Maximilian's Propaganda Activities in The United States, 1865-1866

Maximilian's Propaganda Activities in the United States, 1865-1866
Author(s): Robert W. Frazer

Source: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Feb., 1944), pp. 4-29
Published by: Duke University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2508111 .
Accessed: 20/02/2015 19:58
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Duke University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Hispanic
American Historical Review.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
MAXIMILIAN'S PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1865-18661
The Emperor Maximilian arrived in Mexico in the sum-
mer of 1864. Contrary to what he had been led to expect, he
met with a cold reception. The mass of the people was
apathetic or openly hostile. A considerable force under Benito
Jua6rezand a number of guerrilla bands in various parts of the
republic were waging bitter warfare against the troops sent
by Napoleon III to prepare the way for the new imperial
order. The monarchists themselves were less warm in their
support than Maximilian could have desired. Nor did the
situation improve with the passage of time. Dissension ap-
peared among Maximilian's immediate following, even as
disaffection increased among the Mexicans. New World rec-
ognition, so much desired by Maximilian, failed to material-
ize. Financial difficulties arose as Napoleon III gradually
lost interest and the withdrawal of his support seemed immi-
nent. Finally, the cloud which had from the beginning low-
ered on the northern horizon grew dark and ominous with the
surrender of Lee at Appomatox in the spring of 1865.
The accession of Johnson to the presidency increased
Maximilian's difficulties, for Johnson was an avowed enemy
of monarchical government in Mexico. On accepting the vice-
presidential nomination in 1864 he had declared that after
the war was over the United States would "attend to the
affairs of Mexico," that an expedition would be a form of
recreation for our soldiers, and that, in consequence, the
French would quickly disappear from the continent. His
attitude strengthened the hand of Secretary of State Seward,
whose previous policy of over-strict neutrality had already
begun to change to one of vigorous protest against the inter-
vention. Moreover, the people of the United States, citizens
and public officials alike, were beginning to insist that the
:'I wish to acknowledge the comments and criticisms of Dr. Joseph Byrne
Lockey in the preparation of this paper.

MAXIMILIAN S PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES 5
French be driven from Mexico. The Monroe Doctrine, to
which no officialappeal had been made during the Civil War,
became a subject for public discussion. Meetings were held
to demand its enforcement, editorials and pamphlets were
published in its support, and in general its revival became a
matter of public concern throughout the nation.2
Faced by this situation Maximilian decided to meet unfa-
vorable agitation with countervailing propaganda. Previously
he had left the matter of his relations with the United States
to Napoleon. Although the Emperor of the French was not
yet ready to abandon Maximilian, it was becoming increas-
ingly obvious that he desired to extricate himself from an
unsatisfactory position. Realizing that Napoleon was not
securing the desired recognition, Maximilian decided to seek
it for himself. In spite of every unfavorable augury he be-
lieved he saw the possibility of gaining recognition from his
northern neighbor. Many individuals in the United States
were impressed by the military achievements of the French
forces. Friends of the empire and opponents of the Monroe
Doctrine openly espoused the imperial cause. The cool rela-
tions between the United States and England and the hostility
between President Johnson and Congress might react in favor
of the empire. Finally, the full weight of Napoleon's support
might still be gained. It was a gamble, but the ever-optimistic
Maximilian weighed the chances and thought them good.
To further his' ambitions the emperor established an
agency in New York. For a period of more than a year it
served as the center for imperial intrigue and propaganda.
The work got under way early in 1865 when Luis de Arroyo
arrived in New York with the title of consul general for the
Mexican empire. Arroyo's experience in foreign affairs was
extensive. He had been acting minister of foreign affairs under
several Mexican presidents and, prior to his mission to the
United States, was under-secretary of state and minister of
foreign affairs in Maximilian's government. His mission was
primarily in the nature of an experiment. He was to make
a direct attempt to secure recognition in the hope that it
2 For a discussion of shifting opinion in the United States see Dexter Per-
kins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867 (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 464-548.

6 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW
might be gained without trouble or delay. Soon he requested

the aid of Thomas Corwin, a former minister to Mexico who
favored the empire, in seeking an unofficial interview with
Seward. Exactly what Arroyo hoped to obtain remains un-
disclosed, for the Secretary refused to receive him in any
capacity whatsoever.3 It became evident that recognition
could not be had for the asking. Arroyo settled down in New
York to prepare the ground and await the opportunity to
launch a more serious attempt.
Failure of the direct approach necessitated the use of
more circuitous methods. Mariano Degollado came to New
York in July with full instructions to act as confidential agent
and to assist Arroyo.4 He too had some training for his task.
He had previously served in the Mexican legation in Wash-
ington and as one of Maximilian's councillors of state. In
order to get a better understanding of the problem he pro-
ceeded to Washington where, unfortunately for himself, he
relied largely upon the Marquis de Montholon for his infor-
mation. Montholonhad been French minister in Washington
since his reception by President Johnson on May 13, 1865.
Before that time he had represented Napoleon III at the
Mexican court. He had clashed with Maximilian on several
occasions and eventually had resigned his post. His opinions
of the empire were based on his own knowledge and tinged
with animosity.
As Arroyo had done before him Degollado sought an inter-
view with Seward. To pave the way he carried a letter from
Maximilian expressing the sympathy of the imperial govern-
ment at the assassination of Lincoln. Seward refused to see
him or to receive the letter.5 Degollado assumed the reason
Arroyo to Corwin, March 2, 1865, and Seward memorandum, March 13, 1865,
39 Cong., 1 Sess., H. Ex. Doe. No. 73, I, 573-574.
4 Degollado to Ramirez, July 15, 1865, Hausarchiv, Archiv Kaiser Maximilians
von Mexiko, Karton 144, Degollado 's mission nach Washington, Juli 1865, fol.
706. Library of Congress, facsimiles from Austrian archives, Haus-, Hof- und-
Staatsarchiv, Wien. Hereafter cited as Hausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton 144,
Degollado. All citations to Archiv Maximilians are to Library of Congress
photostats.
5 Seward memorandum, and [ ?] to Matilas Romero, July 8, 1865, 39 Cong.,
1 Sess., H. Ex. Doe. No. 73, I, 574-576. The author of the letter was probably
Edward Lee Plumb, a personal friend of Romero who was at various times con-
nected with the United States legation in Mexico City.

