Evidence shows Defendant never defaulted on her mortgage. Plaintiff LNV has a demonstrated

history of fabricating or making up false payment histories and false claims to courts about the

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 3 of 12


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 4 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 189 of 383

payment histories of its victims with intent to wrongfully deprive them of their property under

color of law as evidenced by Defendants March 2008 bank statement showing her mortgage

payment was processed and in fact paid by her bank; and by the sworn affidavit testimony of

LNV/MGC/Beal victims JoAnn Breitling, Catherine Gebhardt and Marcia Swift.

Each of these LNV/MGC/Beal victims experienced similar acts of deception by MGC and LNV

specific to their payments. This evidence is pertinent and admissible pursuant to Federal Rule

401(a) because it shows a pattern of similar deceit and false claims about missed payments or

defaults by LNV and/or MGC and/or other Beal corporations in foreclosures. This evidence and

testimony makes intent to defraud more probable; intent is a factor for determination of criminal

acts of fraud. This evidence is pertinent and admissible pursuant to Federal Rule 401(b) because

it is of consequence for this court in determining whether LNVs action against Defendant is

justifiable under law and whether pursuant to the doctrine of clean hands this court has

jurisdiction to grant LNV the relief it seeks against Defendant.

Defendant has motioned this court to take judicial notice of Beal Bank, SSB v. Sarich, No. 05-2-

11440-1SEA (King County Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 2006) because it shows a propensity for

corporations owned by Daniel Andrew Beal aka D. Andrew Beal to alter Notes; and Defendant

has claimed LNV Corporation, which is owned by D. Andrew Beal, has altered the Note it

claims was conveyed to it by Residential Funding Company LLC aka Residential Funding

Corporation (GMAC-RFC). This is the conveyance LNV claims gives it standing to foreclose

on Defendants property.

LNV is not the holder of the corresponding note and trust deed as it claims because the Note

shown to Defendant in the law offices of Perkins Coie is in fact a computer generated forgery

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 4 of 12


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 5 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 190 of 383

with a recently forged signature of Dana Lantry on the backside of the last page of the alleged

original Note. This Dana Lantry endorsement is a forgery for the following reasons:

1. In a tape recorded phone conversation (with consent) on September 3, 2015 the same

Dana Lantry who was employed by Peoples Choice Home Loans in 2004 until they filed

for bankruptcy in 2007 told Defendant she could confidently say that she never signed

any deed assignments or allonges to Notes while employed by Peoples Choice because

she was not an executive officer when she worked for Peoples Choice. See Defendants

sworn affidavit testimony [Doc. 93] in support of this objection to LNVs motion for

summary judgment.

2. In a tape recorded phone conversation (with consent) with Denise Price with the

Executive Office for JPMorgan Chase on September 2, 2015 in response to a request sent

to their Legal Papers Served department which has control of the Bear Steans records told

Defendant that Chase could not tell her why the word cancelled was stamped above the

alleged endorsement to the Note bearing the Dana Lantry signature with LaSalle Bank

National Association, as Trustee for cetificateholders of Bear Stearns Asset Backed

Securities I LLC Asset Backed Certificates Series 2004-HE4 stamped above the

signature [Doc. 5-1 page 5 of 7] which Defendant attached to her request for Chases

review because they didnt do it and it wasnt on their documents.

3. The Dana Lantry signature endorsing the Note to make it look like the Bear Stearns

Trust conveyed interest back to Peoples Choice at some unknown date doesnt match the

Dana Lantry signatures on the 2006 assignment of deed of trust purporting to convey

interest from Peoples Choice to Residential Funding Company LLC aka Residential

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 5 of 12


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 6 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 191 of 383

Funding Corporation (GMAC-RFC) and it doesnt match the Dana Lantry signature

on the allonge attached to the alleged original Note Defendant viewed. See [Doc 93

pages 15 and 16 of 24]. Nor did it match any of the signatures of Dana Lantry on

assignments of deed of trust when she worked for Aames and One Stop Mortgage, where

she was an executive officer and deed admit to signing such documents. [Doc 93 page 17

of 24].

4. None of the signatures on the alleged original Note had a pressure indent on the

opposite side of the page except the purported Dana Lantry signature endorsing the

Note to make it look like the Bear Stearns Trust conveyed interest back to Peoples

Choice at some unknown date. See [Doc. 93 pages 8 through 13].

5. The purported Dana Lantry endorsement of the alleged original Note to make it look

like the Bear Stearns Trust (BSABS 2004-HE4) conveyed the Note back to Peoples

Choice at some unknown date was never produced by LNV or MGC in 2012 or 2013 in

Subramaniam v. Beal et al, Case No. 3:12-cv-01681-MO in this court where Defendant

was the Plaintiff regarding the same matters before the court in the present case.

6. William J. Paatalo of B.P. Investigations submitted to this court a declaration [Doc 91 in

3:12-cv-01681-MO] attached hereto as Defendants Exhibit D specific to his findings of

an incurable break in Defendants chain of title and why it was impossible for the 2006

assignment of deed of trust purporting to convey interest from Peoples Choice to

Residential Funding Company LLC aka Residential Funding Corporation (GMAC-

RFC) signed by Dana Lantry to have been a genuine conveyance because the pooling

and servicing agreement specified that once Peoples Choice sold Defendants loan into

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 6 of 12


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 7 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 192 of 383

the BSABS 2004-HE4 Trust Peoples Choice retained no further interest in it. See pages

4 through 5 of Defendants Exhibit D which quotes the pertinent sections of the pooling

and servicing agreement:

It is express intent of the parties hereto that the conveyance of the Mortgage
Notes, Mortgages, assignments of Mortgages, title insurance policies and
modifications, extensions and/or assumptions agreements and private mortgage
insurance policies relating to the Mortgage Loans by the Seller to the Depositor,
and by the Depositor or the Trustee be, and be construed as, an absolute sale
thereof to the Depositor or the Trustee, as applicable. It is, further, not the
intention of the parties that such conveyance be deemed a pledge thereof by the
Seller to the Depositor, or by the Depositor to the Trustee.

Quoting page 7 lines 5 10 and lines 15 20; and page 8 lines 10 13; and page 9 lines

2 6 and lines 8 14 of Defendants Exhibit D:

Assignment# 1 was recorded on 06/28/06 as document No. 2006-077542. This


assignment was allegedly executed on 12/29/05 whereby People's sells, assigns,
transfers, and conveys the subject Note and DOT to "Homecomings Financial
Network, Inc." (hereinafter "HFN.") This assignment circumvents the entire sale
to EMC that was to have occurred on 05/01/04 The 2nd and 3rd assignments of
the DOT are simultaneous. The 2nd is recorded on 08/27/08 as doc No. 2008-
073971 whereby HFN attempts to assign, sell, convey, and deliver the Note and
DOT to "Residential Funding Company, LLC'' (hereinafter "RFC. ") The 3rd is
recorded on the same date as doc No. 2008-073972 whereby RFC attempts to
assign, sell, convey, and deliver the Note and DOT to "LNV Corporation." To
further cloud the title, the subject loan was assigned a MERS identification
number "MIN# 1000221-000972254 7-8" at some point after origination. A check
of the MERS Member directory showed that this number was assigned to
"JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. fka EMC." The existence of MERS means that
another assignment is missing from the chain of title, as some entity would have
had to assign the subject note and DOT to MERS if registered in the .MERS
system. Because the MERS system shows "JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., fka
EMC" as the owner and investor, both assignments #2 & #3 are inconsistent with
the facts The failure to record the assignments and sales to the Trust entities,
and the failure to disclose the Trust's interest in the subject Note and DOT and
subsequent payoff of such, creates a fatal defect in the chain of title. Because the
loan was sold to the BSABS 2004-HE4 Trust, as evidenced by the Bloomberg
exhibits, and the fact that the subject loan was subsequently ''paid off'' within the
trust, the parties now seeking to foreclose the Subramaniam DOT have no
standing to seek such relief.

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 7 of 12


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 8 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 193 of 383

Note none of these facts have changed since April 2013 when Mr. Paatalo submitted his

declaration. If LNV had the Dana Lantry endorsement of the Note appearing to convey

the Note from the BSABS 2004-HE4 Trust back to Peoples Choice and the two allonges

shown to Defendant, one signed by Dana Lantry the other by GMAC-RFC employee

Jason J. Vecchio, in April 2013 when Bill Paatalos declaration was submitted to this

court, then logic dictates that MGC or LNV would have produced it to dispute his

findings of fact. They did not.

It can therefore only be deduced that LNV manufactured this counterfeit endorsement of

the Note and counterfeit allonges in an attempt to cure the break in the chain of title

which the owner of MGC and LNV became aware existed specifically because of the

2012-2013 litigation.

LNVs claims that this court dismissed as meritless Defendants claims in Subramaniam v. Beal

et al, Case No. 3:12-cv-01681-MO but this also is not true. This court made no determination as

to the merits of Defendants claims. Because Defendant was representing herself as a pro-se

litigant she became too ill to continue in the litigation. She had filed an in-camera motion for a

medical continuance that included her medical records in support of her motion because she did

not want her medical records made public, but like what almost happened in the present case, the

court apparently ignored this and denied her motion then summarily dismissed her claims. Her

claims were therefore never adjudicated and her rights to due process and equal protection of the

law pursuant to the United States Constitution were violated. If Defendant must she will file a

Rule 60 motion for relief of this courts earlier summary judgment order to dismiss. In the

interest of saving the court and the parties unnecessary work and expense she suggests that the

court acknowledge that the merits of her claims were never heard in the earlier case and that

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 8 of 12


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 9 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 194 of 383

instead of perpetuating that miscarriage of justice the court could and should now deny LNVs

motion for summary judgment and schedule the case for further discovery and a trial on its

merits.

The courts basic premise in its dismissal of Subramaniam v. Beal as she recalls was something

along the lines of the foreclosure wasnt perfected so no harm done. In the earlier case

Defendant was the plaintiff and had the burden of proof. As a pro se litigant she bit off much

more than she could chew. Defendant must give Your Honor and Mr. Petticord credit for trying

to warn her to reduce further the number of defendants; in the end the anxiety and lack of sleep

she experienced trying to keep up with all the motions to dismiss was a likely contributor for her

health decline and her becoming incapacitated for several months in 2013.

Defendant recalls making an argument against dismissal of the earlier case based on the theory

that no harm was done because didnt get away with it where she compared this concept to not

holding a person who attempts murder accountable allowing that person will just come back to

finish the job; well thats what has indeed happened.

FACTS IN DISPUTE

A. Peoples Choice Home Loan, Inc. (Peoples Choice) did not make a loan to Defendant.

Peoples Choice table funded a loan in behalf of other parties not disclosed to Defendant. The

loan contract is not enforceable because it was originated in fraud. The copy of the

Adjustable Rate Note Defendant was given on February 10, 2004 after the closing doesnt

match the alleged original Note she was shown by LNVs Counsel. Defendants Exhibit E

is a scanned copy of what she was given at closing (Defendants scanner cant fit a legal size

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 9 of 12


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 10 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 195 of 383

paper but otherwise it is a true and accurate copy). Defendants Exhibit F contains

photographs Defendant took of the alleged original Note she was shown by LNVs

Counsel. The differences between these two distinct Notes are obvious and include but are

not limited to the following:

a. Defendants copy of the Note has three (3) pages whereas the one LNV claims is
the original has four (4) pages.
b. Defendants copy doesnt have the legal notices at the top of the first page like the one
LNV has.
c. Defendants copy doesnt contain a final payoff date of March 1, 2034 found on the
one LNV has.
d. LNVs Note is structured differently from Defendants copy with different
headings and numbering or letters before the headings and the verbiage is
different.

B. LNV is not the holder of the Note and Beneficiary of the Trust Deed. Peoples Choice did

not transfer the Note to Residential Funding Company LLC (GMAC-RFC) because on or

before May 1, 2004 Peoples Choice sold the Note and the Trust Deed into the Bear Stearns

Trust (BSABS 2004-HE4) so after May 1, 2004 Peoples Choice no longer had beneficial

interest in either the Note or the Trust Deed and couldnt have transferred it to GMAC-RFC.

Additionally Dana Lantry told Defendant she could not and did not make any such

endorsements for Peoples Choice because she was not an executive officer. Since beneficial

interest in Note and the Trust Deed was never transferred to GMAC-RFC then GMAC-RFC

didnt have any legal authority to transfer such to Plaintiff LNV. The assignment of Trust

Deed to LNV on March 10, 2008 likewise could not and did not occur because GMAC-RFC

had no legal authority to grant/convey or otherwise transfer an interest it did not hold.

C. Defendant did not default on the Note and Trust Deed as claimed by LNV. However this is

not an issue ripe for judicial determination because if LNV is not the holder of the Note and

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 10 of 12


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 11 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 196 of 383

Trust Deed then LNV has no legal authority to collect payments from Defendant and

Defendant has no obligation to make payments to LNV; nor does LNV have standing to

foreclose on Defendants property to enforce the Note. LNVs and MGCs payment history

is inaccurate as already mentioned by Defendant in the foregoing, and MGCs computer

systems June 5, 2015 loan status report is pure fiction; as is most everything generated by

MGCs computer systems.

D. LNV may or may not be exempt from the Oregon Foreclosure Avoidance Program; however

its owner D. Andrew Beal is not exempt from ORS 165.013 (Forgery in the first degree)

nor is he exempt from the prohibited activities defined by 18 U.S. Code 1961 et al;

including but limited to the following activities defined under 18 U.S. Code 1341; 18 U.S.

Code 1343; or 18 U.S. Code 1957. He is not exempt from the civil liability to victims of

such prohibited actions; nor is he exempt from criminal prosecution for such prohibited

actions.

LEGAL STANDARD

As LNV points out summary is appropriate when there are no genuine dispute as to any material

fact; however here we have a dispute as to which Note is genuine (two Notes exist). We have a

dispute regarding whether LNV is the holder of the Note and Trust Deed because Dana Lantry

did not sign any allonges or deed assignments or endorse any conveyances of Notes while she

was employed by Peoples Choice because she was not an executive officer. The Dana Lantry

signatures on LNVs purported original Note appear to even an untrained eye to be made by

different individuals; none of whom could have been Dana Lantry, so these must be forgeries. At

least one of those forgeries has a pressure indent behind the signature when none of the other

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 11 of 12


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 12 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 197 of 383

signatures, including Defendants signature, which appear to be color enhanced computer

generated forgeries, have such a pressure indent. The Dana Lantry endorsement and the allonges

were not produced in April 2013 another indication these are recent forgeries produced by LNV

after April 2013. Beneficial interest in the Trust Deed and Note could not have been conveyed to

LNV in 2008 because Peoples Choice didnt have beneficial interest in the Trust Deed and Note

in 2006 to transfer such to GMAC-RFC because Peoples Choice relinquished all beneficial

interest in the Trust Deed and Note on or before May 1, 2004 to the BSABS 2004-HE4 Trust.

Defendant has identified facts beyond the pleadings that show a genuine issue for trial.

Defendant is not relying of unsupported conjecture or conclusory statements. Plaintiff has

failed to show that Defendant had an enforceable obligation or that she breached such obligation.

Plaintiff has failed to show that it is the holder of the Note and Trust Deed except through

forgeries. LNV has not met its burden. LNV cannot be the holder of a forged Note.

PRAYER

Defendant prays this Honorable Court deny LNVs motions for summary judgment and schedule

this case for further discovery and a trial.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Denise Subramaniam


_________________________________________
Denise Subramaniam

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 12 of 12


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 13 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 198 of 383

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was

served upon all counsel of record, pro-se parties and the United States Attorney General and the

Attorney General of the State of Oregon via the Courts CM/ECF system, email, and/or regular

mail, and/or certified mail with return receipt requested.

U.S. Department of Justice


Loretta Lynch,
U. S. Attorney General
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001
202-514-2000

Gabrielle D. Richards | Perkins Coie LLP


1120 NW Couch Street
10th Floor
Portland, Oregon 97209-4128
D. +1.503.727.2255
F. +1.503.346.2255
grichards@perkinscoie.com

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Denise Subramaniam


_________________________________________
Denise Subramaniam
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 14 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 199 of 383

Defendants Exhibit A
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 15 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 200 of 383
Case # 3:12 CV 1681 MO
Subramaniam vs Beal, Chase, GMAC et al Exhibit M Page 2 of 3
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 16 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 201 of 383
Case # 3:12 CV 1681 MO
Subramaniam vs Beal, Chase, GMAC et al Exhibit M Page 3 of 3
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 17 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 202 of 383
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 18 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 203 of 383

Defendants Exhibit B
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 19 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 204 of 383
Case # 3:12 CV 1681 MO
Subramaniam vs Beal, Chase, GMAC et al Exhibit Q Page 2 of 9
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 20 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 205 of 383
Case # 3:12 CV 1681 MO
Subramaniam vs Beal, Chase, GMAC et al Exhibit Q Page 3 of 9
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 21 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 206 of 383
Case # 3:12 CV 1681 MO
Subramaniam vs Beal, Chase, GMAC et al Exhibit Q Page 4 of 9
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 22 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 207 of 383
Case # 3:12 CV 1681 MO
Subramaniam vs Beal, Chase, GMAC et al Exhibit Q Page 5 of 9
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 23 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 208 of 383
Case # 3:12 CV 1681 MO
Subramaniam vs Beal, Chase, GMAC et al Exhibit Q Page 6 of 9
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 24 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 209 of 383
Case # 3:12 CV 1681 MO
Subramaniam vs Beal, Chase, GMAC et al Exhibit Q Page 7 of 9
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 25 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 210 of 383
Case # 3:12 CV 1681 MO
Subramaniam vs Beal, Chase, GMAC et al Exhibit Q Page 8 of 9
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 26 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 211 of 383
Case # 3:12 CV 1681 MO
Subramaniam vs Beal, Chase, GMAC et al Exhibit Q Page 9 of 9
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 27 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 212 of 383

Defendants Exhibit C
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 28 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 213 of 383
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 29 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 214 of 383

Defendants Exhibit D
Case
Case3:14-cv-01836-MO
3:12-cv-01681-MO Document
Document94 91 Filed
Filed09/08/15
04/30/13 Page
Page30
1 of
of29
61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 215 of 383
\ FILED3(; APR' 1312:39USDC-oRP

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


2 DISTRICT OF OREGON
3
PORTLAND DIVISION
4
In re: Case No. 3:12-CV-1681 MO
5
DENISE SUBRAMANIAM, pro se,
6
Plaintiff.
7

8
D. Andrew Beal et al. DECLARATION OF
9 ~L~J.PAATALO
Defendants,
10

11

12
I, WILLIAM J. PAATALO, HEREBY DECLARE AS FOLLOWS:
13
1. I am an Oregon licensed private investigator under ORS 703.430, and have
14
15
met the necessary requirements under ORS 703.415. My Oregon PSID number

16
is 49411.

17
2. I am over the age of eighteen years, am of sound mind, having never been

18
convicted of a felony or a crime or moral turpitude. I am competent in all

19
respects to make this Declaration. I have personal knowledge of the matters

20
declared herein, and if called to testifY, I could and would competently testifY

21
thereto.

22 3. I have 17 years combined experience in law enforcement and the mortgage

23 industry.

24 4. I worked in the mortgage industry from 1999 to 2008. I was a "loan officer''

25 with Conseco Home Finance from 1999 to 2000 before becoming a "mortgage

26 broker'' from 2000 to 2008. I was the President of Midwestern Mortgage, LLC

27 flk/a Wissota Mortgage, LLC in Wisconsin and Minnesota from 2002 - 2008.
1. Declaration ofWilliam J. Paatalo
28
Case
Case3:14-cv-01836-MO
3:12-cv-01681-MO Document
Document94 91 Filed
Filed09/08/15
04/30/13 Page
Page31
2 of
of29
61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 216 of 383

My company was strictly a "broker" for numerous lending institutions to


1
which I would originate loans on their behalf. I was not a "lender," nor was I
2
involved in "Table-Funding" loans.
3
4
5. I have worked exclusively over the last 30 months investigating foreclosure

5
fraud and issues related to the securitization of residential and commercial

6
mortgage loans.

7
6. I am a Certified Forensic Mortgage Loan Auditor (CFLA), and have spent

8
more than 4,500 hours conducting investigatory research specifically related to

9
mortgage securitization and chain of title analysis. I have performed such

10 analyses for residential real estate located in many states, including, but not

11 limited to Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada, Florida, Montana,

12 Arizona, Ohio, New Jersey, and several other states.

13 7. As a result of the above education and experience I am familiar with issues

14 involving securitization and foreclosure, and I have sufficient training and

15 expertise to qualify as an expert.

16 8. My securitization and chain of title analyses here involve the factual aspects of

17 securitization and chain of title.

18 9. In the performance of my securitization and chain of title audits I rely, as do

19 all persons who perform specialized investigative work relating to the

20 securitization of mortgage loans and chain of title issues, on a multitude of

21 sources. These sources include, but are not limited to my Bloomberg

22 subscription; ABSNet; Edgar (a search tool for Securities and Exchange

23 Commission Filings); other paid subscription sources, including those related

24 to known robosigners and foreclosure related documents.

25 10. I was retained by Denise Subramaniam to research the chain oftitle and

26 securitization of her loan and to provide evidence pertaining to the

27
2. Declaration of William J. Paatalo
28
Case
Case3:14-cv-01836-MO
3:12-cv-01681-MO Document
Document94 91 Filed
Filed09/08/15
04/30/13 Page
Page32
3 of
of29
61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 217 of 383

securitization of said loan. I was also asked to provide an opinion as to the


1
beneficiary status of the Subramaniam deed of trust and promissory note.
2
11. The following publicly recorded documents were inspected on the Securities
3

4
& Exchange Commission's (SEC) government website at

5
http://www.sec.gov/:

7
A. The "BSABS 2004-HE4 Trust" 424b Prospectus Supplement filed May 26,

8
2004: http://www.secinfo.com/dqTm6.1122.htm

10 B. The "BSABS 2004-HE4 Trust" Pooling & Servicing Agreement filed June

11 9, 2004: http://www.secinfo.com/dqTm6.114m.d.htm

12

13 12.In addition, the following exhibits were inspected and marked as follows:

14
C. "BP Investigative Agency Exhibits A-C" -Bloomberg Evidence
15
D. "BP Investigative Agency Exhibit D" - EMC Letter
16
E. "BP Investigative Agency Exhibit E" - MERS captures
17
18
13. After examining the above documents, my opinion is that the Subramaniam
19
20
loan was sold into the "BSABS 2004-HE4 Trust" on or before May 1, 2004;

21
the "Cut-off Date" for all loans to have been sold to the Trust.

22
14.The subject loan was originated on or about February lOth, 2004 with the

23
"Lender" on the Deed of Trust being named "People's Choice Home Loan,

24
Inc., a Wyoming Corporation" (hereinafter "People's.")

25 15. Shortly after origination, the evidence shows that the subject loan was sold to

26 the "Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2004-HE4" (hereinafter

27 "BSABS 2004-HE4.") However, there are no admissions or evidence by way


3. Declaration of William J. Paatalo
28
Case
Case3:14-cv-01836-MO
3:12-cv-01681-MO Document
Document94 91 Filed
Filed09/08/15
04/30/13 Page
Page33
4 of
of29
61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 218 of 383

of assignments that this ever happened. In fact, the entire sale of the subject
1
loan, and its presence within the Trust, have been glossed over and hidden in
2
the loan's chain of title history.
3
4
16.The following parties were named as Trust participants per the Trust's

5
governing document (the "Pooling & Servicing Agreement"- PSA):
Originators:
6 The principal originators of the mortgage loans are:
7
Encore Credit Corporation,with respect to approximately
30.38% of the mortgage loans and People's Choice Home Loans,
8 Inc., with respect to approximately 58.78% of the mortgage
loans. The remaind.er of the mortgage loans were originated
9 by various originators, none of which have originated more
than 10% of the mortgage loans.
10
Depositor:
11
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I LLC, a Delaware
12 limited liability company'and a limited purpose finance
subsidiary of The Bear Stearns Companies Inc. and an
13 affiliate of Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc.
14 Sell.er:
EMC Mortgage Corporation, a Delaware corporation and an
15
affiliate of the depositor and Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc.,
16 which will sell the mortgage loans to the depositor.

17 Master Servicer:
EMC Mortgage Corporation.
18
19 17. The "Cut-Off Date" for the loans to be transferred, sold, and conveyed to the

20 Trust was May 1st, 2004. Here is what was supposed to happen per the PSA:

21
22
Section 2. Ol CONVEYANCE OF 'J!RUS'J! Ii'UND.
23
Pursuant to the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement, the Seller sold, transferred,
24 assigned, set over and otherwise conveyed to the Depositor, without recourse, all the
25 right, title and interest of the Seller in and to the assets in the Trust Fund.

26
27
4. Declaration of William J. Paatalo
28
Case
Case3:14-cv-01836-MO
3:12-cv-01681-MO Document
Document94 91 Filed
Filed09/08/15
04/30/13 Page
Page34
5 of
of29
61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 219 of 383

The Seller has entered into this Agreement in consideration far the purchase of the
1
Mortgage Loans by the Depositor pursuant to the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement
2 and has agreed to take the actions specified herein.

3 The Depositor, concurrently with the execution and delivery hereot hereby sells, transfers,
assigns, sets over and otherwise conveys to the Trustee for the use and benefit of the
4
Certificateholders, without recourse, all the right, title and interest of the Depositor in and
5 to the Trust Fund.

