Torts Cases 31-33

Torts and Damages; LLB 3A

Dean Eduardo Sanson

Table of Contents
22. Filamer Christian Institute vs IAC
G.R. No. 75112 August 17, 1992 ........................................................................................................................... 2
31. Farolan vs Solmac
G.R. No. 83589; March 13, 1991 .......................................................................................................................... 7
32. Picart vs Smith
G.R. No. L-12219; March 15, 1918 ..................................................................................................................... 16
33. RCPI vs CA and Timan
G.R. No. 79578; March 13, 1991 ........................................................................................................................ 21

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 22. Filamer Christian Institute vs IAC
G.R. No. 75112 August 17, 1992

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 75112 August 17, 1992

FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, in his capacity as Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Roxas City and POTENCIANO KAPUNAN,
SR., respondents.

Bedona & Bedona Law Office for petitioner.

Rhodora G. Kapunan for private respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The private respondents, heirs of the late Potenciano Kapunan, seek reconsideration of the
decision rendered by this Court on October 16, 1990 (Filamer Christian Institute v. Court of
Appeals, 190 SCRA 477) reviewing the appellate court's conclusion that there exists an employer-
employee relationship between the petitioner and its co-defendant Funtecha. The Court ruled
that the petitioner is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter
was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily
answerable, and that Funtecha was merely a working scholar who, under Section 14, Rule X, Book
III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code is not considered an employee of
the petitioner.

The private respondents assert that the circumstances obtaining in the present case call for the
application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code since Funtecha is no doubt an employee of the
petitioner. The private respondents maintain that under Article 2180 an injured party shall have
recourse against the servant as well as the petitioner for whom, at the time of the incident, the
servant was performing an act in furtherance of the interest and for the benefit of the petitioner.

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Funtecha allegedly did not steal the school jeep nor use it for a joy ride without the knowledge
of the school authorities.

After a re-examination of the laws relevant to the facts found by the trial court and the appellate
court, the Court reconsiders its decision. We reinstate the Court of Appeals' decision penned by
the late Justice Desiderio Jurado and concurred in by Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Serafin E.
Camilon. Applying Civil Code provisions, the appellate court affirmed the trial court decision
which ordered the payment of the P20,000.00 liability in the Zenith Insurance Corporation policy,
P10,000.00 moral damages, P4,000.00 litigation and actual expenses, and P3,000.00 attorney's
fees.

It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of
petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he was assigned to
clean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day.

Having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa, and was allowed,
to take over the vehicle while the latter was on his way home one late afternoon. It is significant
to note that the place where Allan lives is also the house of his father, the school president,
Agustin Masa. Moreover, it is also the house where Funtecha was allowed free board while he
was a student of Filamer Christian Institute.

Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a road, negotiating a
sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was clear. (TSN, April 4, 1983, pp. 78-79)
According to Allan's testimony, a fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that they
had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as if something
had bumped against the vehicle, but they did not stop to check. Actually, the Pinoy jeep swerved
towards the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane in the direction against
vehicular traffic, and hit him. Allan affirmed that Funtecha followed his advise to swerve to the
right. (Ibid., p. 79) At the time of the incident (6:30 P.M.) in Roxas City, the jeep had only one
functioning headlight.

Allan testified that he was the driver and at the same time a security guard of the petitioner-
school. He further said that there was no specific time for him to be off-duty and that after driving
the students home at 5:00 in the afternoon, he still had to go back to school and then drive home
using the same vehicle.

Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha
reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. Allan's job demands that
he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school
day.

It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep
was routinely driven home for the said purpose. Moreover, it is not improbable that the school

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president also had knowledge of Funtecha's possession of a student driver's license and his desire
to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms.

In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha
definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment
or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the
petitioner school. (See L. Battistoni v. Thomas, Can SC 144, 1 D.L.R. 577, 80 ALR 722 [1932]; See
also Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. 124 SCRA
618 [1983]). Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking
over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the
petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope
of his janitorial duties. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising
the presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance
of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction
of the injury or damage. (Manuel Casada, 190 Va 906, 59 SE 2d 47 [1950]) Even if somehow, the
employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act, the existence of a presumptive
liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant
was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his master's business.
(Kohlman v. Hyland, 210 NW 643, 50 ALR 1437 [1926]; Jameson v. Gavett, 71 P 2d 937 [1937])

Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code, on which the petitioner
anchors its defense, was promulgated by the Secretary of Labor and Employment only for the
purpose of administering and enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code on conditions of
employment. Particularly, Rule X of Book III provides guidelines on the manner by which the
powers of the Labor Secretary shall be exercised; on what records should be kept; maintained
and preserved; on payroll; and on the exclusion of working scholars from, and inclusion of
resident physicians in the employment coverage as far as compliance with the substantive labor
provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages, is concerned.

In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. The
Court, thus, makes the distinction and so holds that Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not
the decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular
accident against a working student of a school and against the school itself.

The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an
alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for
injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his
employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability
of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor
cannot be used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of
the Civil Code.