lay in Johnson's difficulties with Congress. Until the fall
elections were held political considerations would restrain the
administration from treating with any imperial agent. De-
gollado believed, apparently at Montholon's suggestion, that
the delay was only temporary. In the meantime much could
be done to raise Maximilian's prestige in the United States.6
Although Degollado could not confer with Seward, Montholon
could and did. After mildly presenting the case of the empire
he returned with an encouraging report. Degollado allowed
himself to be convinced that recognition was simply a matter
of time.
The arrival of the imperial agents was known to Matias
Romero, Juarez' able minister in Washington. From the out-
set he felt that they had slight chance of success. The
attitude of Congress, coupled with the expressed opinion of
Seward, made him confident that the United States did not
contemplate recognition of Maximilian, at least for the pres-
ent. Romero approved heartily when Seward refused to see
either Degollado or Arroyo. Sebastia'nLerdo de Tejada, min-
ister of foreign affairs under Juarez, had already expressed
the doubt that the United States would recognize Maximilian
"against the interests and against the opinion of the people
of the United States.' '7 There seemed no immediate need to
counteract the activities of the imperial agents. The opinion,
though well founded, was premature, for the real efforts of
Maximilian's representatives had not yet commenced.
In a few weeks Degollado had made his initial decisions
and was ready to begin. Ultimately, he predicted, Congress
would be forced to consider the question of the observ-
ance or non-observanceof the Monroe Doctrine. Recognition
would hinge on the outcome. Pending a decision Degollado
proposed to carry on an elaborate campaign to develop sym-
pathy for the empire throughout the United States. First it
would be necessary to counteract the strong influence already
6
Degollado to Ramirez, July 20, 1865, Hausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton 144,
Degollado, fols. 709-709 verso.
X Lerdo de Tejada to Romero, December 30, 1864, Correspondencia de la
legaci6n mexicana en Washington durante la intervencidn extranjera, 1860-1868-
(10 vols., Mkxico, 1870-1892), IV, 567-568. Hereafter cited as Correspondencia
de la legaci6n mexicana.

built up by Romero. In order to do this Degollado planned to

present the imperial point of view of the Mexican question to
the public. Many persons, notably in the former Confederacy,
already favored the empire. Yet little public discussion of the
Mexican question was heard. To encourage debate it was
imperative that Maximilian have access to the columns of
several of the country's important newspapers and that he
provide a "regular sum of money to dispense hospitality with
decency" to the men whose services he needed.
In conjunction with the press campaign Degollado advo-
cated publication of a short history of Mexico from its inde-
pendence movement to the French intervention. In it the
chaotic political and financial conditions that had attended
the republic would be contrasted with the material and moral
advantages to be derived from the- empire. When published
the history was to be distributed to members of Congress and
others connected with the government. In the meantime an
opening was to be made by personal contacts and casual con-
versations. Degollado was impressed by the apparent power
of the spoken word to mold public opinion in the United
States. By discussion alone he was prepared to pave the
way for recognition. The republican interests had long
poured their propaganda into the waiting ears of the public;
now the imperial agents were determined to offset it with a
.more wordy stream of their own.8
As a final measure Degollado favored an appeal to public
opinion through the pocketbook. He hoped to create interest
by granting privileges to various companies for the purpose
of developing banking and other advantageous enterprises.
Not only would this provide support for Maximilian but it
would secure the development of Mexico as well. Degollado
also suggested that the empire purchase military equipment
from private firms in the United States and thus acquire addi-
tional adherents. Mexico's creditors could expect to be re-
paid when peace and a firm government were established.
8 Degollado to Ramirez, July 22, 1865, Hausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton 146,
Degollado aus Washington und New-York, fols. 14-19. Library of Congress,
facsimiles from Austrian archives, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Wien. Here-
after cited as Hausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton 146, Degollado.

Since the empire proposed to establish both, the unified de-
mands of interested creditors might go a long way toward
securing recognition.
The imperial government accepted Degollado 's sugges-
tions and made them the basis for its subsequent undertak-
ings in the United States. Originally Maximilian hoped that
his representatives would be fully organized by the time Con-
gress met in December. That this would require labor was
realized, but the full extent was grossly underestimated.
There seemed to be no need for haste as long as the agents of
Juarez were impeded in their attempts to gain assistance for
the republican cause.10 The United States gave no sign that
it would aid Juarez by force. Both the army and the navy
were being reduced in size and most of the men mustered out
preferred to return to private life rather than seek new op-
portunities to engage in war."
Maximilian's agents did little at first. Arroyo busied him-
self with the usual tasks of a consular official. He opened
an office on Broadway and inserted notices in the press in-
forming merchants of the city that he was prepared to issue
consular invoices and custom house manifests for shipments
to Mexico.12 Romero was unimpressed by the activities of
the imperialists. He had decided that the United States did
not intend to recognize Maximilian and viewed the presence
of Arroyo and Degollado as merely a temporary annoyance.
He did protest against the assumption of consular duties by
an individual lacking an exequatur from the United States
government. The French consul had exercised the duties
previously and it appeared more logical to Romero that he
continue to do so because he represented "most genuinely the
order of things established in Mexico by the army of Napo-
9Degollado to Maximilian, July 31, 1865; and Degollado to Castillo, Novein-
ber 4, 1865, ibid., fols. 9, 197-197v.
10 Degollado to Ramirez, August 13, 1865, ibid., fols. 50-57; and Degollado to
Castillo, September 12, 1865, Hausarceliv, Maximilians, Karton 144, Degollado,
fols. 745-746.
"I Degollado to Ramirez, July 22, 1865, Hausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton 146,
Degollado, fols. 20-21.
12 Navarro to Romero, July 31, 1865, enc. in Romero to Lerdo de Tejada,
August 1, 1865, Correspondencia de la legaci6n mexicana, Y, 527. Juan N.

Navarro was consul general for the Mexican republic in New York City.

leon III. "'1 No law of the United States prohibited Arroyo 's
acts, and as the imperial forces controlled most of the ports
of Mexico they were in a position to dictate the terms under
which foreign commerce might enter. As far as Seward was
concerned Arroyo might act as commercial agent though he
could not perform consular functions.'4
Romero saw to it that the public was aware of the issue.
He prepared various articles for the press and published a
circular entitled "The United States and Mexico" in which
he pointed out that Juarez needed the aid of the United States-
whereas France and Maximilian desired only its tolerance.
Degollado, on the other hand, found the press difficult of
access. For a time the Coubrrierdes ?8tats Unis, the strongly
pro-Napoleonic French-language newspaper of New York,
was the only journal regularly open to him. His principal
activity was to furnish his government with detailed reports
of the state of affairs in the United States and the activities
of the republican representatives. He kept in close touch with
Montholon who cooperated when it pleased him to do so. On
more than one occasion the French minister was called upon
to protest against some real or fancied infringement of
United States neutrality. This was reassuring to Maximil-
ian's agents but meant little as the protests and replies were
largely matters of diplomatic routine.
The first major effort toward securing recognition was
that of interesting United States capital in Mexican invest-
ments. This was the task of the former Austrian naval officer
and friend of Maximilian, Count Ollivier Resseguier.15 It
was considered best to separate his work from the activities
of Maximilian's known agents in order to make it appear that
his interests were purely personal. His duties were to estab-
lish friendly relations with United States capitalists and to
promote ventures of every sort that would call for the invest-
*13 Romero to Hunter, August 1, 1865, ene. in Romero to Lerdo de Tejada,
August 1, 1865, ibid., pp. 527-528. William Hunter was assistant secretary of
state.
14 Seward to Romero, August 9, 1865, National Archives, State Department,
Notes to Mexico, fols. 347-350.
"CCount Egon Caesar Corti, Maximilian and Charlotte of Mexico (2 vols.,
New York, 1928), II, 443, 529.