6 In connection with such sale, the Depositor has delivered to, and deposited with, the
7
Trustee or the Custodian, as its agent, the following documents or instruments with
respect to each Mortgage Loan sa assigned: (i) the original Mortgage Note, including any
8 riders thereto, endorsed without recourse to the order of "LaSalle Bank National
Association, as Trustee jar certificateholders of Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I LLC
9 Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2004-H4," and showing an unbroken chain of
10 endorsements from the original payee thereof to the Person endorsing it to the Trustee,

11 Section 11.04 I~ION OF PARTIES.


12 It is the express intent of the parties hereto that the conveyance of the Mortgage Nates,
13 Mortgages, assignments of Mortgages, title insurance policies and any modifications,
extensions and/or assumption agreements and private mortgage insurance policies
14 relating to the Mortgage Loans by the Seller to the Depositor, and by the Depositor to the
Trustee be, and be construed as, an absolute sale thereof to the Depositor or the Trustee,
15 as applicable. It is, further, nat the intention of the parties that such conveyance be
I

16 deemed a pledge thereof by the Seller to the Depositor. or by the Depositor to the Trustee.

17 18.Subject loan was identified within the above referenced Trust using the
18 Bloomberg Terminal. Bloomberg Exhibits A-C contain the following:
19
Exhibit A - Subject loan identified as loan nwnber "9722547" within the
20
BSABS 2004-HE4 Trust, Group 0. (Note: Loan numbers often vary and
21
change from the original loan numbers assigned to the original loan. Also, the
22
"Orig Date" is typically the month following the actual month of origination.
23
This particular loan number matches the loan number on the "EMC
24
correspondence letter" dated 04/18/06 attached as an exhibit.)
25

26

27
5. Declaration of William J. Paatalo
28
Case
Case3:14-cv-01836-MO
3:12-cv-01681-MO Document
Document94 91 Filed
Filed09/08/15
04/30/13 Page
Page35
6 of
of29
61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 220 of 383

Exhibit B- List of 15 "Tranche" Classes within the BSABS 2004-HE4 Trust


1
showing 6 of the 15 tranches being "paid off."
2

4
Exhibit C- Loan level history I data within the BSABS 2004-HE4 Trust.

5
Subject loan is # 108. The data runs perpendicular in the additional pages of

6
the exhibit. The exhibit shows that the subject loan was "paid off' in

7
December of 2005. The "pay history" shows that the subject loan was current

8
("C") as ofNovember of2005, 90-days past due ("9") as of October 2005,

9
60-days past due as of September 2005, and in foreclosure status ("F") as of

10 August 2005. This coincides with the "EMC" letter dated 04/18/06, paragraph

11 4- "Ms. Subramaniam's loan entered foreclosure proceedings on August 9,

12 200[5."]

13
14 19.The EMC letter also states in paragraph 2 - "According to our records, EMC

15 acquired the above referenced loan from People's Choice Home Loan on May

16 1, 2004." What this letter fails to state is that EMC was the "Seller" of the

17 loans to the "Depositor" (Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I LLC, a

18 Delaware limited liability company and a limited purpose finance subsidiary

19 of The Bear Stearns Companies Inc. and an affiliate ofBear, Stearns & Co.

20 Inc.) on that very same day. Also on that very same day, the Depositor was to

21 sell the loans to "LaSalle Bank, N.A. as Trustee for the BSABS 2004-HE4

22 Trust. This statement contradicts the recorded assignments of the DOT.

23
24 20.The Trust's Prospectus does however state, "EMC Mortgage Corporation
25 purchased the mortgage loans directly in privately negotiated transactions. "
26 pg.22
27
6. Declaration of William J. Paatalo
28
Case
Case3:14-cv-01836-MO
3:12-cv-01681-MO Document
Document94 91 Filed
Filed09/08/15
04/30/13 Page
Page36
7 of
of29
61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 221 of 383

21.None of these events took place, and none of the Trust entities ever perfected
1
their security interests for the following reasons:
2

3
A. There have been 3 assignments of the DOT recorded in the county land
4
records. Assignment# 1 was recorded on 06/28/06 as document No. 2006-
5
077542. This assignment was allegedly executed on 12/29/05 whereby
6

7
People's sells, assigns, transfers, and conveys the subject Note and DOT to

8
"Homecomings Financial Network, Inc." (hereinafter "HFN.") This

9
assignment circumvents the entire sale to EMC that was to have occurred

10 on 05/01/04.

11

12 This assignment also occurs within the same month that the subject loan

13 was "paid off' within the BSABS 2004-HE4 Trust.

14
15 B. The 2nd and 3rd assignments of the DOT are simultaneous. The 2nd is

16 recorded on 08/27/08 as doc No. 2008-073971 whereby HFN attempts to

17 assign, sell, convey, and deliver the Note and DOT to "Residential

18 Funding Company, LLC'' (hereinafter "RFC. ") The 3rd is recorded on the

19 same date as doc No. 2008-073972 whereby RFC attempts to assign, sell,

20 convey, and deliver the Note and DOT to "LVN Corporation."

21

22 The first "Notice of Default" which was recorded against the property on

23 06/28/06 as Doc. No. 2006-077544 states in paragraph 3, "CAL-


24 WESTERN RECONVEYANCE CORPORATION as Trustee, hereby
25 certifies that no assignments of the trust deed by the trustee or by the
26 beneficiary and no appointments ofa successor trustee have been made
27 except as recorded in the mortgage records of the county or counties in
7. Declaration of William J. Paatalo
28
Case
Case3:14-cv-01836-MO
3:12-cv-01681-MO Document
Document94 91 Filed
Filed09/08/15
04/30/13 Page
Page37
8 of
of29
61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 222 of 383

1
which the above described real property is situate[d. '1 This statement

2
confirms that no assignment was ever recorded evidencing a sale from

3
People's to any other Trust entity or the Trust itself. This represents a fatal

4
break in the chain of title.

6
22.The Trust's Prospectus states, "Assignments ofthe mortgage loans provided to

7
the custodian on behalfof the trustee will be recorded in the appropriate

8
public office for real property records," pg. S-24.

10 23.To further cloud the title, the subject loan was assigned a MERS identification

11 number "MIN# 1000221-0009722547-8" at some point after origination. A

12 check of the MERS Member directory showed that this number was assigned

13 to "JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. fka EMC." MERS Captures 1&2 are

14 attached as an exhibit and show the subject loan as "inactive" in the MERS

15 Registry with JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. fka EMC as both the servicer and

16 investor.

17 24.0riginated by MERS, the Mortgage Identification Number (MIN) is a unique

18 18-digit number used to track a mortgage loan throughout its life, from

19 origination to securitization to pay off or foreclosure. The MERS Quality

20 Assurance Procedures Manual Glossary defines "Deactivation" as follows:

21 "When a loan becomes inactive on the MERS System for one of the

22 following reasons:

23 Paid in Full (includes payoff, deed in lieu, short sale, etc.)


24 Transfer to non-MERS Status

25 Involuntary transfer/default by Servicer

26 Involuntary transfer/default by Subservicer


27 Foreclosure Complete
8. Declaration of William J. Paatalo
28
Case
Case3:14-cv-01836-MO
3:12-cv-01681-MO Document
Document94 91 Filed
Filed09/08/15
04/30/13 Page
Page38
9 of
of29
61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 223 of 383

Reinstated or modified (option 1), not assigned back to MERS


1
25.The existence of:MERS means that another assignment is missing from the
2
chain of title, as some entity would have had to assign the subject note and
3

4
DOT to MERS if registered in the .MERS system. Because the MERS system
shows "JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., fka EMC" as the owner and investor,
5

6
both assignments #2 & #3 are inconsistent with the facts.

8
26.The failure to record the assignments and sales to the Trust entities, and the

9
failure to disclose the Trust's interest in the subject Note and DOT and

10 subsequent payoff of such, creates a fatal defect in the chain of title. Because

11 the loan was sold to the BSABS 2004-HE4 Trust, as evidenced by the

12 Bloomberg exhibits, and the fact that the subject loan was subsequently ''paid

13 off'' within the trust, the parties now seeking to foreclose the Subramaniam

14 DOT have no standing to seek such relief.

15
16 2 7.I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Oregon and

17 the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct and that this

18 declaration was executed on the 26th day of April, 2013.

19
20

21

22 fe~2~
23 Private Investigator - OR PSID# 49411
24 5200 SW Meadows Rd. #150
Lake Oswego, OR 97035
25 (503) 726-5954
26 Bill. bpia@gmail.com
27
9. Declaration of William J. Paatalo
28
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO
3:12-cv-01681-MO Document 94 91 Filed 09/08/15
04/30/13 Page 39 10 of 61
29
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 224 of 383

CONF\DEN1\AL

<HELP> for explanation.

Search By ,
orig Loan Amount ZIP-
Loan Number :

9722547 '
0001502541
Cl1404736B
E43609031A
0135743926
D10431169A
E43609671A
0001488816
0001502848
Dl3574392A
B13646801A
00013666'73
7018478342
7018473426
' 0402113404
0401202.429
44250234
55439583'
' 55219871
' 1695092.266
1695089562 '

Auatralla 61 2 9777 8600 Braat


Iapan 81 3 3201 8900 81ngapo~ 61 6212 1
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO
3:12-cv-01681-MO Document 94 91 Filed 09/08/15
04/30/13 Page 40 11 of 61
29
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 225 of 383

. ~-- .BP.lfM&tigatNe ~
iXtiiEr:~. ~
CONFIDENTIAL A.
~:... 10

._: -.:.F ' : r _;..\ . ,. . . . -.. :~,.. ,

<HELP> for explanation.


not found

1) PdAl 128, 0 4. 1.50 6/25/31


2) PdA2 75,000 0 5.318 1.50 6/25/31 0738791*.6 FLT, IRC
3) PdA3 33,884 0 5.840 7.03 6/25/34 073879AV4 FLT, STEP, IRC
4) Pd M1 17,776 0 1.019 5.02 6/25/34073879AZ1 MEZ, FLT, STEP,.IRC
5) *
M2 14,220 11,265 2.086 4.83 6/25/34073879BA5 MEZ, FLT, STEP, IRC
6) *
M3 4,444 4,118 2.536 4.73 6/25/34073879BB3 MEZ, FLT, STEP, IRC
7) * M4 3,259 698 3.211 4.68 6/25/34073879BC1 MEZ, FLT, STEP, IRC
8} MS 3,555 1,096 3.736 4.63 6/25/34073879809 MEZ, FLT, STEP, IRC
9) M6 2;963 1,234 6.211 4.56 6/25/34073879BE7 MEZ, FLT, STEP, IRC
10) M7 5;332 487 6.211 0.00 6/25/34073879BF4 MEl, FLT, STEP, IRC
U) Rl 0 0 0.000 0.00 6/25/34 073879BJ6 R
11) R2 0 0 0.000 0.00 6/25/34 073879BK3 R
13) RX 0 0 0.000 0.00 6/25/34 073879BL1 R
14) PdP 0 0 0.000 0.00 6/25/34 073879BG2 SUB, EXE
15} Pd CE 0 0 0.000 0.00 6/25/34 073879BHO SUB

Copyright 2012 81ooaberg Fl~no ,,,


&nT-&00 HlBt-6-0 13-Nov-ZOli 12211?
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO
3:12-cv-01681-MO Document 94 91 Filed 09/08/15
04/30/13 Page 41 12 of 61
29
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 226 of 383

CONFlOENTIAL . '

<HELP> for explanation. ,


<MENU> Return to Previous Screen.

181. 97225+7
1M.9722539
118.9722521
111. 9722513
lU. 9722505
lll9722497
114. 9722489
115. 9722463 .
116. 9722455
.117. 9722448
118.9722430
119. 9722422
U8.9722414
Ul-9722406
m. 9722398
U19722380
124.9722372
125. 9722364

Auatrali11 61 2 S??7 8600 Br111!1 55f;1 3048 45~0 EurQOca 44 20 7330 7500 SarlllCinll 49 6i 9204 1210 Hong Kong 852 29?7 6000
Japan 81 3 3201 8900 Stngapor., 65.6212 1000 u.s. 1 212 311 2000 Copyright 2012 Blooabere Finance L.P.
SN 123029 EST &nT-5 00 H1811-&-o 13.-~v-2012 1222 24
. !
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO
3:12-cv-01681-MO Document 94 91 Filed 09/08/15
04/30/13 Page 42 13 of 61
29
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 227 of 383

<HELP> for explanation.


Screen Printed

9722547
. 109. 9722539
no. 9722521
UL 9722513
112.9722505
113.9722497
U4. 9122489
115. 9722463
U6. 9722455
U7. 9722448
111. 9722430
119. 9722422
120.9722414
121. 9722406
122. 9722398.
123. 9722380
124. 9722372
125. 9722364

Au.tralJa. 61 2 9??? 8600 Brazil 5511 3048 4500 EuroP 44 20 ?330 ?500 Ber~nw 49 69 9204 1210 Hone Kong 852 2977 600Q
Japan 81 3 3201 8900 Singapore 65 6212 1000 u.s. 1 212 318 2000 Cot~wrtht 2012 BloalllbeNII Finance L. P.
8N 12302!1 E8.T sttr~s DO Hl&9~6-0 13-No\12012 12 22 40
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO
3:12-cv-01681-MO Document 94 91 Filed 09/08/15
04/30/13 Page 43 14 of 61
29
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 228 of 383

<HELP> for explanation.


Screen Printed

119.9722539
Ut. 9722521
ut.9722513
112. 9722505
U3. 9722497
114. 9722489
115. 9722463
U6. 9722455
U1.9722448
111.9722430
119. 9722422 -
121. 9722414
ln. 9722406
112. 9722398
12i .9722380
124. 9722372
125.. 9722364

Autralla 61 2 9777 8600 Brazil 5511 3048 4Soo E~rope 44 20 ?330 ?500 Serany 49 69 9204 1210 Hong Kong 852 29?? &000
Japan 81 3 3201 8900 Singapore 65 &212 1000 u.s. 1 212 318 2000 CopyriGht 2012 lloo~erg Finance L.P.
SN 123029 EST &nT-500 H1896-0 13-Mov-ZD12 122250
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO
3:12-cv-01681-MO Document 94 91 Filed 09/08/15
04/30/13 Page 44 15 of 61
29
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 229 of 383

<HELP> for explanation.


Screen Printed

108. 9722547
1", 9722539
un. 9722521
11L 9722513
112.9722505
113. 97"22497
114. 9722489
115. 9722463
116. 972i455
111. 9722448
111.9722430
119. 9722422
120. 9722414 .
ln. 9722406
Ul9722398
123. 9722380
124. 9722372
125. 9722364

Aulltrall'a 61 2 9'1'?? 8600 Brazil 5511 3048 4500 Europe <14 20 7330 '1'500 &e.-.any 4t 69 9204 1210 Ho1111 Kang 852 29'1'7 6000
Japan 81 3 .3201 8900 Slngapare 65 6212 11100 U.S. 1 212 318 2000 CopyrlOht 2012 BloollbetNI Finance L.P.
SN 123029 !ST a"T-500 H189-6-0 13-Nov-2012 122258
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO
3:12-cv-01681-MO Document 94 91 Filed 09/08/15
04/30/13 Page 45 16 of 61
29
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 230 of 383

<HELP> for explanation.


Screen Printed

9722547
11.9722539
ue. 9722521
1U. 9722513
112.'9722505 TlV 8.5
lU. 9722497
U4. 9722489
us. 9722463 TlV
116. 9722455 TlV
117. 9722448 TlV
118. 9722430
U9. 9722422
ut.9722414 TlY
121. 9722406 TlY
122.9722398
123. 9722380
124. 9722372
125. 9722364

Autralla 61 2 I??? 8600 Brazil 5511 3048 4500 Eur~ 44 20 ?330.?500 Garnany 49 69 9204 1210 Hong Kong 852 29?? 6000
.Japan 81 3 3201 8900 Slngapora 6S 6212 1000 U.S. 1 212 318 2000 Copyright 2012 Bloolllberg l'lnanco L.P.
. . 8N 123029 EST &MT-500 H1896-0 13-Hoy-2012' 12230?
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO
3:12-cv-01681-MO Document 94 91 Filed 09/08/15
04/30/13 Page 46 17 of 61
29
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 231 of 383

<HELP> for explanation.


Screen Printed

101. 9722547
189. 9722539
110.9722521
1119722513
112. 9722505
1119722497
114. 9722489
115. 9722463
lU. 9722455
117. 9722448
111.9722430
119.9722422
118.9722414
12L 9722406
122. 9722398
123.9722380
1.24.9722372
125. 9722364

Autralla 61 2 9?77 8600 Bra3ll 5511 3048 4500 Europe 4+ 2D 7330 7500.Ger.any 49 699204 1210 Hong Kong 852 297? 6000
Japan 81 3 3201 8900 Singapore 65 6212 1000 u.s. 1 212 318 2000 Copyright 2012 Bloa.berg Finane L.P.
SH 123029 EST ~nT-SOG H1896-0 13-Nov-2012 122318
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO
3:12-cv-01681-MO Document 94 91 Filed 09/08/15
04/30/13 Page 47 18 of 61
29
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 232 of 383

<HELP> for explanation.


Screen Printed

ltL
l&J.9722539
lll. 9722521
w. 9722513
112.9722505
113. 9722497
I 114,9722~
115.9722463 P .. t.~l"'fl'lc;;rnl~A Housing
116. 9722455 Housing
U7. 9722448 P::.i.dnfl~Strclfl Housing
111.9722430 Pirtnf'iFJc;.;ttl"' Housing
119. 9722422 Housing
ua. 9722414 p.,;,rtntl~<;;.,c~ Housing
l21.972i406 Pat,doflFISirlcle Housing
m; 9722398
123. 9722380
124.9722372
125. 9722364

Auairalla 61 2 9?77 saoD Brazil 5511 3048 4500 Europe 44 20 7330 7500 Germany 49 69 9204 1210 Hong Kang 852 2977 6000
.Japan 81 3 320.1 8900 Slngai)Orll 65 6212 1000 u.s. l 212 318 20.00 COP11rlgh1: 2012 Bloollbel'9 Flnan,se L.P.
SM 123029 EST GMT-500 H189-SO 13-Nov-2012 122332
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO
3:12-cv-01681-MO Document 94 91 Filed 09/08/15
04/30/13 Page 48 19 of 61
29
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 233 of 383

<HELP> for explanation.


Screen Printed

109. 9n25-39
U8.9722521
1lL 9722513
1129722505
Ul9722497
U4. 9722489
us. 9722463
ru. 9722455
111. 9722448
us. 9722430
119. 9722422
12t. 9n2414
. 121.9722406
122. 9722398
123. 9722380
124. 9722372
us. 9722364

AuatrGlla61 2 9777 8600 Brazil 5511 3048 4500 urope 44 20 7330 7500 S.r.any 49 69 9204 1210 Hong Kong 852 2977 6000
Japon 81 3 3201 8900 Slnga111o,.. 65 6212 1000 U. B. 1 212 318 2000 . Copyright 2012 Bloollberg Finance L. p.
811 123029 EST G"T-5o DO H189-I-O 13-Nov-2012 12.23"42
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO
3:12-cv-01681-MO Document 94 91 Filed 09/08/15
04/30/13 Page 49 20 of 61
29
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 234 of 383

.l
-
BP lnveslgative

EXHIIIT
~. .J i
D -

Aprll18, 2006

Stateof()regon
Departmeot of Consumer and Business Services
Attention: Timothy'C. Spencer
P.O. Box 14480
Salem., OR 973()9..0405

Ro: Loan Number. 0009722547


Mortgagor: oeru.se Subramamam
Property Address: 13865 S.W. Walker Rd.
Beaverto1i. OR 97005

Dear iunothy C. Spencer:

EM.C MortpJe Corporation (:EMC) is dedicated to providing the bigbest lovel of cuatoJn
service. Yoar~ are very important to us, and we appreciate tbe opportuDity to provide
you with the foUowbla info~n reprding the servicint of this account

Aectxdins to our records, BMC acquired tbe above-referenced loan ftom People's Cbolce Home
Loan on May 1, 2004. We have enclosfld a copy of the Welcome Letter we mailed to Ms.
SubraulaDiam following the trabdr. lD addition. we have enclosed a copy of our JnO!tpp's
loaohistOJy. The first ~EMCreceived for this loan. in tbeamounto$1,169.76. was
applied on July 1, 2004 as the May 2004 installinent. The JUDe ~004 installment was appUed tO
the loan on 1oly 6, 2004, llJid a payment in the amount of~39.52was applied towatd the July
2004 aod August 2004 iostaJ.lmon15 on Aupst 23, 2004. Om- reconJs indicate tbat we did not
receive a payment in September 2004, October 2004, March 2005, July 2005 or August 2005. If
our mortsagor is in disput& of our findings, she may forward ftollt al back copies of canceD.ed
checks for the paymems -in question to the mailinJI!ldress..below. If our researc:hconffmis that
any paymems are missins. we wi,l1 make the apprOpriate adJustments to our ercdit reporting.
s
~ Ms. Subramaniam' loaD entered fO:n:closure prOCNA'Ihs on August 9, 2005, at which time the ; i; :.
Joan was paSt due for the May 2005 iastallmenL ForecloSill'e action wu suspended on
September 16, 2005, wben ourmortp90r entered a forbearance agreement. ~er the terms of
this agreement. ourmortgagorwasrequirecl to pay$1,349.76'by the 12thoeach~onth from
October 200S through September 2006.: Please be advised that we allowed OW' mo~ to
remit several ofber payments after the stipulated duo date, attd we maintained tbis aareement
with OlD' mortpgor until tbe loaD. was transfemd to GMAC-RFC'JHomecominp (GMAC) on
.February 9, 2006.

...
Mae ArdlDr IUclp II,~......_ ltkfte Drive. Sldte 200,1m.r, Tesu 75038
MAJ1.JNG ADDlO.SS: P.O. lex .J41358, 1m.,. Ttas ?501+-1351
A -
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO
3:12-cv-01681-MO Document 94 91 Filed 09/08/15
04/30/13 Page 50 21 of 61
29
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 235 of 383

State af Oregon
Apn11S. 2006
Page Two

Our recorda rotlect that Ms. &ibramaniam's property insurance policy was cancelled on Maad1
15. 2005, requirJD& BMC to establish tender-placed ~ance and croate an escrovv 8COOI.Uit far
payment of this coverage. A~ fortbi ~in the amount of$1,486.00 was
paid from 0\B' ~a escrow account on .May 25, 2005. A partial rciimd in the amount of
$139.00 was forwarded to GMAC on February 15, 2006 for tbe Ullll8ed portion of this policy. If
our mortpaor is in posseaion of .videoce of continuous coverap since Macll200S, she may
forward it to our mailiq adc:lms so that we may diabulse an additioaal re&nd to GMAC to
reirnbame Ms. Subtamaaiam's accouat. In additiott. our :reconla reJlect thtt EMC issued a
disbummcmt fi'om the escrow account ta our mortgagor's county tax oftice in the D01Jl1t of
$2,107.34 for cle1inqlleDt taxes duo in October 2004 on Oe1ober 17, 2005, imd a separate
disbursema1t ibr tans due in October 2005 in the amouDt of 12,269.74 on N~ 10, 2005.
Pleaae bo advised tbatourmottgap"s forbearance agreement did not inelude repayment tbttbe
tax and iDsutm:c escrow advances

.Aceoldinltn tho cnclosecl Note, this loiln bas an adjustable iuterest .rato, 8'taftiDg at 6.99 percent .
at the origination of tho loan. and subject to chanp dot two yeaTS. In a leU date4 Iamiary 26, .
2006, we iDfonnecl Ms. Subrlaaniam that her interest ram would iDctease to 9.99 percem
effective with the Apri12006 instalknel1t Please be advised dlat our mortglp"atOrbearanoo
agreementdid.DOtcbange tho interesrrate terms of the Note. In addiDon, the Note reflects a
pn!p8)'DK'Ili penalty in oflbct for the tim two years of the mortpge.
Please no1e that wo are onable to pro:vide Ms. Subramaniam with a payoif statement, as we are
no .lonp' serviciDg b Joan. It'M& Subnunauiaan would like to obtiin ~ payotr scatomeat. or if
she baa any queatioaa n=gardiug the current .-vicing of her loam, she may CODtact GMAC at 1- .,
800-247-9727. : r
Should you have lilY further questions regarding EMC's servicing of this martpp loao. plea8e
can out Cuatomer Service Executive Desk at 1-800..69>7695, extension 7377, Monday 1:hroll&b
.Friday between the hours of7:30 a.m. aDd 4:30p.m. Cezdrat rime.