There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an extra-contractual obligation
arising from the negligence or reckless imprudence of a person "whose acts or omissions are

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imputable, by a legal fiction, to other(s) who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited
control over (him)." (Bahia v. Litonjua and Leynes, 30 Phil. 624 [1915])

Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a
driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act,
it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the
petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within the
scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the
presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant
or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having
exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and
Allan.

The Court reiterates that supervision includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations
for the guidance of its employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the
protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his
employees. (Bahia v. Litonjua and Leynes, supra, at p. 628; Phoenix Construction, v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 353 [1987])

An employer is expected to impose upon its employees the necessary discipline called for in the
performance of any act indispensable to the business and beneficial to their employer.

In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such rules and guidelines
as would prohibit any one of its employees from taking control over its vehicles if one is not the
official driver or prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer president from authorizing another
employee to drive the school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to prove that it had
imposed sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by persons other than
the driver.

The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled
manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. (Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil. 768, 772
[1918]). In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious
liability for acts or omissions of its employees. (Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263 [1976]; Poblete v.
Fabros, 93 SCRA 200 [1979]; Kapalaran Bus Liner v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]; Franco v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 331 [1989]; Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Baesa, 179
SCRA 384 [1989]) The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and solidary.
However, the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever
damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.

It is an admitted fact that the actual driver of the school jeep, Allan Masa, was not made a party
defendant in the civil case for damages. This is quite understandable considering that as far as
the injured pedestrian, plaintiff Potenciano Kapunan, was concerned, it was Funtecha who was
the one driving the vehicle and presumably was one authorized by the school to drive. The

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plaintiff and his heirs should not now be left to suffer without simultaneous recourse against the
petitioner for the consequent injury caused by a janitor doing a driving chore for the petitioner
even for a short while. For the purpose of recovering damages under the prevailing
circumstances, it is enough that the plaintiff and the private respondent heirs were able to
establish the existence of employer-employee relationship between Funtecha and petitioner
Filamer and the fact that Funtecha was engaged in an act not for an independent purpose of his
own but in furtherance of the business of his employer. A position of responsibility on the part
of the petitioner has thus been satisfactorily demonstrated.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the decision dated October 16, 1990 is hereby
GRANTED. The decision of the respondent appellate court affirming the trial court decision is
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

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 31. Farolan vs Solmac
G.R. No. 83589; March 13, 1991

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 83589 March 13, 1991

RAMON FAROLAN as ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, and GUILLERMO PARAYNO, as

CHIEF OF CUSTOM INTELLIGENCE and INVESTIGATION DIVISION, petitioners,
vs.
SOLMAC MARKETING CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Dakila F. Castro & Associates for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari, instituted by the Solicitor General on behalf of the public
officers-petitioners, seek the nullification and setting aside of the Resolution 1 dated May 25,
1988 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-10509, entitled "Solmac Marketing Corporation
vs. Ramon Farolan, Acting Commissioner of Customs, and Guillermo Parayno, Chief of Customs
Intelligence and Investigation Division," which adjudged these public officers to pay solidarily and
in their private personal capacities respondent Solmac Marketing Corporation temperate
damages in the sum of P100,000.00, exemplary damages in the sum of P50,000.00, and
P25,000.00, as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. This challenged resolution of the
respondent court modified its decision 2 of July 27, 1987 by reducing into halves the original
awards of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00 for exemplary damages and attorney's fees and litigation
expenses, respectively, keeping intact the original grant of P100,000.00 in the concept of
temperate damages. (Strangely, the first name of petitioner Farolan stated in the assailed
resolution, as well as in the decision, of the respondent court is "Damian" when it should be
"Ramon", his correct given name. Strictly speaking, petitioner Ramon Farolan could not be held
liable under these decision and resolution for he is not the one adjudged to pay the huge
damages but a different person. Nonetheless, that is of no moment now considering the
disposition of this ponencia.)

The relevant facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

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At the time of the commission of the acts complained of by the private respondent, which was
the subject of the latter's petition for mandamus and injunction filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case No. 84-23537, petitioner Ramon Farolan was then the Acting
Commissioner of Customs while petitioner Guillermo Parayno was then the Acting Chief, Customs
Intelligence and Investigation Division. They were thus sued in their official capacities as officers
in the government as clearly indicated in the title of the case in the lower courts and even here
in this Court. Nevertheless, they were both held personally liable for the awarded damages
"(s)ince the detention of the goods by the defendants (petitioners herein) was irregular and
devoid of legal basis, hence, not done in the regular performance of official duty . . . ." 3

However, as adverted to at the outset, in the dispositive portion of the challenged resolution, the
one held personally liable is a "Damian Farolan" and not the petitioner, Ramon Farolan. Also as
earlier mentioned, we will ignore that gross error.

Private respondent Solmac Marketing Corporation is a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the Philippines. It was the assignee, transferee, and owner of an importation of Clojus
Recycling Plastic Products of 202,204 kilograms of what is technically known as polypropylene
film, valued at US$69,250.05.