ment of large sums of money. Resseguier stressed the idea

that the enterprises were designed for the economic develop-
ment of Mexico and had no political implications. A number
of concessions were granted but few ever went beyond the
paper stage.
Only one of the projects achieved any success and, in the
long run, it discredited rather than assisted Maximilian.
This was the Imperial Mexican Express Company, estab-
lished by a nine-year concession made in the emperor's name
to Eugene de Courcillon. The company was to transport
mail, merchandise, and passengers between the United States
and Mexico, foster immigration and colonization, and engage
in banking and exchange. The imperial government agreed
to use the company's services exclusively at a ten per cent
reduction under the public rates. The enterprise was to be
financed by two million dollars in capital stock, half of which
would be offered to the public.'6 Clarence Seward, nephew of
the Secretary of State, was secretary of the company. Be-
cause of his connections, many people inferred that the com-
pany had the tacit consent of the government and some went
so far as to believe that it implied an eventual recognition of
Maximilian's regime. Thus the investment of some capital
and the interest of men who could not otherwise have any-
thing to do with the undertaking was assured.17
The company was brought directly to Romero's attention
by the proprietor of a Washington hotel who offered him one
hundred shares of stock in return for aid and cooperation.'8
When this occurred the minister believed that the pretense
had gone far enough. He informed Lerdo de Tejada that the
time was opportune for Juarez to invalidate all acts of Maxi-
milian. To disillusion those who might invest in the com-
16"Portions of the concessions and agreements appear in 39 Congress, 1 Sess.,
H. Ex. Doe. No. 73, II, 251; and enc. in Romero to Seward, October 27, 1865,
ibid., pp. 246-247.
17 [Plumb] to Romero, October 12, 1865, ene. in Romero to Lerdo de Tejada,
October 17, 1865; [Plumb] to Romero, October 20, 1865, ene. in Romero to
Lerdo de Tejada, October 21, 1865, Correspondencia de la legacion mexicana, V,
702-703, 717-718; and Arroyo to Castillo, October 26, 1865, Hausarchiv, Maxi-
milians, Karton 146, Arroyo aus New-York, fol. 108.
18 Romero to Lerdo de Tejada, October 21, 1865, Correspondencia de la
legaci6n mexicana, V, 715-716.

pany, or other imperial projects, he authorized publication

in the New York press of statements declaring that Judrez
had nullified without exception all concessions made by Maxi-
milian.19 The notice had unexpected results. Courcillon took
it upon himself to defend the express company and in so
doing made public many things that Maximilian preferred
to keep private. He addressed Romero, insisting that the
company was composed of United States citizens who sought
to develop commercial relations between their country and
Mexico.26 He also sent a letter to the press stating that
Maximilian had guaranteed to do all in his power to secure
the success of the company and claiming that he had con-
ferred with Juarez in Chihuahua and received assurance that
the enterprise would have his support.21
This simply called forth a new official denial. The public
exchange of notes caused what Arroyo described as a "sen-
sation in public opinion." Neither he nor Degollado was
prepared for the stir that had been created. The appearance
of Courcillon's letter in the New York Herald on October 24
terminated any hope of keeping the true nature of the express
company secret and the tone of the press became more an-
tagonistic toward the empire.22 Arroyo reprimanded Cour-
cillon for his injudicious procedure and attempted to smooth
matters over with publications of his own, but the damage
had been done.23
If Arroyo desired to hush the matter, Romero did not.
The minister particularly resented the participation of Clar-
ence Seward in the company. Although he did not wish to
antagonize or embarrass the Secretary of State, he felt that
the matter should be called to his attention through normal
19 Romero to Navarro, October 18, 1865, ene. in Romero to Lerdo de Tejada,
October 24, 1865, ibid., p. 724. A copy of the published statement is printed in
39 Cong., 1 Sess., H. Ex. Doe. No. 73, II, 244.
20 Courcillon to Romero, October 23, 1865, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., II. Ex. Doe.
No. 73, II, 244-245.
21
Courcillon to , October 23, 1865, ibid., p. 246.
22Arroyo to Castillo, October 24, 1865; Arroyo to Castillo, October 25, 1865,
Hausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton 146, Arroyo, fols. 77-78; and Degollado to
Castillo, November 2, 1865, Hausarchiv, Mlaximilians, Karton 144, Degollado,
fols. 840-847.
23 Arroyo to Castillo, October 27, 1865, Hausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton 146,
Arroyo, fol. 82.

MAXIMILIAN'S PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES 13
diplomatic channels. After speaking with various cabinet
members he sent the State Department copies of the docu-
m'ents regarding the company that had come into his hands
together with decrees of Jua'rez bearing on the case.24 Gen-
eral Grant, a personal friend of Romero and an ardent sup-
porter of the republican cause, saw to it that Seward learned
of his nephew's activities.25 Thus -informed, Seward in-
structed the United States district attorney in New York to
watch the operation of the company closely and be certain
that it did not violate the law. Also, he. made it clear to his
nephew that the company would receive neither special privi-
leges nor protection.26
Nothing more was said of the express company until Jan-
uary, 1866, when the House passed a resolution requesting the
President to transmit the correspondence regarding it.27 This
led Romero to furnish the State Department with additional
documents. From Benito Jua'rez had come a communication
denying that Courcillon's undertaking was sanctioned by the
republican government. "Neither to him nor to anybody
else have I offered things contrary to the law and dignity of
our country. Moreover, I had never before heard of the
gentleman or his projects."28 The company was denounced
in stronger terms by Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, who referred
to it as a design to bribe persons of influence and even public
men. He stated that Courcillon had never been in Chi-
huahua and that the "legitimate authorities" would never
validate his grant.29 These documents were printed, as
24 Romero to Lerdo de Tejada, October 26, 1865; Romero to Lerdo de Tejada,
October 27, 1865; Romero to Lerdo de Tejada, October 27, 1865; and Romero to
Seward, October 27, 1865, enc. in Romero to Lerdo de Tejada, October 27, 1865,
Correspondencia de la legacion mexicana, V, 732-736.
25 Grant to Seward, November 1, 1865, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., H. Ex. Doe. No.
73, II, 252-253.