EncloMlres: Welcome 1.e1ttar


Loan History
Note

cc: Denise SUbnmaaiam


13865 S.W. Wilker Rd.
. Beaverton, OR 97005
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO
3:12-cv-01681-MO Document 94 91 Filed 09/08/15
04/30/13 Page 51 22 of 61
29
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 236 of 383

-------- --
- - ---~---- --~- -~ ~~-.1--
(

...
, -~~--.,,.v .... ~ .... -~~ ---- ~ .. - - . -- - '

~~~~-,H
Seiii!!? ~~ --~
~~Ofll
,.. . . -- 'K'i I d illlti . 'I' .1 " " - - . . . PIIfl''i it~ f 1 .1. _11 U If II . . . . . II "'fM :rf- Z)l('5ii''"WW1*tj IUJk'f PI. :"'A'IV~ I , .... ~,. ::::.-'i!j~lf.ilil:f&~~,~S~~:J~

~ ~ ~ ServlcedD_ lllves~ Windows Internet xplorer


w - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - -
t#._httpso!!~-mers5ei'Vic.erid.orgfslsiinv_~:-~-----
Needhelp1 0
~~~1fJ.t.lt~~ u _-~rm!i:!GfitWtii~il!Hf~~MUt.t~~

! Inactive
Select bomver type lind en(er borroWfN' inft>mt.atkm to - IrtVIIMor for J>UN l000221.Q0091225478

Inve5tor for IndlvlduaJ Borrower

--~~~:;~ctriow-c~H
>~...~ {subrs_ma~~ "*
:~t . . -~~W~l __ ::._
:-~-~;~tnk~-~~~~~~~~~repre~f#.~i,~kl~lila~6e.or~~-mltlh~~--- !!WYldJlifliAAO{Q
.orboirVwei'sautnOitZ#.td~vforllittloanm~.A~~WI.sl.f to~mt#JefdCltJtycftlutir/Qci.n'slt'lvftsb)r

E~!!$,~~~;~~~~~~x
-: . <.. _. .. _,

@ Investo' for Corporation/,.on-Person Ent:ity Borrower


-~---~--__..,,,._~-----~ .. ... -_....,._,......., ...... _ _ ,.;:...,. ..._,_...,-4< _ _ _ <_ . . - ... '" .......... ""___......,.._""...."_____________________ _

Servlc;er: JfMQH.l'JD ~ba~ 1;}'!1:,, fj.l;,f.ka t;Ms; Phone: (800) 8489136


Monroe,. LA

Investor: lPMorgan Chase ~nk, N.A.fka ENC


.,. .. ,. .. ., ",.._,. ,..,.. .;.,.,..,. -o'O'... - .,.,. ... ., ,. ,. ., ,. "~" ,..,. ., .... ,. . . . .,.,. . . .,.'... ..,,. . . . . _..,.,. .. ,0 .... .,..,. .. ,..,...,. - .. ,.., ,..., ..... .,..,. .,,._,. .. ,. ... .., ,. ~ .. --.-,..,. "\. " .. ~ .. .,..., " - ... .,.,...,,. .. "' ..,,.. . . . . . . . ,. .,.., ., "r.,. ,...,. __
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO
3:12-cv-01681-MO Document 94 91 Filed 09/08/15
04/30/13 Page 52 23 of 61
29
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 237 of 383

