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Jakab Zaln-Tams, RISE EN, anul I.

Summary of Max Weber and the theory of the state

Introduction
Weber rejects the idea of defining nationhood on the basis of religion, common language, and
religious affiliation. These, as he says, are too relative and are subject to changes. Thus the idea of the
nation cannot be defined empirically, it is varied across nations. The common trait amongst them is the
idea of a cultural mission. Furthermore Weber views the state as a political organization with the
monopoly over the use of legitimate force necessary for the implementation of laws. But the state and
the nationhood arent binded together.
Then, he notes that state arose mainly because of the need from people with economic interest,
who required the supression of private violence and the creation of rationally ordered gurantess which
allowed thinking in long-term economics. He also argues that the imperialism of the states arises not
only from economical considerations but it is also intertwined with the states dynamic of power. In
the following, he defines the state as the membership of people in one all-encompassing institution in
contrast to the primeval construction. That is the one, in which consensual groups formed their law
communities and the membership derived from objective chracteristics such as place of birth etc. The
modern state creates a gapeless system of codes, capable of encompassing all social action, where the
states provides the legal framework, in which the citizens hve their autonomy.
The Nation
According to Weber the concept of the nation means a solidarity in the face of other groups and
in this sense the concept belongs in the sphere of values. The problem is with the delimitation of these
groups. As mentioned above, some aspect cant be decisive in the question of nationhood (language,
ethnicity etc.), there are several examples for this, like the Irish-English-North American relationship.
Weber approaches this question from the relationship of the nation and prestige interests. The
legitimacy of the nation is usually anchored in its superiority or irreplaceability and this can be best
preserved by the cultivation of the peculiarity of the group, this idea is proposed as a general
distinctive attribute of nations.
The state
A state is defined as a political organization which has the exclusive right to the use of force
and it has a compulsory membership. As we have seen, the states are characterized by a changing
content and hence we should form an abstract idea of it which can be generally applied. In its formal
features, the modern state is characterized by administrative and legal orders. It claims validity over all
actions that occur within the territory of its domination. Also, legitimate violence can exist only to the
extent which is permitted by the state. The monopoly of violence rises with the increasing feeling of
solidarity in contrast to the outer groups. The emergence of this monopoly created a public peace,
being the means of submission of all disputes to the arbitration of judges. We can observe a gradual
transformation of the coercive apparatus into an institution which defends the citizens rights. Two
other important aspects of modern state is the compulsory jurisdiction over a territory and the
continuity of operation.
The main groups interested in pacification are those guided by economic interests and the
expansion of the market (for example those who collected bridge tolls and so on). This created a
synergetic tendency. Creating a legitimate legal order formed a stable market and the groups with an
economic interest are in favour of this.
Power prestige
Political formations can be diferrentiated on the manner which they use force. A specific
internal dynamic is present here, namely the member may pretend to a special prestige on the basis of
the power they have. These pretensions may manifest in the external conduct of power and may play
into the origin of wars. By war a state can gain power, and this implies growth concerning the power
of modern officers. Thus we can say that in practice the prestige of powers means the glory of power
over other communities. But the neighbours of a political formation also tends to be prone to prestige
and this leads, by the dynamic of the power, to competition or even war. In this context, Great Powers
are the ones, who are bearers of power prestige. These powers are often expansive but this isnt a
neccesary trait. Their attitude may change due to economic factors.
The economic foundations of imperialism
Weber notes the fact, that the origin and the expansion of a state might be explained
economically, but this doesnt hold true in all cases. A good example for this is Germany, where the
custom frontiers determine the economical transactions not in the other way around. Trade, then, is not
a decisive factor in the policy of economic expansion but the economic structure can be nevertheless.
As Weber says, the interest of some calls war into life (for example those who supply the materials for
war) regardless of the outcome. Banks finance war loans, also the heavy industry is interested in
waging war, thus the profit is a decisive factor regarding the orientation of a state.
The poriftablenes of imperialism is compared to the pecifist orientation, these two are
connected with the extent to which economic need are satisfied by a public or private economy. The
more importance public enterprises gains in supplying needs (at the expense of the usual private trade),
the more it is backed by economic expansion. The members, who invest in such economic
transactions, aim to form monopolies in order to secure themselves. A perfect way for this is by
subjecting certain areas by political power, which brings us back to imperialism. Weber argues, that
the situation wouldnt change even after introducing state-socialist communities, for the
organizations would still seek to buy the goods as cheaply as possible, which might be located abroad.
They have no interest in refraining from the exploitation of weaker communities for their own benefit.
From particularistic law to formal legal equality and the rights of individuals
In the past, law arose on the basis of consent, it was volitive. In these law communities
membership was decided upon objective characteristics. The individuals participating in such a group
were comrades in law, so subjection to a special law was strictly a personal quality. Any lawsuit
that would take place was reconciled by patriarchal arbitration. In these communities an important
dualism was present: between the crated laws and the norms determinative of disputes among
members. Also another problem arose, namely that an individual could be part of several communities.
The modern political organizations rests on the prestige bestowed upon them by their members,
that is the legitimacy of those social actions prescribed by these organizations. This is further
intensified by to the point where the only organization who can legitimately use force is the state.
Basically, this is the guarantee of the legal order.
The legal equality of persons formed by virtue of two rationalizing forces. Firstly, by the
extension of market economy and secondly by the bureaucratization of the activities of the organs of
the consensual groups. Creating law was no longer particularistic and for this transformation the main
cause was the power-needs of those who were oriented towards power in the market. The formal
egalitarian system in the economy created advantage for the propertied classes. Everybody had the
chance to establish a business but the propertied had a clear advantage of using these rights.
Furthermore, formal justice is clearly in favour of the ones who wield economic power,
because they are interested in its functional operation. Non-formal justice means for these people
arbitrariness and instability, which obviously doesnt favour the growth of economic power. This
pressure from different groups interested in economic power eventually brought about systematically
codified law. These proceed from five postulates: every concrete legal decision must be the application
of an abstract legal concept. Secondly, the derivation of this abstract legal concept to particular cases
must be based on legal logic. Thirdly, law most constitute a gapless system. Fourthly, whatever cannot
be constructed rationally in legal terms is irrelevant legally. Lastly, every social action of humans must
either be an application, an execution or an infringement of the legal system. These legal propositions
might be distinguished s either prescriptive, prohibitory or permissive ones. Refering to these can be a
source of power (for example I have the right to decide upon a certain thing freely, thus I have to
power for it)
In conclusion, there is a relation between the expansion of the market and the expansion of
contractual freedom. For example by gaining power, we expect the expansion of the market or at least
the transformation of it taking into account our needs for prestige, that is granting certain freedoms.

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