26 Seward to Dickinson, November 1, 1865; and William H. Seward to Clar-
ence Seward, November 1, 1865, ibid., p. 255.
27 The Congressional Globe, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., part 1, p. 172. The resolution
was introduced by Samuel J. Randall of Pennsylvania.
28 Juarez to Romero, December 22, 1865, ene. in Romero to Hunter, January
21, 1866, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., H. Ex. Doe. No. 73, II, 257.
29 Lerdo de Tejada to Romero, December 26, 1865; and Lerdo de Tejada to
Romero, December 26, 1865, Correspondencia de la legacion m-exicana, VI, 384-
385.

Romero had hoped, at the request of the House. He saw to

it that they received full publicity in the press, including the
complete reprinting of the documents in the New York Her-
ald.30 It was a heavy blow to the intrigues of Maximilian's
agents.
The victory undoubtedly lay with Romero. Degollado
blamed the fiasco on Courcillon's willingness to sacrifice the
welfare of the empire for his personal gain.31 The outcome
did not encourage the imperialists to promote other financial
ventures. Resseguier continued his attempts to interest cap-
italists and public men in various undertakings but with
negligible results. In fact, the Baja California colonization
concession made by Juarez was far more successful than
any of the imperialist projects. Resseguier 's usefulness
largely came to an end when it became known that he was con-
nected with Maximilian's regime.32 He remained in the
United States writing optimistic notes to Maximilian until
he was summoned home in August, 1866, because of the crit-
ical state of affairs in Mexico. He was back in New York
on a fresh mission before the year was out but did little more
than inform and advise the emperor and that not always
accurately or wisely.33
The first phase of the imperial campaign to create sym-
pathy had failed. The adherents of both Maximilian and
Juarez expected that the thirty-ninth Congress, convening in
December, 1865, would permanently decide the question of
United States policy toward Mexico. To inculcate a favor-
able attitude in the public mind was the immediate concern
of Arroyo and Degollado. Yet this offered more difficulties
than they had expected, especially since the press consistently
refused to back the imperial cause.34 Many of the New York
30 Romero to Lerdo de Tejada, February 12, 1866, Correspondencia de la
legaci6n mexicana, VII, 144; and the New York Herald, February 3, 1866.
38 Degollado to Castillo, February 19, 1866, Hausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton
144, Degollado, fol. 849.
32 See the New York Herald, June 10, 1866; and Romero to Lerdo de Tejada,
June 10, 1866, Correspondencia de la legaci4n mexicana, VII, 621.
33Corti, op. cit., II, 657-658, 760.
34 Borg to Castillo, November 30, 1865, Hausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton 146,
Borg aus New-York, fols. 561-561v.

MAXIMILIAN 'S PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES 15
journals, particularly the Herald, openly opposed the empire.
Arroyo and Degollado did their best under the circumstances.
They secured the publication of a few genuine news items but
expended more effort in pure propaganda. Their writings
took three general forms. First, they emphasized and dis-
torted subjects of a controversial nature in order to dis-
parage the republican cause. Second, they sought to obstruct,
by undermining confidence or appealing to legality, anything
that might assist the republican cause. Finally, they wrote
various articles purporting to prove the value of the imperial
rule to Mexico. More might have been achieved had it not
been that most of these articles were printed only in the
Courrier des Ptats Unis.
Arroyo hinted that the time had come to obtain the assist-
ance of certain members of Congress by bribery. He saw no
reason to leave to chance something that might be secured
at a price.35 Such an attempt was foreseen by Romero, who
was aware that the imperial agents had funds to use in sway-
ing public opinion in favor of the empire. He feared that
part of the money might be spent to impede the passage of
resolutions in favor of the republic and to delay Congressional
action on the Mexican question. A member of the House,
whose name Romero did not mention, claimed to have refused
an offer of twenty thousand dollars in gold to adopt the cause
of Maximilian. It is doubtful that any such amount was
available for the purpose, but it is an indication of the trend
of thought indulged in by the opposing parties. In this re-
spect Romero asked Lerdo de Tejada if he should combat
bribery with bribery. A New York broker had assured him
that two hundred thousand dollars in Mexican bonds would
secure the passage of certain desired resolutions during the
first week of the coming session. Though the minister be-
lieved this to be an exaggeration, he admitted that everywhere
there were persons open to bribery and that Congress was
probably no exception.36 It is well to note that Lerdo de
36Arroyo to Castillo, October 30, 1865, Hausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton 146,
Arroyo, fol. 85.
:" Romero to Lerdo de Tejada, November 18, 1865, Correspondencia de la
legacidn mexicana,V, 809-810.

Tejada ignored the suggestion that his government- resort to

bribery to gain its ends.37
It was at this time that Thomas Massey arrived in New
York. He was an ex-Confederate who had gone with his f am-
ily to Mexico where he became a close friend of Juan Nepo-
muceno Almonte, former head of the regency and now grand
marshal and minister of Maximilian's household. Massey, who
had formerly engaged in newspaper work, persuaded Almonte
that he could undertake a confidential mission with every hope
of success. He came to the United States with high hopes
and many plans. His connection with the empire was kept
secret so that his operations would be more impressive. He
proposed to give lectures in various parts of the United States
and publish many articles in the press. The articles, written
under a variety of names, would influence the administration
by their very number, he hoped.38 Convinced that he would
succeed where the other agents had failed, Massey rushed off
to the United States, leaving the necessary financial arrange-
ments to Maximilian. In the meantime he intended to rely
on his personal funds.39 It became evident some time later
that Massey's own funds were all that Maximilian considered
necessary for the work.
In the United States Massey retained his character of
private citizen. As far as he could see neither the imperial
agents nor the French minister had done anything prior to
his arrival. "You stood no more chance for recognition than
did the Hottentots," he informed Almonte.40 He proceeded
to Washington where he installed himself in the Willard
Hotel, ready to "influence" Congress when it convened. In
the capital he spent his time seeing persons whom he expected
to convince of the value of supporting Maximilian. He was
quite satisfied with his work and greatly impressed by what
he was doing. The need for funds to prepare the way in Con-
37 Lerdo de Tejada to Romero, December 30, 1865, Correspondencia de la
legacion ecxicana, VI, 417.
8 Massey to Almnte, August 15, 1865, Hausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton 144,
Verschiedene Berichte aus New-York, fols. 528-534.
SMassey to Almonte, September 8, 1865, ibid., fols. 596-597.
40
Massey to Almonte, November 7, 1865, ibid., fols. 592-593.