1'

~~~~-~-
tr~~"'fill!!itl!tli!I'.J'~~--~'ti'J.'<t-lillllt!llll~'lmiJ!Illlll.lill!ii-'"~;ll!JW<iiffit'Ji!lli;l-..Jr:::l1!Jilt\'i#i;iS!lliii!ilill<iiiJiiliru!!li1l~llli.'~rliille~.r.!I1JI.~~

1 record matched your search:


NeeiJ help? 0
MIN: 1000221-0009722547-8 Note Date: 02/10/2004 MIN Status: Inactive

5ervicer: JPMQrg!;,ln Qls~ t;}gnk~ fi.A.fka EM&; Phone: {800) 848~9136


Monroe, LA

If you are a borrower on this loan, you can click here to enter additional information and dtsplay the Investor name.
---t-'........................~...... :.............................- ..........,........ ,.............................. ,.............._.,,........,.. ..................... ~ ........................ ;.,..........,.......~ .................... _, .. _,,., ... :,...... .-....... -............................... ,.,.....,_..., :...................................,.,., .........~ ..~.. .:. ....,......,..... ,.--. ,~,.,

Return t:Q SearrJl


. . . . . _. . . .
~ ~~---- . . . . . . _. . . """'' "'. .'"""',..__ ~.~-~----'!""""!--..,_- . . -.. . _. .._,.:;. , ,. . ~----......._ . . __ ___..,.._~.-- . .-------......._. ~-~- .. . ,..--.. _. ___.,.._ . . . . . . . .-...._. . . . . . _____._,. . . . . . . . . -.-------l"'"'r'"'~'.-.....~- .. ,_..--~ ........ ---~--- ...--,..

For more informatiOn about Mort:gage Eled:ronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) please go to www,mgrsioc,grn
Copy.cight~. ~;i:i!.;;!. h\' MFRSC('HH> <iGldih~<ci, In;;.
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 53 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 238 of 383

Defendants Exhibit E
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 54 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 239 of 383
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 55 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 240 of 383
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 56 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 241 of 383
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 57 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 242 of 383

Defendants Exhibit F
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 58 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 243 of 383
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 59 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 244 of 383
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 60 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 245 of 383
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 94 Filed 09/08/15 Page 61 of 61
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 246 of 383
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 1 of 92
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 247 of 383
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 2 of 92
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 248 of 383
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 3 of 92
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 249 of 383
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 4 of 92
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 250 of 383
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 5 of 92
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 251 of 383
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 6 of 92
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 252 of 383
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 7 of 92
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 253 of 383

Notice in the top signature


the signer makes two
distinct letters A & B with
the pen leaving the paper to
form the letter B. But in
the second signature the
signer's pen never leaves
the paper and from the top
forms the downstroke of the
B. The letters A & B are
both formed very differently
in these two signatures.
This is too much of a
variation to be the same
individual making both of
the signatures.
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 8 of 92
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 254 of 383

Notice that this assignment was filed on


December 6, 2000 while the second
assignment was filed on September 5, 2001.
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 9 of 92
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 255 of 383

Notice this first assignment


purports to covey interest from
Aames Funding Corp. to Aames
Capital Corp.

This is yet a different


variation of the "Amy
Brackett" signature from
the earlier two.

Notice that the date that


the notary signed this is
October 26, 2008. The
document was purportedly
filed in December 2001.

This is definitely 2008 because a clearer copy of this document was included in the packet
Jeff Hardaway sent us two days before LNV sold our home with the fake welcome letter.
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 10 of 92
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 256 of 383

This one is filed on September 5, 2001.


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 11 of 92
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 257 of 383

This one purports to


convey interest from
Aames Capital Corp. to
Bankers Trust Company
of California N.A. in Trust
for the benefit of the
holders of Aames
Mortgage Trust 2000-2
Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series
2000-2, C/O Countrywide
Home Loans SV-70.

Notice here the date


is 2000. why would
a later conveyance
have an earlier
execution date?
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 12 of 92
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 258 of 383

I took this with my


camera so to show it
is definitely 2008 and
not 2000 I also took a
close-up of just the
date which is in the
insert below
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 13 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
58-2
10528084,
Filed 01/23/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
14 of 54
259 PageID
of 383 1062
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 14 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
58-2
10528084,
Filed 01/23/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
15 of 54
260 PageID
of 383 1063
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 15 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
58-2
10528084,
Filed 01/23/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
16 of 54
261 PageID
of 383 1064
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 16 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
58-2
10528084,
Filed 01/23/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
17 of 54
262 PageID
of 383 1065
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 17 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
58-2
10528084,
Filed 01/23/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
18 of 54
263 PageID
of 383 1066
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 18 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
58-2
10528084,
Filed 01/23/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
19 of 54
264 PageID
of 383 1067
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 19 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
58-2
10528084,
Filed 01/23/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
20 of 54
265 PageID
of 383 1068
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 20 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
58-1
10528084,
Filed 01/23/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
20 of 39
266 PageID
of 383 1029

Broker forged our signatures


without our knowledge or
permission.
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 21 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
58-1
10528084,
Filed 01/23/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
21 of 39
267 PageID
of 383 1030

Broker forged our


signatures without
our knowledge or
our permission
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 22 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
58-1
10528084,
Filed 01/23/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
22 of 39
268 PageID
of 383 1031

They closed without


the Texas title. They
also state this is
"special"
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 23 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
58-1
10528084,
Filed 01/23/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
23 of 39
269 PageID
of 383 1032
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 24 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
58-1
10528084,
Filed 01/23/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
24 of 39
270 PageID
of 383 1033

Broker crossed out


our automobile
loans to improve
our debt to income
ratio without our
knowledge or
permission. We did
not see any of
these documents
until March 2011.
Scott Hayes,
attorney for MGC,
gave them to our
attorney, Emil
Lippe, case #
DC-10-02189
Dallas District Court
in 2010 but we did
get them until we
changed attorneys
in 2011.

There are no
signatures on this
document
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 25 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
58-1
10528084,
Filed 01/23/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
25 of 39
271 PageID
of 383 1034

No signatures
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 26 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
58-1
10528084,
Filed 01/23/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
26 of 39
272 PageID
of 383 1035

Only the Broker's


signature
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 27 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
58-1
10528084,
Filed 01/23/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
27 of 39
273 PageID
of 383 1036
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 28 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
58-1
10528084,
Filed 01/23/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
28 of 39
274 PageID
of 383 1037

We believe now that the broker may


have "fudged" information on the
documents to "fix" these problems.
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 29 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
58-1
10528084,
Filed 01/23/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
29 of 39
275 PageID
of 383 1038
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 30 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
58-1
10528084,
Filed 01/23/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
30 of 39
276 PageID
of 383 1039

No Signatures
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 31 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
58-1
10528084,
Filed 01/23/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
31 of 39
277 PageID
of 383 1040
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 32 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
58-1
10528084,
Filed 01/23/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
32 of 39
278 PageID
of 383 1041

No Signatures
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 33 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
58-1
10528084,
Filed 01/23/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
33 of 39
279 PageID
of 383 1042
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 34 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
58-1
10528084,
Filed 01/23/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
34 of 39
280 PageID
of 383 1043

Why are our signatures completely separated


from the contract and/or the documents we are
supposedly acknowledging with our signatures?
None of the Truth in Lending Disclosure
Statement pages contain our signatures, and we
never received them, so we were never given
proper legal disclosure under the Truth in
Lending Act. A judicial determination was
already made as to this fact by Judge Tanya
Parker in the 116th District Court, case #
DC-11-07087.
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 35 of 92
Case
Case:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document ID:6210528084,
Filed 08/10/15
DktEntry:Page
63-2,1 Page
of 4 PageID
281 of 383
2947

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
SAMUEL G. BREITLING AND
JO ANN BREITLING,

Plaintiffs,

vs. NO. 3:15-CV-00703-B

LNV CORPORATION, ET AL., MOTION TO VACATE
JUDGE TILLERYS VOID
Defendants. ORDER

AFFIDAVIT OF WADE KRICKEN IN SUPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO VACATE


JUDGE TILLERYS VOID ORDER

Come now Plaintiffs, Samuel G. and JoAnn S. Breitling, who are self represented and

incorporate herein their pleadings in the following directly related cases:

1. LNV Corporation v. Breitlings et al, Civil Cause DC-14-04053 in the Dallas County
District Court in the 134th Judicial District, filed on April 15, 2014
2. Breitlings v. LNV Corporation et al, Civil Cause DC-14-09604 in the Dallas County
District Court in the 101st Judicial District, filed on August 29
3. Breitling et al. v. LNV Corporation et al., Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-3322-M (first
removal by Beal entities to this U.S. District Court, heard by Judge Barbara Lynn)
4. LNV Corporation v. Breitlings et al, Civil Cause No. JD15-00071C in the Justice of the
Peace Court Number 2 in Garland Texas, Judge Gerry Cooper
5. LNV Corporation v. Breitlings et al, Civil Cause No. CC-15-00911-C in the County
Courts at Law Number 3 in Dallas County, Judge Sally Montgomery
6. LNV Corporation v. Breitlings et al, Civil Cause No. 05-15-0677-CV in the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas at Dallas, filed on or around May 27, 2015
7. Breitling et al. v. LNV Corporation et al., Civil Action No. 3:15-cv-00703-B (second
removal by Beal entities) U.S. District Court, now heard by Judge Jane Boyle.

Plaintiffs submit to this court the affidavit of attorney Wade Kricken who was present in

behalf of Plaintiffs for a May 8, 2015 hearing in the County Court of Law before Judge Sally

Montgomery and therefore has personal knowledge of what happened at this hearing. This
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 36 of 92
Case
Case:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document ID:6210528084,
Filed 08/10/15
DktEntry:Page
63-2,2 Page
of 4 PageID
282 of 383
2948

hearing was scheduled because Plaintiffs appealed the eviction order issued by Judge Gerry

Cooper in the Garland, Texas J.P. Court on January 26, 2015. (Defendant LNVs eviction

complaint heard by Cooper was filed as a result of a void order issued by Dale B. Tillery on

August 4, 2014.) Pursuant to Texas Rule 506.1(h) of Civil Procedure Plaintiffs were supposed to

be given a trial de novo meaning a new trial as if the trial in the J.P. court had never happened.

This is not what happened. Sally Montgomery conducted no trial and made an

immediate decision to give possession to LNV. As shown by the transcript of the hearing

attached to the Affidavit of JoAnn Breitling in support of Plaintiffs motion to vacate Tillerys

void order she did so because she was asked to. Her decision is in direct violation of Texas

Rule 506.1(h) of Civil Procedures. Judges are not supposed to violate Texas Rules because they

are asked to. LNVs Counsel Luke Madole is the person who asked her to; and he contributed

heavily to her judicial campaign. It is unconstitutional, and may be considered criminal, for a

judge to make a ruling based on personal gain (political financial contributions resulted in Sally

Montgomery winning a position as a judge with considerable authority over the lives of

individual Texans brought before her, and such a position could/should be considered a personal

gain.) Therefore the unconstitutional and void order of Tillery has resulted in further violations

of Plaintiffs constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law; and to further

damages to Plaintiffs.

Respectfully Submitted,

__________________________________ __________________________________
JoAnn Breitling Samuel G. Breitling
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 37 of 92
Case
Case:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document ID:6210528084,
Filed 08/10/15
DktEntry:Page
63-2,3 Page
of 4 PageID
283 of 383
2949
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 38 of 92
Case
Case:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document ID:6210528084,
Filed 08/10/15
DktEntry:Page
63-2,4 Page
of 4 PageID
284 of 383
2950
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 39 of 92
Case
Case:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document ID:6110528084,
Filed 08/03/15
DktEntry:Page
63-2,1 Page
of 4 PageID
285 of 383
2943

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
SAMUEL G. BREITLING AND
JO ANN BREITLING,

Plaintiffs,

vs. NO. 3:15-CV-00703-B

LNV CORPORATION, ET AL., MOTION TO VACATE
JUDGE TILLERYS VOID
Defendants. ORDER
s
AFFIDAVIT OF ANNIE BREITLING IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO
VACATE JUDGE TILLERYS VOID ORDER

Come now Plaintiffs, Samuel G. and JoAnn S. Breitling, self represented, and incorporate

herein their other pleadings in this case and their related cases and submit this sworn Affidavit in

support of their motion to vacate Tillerys void order issued on August 4, 2014 granting

Defendant LNV Corporation (LNV) summary judgment in LNV Corporation v. Breitlings et

al, Case# DC-14-04053 in the Dallas County District Court in the 134th Judicial District. Affiant

Annie Breitling was present for the non-judicial foreclosure sale of Plaintiffs property n the 29th

day after the said void order was issued to LNV; which violated the automatic stay Plaintiffs

invoked pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 736.11 by filing Breitlings v. LNV

Corporation et al, Case# DC-14-09604 in the 101st Dallas County District Court.

Respectfully Submitted,

________________________________ ________________________________
JoAnn Breitling Samuel G. Breitling
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 40 of 92
Case
Case:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document ID:6110528084,
Filed 08/03/15
DktEntry:Page
63-2,2 Page
of 4 PageID
286 of 383
2944
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 41 of 92
Case
Case:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document ID:6110528084,
Filed 08/03/15
DktEntry:Page
63-2,3 Page
of 4 PageID
287 of 383
2945
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 42 of 92
Case
Case:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document ID:6110528084,
Filed 08/03/15
DktEntry:Page
63-2,4 Page
of 4 PageID
288 of 383
2946
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 43 of 92
Case Case:
3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document
ID: 10528084,
54 Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
1 of 26
289PageID
of 383 894

Samuel G. Breitling and JoAnn Breitling


Plaintiffs,
Civil Action No 3:14-cv-3322-M
vs.
LNV Corporation, ET AL.,
Defendants

Dear Honorable Judge Barbara Lynn,


January 1, 2015

URGENT LETTER AND AFFIDAVIT TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE BARBARA LYNN

I am filing this letter to the court with a great sense of urgency. Your honorable Judge Barbara Lynn
has ordered a stay on the above referenced case, pending her decision about whether the federal court
has jurisdiction or whether the case will be remanded back to the State court where we filed it.
D. Andrew Beal, the owner of Defendant corporations LNV and MGC Mortgage, have hired yet another
law firm, Buckley Madole, P.C., which sent us a letter timed to be received at a time guaranteed to ruin
any chance of holiday spirit or joy for our family.
The letter dated December 30, 2014 was received on December 31, and opened by me the morning of
January 1, 2015. It is a three day demand to vacate premises. This letter from attorney signed by
Sammy Hooda at Buckley Madole is attached to our letter to this Honorable Court. I had to take a
photograph of the letter with my cell phone to attach here as I have no printer and no place is open
where I could copy and scan it.
LNV Corporation aka D. Andrew Beal knows that we filed a timely independent complaint on August
29, 2014 against LNV and others specific to LNVs standing to foreclose which invoked an automatic
stay under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 736.11; that we timely filed a lis pendens with our county;
and that we notified Beal and his attorneys of the automatic stay and lis pendens prior to the sale, yet
Beal willfully instructed his LNV Corporation and his attorneys Defendant Codilis and Stawiarski
proceed with an illegal sale of our home.
Beal through his LNV Corporation, and his attorneys willfully violated Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
736.11with intent to harm us and to cause us to suffer extreme emotional distress, physical injury and
financial losses, as well as to unjustly enrich himself by illegally depriving us of our property without
due process. Beals MGC Mortgage Inc. was informed by Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott in a letter
dated October 4, 2010 that states:
It is likely that affidavits and other documents, such as deeds of trust and appointments of
substitute trustees, with the issues described above [robosigning] may have been used in
connection with foreclosures in the State of Texas. Regardless of whether the foreclosure was
nonjudicial or a judicial one in connection with a home equity loan, home equity line of credit
or reverse mortgage, if any of the practices described above [robosigning]were utilized in
establishing MGC Mortgage Inc.s authority to conduct the sale or obtain a court order for a
sale, such use would have been in violation of Section 17.46(a) of the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act; Section 392.304, Texas Debt Collection Practices Act; Section 37.02, Texas Penal
Code; Section 12.001, Texas Property Code; Section 406.009, Texas Government Code; Texas
Constitution Article 16, Section 50; and/or Rule 376(1), Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and the
document and therefore the foreclosure sale would have been invalid.
Greg Abbotts letter was included as part of Plaintiffs Exhibit D to Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants
LNV & MGCs Motion for Leave to File Reply in Support of Objections to Recommendation and Brief in
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 44 of 92
Case Case:
3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document
ID: 10528084,
54 Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
2 of 26
290PageID
of 383 895

Support [See Document 52 page 120 and 121 of 125.] For Your Honors convenience a copy of this
letter is also attached here.
Typical of every such event orchestrated by Beal or his corporations, it is timed during a holiday so
that it is impossible to respond quickly. To comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1) I
need to file a notarized affidavit, but because today is January 1st and a holiday it is impossible to find a
notary within the three day time limit which expires on January 2, 2015.
Eviction will cause me and my family irreparable harm. I am 65 years old, and I have been medically
disabled since 1998. My husband has been medically disabled since 2002. He currently has a blockage
in his heart and a tumor in his esophagus. His medical problems have been adversely affected, if not
caused by, the years of emotion distress caused by ongoing court battles with Beals corporations.
Our 31-year-old son lives with us and he is completely dependent on us for his care. He was born with
Down syndrome. In 2013 he was diagnosed with Achalasia, a rare disease of the auto-immune system
that affects one in 100,000 people. He requires a regular schedule, a clean environment, a special and
highly restrictive diet and around-the-clock supervision and monitoring. Illegal displacement from our
home would be devastating to his emotional, psychological and physical health and his sense of well
being. None of us could recover from such an ordeal. An unjust and illegal eviction could easily cause
the death of my husband and possibly our son.
Since LNV filed its fraudulent "in rem" foreclosure action against us on April 15, 2014 my husband has
had the following emergency visits to the hospital on or about the following dates: June 26, 2014
(another blockage to his heart was found); September 9, 2014 (he developed pneumonia right after
our home was illegally sold); September 25, 2014; November 25, 2014; and December 19, 2014.
Other Beal victims have also experienced multiple hospitalizations and/or serious health problems
caused by serve and prolonged stress. A disproportional number of Beal Victims are senior citizens
and single females and/or disabled. Almost, if not all, Beals victims in our group had built significant
equity into their homes. We are the most vulnerable citizens in our society and this makes us targets
for Beals crimes.
We are part of a growing group of Beal victims whove all been reporting the activities of Beals
corporations and his agents to the U.S. Justice Department and the FBI.
In early December FBI agent Darrell James walked into Beal Bank asking questions about MGC. Since
then Beal has increased his intimidation and harassment of the handful of us who are publically vocal
about his activities. Attached to this letter are some of a series of letters written by J. Pat Heptig,
another Beal attorney, and sent to several of the Beal victims, including me. Our online postings are
well within our freedom of speech rights under the First Amendment of the Constitution. D. Andrew
Beal is a public figure and lots of information exists explaining how he would need to prove what we
are saying about him is false and that we knew it was false and that he was actually harmed by what
we said and that we said it with malicious intent knowing it was false to prevail in a defamation action
against us. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 376
U.S. 254 (1964), New York Times Co. v. United States 403 u.s. 713 (1971), Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F. 2d 1270 -
Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit 1986, Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18
L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967).
It is hard to believe Beals attorney, Mr. Heptig, doesnt know this; which means he is sending these
letters specifically to intimidate and harass us and cause emotional harm. But Beal doesnt stop there.
He filed a foreclosure action against Denise Subramaniam in Oregon that will most certainly prove to
be fraudulent and his LNV falsely claimed that Stuart Hamm had not made payments while in
bankruptcy since July 2014 and motioned the court to lift the automatic stay so they could sell his
familys home. Ive attached LNVs motion and copies of the Hamms checks made payable to MGC and
cashed by DMI for the months LNV claims they were not paid.
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 45 of 92
Case Case:
3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document
ID: 10528084,
54 Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
3 of 26
291PageID
of 383 896

There is no question about whether D. Andrew Beal knew he violated the laws, including Texas penal
code, by utilized forged, false, and robosigned documents in establishing MGCs or LNVs authority to
conduct the sale of our home or to obtain a court order for the sale of our home; or that D. Andrew
Beal knows the foreclosure sale of our home is invalid; Greg Abbotts letter to MGC in 2010 evidences
these facts.
This Honorable Court has a constitutional obligation to uphold the United States Constitution and to
protect our constitutional right to not be deprived of our property, our liberty and our lives without
due process.
D. Andrew Beal and his corporations and the attorneys he hires have absolutely no regard for the law.
They are attempting to circumvent this court and execute an eviction this threat is no longer a
conjecture it is a fact.
D. Andrew Beal appears to enjoy inflicting as much pain and suffering on his victims as he possibly
can; he is nothing more than a thug operating a criminal enterprise. D. Andrew Beal has a personal
vendetta against me and the other outspoken victims who have been reporting his activities to
government officials; he is doing this in retaliation.
Quoting the Honorable Judge Bennett of the United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, C.D. in his Opinion
and Order decided January 11, 1993:
In discharging their duties, federal courts must protect the constitutional rights of prison
inmates in the face of a prison regulation or practice which offends a fundamental constitutional
guarantee. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 486, 89 S.Ct. 747, 749, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969); Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-406, 94 S.Ct. 1800,1807-08, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974), overruled in part by
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989); Turner, 482 U.S. at 84,
107 S.Ct. at 2259.
We are not prison inmates but law abiding citizens who have had the misfortune to become victims of
a crime; we are powerless to protect ourselves and our constitutional rights under these
circumstances and beseech Your Honor and this Court to do everything within its power to protect us
from an illegal and unjust eviction from our home pending ligation; and to sanction the Beal
Defendants for their continuing willful abuse of judicial process.
The statements I make herein are true to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, formed
after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances. I do hereby swear to the statements I make
herein are sworn statements made with my hand on a Bible; and a swear to tell the truth and only the
truth. I beseech this Honorable Court to accept this as my sworn affidavit under the urgency of this
situation.

With All Sincerely

JoAnn Breitling

1704 Cornwall Lane


Sachse, Texas 75048
214-674-6572

CC: U.S. Justice Deptment, FBI


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 46 of 92
Case Case:
3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document
ID: 10528084,
54 Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
4 of 26
292PageID
of 383 897
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 47 of 92
Case Case:
3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document
ID: 10528084,
54 Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
5 of 26
293PageID
of 383 898
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 48 of 92
Case Case:
3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document
ID: 10528084,
54 Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
6 of 26
294PageID
of 383 899
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 49 of 92
Case Case:
3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document
ID: 10528084,
54 Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
7 of 26
295PageID
of 383 900
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 50 of 92
Case Case:
3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document
ID: 10528084,
54 Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
8 of 26
296PageID
of 383 901
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 51 of 92
Case Case:
3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document
ID: 10528084,
54 Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
Page Page
9 of 26
297PageID
of 383 902
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 52 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID: 54
10528084,
Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: Page
63-2, 10
Page
of 26
298 PageID
of 383 903
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 53 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID: 54
10528084,
Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: Page
63-2, 11
Page
of 26
299 PageID
of 383 904
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 54 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID: 54
10528084,
Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: Page
63-2, 12
Page
of 26
300 PageID
of 383 905
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 55 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID: 54
10528084,
Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: Page
63-2, 13
Page
of 26
301 PageID
of 383 906
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 56 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID: 54
10528084,
Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: Page
63-2, 14
Page
of 26
302 PageID
of 383 907
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 57 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID: 54
10528084,
Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: Page
63-2, 15
Page
of 26
303 PageID
of 383 908

Joann Breitling <joannbreitling@yahoo.com> Thu, Jan 1, 2015 at 5:09 PM


Reply-To: Joann Breitling <joannbreitling@yahoo.com>
To: Dee Syfert <deesyfert@gmail.com>

On Monday, December 15, 2014 8:49 AM, Pat Heptig <pheptig@heptiglaw.com> wrote:

Mrs. Breitling,
Thank you for your cooperation in promptly removing the letter from the scribd.com website.
Please remove the false and defamatory statements about my clients on the
www.bealvictims.com website as well.
Respectfully,

Pat Heptig
Heptig Law Group, Ltd.

From: Joann Breitling [mailto:joannbreitling@yahoo.com]


Sent: Saturday, December 13, 2014 7:58 AM
To: pheptig@heptiglaw.com
Subject: "Cease and Desist Letter"

December 13, 2014

Dear Mr. Heptig,

This letter is to inform you that I am in receipt of your "cease and desist" letter that your client, Andy Beal,
asked you to send to me. I want you to know that I am not a "troublemaker", my intent was never to harm
any of the "Beal entities", and I have requested that Ms. Subramaniam remove my letter from you collection.
(I do not have access to do this. It is HER account.) She has assured me that the letter will be removed in
a timely manner.

My removal of the letter is not an admission that the statements I made in my very heartfelt letter were false
and defamatory to the "Beal entities". You are evidently unaware of the activities of your client, I realize that
as his attorney your are only his "messenger". Very sadly, I must inform you that EVERY STATEMENT I
made in my letter WILL BE PROVEN TO BE TRUE. (Some have already been proven to be true
statements.) Your client is a very wealthy and a very powerful man, but in the end, the truth lives. Any
damage to the "Beal entities" will not be because of a letter written by a 65 year old disabled grandmother of
13, it will be because of his own pride, and the things that he has done that he has evidently not disclosed
to you. If you knew the truth as I know it, you would not risk your career by having him as a client.

That being said, please know that I am complying with your request, I will post no more personal opinions
on Scribd., and my only future activities will be pursued through the court system, as I have for the past five
years.

Very sincerely,

JoAnn S. Breitling
214-674-6572
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 58 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID: 54
10528084,
Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: Page
63-2, 16
Page
of 26
304 PageID
of 383 909
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 59 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID: 54
10528084,
Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: Page
63-2, 17
Page
of 26
305 PageID
of 383 910
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 60 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID: 54
10528084,
Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: Page
63-2, 18
Page
of 26
306 PageID
of 383 911
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 61 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID: 54
10528084,
Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: Page
63-2, 19
Page
of 26
307 PageID
of 383 912
14-50843-cag Doc#40 Filed 12/29/14 Entered 12/29/14 13:51:34 Main Document Pg 1 of 5

Mackie WolfZientz & Mann, P.C.


Chelsea Schneider
Parkway Office Center, Suite 900
14160 North Dallas Parkway
Dallas, Texas 75254
(214) 635-2650
(214) 635-2686 - Facsimile

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT


FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

In re: STUART C. HAMM Case No. 14-50843 (Chapter 13)



LNV CORPORATION, its successors and/or
assigns, Movant

vs. JUDGE CRAIG A. GARGOTTA

NORA HAMM and STUART C. HAMM,
Debtor and MARY K VIEGELAHN, Trustee,
Respondents

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STA AGAINST DEBTOR(S) AND CO-
DEBTOR STAY REGARDING 5160 CR 405, FLO SVILLE, TX 78114 AND WAIVER
OF THIRTY DAY REQUIREMENT PDRStNT TO 11 D.S.C. 362(e)

NOTICE: THIS PLEADING REQUESTS RELIEF THAT MAY BE ADVERSE TO YOUR


INTEREST.

IF NO TIMELY RESPONSE IS FILED WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS FROM THE DATE
OF SERVICE, THE RELIEF REQUESTED HEREIN MAY BE GRANTED WITHOUT A
HEARING BEING HELD.

A TIMELY FILED RESPONSE IS NECESSARY FOR A fEARING TO BE HELD.

TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES BAfKRUPTCY JUDGE:

LNV CORPORATION ("Movant") hereby moves this Court, pursuant to 11 V.S.C. 362, for

relief from the automatic stay with respect to certain real property of the Debtor(s) having an

address of 5160 CR 405, FLORESVILLE, TX 78114 (the "Property"). The facts and

circumstances supporting this Motion are set forth in the Affidavit in Support of Motion for

Relief from Automatic Stay filed contemporaneously herewith (the "Affidavit"). In further

12-{)()0119-391
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 62 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID: 54
10528084,
Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: Page
63-2, 20
Page
of 26
308 PageID
of 383 913
14-50843-cag Doc#40 Filed 12/29/14 Entered 12/29/14 13:51:34 Main Document Pg 2 of 5

support of this Motion, Movant respectfully states:

1. A petition under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code was filed with

respect to the Debtor(s) on 03/3112014.

2. The Debtor(s) has/have executed and delivered or is/are otherwise obligated with

respect to that certain promissory note in the original principal amount of $160,500.00 (the

"Note"). A copy of the Note is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". Movant is an entity entitled to