Polypropylene is a substance resembling polyethelyne which is one of a group of partially

crystalline lightweight thermoplastics used chiefly in making fibers, films, and molded and
extruded products. 4

Without defect, polypropylene film is sold at a much higher price as prime quality film. Once
rejected as defective due to blemishes, discoloration, defective winding, holes, etc.,
polypropylene film is sold at a relatively cheap price without guarantee or return, and the buyer
takes the risk as to whether he can recover an average 30% to 50% usable matter. 5 This latter
kind of polypropylene is known as OPP film waste/scrap and this is what respondent SOLMAC
claimed the Clojus shipment to be.

The subject importation, consisting of seventeen (17) containers, arrived in December, 1981.
Upon application for entry, the Bureau of Customs asked respondent SOLMAC for its authority
from any government agency to import the goods described in the bill of lading. Respondent
SOLMAC presented a Board of Investment (BOI) authority for polypropylene film scrap. However,
upon examination of the shipment by the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST), it
turned out that the fibers of the importation were oriented in such a way that the materials were
stronger than OPP film scrap. 6 In other words, the Clojus shipment was not OPP film scrap, as
declared by the assignee respondent SOLMAC to the Bureau of Customs and BOI Governor Lilia
R. Bautista, but oriented polypropylene the importation of which is restricted, if not prohibited,
under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 658-B. Specifically, Sections 1 and 2 of LOI No. 658-B provide
that:

xxx xxx xxx

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 1. The importation of cellophane shall be allowed only for quantities and types of
cellophane that cannot be produced by Philippine Cellophane Film Corporation. The
Board of Investments shall issue guidelines regulating such importations.

2. The Collector of Customs shall see to the apprehension of all illegal importations of
cellophane and oriented polypropylene (OPP) and the dumping of imported stock lots of
cellophane and OPP.

xxx xxx xxx

Considering that the shipment was different from what had been authorized by the BOI and by
law, petitioners Parayno and Farolan withheld the release of the subject importation.

On June 7, 1982, petitioner Parayno, then Chief of Customs Intelligence and Investigation
Division, wrote the BOI asking for the latter's advice on whether or no t the subject importation
may be released 7 A series of exchange of correspondence between the BOI and the Bureau of
Customs, on one hand, and between the late Dakila Castro, counsel for the private respondent,
and the BOI and the Bureau of Customs, on the other, ensued, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

4. In a letter dated August 17, 1982, the BOI agreed that the subject imports may be
released but that holes may be drilled on them by the Bureau of Customs prior to their
release.

5. On January 20, 1983, (the late) Atty. Dakila Castro, (then) counsel of private respondent
wrote to petitioner Commissioner Farolan of Customs asking for the release of the
importation. The importation was not released, however, on the ground that holes had
to be drilled on them first.

6. Atty. Dakila Castro then wrote a letter dated October 6, 1983, to BOI Governor
Hermenigildo Zayco stressing the reasons why the subject importation should be released
without drilling of holes.

7. On November 8, 1983, BOI Governor H. Zayco wrote a letter to the Bureau of Customs
stating that the subject goods may be released without drilling of holes inasmuch as the
goods arrived prior to the endorsement on August 17, 1982 to the drilling of holes on all
importations of waste/scrap films.

8. On February 1, 1984, petitioner Commissioner Farolan wrote the BOI requesting for
definite guidelines regarding the disposition of importations of Oriented Polypropylene
(OPP) and Polypropylene (PP) then being held at the Bureau of Customs.

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 9. On March 12, 1984, Minister Roberto Ongpin of Trade, the BOI Chairman, wrote his
reply to petitioner Farolan . . . .8 (This reply of Minister Ongpin is copied in full infra.)

On March 26, 1984, respondent Solmac filed the action for mandamus and injunction with the
RTC as above mentioned. It prayed for the unconditional release of the subject importation. It
also prayed for actual damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. As prayed for, the trial
court issued a writ of preliminary injunction.

After hearing on the merits, the RTC rendered a decision on February 5, 1985, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants to release the

subject importation immediately without drilling of holes, subject only to the normal
requirements of the customs processing for such release to be done with utmost dispatch
as time is of the essence; and the preliminary injunction hereto issued is hereby made
permanent until actual physical release of the merchandise and without pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 9

From the decision of the trial court, Solmac, the plaintiff below and the private respondent
herein, appealed to the Court of Appeals only insofar as to the denial of the award of damages is
concerned. On the other hand, the petitioners did not appeal from this decision. They did not see
any need to appeal because as far as they were concerned, they had already complied with their
duty. They had already ordered the release of the importation "without drilling of holes," as in
fact it was so released, in compliance with the advice to effect such immediate release contained
in a letter of BOI dated October 9, 1984, to Commissioner Farolan. Thus, to stress, even before
the RTC rendered its decision on February 5, 1984, the Clojus shipment of OPP was released 10 to
the private respondent in its capacity as assignee of the same. Be that it may, the private
respondent filed its appeal demanding that the petitioners be held, in their personal and private
capacities, liable for damages despite the finding of lack of bad faith on the part of the public
officers.

After due proceeding, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 11 on July 27, 1987, the
dispositive portion which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is modified by ordering the defendants Ramon

Farolan and Guillermo Parayno solidarity, in their personal capacity, to pay the plaintiff
temperate damages in the sum of P100,000, exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000
and P50,000 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. Costs against the defendants.

SO ORDERED.

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On August 14, 1987, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court
of Appeals.