gress soon made itself felt, but the pecuniary aspects of his
mission had not yet begun to worry him.4'
When Congress met in December the outcome was dis-
appointing to Maximilian's court. There was nothing to
show that Massey or the others had achieved anything.
This was not strange, for interest in the United States was
centered on internal issues. Reconstruction, exclusion of
Congressmen elected from the Southern states, and the quar-
rel with President Johnson were the subjects of primary con-
cern. Romero strove with some success to keep the Mexican
question before Congress. The most important resolution
affecting the issue was that introduced jointly by Senator
Benjamin Wade and Representative Robert Schenck. It
strongly opposed the empire and requested the President "to
take such steps concerning this grave matter as will vindicate
the recognized policy and protect the honor and interests of
our Government. "42 At the same time four other measures
requesting information on various aspects of the Mexican
question were introduced in Congress.43 Romero was pleased
with the day's work, particularly as he had been consulted
in advance regarding several of the resolutions.44 Other res-
olutions were presented before the month was out, including
one calling for information pertaining to the steps taken by
Maximilian or any European power to obtain recognition of
the empire by the United States.45
It would seem that the interests of Juarez were in the
ascendency as far as Congress was concerned. However, the
imperialists were inclined to belittle the resolutions. When
Louis Borg, the French vice consul in New York, informed
Castillo of the Wade-Schenck resolution, he commented only
that it was hostile to the empire.46 Degollado assured his
government that the measures should cause no alarm. He
41 Massey to Alinonte, November 21, 1865, ibid., fols. 589-590v.
42 The Congressional Globe, 39 Cong., I Sess., part 1, p. 19.
43 Ibid., pp. 17, 20, 22.
ii Romero to Lerdo de Tejada, December 10, 1865, Correspondeneia de la
legaoi6n ,mexicana, V, 883-884.
46 The Congressional Globe, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., part 1, p. 70.
4
Borg to Castillo, December 12, 1865, Hausarchiv, Maximilians, rarton 146,
Borg, fols. 696-697.

rightly predicted that Congress, under the sway of the rad-

icals, would keep attention focused on domestic issues.47 Nor
did the resolutions trouble Massey, though the exclusion of
the Southern members did. He had hoped to secure the sup-
port of the South and now decided to defer action until Con-
gress gave further indication of its intentions.48 In order to
forward his plans for influencing people he moved to the west
to continue his lectures and gain the backing of the press in
that part of the country.49
Massey opened his speaking tour in Ohio, went on to
Indiana, and then east to Philadelphia.50 Following his west-
ern jaunt he divided his time between Washington and New
York. Delay followed delay as one thing after another dis-
tracted the attention of Congress and the United States public
from the Mexican issue. In February, 1866, Massey finally
admitted that his work had been unproductive. For the first
time he spoke in tones that were not hopeful. ". . . I shall
succeed or despair as soon as possible-but will hang on till
one or the other is reached." Continued lack of funds and
failure to receive news of his family contributed!to his worries,
which were as much for his personal well-being as for the
fate of his mission.5" He could still see a glimmer of hope
for recognition of the empire, but it was growing fainter.
Finally he received a small sum of money from Mexico, but
it was inadequate to meet the expense of his grandiose under-
takings. There was no word from his wife, little encourage-
ment from the imperial foreign office, and even his supreme
confidence could not last forever. He simply gave up, con-
vinced that his efforts were unappreciated. In only one thing
had he succeeded. Apparently no one in the United States,
not even the other imperial agents, was aware of his connec-
47 Degollado to Castillo, December 23, 1865, Hausarehiv, Maximilians, Karton
146, Degollado, fol. 275v.
48 Massey to [Almonte], n. d., Hausarehiv, Maximilians, Karton 144, Ver-
sehiedene Berichte, fols. 587-587v.
-I Massey to Almonte, December 5, 18654 ibid., fols. 586v-588v. Folio 587-
587v does not form part of this despatch.
50 Massey to Almonte, January 19, 1865 [1866], ibid., fols. 579-580v.
Massey to Almonte, February 24 [1866], ibid., folo. 554-555v.

tion with the empire. Thus passed from the picture this
fatuous individual.52
Despite their constant labors Arroyo and Degollado made
little headway. They were ready to welcome Bela Estvan
when he concerned himself with their projects. Long a resi-
dent of the Southern states, Estvan had served for eighteen
months in the Confederate army. He resigned in 1863, spent
some time in London, then went to New York. He called sev-
eral times at Arroyo's office, gave the impression that he was
a man of some consequence, and spoke encouragingly of the
imperial prospects for recognition.53 In October, 1865, James
Gordon Bennett sent him to Mexico as special correspondent
for the New York Herald. Estvan arrived in Mexico City on
November 12, and a few days later secured a private audience
with Maximilian. To explain his interest he later wrote:
... despite my seventeen years' absence from my homeland [Austria]
I still preserveda deep affectionfor the imperial Family of the House
of Habsburg,I took the opportunity with vivid interest to indirectly
serve an imperial Prince, thus redeemingthe political debt which I
still had to pay to the Austrian House from previousyears.
It is doubtful that he desired to serve an imperial prince so
much as he wished to serve Bela Estvan.
Estvan discussed his ideas with the emperor, who requested
him to confer with Martin Castillo y Cos, the minister of for-
eign affairs. In the meantime Arroyo also arrived in Mexico
to consult with Castillo. Estvan's plan, which was based on-
the subsidization of the United States press, received Arroyo's
full backing. He felt that an entire year had been wasted
and that subvention to the press offered the only way to make
up for lost time. The experiment was approved by Castillo
and later by Maximilian, who arranged to retain Estvan's serv-
ices for two years at five thousand dollars a year. In addi-
tion, forty thousand dollars a year was to be provided for
expenses. Although he had hoped- for twice that sum, Estvan
seemed confident of success.54
Massey to Almonte, March 23 [1866], ibid., fols. 550-551v.
52
Arroyo to Castillo, October 24, 1865, Hausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton 146,

53
Arroyo, fol. 76.

s"Arroyo to Degollado, December 31, 1865, Hausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton

While in Mexico, Arroyo was raised to the position of

under-secretary of foreign affairs, an indication of the im-
portance attached to the mission in New York. He remained
for some time consulting with Castillo and visiting his fam-
ily. When Estvan returned to New York the consulate was in
charge of Louis Borg, whom Arroyo had appointed commer-
cial agent.55 Borg had received fifteen thousand dollars for
the first three months' expenses of the press campaign and
both he and Degollado had been instructed to cooperate with
Estvan. Though Estvan took full credit for the idea of brib-
ing the press, the project was launched before he reached the
United States. He was sent to assist and not to direct.56 It
was the animosity that he developed for his associates that
made him attempt to play a lone hand.
In Arroyo's absence, Borg was to administer the finances.
Degollado was to supervise the work with the press. Estvan
was to prepare and secure publication of materials furnished
by the others. No risk was to be taken of a repetition of the
Courcillon affair. At the close of each month Estvan was to
account for his expenditures and receive a sum sufficient to
cover them. He was not, as he had supposed, to be given a
lump sum to use as he saw fit.57 The restrictions displeased
him; nevertheless, he embarked at once on an ambitious pro-
gram, apparently with the full support of his fellow agents.
He rented and elaborately furnished offices in both Washing-
ton and New York and proposed to hire numerous assistants.
The actual business of bribing the press was to be achieved
by presents to the editors of the various newspapers whose
-
services were desired. The sum of forty thousand three hun-
dred dollars was stipulated for this purpose during the first
year alone. In addition, Estvan's budget called for some
thirty-five thousand dollars, well above the sum provided'even
144; Degollado, fols. 1054-1054v; and Estvan to Fischer, January 12, 1867,
Hausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton 144, Berichte von B. Estvan aus New-York,
fols. 685-687. Father Augustine Fischer, a Jesuit, was Maximilian's confidential
advisor and honorary court chaplain.
56 Arroyo to Castillo, October 30, 1865, Hausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton 146,
Arroyo, folks. 89-89v.
" Arroyo to Degollado, January 16, 1866, Hausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton
5
Arroyo to Degollado, January 18, 1866, ibid., fols. 1060-1061.

considering the favorable rate of exchange in United States
currency.58 Nothing on this scale was ever carried out, but
within a few days of his arrival Estvan spent six thousand
dollars, three times the amount authorized by Borg.
Estvan's budget amazed both Borg and Degollado. They
failed to realize the necessity for an intensive campaign involv-
ing comparatively large sums of money. Arroyo's instruc-
tions were open to more than one interpretation and Borg
believed that Estvan was to be limited in his expenditures.
Although Estvan urged the importance of prompt action and
full confidence, the agents hesitated to provide the sums he
requested even though they feared to retard his work. Fi-
nally, they gave him seven thousand five hundred dollars but
agreed between themselves that nothing more should be paid
out until Arroyo returned to New York.59 Estvan criticized
Borg for the delay but attributed it to misunderstanding. He
offered to hold himself personally responsible for the work in
case Degollado and Borg were unsure of their position.
When Arroyo returned about the middle of February, Estvan-
was convinced that the plans would move rapidly ahead.,0
The lack of harmony among the Hapsburg agents did not
appreciably delay Estvan's work. William Vincent Wells, a
great grandson of Samuel Adams, was in charge of the New
York office. Attracted to California by the gold rush, Wells
had been associated with several early San Francisco news-
papers. In 1865 he visited Maximilian's court and became a
warm adherent of the emperor. He returned to the United
States with promises of rich mining concessions in Mexico
and a commission as Estvan's assistant. In New York, within
reach of the imperial consulate, he was largely responsible
for the dissemination of propaganda. Estvan, in Washing-
ton, was more interested in forming personal contacts and
planning petty intrigues. According to his own account he
succeeded in coming to terms with the owners of several New
58
Proposed budget, ibid., pp. 1064-1065. The rate of exchange in the -United
States was approximately one paper dollar to sixty-eight cents in gold.
69Borg to Degollado, February 12, 1866; and Degollado to Borg, February
12, 1866, ibid., pp. 1073-1076.
6?Estvan to Castillo, February 23, 1866, Hausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton
144, Estvan, fols. 624-625.

York newspapers. Two points stood out in the arrangements.

The persons involved insisted that their names remain undis-
closed and the subventions had to be paid regularly in advance
every three months. It was purely a matter of business, for
no one concerned seemed to have faith in the future of the
empire. Among his expenses Estvan listed payments of seven
hundred and fifty dollars each to the Herald, Times, and
Tribune."' In the light of later developments it should be
said that the actual complicity of these journals is doubtful.
If the Herald and Times were bribed, they did not live up to
their agreements. The Tribune,occasionally published arti-
cles favorable to the empire, but this may be explained by
Horace Greeley's policy of opposition to the administration.62
Within a month of his return to the United States, Estvan
was surrounded by difficulties. In carrying out his commis-
sion he expected and sought the aid of the Marquis de Mon-
tholon. When he came to know the Marquis, Estvan formed
the opinion that he was hostile to the best interests of Maxi-
milian. "His ideas were exclusively French," Estvan wrote,
"and all his hopes and anxieties were with reference to the
position of France in the Maximilian question, without much
care for the actual success of H. M. the Emperor personally
or the Empire in the abstract."63 The Hungarian constantly
complained of Montholon's attitude, a serious matter as only
through the French legation did the imperial agents have
access to the State Department. Furthermore, Estvan charged
that Borg was acting entirely under instructions from the
French legation. This is probable, for Borg was French vice
consul in New York. Whether he was actually instructed to
impede Estvan is less certain.
61 Estvan to Degollado and Borg, February 12, 1866, Hausarchiv, Maximilians,
Karton 144, Degollado, fols. 1071-1071v; and Estvan to Castillo, June 9, 1866,
Hausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton 144, Estvan, fols. 677-678.
62 An examination of the Times for the period of Estvan 's activity discloses
no change of attitude toward the Mexican issue. It advocated a peaceful settle-
ment, apparently taking it for granted that Maximilian could not permanently
maintain his empire. The case of the Herald is even more certain, as Bennett
admittedly repulsed Estvan 's overtures. In the absence of further proof, it
would seem probable that Estvan pocketed the subsidies himself.
63 Estvan to Castillo, February 23, 1866, lausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton
144, Estvan, fol. 626.

An even stronger proof of Montholon's disaffection, if
Estvan's word can be accepted, was soon disclosed. Estvan
had remained on friendly terms with his former employer,
James Gordon Bennett. He expected him to be an important
ally of the imperial cause. However, from Montholon, Ben-
nett learned that Estvan hoped to obtain the support of the
Herald by bribery. He viewed this as a personal insult and
accused Estvan of coming from Mexico with "$8,000, for the
avowed purpose of buying the Herald for the Imperial cause."
When Estvan denied the charge, Montholon's letter was shown
to him. Although he offered to explain the "infamous fabri-
cation" of the French minister, Bennett refused to listen.
This destroyed any hope of gaining the support of the Herald,
but it served to reveal the extent of Montholon's disloyalty.64
From the outset Estvan succeeded in obtaining the pub-
lication of some articles, but they followed the same lines as
those previously prepared by the consulate. Many were in
the form of letters signed with pseudonyms of which Veritas
was common.65 Much of the actual writing was done by Wells
as Estvan spent the greater portion of his time in Washing-
ton talking to anyone who would listen. Undoubtedly the
strangest association that he formed was with some of the
leaders of the Fenian movement. No sooner had he become
acquainted with them than he sought some way to use them
for his own ends.
I explained to them that the MonroeDoctrine was in reality a part
of the British system against Ireland by which public hostility in
America should be diverted from England to France; and that Eng-
lish statesmen were industriously intriguing in that direction. The
attention of these Gentlemenwas at once engaged, and they agreed
that their cause could be well served by opposing the Monroe Doc-
trine, not only for the above mentioned reason, but on the ground
that all Americansympathy expressedfor any foreign purpose ought
to be for Ireland and not for Mexico, for the Irish had sacrificed
200,000 men in the War for the Union, while Mexico had never been
of any consequenceto us. It was also shown that the establishment
of a Catholic governmentin Mexico was important in the religious
64 Estvan to Castillo, March 4, 1866, ibid., fols. 638-650.
6l For example see The New York Tribune, February 24, 1866.