enforce the Note.

3. Pursuant to that certain Deed of Trust (the "Deed of Trust"), all obligations

(collectively, the "Obligations") of the Debtor(s) under and with respect to the Note and the Deed

of Trust are secured by the Property. A copy of the Deed of Trust is attached hereto as Exhibit

"B" .

4. All rights and remedies under the Deed of Trust have been assigned to the Movant

pursuant to that certain assignment of deed of trust, a true and correct copy of which is attached

hereto as Exhibit "C".

5. The legal description of the Property is set forth in the Deed of Trust, a copy of

which is attached hereto, and such description is incorporated and made a part hereof by

reference.

6. Dovenmuehle Mortgage services the loan on the Property referenced in this

Motion. ill the event the automatic stay in this case is modified, this case dismisses, and/or the

Debtors obtain a discharge and a foreclosure action is commenced on the mortgaged property,

the foreclosure will be conducted in the name of Movant. Movant, directly or through an agent,

has possession of the Note. The Note is either made payable to Movant or has been duly

endorsed.

7. As of the November 19, 2014, the amount of the outstanding Obligations is at

12-000119-391
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 63 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID: 54
10528084,
Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: Page
63-2, 21
Page
of 26
309 PageID
of 383 914
14-50843-cag Doc#40 Filed 12/29/14 Entered 12/29/14 13:51:34 Main Document Pg 3 of 5

least $237,395.77.

8. In addition to the other amounts due to Movant reflected in this Motion, as of the

date hereof, in connection with seeking the relief requested in this Motion, Movant has also

incurred $650.00 in legal fees and $176.00 in costs. Movant reserves all rights to seek an award

or allowance of such fees and expenses in accordance with applicable loan documents and

related agreements, the Bankruptcy Code and otherwise applicable law.

9. The following chart sets forth the number and amount of post-petition payments
due pursuant to the terms of the Note that have been missed by the Debtor(s):

Type # From To Monthly Total Missed


Payment Payments
Amount
Payments 5 07/0112014 11/01/2014 $1,544.93 $7,724.65
Less post-petition partial payments: ($1,503.21)

Total: $6,221.44

10. Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" is a post-petition payment history with respect to

the Obligations.

11. Cause exists for relief from the automatic stay for the following reasons:

(a) Movant's interest in the Property is not adequately protected.

(b) Post petition payments have not been made to Movant.

(c) Pursuant to 11 V.S.C. 362(d)(2)(A), Debtor(s) has/have no equity in the

Property; and pursuant to 362(d)(2)(B), the Property is not necessary for

an effective reorganization.

WHEREFORE, Movant prays that this Court issue an Order terminating or modifying the

stay and granting the following:

1. Relief from the stay allowing Movant (and any successors or assigns) to proceed

under applicable non-bankruptcy law to enforce its remedies to foreclose upon and obtain

12-000119-391
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 64 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID: 54
10528084,
Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: Page
63-2, 22
Page
of 26
310 PageID
of 383 915
14-50843-cag Doc#40 Filed 12/29/14 Entered 12/29/14 13:51:34 Main Document Pg 4 of 5

possession of the Property.

2. That the Order be binding and effective despite any conversion of this bankruptcy

case to a case under any other chapter of Title 11 of the United States Code.

3. That the 14-day stay described by Bankruptcy Rule 4001(a)(3) be waived.

4. In the event that the stay terminates as to the Property and the Property 1S

foreclosed, i.e., Debtor(s) no longer have title to the Property, Movant is relieved of the

requirements set forth in FRBP 3002.1 with respect to the Property.

5. For such other relief as the Court deems proper.

Respectfully submitted,

MACKIE WOLF ZIENTZ & MANN, P.c.

Isl Chelsea Schneider

Chelsea Schneider
State Bar No.: 24079820
Mackie WolfZientz & Mann, P.c.
Parkway Office Center, Suite 900
14160 North Dallas Parkway
Dallas, Texas 75254
Phone: (214)635-2650
Facsimile: (214) 635-2686

ATTORNEY FORMOVANT

12-000\\9-391
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 65 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID: 54
10528084,
Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: Page
63-2, 23
Page
of 26
311 PageID
of 383 916
14-50843-cag Doc#40 Filed 12/29/14 Entered 12/29/14 13:51:34 Main Document Pg 5 of 5

Certificate of Service

A copy of this motion was served on the persons listed below in the manner indicated on
29th of December, 2014.

Isl Chelsea Schneider

Chelsea Schneider

Via Pre-Paid U.S. Mail:

STUARTC. HAMM
5160 CR 405
FLORESVILLE, TX 78114
Debtor(s)

Via ECF:
H. ANTHONY HERVOL
4414 CENTERVIEW DRIVE, SUITE 200
SAN ANTONIO, TX 78228
Attorney for Debtor(s)

Via ECF:
MARY K VIEGELAHN
10500 HERITAGE BLVD., STE. 201
SAN ANTONIO, TX 78216
CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE

Via ECF:
US TRUSTEE
441 G STREET, NW, SUITE 6150
WASHINGTON, DC 20530

12-000119-391
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 66 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID: 54
10528084,
Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: Page
63-2, 24
Page
of 26
312 PageID
of 383 917
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 67 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID: 54
10528084,
Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: Page
63-2, 25
Page
of 26
313 PageID
of 383 918
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 68 of 92
Case 3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID: 54
10528084,
Filed 01/02/15
DktEntry: Page
63-2, 26
Page
of 26
314 PageID
of 383 919
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 69 of 92
CaseCase:
3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document
ID: 10528084,
55 Filed 01/05/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
PagePage
1 of 2315PageID
of 383 920

Samuel G. Breitling and JoAnn Breitling


Plaintiffs,
Civil Action No 3:14-cv-3322-M
vs.
LNV Corporation, ET AL.,
Defendants

Dear Honorable Judge Barbara Lynn,


January 1, 2015

SUPPLIMENT TO URGENT LETTER AND AFFIDAVIT TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE BARBARA LYNN

Dear Honorable Judge Lynn,


As a pro per litigant Im learning as I go by the seat of my pants I just found these statutes and case
law that support my position that the District Court has jurisdiction over this case, and the County JP
Court lacks jurisdiction in an eviction action brought against us by Defendant LNV (or any of the Beal
Defendants) as a dispute over title is intrinsic to our complaint against them filed originally in the
District Court.
Pertaining to County Court jurisdiction: Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 510.3(e) Only Issue. The court
must adjudicate the right to actual possession and not title.
Texas Govt. Code 26.043(2) CIVIL MATTERS IN WHICH COUNTY COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION.
A county court does not have jurisdiction in:
(2) a suit for the enforcement of a lien on land;
(6) a suit for the trial of the right to property valued at $500 or more and levied on under a
writ of execution, sequestration, or attachment;
(8) a suit for the recovery of land.
The jurisdiction of the district court pre-empts the justice court on issues of possession when
questions of title and possession are so integrally linked or intertwined that possession may not be
determined without first determining title. In such cases the justice court is deprived of jurisdiction.
Mitchell v. Armstrong Capital Corp., 911 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Tex. App-Houston (1st Dist.) 1995,, writ
denied); Merit Management Partners I, L.P. v. Noelke, 266 S.W. 3d 637,650 (Tex. App, Austin, 2008, no
pet.)
"A Justice Court has no jurisdiction of a suit for damages for injury to or destruction of an easement
over land. An easement is a right which one proprietor has to some profit, benefit or lawful use out of
or over the estate of another proprietor. To prove this right necessarily involves proof of title, and
hence the County and Justice Courts have no jurisdiction." Henslee v. Boyd, 107 S.W. 128 (Tex. Civ. App.
Dallas 1908, no writ)
The government code provides that a county court does not have jurisdiction in a suit for the
recovery of land. Tex. Govt Code Ann. 26.043(8) (West 2004); see also Doggett v. Nitschke, 498
S.W.2d 339, 339 (Tex. 1973) (A county court does not have jurisdiction to try questions of title to
land.)
D. Andrew Beal, and therefore his Beal Defendants (MGC, LNV, DMI and C&S) have no regard for the
law. Beal has amassed billions of dollars breaking the laws (based on information from just one
accounting firm he has illegally earned profits of $19.7 billion dollars and this is likely only a fraction
of his gains from such activities). He uses that unduly gained wealth to abuse the judicial system and to
thwart justice.
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 70 of 92
CaseCase:
3:14-cv-03322-M-BN
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document
ID: 10528084,
55 Filed 01/05/15
DktEntry: 63-2,
PagePage
2 of 2316PageID
of 383 921

Beal was warned by Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott in 2010 that it was illegal to foreclosure on
properties using robosigned (i.e. forged documents with false signatures and false statements
pertaining to the grantor/grantee or assignor/assignee). Beals attorneys representing Beals MGC lied
to Greg Abbott and said they had no completed foreclosures or foreclosures in process with such
robosigned documents.
Then in 2015 dozens of Beal victims are still fighting Beal foreclosures in State and Federal Courts
across the country because Beal has used and is using robosigned documents to establish his MGC or
LNVs authority to conduct a sale of their property. Many of these Beal victims have been fighting him
since 2010, like us. Also these Beal victims were never in a default of their own making; Beals MGC
caused defaults by not accepting payments or misappropriating payments.
In our case Beal utilized the illegal practices described in Greg Abbotts 2010 letter to establish his
LNVs authority to conduct a sale of our property; and obtained a court order for such sale using such
illegal practices, which Beal knew or should have known were illegal due to his receipt of Greg
Abbotts letter in 2010 through his MGC. Then he blatantly violated Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
736.11 which gave me an automatic stay if I filed my own, independent lawsuit by 5:00 p.m. on the
Monday prior to the sale. My lawsuit was filed on Friday, August 29, 2014; the sale was held on
Wednesday September 2, 2014. This illegal sale was videotaped by WFAA-TV. The reporter, off
camera, asked the trustee, why she violated the stay and sold my home FIRST that morning. She
replied I was told to. As soon as my home was sold, she told the crowd that she was taking a break,
and turned around to make a phone call.
Beal and his Beal Entities have used Beals ill-gotten excessive wealth to abuse to judicial process with
intent to cause excess litigation costs to their opponents knowing their opponents have limited
financial resources.
It is scary to us and to all the Beal victims that so many people can be paid to break the law and no one
is stopping D. Andrew Beal.
This Honorable Court needs to send a very strong message to D. Andrew Beal and his Beal Entities to
let them know they are not above the law by sanctioning them and causing them to pay us the attorney
fees we requested; and by any other means within the Courts power to impose.

With All Sincerely

JoAnn Breitling

1704 Cornwall Lane


Sachse, Texas 75048
214-674-6572

CC: U.S. Justice Department, FBI


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 71 of 92
CaseCase:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
6810528084,
Filed 08/21/15
DktEntry:
Page
63-2,
1 of
Page
12 317
PageID
of 383
3134

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
SAMUEL G. BREITLING AND
JO ANN BREITLING,

Plaintiffs, NO. 3:15-CV-00703-B

vs.
REPLY TO CODILIS &
LNV CORPORATION, ET AL., STAWIARSKISS REPLY TO
PLAINTIFFS OBJECTION TO
Defendants. MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

PLAINTIFFS REPLY TO CODILIS & STAWIARSKISS REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS


OBJECTION TO CODILIS & STAWIARSKISS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Come now Plaintiffs, Samuel G. and JoAnn S. Breitling, who are self represented and

incorporate herein their pleadings in their directly related cases referenced in [Doc 66] and

further say as a reply to Codilis & Stawiarskiss (C&Ss) reply to Plaintiffs objection to its

motion for summary judgment [Doc 67]:

Defendant C&S has been merely a puppet doing the bidding of Defendant LNV and this

last pleading it filed is a blatant illustration of this fact.

First of all Plaintiffs first filed a Motion to Vacate Tillerys Void Order on August 18,

2014 into the 134th court in LNV Corporation v. Breitlings, case# DC-14-04053. A summary

judgment order is never final and can be challenged collaterally at any time, and a post judgment

motion which has not been adjudicated, such as Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate Tillerys Void

Order filed on August 18, 2014 renders the case unripe for appeal the post-judgment motion

must be adjudicated to make it ripe for appeal. Defendants C&S and LNV sold Plaintiffs

property on the 29th day after Tillerys void order was issued (this was a day before the thirty
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 72 of 92
CaseCase:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
6810528084,
Filed 08/21/15
DktEntry:
Page
63-2,
2 of
Page
12 318
PageID
of 383
3135

(30) days Plaintiffs would have had to appeal) AND Defendants C&S and LNV knew a post

judgment motion was pending to vacate Tillerys void order AND they knew a hearing was

scheduled on the portion of that motion specific to Tillerys recusal YET they chose to sell

Plaintiffs property before any of these events, thus they knew they might incur a liability if

Tillerys void order was vacated.

Secondly, Plaintiffs did not need to file an appeal because instead of an appeal they filed

an independent lawsuit pursuant to Rule 736 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. To make it

easier for Defendant C&S to locate and read Rule 736.11 it states:

(a) A proceeding or order under this rule is automatically stayed if a respondent


files a separate, original proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction that puts in
issue any matter related to the origination, servicing, or enforcement of the loan
agreement, contract, or lien sought to be foreclosed prior to 5:00 p.m. on the Monday
before the scheduled foreclosure sale.
(b) Respondent must give prompt notice of the filing of the suit to petitioner or
petitioner's attorney and the foreclosure trustee or substitute trustee by any
reasonable means necessary to stop the scheduled foreclosure sale.
(c) Within ten days of filing suit, the respondent must file a motion and proposed
order to dismiss or vacate with the clerk of the court in which the application was
filed giving notice that respondent has filed an original proceeding contesting the
right to foreclose in a court of competent jurisdiction. If no order has been signed,
the court must dismiss a pending proceeding. If an order has been signed, the court
must vacate the Rule 736 order.
(d) If the automatic stay under this rule is in effect, any foreclosure sale of the
property is void. Within 10 business days of notice that the foreclosure sale was
void, the trustee or substitute trustee must return to the buyer of the foreclosed
property the purchase price paid by the buyer.

Of course Defendant C&S most certainly knows and understands the requirements of

Rule 736.11 and evidence in [Doc 58 in case 3:14-cv-3322-M] clearly shows that Counsel for

Defendant LNV Jeffery Hardaway employed by Defendant C&S knows and understands the

requirements of Rule 736 and Rule 736.11. Defendants C&S and LNV have intentionally
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 73 of 92
CaseCase:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
6810528084,
Filed 08/21/15
DktEntry:
Page
63-2,
3 of
Page
12 319
PageID
of 383
3136

attempted to skirt these laws by claiming they foreclosed pursuant to Rule 735 and not Rule 736

however this is not possible. Texas Rule 735.1 states:

Liens Affected Rule 736 provides the procedure for obtaining a court order, when
required, to allow foreclosure of a lien containing a power of sale in the security
instrument, dedicatory instrument, or declaration creating the lien, including a lien
securing any of the following:
(a) a home equity loan, reverse mortgage, or home equity line of credit under
article XVI, sections 50(a)(6), 50(k), and 50(t) of the Texas Constitution;

Plaintiffs loan was a Texas home equity loan, therefore Rule 735.1(a) specifically

requires that the procedure for foreclosure of a home equity loan is governed by Rule 736.

Defendants claims and arguments are without substance; and they knew this was the case

BEFORE they sold Plaintiffs property. Owner of Defendant LNV, D. Andrew Beal, wasnt

making a business decision when he instructed his agents to move forward with the foreclosure

and sale of Plaintiffs property in spite of the fact they would knowingly and willfully be

violating Rule 735 and Rule 736 he was acting in retaliation in violation of 18 U.S. Code 1513

against Plaintiffs for daring to speak out publically against him and for reporting the activities of

his corrupt enterprise to authorities and for helping to bring together and unify the ever growing

group of LNV/MGC/Beal victims including but not limited to those victims in Plaintiffs noticed

related cases. D. Andrew Beal, owner of Defendant LNV, motivated by his urge to seek revenge

willfully intended to inflict as much mental anguish, financial loss, and pain and suffering on

Plaintiffs as possible; and he paid his agent Defendant C&S enough to motivate them to willfully

violate Texas Rule 735 and Rule 736 of Civil Procedure and to therefore participate in his

conspiracy to wrongfully and illegally deprive Plaintiffs of their civil rights and their property.

Pursuant to Rule 736.11(a) Plaintiffs filed a separate, original proceeding in a court of

competent jurisdiction that puts in issue any matter related to the origination, servicing, or
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 74 of 92
CaseCase:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
6810528084,
Filed 08/21/15
DktEntry:
Page
63-2,
4 of
Page
12 320
PageID
of 383
3137

enforcement of the loan agreement, contract, or lien sought to be foreclosed prior to 5:00 p.m. on

the Monday before the scheduled foreclosure sale and they notified Defendants LNV and C&S

pursuant to Rule 736.11(b). (Breitlings v. LNV Corporation, case# DC-14-09604.)

Plaintiffs had already filed a motion to vacate Tillerys void order; and pursuant to Rule

736.11(c) Plaintiffs timely filed a new motion to vacate into the new case and sent a letter the

Trustee, Shelley Ortolani, who sold Plaintiffs property in a non-judicial foreclosure sale stating

that the sale was void. Rule 736.11(d) makes it clear that the sale of Plaintiffs property is void.

Defendant C&S and its client Defendant LNV know and fully understand Rule 736 of the

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and specifically know and understand the automatic stay of sale

pursuant to Rule 736.11. Defendant LNVs owner Daniel Andrew Andy Beal (D. Andrew

Beal) apparently doesnt like this consumer protection law (or any other consumer protection

laws such as the one named in the Texas Attorney Generals letter which Plaintiffs quoted [Doc

37]. The letter was attached as Exhibit D to [Doc 58] in case 3:14-cv-3322-M). The warning in

this letter and the fact that C&S attorney Jeffery Hardaway has filed correctly prepared

applications for expedited foreclosure pursuant to Rule 736 together evidences that fact that

Defendants C&S and LNV knowingly and with intent violated Rule 736 and then in willful

violation of Rule 736.11 sold Plaintiffs property to Defendant LNV on September 2, 2014. D.

Andrew Beal, owner of Defendant LNV and his Counsel C&Ss employee Jeffery Hardaway,

also knew as evidenced by the Texas Attorney Generals letter that any sale perfected using robo

signed assignments of deed of trust, such as they did in Plaintiffs case, is a void sale; and that

foreclosures using such robo signed documents violated several Texas civil rules and codes as

well as Texas penal code; yet D. Andrew Beal willfully instructed and still instructs his

employees and his agents to do so anyway.


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 75 of 92
CaseCase:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
6810528084,
Filed 08/21/15
DktEntry:
Page
63-2,
5 of
Page
12 321
PageID
of 383
3138

Thirdly the remedy for bribery of a judge, which is a criminal felony offense, is NOT

appeal. It is the reporting of the crime to authorities, which Plaintiffs have done and continue to

do. In fact pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. 4 Plaintiffs and the other LNV/MGC/Beal victims have

knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States and

hereby do make known to the Honorable Judge Jane Boyle of such.

MISPRISION OF FELONY

Title 18 U.S.C. 4 (Misprision of felony) states:

Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the
United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or
other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than three years, or both.

Plaintiffs hereby inform the Honorable Judge Jane Boyle that the probability is high that

Dale B. Tillery accepted a bribe offered by Defendant LNV and/or Defendant C&S in exchange

for his void summary judgment ruling in favor of Defendant LNV, and evidence already in court

record indicates the truth of this claim. However conclusive proof can only be gathered through

a proper criminal investigation, and Plaintiffs hereby request the Honorable Judge Jane Boyle, if

she hasnt already done so, report this crime to the FBI, the United States Attorney General

and/or any other person in civil or military authority and order them to investigate the possibility

of whether Dale B. Tillery accepted a bribe in exchange for his decision favoring Defendant

LNV and to fully prosecute all participants to such an act of bribery.

Plaintiffs further inform the Honorable Judge that D. Andrew Beal through his MGC

Mortgage Inc. (MGC) and his Defendant LNV and his other business enterprises and his

agents and attorneys, (LPS affiliated or not) and his employees and his agents employees who

have given and continue to give perjured sworn testimony through affidavits and declarations to
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 76 of 92
CaseCase:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
6810528084,
Filed 08/21/15
DktEntry:
Page
63-2,
6 of
Page
12 322
PageID
of 383
3139

courts across the country, who knowingly caused to be filed via the U.S. mail and/or via

electronic wire transfer with county recorders offices across the country assignments of deed

containing false claims regarding the grantors and grantees and other alterations and which have

been robo signed or otherwise contain forged signatures, consistent with the adjudicative facts

recognized as a felony crime by the United States District Court Middle District of Florida

Jacksonville Division; United States of America v. Lorraine Brown; and which after D. Andrew

Beal and his cohorts trump up a false claims of default by misappropriating payments through D.

Andrew Beals MGC, they then submit to courts these false documents as being genuine when

they know they are not, knowing judges will rely on them as genuine, with intent to deceive the

court and to thereby deprive Plaintiffs and the other LNV/MGC/Beal victims of their property

and their civil rights. D. Andrew Beal and his LNV and his MGC thereby do commit the felony

crime of forgery because they knowingly use altered and otherwise forged instruments to enforce

foreclose actions and thereby obtain

And pursuant to 18 U.S. Code 1968 Plaintiffs request the Honorable Judge Jane Boyle,

if she hasnt already done so, to report this pattern of racketeering crime to the FBI, the United

States Attorney General (who prosecuted Lorraine Brown) and/or any other person in civil or

military authority and to order them to investigate this crime and to fully prosecute all

participants in this criminal conspiracy to obstruct justice and to deprive Plaintiffs and the other

LNV/MGC/Beal victims of their civil rights and of their property.

HOWEVER Tillerys judgment is void regardless of whether or not a criminal indictment

and conviction is ever made against Tillery and/or Defendant LNVs owner D. Andrew Beal

and/or Defendant C&Ss employee Defendant LNVs Counsel Jeffery Hardaway; because the

appearance of bias or impropriety alone is sufficient cause to sustain a claim of violation of due
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 77 of 92
CaseCase:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
6810528084,
Filed 08/21/15
DktEntry:
Page
63-2,
7 of
Page
12 323
PageID
of 383
3140

process. This court can determine from the record that Tillery in fact denied the Plaintiffs due

process. His actions are unconscionable and a direct violation of his oath of office and the Texas

judicial code of conduct. See [Doc 1 the copy of Plaintiffs first and second motions to vacate

Tillerys void order included in the removal documents in case: 3:14-cv-3322-M] and referenced

by Magistrate Judge David Horan in his findings, conclusions and recommendations to remand

[Doc 42 in case: 3:14-cv-3322-M].

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

A court exceeds its jurisdiction when the judge behaves in a way contrary to the United

States Constitution, or when the judge appears to be biased, or when the judge denies a litigant

due process, and most definitely when a judge accepts a bribe in exchange for his ruling because

engaging in bribery is a felony crime and a judge who engages in bribery is not acting under the

authority of his judicial position but for his own personal gain as an individual and therefore is

lacking in jurisdiction to make judicial decisions. The title judge does not automatically

confer jurisdiction. When a judge acts in a manner that shows bias towards one party or when he

makes a decision prior to hearing the parties claims and without reviewing the evidence and

making a determination of fact and a conclusion of law which applies to the facts he denies due

process and thereby exceeds his jurisdiction and acts contrary to the United States Constitution

and his constitutionally required oath of office.

The United States Supreme Court in Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994)

concluded:

When the prevailing standard of conduct imposed by the law for many of society's
enterprises is reasonableness, it seems most inappropriate to say that a judge is
subject to disqualification only if concerns about his or her predisposed state of
mind, or other improper connections to the case, make a fair hearing impossible.
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 78 of 92
CaseCase:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
6810528084,
Filed 08/21/15
DktEntry:
Page
63-2,
8 of
Page
12 324
PageID
of 383
3141

That is too lenient a test when the integrity of the judicial system is at stake.
Disputes arousing deep passions often come to the courtroom, and justice may
appear imperfect to parties and their supporters disappointed by the outcome. This
we cannot change. We can, however, enforce society's legitimate expectation that
judges maintain, in fact and appearance, the conviction and discipline to resolve
those disputes with detachment and impartiality.
The standard that ought to be adopted for all allegations of an apparent fixed
predisposition, extrajudicial or otherwise, follows from the statute itself:
Disqualification is required if an objective observer would entertain reasonable
questions about the judge's impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a
detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge
must be disqualified. Indeed, in such circumstances, I should think that any judge
who understands the judicial office and oath would be the first to insist that another
judge hear the case.
In matters of ethics, appearance and reality often converge as one. See Offutt v.
United States, 348 U. S. 11, 14 (1954) ("[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of
justice"); Ex parte McCarthy, [1924] 1 K. B. 256, 259 (1923) ("[J]ustice should not
only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done"). I do not
see how the appearance of fairness and neutrality can obtain if the bare possibility of
a fair hearing is all that the law requires. Cf. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U. S. 238,
242 (1980) (noting the importance of "preserv[ing] both the appearance and reality
of fairness," which "'generat[es] the feeling, so important to a popular government,
that justice has been done''') (quoting Joint AntiFascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U. S. 123, 172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).

Courts have repeatedly held that positive proof of the partiality of a judge is not a

requirement, only the appearance of partiality. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.,

486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988) (what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its

appearance); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Section 455(a) is

directed against the appearance of partiality, whether or not the judge is actually biased.)

(Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. 455(a), is not intended to protect litigants from

actual bias in their judge but rather to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the

judicial process.). United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) (The right to a

tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process

Clause.).
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 79 of 92
CaseCase:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
DocumentID:
6810528084,
Filed 08/21/15
DktEntry:
Page
63-2,
9 of
Page
12 325
PageID
of 383
3142

In United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) the court concluded:

We need not decide whether section 144 was irrevocably waived in the reply brief.
The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but
on the Due Process Clause. While a probation revocation proceeding need not
include the full panoply of rights that attend a criminal prosecution, see United
States v. Francischine, 512 F.2d 827, 829 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Farmer,
512 F.2d 160, 162 (6th Cir. 1975), due process of course requires a fair hearing,
United States v. Foster, 500 F.2d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 1974). It has long been
recognized that freedom of the tribunal from bias or prejudice is an essential
element of due process.

Even when jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties exists, a final order may

nevertheless be susceptible of collateral attack when the court has exceeded its jurisdiction in

rendering it. This basis of collateral attack has been recognized by a number of state and federal

courts. Arenas v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 962, 970 n.23 (S.D.Cal.1951), aff'd, 197 F.2d 418

(9th Cir. 1952); Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 278 F. Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y.1967); In re Wooley's

Estate, 96 Vt. 60, 117 A. 370 (1922); Commonwealth ex. rel. Roviello v. Roviello, 229 Pa.Super.

428, 323 A.2d 766 (1974); see Developments in the LawRes Judicata, 65 Harv.L.Rev. 818, 851

(1952); Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1059, 2 at 1066 (1950); 17 Am. Jur.2d Contempt 42 (1964);

Restatement Judgments 10(e) at 58 (1942).

Wherever one is assailed in his person or his property, said this court in Windsor v. Mc

Veigh, 93 U. S. 274, 277, there he may defend, for the liability and the right are inseparable.

This is a principle of natural justice, recognized as such by the common intelligence and

conscience of all nations. A sentence of a court pronounced against a party, without hearing

him or giving him an opportunity to be heard, is not a judicial determination of his rights, and is

not entitled to respect in any other tribunal... The jurisdiction acquired by the court by seizure of

the res was not to condemn the property without further proceedings. Sabariego v Maverick,

124 US 261, 31 L Ed 430, 8 S Ct 461.


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 80 of 92
CaseCase:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document ID:
68 10528084,
Filed 08/21/15
DktEntry:
Page63-2,
10 Page
of 12 326
PageID
of 383
3143

The States cannot, in the exercise of control over local laws and practice, vest State

courts with power to violate the supreme law of the land. Hines v. Lowrey, 305 U.S. 85, 90, 91,

59 S.Ct. 31, 34, 35, 83 L.Ed. 56; Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24, 44 S.Ct. 13, 14, 68 L.Ed.

143.

That a State court before which a proceeding is competently initiated mayby operation

of supreme Federal lawlose jurisdiction to proceed to a judgment unassailable on collateral

attack is not a concept unknown to our Federal system. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43

S.Ct. 265, 67 L.Ed. 543. Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461.

(T)he action of the Walworth County Court was not merely erroneous but was beyond

its power, void, and subject to collateral attack. And the determination whether the Act did so

operate is a construction of that Act and a Federal question. Kalb v. Feuerstein (1940) 308 US

433, 60 S Ct 343, 84 L ed 370.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, Defendant C&S bases its entire premise for summary judgment on

Tillerys void judgment by claiming that Plaintiffs claims were fully adjudicated when any

reasonable person would conclude otherwise. In fact Plaintiffs claims have never been

adjudicated. Defendants C&S and LNV in fact willfully violated Rule 736 of Texas Rules of

Civil Procedure and willfully committed fraud upon the court. The appearance is that they bribed

not just one judge, but two judges Dale B. Tillery and Gerry Cooper (or at the very least

improperly influenced them) since Defendant LNVs Counsel Jeffery Hardaway employed by

Defendant C&S could not have known that Tillery would deny Plaintiffs reasonable motion for

a thirty (30) day continuance to find a new attorney, and deny Plaintiffs motion to transfer so
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 81 of 92
CaseCase:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document ID:
68 10528084,
Filed 08/21/15
DktEntry:
Page63-2,
11 Page
of 12 327
PageID
of 383
3144

that he could pre-arrange for a mediator to attend the August 4, 2014 hearing unless he or his

client Defendant LNV had ex parte communications with Tillery before the hearing. And Gerry

Cooper and Defendant LNVs Counsel Luke Madole most certainly had some prior agreement to

deprive Plaintiffs of their due process in LNV Corporation v. Breitlings, Case# JD15-00071C in

the Justice of the Peace Court Number 2 in Garland Texas because they failed to respond when

Plaintiff JoAnn Breitlings questioned them about a motion in limine after she overheard Luke

Madole whisper a reminder to Cooper about the motion in limine. And in LNV Corporation v.

Breitlings Case# CC-15-00911-C in the County Courts at Law Number 3 in Dallas County,

Judge Sally Montgomery deprived Plaintiffs of their trial de novo pursuant to Rule 510.10(c)

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure because as per the hearing transcript Luke Madole asked her to.

Such blatant disregard for the law and for the judicial process should not be rewarded.

THEREFORE Plaintiffs beseech this court to send a very clear message to Defendant

C&S that such abuses and wrongdoings will not be tolerated and deny their motion for summary

judgment. Plaintiffs pray the court instead grant their counter/cross motion for summary

judgment; and/or otherwise for the sake public interest award Plaintiffs damages and sanction

the attorneys and the judges who participated in the LNV/Beals conspiracy to deprive Plaintiffs

of their civil rights.

Respectfully Submitted,
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 82 of 92
CaseCase:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document ID:
68 10528084,
Filed 08/21/15
DktEntry:
Page63-2,
12 Page
of 12 328
PageID
of 383
3145

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was

served upon all counsel of record and pro-se parties via the Courts CM/ECF system, email,

and/or regular mail, and/or certified mail with return receipt requested; and that a correct copy of

the foregoing document was served upon The United States Attorney General and the Texas

Attorney General at the addresses below:

Attorney General of Texas, Macdonald Devin, PC


Ken Paxton Codilis & Stawiarski
P.O. Box 12548 3800 Renaissance Tower
Austin, Texas 78711 1201 Elm Street
Dallas, TX 75270
Marc Cabera, Jason Sanders,
Robert Mowery U. S. Department of Justice,
Locke Lord LLP Loretta Lynch,
2200 Ross Ave, # 2200 U. S. Attorney General
Dallas, TX 75201 950 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Washington, DC 20530
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 83 of 92
Case Case:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document ID:
44-1
10528084,
Filed 06/22/15
DktEntry:Page
63-2,1Page
of 10 329
PageID
of 3831851

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
SAMUEL G. BREITLING AND