On May 25, 1988, the Court of Appeals issued its resolution modifying the award of damages, to
wit: temperate damages in the sum of P100,000,00, exemplary damages in the sum of
P50,000.00, and P25,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. The respondent court
explained the reduction of the awards for exemplary damages and attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation in this wise:

3. In our decision of July 27, 1987, We awarded to plaintiff-appellant Pl00,000 as

temperate damages, Pl00,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation. Under Art. 2233 of the Civil Code, recovery of exemplary
damages is not a matter of right but depends upon the discretion of the court. Under
Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must always be
reasonable. In view of these provisions of the law, and since the award of temperate
damages is only P100,000.00, the amount of exemplary damages may not be at par as
temperate damages. An award of P50,000.00, as exemplary damages may already serve
the purpose, i.e., as an example for the public good. Likewise, the attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation have to be reduced to 25% of the amount of temperate damages,
or P25,000.00, if the same have to be reasonable. The reduction in the amount of
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees and expenses of litigation would be in accord
with justice and fairness. 12

The petitioners now come to this Court, again by the Solicitor General, assigning the following
errors allegedly committed by the respondent court:

The Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the finding of the trial court that the defense
of good faith of petitioners (defendants) cannot be discredited.

II

The Court of Appeals erred in adjudging petitioners liable to pay temperate damages,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. 13

These two issues boil down to a single question, i.e., whether or not the petitioners acted in good
faith in not immediately releasing the questioned importation, or, simply, can they be held liable,
in their personal and private capacities, for damages to the private respondent.

We rule for the petitioners.

The respondent court committed a reversible error in overruling the trial court's finding that:

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 . . . with reference to the claim of plaintiff to damages, actual and exemplary, and
attorney's fees, the Court finds it difficult to discredit or disregard totally the defendants'
defense of good faith premised on the excuse that they were all the time awaiting
clarification of the Board of Investments on the matter. 14

We hold that this finding of the trial court is correct for good faith is always presumed and it is
upon him who alleges the contrary that the burden of proof lies. 15 In Abando v. Lozada, 16 we
defined good faith as "refer[ring] to a state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the
individual concerned. It consists of the honest intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable
and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is the opposite of fraud, and its absence should be
established by convincing evidence."

We had reviewed the evidence on record carefully and we did not see any clear and convincing
proof showing the alleged bad faith of the petitioners. On the contrary, the record is replete with
evidence bolstering the petitioners' claim of good faith. First, there was the report of the National
Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) dated January 25, 1982 that, contrary to what the
respondent claimed, the subject importation was not OPP film scraps but oriented
polypropylene, a plastic product of stronger material, whose importation to the Philippines was
restricted, if not prohibited, under LOI
17
658-B. It was on the strength of this finding that the petitioners withheld the release of the
subject importation for being contrary to law. Second, the petitioners testified that, on many
occasions, the Bureau of Customs sought the advice of the BOI on whether the subject
importation might be released. 18 Third, petitioner Parayno also testified during the trial that up
to that time (of the trial) there was no clear-cut policy on the part of the BOI regarding the entry
into the Philippines of oriented polypropylene (OPP), as the letters of BOI Governors Tordesillas
and Zayco of November 8, 1983 and September 24, 1982, respectively, ordering the release of
the subject importation did not clarify the BOI policy on the matter. He then testified on the letter
of the BOI Chairman Roberto Ongpin dated March 12, 1984, which states in full:

Thank you for your letter of 1 February 1984, on the subject of various importations of
Oriented Polypropylene (OPP) and Polypropylene (PP) withheld by Customs and the
confusion over the disposition of such imports.

I have discussed the matter with Vice-Chairman Tordesillas and Governor Zayco of the
Board of Investments and the following is their explanation:

1. On 22 June 1982, the BOI ruled that importation of OPP/PP film scraps intended for
recycling or repelletizing did not fall within the purview of LOI 658-B.

2. On 17 August l982, the BOI agreed that holes could be drilled on subject film imports
to prevent their use for other purposes.

3. For importations authorized prior to 22 June 1982, the drilling of holes should depend
on purpose for which the importations was approved by the BOI that is, for direct

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 packaging use or for recycling/repelletizing into raw material. The exemption from drilling
of holes on Solmac Marketing's importation under Certificates of Authority issued on 1
April 1982 and 5 May 1982 and on Clojus' importation authorized in 1982 were endorsed
by the BOI on the premise that these were not intended for recycling/repelletizing.

Should your office have any doubts as to the authorized intended use of any imported
lots of OPP/PP film scraps that you have confiscated, we have no objection to the drilling
of holes to ensure that these are indeed recycled.

I have requested Governor Zayco to contact your office in order to offer any further
assistance which you may require. 19

It can be seen from all the foregoing that even the highest officers (Chairman Ongpin, Vice-
Chairman Tordesillas, and Governor Zayco) of the BOI themselves were not in agreement as to
what proper course to take on the subject of the various importations of Oriented Polypropylene
(OPP) and Polypropylene (PP) withheld by the Bureau of Customs. The conflicting
recommendations of the BOI on this score prompted the petitioners to seek final clarification
from the former with regard to its policy on these importations. This resulted in the inevitable
delay in the release of the Clojus shipment, one of the several of such importations. The confusion
over the disposition of this particular importation obviates bad faith. Thus the trial court's finding
that the petitioners acted in good faith in not immediately releasing the Clojus shipment pending
a definitive policy of the BOI on this matter is correct. It is supported by substantial evidence on
record, independent of the presumption of good faith, which as stated earlier, was not
successfully rebutted.

When a public officer takes his oath of office, he binds himself to perform the duties of his office
faithfully and to use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit of the
public. Thus, in the discharge of his duties, he is to use that prudence, caution, and attention
which careful men use in the management of their affairs. In the case at bar, prudence dictated
that petitioners first obtain from the BOI the latter's definite guidelines regarding the disposition
of the various importations of oriented polypropylene (OPP) and polypropylene (PP) then being
withheld at the Bureau of Customs. These cellophane/film products were competing with locally
manufactured polypropylene and oriented polypropylene as raw materials which were then
already sufficient to meet local demands, hence, their importation was restricted, if not
prohibited under LOI 658-B. Consequently, the petitioners can not be said to have acted in bad
faith in not immediately releasing the import goods without first obtaining the necessary
clarificatory guidelines from the BOI. As public officers, the petitioners had the duty to see to it
that the law they were tasked to implement, i.e., LOI 658-B, was faithfully complied with.

But even granting that the petitioners committed a mistake in withholding the release of the
subject importation because indeed it was composed of OPP film scraps, 20 contrary to the
evidence submitted by the National Institute of Science and Technology that the same was pure
oriented OPP, nonetheless, it is the duty of the Court to see to it that public officers are not
hampered in the performance of their duties or in making decisions for fear of personal liability

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for damages due to honest mistake.1wphi1 Whatever damage they may have caused as a result
of such an erroneous interpretation, if any at all, is in the nature of a damnum absque
injuria. Mistakes concededly committed by public officers are not actionable absent any clear
showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. 21 After
all, "even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the
presumption of good faith. 22

In the same vein, the presumption, disputable though it may be, that an official duty has been
regularly performed 23 applies in favor of the petitioners. Omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter
esse acta. (All things are presumed to be correctly and solemnly done.) It was private
respondent's burden to overcome this juris tantum presumption. We are not persuaded that it
has been able to do so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, the assailed Resolution of the respondent court,
in CA-G.R. SP No. 10509, dated May 25, 1988, is SET ASIDE and ANNULLED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Lantin, M., J., ponente, with Reyes, M.T. and Martinez, A.M., JJ., concurring.

2 Grio-Aquino, C., J., ponente, with Reyes, M.T. and Lantin, JM., JJ., concurring.

3 Decision, CA-G.R. SP No. 10509; rollo, 40.

4 Webster's Third New International Dictionary.

5Letter of Edward Keller of Mobil (Phils.) to Collector of Customs, dated May 7, 1982;
Original Record, 27.

6 Exhibit "5" for the defendants, now the petitioners herein; Original Record, 56.

7 Exhibit "Q" for the plaintiff, now the private respondent; Original Record, 36.

8 Rollo, 18-19.

9Original Record 228-238, penned by Judge Florencio B. Cabanos, Branch LIV, Manila,
RTC.

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 10 Rollo, 25.

11 Grio-Aquino, C., J., ponente, with Reyes, M.T. and Lantin, J.M., JJ., concurring.

12 Decision in CA-G.R. No. SP 10509, Court of Appeals; rollo, 34.

13 Rollo, 22.

14 Decision in Civil Case No. 84-23537, supra, 237.

15Article 527, New Civil Code. Rule 131, sec. 5(a), Revised Rules of Court; U.S. vs. Rafinan,
1 Phil. 294; see also Guillen vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 83175, December 4, 1989, 799.

16G.R. 82564, October 13, 1989, 178 SCRA 509; emphasis in the original, citing Hilario vs.
Galvez, 45494-R, August 19, 1971.

17 Rollo, 23.

18 Id., 60.

19 Rollo, 122; emphasis in the copied text.

20 Decision in Civil Case No. 84-23537, Regional Trial Court of Manila.

21Dale Sanders, et al. v. Hon. Regino T. Veridiano II, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-46930, June 19,
1988, 162 SCRA 88 (1988).

22 Supra.

23 See 5(m), Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court.

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 32. Picart vs Smith
G.R. No. L-12219; March 15, 1918

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918

AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellee.

Alejo Mabanag for appellant.

G. E. Campbell for appellee.

STREET, J.:

In this action the plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the defendant, Frank Smith, jr., the
sum of P31,000, as damages alleged to have been caused by an automobile driven by the
defendant. From a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union absolving
the defendant from liability the plaintiff has appealed.

The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place on December 12, 1912,
on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. It appears that upon the occasion in question
the plaintiff was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, the
defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about
ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and
blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken
the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback
before him was not observing the rule of the road.

The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However,
being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the
pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He
says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over
to the other side. The bridge is shown to have a length of about 75 meters and a width of 4.80
meters. As the automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that being the
proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman

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would move to the other side. The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made
no sign for the automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant,
instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to
approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near,
there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly
turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where
it as then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal
that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing.
In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was
broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. From the evidence
adduced in the case we believe that when the accident occurred the free space where the pony
stood between the automobile and the railing of the bridge was probably less than one and one
half meters. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which
caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.