point of view as a barrier against the menacing Protestant power in

the United States.06
Estvan made much of his Fenian connections. He claimed
that the entire Fenian press and nearly a million voters had
been attached to the empire through his judicious work. In
his own words, it was "the most decided success thus far
made for the Empire."
Estvan continued to fuss and fume about the conduct of
his fellow agents. When some "Juarist mischief maker" dis-
closed the nature of his Washington bureau in the press,
Arroyo saw fit to publish a reply over his own name. Estvan
had made every effort to keep his operations secret and this
was the first public information about him and his work. He
was much annoyed at what he termed an invitation to a news-
paper controversy and the unnecessary disclosure of his true
position. Lack of funds gave him even more to complain
about. All of the money initially provided for his use had
been expended and he was desirous that future installments
be sent to him directly. In order to carry out his plans, reg-
ular remittances were necessary. It was to his advantage to
have the money in his own hands. The newspaper men with
whom he dealt found it more convenient to make verbal rather
than written agreements with him. It was not desirable to
bring third parties into his understandings nor to produce
written contracts for Arroyo 's edification. As matters stood,
delays and bickerings were unavoidable and Estvan's oppor-
tunity for lining his own pockets was considerably decreased.
As he pointed out, the results of the November congressional
elections might well determine the fate of the empire in the
United States. He had seven months to prepare the public
and only through a consistently favorable press could he hope
to obtain the desired results.67
Despite his plea, Estvan was not given a free hand. In-
deed he was given nothing more at all. Like the other agents
sent by the Imperial government, or, for that matter, by
Juarez, he was expected to get along on promises and on his
"6 Estvan to Castillo, February 23, 1866, Hausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton 144,
Estvan, fols. 629-631.
"I Estvan to Castillo, March 23, 1866, ibid., fols. 651-653, 660-663.

MAXIMILIAN IS PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES 25
own initiative. Promises did not satisfy Estvan and he com-
plained with renewed vigor, hinting that it would be neces-
sary to terminate his work unless funds were regularly and
promptly received. His initiative, however, was remarkable.
He turned to George Francis Train, one of his Fenian ac-
quaintances, for aid and was not disappointed. When the
second installment failed to arrive, Estvan borrowed the
money from Train. In return he gave him a bill of exchange
for fifteen thousand dollars on the imperial cabinet. At the
time Train was a candidate for the United States Senate
from Nebraska and Estvan counted on his possible future
importance to assure prompt payment of the bill.68 Actually,
the drafts came back unpaid, though accompaniedby an order
from Maximilian which Estvan could not turn into cash.69
Numerous articles treating both sides of the Mexican
question were appearing in the press. There is little doubt
that Estvan's bureau was responsible for part of them, but
the greater number were merely factual and many came from
other sources. Estvan claimed much for his labors and
stressed the need for financial aid if the work was to go on.
The appeal came too late. Arroyo was aware of Montholon's
desire to discredit Estvan. Though he was unwilling to
accept the truth of every bit of gossip that reached his ears,
a choice was demanded. Apparently he could work with
Montholon or with Estvan, but not with both. He did not
entirely trust Montholon, but he could not risk a complete
break with the representative of Napoleon I1.70 The output
of Estvan's bureau was never really satisfactory. On more
than one occasion articles or suggestions for articles sent by
Degollado were never published. Wells, whose duty it was
to deal with the press, made many promises but frequently
failed to live up to them. It was obvious that many of the
articles published were partisan in nature and not the product
of Estvan's bureau. In general, the Republican organs fa-
vored a peaceful settlement of the Mexican question whereas
"8 Estvanto Castillo, May 22, 1866, ibid., fols. 666-667.
"I Estvan to Fischer, January 12, 1867, ibid., fols. 690-691.
70 Estvan to Castillo, June 9, 1866, ibid., fols. 674-679; and Arroyo to Castillo,
March 10, 1866, Hausarchiv, Maximnilians, Karton 146, Arroyo, fols. 117-127.

the Democratic press advocated vigorous measures against

the empire.7' Taking these points into consideration, Arroyo
decided not 'to provide Estvan with additional funds. He
informed Castillo of his decision and in April ordered Dego-
llado to have nothing further to do with Estvan until new
instructions were issued.72
They were not long in coming. Degollado was given full
charge of the work with the press. In the future he was to
approve in advance every article published by Estvan's bu-
reau. The arrangements made by Estvan with the press were
to be verified by interviews with the editors before any fur-
ther subsidies were paid. If the bureau published anything
that threatened to compromise the empire in any way, it was
to be refuted immediately. Estvan was forbidden to call him-
self an employee of the imperial government or to make
offers, concessions, or arrangements concerning Mexico.
Finally, preparations were made for closing both of his
offices should Arroyo decide such a move was necessary.73
On April 25 Arroyo departed for Mexico to resume his
duties as under-secretary for foreign affairs, again leaving
Borg in charge of the consulate. Either Estvan, who was
completely out of touch with the consulate, was unaware of
the restrictions placed on him, or he hoped to ignore them
and go over Arroyo's head. He informed Castillo that since
the under-secretary's departure the bureau and the press
were cooperating in "utmost harmony." Particularly he
pointed to the improved tone of the press, stating that its
original hostility had gradually modified as a result of his
"truly satisfactory labors."74
71 Borg to Castillo, January 8, 1866, Hausa~rchiv, Maximilians, Karton 146,
Borg, fol. 583. Andrew Johnson had spoken publicly and privately in favor of
material aid for Juarez. The bulk of the Republican press opposed virtually
everything that Johnson proposed on purely political grounds. This did not mean
a lack of sympathy with Jualrez; it simply indicated that the Republican press
backed Congress in the struggle with the President. Likewise the Democratic
press often accepted Johnson 's policies for partisan reasons.
72 Arroyo to Degollado, April 5, 1866, Hausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton 144,
Degollado, fol. 1088.
73 Instructions, Arroyo to Degollado, April 9, 1866, ibid., fols. 1090-1090v.
74 Estvan to Castillo, June 9, 1866, Hausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton 144,
Estvan, fols. 674-675. Estvan failed to take the changed situation into account.
By this time Napoleon had announced his intention of withdrawing French