JO ANN BREITLING,

Plaintiffs,

vs. NO. 3:15-CV-00703

LNV CORPORATION, ET AL.,

Defendants.

STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF DALLAS
CITY OF SACHSE

AFFIDAVIT OF JOANN BREITLING


IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS NOTICE OF INTENT
I, JoAnn Breitling, am beyond 18 years of age. I have resided in Dallas County all of my
life. I have never been convicted of a crime. I am fully competent to make this affidavit
in testimony of my personal knowledge and experience. I swear under the penalty of
perjury and under the laws of Texas that my testimony herein is true and accurate.
Our son, Samuel Matthew Breitling, who we call Matt or Matty was born in 1983
with Down syndrome and congenital heart disease. He had two open heart
surgeries in his first year of life and we almost lost him both times. By the grace of
God he survived and he thrived and he grew up in a loving home with six sisters.
On March 7, 2013 our law suit against MGC Mortgage Inc. (owned by D. Andrew
Andy Beal, who also owns LNV Corporation, a defendant in the present case) went
to mediation and because our attorney had a meltdown in the middle of our session
because she said she could not defend against yet another summary judgment by
Scott Hayes, attorney for MGC. (she had won the one in August 2012, hands down,
and she informed him we were going to trial), buy the guy would just not stop filing
summary judgments to delay/prevent the trial from going forward. He was the
reason for her meltdown; he had violated the scheduling order to set a hearing to
move the trial date back so that his fifth motion for summary judgment could be
heard before the trial.

Affidavit of JoAnn Breitling in Support of Plaintiffs Notice of Intent Page 1 of 4


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 84 of 92
Case Case:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document ID:
44-1
10528084,
Filed 06/22/15
DktEntry:Page
63-2,2Page
of 10 330
PageID
of 3831852

The case was abated for 90 days with my consent. During that 90 day period I gave
power of attorney to a financial officer in Dallas, Glenn Joyner, who called us two
weeks after the mediation and he had contacted MGC and they told him (TWO
WEEKS AFTER THE MEDIATION) that MGC had no authority over our loan.
Mr. Joyner had been in the mortgage industry for a very long time and he said he
knew something very illegal was going on. I called Ellington Mortgage Partners and
notary Jeanne Stafford during this period, doing my own mini discovery and I
learned how deeply the fraud ran.
In April 2013 our son Matthew became ill. I took him to Dr. Trung Dao in
Richardson, and he was misdiagnosed as having acid reflux, and he was put on
medication that made him worse. In May, 2013, the Monday morning after Mothers
Day I took our son to Methodist Richardson ER at 5 AM in the morning. He was very
ill. There, they diagnosed him as having an abscess in his lung and they sent him
home on two medications.
He became sicker by the day. I went to Dr. Marcum Quinn, a pulmonary specialist
four days later, and he changed some of the medications and assured me our son
would be fine, but he would need to stay on 1000 mg of penicillin a day for three
months. I was taking him back for x-rays every 2-3 weeks. During this time (the
abatement period) I was trying to locate a new attorney; help my youngest daughter
plan an out of town wedding because of Andy Beals threats to our property she was
afraid to plan anything in Dallas; and I was trying to managed my sons health
problems.
Also in April 2013 my husband had a double knee surgery and I was caring for him
as well during his period of recuperation.
Matthew was taking the medications prescribed but he was not improving. In June
2013 Scott Hayes called me and asked me to set a hearing to re-open our case. I was
honest with him and told him our son was very sick and I needed it set out to the
end of July 2013. I respected that and set the hearing for July 30, 2013
We had gone to Kingwood Texas in late July 22, 2013 for events leading up to our
daughters wedding. At a family dinner in a restaurant Matthew projectile vomited
and I had to rush him out of the room. He was unable to eat anything at all without
vomiting from that time on so the next morning I took him to Kingwood Medical
Center ER where we spent seven hours while they did numerous tests yet we came
home with no diagnosis. Matthews health continued to deteriorate.
While my son had life threatening health problems I was on the phone speaking
with attorney after attorney and setting appointments whenever possible. The guilt
I felt because I was spending so much time looking for an attorney when my son was
so ill became unbearable. I realized I could not fight in court and fight for my sons
life at the same time. With much reluctance I made the decision to non-suit our
case. I filed the notice on or around July 29, 2013, and as soon as the case was
opened by agreed order, Judge Tonya Parker closed it, without prejudice.

Affidavit of JoAnn Breitling in Support of Plaintiffs Notice of Intent Page 2 of 4


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 85 of 92
Case Case:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document ID:
44-1
10528084,
Filed 06/22/15
DktEntry:Page
63-2,3Page
of 10 331
PageID
of 3831853

One attorney I had spoken with and emailed back and forth with concerning my
case, Rachel Khirallah, in Dallas finally told me to come in with $3,000 cash and she
would take my case. So on August 1, 2013 two days after non-suiting I met with her.
I put the $3,000 cash on her desk and she pulled up our case number DC-1107087.
When she kept scrolling down and saw how many times Scott Hayes had filed for
summary judgment (he NEVER could win) she pushed the $3,000 back to me and
said she could not take the case and file a new lawsuit. She said my claims were
good and they were valid, but that the MGCs attorney would tie up all of her time
with his frivolous motions. She said that with the hours she would have to put into a
case with that many motions, the cost would be over $75,000, and she could not
afford to take my case because she was a solo attorney. Many other attorneys Ive
spoken with have told me the same thing. Some specifically said that Andy Beal
would spend millions to defeat us. I felt devastated. It was during this 90-day
abatement period that I had come into contact with other MGC/LNV/Beal victims so
I felt very angry that someone could get away with destroying our lives and the lives
of so many others because he was a billionaire and we were average citizens living
on a limited retirement income. Justice should not be about who has the most
money, but about the merits of the case.
That same week in August I took Matty back to Dr. Trung Dao who gave us more
medications, but our Matty continued to get worse. We returned to Kingwood for
another wedding function and Matty started coughing non-stop. On one of our
previous visits to the ER we were told Matty had an abscess on his lung so I took
Matty to a lung specialist. He sent us immediately to the hospital for a CAT scan of
our Mattys lungs. He called me the same day and said Matty either had Scleraderma
or Achalasia. Neither diagnosis was a good one. We went back to the hospital the
next day for a swallow test. We were then referred to Dr. Ranga Nathan who
scheduled our son to have an immediate procedure to see what was wrong with
Mattys throat.
During this procedure Matty aspirated and all of his vital signs fell dangerously. An
ambulance was called and we were immediately taken back to Kingwood Medical
Center and Matty was admitted into ICU with a blood pressure of 60/37.
I stayed with him night and day for ten days in ICU. Six doctors came daily to see
Matty. They determined he had aspiration pneumonia. Dr. Nathan called in another
specialist, Dr. George Nunez, and together they were able to diagnose Matty with
Achalasia.
They performed Mattys first surgery to stabilize him. He will need more surgeries
in the future. He cannot be left alone; he is on a very restricted diet; and his lungs
and his immune system are severely compromised because of this rare disease. He
takes medications 3-4 times daily and we follow-up with his specialists several
times a year. I have attached a letter written by Mattys specialist as Exhibit A
attached to this Affidavit, and Ive included several photographs of our Matty during
this devastating period in our lives in my Exhibit B attached to this Affidavit.

Affidavit of JoAnn Breitling in Support of Plaintiffs Notice of Intent Page 3 of 4


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 86 of 92
Case Case:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document ID:
44-1
10528084,
Filed 06/22/15
DktEntry:Page
63-2,4Page
of 10 332
PageID
of 3831854
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 87 of 92
Case Case:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document ID:
44-1
10528084,
Filed 06/22/15
DktEntry:Page
63-2,5Page
of 10 333
PageID
of 3831855

Exhibit A
In Support of the Affidavit of JoAnn Breitling

In Support of Plaintiffs Notice of Intent

Letter from Dr. Ranga S. Nathan, M.D., F.A.C.G.

Specific to the medical condition of Samuel Matthew Matty Breitling and


irreparable harm that would be caused to him should he be displaced by a wrongful
eviction of the Breitlings from their home of 33 years
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 88 of 92
Case Case:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document ID:
44-1
10528084,
Filed 06/22/15
DktEntry:Page
63-2,6Page
of 10 334
PageID
of 3831856
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 89 of 92
Case Case:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document ID:
44-1
10528084,
Filed 06/22/15
DktEntry:Page
63-2,7Page
of 10 335
PageID
of 3831857

Exhibit B
In Support of the Affidavit of JoAnn Breitling

In Support of Plaintiffs Notice of Intent

Photographs of Samuel Matthew Matty Breitling while in intensive care at


Kingwood Medical Center ICU
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 90 of 92
Case Case:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document ID:
44-1
10528084,
Filed 06/22/15
DktEntry:Page
63-2,8Page
of 10 336
PageID
of 3831858

Samuel Matthew Matty Breitling and Plaintiff JoAnn Breitling at the Intensive Care
Unit at Kingwood Medical Center in September 2013.

Contrary to the allegations of LNVs (Beals) Locke Lord attorneys the Breitlings did not
non-suit to play games with the court; they had to due to a medical emergency that
threatened the life of their precious son, Matty.

None of the Breitlings legitimate claims against MGC, LNV and other Beal agents have
ever been adjudicated by any court because of the malicious and intentionally abusive
actions taken by the Beal entities to thwart the Breitlings constitutional rights to due
process and equal protection of the law under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the
Unites States Constitution.
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 91 of 92
Case Case:
3:15-cv-00703-B
15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document ID:
44-1
10528084,
Filed 06/22/15
DktEntry:Page
63-2,9Page
of 10 337
PageID
of 3831859

Matthew Breitling in the t the Intensive Care Unit at Kingwood Medical Center in
September 2013 with Sponge Bob and doing his favorite pastime drawing.

Matty drew this picture of his house

Mattys favorite hockey team from Los Angles.


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 96 Filed 09/09/15 Page 92 of 92
Case 3:15-cv-00703-B
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017,
Document 44-1
ID: 10528084,
Filed 06/22/15
DktEntry:
Page
63-2,
10Page
of 10338
PageID
of 3831860

Above is a photograph from the Breitling family gathering in celebration of Samuel Breitlings 70th
birthday on June 6, 2015. Samuel served Dallas as a police officer for 33 years and served in the United
States military for 4 years before this as a Marine. Since MGC took over servicing of the Breitlings
mortgage in 2008 the spirit of every Breitling family event has been dampened with the knowledge that
they might lose their precious family home of 33 years to fraud.

When Matthew was born the Breitlings reached out to the Down
Syndrome Guild of Dallas. JoAnns best friend was a school
teacher and she put her in touch with Ruth Ann Stallings. When
Matthew was three weeks old, Matthew and JoAnn were invited to
the Stallings home in Lake Highlands. (Gene Stallings is a
legendary football coach in Texas for the Texas A & M University
and a coach for the Dallas Cowboys).

They had the honor of meeting the Stallings son John Mark. Ruth
Ann became JoAnns mentor, and a few months later she became a
writer for the for the Guilds newsletter and Matty was the Guilds
poster child when he was five years old.

JoAnn self published a book in 1992 about her experiences


parenting a child with Down syndrome. The book is sold on
Amazon and a copy of the books first edition is to the left. She
began to work with now Bishop Mark Seitz of the El Peso diocese
and she counseled women who were considering aborting babies
with Down syndrome over the next five years. Matty and his sisters
also appeared on Good Morning Texas in 1997.
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 101 Filed 09/25/15 Page 1 of 10
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 339 of 383

Denise Subramaniam
Self-represented
13865 SW Walker Rd
Beaverton OR 97005
503-764-5300

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION

LNV CORPORATION Civil Case No. 3:14-cv-01836


Plaintiff,
v. DEFENDANTS RESPONSE TO
DENISE SUBRAMANIAM PLAINTIFFS REPLY
pro per MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
Defendant PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DEFENDANTS RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS REPLY MEMORANDUM


IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant incorporates herein all her pleadings in this case; her Notice of Directly Related

Cases; her Notice of Constitutional Questions as well as the Notices of Constitutional Questions

filed by the other LNV/MGC/Beal victims in the noticed related cases; and in her noticed related

cases; and her motion to compel Plaintiff LNV Corporation (LNV) to produce its business

license and the agreement between Residential Funding Company LLC aka Residential Funding

Corporation (GMAC-RFC) that included the alleged conveyance of deeds of trust/mortgages

for Defendants property and all the other LNV/MGC/Beal victims with instruments endorsed by

GMAC-RFC employees Diane M. Meistad and Betty Wright or Michael Mead executed on

March 10, 2008 before LNV was incorporated in the State of Nevada and before LNV could

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 1 of 10


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 101 Filed 09/25/15 Page 2 of 10
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 340 of 383

have acquired a Nevada business license allowing it to legally transact business. Plaintiff also

incorporates her Affidavit already filed in support of her motion to compel and in support of this

objection, and states the following:

In response to Plaintiff LNV Corporations reply memorandum in support of LNVs motion for

summary judgment Defendant, a pro se litigant, argues that the motion for summary judgment

filed by Plaintiff LNV Corporation (LNV) should be denied for the following reasons:

1. Although LNV claims to have uncontroverted evidence that LNV is the holder of the

note and beneficiary of the trust deed and is therefore entitled to foreclosure; the alleged

original note that I was shown appears to be an electronically altered copy color

enhanced to make it appear to be genuine. This altered note contains a recently forged

signature (the only signature on the entire document that made an indent on the reverse

side of the paper) of Dana Lantry as Assistant Vice President of People Choice Home

Loan, Inc. (Note that People which should have been correctly written as Peoples is

not my typo but this is the way it appears on the endorsement, See Defendants

EXHIBIT A page 1 top photo.) The s appears to have been cut off. This is typical

feature in electronically captured and altered images. If one forgot to type the s then

there would not be a partial s there would be no s. The partial s can only be the

result of an overlay of electronic layers or of a manual cut and paste of layers from

multiple images to create a new image. This is meant to deceive the court.

A comparison of the other two Dana Lantry signatures on page 1 of Defendants

EXHIBIT A shows enough differences between the signatures to indicate that they were

made by different individuals. Furthermore the tape recorded conversation Defendant

had with Dana Lantry can leave no doubt that the real Dana Lantry who was employed by

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 2 of 10


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 101 Filed 09/25/15 Page 3 of 10
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 341 of 383

One Stop Mortgage, then Aames, then Peoples Choice and then USB AG New York

DID NOT sign the allonge or the assignment of trust deed submitted to this court as

genuine by Plaintiff LNV. Hear Defendants EXHIBIT B which is a jump-drive that

contains the .mp3 audio file of this tape recorded conversation. (Note Defendant cant file

this exhibit electronically and will need to file it in person at the courthouse.)

In this tape recorded phone conversation Dana Lantry identifies herself as the individual

who was employed by Peoples Choice; she further says that while she was employed by

Peoples Choice she can confidently say that she never signed any allonges or deed

assignments because she was not an executive officer with Peoples Choice. This

statement implies that she could not have signed the suspicious endorsement on the note

either.

This is conclusive evidence that the note LNV claims to hold is a counterfeit instrument

and that the assignment of trust deed is also a counterfeit instrument. These counterfeit

instruments have been intentionally manufactured by Plaintiff LNV with intent to deceive

this court and to thereby wrongfully deprive Defendant of her property under color of law

and to unjustly enrich the owner of Plaintiff LNV, Daniel Andrew Andy Beal. (D.

Andrew Beal).

2. Plaintiff LNVs willfully misleading claims that Defendants claims in the present case

rely entirely on pleadings from two earlier cases: pleadings from two cases filed by

Defendant that were dismissed by this Court with prejudice is again intended to deceive

this court, and Defendant can only pray that your Honor will see through this ploy.

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 3 of 10


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 101 Filed 09/25/15 Page 4 of 10
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 342 of 383

First the case filed in 2012 (Subramaniam v. Beal et al, Case No. 3:12-cv-01681) was

specific to a wrongful non-judicial foreclosure attempt by Plaintiff LNV and its agents

LPS affiliated agents, law firm RCO Legal and its cohort Northwest Trustee Services,

initiated in 2012. While the present case stems from a wrongful judicial foreclosure

action brought by Plaintiff LNV against Defendant and her property in November 2104.

These cases are related in that the subject property involved is the same, and that one of

the parties involved in the earlier case, Plaintiff LNV, is the party that initiated the

present wrongful foreclosure action. This earlier action (Subramaniam v. Beal et al, Case

No. 3:12-cv-01681) was summarily dismissed by this court without any judicial

determination of fact or conclusion of law specific based on the merits of her case

specific to whether or not the party attempting to foreclose, Plaintiff LNV, had standing

to do so. It is true that Defendant challenged Plaintiff LNVs standing to foreclose on

some of the same grounds she is currently challenging Plaintiff LNVs standing to

foreclose on her property; but because Defendant was a pro se litigant and unable at that

time to follow legal procedures (and she is still deficient in this ability) the court

dismissed her case, not on its merits but on her procedural defects. This resulted in a

miscarriage of justice and a denial of her constitutional rights to due process and equal

protection of law guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United

States Constitution. These violations of Defendants rights to due process and equal

protection of law are the catalyst for her filing her Notice of Constitutional Questions

challenging the constitutionally of Federal Rule 56 and other statutes that have the effect

of discriminating against pro se litigants.

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 4 of 10


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 101 Filed 09/25/15 Page 5 of 10
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 343 of 383

This Court now has an opportunity to correct this earlier miscarriage of justice by

carefully reviewing the evidence in this case, and in the noticed related cases of other

LNV/MGC/Beal vicitms, and by adhering to Supreme Court direction to hold the

pleadings of pro se litigants to a less stringent standard that pleadings prepared by

attorneys. A dispute of material fact exists in this case; and any claims to the contrary

such as those peppered throughout LNVs reply and memorandum in support of its

motion for summary judgment is beyond the willing suspension of disbelief of any

reasonable person.

The Court should deny Plaintiff LNVs motion for summary judgment; or the Court

should allow for further discovery specific to the authenticity of the note and assignment

of trust deed; and specific to other matters that have a direct bearing on whether any legal

conveyance of Defendants note and trust deed to Plaintiff LNV ever in fact occurred;

and whether the note and trust deed in this case was ever an enforceable instrument.

3. Defendant had attached the OMNI Document Examinations (OMNI) Report previously

submitted as an exhibit to one of her pleadings since LNVs reply complains that she did

not produce it. See Defendants EXHIBIT C which in addition to the preliminary OMNI

report includes the photograph she took of the Jason J. Vecchio endorsed allonged

attached to the allege original note shown to her in the officers of LNVs Counsel. This

signature is also a spot-on match with those signatures already evaluated.

4. Defendant lacks the financial resources, as do the other pro se LNV/MGC/Beal victim

litigants in her noticed related cases, to pay for the services of such expert witnesses.

This is one of the reasons we have related our cases so that we can ideally share the costs

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 5 of 10


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 101 Filed 09/25/15 Page 6 of 10
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 344 of 383

of such expert evaluation and testimony which is needed by the courts to make a fair and

just evaluation as to whether or not the notes LNV has shown to various victims and

individuals like WFAA investigative reporter Brett Shipp are in fact genuine as LNV, or

LNVs owner D. Andrew Beal and his agents, claim or if they are in fact forgeries

intentionally altered to deceive the courts.

In addition to further evaluation by OMNI of the signatures on allonges to notes and on

assignments of mortgages or assignments of trust deed, Defendant has contacted an

expert in examining financial instruments to determine whether they are authentic or

electronic forgeries. Dr. James M. Kelley, Ph.D. of Computer Forensic Examinations is

an independent scientist specializing in this field of expertise. He is qualified as an expert

ad and has testified as such in numerous court cases. See Defendants EXHIBIT D. Dr.

James M. Kelleys fees are also out-of- reach financially for Defendant and the other pro

se LNV/MGC/Beal victim litigants in her noticed related cases without a consolidation

that would allow for reduction in these fees and sharing of these costs.

5. Of course the FBI also has the expertise and equipment to make such expert

determinations as to the authenticity of financial instruments LNV claims are genuine and

which give it standing to foreclose on properties across the county. It is in the public

interest, as well as in this Courts interest to engage exert evaluation to determine

authenticity of the note LNV has produced to this court and to the courts hearing the

cases of the other pro se LNV/MGC/Beal victim litigants in her noticed related cases

because using counterfeit financial instruments to deceive courts across the county as to

title deeds to real property so as to foreclose on these properties for personal gain

constitutes a criminal RICO offence. Criminal prosecution of Plaintiff LNVs owner D.

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 6 of 10


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 101 Filed 09/25/15 Page 7 of 10
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 345 of 383

Andrew Beal and his agents, including his attorneys, who willfully engage in his criminal

enterprise activities, is warranted. The public has had enough and demands criminal

convictions of individuals who engage in these crimes against their property and their

freedom.

6. The single bank statement Counsel for LNV complained about was attached as an exhibit

to Defendants motion to strike the sworn declaration testimony of Michelle Conner [Doc

80 page 20] to show Ms. Conner doesnt have personal knowledge of Defendants

mortgage or her mortgage payment history as she claims because if she did have personal

knowledge she would know that Defendant in fact did make payments beyond the April

1, 2007 date Ms. Conner testified was the date on which Defendant stopped making

payments and went into default.

Defendant had experienced misappropriation of her mortgage payments by a prior

servicer, EMC Mortgage Inc. (EMC). EMC falsely claimed she was in default in

September 2005. Defendant wanted to refinance her mortgage in February 2006 but

EMC had claimed Defendants mortgage transferred to GMAC. When Defendant phoned

GMAC using the phone number provided by EMC she was told GMAC did not have her

mortgage. In March 2006 Defendant wrote a letter to Tom Donatacci, Vice President of

GMAC Mortgage. She received a letter in response dated April 3, 2006 from Sharon

Robinson Executive Offices GMAC Mortgage confirming GMAC does not currently,

and did not previously service a loan for you on the above referenced property she

goes on to state: The attachments included with your letter indicate Homecomings

Financial was at one time the servicer of your account, which is now being serviced by

Litton Loan Servicing. See Defendants EXHIBIT E.

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 7 of 10


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 101 Filed 09/25/15 Page 8 of 10
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 346 of 383

At the time Defendant received this letter she had not heard of either Homecomings or

Litton. A couple weeks after she received this letter Litton informed her they had

acquired her loan. Notice that GMAC never once mentioned in this letter that

Homecomings was a GMAC subsidiary a fact that Defendant had no way of knowing,

but one that was most certainly known by Mr. Donatacci and Ms. Robinson. It was not

until Defendant got her land records from her county recorders office in 2012 that she

saw GMAC-RFC on the 2006 deed assignments, including the one bearing Dana Lantrys

signature. Defendant never made any payments to Homecomings; she had made three

payments to Peoples Choice then all her payments prior to Litton were made to EMC.

In early 2006 Defendant hired attorneys Elizabeth Lemoine and Kevin Luby who finally

obtained a payment history from EMC after repeated requests for one by Defendant went

unacknowledged. Litton Loan Servicing had claimed to be the new servicer in 2006 but

at that time Defendant did not understand what a servicer was. Litton initiated a non-

judicial foreclosure based on the false default claim made by EMC. Unknown to both

Defendant and her attorneys in 2006 Litton was a servicer for GMAC-RFC and Littons

foreclosure attempt in 2006 was in behalf of GMAC-RFC. Defendant and her attorneys

had been deceived by GMAC-RFC and Litton in 2006.

By October 2006 Defendants attorneys proved she had not missed a single payment

EMC claimed she had missed and she was current on her mortgage. (EMCs payment

history was illogical because it showed scattered missed payments through a two year

period.) Even though Litton knew Defendant was not in default Littons attorneys refused

to call off the trustee sale on Defendants property when her attorney asked them to do so

because Litton had no incentive to settle, as the equity our client possesses in the

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 8 of 10


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 101 Filed 09/25/15 Page 9 of 10
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 347 of 383

residence was more than adequate to satisfy the amount you sought in the sale. See

Defendants EXHIBIT F. Defendants attorney was shocked and because by this time

Defendants cash resources were so drained by the hours of attorney fees she could not

afford to pursue injunctive relief and was forced to file bankruptcy to prevent a wrongful

foreclosure on her property in November 2006. The bankruptcy ended up costing her at

least a million dollars in lost earnings and prevented her from obtaining affordable health

insurance and health care that caused her much physical suffering.

Your Honor this Defendant and the other LNV/MGC/Beal victims in the noticed related

cases want to know what you would want done if this happened to you.

7. Unfortunately what happened to Defendant is not an isolated instance. The other

LNV/MGC/Beal victims have also experienced misappropriation of intentional their

mortgage payments; false claims of default; filing of counterfeit assignments of trust deed

or assignments mortgage with their county recorders offices; LNVs and/or MGCs or

another Beal entitys submission of these counterfeit assignments in foreclosure litigation

to courts as genuine when LNVs owner D. Andrew Beal knows or should know they are

not genuine; willful submission of altered and counterfeit notes to courts as genuine with

intent to deceive; fabricated and false payment histories; submission of false affidavits

and declarations by MGC employees; a pattern of abuse of judicial process by attorneys

for LNV and other Beal entities with intent to deprive Defendant and the other

LNV/MGC/Beal victims of their civil rights. See the Affidavit of Catherine Gebhardt.

8. According to the email communication between Ms. Gebhardt and Rennie Brode from

the Nevada Secretary of States Office (Gebhardts Exhibit I) pertaining to when LNV

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 9 of 10


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 101 Filed 09/25/15 Page 10 of 10
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 348 of 383

Corporation became authorized to legally conduct business LNV filed its initial list of

officers on April 14, 2008. NRS 76.100(1) states:

A person shall not conduct a business in this State unless and until the person
obtains a state business license issued by the Secretary of State. If the person
is: (a) An entity required to file an initial or annual list with the Secretary of
State pursuant to this title, the person must obtain the state business license at
the time of filing the initial or annual list.

Therefore the earliest LNV could have obtained a Nevada business license allowing it to

legally conduct business would have been on or after April 14, 2008. Any conveyances of

notes or trust deeds to LNV prior to that date would have been illegally conveyed

rendering this court, and any other court, lacking in jurisdiction to grant LNV any relief it

may seek specific to such illegally transacted business.

9. LNVs Counsel complains that Defendant didnt file affidavits in support of her objection

to LNVs motion for summary judgment yet LNV objects to the Affidavit of JoAnn

Breiting filed in support of her objection. Other LNV/MGC/Beal victims are preparing

verified affidavits to support of Defendants objection to LNVs motion for summary

judgment and the victims Notices of Constitutional Questions.

PRAYER

Defendant prays this Honorable Court deny LNVs motions for summary judgment and schedule

this case for further discovery and for a jury trial.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Denise Subramaniam


_________________________________________
Denise Subramaniam

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 10 of 10


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 102 Filed 09/28/15 Page 1 of 8
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 349 of 383

COUNTY OF HARRIS
STATE OF TEXAS

SWORN AFFIDAVIT OF CATHERINE GEBHARDT

My name is Catherine Gebhardt. My nickname is Cathy. I am over the age of 18 years and am
fully competent to make this affidavit. I reside in Sevierville Tennessee. I swear under penalty of
perjury under the laws of Texas and Tennessee as well as the United States, that this written
testimony contained herein is true and accurate.
I have been fighting to protect my home from wrongful foreclosure since 2009. There were two
attempted foreclosures lodged against me, one in 2009 and one in 2011, by LNV Corporation or its
agents. Then LNV Corporation filed a complaint against me for breach of contract in September
2012. Below are the case names and numbers:
1. Gebhardt v GMAC Mortgage et al, Case No. 2009-059-I, in the Circuit Court for Sevier
County Tennessee and removed to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee at Knoxville by defendants as Case No.: 3:09-CV-425.
2. Gebhardt v. Dovenmuhle Mortgage Inc., et al Case No. 2011-0613-II in the Circuit Court for
Sevier County Tennessee.
3. LNV Corporation v. Gebhardt, Case No. 3:12-CV-468-TAV-HBG in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville, Case No. 14-5605 in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
I had two different attorneys in the earlier two cases; Andrew E. Farmer and Douglas E. Taylor.
Their actions and inactions indicate they were not working to protect my interests, although I didnt
discover this until October 2013.
Evidence of fraud from the origination of my mortgage exists. In September 2013 I obtained records
from Guaranty Land Title, the title company that closed my loan, which included a loan application I
never filled out or signed that states I am not an American citizen nor did I buy for residential
purposes. See Exhibit A. The attorney owner of Guaranty Land Title, Jerry Dewayne Kerley, was
indicted and convicted of thirteen felonies involving money laundering, wire fraud, and mortgage
fraud in a separate case of illegal activities which began in 2006. See Exhibit B. The crimes he was
convicted of are similar to what occurred at my origination in 2002. Unknown to me when I hired
Doug Taylor he was friends with Jerry Kerley
Taylor was also friends with the mortgage broker, Joyce Linger. I requested Taylor add Kerley as a
defendant to Gebhardt v. Dovenmuhle Mortgage Inc. but he told me it was not necessary because
Kerley was already toast having been criminally charged. In 2014 as a pro se litigant I served a
subpoena on Sevier County Bank to obtain a copy of the check written by Guaranty Land Title to the
Ronnie Sullivan, the seller of my property, and a copy of the fed wired transfer of the funds
Guaranty Land Title received on the day my loan closed. These funds came from Bank One N.A.
The check to Sullivan was $166,767.85 while the amount paid to Guaranty Land Title by Bank One
N.A. was $242,485.02. (See Exhibit C) A difference of $75,717.17 was fraudulently padded into
my mortgage loan and it appears this money was pocketed by Kerley and/or Linger.
In 2012 I took my mortgage origination documents to certified CPA W. Michael Alfred. He told me
none of the figures matched up. He discovered that $28,000 had been padded into my loan as per the
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 102 Filed 09/28/15 Page 2 of 8
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 350 of 383

settlement statement. These funds were actually part of a separate owner financed agreement I made
with the seller, Ronnie Sullivan, for acreage adjacent to the property on which my house sits. This
$28,000 was never supposed to be added into my loan. Kerley and Linger knew this as Kerley
prepared my Promissory Note with Sullivan. Virgina Johnson, a relative of Joyce Johnson Linger,
did the appraisal on the same day as the loan closed. The propertys value was inflated by at least
$47,717.17 to deceive me into borrowing more money than needed to pay the seller. See Exhibit D.
The lender on my mortgage documents was stated as Sebring Capital Partners yet the funds came
from Bank One N.A. It was never disclosed to me and that Bank One N.A. was involved in my
mortgage. It appears Sebring was not really the lender as I had been misled to believe.
Joyce Linger, the broker involved in my mortgage, was named as a defendant in Gebhardt v.
Dovenmuhle Mortgage Inc. filed in 2011 yet she has never been served due to the nefarious conduct
of attorney Douglas E. Taylor. Douglas E. Taylor did not accomplish many things he said he would
do in that case. In early 2012 he told me to non-suit LNV Corporation and Dovenmuhle because he
had scared them away. I trusted him because he was the trained attorney and so I did as he
suggested. After I fired Doug Tayor in October 2013 he began, without my knowledge or
permission, filing things in this State case that had been dormant with the sole remaining defendant
Joyce Linger. See Exhibit E. In 2014 I learned Taylor should have filed a motion for a default
judgment against LNV and Dovenmuhle because they did not file a timely answer in spite of having
been served. Had Taylor done so, LNV never could have filed a lawsuit against me.
In September 2012 I was sued in Federal Court for Breach of Contract by LNV Corporation in the
U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Tennessee Knoxville Division as; LNV Corporation v.
Gebhardt. The case is currently on appeal in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati Ohio.
The appellate case No. is 14-5605; and I recently have filed a related lawsuit against the originators
of my mortgage loan and Beal Financial Corporation which is the parent company of LNV
Corporation. Gebhardt v. Beal Financial Corporation et al; Case No. 3:15-cv-286.
There are many irregularities, inconsistencies and falsities in the documents submitted to the court
by LNV to support their actions lodged against me. LNV attached to its complaint against me in
September 2012 it as Exhibit 1 what it claimed was a true and exact copy of the Note. (See Doc 1-1
in Case 3:12-CV-468). This copy is of a counterfeit Note. This can be ascertained due to the fact
that LNV attached a completely different document which it claimed was also a true and exact copy
of the Note to a Motion for Summary Judgment LNV filed in August 2013. (See Doc 10-2 Case
3:12-CV-468). These different copies of the Note are attached as my Exhibit F because LNV had
these copies of these Notes sealed. The first copy of the Note (Note A) contains two pages
designated as page 3 in a three page document. The difference between these two page 3s is that the
second page 3 contains a stamped endorsement by Judy Faber as Vice President which reads Pay to
the Order of JPMorgan Chase Bank, as Trustee without recourse Residential Funding Corporation.
The other endorsement reads; Pay to the Order of Residential Funding Corporation without
recourse Sebring Capital Partners by Gayna Yeager, Vice President. The first page 3 by way of
comparison is blank in the area where it reads Pay to the Order of although is bears the signature
of Gayna Yeager, and it does not include the Judy Faber endorsement. The Gayna Yeager signature
on these pages does not match her official signature on file with the Texas Secretary of State. Then
on the signature page of the Floor Rate Addendum to Note (page 9 of Doc 1-1) my signature was
electronically copied from another document and placed onto this page. This can be ascertained by
white space one can clearly see all around the letters of my signature and the lines it sat upon whilst
a black streak runs through the page on an enlargement of this signature shown on the page
following page 9 of LNVs Doc 1-1. My answer to LNVs complaint filed on 09/27/2012 (Doc 4
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 102 Filed 09/28/15 Page 3 of 8
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 351 of 383

Case 3:12-CV-468) pointed out these irregularities. LNV then altered the true and exact copy of the
Note attached to Doc 10-2 (Note B) to clean up these irregularities. Note A and Note B cannot
both be true and exact copy of the Original Note of which I have never been shown. Anyone can
put a stamp designating Original on a document and this act does not make the document such.
Any layperson would recognize the differences in what LNV claims are two exact copies of the
Original Note. To prevent the public from ever seeing these two very different copies of the Note
LNV asked the court to seal them owing to the fact that LNV failed to black out my social security
number. My attorney was informed LNV had not protected my social security number on Note A, so
LNV should have blacked it out on Note B. I believe this was an intentional act by LNV so as to
seek court sanction to seal this evidence from the public that LNV is passing off counterfeit Notes as
genuine to the court. In a lawsuit for breach of contract the Note is the contract. I challenged the
authenticity of the Note submitted to the court by LNV twice and altered differently each time so
summary judgment should never have been granted in my case. LNV was granted a judgment
against me of nearly half a million dollars and executed a writ to sell my home as a result.
Many of the LNV/MGC/Beal victims have had LNV and its attorneys produce counterfeit Notes and
counterfeit assignments of mortgage/deed and counterfeit allonges to Notes. We have reached out to
one another and shared and compared our documents. Many of us have a Corporation Assignment
of Deed of Trust to LNV executed on 03/10/2008. Mine is on file in the Registrar of Deeds office in
Sevier County Tennessee. Many of the other LNV/MGC/Beal victims have nearly identical
assignment of trust deed (in some states these documents are titled assignment of mortgage) all
dated 03/10/2008 and all signed by GMAC-RFC employees Michael Mead or Betty Wright and
notarized by Diane M. Meistad also a GMAC-RFC employee. See Exhibit G.
As a group the LNV/MGC/Beal victims and I located nearly 50 such assignments as well as many
more documents signed by Michael Mead and/or Betty Wright. When we compared the signatures in
these documents we could see that several different individuals signed as Michael Mead, and several
different individuals signed as Betty Wright.
After doing extensive research and reaching out to the Secretary of State in Nevada, I learned that
LNV Corporation was not authorized to do any business in Nevada until they were incorporated in
the state of Nevada which happened on 03/17/2008. The certified Articles of Incorporation for LNV
Corporation which I obtained from Nevada are entered into LNV Corporation v. Gebhardt on
Appeal in the Sixth Circuit as Case No. is 14-5605. See Exhibit H.
Further, 03/17/2008 is the date that Nevada recognizes LNV Corporation as being authorized to
legally conduct business as one cannot conduct business before they are incorporated. Their business
license is tied with their application for incorporation and the filing of their list of officers. In an
email sent to me by Rennie Brode from Nevada Secretary of State, Ross Millers office dated
August 23, 2013 Rennie states that LNV did not file its Initial List of Officers until 04/14/2008.
The earliest LNV could have obtained a Nevada business license was 04/14/2008. Doing business in
the state of Nevada without a business licensure is illegal per this email and per Nevada statutes
NRS 76.100(1). See Exhibit I. It is logical to assume that one cannot legally convey anything when
they do not yet exist, yet so many conveyances of trust deed to LNV were executed on 03/10/2008
or on dates even proceeding 03/10/2008 and on dates preceding 04/14/2008.
Assignments of Trust Deeds of conveyance to LNV Corporation that show an execution date of
03/10/2008 were filed by or on behalf of MGC Mortgage Inc. in the county recorders offices for
other LNV/MGC/Beal victims of which I am personally acquainted such as Chris and Marcia Swift
in Illinois, Denise Subramaniam in Oregon, Robynne Fauley in Oregon, Tuli Molina in Arizona, and
Rhonda Hardwick in Indiana. Other LNV/MGC/Beal victims have this same 03/10/2008 assignment
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 102 Filed 09/28/15 Page 4 of 8
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 352 of 383

of trust deed to LNV signed by the same parties that signed my assignment of deed of trust, but I am
not personally acquainted with them. I am personally acquainted with LNV/MGC/Beal victims
Samuel and JoAnn Breitling who have a counterfeit assignment of Trust Deed dated 03/21/2008
prior to the earliest date of 04/14/2008 that LNV could have been licensed by Nevada to do business.
In all my years of fighting against a fraudulent foreclosure on my home neither MGC Mortgage Inc.,
the company I was told was the servicer for my loan beginning in October 2008, nor LNV ever
provided me with a payment history. In the breach of contract case filed against me in September
2012, (i.e. LNV Corporation v. Gebhardt on Appeal as Case No. is 14-5605). Early in 2013 in
response to a request by Doug Taylor LNVs Counsel Ronald G. Steen Jr. sent 91 pages of
documents of which included a fabricated payment summary dated 08/27/2012 signifying I made
26 payments in July 2010 of $2,569.56 each totaling $66, 808.56 being paid to MGC in July 2010.
Then in response to a QWR under RESPA I sent to MGC at 1 Corporate Drive in Lake Zurich
Illinois in early 2014 I received a letter dated 02/28/2014 from LNVs Counsel Ronald G. Steen Jr.
stating that Steens law firm represents MGC Mortgage Inc. even though the breach of contract
lawsuit was initiated by LNV Corporation and MGC is not a party to that lawsuit; and of which
included another payment summary dated 02/26/2014 that showed I made 45 payments in July of
2010 totaling $115,630.20 of which I paid to MGC in one month. See Exhibit J.
These so called payment summaries are total fabrications and beyond what anyone of sound mind
would believe. These summaries lack itemization, detail and authentication; and they are
inconsistent with my banking records. They are completely fabricated. This is the same experience
for the rest of the LNV/MGC/Beal victims; no accurate payment history has ever been produced by
MGC and LNV.
I have a sworn affidavit on file in the Sevier County Registrar of Deeds office in Sevierville TN
which can be obtained online by utilizing Titlesearcher.com which has been there since year 2011
stating that I have never been able to elicit a complete pay history. See Exhibit K.
Like so many other LNV/MGC/Beal victims including the ones already named herein and many
others not named herein I have never received any correspondence at any time from LNV
Corporation. No letter head signifies LNV Corporation as the sender of any communication sent to
any LNV/MGC/Beal victim.
My mortgage payments were made to GMAC Mortgage, LLC and prior to that to Homecomings
Financial Network. In September 2008, I learned from GMAC Mortgage LLC that my servicing
was transferring to MGC Mortgage Inc. of which the address was provided for me as being 7195
Dallas Parkway, Plano, TX, 75024.
In October 2008, I purchased a certified cashiers check made payable to MGC Mortgage Inc. in the
amount of $6,000.00 which I mailed to 7195 Dallas Parkway, Plano, Texas, 75024 with intent to pay
ahead my mortgage until January 2009. MGC claimed to have never received this payment or other
payments I made to MGC or GMAC after October 2008. After LNV filed their breach of contract
case against me in September 2012 I began combing my bank records, and asked my bank if they
could get me a copy of any of the cashier checks with which I made payment to MGC. In 2013 my
bank finally found this $6,000 cashiers check that was paid to Beal Bank SSB in Plano Texas on
October 29, 2008. See Exhibit L.
In LNVs complaint for breach of contract, (i.e. LNV Corporation v. Gebhardt on Appeal as Case
No. is 14-5605), it states on LNVs Corporate Disclosure that LNV is a subsidiary of Beal Bank
USA, with no mention of Beal Bank SSB in Plano Texas, as a parent to LNV. No conveyance of the
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 102 Filed 09/28/15 Page 5 of 8
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 353 of 383

Note or assignment of the trust deed was ever made to Beal Bank SSB, or even Beal Bank USA, as
with the Swift case. LNV also expunged a document from court record in my case (Doc 1-5) in
opposition to Federal Rules and with the assistance of court employees. See Exhibit Z.
Oddly neither MGC nor LNV has ever disclosed what they did with that $6,000.00 or the other
funds I paid MGC or GMAC after October 2008 that were supposed to be applied to my mortgage.
In fact MGC claimed they never received this $6,000 payment or the other payments I had sent to
MGC or GMAC after GMAC told me the servicing transfer to MGC had fallen through and I was
supposed to make payments to GMAC again.
I phoned GMAC Mortgage LLC in December 2008 because I had immense difficulty reaching
anyone at MGC Mortgage Inc. When I did get through an MGC employee told me that their system
was not fully uploaded and not to worry. I thought GMAC could tell me if they saw the $6,000
payment. I thought I was surely ahead in my payments and that no payments would be due until
January 2009 but GMAC told me that I still owed $1,511.76. I did not understand why, but I paid
GMAC this amount by phone on December 24, 2008, which drafted through my bank on December
26, 2008. In January 2009 GMAC told me they still had my account but could not explain why and
told me that my mortgage payments would be in excess of $4,000.00 per month moving forward,
double what they had been). I was shocked. I knew at that point there was money misappropriation
going on. I made one more payment in January 2009 in the amount of $4,080 dollars and then
searched for legal help. See Exhibit M.
Later in 2009, GMAC began foreclosure proceedings. I obtained a temporary restraining order from
a local judge after hiring attorney Andrew E. Farmer to file suit in my behalf which stopped the sale
of my property scheduled for May 16, 2009. Later in 2009 GMAC halted all their proceedings due
to the national attention about the robo signing scandal at that time. Like so many of the
LNV/MGC/Beal victims we knew payment misappropriation was going on but we had no idea the
extent of fraud being leveled against us.
A letter from Erica Fitzpatrick Thomas, who claims to be the Vice President of MGC Mortgage,
which is dated 06/23/2011 was sent to my Congressmans office addressed to Shelia Houser,
Administrative Assistant to Congressman Phil David Roe which states that MGC Mortgage Inc. did
not take servicing of my loan until on or about July 01, 2009, and that MGC has never received
any payments from me. See Exhibit N. (Remembering LNVs payment summaries in my
Exhibit H one must ask: Why then does a payment summary dated 02/26/2014 show I made 45
payments to MGC in July of 2010 totaling $115,630.20; and a payment summary dated 08/27/2012
signify in July of 2010 I made 26 payments to MGC of $2,569.56 each totaling $66, 808.56?)
It is clear from these documents that MGC misappropriated my $6,000 payment made in October
2008 which was paid to Beal Bank SSB, my $1,511.76 payment made to GMAC in December 2008,
and my $4,080 payment made to GMAC in January 2009.
In LNV Corporation v. Gebhardt LNV submitted to the court a false affidavit by Brett J. Maloney
which was accepted and deemed as true by the court. Many of the other MGC/LNV/Beal victims,
including Stuart and Nora Hamm, David Gates, Samuel and JoAnn Breitling, and Becky Gentry-
Youngblood have had such sworn testimony by affiant Brett J. Maloney entered into their court
cases by LNV or LPP Mortgage Ltd. another Beal Corporation. Maloney has claimed to have never
been convicted of a crime. I ordered a criminal background check on him and discovered he had
been convicted of a felony crime. See Exhibit O. Notice that on page 9 of this exhibit the report
shows that Bret Maloney is a Loan Trader at Beal Bank S.S.B.
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 102 Filed 09/28/15 Page 6 of 8
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 354 of 383

MGC/LNV/Beal victims, the Swifts, deposed Maloney and his sworn deposition testimony can be
proven to be false perjured testimony. I objected to Maloneys affidavit testimony as being false in
my case but by this time I had been forced to represent myself and Judge Varlan ignored my
objection. One of the many things Maloney claimed in his deposition from the Swift case was that
he was the only Senior Vice President of MGC. We obtained records from the Texas Tax Finance
office with a list showing several Senior Vice Presidents for MGC. Another thing Maloney said in
has sworn testimony was that the Beal entities (MGC, LNV, LPP, Beal Bank, etc) all operate under
the same roof as one organization; and in an attempt to explain away the many LNV/MGC/Beal
victims claims about 7195 Dallas Parkway, Plano, Texas address being an empty lot, he said the
building located at 6000 Legacy Drive of which is the address for Beal Bank, wraps around the
corner and that side of the building is located on Dallas Parkway. This is untrue. A Google map
shows this as being untrue, as does a photograph taken by JoAnn Breitling; and in 2011 I requested
verification of delivery for a letter I mailed to MGC at the 7195 Dallas Parkway address and Walter
Henry at UPS called the driver who said he had to force deliver my letter to 6000 Legacy Drive,
the address for Beal Bank. See Exhibit P.
In 2013 myself and LNV/MGC/Beal victims Denise Subramaniam and Cammy Depew phoned
MGC and witnessed each others phone conversations. We asked to speak to Bret Maloney. The
MGC employee who answered the phone told us no Bret Maloney worked for MGC. Then we asked
to speak to someone in MGCs Default Management Department of which Bret Maloney said in his
affidavits he was Senior Vice President. We were told MGC did not have such a department. A
LinkedIn profile for Bret Maloney show him to be a Loan Trader for Beal Bank; which was also
shown in the criminal report I ordered on Bret Maloney see page 9 of my Exhibit O.
Myself and LNV/MGC/Beal victims Denise Subramaniam and Cammy Depew also phoned and/or
witnessed phone conversations where one of us phoned LNV. Since none of us were ever sent any
communication from LNV we looked up LNVs phone numbers online. Each time we phoned LNV
we reached either Beal Bank or CLMG Corporation (another of Beals corporations). I have tape
recorded phone conversations where a Beal Bank employee routed me to CLMG Corporation of
which I had dialogue with one of their employees who told me they service for LNV but they do not
speak or communicate with LNV Corporation. I have learned that since our earlier calls in 2013 the
telephone number one elicits for LNV Corporation on the internet is a mobile number and their
message asks one to leave their name and number as they are helping other people. This same
message is elicited each time a person dials the number whether it be 3pm or 3am.
LNVs counsel in LNV Corporation v. Gebhardt sent me a mortgage payoff statement. This is an
odd looking document which I immediately questioned and brought to the attention of the other
MGC/LNV/Beal victims most of whom discovered they also had been sent almost identical
mortgage payoff statement by MGC. See Exhibit Q. These letters advise us to wire funds to: Bank
of America, Chicago, IL, ABA Number 026009593, Account Number 8666116790 so we made
some telephone calls to Bank of America inquiring about the routing number and account number
for the fed wire transfer. I was told on four occasions that the account did not exist; these calls were
witnessed by another MGC/LNV/Beal victim and recorded.
On August 30, 2013, I wired a $5.00 into this account which supposedly did not exist from
Tennessee State Bank in Sevierville, TN. My bank manager knew I was fighting a case involving
mortgage fraud and needed documentary evidence that this fed wire account did not exist. She
suggested I wire a nominal amount into the account which would result in a rejection being that the
account did not exist which would provide the documentary evidence I desired. The funds were not
rejected so I wrote a letter to Brian Moynihan, CEO of Bank of America. Before I received his reply
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 102 Filed 09/28/15 Page 7 of 8
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 355 of 383

I had another idea and on September 2013 I wired another $5.00 into the account this time I wrote
Charlotte NC instead of Chicago on the transfer. This second fed wire transaction was rejected three
days after I wired the funds. My bank called and told me to pick up the rejection receipt. That very
afternoon I received another call from Sherry Cole at my bank because the earlier fed wire
transaction I made on August 30th was also just then rejected. I immediately went to the bank and
obtained that document. Ms. Cole told me that not five minutes after I left the bank earlier that
morning she had received a very strange call from a man who identified himself as Charles King,
with the Mortgage Relief Aid a government agency and her caller ID read U.S. Government. He
asked her questions about whether Tennessee State Bank accepted ACH deposits, to which she
responded in the affirmative. He told her that Bank of America and one other bank that she could not
recall the name of, did not take ACH deposits. She wrote this on Bank letterhead. See Exhibit U.
MGC/LNV/Beal victim Denise Subramaniam phoned her Congresswomans office to verify if the
Mortgage Relief Aid was indeed a government agency and she told me she was told it was not.
We discovered that a young attorney named Charles King worked for Dovenmuehle but an older
man named Charles King worked for Bank of America Merrill Lynch in Jacksonville, FL. This
Charles King was an older man who was a Trust Operations and Private Wealth Management
Client Services Executive and a former Global Wealth and Investment Management (GWIM)
Operations Executive. I asked Sherry Cole if the man who phoned sounded like a young man or an
older man and she resonded that he sounded like an older man. I then wrote a letter to Bank of
America asking about whether the Charles King that worked for Bank of America had made the
phone call but they responded that it could not a Bank of America employee and had to be a
Dovenmuehle employee. See Exhibit R.
In early October 2013 (on or around October 03, 2013) a call came to my office which was taken by
an associate of mine who told me the caller said her name was Linda with Bank of America when
she asked for my social security number my associate refused to give her this information and
instead encouraged her to call back later to speak with me directly when I returned to the office.
Within one hour, Linda called back and left a voice message saying her name was Linda with Bank
of America and that she had something from me and asked me to call her back. She left no last
name, reference number, or phone extension in her message. I did call back but when I had no last
name or extension I was told me they could not help as there are many Lindas who work at Bank
of America.
I called Bank of America again that afternoon (on or around October 03, 2013) and talked with a
gentleman who said his name was Renee who told me he was located in Mexico. He told me that he
would send an email to abuse@BankofAmerica.com about the call from Linda because Bank of
America would never phone anyone and ask for their social security number. He said he was aware
of a scam going on where door tags being were placed upon the doors of peoples homes. I recorded
this phone call.
I did not tell Renee that in September of 2013 a lady named Pam Penny had written her name and a
Bank of America phone number upon a door tag which the Sheriffs Deputy elicited from her after a
friend of mine chased her and some other people off my property after they would not properly
identify themselves. We phoned the Sevier County Sheriffs and they were found hiding in the
bushes watching my property as well as taking pictures of my property. See Exhibit S. Because
Pam Penny indicated on the door tag she was with Bank of America I phoned Bank of America and
asked if they had an interest in my mortgage loan. I was told no loan with my address existed with
Bank of America; I requested they put that in writing and they did send me a letter stating this.
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 102 Filed 09/28/15 Page 8 of 8
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 356 of 383
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 105 Filed 09/29/15 Page 1 of 14
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 357 of 383

Denise Subramaniam
Self-represented
13865 SW Walker Rd
Beaverton OR 97005
503-764-5300

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION

LNV CORPORATION Civil Case No. 3:14-cv-01836


Plaintiff,
v. DEFENDANTS RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFFS OBJECTION TO
DENISE SUBRAMANIAM AFFIDAVIT OF JOANN BREITLING IN
pro per SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION
Defendant
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DEFENDANTS RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS OBJECTION TO


AFFIDAVIT OF JOANN BREITLING IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant incorporates herein all her pleadings in this case; her Notice of Directly Related

Cases; her Notice of Constitutional Questions as well as the Notices of Constitutional Questions

filed by the other LNV/MGC/Beal victims in the noticed related cases; and in her noticed related

cases; and her motion to compel Plaintiff LNV Corporation (LNV) to produce its business

license and the agreement between Residential Funding Company LLC aka Residential Funding

Corporation (GMAC-RFC) that included the alleged conveyance of deeds of trust/mortgages

for Defendants property and all the other LNV/MGC/Beal victims with instruments endorsed by

GMAC-RFC employees Diane M. Meistad and Betty Wright or Michael Mead executed on

March 10, 2008 before LNV was incorporated and licensed to do business in Nevada (LNV filed

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 1 of 14


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 105 Filed 09/29/15 Page 2 of 14
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 358 of 383

its list of officers on April 14, 2008 and therefore could have acquired a Nevada business license

prior to that date.) Plaintiff also incorporates her Affidavit already filed in support of her motion

to compel and in support of this objection, and the Affidavit of Catherine Gebhardt [Doc 102]

and states the following:

In response to Plaintiff LNV Corporations (LNV) objection to the Affidavit of JoAnn

Breitling in Support of Defendants Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant argues the following:

Counsel for LNV claims the Breitling case is not relevant to the present case. This is not true for

the following reasons:

1. Defendant and the Breitlings are both being foreclosed upon by Plaintiff LNV

Corporation and the mortgage servicer for both Defendant and the Breitlings was MGC

Mortgage Inc. (MGC); and both Defendant and the Breitlings claim servicing fraud

(i.e. misappropriation of payments, false claims of default with intent to foreclose.)

2. LNV has submitted to the courts in both these foreclosure actions affidavits of employees

of MGC. In the present case LNV submitted the affidavit of Michelle Conner in support

of LNVs motion for summary judgment; in the Breitlings case LNV submitted the

affidavits of Edward J. Bagdon and Bret Maloney.

3. Defendant and the Breitlings challenged the credibility of these affiants and submitted to

the courts evidence to show that the testimony of these affiants is perjured testimony and

that these affiants do not have personal knowledge of these defendants mortgages or

about the payment history of their mortgage loans. Collectively similar individual acts by

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 2 of 14


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 105 Filed 09/29/15 Page 3 of 14
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 359 of 383

MGC and LNV, of submitting false affidavits to a court shows a specific a pattern of

intent to deceive the courts.

4. Defendant and the Breitlings both filed Notices of Related Cases and Notices of

Constitutional Questions; as has Affiant, Catherine Gebhardt. Each of them has

individually and collectively challenged the constitutionality of federal Rule 56 because

wealthy litigants (like MGC and LNV each wholly owned by other Beal corporate

entities, ultimately wholly or significantly owned and controlled by D. Andrew Beal)

abuse the judicial process and conspire with their highly paid attorneys to interfere in the

civil rights of pro se litigants like Defendant, the Breitlings and Gebhardt (and even of

litigants who have attorneys with less financial resources than the large corporate law

firms hired by Beal) by filing continual motions to dismiss and motions for summary

judgment to prevent discovery in these cases and to prevent Beals legal opponents from

ever going to a trial on the merits of their cases. Beal and his attorneys know or should

know this abuse of process will result in higher legal fees for their opponents and their

opponents attorneys and will ultimately cause the Beal entities to win, not based on the

merits of their own claims, but based on their opponents weaker financial position.

5. LNV has submitted to the courts in both Defendants and the Breitlings foreclosure

actions, as well as in the Gebhardt case, copies of notes it claims are true and accurate

copies of the original note; allonges to these notes, and assignments of trust deeds were

filed via mail or wire with these litigants respective county land recorders office. These

documents specific to Defendants and to the Breitlings mortgage and property contain

suspicious endorsements. Dana Lantry as Vice President or Assistant Vice President of

Peoples Choice Home Loans was an endorser of such documents in the present case, and

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 3 of 14


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 105 Filed 09/29/15 Page 4 of 14
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 360 of 383

Amy Brackett as Assistant Secretary of Aames Funding Corporation dba Aames Home

Loans was an endorser in the Breitlings case. These mortgage related documents were

mailed and/or electronically filed via wire by MGC as shown on the face of these

documents.

6. Both Defendant and the Breitlings have claimed the mortgage related documents

submitted to the courts by LNV are altered and/or false. Dana Lantry was employed by

Aames and then by Peoples Choice. She confirms this in her 21 minute audio taped

phone conversation with Defendant on September 3, 2015, [Doc 101-2 Exhibit B]. She

further confirms that she did not sign any allonges or assignments of trust deed while

employed by Peoples Choice because she was not an executive officer. In this taped

phone conversation Dana Lantry also says she did not recall an Amy Brackett employed

by Aames. Although she says Aames was a large company with many offices in the

phone conversation, Dana Lantry worked at the Aames Irvine California location where

there would have been relatively few employees working in that office. Further evidence

exists that the Breitlings Amy Brackett endorsed assignment of trust deed is fraudulent.

Carlos E. Moral in Ulysses, Kansas ordered a title audit after an application to refinance

his mortgage was declined because the bank told him his title was clouded. The title

search report identifies a specific assignment of trust deed to Morals property as the

cause of the cloud on his title. This assignment was also endorsed by Amy Brackett as

Secretary of Aames Capital Corporation. See Exhibit A attached herein. A comparison

of the Amy Brackett signature on the Breitlings assignment of trust deed to the one on

the Morals assignment of trust deed shows stark differences that indicate these two

Amy Brackett signatures were made by different individuals; consistent with the

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 4 of 14


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 105 Filed 09/29/15 Page 5 of 14
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 361 of 383

criminal conspiracy crimes of Lorraine Brown. The cloud on Defendants title begins

with the Dana Lantry endorsed assignment of trust deed. This is supported by the

declaration testimony of Bill Paatalo, [Doc 94 Exhibit D pages 29 through 48.] The facts

presented to the court via Bill Paatalos audit and declaration have not changed and are

further substantiated by the phone conversation between Defendant and Dana Lantry who

says she never signed any allonges or assignments of trust deed in behalf of Peoples

Choice because she was not an executive officer for Peoples Choice.

This can only mean one thing, the assignment of trust deed and the allonge LNV

submitted to this court bearing a Dana Lantry signature was signed by someone else,

not Dana Lantry, thereby making these instruments forged instruments. An issue before

this court is whether or not these instruments were willfully forged by employees of

MGC, LNV, Beal Bank USA, Beal Bank SSB, Beal Financial Corporation or any other

Beal corporate entity under the instruction or direction of the one person who controls all

these Beal corporate entities and who financially gains the most from the deceptive

practice of submitting such forgeries to courts to support of foreclosure actions with

intent to deprive Defendant, the Breitlings and other LNV/MGC/Beal victims of their

property under color of law without due process.

7. Defendant and the Breitlings and Gebhardt and many of the other LNV/MGC/Beal

victims claimed that MGC (or its predecessors) misappropriated their payments. They

have submitted evidence to their respective courts to substantiate the truth of their claims.

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 5 of 14


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 105 Filed 09/29/15 Page 6 of 14
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 362 of 383

8. Defendant and the Breitlings and Gebhardt and many of the other LNV/MGC/Beal

victims experienced acts of fraud during the origination of their mortgages and have

submitted evidence of such to their respective courts.

9. Both Defendant and the Breitlings and many of the other LNV/MGC/Beal victims sought

to refinance their mortgages but were prevented from doing so by the wrongful, unfair

and/or unlawful debt collection practices of MGC (or its predecessors); and were thus

entrapped by a predatory mortgage servicer that made false claims of default with intent

to wrongfully foreclose on their properties. Such debt collection practices are consistent

with violations of consumer rights pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. If

LNV is not the holder of Defendants and the Breitlings and Gebhardts and the other

LNV/MGC/Beal victims note and trust deed, as it claims, then LNV lacks standing to

either collect payments from Defendant or the Breitlings or Gebhardt or the other

LNV/MGC/Beal victims and lacks standing to foreclose on their properties.

10. Both Defendant and the Breitlings and most of the other LNV/MGC/Beal victims

suffered wrongful damage to their credit caused by MGC/LNV/Beal and significant

financial harm as a result.

11. Defendant and the Breitlings both submitted evidence to their courts showing that the

ultimate owner and person who controls the activities of MGC and LNV, D. Andrew

Beal, knew or should have known that the endorsements on these notes, on the allonges

to these notes, and on these assignments of trust deed were not genuine endorsements.

See [Doc 69-1 pages 5 &6] If Beals employees or Beals agents, including his attorneys,

participated in altering these negotiable instruments to give the appearance of a

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 6 of 14


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 105 Filed 09/29/15 Page 7 of 14
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 363 of 383

conveyance to LNV when such did not in fact occur; or in forging the signatures of Dana

Lantry or Amy Brackett on these negotiable instruments to give the appearance of an

ultimate conveyance to LNV when such did not in fact occur, then D. Andrew Beal

would be guilty of the felony crime of forgery; and guilty of engaging in monetary

transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity in violation of 18 U.S.

Code 1957, a racketeering activity as defined by 18 U.S. Code 1961(1). A civil

RICO claim requires at least two acts of racketeering activity occurring within 10 years

of each other. In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 741 F. 2d 482 - 1984, the Supreme

Court struggled with the meaning of the word requires and hinted that while two acts

were necessary to establish a pattern, they may not be sufficient. In H.J. Inc. v.

Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 US 229, Supreme Court 1989 the Supreme Court

undertook the task of resolving the split and created the relationship plus continuity

test. This test requires RICO plaintiffs to show that the alleged racketeering acts are

related and amount to or pose a significant threat of continued criminal activity.

Showing this court the relationship and the continuity between the racketeering acts

committed by LNV, MGC and the other Beal entities and Beal agents and Beal attorneys

in the Defendants case and in the Breitlings case, in the Gebhardt case, and in the cases

of the other LNV/MGC/Beal victims shows that as a group we can meet the Supreme

Courts relationship plus continuity test for a civil RICO action.

The Sedima court also determined:

There is no requirement that a private action under 1964(c) can proceed only
against a defendant who has already been convicted of a predicate act or of a
RICO violation. A prior conviction requirement is not supported by RICO's
history, its language, or considerations of policy. To the contrary, every indication
is that no such requirement exists. Accordingly, the fact that respondents have not

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 7 of 14


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 105 Filed 09/29/15 Page 8 of 14
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 364 of 383

been convicted under RICO or the federal mail and wire fraud statutes does not
bar petitioner's action. Pp. 473 U. S. 488-493.

12. Defendant, the Breitlings, Gebhardt and the other LNV/MGC/Beal victims who have or

will file Notices of Constitutional Questions, have challenged the constitutionality of

federal Rule 23 because the rule and/or its application by the federal courts bars us as pro

se litigants from availing ourselves of a class action remedy in spite of the fact that 1) we

are collectively many members of a class so numerous that joinder of all members may

be impracticable as the number of known LNV/MGC/Beal victims in our group is

approximately forty-five (45) and new victims regularly contact our group and our

research indicates there may be tens of thousands of class members; 2) there are

questions of law or fact common to the class; 3) the claims or defenses of the

representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and 4) the

representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a risk

of: (A. inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that

would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; and

B.) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter,

would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual

adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their

interests.

For example class members Cammy Depew and Tuli Molina have already lost their

homes to LNV and been evicted from their homes by LNV in spite of LNV and its

attorneys submissions to courts of the same questionable copies of notes, allonges and

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 8 of 14


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 105 Filed 09/29/15 Page 9 of 14
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 365 of 383

assignments of trust deeds all with suspicious endorsements fitting the same

characteristics as those found in the Dana Lantry and Amy Brackett endorsed instruments

that LNV submitted to the courts in Defendants and in the Breitlings cases. Cammy

Depew was handicapped by not having a car and lived more than an hour from the

federal court. She was ultimately blindsided by LNVs Locke Lord attorney propensity

to remove pro se litigants to federal court then dismiss without any opportunity for

discovery or review of the merits. Locke Lord also represents LNV in the Breitlings case

and in the Randle case and published a how-to manual for other attorneys about handling

predatory pro se litigants using this very tactic that was submitted into evidence in the

Breitling case.

Defendant and many of the other pro se litigants have had earlier cases summarily

dismissed with prejudice because of procedural deficits and because most courts fail to

apply a less stringent standard to their pro se pleadings than they would to a pleadings

written by attorneys in spite of numerous Supreme Court decisions directing them to do

so. LNV uses these cases against them, as LNVs Counsel Ms. Richards keeps

attempting to do in Defendants case, and LNVs Counsel Marc Cabera and Luke Madole

do in the Breitlings case, in LNVs Counsel Ronald G. Steen Jr. has done in Gebhardts

case, in LNVs Locke Lord attorneys in Cammy Depews case and as LNVs counsel do

in many of the other LNV/MGC/Beal victims cases. Each time a pro se litigant loses a

case in this manner it substantially impairs or impedes the ability of future victims to

protect their interests because these cases set precedence.

And when Beal alters a note, like the court concluded his Beal Bank SSB did in Beal

Bank, SSB v. Sarich, No. 05-2-11440-1SEA (King County Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 2006) and

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 9 of 14


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 105 Filed 09/29/15 Page 10 of 14
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 366 of 383

criminal consequence are not enforced by the court other LNV/MGC/Beal victims suffer.

Our ability to protect our interests have been substantially impaired or impeded becuase

Beals attorneys ultimately prevailed in overturning the lower courts decision on appeal

with no judicial discussion about the felony act of forgery which should have barred Beal

from seeking judicial relief based on the doctrine of clean hands; and should have

resulted in a criminal indictment and conviction. Cases like Beal Bank, SSB v. Sarich set

precedence that the Beal entities, and other entities like them, have used against members

of the LNV/MGC/Beal victim class and against other classes of homeowners victimized

by similar acts of felony forgery.

13. Defendant, the Breitlings, Gebhardt and the other LNV/MGC/Beal victims claim LNV

and other Beal entities and agents, including LPS affiliated agents like Dovenmuehle

Mortgage Inc. (DMI) and with Beals attorneys conspire to interfere in the

LNV/MGC/Beal victims civil rights through a systematic pattern of abuse of judicial

process, fraud upon the court and evidence tampering, and in some cases bribery, with

intent to deprive these victims of their constitutional rights to due process and equal

protection of law and to thereby deprive them of their real property, their liberty to enjoy

their years-long investment in their property and to make beneficial financial decisions

about that investment, and to deprive them of their quality of life under color of law in

violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution.

LNVs Counsel Ms. Richards has very selective memory as to the courts direction specific to

Defendants discovery. Quoting from the transcript of the hearing held on July 8, 2015 [Doc 92-

1 page 14 line 18 through to page 16 line 17]:

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 10 of 14


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 105 Filed 09/29/15 Page 11 of 14
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 367 of 383

THE COURT: What relevance, if any, does a challenge to the authenticity of the original
note have to do, in your view, with your motion?
MS. RICHARDS: I don't think that -- well --
THE COURT: If the original note is inauthentic, that goes somewhere, doesn't it?
MS. RICHARDS: I don't think that the defendant has any proof, aside from her
allegations and her conclusory statements that the note and the allonge and the deed of
trust are forgeries.
THE COURT: That wasn't my question. My question was assuming that it is inauthentic,
that would be relevant to the inquiry in this case, wouldn't it?
MS. RICHARDS: I think that LNV is the holder of the note and I do not believe the note
is forged. I have no reason to believe that the note is forged.
THE COURT: So I didn't think I'd have to give you the same suggestion I gave your
opponent, which is to answer that question I'm actually asking. I'm not asking whether
you believe the note is forged. I'm asking about the possible relevance of the things she's
requested.
So she contends that with an opportunity to engage in discovery, she can uncover
information that would reveal that the note is inauthentic, forged or otherwise. We're not
going to go down that route if even being successful wouldn't help her in her case, but I'm
under the impression that if she were successful in that endeavor, it would, in fact, have a
lot to do with your motion, wouldn't it?
MR. WESTON: Your Honor, may I interject?
THE COURT: No. It's a simple question. If she's right that the note is forged, is that
relevant evidence to your motion?
MS. RICHARDS: I don't believe it is, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Why not?
MS. RICHARDS: I think that -- I think it goes back to during the course not only of this
case, but also in the cases that have been previously dismissed. These are not new
arguments, and it doesn't change the underlying facts of the case that defendant is in
default.
THE COURT: Well, if she's in default on a note that's forged, then she's not in default in
a way that matters for our case, right? You have to have an authentic note for her to be in
default on it, don't you? Isn't that sort of the basic foundation of foreclosure?
MS. RICHARDS: I believe that if she is able to prove the note is forged, then it's possible
that that would be relevant. I think that my position, though, is that there is not a shred of
evidence either currently before the Court and in the record, nor could there possibly be
any evidence that defendant can put forward to show that.

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 11 of 14


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 105 Filed 09/29/15 Page 12 of 14
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 368 of 383

The Honorable Judge Mosman also said to Defendant as per [Doc 92-1 page 20 lines 5 through

10]:

The other thing that I think you're telling me you want to try to do is you want to try to
show that their right to foreclose somehow doesn't really exist. So you just tell me why
you think they're not entitled to foreclose. Either they don't really have a note, it's bogus,
or that some transfer somewhere along the way didn't really happen.

As the court said the basic foundation of foreclosure is that you have to have an authentic

note for her to be in default on it. The same premise is true in the Breitling case: in the

Gebhardt case: in the Hardwick case; in the Molina case; in the Swift case; in the Fauley case;

the Randle case; in the Hamm case; in the Gates case; in the Youngblood case; in the Depew

case and in the cases for all the LNV/MGC/Beal victims. Defendant noticed that except for the

Dana Lantry endorsement on the backside of the last page of the note LNVs Counsel Ms.

Richards showed her, none of the other signatures on the note had pressure intents.

The audio tape of the phone conversation between Defendant and Dana Lantry on September 3,

2015, [Doc 101-2 Exhibit B], casts doubt on her endorsement of the note submitted to the court

by LNV, and since she said she never signed any allonges or assignments of trust deed when she

worked for Peoples Choice then the only conclusion a reasonable person could make is that

these instruments are forged and the transfer somewhere along the way didn't really happen

and LNV therefore lacks standing to foreclose.

JoAnn Breitlings Affidavit testimony is relevant to Defendants case in the same way that

testimony from multiple rape victims is relevant to a prosecuting attorney in a criminal rape case.

The he said, she said nature of rape cases can make prosecution difficult. Even when forensic

evidence of rape exists the rapist will often claim the sex was consensual. Its more common for

a criminal to lie than to tell the truth; and theyre often very good at it. Testimony from other

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 12 of 14


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 105 Filed 09/29/15 Page 13 of 14
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 369 of 383

victims who can identify the physical characteristics of their rapist which all match the rapist on

trial; and testimony about each womans experience of the rape that collectively shows a pattern

or mode of operandi specific to the specific rapist on trial; along with matching forensic

evidence is often necessary to win a conviction. Likewise the similar experiences of the other

LNV/MGC/Beal victims which match Defendants experiences and their collective evidence

which shows a pattern of activity that these victims hope will result in criminal indictments and

convictions of D. Andrew Beal, his employees, employees of his agents, and of his attorneys

who willfully participate in his criminal conspiracy acts so as to prevent others from suffering

the horrific financial loss and emotional duress they have suffered for so many years.

If LNV, MGC and the other Beal entities have forged the notes, allonges and assignment of trust

deed being used to foreclose on all these LNV/MGC/Beal victims, then this is a significant

matter not just for this court and for this case, but for other courts presiding over cases involving

foreclosures by LNV and other Beal entities; and it is a matter for the United States Justice

Department and the FBI to investigate, because mass forgery with intent to illegally foreclose on

thousands of properties under color of law is a matter of great public interest.

For this court or any court to allow such a criminal conspiracy to defraud homeowners and the

courts to continue would be a grave miscarriage of justice and an insult to all law abiding

citizens.

LNVs Counsel Ms. Richards is walking a very thin line between representing her clients

interests and participating in Beals criminal conspiracy to defraud the courts and to interfere in

Defendants civil rights and the civil rights of the other LNV/MGC/Beal victims.

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 13 of 14


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 105 Filed 09/29/15 Page 14 of 14
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 370 of 383

Her personal attitude about foreclosure is clearly reflected in her reluctance to answer this courts

question, If she's right that the note is forged, is that relevant evidence to your motion?

Ms. Richards response was, I don't believe it is, Your Honor. Clearly her client doesnt

believe it is either. Fortunately most U.S. citizens do understand that you have to have an

authentic note for one to be in default on it.

Defendant, the Breitlings and the other LNV/MGC/Beal victims challenged the constitutionality

of 18 U.S.C. 4 because as pro se litigants who are also victims of a pattern of RICO crimes and

who have done everything within their power to report these crimes to authorities are, like so

many U.S. citizens, frustrated and extremely disappointed in the inaction of our government and

in our judiciary when it comes to investigating these crimes and criminally prosecuting these

crimes. Individuals like D. Andrew Beal need to be held accountable. An impartial judiciary that

upholds our Constitution and enforces our laws equally and impartially is essential to maintain

public confidence in our system of justice. Our system of government fails when individuals like

D. Andrew Beal are permitted to continue to commit felony crimes and profits greatly from his

crimes at the expense of hard working and law abiding citizens and taxpayers.

PRAYER

Defendant prays this Honorable Court deny LNVs motions for summary judgment and schedule

this case for further discovery and for a jury trial.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Denise Subramaniam


_________________________________________
Denise Subramaniam

Defendant Motion to Consolidate Directly Related Cases Page 14 of 14


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 121 Filed 01/28/16 Page 1 of 2
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 371 of 383

fILEri28 .JAN '1615:261JSDCtJRP


Denise Subramaniam
Self-represented
13865 SW Walker Rd
Beaverton OR 97005
503-764-5300

UNITED ST ATES DISTRICT COURT


DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION

LNV CORPORATION Civil Case No. 3:14-cv-01836


Plaintiff,
v. AFFIDAVIT OF DENISE
DENISE SUBRAMANIAM SUBRAMANIAM IN SUPPORT
pro per OF MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
Defendant RULE 65(8) INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

AFFIDAVIT OF DENISE SUBRAMANIAM

STATE OF OREGON
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON
AFFIDAVIT

I Denise Subramaniam am over the age of eighteen ( 18) years. I reside in Beaverton Oregon and
have never been convicted of a crime. I'm fully competent to make this affidavit. The testimony
contained herein is of my personal knowledge and experience. I swear under the penalty of
perjury and under the laws of Oregon and the United States that my testimony herein is true and
accurate.
On or around 1/2712016 I discovered that the instruments Plaintiff LNV submitted as exhibits to
its foreclosure complaint and its motion for summary judgment that it claimed to be a ''true and
accurate copis'' of the "original" note, allonge and assignment of deed of trust cannot possibly be
genume.
Dana Lantry endorsed the questioned Note as "Asst. Vice President" of People's Choice Home
Loan, Inc. On June 28, 2006 an assignment of deed of trust was recorded with Defendant's
county also endorsed by Dana Lantry which was executed on 12/29/2005 and purports to convey
beneficial interest in the deed of trust from People's to Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.
Dana Lantry also purportedly endorsed as "Vice President" of People's Choice Home Loan, Inc.,
allonge that purports to convey beneficial interest to Residential Funding Company LLC.
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 121 Filed 01/28/16 Page 2 of 2
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 372 of 383

These facts on the face of these three instruments submitted into court record by Plaintiff LNV
support Defendant's claim that LNV manufactured what it submitted to the court as the
"original'' Note and its allonges after May 2013 and before November 2014 with intent to
deceive and falsely imply a "cure" of the fatal break in Defendant's chain of title pointed out in
the Paatalo declaration.
Affiant and the other Beal victims have named Judge Mosman and three other federal judges and
four state judges as co-conspirators in a formal criminal complaint filed with the FBI. A copy of
this complaint has been mailed to James B. Corney, Director of the FBI; and has been, or is
being, hand delivered to local FBI field offices in more than a dozen states where the Beal
victims live. Our complaint is for prohibited RICO activities and for conspiracy to deprive us of
our civil rights under color of law.
I am disabled, I have been known to be disabled, and the United States recignises me as a
disabled person. My home provides accommodation for my disabilties pursuant to the ADA and
Fair Housing Act; the loss of my home would cause me to suffer debilitaing phycial injury; and
it is nearly impossible for someone with my disabilties to find housing that accommodates my
special needs.
An unconstitutional and wrongful sale of my property would cause me to suffer irreparable
harm. I've motioned the court for temporary stay of a sheriffs sale of my home scheduled for
tomorrow. There is no time to notify opposing counsel; and may not be in my interests. As a pro
se, disabled litigant, I've been terribly disadvantaged in this case. I've motioned for 14 days
temporary injunctive relief; in the hopes I'll be able to find counsel to represent me at a hearing
for preliminary injunctive relief; and to pursue my Rule 6 motion for relief.
Further Affiant sayeth not.

~s _____
Denise Subramaniam
13865 SW Walker Rd
Beaverton OR 97005
503-764-5300

Personally appeared before me, a notary public in and for Washington county Oregon, the above

on the J. ~day of~teilibet, 1015.


JcJJ vatr, J,.ol'

~~
OFACIALSTAMP
EMILY ANNE BALILONIS
NOTARY PUBLIC-OREGON
COMMISSION NO. 943359
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES OCTOBER 06. 2019
-
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 123 Filed 01/28/16 Page 1 of 11
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 373 of 383

FILED28 .JAN '1615:27JJsVCtJRP


Denise Subramaniam
Self-represented
13865 SW Walker Rd
Beaverton OR 97005
503-764-5300

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION

LNV CORPORATION Civil Case No. 3:14-cv-01836


Plaintiff,
v. REVISED NOTICE OF
DENISE SUBRAMANIAM CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIO S
pro per
Defendant

REVISED NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS

Comes now Defendant, Denise Subramaniam, self represented and Pursuant to Federal

Rules 28 U.S.C. 2403 and 5.1 (a)( I) hereby makes notice of constitution questions.

Pursuant to Federal Rule 5.1 (a)( I )(B) Defendant and the other Beal victims challenge

Rule 12 and Rule 56 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the state counterparts to these rules

as being unconstitutional because they have a disparate impact on Defendant and other class

members (i.e. Beal victims), most of whom are also members of protected classes including

senior citizens, the disabled, single female heads of household or single females , and/or

minorities, and who due to the economic disadvantage associated with these classes, and the

reason they are considered protected classes, and due to the ever increasing costs of litigation

often find themselves with no choice but to represent themselves, knowing they are inept to do

so, when faced with situations where they will be wrongfully deprived of their property, their life
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 123 Filed 01/28/16 Page 2 of 11
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 374 of 383

quality and their liberty to access their life-long investment in their property; which is also their

residence.

Federal Rules 56 and Rule 12 as they are currently written result in a discriminatory

disparate impact on non-criminal homeowner prose litigants fighting wrongful foreclosure

actions. A disproportionate number of parties, wealthy financial institutions, and in the case of

the Beal class of victims, the Beal international organization with financial resource of more than

$19 Billion, opposing this class of prose litigants are routinely granted summary judgments

under Rule 56 and summary dismissals under Rule 12 by both state and federal courts.

Rule 56 and Rule 12 also result in a discriminatory disparate impact on non-criminal pro

se litigants involved in other civil rights related litigation, such as employment discrimination,

and divorce and child custody litigation, where, like with homeowners in foreclosure related

litigation, a significant number of litigants cannot afford legal representation and are left with

few choices but to represent themselves pro se.

Defendant has been denied due process and equal protection of the law in violation of the

fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution due to summary judgment

orders granted to LNV Corporation by U.S. District Judge Michael W. Mosman. Defendant is

about to be illegally and unconstitutionally deprived of their property and of her right to a jury

trial under the seventh amendment to the United States Constitution by Rule 56 FRCP. The

derivation of her property will result in a deprivation of her life quality and her liberty. Rule 56

and Rule 12 result in an arbitrary, capricious, abuse of judicial discretion resulting in rulings that

are not in accordance with law and/or made without the observance of procedure required by

law.
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 123 Filed 01/28/16 Page 3 of 11
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 375 of 383

Due to the exceptionally high costs associated with litigation, and the lack of government

funding for legal aid services to those in need, and the lack of any effective non-attorney

regulatory agency to assure accountability for attorneys and judges who routinely violate their

professional codes of conduct, more Americans than ever are unable to obtain meaningful access

to our courts and to justice. This problem threatens our very democracy.

Respected commentators and judges have criticized summary judgment as being

unconstitutional. Professor Thomas argues that summary judgment is unconstitutional because it

did not exist at common law and violates the historical test set forth textually in the Seventh

Amendment. See Suja A. Thomas, Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA.L.REV. 139,

139 (200 7) (arguing that summary judgment conflicts with the common law axiom that the jury

decides the facts); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Still Unconstitutional: A Reply to

Professors Brunet and Nelson, 93 IOWA L.REV. 1667, 1667 (2008) (attacking articles seeking to

defend the constitutionality of summary judgment). " In Suits at common law, where the value in

controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved ... " US.

CONST. Amend. VII.

Judge Patricia Wald worries that trial judges are too quick to grant summary judgment

and that Federal Rule 56 of Civil Procedure " has assumed a much larger role in civil case

dispositions than its traditional image portrays ... to the point where fundamental judgments

about the value of trials and especially trials by jury may be at stake." Patricia Wald, Summary

Judgment at Sixtv, 76 TEXAS L. REV. 1897, 1898 (1998). Accord, Richard L. Steagall. The

Recent Explosion in Summary Judgments Entered by the Federal Courts Has Eliminated the

Jury From Political Power, 33 S.ILL.L.REV. 469, 496-99 (2009) (setting forth a litany of

problems caused by overuse of summary judgment).


Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 123 Filed 01/28/16 Page 4 of 11
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 376 of 383

Professor Stephen Burbank describes the original 1938 Federal Rule 56 as a "radical

transformation" of earlier versions of a much more confined procedure. Stephen Burbank,

Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or

Gomorrah?, 1 J.EMP. LEG. STUD. 591 , 591 (2004).

Professor Schneider concludes that courts grant a disproportionate number of defendants'

summary judgment requests in cases raising gender discrimination. See Elizabeth M Schneider,

The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L.REV.

705, 760 (2008). See also, Elizabeth M Scheider, The Changing Shape o[Federal Pretrial

Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158

U.PA.L.REV. 517 (2010).

Professor John Bronsteen delivered the ultimate criticism by strongly urging that

summary judgment be eliminated and defending this revolutionary suggestion by asserting that

the progress and settlement of civil litigation would be relatively unchanged by his proposal. See

John Bronsteen. Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASHL.REV.522 (2007).

Most of these summary dismissals and summary judgments rendered against homeowner

prose litigants are due to procedural defects in prose pleadings and due to prose litigants '

inexperience with obtaining evidence through discovery. More often than not, these prose

litigants are deprived of any meaningful opportunity for discovery by over use of Rule 56 and

Rule 12 by judges who want to quickly end these pro se foreclosure cases with rulings favoring

the foreclosing parties which are based on their own personal biases rather than on any sense of

justice. Rule 56 and Rule 12 as written allows judges too broad of a discretion, too often abused,

that results in an unconstitutional impact on not just prose litigants, but on small law firms with
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 123 Filed 01/28/16 Page 5 of 11
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 377 of 383

modest budges who litigate in behalf of homeowners against opposing corporate entities with

billions and trillions of dollars at their disposal. Rule 56 and Rule 12 deprive far too many non-

corporate litigants from a trial by jury on the merits of their cases; another civil right guaranteed

by the seventh amendment to the United States Constitution.

" I consider trial by jury the greatest anchor ever yet devised by humankind for holding a

government to the principles of its constitution." Thomas Jefferson, 1792.

The American jury trial is a constitutional right. One of the primary concerns of the

founding fathers was preventing the United States of America from developing an oppressive

government. Much of the Bill of Rights was born out of that concern. A primary strength of the

jury trial is that it acts as a check to unfettered prosecutorial power. If judges decided every case,

it could raise a number of concerns about fairness in the judicial process. Defendant, the other

Beal victims, and thousands of other prose homeowners litigants are in fact experiencing such

unconstitutional unfairness in the courts as a result of Rule 56 and Rule 12 which have eroded

our judiciary into an oppressive mechanism for imposing the undemocratic will of an elite

corporate oligarchy on the masses thorough civil litigation that often results in an

unconstitutional deprivation of their life, liberty and property.

The onslaught of foreclosure actions beginning around 2008 brought on by the economic

crashes caused by the wrong-doings of Wall Street "too big to fail banks" around mid-2000 has

created a dichotomy of opposition reflected in foreclosure litigation where all the power is on

one side; the foreclosing party. The excessive wealth and corporate political power on that side

of the dichotomy has resulted in an unprecedented deprivation of civil rights through a calculated
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 123 Filed 01/28/16 Page 6 of 11
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 378 of 383

and systematic abuse of Rule 56 and Rule 12 to deprive homeowners of any opportunity to have

their claims heard and fairly adjudicated.

D. Brock Hornby a District Judge on the United States District Court for the District of

Maine in SUMMARY JUDGMEN T WITHO UT ILLUSIONS writes on page 7:

17
" Summary judgment motions change litigation stakes. By filing them, defendants delay
recovery and increase Defendant' legal expenses (or Defendant' lawyers ' expenses in contingent
18
fee cases). They also increase Defendant' risk because, if Defendant lose, all is over except an
expensive, delayed, and uncertain appeal. Therefore, Defendant' case values decrease for
19
settlement purposes. "

The change in litigation stakes described by Judge D. Brock Hornby has created a no-win

situation for homeowners litigating to protect their property interest from foreclosure actions

intended to deprive them of their property. Many of these foreclosures where homeowners have

been fighting for years are based on counterfeit mortgage instruments never examined by experts

or the courts for authenticity despite obvious signs on the face of these instruments of forgery ,

electronic alterations, and falsities. When the prose homeowner litigants point this out to the

courts in their pleadings their objections and their evidence supporting their claims that these

instruments are not authentic; most often fall on deaf judicial ears. Counterfeit mortgage

instruments erode the foreclosing parties ' standing to foreclose , yet far too many judges routinely

accept these counterfeits as genuine and grant summary judgments under Rule 56 or Rule 12,

particularly when the homeowner litigants are prose.

An undeniable bias exists within the judiciary against the homeowners in these cases.

Data based on I 05 foreclose related cases presided over by Judge Jane Boyle, presiding over the

case of Beal victims JoAnn and Samuel Breitling in Texas demonstrates this judicial bias. Most

of these I 05 cases were removed to federal court by the parties opposing homeowners. In more
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 123 Filed 01/28/16 Page 7 of 11
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 379 of 383

than half these cases the homeowners were prose litigants. Not one of these I 05 cases went to a

jury trial. Only two cases were settled. The rest were dismissed with prejudice against

homeowners pursuant to Rule 12 or summary judgment was granted to the opposing party

pursuant to Rule 56. Not once has Judge Boyle ruled in favor of a homeowner. Cases involving

homeowners with Hispanic names were summarily decided via Rule 12 or Rule 56 more quickly

than in other cases; with all such homeowners being deprived of their property without due

process, without equal protection of law and without a jury of their peers. The deprivation of

their property more certainly had a negative impact on these families' quality of life.

Defendant, the other Beal victims and other homeowner litigants have experienced

unconscionable violations of their civil rights, and deprivation of their civil rights under color of

law by judges who abuse their discretion and make biased summary decisions because Rules 56

and 12 allow them far too much discretion to do just that. Such a one-sided economic dichotomy

that exists in these cases creates a situation where attorneys representing excessively wealthy

foreclosing parties abuse the judicial process through repeated summary judgment and dismissal

motions under Rules 56 and 12 in a calculated effort to exploit the very change in litigation

stakes described by Judge D. Brock Hornb. The financial incentive is in favor of these parties

continuing with their fraud because the penalties for being caught are miniscule.

Consumer protection laws cap penalties and fines at $10,000 which for litigants with

billions and trillions of dollars at their disposal is a meaningless non-deterrent in light of the

billions in undue profits they gain through perfecting foreclosures with counterfeit mortgage

instruments. These parties also have the political clout and financial means to improperly

influence judges for favorable rulings; and to improperly influence government regulatory
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 123 Filed 01/28/16 Page 8 of 11
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 380 of 383

authorities to look the other way. In the case of the Beal organization the evidence of this

happening is significant.

This one-sided economic dichotomy, and the self-regulating legal institutions that

undermine any meaningful accountability for attorneys and judges, has created a predatory legal

quagmire for homeowners. Tens of thousands of homeowners have been exploited by attorneys

and law firms , like the Lane Law Firm and J.D. Milks hired by Defendant, who exploit the lack

of supply to meet the demand for legal representation of homeowners fighting foreclosure. These

inscrutable attorneys advertise themselves as foreclosure experts, when they have little or no

experience in this area of litigation. They merely exploit homeowners and bleed them of their

financial resources. They file cookie cutter pleadings to placate their clients until the inevitable

defeat of their clients' cases due to summary orders under Rule 56 or Rule 12. Their clients'

cases never go to trial before a jury.

Even when attorneys have passion for the plight of homeowners and a sincere desire to

achieve justice for their clients, their efforts are often thwarted by the one-sided economic and

legal dichotomy that tips heavily in the favor of excessively wealthy corporate parties litigating

foreclosure actions against their clients ' property. These foreclosing parties know their success

comes through a denial of discovery and in engaging in egregious legal tactics to prevent the

truth from being exposed. Rule 56 and Rule 12 are the best legal tools at the disposal of such

corrupt attorneys. Their legal strategies are just as Judge D. Brock Hornby described: to delay

recovery and increase homeowners ' legal expenses. These corporate attorneys capitalize on the

change in litigation stakes created by Rule 56 and Rule 12 to increase homeowners ' risk which in

turn increases the risks for homeowners' attorneys ; making it financially un-lucrative for ethical

attorneys to represent homeowners; and decreasing the supply of legal assistance for
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 123 Filed 01/28/16 Page 9 of 11
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 381 of 383

homeowners, and at the same time creating a situation where mass numbers of homeowners have

little choice but to represent themselves as prose litigants, where they become sitting ducks to be

expoited by corrupt officers of the court and corrupt judges.

The jury trial is a vital part of America' s system of checks and balances. Appointed

judges might be beholden to politics and the people who appointed them. Elected judges could

be swayed by public opinion in a given case. Jurors, on the other hand, are not appointed and

instead serve on a jury as part of their civic duties.

A jury trial, guaranteed by the United States Constitution, is the first major check on the

discretion of judges. A judge, holding office over the course of multiple cases, and selected by

appointment or election, is susceptible to undue influence. A jury, chosen by sortition, or lot, for

a single case, just before the case, is less likely to be corrupted, and having multiple jurors render

verdicts collectively provides a check by each on the others. What they might lack in knowledge

of the law is offset by their connection to the non-legal environment in which most people

subject to the law must operate.

Most complaints of abuse of judicial discretion, and calls to limit such abuse with more

laws, concern questions of policy or equity, but there is another broad category, which concerns

constitutional questions of due process and civil rights which are raised by Defendant herein .

Quoting for Judge William G. Young Speech at Judicial Luncheon The Florida Bar 's

Annual Convention in Orlando June 28, 200 7:

"(T)he American jury system is dying. It is dying faster in 'the federal courts than in
the state courts. It is dying faster on the civil side than that on the criminal side, but
it is dying. It will never go entirely, but it is already marginalized. It will never go
entirely, but it is already marginalized. It is not at the center of our political
discourse. How is this possible, with our Constitution and every one of the 50 state
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 123 Filed 01/28/16 Page 10 of 11
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 382 of 383

constitutions guaranteeing the right to trial by jury? The general answer is that we
do not care."

Defendant is members of a class of Beal victims, and they are members of a broader class

of pro se homeowners litigants routinely deprived of meaningful due process, and who have been

unconstitutionally and unlawfully deprived of their property and of their life quality and their

liberty to make choices we all cherish as a result. Their constitutional rights to due process and

equal protection of law have been violated through the unchecked judicial abuse of the

unconstitutional Rules 56 and 12 of FRCP.

Respectfully Submitted,

Denise Subramaniam
Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 123 Filed 01/28/16 Page 11 of 11
Case: 15-35963, 07/31/2017, ID: 10528084, DktEntry: 63-2, Page 383 of 383

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was

served upon all counsel of record, pro-se parties and the United States Attorney General and the

Attorney General of the State of Oregon via the Court' s CM/ECF system, email , and/or regular

mail , and/or certified mail with return receipt requested.

U.S. Department of Justice


Loretta Lynch,
U. S. Attorney General
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001
202-514-2000

Gabrielle D. Richards I Perkins Coie LLP


1120 NW Couch Street
I0th Floor
Portland, Oregon 97209-4128
D. +1.503.727.2255
F. + 1.503.346.2255
grichards@perkinscoie.com

Respectfully Submitted,

Denise Subramaniam