The question presented for decision is whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in
the manner above described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to
repair the damage done; and we are of the opinion that he is so liable. As the defendant started
across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the
proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes
that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the
horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of things this change of
situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it
was not longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of
greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was
his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons
on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the
danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon
the horse. He was, we think, deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet
exhibited fright. But in view of the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if
the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles, he might get exited and jump under
the conditions which here confronted him. When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to
this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the
Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.

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The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must
of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved
in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot here be of much value but this much can be
profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before
them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future.
Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest
or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a
result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to
guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion
born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these
terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this:
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have
foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing
conduct or guarding against its consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence
is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our
opinion, have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would
therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that
course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against
the threatened harm.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already
stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover
which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of
the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded
the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is
that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

The decision in the case of Rkes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359) should perhaps
be mentioned in this connection. This Court there held that while contributory negligence on the
part of the person injured did not constitute a bar to recovery, it could be received in evidence
to reduce the damages which would otherwise have been assessed wholly against the other
party. The defendant company had there employed the plaintiff, as a laborer, to assist in
transporting iron rails from a barge in Manila harbor to the company's yards located not far away.
The rails were conveyed upon cars which were hauled along a narrow track. At certain spot near
the water's edge the track gave way by reason of the combined effect of the weight of the car
and the insecurity of the road bed. The car was in consequence upset; the rails slid off; and the
plaintiff's leg was caught and broken. It appeared in evidence that the accident was due to the
effects of the typhoon which had dislodged one of the supports of the track. The court found that
the defendant company was negligent in having failed to repair the bed of the track and also that
the plaintiff was, at the moment of the accident, guilty of contributory negligence in walking at

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the side of the car instead of being in front or behind. It was held that while the defendant was
liable to the plaintiff by reason of its negligence in having failed to keep the track in proper repair
nevertheless the amount of the damages should be reduced on account of the contributory
negligence in the plaintiff. As will be seen the defendant's negligence in that case consisted in an
omission only. The liability of the company arose from its responsibility for the dangerous
condition of its track. In a case like the one now before us, where the defendant was actually
present and operating the automobile which caused the damage, we do not feel constrained to
attempt to weigh the negligence of the respective parties in order to apportion the damage
according to the degree of their relative fault. It is enough to say that the negligence of the
defendant was in this case the immediate and determining cause of the accident and that the
antecedent negligence of the plaintiff was a more remote factor in the case.

A point of minor importance in the case is indicated in the special defense pleaded in the
defendant's answer, to the effect that the subject matter of the action had been previously
adjudicated in the court of a justice of the peace. In this connection it appears that soon after the
accident in question occurred, the plaintiff caused criminal proceedings to be instituted before a
justice of the peace charging the defendant with the infliction of serious injuries (lesiones graves).
At the preliminary investigation the defendant was discharged by the magistrate and the
proceedings were dismissed. Conceding that the acquittal of the defendant at the trial upon the
merits in a criminal prosecution for the offense mentioned would be res adjudicata upon the
question of his civil liability arising from negligence -- a point upon which it is unnecessary to
express an opinion -- the action of the justice of the peace in dismissing the criminal proceeding
upon the preliminary hearing can have no effect. (See U. S. vs. Banzuela and Banzuela, 31 Phil.
Rep., 564.)

From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and
judgment is her rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of two hundred
pesos (P200), with costs of other instances. The sum here awarded is estimated to include the
value of the horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of
his apparel, and lawful interest on the whole to the date of this recovery. The other damages
claimed by the plaintiff are remote or otherwise of such character as not to be recoverable. So
ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Araullo, Avancea, and Fisher, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.

Separate Opinions

MALCOLM, J., concurring:

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MAS
After mature deliberation, I have finally decided to concur with the judgment in this case. I do so
because of my understanding of the "last clear chance" rule of the law of negligence as
particularly applied to automobile accidents. This rule cannot be invoked where the negligence
of the plaintiff is concurrent with that of the defendant. Again, if a traveler when he reaches the
point of collision is in a situation to extricate himself and avoid injury, his negligence at that point
will prevent a recovery. But Justice Street finds as a fact that the negligent act of the interval of
time, and that at the moment the plaintiff had no opportunity to avoid the accident.
Consequently, the "last clear chance" rule is applicable. In other words, when a traveler has
reached a point where he cannot extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not avert the
injury, his negligence in reaching that position becomes the condition and not the proximate
cause of the injury and will not preclude a recovery. (Note especially Aiken vs. Metcalf [1917],
102 Atl., 330.)

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 33. RCPI vs CA and Timan
G.R. No. 79578; March 13, 1991

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 79578 March 13, 1991

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES MINERVA TIMAN and FLORES TIMAN, respondents.

Salalima, Trenas, Pagaoa & Associates for petitioner.

Paul P. Lentejas for private respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

A social condolence telegram sent through the facilities of the petitioner gave rise to the present
petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision 1 of the respondent Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the judgment 2 of the trial court, dated February 14, 1985, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Ordering the defendant RCPI to pay plaintiff the amount of P30,848.05 representing
actual and compensatory damages; P10,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

2. Awarding of attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00. Costs against the defendant.

SO ORDERED. 3

The facts as gleaned from the records of the case are as follows:

On January 24, 1983, private respondents-spouses Minerva Timan and Flores Timan sent a
telegram of condolence to their cousins, Mr. and Mrs. Hilario Midoranda, at Trinidad, Calbayog
City, through petitioner Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI, hereinafter) at

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Cubao, Quezon City, to convey their deepest sympathy for the recent death of the mother-in-law
of Hilario Midoranda 4 to wit:

MR. & MRS. HILARIO MIDORANDA

TRINIDAD, CALBAYOG CITY

MAY GOD GIVE YOU COURAGE AND STRENGTH TO BEAR YOUR LOSS. OUR DEEPEST SYMPATHY
TO YOU AND MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY.

MINER & FLORY. 5

The condolence telegram was correctly transmitted as far as the written text was concerned.
However, the condolence message as communicated and delivered to the addressees was
typewritten on a "Happy Birthday" card and placed inside a "Christmasgram" envelope. Believing
that the transmittal to the addressees of the aforesaid telegram in that nonsuch manner was
done intentionally and with gross breach of contract resulting to ridicule, contempt, and
humiliation of the private respondents and the addressees, including their friends and relatives,
the spouses Timan demanded an explanation. Unsatisfied with RCPI's explanations in its letters,
dated March 9 and April 20, 1983, the Timans filed a complaint for damages. 6

The parties stipulated at the pre-trial that the issue to be resolved by the trial court was:

WHETHER or not the act of delivering the condolence message in a Happy Birthday" card
with a "Christmasgram" envelope constitutes a breach of contract on the part of the
defendant. If in the affirmative, whether or not plaintiff is entitled to damages. 7

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondents Timans which was affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals. RCPI now submits the following assignment of errors:

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN CONDEMNING PETITIONER TO PAY ACTUAL AND

COMPENSATORY DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P30,848.05.

II

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN CONDEMNING PETITIONER TO PAY MORAL

DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P10,000.00.

III

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN CONDEMNING PETITIONER TO PAY EXEMPLARY

DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P5,000.00.

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 IV

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN CONDEMNING PETITIONER TO PAY ATTORNEYS FEES

IN THE AMOUNT OF P5,000.00 PLUS COSTS OF SUIT. 8

The four assigned errors are going to be discussed jointly because they are all based on the same
findings of fact.

We fully agree with the appellate court's endorsement of the trial court's conclusion that RCPI, a
corporation dealing in telecommunications and offering its services to the public, is engaged in a
business affected with public interest. As such, it is bound to exercise that degree of diligence
expected of it in the performance of its obligation. 9

One of RCPI's main arguments is that it still correctly transmitted the text of the telegram and
was received by the addressees on time despite the fact that there was "error" in the social form
and envelope used. 10 RCPI asserts that there was no showing that it has any motive to cause
harm or damage on private respondents:

Petitioner humbly submits that the "error" in the social form used does not come within
the ambit of fraud, malice or bad faith as understood/defined under the law. 11

We do not agree.

In a distinctly similar case, 12 and oddly also involving the herein petitioner as the same culprit,
we held:

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving and transmitting

messages. Everytime a person transmits a message through the facilities of the petitioner,
a contract is entered into. Upon receipt of the rate or fee fixed, the petitioner undertakes
to transmit the message accurately . . . As a corporation, the petitioner can act only
through its employees. Hence the acts of its employees in receiving and transmitting
messages are the acts of the petitioner. To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly
for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of petitioner's business is to deprive the
general public availing of the services of the petitioner of an effective and adequate
remedy. 13

Now, in the present case, it is self-evident that a telegram of condolence is intended and meant
to convey a message of sorrow and sympathy. Precisely, it is denominated "telegram of
condolence" because it tenders sympathy and offers to share another's grief. It seems out of this
world, therefore, to place that message of condolence in a birthday card and deliver the same in
a Christmas envelope for such acts of carelessness and incompetence not only render violence
to good taste and common sense, they depict a bizarre presentation of the sender's feelings.
They ridicule the deceased's loved ones and destroy the atmosphere of grief and respect for the
departed.

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MAS
Anyone who avails of the facilities of a telegram company like RCPI can choose to send his
message in the ordinary form or in a social form. In the ordinary form, the text of the message is
typed on plain newsprint paper. On the other hand, a social telegram is placed in a special form
with the proper decorations and embellishments to suit the occasion and the message and
delivered in an envelope matching the purpose of the occasion and the words and intent of the
message. The sender pays a higher amount for the social telegram than for one in the ordinary
form. It is clear, therefore, that when RCPI typed the private respondents' message of condolence
in a birthday card and delivered the same in a colorful Christmasgram envelope, it committed a
breach of contract as well as gross negligence. Its excuse that it had run out of social condolence
cards and envelopes 14 is flimsy and unacceptable. It could not have been faulted had it delivered
the message in the ordinary form and reimbursed the difference in the cost to the private
respondents. But by transmitting it unfittinglythrough other special forms clearly, albeit
outwardly, portraying the opposite feelings of joy and happiness and thanksgivingRCPI only
exacerbated the sorrowful situation of the addressees and the senders. It bears stress that this
botchery exposed not only the petitioner's gross negligence but also its callousness and disregard
for the sentiments of its clientele, which tantamount to wanton misconduct, for which it must be
held liable for damages.

It is not surprising that when the Timans' telegraphic message reached their cousin, it became
the joke of the Midorandas' friends, relatives, and associates who thought, and rightly so, that
the unpardonable mix-up was a mockery of the death of the mother-in-law of the senders'
cousin. Thus it was not unexpected that because of this unusual incident, which caused much
embarrassment and distress to respondent Minerva Timan, he suffered nervousness and
hypertension resulting in his confinement for three days starting from April 4, 1983 at the Capitol
Medical Center in Quezon City. 15

The petitioner argues that "a court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or guess work as to
the fact and amount of damages, but must depend on the actual proof that damages had been
suffered and evidence of the actual amount. 16 In other words, RCPI insists that there is no causal
relation of the illness suffered by Mr. Timan with the foul-up caused by the petitioner. But that
is a question of fact. The findings of fact of the trial court and the respondent court concur in
favor of the private respondents. We are bound by such findingsthat is the general rule well-
established by a long line of cases. Nothing has been shown to convince us to justify the
relaxation of this rule in the petitioner's favor. On the contrary, these factual findings are
supported by substantial evidence on record.

Anent the award of moral and exemplary damages assigned as errors, the findings of the
respondent court are persuasive.1wphi1

. . . When plaintiffs placed an order for transmission of their social condolence telegram,
defendant did not inform the plaintiff of the exhaustion of such social condolence forms.
Defendant-appellant accepted through its authorized agent or agency the order and
received the corresponding compensation therefor. Defendant did not comply with its
contract as intended by the parties and instead of transmitting the condolence message

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 in an ordinary form, in accordance with its guidelines, placed the condolence message
expressing sadness and sorrow in forms conveying joy and happiness. Under the
circumstances, We cannot accept the defendant's plea of good faith predicated on such
exhaustion of social condolence forms. Gross negligence or carelessness can be attributed
to defendant-appellant in not supplying its various stations with such sufficient and
adequate social condolence forms when it held out to the public sometime in January,
1983, the availability of such social condolence forms and accepted for a fee the
transmission of messages on said forms. Knowing that there are no such forms as testified
to by its Material Control Manager Mateo Atienza, and entering into a contract for the
transmission of messages in such forms, defendant-appellant committed acts of bad faith,
fraud or malice. . . . 17

RCPI's argument that it can not be held liable for exemplary damages, being penal or punitive in
character, 18 is without merit. We have so held in many cases, and oddly, quite a number of them
likewise involved the herein petitioner as the transgressor.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . In contracts and quasi-contracts, exemplary damages may be awarded if the

defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner.1wphi1 There was gross negligence on the part of RCPI personnel in
transmitting the wrong telegram, of which RCPI must be held liable. Gross carelessness
or negligence constitutes wanton misconduct.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . punitive damages may be recovered for wilful or wantonly negligent acts in respect of
messages, even though those acts are neither authorized nor ratified (Arkansas & L.R. Co.
vs. Stroude 91 SW 18; West vs. Western U. Tel. Co., 17 P807; Peterson vs. Western U. Tel.
Co., 77 NW 985; Brown vs. Western U. Tel. Co., 6 SE 146). Thus, punitive damages have
been recovered for mistakes in the transmission of telegrams (Pittman vs. Western Union
Tel. Co., 66 SO 977; Painter vs. Western Union Tel. Co., 84 SE 293) (emphasis supplied). 19

We wish to add a little footnote to this Decision. By merely reviewing the number of cases that
has reached this Court in which the petitioner was time and again held liable for the same causes
as in the present case breach of contract and gross negligencethe ineluctable conclusion is that
it has not in any way reformed nor improved its services to the public. It must do so now or else
next time the Court may be constrained to adjudge stricter sanctions.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

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MAS
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1CA-G.R. CV No. 06008, promulgated on August 14, 1987; Magsino, Celso L., J., ponente,
Melo, Jose A.R. and Lising, Esteban M., concurring.

2 Rendered by Judge Johnico G. Serquia, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch CV
(105), Civil Case No. Q-38497.

3 Rollo, 59.

4 Id., 56.

5 Id., 48.

6 Id., 56.

7 Id., 57.

8 Id., 11.

9 Id., 49.

10 Petition, 6; Rollo, 12.

11 Id.

12"SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN WALA KANG PADALA DITO
KAHIT BULBUL MO", RCPI v. Court of Appeals, No. L-44748, promulgated on August 29,
1986, 143 SCRA 659.

13 Supra, 662-663.

14 Rollo, 6.

15 Id., 50.

16 Id., 100.

17 Id., 51.

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MAS
 18 Petition, 16; Rollo, 22.

19RCPI vs. Court of Appeals, No. 55194, promulgated on February 26, 1981, 103 SCRA 359,
362.

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