Estvan's extremely optimistic attitude at a time when the
fortunes of the empire were decidedly on the decline was based
on a desire to impress Castillo and assure the continuance of
his expense account. Instead, Borg decided to end the affair.
The documents regarding Estvan's activities were sent to the
imperial foreign office and, as far as the consulate was con-
cerned, the press campaign was over.75 Despite all the crit-
icism of Estvan, Castillo did remit a second installment of
eight thousand dollars to the consulate. When Borg resigned
a short time later, he ordered it returned to Mexico. This
left Estvan in a precarious situation as his creditors were
beginning to press him. As a last resort he decided to go to
Paris and appeal personally to Castillo, who was in Europe
with the Empress Charlotte on her tragic journey. He ar-
rived after the empress had departed for Rome and followed
her party there. The trip was of little avail. Charlotte had
just been stricken with insanity and Castillo had little time
for Estvan's pleas. A letter to Arroyo requesting that some
satisfactory settlement be made was the sole outcome.76 With
that Estvan returned to New York, but his part in the imperial
intrigue had ended.
The departure of Arroyo, the withdrawal of Borg, and the
removal of Estvan left only Resseguier, Degollado, and Mon-
tholon to carry on. Resseguier's usefulness was past. A
month prior to Arroyo's departure Degollado had submitted
his own resignation, giving as reason illness which prevented
him from carrying on his duties in the proper manner.77 The
resignation was accepted by Castillo with expressions of re-
gret, but no one was appointed to succeed him. Degollado
was requested to bring all the documents and papers of the
consulate to Mexico when he returned.78 He remained quietly
troops from Mexico. This virtually assured the fall of Maximilian. There
was no reason for the press to continue active hostility after the objective had
been secured.
75 Borg to Degollado, May 9, 1866, Hausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton 144,
Degollado, fol. 1096v.
76 Estvan to Fischer, January 12, 1867, Hausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton 144,
Estvan, fols. 691-692.
77 Degollado to Castillo, March 24, 1866, Hausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton
78 Castillo to Degollado, April 9, 1866, ibid., fols. 1250-1250v.

in New York for several months, continuing to perform a few

routine tasks, then he too retired to Mexico. Upon his de-
parture he placed Cristobal Rosas in charge of the consu-
late.79 By this time the position was largely honorary, since
the usefulness of the consulate had ended. Maximilian's
attempt to secure recognition from the United States had
come to a close.
The task of representing the Mexican empire was left
entirely to Montholon. His role had been unusual. Disliking
Maximilian when he came to Washington, he had never ac-
tively pushed the subject of recognition. In November, 1865,
on the instructions of his government, he suggested to Seward
that France would withdraw its troops in return for United
States recognition of Maximilian.80 The Secretary of State
tactfully assured him that the United States did not object to
French troops in Mexico but to the fact that they were there
to establish a "foreign monarchical government."8' This,
Montholon's one serious attempt to secure recognition, was
at Napoleon's request and was not vigorously pressed. Sew-
ard 's refusal to consider recognition led to a new French
offer. If the United States would give assurance that it would
observe strict neutrality toward Maximilian, France would
consider removing its troops from Mexico.82 When Mon-
tholon presented this offer to Seward on January 29, 1866,
his official efforts to aid Maximilian closed. Seward's satis-
factory reply opened the way for Napoleon to announce plans
for the evacuation of Mexico. More than ever Montholon
avoided the problems of the Mexican empire in his relations
with the Department of State. His notes touched on Mexico
in a purely perfunctory manner and his interest was obviously
in conciliating the United States, not in discussing debatable
questions.
71
Juan Nepomuceno de Pereda to Rosas, n. d., enc. in Romero to Lerdo de
Tejada, October 20, 1866, Correspondencia de la legaci6n mexicana, VIII, 416.
Pereda was Maximilian's under-secretary of foreign affairs as Arroyo had been
raised to minister of the imperial household.
80 Drouyn de Lhuys to Montholon, October 18, 1865, enc. in Molntholon to
Seward, November 29, 1865, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., H. Ex. Doe. No. 73, II, 346-347.
81 Seward to Montholon, December 6, 1865, ibid., pp. 347-348.
82 Drouyn de Lhuys to Montholon, January 9, 1866, ene. in Montholon to

Seward, January 29, 1866, ibid., p. 541.

The causes of Maximilian's failure to achieve his objects
in the United States are obvious. Neglect to organize and
coordinate the work sacrificed any slight chance of success.
Too little money was available to carry out the pretentious
plans. The men intrusted with the task were not carefully
chosen. They could not compete with the influence already
built up by Matias Romero with Congress and the press. Dis-
putes, hostility, and jealousy constantly marred their rela-
tions. Their personal interests frequently caused them to
lose sight of their assigned duties. The very timing of the
enterprise was poor, for it came when Maximilian's power
was rapidly waning. Even if the organization had been flaw-
less and the participants thoroughly capable, the outcome
would doubtless have been the same. As it was, the entire
venture was just another example of Maximilian's blunder-
ing-the same combination of unwarranted optimism and
negligible achievement that marked the brief history of the
second Mexican empire.
ROBERT W. FRAZER.
Culver City, California.


Maximilian's Propaganda Activities in The United States, 1865-1866

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Maximilian's Propaganda Activities in The United States, 1865-1866

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Maximilian's Propaganda Activities in the United States, 1865-1866

Author(s): Robert W. Frazer

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

might be gained without trouble or delay. Soon he requested

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

built up by Romero. In order to do this Degollado planned to

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

August 1, 1865, Correspondencia de la legaci6n mexicana, Y, 527. Juan N.

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

ment of large sums of money. Resseguier stressed the idea

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

pany, or other imperial projects, he authorized publication

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

73, II, 252-253.

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

Romero had hoped, at the request of the House. He saw to

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

Tejada ignored the suggestion that his government- resort to

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

rightly predicted that Congress, under the sway of the rad-

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

Arroyo to Castillo, October 24, 1865, Hausarchiv, Maximilians, Karton 146,

Arroyo, fol. 76.

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

While in Mexico, Arroyo was raised to the position of

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

York newspapers. Two points stood out in the arrangements.

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

point of view as a barrier against the menacing Protestant power in

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

the Democratic press advocated vigorous measures against

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

in New York for several months, continuing to perform a few

82 Drouyn de Lhuys to Montholon, January 9, 1866, ene. in Montholon to

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

This content downloaded from 200.24.17.12 on Fri, 20 Feb 2015 19:58:45 PM

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi