JUNE 24, 2017
Politics of Hysteria
The West Bengal government must initiate a political dialogue to resolve the Gorkhaland issue.
T
he cornerstone of a functioning democracy is popular
participation in politics. But hysteria only threatens de-
mocracy. For democratic politics presupposes an informed
citizenry; hysteria, on the contrary, promotes thoughtlessness.
Today, Indian politics seems to be propelled by catchphrases
meant to produce a frenzied response: cow slaughter, love jihad,
black money, and, above all, separatism. The latters spectre
obfuscates open-minded discussions on claims to political auto-
nomy. The current crisis in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal
is symptomatic of the shrinkage of space for democratic dialogue.
On 8 June, massive demonstrations led by Gorkha Janmukti
Morcha (GJM) rocked Darjeeling as the West Bengal cabinet
held its meeting in the hill town for the first time in 45 years.
The trigger was Chief Minister Mamata Banerjees decision to
make Bengali compulsory in schools across the state. However,
by the time the state cabinet met in Darjeeling, Banerjee had
clarified that this would not apply to the predominantly Nepali-
speaking hill region. The language issue, by then, had mutated
into a renewal of the demand for Gorkhaland. The government
responded with its armed might. It deployed police, paramili-
tary forces, as well as the army to crush the protests.
The Trinamool Congress (TMC)-led state government argued
that armed intervention was necessary in the interest of West
Bengals territorial integrity. This whipped up popular hyste-
ria. A frenzied Bengali cultural assertion hastily equated Dar-
jeeling with Kashmir. Both were seen as examples of separa-
tism, obscuring the obvious fact that while the self-determina-
tion movement in Kashmir demanded separate nationhood, the
Gorkhaland movement only demanded autonomous statehood
within India. This deliberate forgetfulness was fostered by the
Kolkata press, influential sections of which accused the central
government of double standards for doing nothing to control
violence in north Bengal while tackling the Kashmir agitation
with an iron fist. The casualty in this line of reasoning is reason
itself. It reinforces our collective amnesia about how brutal sup-
pression of popular movements can only lead to their temporary
suspension; it can never resolve the issues at stake.
Of course, the state government must not concede GJMs de-
mands without evaluating its claims. At the outset, it is imperative
to question the basis of the ethnolinguistic identity that the
movement seeks to mobilise. Historian Lionel Caplan argues that
Economic & Political Weekly EPW JUNE 24, 2017 vol lII nos 25 & 26
the origin of the term Gorkha (or Gurkha) can be traced to co-
lonial martial race theory that grouped diverse ethnolinguistic
communities under this category for military recruitment. But
does this compromise its legitimacy? Undoubtedly, community
identitiescultural, religious, linguistic, ethnic, nationalare all
historically produced. Most of those we identify ourselves with
today, to a greater or lesser extent, have been constituted through
colonial encounters. If Bengali bhadralok identityexplicitly
fashioned after the professional middle classes of Britainis
legitimate, why should Gorkha identity, which challenges the
formers political hegemony in north Bengal, not be so?
The more pressing question is about whom the GJM seeks to
represent and whom it excludes. Gorkhas are, by no means, the
only ethnic group in north Bengal. To what extent does the GJM
represent various ethnic minorities? Again, apart from Darjeel-
ing, where the Gorkhas are in a majority, GJM claims large
tracts in the foothills and the plains, including Siliguri town, as
part of Gorkhaland. Here, the Gorkhas are in a minority. The
GJM has to be questioned on how it seeks to accommodate non-
Gorkhas in this proposed state. But this can happen only
through an open democratic dialogue, not through muscle-flex-
ing or hysterical defence of territorial integrity.
The prime reason for the state governments continuing use
of brute force is the belief that an explicit display of commit-
ment to West Bengals territorial integrity will consolidate TMCs
support in the rest of the state. The Gorkhaland movement
haunts Bengal with memories of its partition in 1905 and 1947.
The TMC hopes to project itself as the champion of Bengali cul-
tural identity by appearing to be absolutely uncompromising on
any demand for the states vivisection. This is meant to coun-
ter Bharatiya Janata Partys (BJP) strategy of using Hindutva to
make inroads into West Bengal politics.
Political unrest has brought economic life to a halt in north Ben-
gal. Still, TMC will probably make electoral profits out of it in the
short run. Just as the previous Left Front government (which had
also adopted very similar positions vis--vis the Gorkhaland
demand), it understands the value of pandering to Bengali cultural
chauvisim. BJPs vacillation on this issue is also instructive. It had
previously been sympathetic towards the Gorkhaland movement.
But its rising ambitions in Bengal politics have muddied the waters.
BJPs Darjeeling unit has endorsed the Gorkhaland demand; the
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EDITORIALS

West Bengal unit has opposed it, while the central government
has provided military aid to crush the agitation. Adding another
layer of complexity, Sikkims Chief Minister Pawan Kumar
Chamling has come out in open support for Gorkhaland. In the
end, however, whipping up mass hysteria on separatism will
be injurious to the very health of our democracy.
Violence is often used as an excuse on both sides for not enter-
ing into dialogue. The onus of bringing the temperature down lies
with the state government. Mamata Banerjee, who claims to be
the democratically elected chief minister for the whole of West
Bengal, needs to initiate a political dialogue instead of playing the
politics of mass hysteria.

8 JUNE 24, 2017 vol lII nos 25 & 26 EPW Economic & Political Weekly