SALAZR V.

PEOPPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Salazar, vice president and treasurer of Aurora/Uni Group was charged with estafa for the 41,300.00 given by Skiva
internationals intended for the manufacturing of seven hundred dozen stretch twill jean, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same for his own personal use and benefit and
failed to return the said amount.

Salazar alleged that Skiva has no authority to institute the present action as estafa was not committed against Skiva but
against Aurora on the basis of the findings that the transaction between Skiva and Aurora was one of sale. That pursuant
to Section 3 Rule 110 the complaint should not have been instituted by Skiva for it is not the offended party.

RULING: The complaint referred to in Rule 110 contemplates one that is filed in court to commence a criminal action
in those cases where a complaint of the offended party is required by law, instead of an information which is generally
filed by a fiscal.[50] It is not necessary that the proper offended party file a complaint for purposes of preliminary
investigation by the fiscal. The rule is that unless the offense subject of the complaint is one that cannot be prosecuted de
oficio, any competent person may file a complaint for preliminary investigation.[51]
Thus, as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by a complaint or information, both of which are filed in
court. If a complaint is filed directly in court, the same must be filed by the offended party and in case of an information,
the same must be filed by the fiscal. However, a complaint filed with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by any
person.[52] Thus, in the case at bar, the complaint was validly filed by Skiva despite the finding of the lower court that
petitioner had no obligation to account to Skiva.

QUE v. People of the Philippines

Petitioner Victor Que convicted of the crime violating B.P. 22 seeks a review by certiorari for the decision rendered
by the Court of Appeals and the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner raise the issue that the respondent appellate court erred in considering material facts as well as the
principal element of the crime charged showing that the lower court had no jurisdiction to try the instant case.

RULING: There is no question that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City had jurisdiction over the case as provided for
in Secs. 10 and 15 (a) Rule 110 of the New Rules of Court. The findings of fact of the trial court reveal that the checks in
question were issued at Quezon City as admitted by petitioner himself in his answer when he was sued by the
complainant on his civil liability. Thus, the trial court held:

In his answer (Exhibit "H") to the civil complaint for collection of sum of money, docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-32445 of the Court of First Instance, Branch IX, Quezon City (Exhibit "G"), the accused inferentially
admitted that the purchases and issuance of the check in question were made at Francis Hill Supply
located at No. 194 Speaker Perez Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. (Exhibit "G-1" and Exhibit "H-
1"). (p. 4, Dec.) (p. 62, Rollo)

It is of no moment whether the said checks were deposited by the complainant in a bank located outside of Quezon City.
The determinative factor is the place of issuance which is in Quezon City and thus within the court's jurisdiction.

NASI VILLAR V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Nasi Villar was convicted of illegal recruitment as defined under sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act 8042 for recruiting Nila
Panilag for employment abroad, demand and received 6,500 as a placement fee, the said accused being non-licensee or
non-holder of authority to engage in the recruitment of workers abroad to the damage and prejudice of the herein
offended party.

The Court of Appeals in its decision noted that the criminal acts alleged to have been committed happened sometime in
1993. However, R.A. No. 8042, under which petitioner was charged, was approved only on 7 June 1995 and took effect
on 15 July 1995. Thus, the Court of Appeals declared that petitioner should have been charged under the Labor Code, in
particular Art. 13(b) thereof, and not under R.A. No. 8042.

Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider that R.A. No. 8042 cannot be given retroactive
effect and that the decision of the RTC constitutes a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto law.
Since R.A. No. 8042 did not yet exist in January 1993 when the crime was allegedly committed, petitioner argues that
law cannot be used as the basis of filing a criminal action for illegal recruitment.

OSG) argues that the Court of Appeals' conviction of petitioner under the Labor Code is correct. While conceding that
there was an erroneous designation of the law violated by petitioner, the OSG stresses that the designation of the
offense in the Information is not determinative of the nature and character of the crime charged against her but the acts
alleged in the Information.

RULING: In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals,13 we held that the real nature of the crime charged is determined, not from the
caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the law alleged to have been violatedthese being
conclusions of lawbut by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. What controls is not the designation
but the description of the offense charged. From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the
accused what the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged is. If the accused performed the acts alleged
in the body of the information, in the manner stated, then he ought to be punished and punished adequately, whatever
may be the name of the crime which those acts constitute.14