RULE 130- ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE already named John Thomas Lopez.
already named John Thomas Lopez.[1] She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the
A. OBJECT EVIDENCE
Test for Admissibility
a.) Relevancy
EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R. TIJING, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS (Seventh Division) and ANGELITA DIAMANTE, respondents.
For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 6, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 39056, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court in a petition for habeas
corpus of Edgardo Tijing, Jr., allegedly the child of petitioners.
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse
Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of
private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila.
According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an
urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked
Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under
the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while Bienvenida was
doing laundry.
When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were
gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelitas house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find
them there. Angelitas maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll and told
Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to Angelitas house after three days, only to
discover that Angelita had moved to another place.Bienvenida then complained to her
barangay chairman and also to the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance.
Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could not imagine how her spouse
would react to the disappearance of their youngest child and this made her problem even
more serious. As fate would have it, Bienvenida and her husband reconciled and together,
this time, they looked for their missing son in other places. Notwithstanding their serious
efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts.
Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of
Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying
in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where
she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four years. She claims that the
boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was
boy despite her demand to do so.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order
to recover their son. To substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two witnesses,
namely, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez. The first witness, Vasquez, testified that she
assisted in the delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her clinic in Sta. Ana,
Manila. She supported her testimony with her clinical records. [2] The second witness,
Benjamin Lopez, declared that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not have possibly
fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter was sterile. He recalled that Tomas met an
accident and bumped his private part against the edge of a banca causing him excruciating
pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing capacity. Benjamin further declared that Tomas
admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son and that he and Angelita
were not blessed with children.[3]
For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserts
that at age 42, she gave birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of
midwife Zosima Panganiban in Singalong, Manila. She added, though, that she has two other
children with her real husband, Angel Sanchez.[4] She said the birth of John Thomas was
registered by her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila
on August 4, 1989.
On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common-law
husband could not have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an
impossibility.[5] The trial court also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial
similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and
the same person who is the natural child of petitioners.The trial court decreed:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition
for Habeas Corpus, as such, respondent Angelita Diamante is ordered to immediately release
from her personal custody minor John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn him over and/or surrender
his person to petitioners, Spouses Edgardo A. Tijing and Bienvenida R. Tijing, immediately
upon receipt hereof.
Branch Sheriff of this Court, Carlos Bajar, is hereby commanded to implement the decision of
this Court by assisting herein petitioners in the recovery of the person of their minor son,
Edgardo Tijing Jr., the same person as John Thomas D. Lopez.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Angelita seasonably filed her notice of appeal.[7] Nonetheless, on August 3, 1994, the
sheriff implemented the order of the trial court by taking custody of the minor. In his report,
the sheriff stated that Angelita peacefully surrendered the minor and he turned over the
custody of said child to petitioner Edgardo Tijing.[8]
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the
trial court. The appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. In
its view, the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she was the
mother of the minor. It ruled that the lower court erred in declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr.,
and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person,[9] and disposed of the case, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower court dated March 10, 1995 is
hereby REVERSED, and a new one entered dismissing the petition in Spec. Proc. No. 94-
71606, and directing the custody of the minor John Thomas Lopez to be returned to
respondent Angelita Diamante, said minor having been under the care of said respondent at
the time of the filing of the petition herein.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the abovequoted decision which was
denied. Hence, the instant petition alleging:
I True, it is not the function of this Court to examine and evaluate the probative value of
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT
DECLARED THAT THE PETITIONERS ACTION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS MERELY
SECONDARY TO THE QUESTION OF FILIATION THAT THE PETITIONERS HAD
LIKEWISE PROVEN.
II
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS AND
DIRECTING THAT THE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR JOHN THOMAS LOPEZ WHO WAS
PROVEN TO THE SAME MINOR AS EDGARDO R. TIJING, JR., BE RETURNED TO THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT.[11]
In our view, the crucial issues for resolution are the following:
(1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy?
(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the
same person and is the son of petitioners?
We shall discuss the two issues together since they are closely related.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto.[12] Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable
parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third
person of his own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the
question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the
availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining
the right of custody over a child.[13] It must be stressed too that in habeas
corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual
presumptions including those as to identity of the person.
In this case, the minors identity is crucial in determining the propriety of the writ
sought. Thus, it must be resolved first whether the Edgardo Tijing, Jr., claimed by Bienvenida
to be her son, is the same minor named John Thomas Lopez, whom Angelita insists to be her
offspring. We must first determine who between Bienvenida and Angelita is the minors
biological mother. Evidence must necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons, initially
thought of to be distinct and separate from each other, are indeed one and the
same.[14] Petitioners must convincingly establish that the minor in whose behalf the
application for the writ is made is the person upon whom they have rightful custody. If there
is doubt on the identity of the minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made,
petitioners cannot invoke with certainty their right of custody over the said minor.
all evidence presented to the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned
decision, resolution or order.[15] But since the conclusions of the Court of Appeals contradict
those of the trial court, this Court may scrutinize the evidence on the record to determine
which findings should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts.
A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by
Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son,
Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips,
she admitted that after the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez
Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of marriage in
1974. Assuming she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she offered no
evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten years. The
midwife who allegedly delivered the child was not presented in court. No clinical records, log
book or discharge order from the clinic were ever submitted.
Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer
capable of siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile
because of the accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only
an adopted son. Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no
children after almost fifteen years together.Though Tomas Lopez had lived with private
respondent for fourteen years, they also bore no offspring.
Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed
by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged
birth of the child.Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth
should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can
the parent register the birth of his child. The certificate must be filed with the local civil
registrar within thirty days after the birth.[16] Significantly, the birth certificate of the child
stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married on October 31, 1974, in
Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false because even private respondent had admitted she is a
common-law wife.[17] This false entry puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate.
Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were
both in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head
shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material
evidence to establish parentage.[18] Needless to stress, the trial courts conclusion should be
given high respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the physical appearances of the
minor and petitioner concerned.
Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenidas giving birth to Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., at her clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of
a log book, discharge order and the signatures of petitioners.
All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of
petitioners. The writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt
the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise
in using DNA test[19] for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines
Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability
to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on
the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and
the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are
analyzed to establish parentage.[20] Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of
DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge.[21] Eventually, as the appropriate case comes,
courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that
courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations
presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress. [22] Though it is not necessary in this
case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt
resolution of parentage and identity issues.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed DECISION of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED. Costs against
the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RONNIE RULLEPA y
GUINTO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
On complaint of Cyra May Francisco Buenafe, accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto
was charged with Rape before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of November, 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously removing her panty, kissing her lips and vagina and thereafter rubbing his
penis and inserting the same to the inner portion of the vagina of the undersigned
complainant, 3 years of age, a minor, against her will and without her consent.[1]
Arraigned on January 15, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.[2]
From the testimonies of its witnesses, namely Cyra May,[3] her mother Gloria Francisco
Buenafe, Dr. Cristina V. Preyra, and SPO4 Catherine Borda, the prosecution established the
following facts:
On November 20, 1995, as Gloria was about to set the table for dinner at her house in
Quezon City, Cyra May, then only three and a half years old, told her, Mama, si kuya Ronnie
lagay niya titi niya at sinaksak sa puwit at sa bibig ko .
Kuya Ronnie is accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa, the Buenafes house boy, who was
sometimes left with Cyra May at home.
Gloria asked Cyra May how many times accused-appellant did those things to her, to
which she answered many times. Pursuing, Gloria asked Cyra May what else he did to her,
and Cyra May indicated the room where accused-appellant slept and pointed at his pillow.
As on the night of November 20, 1995 accused-appellant was out with Glorias husband
Col. Buenafe,[4] she waited until their arrival at past 11:00 p.m. Gloria then sent accused-
appellant out on an errand and informed her husband about their daughters plaint. Buenafe
thereupon talked to Cyra May who repeated what she had earlier told her mother Gloria.
When accused-appellant returned, Buenafe and Gloria verified from him whether what
Cyra May had told them was true. Ronnie readily admitted doing those things but only once,
at 4:00 p.m. of November 17, 1995 or three days earlier. Unable to contain her anger, Gloria
slapped accused-appellant several times.
Since it was already midnight, the spouses waited until the following morning to bring
accused-appellant to Camp Karingal where he admitted the imputations against him, on
account of which he was detained. Glorias sworn statement[5] was then taken.[6]
Recalling what accused-appellant did to her, Cyra May declared at the witness
stand: Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa bunganga , thus causing her pain
and drawing her to cry. She added that accused-appellant did these to her twice in his a- That is not true, sir.
bedroom.
q- If that is not true, what is the truth?
Dr. Ma. Cristina V. Preyra, the Medico-Legal Officer and Chief of the Biological Science
Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory who examined Crya May, came up a- As I have mentioned earlier that before I started working with the family I was
with her report dated November 21, 1995,[7] containing the following findings and sent to Crame to buy medicine for the daughter because she had difficulty in
conclusions: urinating.
q- Did you know why the child has difficulty in urinating?
FINDINGS:
a- No, I do not know, sir.
GENERAL AND EXTRA GENITAL: q- And how about the present complaint filed against you, the complaint filed by
the mother of the victim?
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female child subject. Breasts are
a- I did not do it, sir.
undeveloped. Abdomen is flat and soft.
q- What is the truth, what can you say about this present complaint filed against
GENITAL: you?
a- As I said Mrs. Buenafe got mad at me because after I explained to her that I
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with congested was going with her gusband (sic) to the children of the husband with a former
and abraded labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same is disclosed marriage.[9]
an abraded posterior fourchette and an elastic, fleshy type intact hymen. External vaginal
orifice does not admit the tip of the examining index finger. Finding for the prosecution, Branch 96 of the Quezon City RTC rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
xxx
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO
CONCLUSION: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, and he is accordingly sentenced to death.

Subject is in virgin state physically. The accused is ordered to pay CYRA MAE BUENAFE the amount of P40,000.00 as civil
indemnity.
There are no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma at the time of
examination. (Emphasis supplied.) Costs to be paid by the accused.[10] (Italics in the original.)

By Dr. Preyras explanation, the abrasions on the labia minora could have been caused Hence, this automatic review, accused-appellant assigning the following errors to the
by friction with an object, perhaps an erect penis. She doubted if riding on a bicycle had trial court:
caused the injuries.[8]
I
The defenses sole witness was accused-appellant, who was 28 and single at the time he
took the witness stand on June 9, 1997. He denied having anything to do with the abrasions
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE THE ACCUSED-
found in Cyra Mays genitalia, and claimed that prior to the alleged incident, he used to be
APPELLANTS ADMISSION.
ordered to buy medicine for Cyra May who had difficulty urinating. He further alleged that
after he refused to answer Glorias queries if her husband Buenafe, whom he usually
accompanied whenever he went out of the house, was womanizing, Gloria would always find II
fault in him. He suggested that Gloria was behind the filing of the complaint. Thus:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED ON (sic) RULING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS SILENCE
q- According to them you caused the abrasions found in her genital? DURING TRIAL AMOUNTED TO AN IMPLIED ADMISSION OF GUILT.
III a- Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa bunganga
q- How many times did he do that to you?
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. a- Twice, sir.
xxx
IV
q- Do you remember when he did these things to you?
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH
a- Opo.
UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.[11] (Emphasis supplied.)
q- When was that?
Accused-appellant assails the crediting by the trial court, as the following portion of its
a- When my mother was asleep, he put he removed my panty and inserted his
decision shows, of his admission to Gloria of having sexually assaulted Cyra May:
penis inside my vagina, my anus and my mouth, sir.
In addition, the mother asserted that Rullepa had admitted Cyra Ma[y]s complaint during xxx
the confrontation in the house. Indeed, according to the mother, the admission was even
q- After your Kuya Ronnie did those things to you what did you feel?
expressly qualified by Rullepas insistence that he had committed the sexual assault only
once, specifying the time thereof as 4:00 pm of November 17, 1995. That qualification a- Sabi nya ganito (Witness putting her finger in her lips) Nasaktan po ako at
proved that the admission was voluntary and true. An uncoerced and truthful admission like umiyak po ako.
this should be absolutely admissible and competent.
q- Did you cry because of hurt?
xxx a- Yes.

Remarkably, the admission was not denied by the accused during trial despite his freedom to
deny it if untrue. Hence, the admission became conclusive upon him.[12] (Emphasis supplied.)
To accused-appellant, the statements attributed to him are inadmissible since they were
made out of fear, having been elicited only after Cyra Mays parents bullied and questioned
him.He thus submits that it was error for the trial court to take his failure to deny the details of her ordeal:
statements during the trial as an admission of guilt.
Accused-appellants submission does not persuade. The trial court considered his
admission merely as an additional ground to convince itself of his culpability. Even if such
admission, as well as the implication of his failure to deny the same, were disregarded, the
evidence suffices to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The plain, matter-of-fact manner by which Cyra May described her abuse in the hands
of her Kuya Ronnie is an eloquent testament to the truth of her accusations. Thus she
testified on direct examination:
q- What part of your body hurt?
a- Pepe ko po. When I went to the bathroom to urinate, I felt pain in my organ,
sir.[13]
Cyra May reiterated her testimony during cross-examination, providing more revolting
q- So, you said that Kuya Ronnie did something to you what did he do to you on
November 17, 1995?
a- Sinaksak nga yong titi nya. He inserted his penis to my organ and to my mouth,
sir.
xxx
q- When you said that your kuya Ronnie inserted his penis into your organ, into
your mouth, and into your anus, would you describe what his penis?

q- Do you recall if Ronnie Rullepa did anything to you? a- It is a round object, sir.

a- Yes, sir. C o u r t:

q- What did he do to you? Is this titi of your kuya Ronnie a part of his body?
a- Opo.
q- Was that in the head of kuya Ronnie? Accused-appellant draws attention to the statement of Cyra May that he was not in the
house on November 17 (1995), as reflected in the following transcript of her testimony:
a- No, sir.
q- Is it not a fact that you said a while ago that when your father leaves the house,
q- Which part of his body that titi located? he [was] usually accompanied by your kuya Ronnie?
(Witness pointing to her groin area) a- Opo.
C o u r t: q- Why is it that Kuya Ronnie was in the house when you father left the house at
Continue that time, on November 17?

xxx a- He was with Kuya Ronnie, sir.

q- Why were you in that room?
a- Gusto nya po matulog ako sa kuwarto niya.
q- When you were in that room, what did Kuya Ronnie do to you?
a- Hinubo po niya ang panty ko.
q- And after he remove your panty, what did Kuya Ronnie do, what did he do to
you?
a- He inserted his penis to my organ, sir.
q- Why did kuya Ronnie, was kuya Ronnie already naked or he was already
wearing any clothing?
a- Still had his clothing on, sir.
q- So, where did his penis, saan lumabas ang penis ni Kuya Ronnie?
a- Dito po, (Witness referring or pointing to her groin area)
q- So, it is not correct that kuya Ronnie did something to you because your kuya
Ronnie [was] always with your Papa?
a- Yes, sir.[15]
The above-quoted testimony of Cyra May does not indicate the time when her father
Col. Buenafe left their house on November 17, 1995 with accused-appellant and, thus, does
not preclude accused-appellants commission of rape on the same date. In any event, a
young child is vulnerable to suggestion, hence, her affirmative response to the defense
counsels above-quoted leading questions.
As for the variance in the claim regarding when Gloria was informed of the rape, Gloria
having testified that she learned of it on November 20, 1995 [16] while Cyra May said that
immediately after the incident, she awakened her mother who was in the adjacent room and
reported it:[17] This is a minor matter that does not detract from Cyra Mays categorical,
material testimony that accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina.
Accused-appellant goes on to contend that Cyra May was coached, citing the following
portion of her testimony:

xxx q- Yong sinabi mong sinira nya ang buhay mo, where did you get that phrase?

q- So, thats the and at the time, you did not cry and you did not shout for help? a- It was the word of my Mama, sir.[18]

a- Sabi nya po, not to make any noise because my mother might be roused from On the contrary, the foregoing testimony indicates that Cyra May was really narrating the
sleep. truth, that of hearing her mother utter sinira niya ang buhay mo.

q- How long was kuya Ronnie did that to you?
a- Matagal po.
q- After kuya Ronnie scrub his penis to your vagina, what other things did he do?
a- After that he inserted his penis to my mouth, and to my anus, sir.
q- You did not complain and you did not shout?
a- I cried, sir.[14]
Accused-appellants suggestion that Cyra May merely imagined the things of which he is
accused, perhaps getting the idea from television programs, is preposterous. It is true that
the ordinary child is a great weaver of romances, and her imagination may induce (her) to
relate something she has heard or read in a story as personal experience.[19] But Cyra Mays
account is hardly the stuff of romance or fairy tales. Neither is it normal TV fare, if at all.
This Court cannot believe that a victim of Cyra Mays age could concoct a tale of
defloration, allow the examination of her private parts, and undergo the expense, trouble,
inconvenience, not to mention the trauma of public trial.[20]
 Besides, her testimony is corroborated by the findings of Dr. Preyra that there were
abrasions in her labia minora, which she opined, could have been caused by friction with an
erect penis.
This Court thus accords great weight to the following assessment of the trial court
regarding the competency and credibility of Cyra May as a witness:
Her very tender age notwithstanding, Cyra Ma(y) nonetheless appeared to possess the
necessary intelligence and perceptiveness sufficient to invest her with the competence to
testify about her experience. She might have been an impressionable child as all others of
her age are but her narration of Kuya Ronnies placing his titi in her pepe was certainly one
which could not be considered as a common childs tale. Her responses during the
examination of counsel and of the Court established her consciousness of
the distinction between good and bad, which rendered inconceivable for her to describe a
bad act of the accused unless it really happened to her. Needless to state, she described the
act of the accused as bad. Her demeanor as a witness manifested during trial by her
unhesitant, spontaneous, and plain responses to questions further enhanced her claim to
credit and trustworthiness.[21] (Italics in the original.)
In a futile attempt at exculpation, accused-appellant claims that even before the alleged
incident Cyra May was already suffering from pain in urinating. He surmises that she could
have scratched herself which caused the abrasions. Dr. Preyra, however, was quick to rule
out this possibility. She stated categorically that that part of the female organ is very
sensitive and rubbing or scratching it is painful.[22] The abrasions could not, therefore, have
been self-inflicted.
That the Medical-Legal Officer found no external signs of recent application of any form
of trauma at the time of the examination does not preclude accused-appellants conviction
since the infliction of force is immaterial in statutory rape. [23]
More. That Cyra May suffered pain in her vagina but not in her anus despite her
testimony that accused-appellant inserted his penis in both orifices does not diminish her
credibility. It is possible that accused-appellants penis failed to penetrate her anus as deeply
as it did her vagina, the former being more resistant to extreme forces than the latter.
Accused-appellants imputation of ill motive on the part of Gloria is puerile. No mother in
her right mind would subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace and trauma attendant to a
prosecution for rape if she were not motivated solely by the desire to incarcerate the person
responsible for the childs defilement.[24] Courts are seldom, if at all, convinced that a mother
would stoop so low as to subject her daughter to physical hardship and shame concomitant
to a rape prosecution just to assuage her own hurt feelings.[25]
Alternatively, accused-appellant prays that he be held liable for acts of lasciviousness
instead of rape, apparently on the basis of the following testimony of Cyra May,
quoted verbatim, that he merely scrubbed his penis against her vagina:
q- Is it not a fact that kuya Ronnie just made some scrubbed his penis into your
vagina?
a- Yes, sir.
q- And when he did not actually penetrated your vagina?
a- Yes, sir.[26]
Dr. Preya, however, found abrasions in the labia minora, which is directly beneath the labia
majora,[27] proving that there was indeed penetration of the vagina, not just a mere rubbing
or scrubbing of the penis against its surface.
In fine, the crime committed by accused-appellant is not merely acts of lasciviousness
but statutory rape.
The two elements of statutory rape are (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a
woman, and (2) that the woman is below twelve years of age. [28] As shown in the previous
discussion, the first element, carnal knowledge, had been established beyond reasonable
doubt. The same is true with respect to the second element.
The victims age is relevant in rape cases since it may constitute an element of the
offense. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659,[29] provides:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
x x x.
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age x x x.
x x x.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
x x x.
Furthermore, the victims age may constitute a qualifying circumstance, warranting the
imposition of the death sentence. The same Article states:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity with the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
x x x.
4. when the victim is x x x a child below seven (7) years old.
x x x.
Because of the seemingly conflicting decisions regarding the sufficiency of evidence of
the victims age in rape cases, this Court, in the recently decided case of People v.
Pruna,[30]established a set of guidelines in appreciating age as an element of the crime or as
a qualifying circumstance, to wit:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to
prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother
or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on
matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party
pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the
following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The
failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken
against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
Applying the foregoing guidelines, this Court in the Pruna case held that the therein
accused-appellant could only be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua since:
x x x no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as a baptismal certificate of
LIZETTE, was presented to prove her age. x x x.
x x x.
However, the Medico-Legal Report relied upon by the trial court does not in any way prove
the age of LIZETTE, for there is nothing therein which even mentions her age. Only
testimonial evidence was presented to establish LIZETTEs age. Her mother, Jacqueline,
testified (that the victim was three years old at the time of the commission of the crime).
xxx
Likewise, LIZETTE testified on 20 November 1996, or almost two years after the incident,
that she was 5 years old. However, when the defense counsel asked her how old she was on
3 January 1995, or at the time of the rape, she replied that she was 5 years old. Upon
further question as to the date she was born, she could not answer.
For PRUNA to be convicted of rape in its qualified form and meted the supreme penalty of
death, it must be established with certainty that LIZETTE was below 7 years old at the time
of the commission of the crime. It must be stressed that the severity of the death penalty,
especially its irreversible and final nature once carried out, makes the decision-making
process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and
evidence.
In view of the uncertainty of LIZETTEs exact age, corroborative evidence such as her birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or any other authentic document should be introduced in
evidence in order that the qualifying circumstance of below seven (7) years old is appreciated
against the appellant. The lack of objection on the part of the defense as to her age did not
excuse the prosecution from discharging its burden. That the defense invoked LIZETTEs
tender age for purposes of questioning her competency to testify is not necessarily an
admission that she was below 7 years of age when PRUNA raped her on 3 January
1995. Such being the case, PRUNA cannot be convicted of qualified rape, and hence the
death penalty cannot be imposed on him.
However, conformably with no. 3 (b) of the foregoing guidelines, the testimony of LIZETTEs
mother that she was 3 years old at the time of the commission of the crime is sufficient for
purposes of holding PRUNA liable for statutory rape, or rape of a girl below 12 years of
age. Under the second paragraph of Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in relation to
no. 3 of the first paragraph thereof, having carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of
age is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the penalty to be imposed on PRUNA should
be reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty. (Italics in the original.)
Several cases[31] suggest that courts may take judicial notice of the appearance of the
victim in determining her age. For example, the Court, in People v. Tipay,[32] qualified the
ruling in People v. Javier,[33] which required the presentation of the birth certificate to prove
the rape victims age, with the following pronouncement:
This does not mean, however, that the presentation of the certificate of birth is at all times
necessary to prove minority. The minority of a victim of tender age who may be below the
age of ten is quite manifest and the court can take judicial notice thereof. The crucial years
pertain to the ages of fifteen to seventeen where minority may seem to be dubitable due to
ones physical appearance. In this situation, the prosecution has the burden of proving with
certainty the fact that the victim was under 18 years of age when the rape was committed in
order to justify the imposition of the death penalty under the above-cited provision.
(Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, a handful of cases[34] holds that courts, without the requisite hearing
prescribed by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,[35] cannot take judicial notice of the
victims age.
Judicial notice signifies that there are certain facta probanda, or propositions in a partys
case, as to which he will not be required to offer evidence; these will be taken for true by the
tribunal without the need of evidence.[36] Judicial notice, however, is a phrase sometimes
used in a loose way to cover some other judicial action. Certain rules of Evidence, usually
known under other names, are frequently referred to in terms of judicial notice. [37]
The process by which the trier of facts judges a persons age from his or her appearance
cannot be categorized as judicial notice. Judicial notice is based upon convenience and
expediency for it would certainly be superfluous, inconvenient, and expensive both to parties
and the court to require proof, in the ordinary way, of facts which are already known to
courts.[38] As Tundag puts it, it is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly
take and act on without proof because they already know them. Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court, where the provisions governing judicial notice are found, is entitled What Need Not Be
Proved. When the trier of facts observes the appearance of a person to ascertain his or her
age, he is not taking judicial notice of such fact; rather, he is conducting an examination of
the evidence, the evidence being the appearance of the person. Such a process militates
against the very concept of judicial notice, the object of which is to do away with the
presentation of evidence.
This is not to say that the process is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court; on the
contrary, it does. A persons appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence,
the same being addressed to the senses of the court. Section 1, Rule 130 provides:
SECTION 1. Object as evidence. Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of
the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or
viewed by the court.
To be sure, one author writes, this practice of inspection by the court of objects, things
or persons relevant to the fact in dispute, has its roots in ancient judicial procedure.[39] The
author proceeds to quote from another authority:
Nothing is older or commoner in the administration of law in all countries than the
submission to the senses of the tribunal itself, whether judge or jury, of objects which furnish
evidence. The view of the land by the jury, in real actions, of a wound by the judge where
mayhem was alleged, and of the person of one alleged to be an infant, in order to fix
his age, the inspection and comparison of seals, the examination of writings, to determine
whether they are ()blemished,() the implements with which a crime was committed or of a
person alleged, in a bastardy proceeding, to be the child of another, are few illustrations of
what may be found abundantly in our own legal records and textbooks for seven centuries
past.[40] (Emphasis supplied.)
A persons appearance, as evidence of age (for example, of infancy, or of being under
the age of consent to intercourse), is usually regarded as relevant; and, if so, the
tribunal may properly observe the person brought before it. [41] Experience teaches that
corporal appearances are approximately an index of the age of their bearer, particularly for
the marked extremes of old age and youth. In every case such evidence should be accepted
and weighed for what it may be in each case worth. In particular, the outward
physical appearance of an alleged minor may be considered in judging his age; a contrary
rule would for such an inference be pedantically over-cautious.[42] Consequently, the jury or
the court trying an issue of fact may be allowed to judge the age of persons in court by
observation of such persons.[43] The formal offer of the person as evidence is not
necessary. The examination and cross-examination of a party before the jury are equivalent
to exhibiting him before the jury and an offer of such person as an exhibit is properly
refused. [44]
This Court itself has sanctioned the determination of an aliens age from his
appearance. In Braca v. Collector of Customs,[45] this Court ruled that:
The customs authorities may also determine from the personal appearance of the immigrant
what his age is. The person of a Chinese alien seeking admission into the Philippine Islands is
evidence in an investigation by the board of special inquiry to determine his right to enter;
and such body may take into consideration his appearance to determine or assist in
determining his age and a finding that the applicant is not a minor based upon such
appearance is not without evidence to support it.
This Court has also implicitly recognized the same process in a criminal case. Thus,
in United States v. Agadas,[46] this Court held:
Rosario Sabacahan testified that he was 17 years of age; that he had never purchased a
cedula; and that he was going to purchase a cedula the following january. Thereupon the
court asked this defendant these questions: You are a pretty big boy for seventeen. Answer:
I cannot tell exactly because I do not remember when I was born, but 17 years is my
guess. Court: If you are going to take advantage of that excuse, you had better get some
positive evidence to that effect. Answer: I do not remember, as I already stated on what
date and in what year I was born. The court, in determining the question of the age of the
defendant, Rosario Sabacahan, said:
The defendant, Rosario Sabacahan, testified that he thought that he was about 17 years of
age, but judging by his appearance he is a youth 18 or 19 years old. He has shown that
he has no positive information on the subject and no effort was made by the defense to
prove the fact that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of article 9, paragraph 2, of
the Penal code, which fact it is held to be incumbent upon the defense to establish by
satisfactory evidence in order to enable the court to give an accused person the benefit of
the mitigating circumstance.
In United States vs. Estavillo and Perez (10 Off. Gaz., 1984) Estavillo testified, when the case
was tried in the court below, that he then was only 16 years of age. There was no other
testimony in the record with reference to his age. But the trial judge said: The accused
Estavillo, notwithstanding his testimony giving his age as 16 years, is, as a matter of fact, not
less than 20. This court, in passing upon the age of Estavillo, held:
We presume that the trial court reached this conclusion with reference to the age of Estavillo
from the latters personal appearance. There is no proof in the record, as we have said, which
even tends to establish the assertion that this appellant understated his age. * * * It is true
that the trial court had an opportunity to note the personal appearance of Estavillo for the
purpose of determining his age, and by so doing reached the conclusion that he was at least
20, just two years over 18. This appellant testified that he was only 16, and this testimony
stands uncontradicted. Taking into consideration the marked difference in the penalties to be
imposed upon that age, we must, therefore, conclude (resolving all doubts in favor of the
appellants) that the appellants ages were 16 and 14 respectively.
While it is true that in the instant case Rosario testified that he was 17 years of age, yet the
trial court reached the conclusion, judging from the personal appearance of Rosario, that he
is a youth 18 or 19 years old. Applying the rule enunciated in the case just cited, we must
conclude that there exists a reasonable doubt, at least, with reference to the question
whether Rosario was, in fact 18 years of age at the time the robbery was committed. This
doubt must be resolved in favor of the defendant, and he is, therefore, sentenced to six
months of arresto mayor in lieu of six years ten months and one day of presidio mayor.x x x.
There can be no question, therefore, as to the admissibility of a persons appearance
in determining his or her age. As to the weight to accord such appearance, especially in
rape cases, Pruna laid down guideline no. 3, which is again reproduced hereunder:
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother
or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on
matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party
pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the
following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 18 years old.
Under the above guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the
victim is sufficient to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a), (b) and (c)
above. In such cases, the disparity between the allegation and the proof of age is so great
that the court can easily determine from the appearance of the victim the veracity of the
testimony. The appearance corroborates the relatives testimony.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the persons appearance, as
object evidence of her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age becomes greater
and, following Agadas, supra, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.
This is because in the era of modernism and rapid growth, the victims mere physical
appearance is not enough to gauge her exact age. For the extreme penalty of death to be
upheld, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime must be substantiated. Verily, the minority of the victim should be not only alleged but
likewise proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. Be it remembered that
the proof of the victims age in the present case spells the difference between life and
death.[47]
 In the present case, the prosecution did not offer the victims certificate of live birth or
similar authentic documents in evidence. The victim and her mother, however, testified that
she was only three years old at the time of the rape. Cyra Mays testimony goes:
q- Your name is Cyra Mae is that correct?
a- Yes, sir.
q- And you are 3 years old?
a- Yes, sir.[48]
That of her mother goes:
Q How old was your daughter when there things happened?
A 3 and years old.
Q When was she born?
A In Manila, May 10, 1992.[49]
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age
sought to be proved (below twelve years), the trial court would have had no difficulty
ascertaining the victims age from her appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore, exists
that the second element of statutory rape, i.e., that the victim was below twelve years of age
at the time of the commission of the offense, is present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here,
reasonable doubt exists. A mature three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for an
underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of the victim, as object evidence, cannot be
accorded much weight and, following Pruna, the testimony of the mother is, by itself,
insufficient.
As it has not been established with moral certainty that Cyra May was below seven
years old at the time of the commission of the offense, accused-appellant cannot be
sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed
upon him.
In line with settled jurisprudence, the civil indemnity awarded by the trial court is
increased to P50,000.00. In addition, Cyra May is entitled to an award of moral damages in
the amount of P50,000.00.[50]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto is
found GUILTY of Statutory Rape, defined and punished by Article 335 (3) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is
ordered to pay private complainant, Cyra May Buenafe y Francisco, the amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SAMUEL
ULZORON, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
SAMUEL ULZORON was charged with rape with the use of a deadly weapon.
Complaining witness was Emily Gabo. On 8 March 1995 the trial court adjudged him guilty as
charged and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. [1] No indemnity was awarded to Emily for
the sexual assault.
On 31 March 1987, at around 10:00 oclock in the morning, Emily was watering her
plants near a well in Brgy. Tumarbong, Roxas, Palawan, when Samuel suddenly appeared.
He was armed with a 2-foot long bolo hanging in its scabbard around his waist with a long-
sleeved work shirt slung over his shoulder. He asked Emily where her husband was. She
replied that Roberto was already in the kaingin so she advised him to follow her husband
there. But Samuel opted to remain and rest on an anthill some two and a half (2 ) meters
from the well. [2]
After Emily finished watering her plants and before she could start washing clothes,
Samuel grabbed her wrists and locked them with one hand behind her back with the other
drawing his bolo and pointing it at her neck. She struggled to free herself from his hold but
was so intimidated with the bolo that she could not shout for help; she lost her strength
eventually. After she weakened, he dragged her some forty (40) meters away to the bushes
and tall grasses. He forced her to lie down; then he mounted her. He laid his bolo beside
him, pinned her arms with one hand, and with the other, loosened the buttons of her dress.
Emily could only struggle in vain until he ripped off her dress and panties. He opened the
zipper of his pants and then inserted his penis to her vagina. He copulated with her for about
fifteen (15) minutes. She did everything to disengage herself from the sexual imbroglio but
her efforts proved no match to his strength. [3]
At this moment, Emily heard her husbands voice calling for her. Roberto was now
somewhere within the vicino. He saw Emilys slippers near the well so he frantically hollered,
Baby! She answered back. When Robertos voice was heard by Samuel, he dashed off and
fled to the thickets. [4]
Roberto followed the direction of Emilys voice until he saw her emerge from the thick
bushes. She was in a state of shock. He asked her what happened and she told him that she
was sexually abused by Samuel Ulzoron. Emily pointed Roberto to the place where she was
dragged and raped. Together when they went there and found Ulzorons bolo and work shirt
and took them home. [5]
 The following afternoon, Emily went to Dr. Feliciano M. Velasco Jr. for physical
examination. The doctor noted the discharge mixed with semen in her private part. He
opined that it could have been caused by sexual intercourse within twenty-four (24) hours
prior to his examination. He found her cervix to be parous with superficial erosions. Her
hymen was obliterated with caruncles. 6 The next day Emily lodged a complaint for rape
against Samuel Ulzoron as she turned over his belongings to the police authorities as her
evidence in support thereof. 7
Ulzoron had his own story to tell. He said that on the day of the incident he saw Emily at
the well. She told him that work in the kaingin would be in the afternoon yet so she advised
him to come back. Since he was returning in the afternoon, he decided to leave his bolo and
work shirt near the well. However, at around 10:00 oclock that morning, as he was about to
retrieve his bolo and shirt, he saw the Gabo spouses having sexual intercourse in a hut with
a wall only on one side. As he was ashamed to be seen by them he proceeded instead to the
house of a relative. 8
On the strength of the testimony of Emily Gabo, the trial court convicted the accused. It
found her testimony straightforward and credible. It rationalized that she would not have
filed her complaint for rape if her accusations were not true, for to do so would only expose
herself to public shame or ridicule. No improper motive on her part to file the case had been
shown. The findings of the examining physician also lent credence to her claim. On the other
hand, the trial court found the defense of the accused too weak, anemic, for if Ulzoron really
felt embarrassed to be seen by the Gabo spouses, he could have taken a detour or passed
another way to get back his bolo and work shirt. Besides, it was never established that the
Gabos had so much yearning for each other that they had to indulge in sexual congress in a
hut that was open to public view and at such an unlikely hour. 9
Appellant concedes, even as he assails his conviction, that his defense is inherently
weak. Nevertheless, he faults the trial court for convicting him on the basis of his defense.
He argues that the undisputed facts and circumstances made it more likely that Emily was
involved in an adulterous relationship with him. 10 He claims, for instance, that there was
absolutely nothing to support the victims claim of struggle, and that while he allegedly
dragged her forty (40) meters away before assaulting her sexually, the examining physician
could not conclude that physical force was actually inflicted since she did not sustain any
physical injuries.11 Another point raised by the defense in her testimony that while he was on
top of her his bolo was beside him. The plain import of such testimony, according to the
accused, is that the bolo was not a necessary instrument in the commission of the
crime.12 He also invites attention to the circumstance that the judge who wrote the decision
did not personally try the case and therefore lacked the opportunity to observe the demeanor
of the parties and their witnesses.13
The arguments of appellants are unpersuasive ; they fail to convince us. Contrary to his
claim that he was convicted because of his weak defense, his conviction was actually
founded on the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution. With regard to his claim that he
had an adulterous relationship with the victim, the Office of the Solicitor General observed
that such claim was a radical departure from the defense of denial he raised at the trial. The
OSG observed further that the sweetheart defense was being raised for the first time in this
appeal hence should be disallowed conformably with established jurisprudence. 14 Here, the
Court does not necessarily agree. Appellant could only be emphasizing the point that the
facts and circumstances established could lead to a conclusion of the existence of adulterous
relationship between him and Emily and not of rape. In other words, appellant could be
utilizing the sweetheart theory not necessarily as a defense but as a focal point in disputing
the appreciation by the trial court of the evidence for the prosecution. Thus, this course
taken by the defense may not be totally disregarded.
The term dragged should not indeed be taken in the meaning understood by appellant
as dragged along on the ground. When asked on cross-examination by the defense counsel
to describe how she and appellant travelled at (sic) forty (40) meters distance, 15 she said, He
was holding my hands and at the same time he is (sic) pushing me forward.16 This testimony
adequately explains the absence of injuries in her body. At any rate, it is not necessary for
the commission of rape that there be marks of physical violence on the victims body. 17 While
Emily repeatedly mentioned her struggles to be released from his grasp, such efforts need
not always result in physical injuries.18 Besides, they did not refer to the circumstances when
she was being dragged by the accused, but to the circumstances when he initially grabbed
her hands,19 when he was on top of her, 20 when he was undressing her,21 and when she was
exerting efforts to disengage herself from the sexual anchorage.22
Intimidation may be of the moral kind, e.g., the fear caused by threatening a woman
with a knife.23 There was sufficient intimidation when appellant pointed his 2-foot long bolo
at Emilys neck while they were near the well until they reached the spot where she was
finally abused. This intimidation continued even after he positioned himself on top of her and
placed the bolo beside him since he was at liberty to point it anew at her neck or any part of
her body. Anyway, the significant consideration is that, as aforementioned, the intimidation
was continuous as to sufficiently engender fear in her mind.24
The circumstance that the judge who wrote the decision had not heard the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses does not taint or disturb his decision. After all, he had the
records of the case before him including the transcript of stenographic notes. The validity of
a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer only took over from a
colleague who had earlier presided at the trial unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse
of discretion in the appreciation of the facts,25 and none exists in the present case. The
records amply support the factual findings of the trial court and its assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses.
The circumstances of force and intimidation attending the instant case were manifested
clearly not only in the victims testimony but also in the physical evidence presented during
the trial consisting of her torn dress and underwear as well as the medico-legal report. Such
pieces of evidence indeed are more eloquent than a hundred witnesses. 26 The fact of carnal
knowledge is not disputed. It was positively established through the offended partys own
testimony and corroborated by that of her examining physician.
 Moreover, the conduct of the complaining witness immediately following the assault
clearly established the truth of her charge that she was raped by accused-
appellant.27Consequently, we agree with the observation of the OSG that Emilys actuations
following her misfortune, namely, her revelation to her husband of her violation by the
accused and subjecting her private parts immediately to medical examination, as well as the
filing of her complaint for rape immediately thereafter are consistent with her
straightforward, logical, truthful and credible testimony thus rebutting any insinuation of
voluntariness on her part to the sexual confrontation; rather, they only display a moral
certainty of his culpability for the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from finding accused-appellant SAMUEL ULZORON
guilty of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED. In addition, he is
ordered to indemnify his victim Emily Gabo the amount of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
DELFIN ABALOS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RTC-Br. 38, LINGAYEN,
PANGASINAN, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Liberato Damias visited his girlfriend at her house in San Isidro, Rosales, Pangasinan, on
the night of 27 January 1993. He did not realize that that would be his last rendezvous with
her. He was gunned down soon after and died slowly in her arms. His assailant apparently
driven by extreme jealousy hurriedly fled leaving the lovers to the mercy of their fate.
On 26 February 1993 an Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Lingayen, Pangasinan, charging petitioner Delfin Abalos with murder for the killing of Liberato
Damias.[1] The Information alleged that the accused, using an unlicensed firearm, with intent
to kill, employing treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, shot and killed
Liberato Damias. It further alleged that Delfin Abalos should be considered a recidivist having
been previously convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan.[2]
The bereaved Veronica Bulatao testified that she had known petitioner Delfin Abalos for
several years as they were neighbors, their houses being only fifty (50) meters from each
other.[3] According to her, Delfin was courting her since June 1992 but she jilted him since
she was already involved with the now deceased Liberato Damias. In fact, she said, Delfin
was enraged when she rejected him that he even threatened to kill her if she decided to
marry Liberato.[4] He relentlessly pursued her even when she left San Isidro to reside
temporarily in San Juan and Sta. Ana, Manila.[5] She also testified that a few days before he
shot Liberato Delfin went to her house ostensively to watch television. But when she learned
that his real intention was to see her she told him not to visit her again. [6]
Veronica further narrated that on the night of 27 January 1993 Liberato visited her at
around 7 o'clock. As she was entertaining him at the balcony of their house she noticed
petitioner walking back and forth in front of their house. He was just about four (4) meters
or so away from them.[7] As she was ill at ease with petitioners conspicuous demeanor below,
she asked Liberato to transfer to their sala where they could continue talking. When they
moved inside, Liberato sat near the entrance of the house with his left side towards the door
with Veronica sitting in front of him. The positions of Liberato and Veronica and their
proximity to one another could have heightened Delfin's animosity that he suddenly appeared
at the door and in a semi-kneeling position shot Liberato on his left side.[8] Liberato could
only embrace Veronica as blood trickled from his mouth and he desperately gasped for
breath. Veronica positively identified petitioner Delfin Abalos as he scurried away since the
sala of her house was adequately lit by a kerosene lamp and he was only one (1) meter away
from them when he pulled the trigger.[9]
SPO1 Melchor Bernabe recounted that on the night of 27 January 1993 the barangay
captain of San Isidro went to the police station and reported the shooting incident to
him.[10] So he proceeded to the crime scene with the Chief of Police and SPO2 Ruben Pitok to
investigate the matter. Upon reaching the house of Veronica Bulatao he saw Liberato's body
sprawled on the floor. He asked Veronica who the assailant was but she was in incoherent
and in a state of shock. It was only later at the police station that she was able to reveal the
identity of the gunman. Upon learning that Delfin Abalos was positively identified by
Veronica, SPO1 Bernabe went to the house of Delfin and accosted him. Then he brought him
to the station for further questioning.[11]
Dr. Ingrid Gancinia, Municipal Health Officer of Rosales, Pangasinan, testified that
Liberato died from a bullet wound which pierced the lower part of his left armpit, and that
there were powder burns on the victims body indicating that he was shot at a very close
range, probably around six (6) inches away.[12]
But Delfin denied killing Liberato. He claimed that on the night of 27 January 1993 he
worked with his father in the tobacco fields from 3:00 p.m. until midnight, [13] and the only
time he left was from 6:00 to 6:30 in the evening to get supper from their house. He stopped
working at midnight and went straight home to sleep. He only woke up at 4:00 o'clock the
following morning when his father told him that there were some policemen downstairs
looking for him. After telling him that he was a suspect in the shooting, his room was
searched and then he was brought to the police station for investigation. [14]
Celestino Abalos, Delfins father, together with Ruben Fragata and Virgilio Ortiz, tried to
corroborate Delfin's alibi. The three (3) all claimed that they had supper near the tobacco
fields from 6:30 to 8:00 p.m., and that after eating, they returned to the fields to finish their
work. They also said that from the time they finished dinner Delfin never left the fields until
midnight.[15]
Jerry Fernandez, another defense witness, testified that after spraying insecticide on his
plants he took a bath at a well near the tobacco plantation from 8:00 to 9:00 p.m. during
which he saw Delfin around twenty (20) meters away working at the fields, [16] and that
before heading for home he noticed Delfin still busy with his work.
On rebuttal, Inocencio Bulatao, Veronica's father, testified that Delfin, contrary to his
alibi, was not in the fields but in their house prior to the shooting. In fact Inocencio said that
at around 7:00 p.m., Delfin was in their house watching television with his family as they
customarily allowed their neighbors to do so. When Liberato arrived Veronica took him to the
balcony where they talked. An hour later, Inocencio turned the television off, so petitioner
left their house,[17] and Inocencio proceeded to their kitchen to rest. Then he heard a shot
prompting him to rush to the sala to check if anything wrong happened to his
daughter.[18] But Veronica told him that Delfin shot Liberato. Inocencio then called out to his
neighbors for help.[19]
Delfin Abalos alibi failed to convince the trial court. It found petitioner guilty of murder
and imposed upon him an indeterminate prison term of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum. Petitioner was also ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim P38,000.00 for actual damages, P50,000.00 for compensatory damages
and P30,000.00 for moral damages.[20] However, the aggravating circumstance of use of an
unlicensed firearm was not appreciated as the weapon was never recovered.
The Court of Appeals sustained on appeal the award for damages but set aside the
conviction of petitioner for murder and found him guilty instead of the lesser crime of
homicide. The appellate court concluded that the aggravating circumstance of treachery was
not indubitably established to qualify the killing of Liberato to murder and reduced
petitioner's sentence to an indeterminate prison term of twelve (12) years of prision
mayor maximum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal.[21] His
motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, petitioner comes to us on a petition for
review.
Petitioner argues that the testimony of the lone witness, Veronica Bulatao, was not
credible; that the Court of Appeals erred in considering his three (3) prior convictions as basis
for finding him guilty of homicide; and, his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In an apparent attempt to destroy Veronicas credibility, petitioner asserts that her
actions prior to the shooting were highly questionable. If indeed he had threatened her life,
then why did she still allow him to enter their house that night? If she really saw him
suspiciously walking back and forth near their house, why did she not warn Liberato of the
impending danger?[22]
Petitioner also cites inconsistencies in her testimony, such as her assessment of the time
frame when he courted her and her statements as to when she last saw him prior to the
commission of the crime.[23] He even went to the extent of saying that Veronicas act of
allowing him to court her despite her existing relationship with Liberato showed her deceitful
character, hence, her unreliability as a witness.
We disagree. Veronicas actions prior to the incident and the alleged inconsistencies in
her testimony do not affect her credibility in positively identifying Liberatos killer. The fact
remains that she was only a meter away when she saw Delfin shot Liberato. Also, a kerosene
lamp lighted the sala thus enabling her to easily recognize Delfin as the gunman. And such
illumination produced by a kerosene lamp has indeed been held sufficient to allow a witness
to identify a person.[24] Veronica's competency in identifying petitioner is further
strengthened by the fact that they were neighbors for several years and so she was very
familiar with him. Veronica even saw him immediately before the shooting as he paced the
barangay road only a few meters away.
More importantly, we have consistently reiterated that the credibility of witnesses is a
matter best assessed by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude.[25] Thus, unless certain
facts of substance and value have been overlooked, which if considered might affect the
result of the case, the trial courts appraisal of the credibility of a witness should not be
overturned.[26] The trial court ruled that Veronica testified in a clear, straightforward and
flawless manner.[27] We see no cogent reason to deviate from that observation.
Petitioner holds that the Court of Appeals erred in giving weight to his three (3) prior
convictions as a basis for finding him guilty. He maintains that his past convictions for
murder, homicide and frustrated homicide do not prove that he was capable of killing
Liberato.
Although it is true that the appellate court mentioned his prior convictions in its decision,
such was not the basis for finding him guilty of homicide. The appellate court only mentioned
the prior convictions to show that Veronica took his death threats seriously. [28] The decisive
factor for convicting petitioner was still the positive identification made by Veronica during
the trial.[29] Obviously, even without mentioning his earlier convictions, the Court of Appeals
would have still concluded that Delfin did kill Liberato.
The last issue raised by petitioner is that the appellate court erred in finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. He argues that he had a solid alibi to prove his
innocence and that the paraffin test yielded negative for powder burns on his hand, hence
confirming that he never fired the shot that killed Liberato.
For alibi to prosper, petitioner must not only prove that he was not at the crime scene
but that it was also physically impossible for him to have been present there at the time the
offense was committed.[30] He miserably failed to satisfy the second requisite. Delfin himself
testified that the distance between the tobacco fields to Veronicas house was only around
400 meters and it only took eight (8) minutes to traverse such path. [31] Evidently, it was not
impossible for Delfin to be present at the locus criminis.
Further, it has been long established that alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused by a credible witness who had no ill motive to falsely
testify.[32] The absence of ill motive on Veronicas part was even substantiated by petitioner in
his testimony. Thus -
 Q: Since you admitted that your family and the family of the Bulataos have no
misunderstanding whatsoever, can you tell the honorable court the reason why
Veronica Bulatao pinpointed you as the one who shot Liberato Damias.
A: I dont know of any reason, sir.
Q: As far as you are concerned Veronica Bulatao has no ill-motive to testify against you, is
that what you mean.
A: None, sir.[33]
Thus, contrary to petitioners assertion, Veronica only testified against him to seek
justice for Liberatos death, and not to arbitrarily implicate anyone just to put an end to her
boyfriends case.
Anent the paraffin test, it is true that it produced a negative result but such fact does
not ipso facto merit Delfins acquittal. This Court acknowledges that the absence of powder
burns in a suspects hand is not conclusive proof that he has not fired a gun. [34] In fact, the
traces of nitrates can easily be removed by the simple act of washing ones hand. [35]
However, although we agree that Delfin was Liberatos assailant, we disagree with the
sentence imposed by the appellate court. Murder, and not homicide, was committed.
The Court of Appeals, abiding by established jurisprudence, ruled that before treachery
could be considered, two (2) conditions must be present. First, that the means, method or
manner of execution employed would ensure the safety of the malefactor from the retaliatory
or defensive acts of the victim; and second, that the perpetrator deliberately or consciously
adopted such means of execution. However, the appellate court ruled that the prosecution
failed to satisfy the second requisite there being no proof that petitioner deliberately sought
such manner of executing the crime to ensure his own safety from any form of retaliation
that the victim might have employed.[36]
The records, however, prove otherwise. Before the incident, Delfin walked back and
forth on the barangay road, a few meters from the balcony where Veronica was entertaining
Liberato.[37] He waited for the perfect opportunity to execute his fiendish plot. While Liberato
cozily sat in Veronicas sala, devoting his full attention to her, petitioner suddenly appeared at
the door from behind and without warning shot him. Surely, there is no other conclusion but
that he deliberately and consciously employed such means of execution to ensure his own
safety from any form of defense that Liberato might have used.
It should be remembered that the essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected
attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the part of the
latter.[38] This was what Delfin did. He attacked Liberato while he was deeply engrossed in
conversation with Veronica, oblivious of the lurking peril to his life. The trial court was
therefore correct in ruling that the crime committed was murder.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that although recidivism was alleged in the Information,
the evidence introduced was insufficient to prove it as an aggravating
circumstance. According to the appellate court, the certification presented during the trial
showing that Delfin was already on parole failed to state what crime he was previously
convicted of.[39] As such, there was no way to determine if the prior crime committed fell
under the same title as murder.
The records however reveal that petitioner himself openly admitted in court that he was
previously convicted of three (3) other offenses. He said:
Q: Is it not a fact Mr. Accused that you were previously convicted of murder, attempted
homicide and homicide?
A: I was convicted of Murder, Homicide and Attempted Homicide, sir.
Q: This conviction of the crime of Murder was under Criminal Case No. L-1691, CFI,
Lingayen Pangasinan and you were sentenced on July 20, 1978, is it not?
A: That was Homicide, July 29, 1978, sir.
Q: Who was your victim in that homicide case?
A: Bernardo Valdez, sir.
Q: About this murder case conviction, who was your victim?
A: Ricardo Villamin, sir.
Q: And when were you convicted in this murder case?
A: I cannot remember already, sir. I was convicted first of Homicide, then attempted
homicide and then murder.
Q: And who was your victim in this Attempted Homicide case?
A: Rodrigo Batucan, sir.[40]
This candid admission by petitioner of his prior convictions is sufficient to establish
recidivism as a generic aggravating circumstance.[41] And since all of his earlier convictions
fall under the same title of The Revised Penal Code , i.e., Crimes Against Persons (Title
Eight), he can be properly considered as a recidivist.
Petitioner should therefore be convicted of murder qualified by treachery, with the
generic aggravating circumstance of recidivism. When he committed the crime, the
imposition of the death penalty was still proscribed by the 1987 Constitution, thus he should
only be sentenced to reclusion perpetua and not death. And since the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua, an indivisible penalty, the provisions of The Indeterminate Sentence
Law applied by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be invoked.[42]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding petitioner DELFIN ABALOS
guilty of homicide is MODIFIED. He is instead adjudged GUILTY of MURDER with recidivism
as a generic aggravating circumstance. He is therefore sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Liberato Damias P50,000.00 for civil
indemnity, P30,000.00 for moral damages and P38,000.00 for actual damages, and to pay
the costs.
SO ORDERED.
b. Competency
RUDY CABALLES y TAIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
D APPEALS
E C I S I O N and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision[1] of respondent Court of Appeals dated
September 15, 1998 which affirmed the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Santa Cruz, Laguna, finding herein petitioner, Rudy Caballes y Taio, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of theft, and the resolution[2] dated November 9, 1998 which denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
In an Information[3] dated October 16, 1989, petitioner was charged with the crime of
theft committed as follows:
"That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of Pagsanjan, and/or
elsewhere in the Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent of gain, and without the knowledge and consent of the
owner thereof, the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and carry away about 630-kg of Aluminum Cable Conductors,
valued at P27, 450.00, belonging to and to the damage and prejudice of said owner National
Power Corp., in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
During the arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits
ensued.
The facts are summarized by the appellate court as follows:
"[At] about 9:15 p.m. of June 28, 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while
on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep
unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged
down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant. When asked what was loaded on the
jeep, he did not answer; he appeared pale and nervous.
With appellant's consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles
of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power
Corporation (NPC). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55,
244.45. Noceja asked appellant where the wires came from and appellant answered that
they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away
from Sampalucan. Thereafter, appellant and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were
brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of the appellant and the
jeep loaded with the wires which were turned over to the Police Station Commander
of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Appellant was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.
In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. He testified that he is a driver and resident
of Pagsanjan, Laguna; a NARCOM civilian agent since January, 1988 although his
identification card (ID) has already expired. In the afternoon of June 28, 1989, while he was
driving a passenger jeepney, he was stopped by one Resty Fernandez who requested him to
transport in his jeepney conductor wires which were in Cavinti, Laguna. He told Resty to wait
until he had finished his last trip for the day from Santa Cruz, Laguna. On his way to Santa
Cruz, Laguna, he dropped by the NARCOM headquarters and informed his superior,
Sgt. Callos, that something unlawful was going to happen. Sgt. Callos advised him to proceed
with the loading of the wires and that the former would act as back-up and intercept the
vehicle at the Sambat Patrol Base in Pagsanjan.
After receiving those instructions, he went back to see Resty. Although Resty had his own
vehicle, its tires were old so the cable wires were loaded in appellant's jeep and covered
with kakawati leaves. The loading was done by about five (5) masked men. He was
promised P1,000.00 for the job. Upon crossing a bridge, the two vehicles separated but in his
case, he was intercepted by Sgt. Noceja and Pat. De Castro. When they discovered the
cables, he told the police officers that the cables were loaded in his jeep by the
owner, Resty Fernandez. But despite his explanation, he was ordered to proceed to police
headquarters where he was interrogated. The police officers did not believe him and instead
locked him up in jail for a week."[4]
On April 27, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment[5] the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft of
property worth P55,244.45, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment from
TWO (2) [YEARS], FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional, as
minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor, as maximum, to indemnify the complainant
National Power Corporation in the amount of P55, 244.45, and to pay the costs."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction but deleted the
award for damages on the ground that the stolen materials were recovered and modified the
penalty imposed, to wit:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that
appellant RUDY CABALLES is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in theft,
defined and penalized under Articles 308 and 309, par. 1, Revised Penal Code, and there
being no modifying circumstances, he is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of Four (4)
years, Nine (9) months and Eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum term, to
Eight (8) years, Eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum term. No
civil indemnity and no costs."[6]
Petitioner comes before us and raises the following issues:
"(a) Whether or not the constitutional right of petitioner was violated when the police officers
searched his vehicle and seized the wires found therein without a search warrant and when
samples of the wires and references to them were admitted in evidence as basis for his
conviction;
(b) Whether or not respondent Court erred in rejecting petitioner's defense that he was
engaged in an entrapment operation and in indulging in speculation and conjecture in
rejecting said defense; and
(c) Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt and thus failed to overcome the constitutional right of petitioner to
presumption of innocence."
The conviction or acquittal of petitioner hinges primarily on the validity of
the warrantless search and seizure made by the police officers, and the admissibility of the
evidence obtained by virtue thereof.
In holding that the warrantless search and seizure is valid, the trial court ruled that:
"As his last straw of argument, the accused questions the constitutionality of the search and
validity of his arrest on the ground that no warrant was issued to that effect. The Court
cannot again sustain such view. In the case of People v. Lo Ho [Wing], G.R. No. 88017,
January 21, 1991, it has been held that considering that before a warrant can be obtained,
the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the
issuing judge - a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling
effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to
another with impunity, a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on
grounds of practicability. The doctrine is not of recent vintage. In the case
of Valmonte vs. de Villa, G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990 (Resolution on Motion for
Reconsideration, September 29, 1989), it was ruled that automobiles because of their
mobility may be searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying warrantless search of a
resident or office. x x x To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched
for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a
large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of
criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances (Ibid.). In Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA
311, and People vs. Ortiz, 191 SCRA 836, the Supreme Court held that a search may be
made even without a warrant where the accused is caught in flagrante. Under the
circumstances, the police officers are not only authorized but are also under obligation to
arrest the accused even without a warrant."[7]
Petitioner contends that the flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who were on
routine patrol, merely on "suspicion" that "it might contain smuggled goods," does not
constitute probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure. He insists that,
contrary to the findings of the trial court as adopted by the appellate court, he did not give
any consent, express or implied, to the search of the vehicle. Perforce, any evidence
obtained in violation of his right against unreasonable search and seizure shall be deemed
inadmissible.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their
persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section
2, Article III thereof, which reads:
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."
The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the
admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute
but admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence;[8] (2) seizure of evidence in plain view;[9] (3) search of moving vehicles;[10] (4)
consented warrantless search;[11] (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations
(Terry search);[12] and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.[13]
In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and
reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events where
warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be
performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search
or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place
or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.[14]
 It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers in the
case at bar was not authorized by a search warrant. The main issue is whether the evidence
taken from the warrantless search is admissible against the appellant. Without said evidence,
the prosecution cannot prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
I. Search of moving vehicle
Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation
of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal
activity.[15] Thus, the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily
liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality.
This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons
to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement
which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving
vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might
add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. [16] Searches without warrant of
automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or
immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or 'constructive borders' like
checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State.[17]
The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of
the territory and in the absence of probable cause. [18] Still and all, the important thing is that
there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in
such a case.
Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable ground
of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the items,
articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by law is in the place to be searched.[19] The required probable cause that will
justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved
according to the facts of each case.[20]
One such form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without warrant at
military or police checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per se, [21] for as long
as it is warranted by the exigencies of public order[22] and conducted in a way least intrusive
to motorists.[23] A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an
extensive search.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to
the following instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds;[24] (2) simply looks into a vehicle;[25] (3)
flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors;[26] (4) where the occupants are not
subjected to a physical or body search;[27] (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited
to a visual search or visual inspection;[28] and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a
fixed area.[29]
None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers
did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner's vehicle. They
had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they
were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine check.
In the case of United States vs. Pierre,[30] the Court held that the physical intrusion
of a part of the body of an agent into the vehicle goes beyond the area protected by the
Fourth Amendment, to wit:
"The Agent . . . stuck his head through the driver's side window. The agent thus effected a
physical intrusion into the vehicle. . . [W]e are aware of no case holding that an officer did
not conduct a search when he physically intruded part of his body into a space in which the
suspect had a reasonable expectation of privacy. [The] Agent['s] . . . physical intrusion
allowed him to see and to smell things he could not see or smell from outside the vehicle. . .
In doing so, his inspection went beyond that portion of the vehicle which may be viewed
from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers, and into the
area protected by the Fourth amendment, just as much as if he had stuck his head inside the
open window of a home."
On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
such a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting
the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the
motorist is a law-offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a
crime in the vehicle to be searched.[31]
This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an
extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a
package the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom")
of the Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers
that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search
was conducted; (3) Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when
the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his
waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers when requested to
do so; (4) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a woman having the
same physical appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana; [32] (5) the
accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier
received confidential reports that said accused would transport a large quantity of marijuana;
and (6) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence
information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy - one who
participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belonged -
that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country.[33]
In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police
officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the
vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and
uncommon.
Pat. Alex de Castro recounted the incident as follows:
"ATTY. SANTOS
Q Now on said date and time do you remember of any unusual incident while you
were performing your duty?
A Yes, sir, at that time and date myself and Police Sgt. Noceja were conducting
patrol in the said place when we spotted a suspicious jeepney so we stopped
the jeepney and searched the load of the jeepney and we found out (sic)
these conductor wires.
Q You mentioned about the fact that when you saw the jeepney you became
suspicious, why did you become suspicious?
A Because the cargo was covered with leaves and branches, sir.
Q When you became suspicious upon seeing those leaves on top of the load what
did you do next, if any?
A We stopped the jeepney and searched the contents thereof, sir."[34]
The testimony of Victorino Noceja did not fare any better:
"ATTY SANTOS
Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?
A Because I saw that the vehicle being drawn by Caballes was covered
by kakawati leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle should
not be covered by those and I flagged him, sir."[35]
We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is
not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute
"probable cause" as would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant.
In People vs. Chua Ho San,[36] we held that the fact that the watercraft used by the
accused was different in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over
the Bacnotan seas coupled with the suspicious behavior of the accused when he attempted
to flee from the police authorities do not sufficiently establish probable cause. Thus:
"In the case at bar, the Solicitor General proposes that the following details are suggestive of
probable cause - persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband
articles, CHUA'swatercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that
commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, CHUA's illegal entry into the Philippines
x x x, CHUA's suspicious behavior, i.e., he attempted to flee when he saw the police
authorities, and the apparent ease by which CHUA can return to and navigate his speedboat
with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, beyond the reach of Philippine laws.
This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale
clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited
drug, confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier of prohibited
drug and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious
demeanor or behavior, and suspicious bulge in the waist - accepted by this Court as sufficient
to justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case. There was no classified information that a
foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in
question. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact
that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats
of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an
offense. x x x." (emphasis supplied)
In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report
or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which
could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where
tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and
seizure.[37] Unfortunately, none exists in this case.
II. Plain view doctrine
It cannot likewise be said that the cable wires found in petitioner's vehicle were in plain
view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly
exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is
not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package
proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its
contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be
seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from
its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain A We were conducting patrol at the poblacion and some barangays, sir.
view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.[38] xxxxxxxxx

It is clear from the records of this case that the cable wires were not exposed to sight Q After conducting the patrol operation, do you remember of any unusual incident
because they were placed in sacks[39] and covered with leaves. The articles were neither on said date and time?
transparent nor immediately apparent to the police authorities. They had no clue as to what A Yes, sir.
was hidden underneath the leaves and branches. As a matter of fact, they had to ask
petitioner what was loaded in his vehicle. In such a case, it has been held that the object is Q What is that incident?
not in plain view which could have justified mere seizure of the articles without further A While I was conducting my patrol at barangay Sampalucan, I saw
search.[40] Rudy Caballes driving a vehicle and the vehicle contained aluminum wires, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
III. Consented search Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?
A Because I saw that the vehicle being driven by Caballes was covered
Petitioner contends that the statement of Sgt. Victorino Noceja that he checked the by kakawati leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle should not be
vehicle "with the consent of the accused" is too vague to prove that petitioner consented to covered by those and I flagged him, sir.
the search. He claims that there is no specific statement as to how the consent was asked
and how it was given, nor the specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged Q Did the vehicle stop?
"consent." At most, there was only an implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, A Yes, sir, and after said vehicle stop[ped], I removed the cover of said
which is no "consent" at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. vehicle and by so doing, I saw the aluminum wires.
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a Q Before you saw the aluminum wires, did you talk to the accused?
personal right which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an
otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and A Yes, sir, I asked him what his load was.
intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. [41] Hence, consent to a search Q What was the answer of Caballes?
is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.[42] The
question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be A He did not answer and I observed him to be pale, "nagpapamutla" (sic),
determined from the totality of all the circumstances.[43] Relevant to this determination are so I told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he
the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which answered in the positive.
consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded
Q And after you saw for yourself the aluminum wires loaded on the jeep, what did
location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; [44] (4) the education
you do?
and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the
defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; [45] (7) the nature of the police A I asked him where those wires came from and he answered those came from
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly the Cavinti area, sir."[48]
vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. [46] It is the State which has the burden
of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of
that it was freely and voluntarily given.[47] consented warrantless searches and seizure. But in these cases, the police officers' request
to search personnel effects was orally articulated to the accused and in such language that
In the case at bar, Sgt. Victorino Noceja testified on the manner in which the search was left no room for doubt that the latter fully understood what was requested. In some instance,
conducted in this wise: the accused even verbally replied to the request demonstrating that he also understood the
nature and consequences of such request.[49]
"WITNESS
In Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals,[50] the apprehending officers sought the
Q On June 28, 1989, where were you?
permission of petitioner to search the car, to which the latter agreed. Petitioner therein
himself freely gave his consent to said search. In People vs. Lacerna,[51] the appellants
who were riding in a taxi were stopped by two policemen who asked permission to search
the vehicle and the appellants readily agreed. In upholding the validity of the consented
search, the Court held that appellant himself who was "urbanized in mannerism and speech"
expressly said that he was consenting to the search as he allegedly had nothing to hide and
had done nothing wrong. In People vs. Cuizon,[52] the accused admitted that they signed a
written permission stating that they freely consented to the search of their luggage by the
NBI agents to determine if they were carrying shabu. In People vs. Montilla,[53] it was held
that the accused spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the
bag without being forced or intimidated to do so, which acts should properly be construed as
a clear waiver of his right. In People vs. Omaweng,[54] the police officers asked the
accused if they could see the contents of his bag to which the accused said "you can see the
contents but those are only clothings."Then the policemen asked if they could open and see
it, and accused answered "you can see it." The Court said there was a valid consented
search.
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against
obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1)
the right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of
the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right.[55]
In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally surrendered
his right against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers
allegedly obtained the consent of petitioner for them to conduct the search leaves much to
be desired. When petitioner's vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached petitioner
and "told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the
positive." We are hard put to believe that by uttering those words, the police officers were
asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle of
petitioner. For all intents and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing upon herein
petitioner that they will search his vehicle.The "consent" given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. In addition, in
cases where this Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be noted that the
police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to
be searched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear and positive proof. In
the case of herein petitioner, the statements of the police officers were not asking for his
consent; they were declaring to him that they will look inside his vehicle. Besides, it is
doubtful whether permission was actually requested and granted because when
Sgt. Noceja was asked during his direct examination what he did when the vehicle of
petitioner stopped, he answered that he removed the cover of the vehicle and saw the
aluminum wires. It was only after he was asked a clarificatory question that he added that he
told petitioner he will inspect the vehicle. To our mind, this was more of an
afterthought. Likewise, when Pat. de Castro was asked twice in his direct examination what
they did when they stopped the jeepney, his consistent answer was that they searched the
vehicle. He never testified that he asked petitioner for permission to conduct the search.[56]
Neither can petitioner's passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to
the warrantless search. In People vs. Barros,[57] appellant Barros, who was carrying a
carton box, boarded a bus where two policemen were riding. The policemen inspected the
carton and found marijuana inside. When asked who owned the box, appellant denied
ownership of the box and failed to object to the search. The Court there struck down
the warrantless search as illegal and held that the accused is not to be presumed to have
waived the unlawful search conducted simply because he failed to object, citing the ruling in
the case of People vs. Burgos,[58] to wit:
"As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the
courts do not place the citizens in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by
force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to
a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of
regard for the supremacy of the law."
Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are
insufficient to sustain petitioners conviction. His guilt can only be established without
violating the constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure.
WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused
Rudy Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), and ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief,
Special Actions and Investigation Division, DENR, respondents.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. TERESITA DIZON-
CAPULONG, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, and RI CHUY PO, respondents.
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY.
VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and Investigation Division,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), ATTY.
NESTOR V. GAPUSAN, TIRSO P. PARIAN, JR., and FELIPE H.
CALLORINA, JR., respondents
The first and third cases, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784, were originally
assigned to the Second and Third Divisions of the Court, respectively. They were
subsequently consolidated with the second, a case of the Court en banc.
 Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna
Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de
Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of
Forest Development (BFD) under Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469. Its
permit as such was to expire on 25 September 1990.
Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and respondent Atty. Vincent A. Robles
were, during all the time material to these cases, the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Chief of the Special Actions and
Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR, respectively.
The material operative facts are as follows:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts,
and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the
SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the
said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the
lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and almaciga
lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required
invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and
impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. [1] The team was
not able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner. [2]
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge
Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue
thereof, the team seized on that date from the petitioners lumberyard four truckloads of
narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately
200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa. [3]
On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner 's lumberyard in
Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga,
supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner
failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary
invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the
lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin.[4]
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the owner retains
the physical possession of the seized articles. Only an inventory of the articles is taken and
signed by the owner or his representative. The owner is prohibited from disposing them until
further orders.[5]
On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to Robles requesting an
extension of fifteen days from 14 April 1990 to produce the required documents covering the
seized articles because some of them, particularly the certificate of lumber origin, were
allegedly in the Province of Quirino. Robles denied the motion on the ground that the
documents being required from the petitioner must accompany the lumber or forest products
placed under seizure.[6]
On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandum-report recommending to Secretary
Factoran the following:
1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber Dealer's Permit of
Mustang Lumber, Inc. for operating an unregistered lumberyard and resaw mill
and possession of Almaciga Lumber (a banned specie) without the required
documents;
2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang Lumberyard including the truck
with Plate No. CCK-322 and the lumber loaded herein [sic] now at the DENR
compound in the event its owner fails to submit documents showing legitimacy
of the source of said lumber within ten days from date of seizure;
3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang Lumber Inc.
and Mr. Ruiz, or if the circumstances warrant for illegal possession of narra and
almaciga lumber and shorts if and when recommendation no. 2 pushes through;
4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and CDV-458 as well as the
lumber loaded therein for transport lumber using recycled documents.[7]
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately the
petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit No. NRD-4-092590-0469 and directing the petitioner to
explain in writing within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's permit should not be cancelled.
On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles informing the
latter that the petitioner had already secured the required documents and was ready to
submit them. None, however, was submitted.[8]
On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order wherein, after reciting the
events which took place on 1 April and 3 April 1990, he ordered CONFISCATED in favor of
the government to be disposed of in accordance with law the approximately 311,000 board
feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts, and sticks found inside the petitioner's
lumberyard.[9]
On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with a prayer for a restraining order or preliminary injunction against Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and Atty. Vincent A. Robles. The case (hereinafter, the FIRST
CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53648 and assigned to Branch 35 o the said
court. The petitioner questioned therein (a) the seizure on 1 April 1990, without any search
and seizure order issued by a judge, of its truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and its cargo of
assorted lumber consisting of apitong, tanguile, and lauan of different sizes and dimensions
with a total value of P38,000.00; and (b) the orders of Secretary Factoran of 23 April 1990
for lack of prior notice and hearing and of 3 May 1990 for violation of Section 2, Article III of
the Constitution.
On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that violations of P.D. No. 705 (The
Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines), as amended, were committed and acting upon
instruction of Robles and under Special Order No. 897, series of 1990, a team of DENR
agents went to the business premises of the petitioner located at No. 1352 Juan Luna Street,
Tondo, Manila.The team caught the petitioner operating as a lumber dealer although its
lumber-dealer's permit had already been suspended on 23 April 1990. Since the gate of the
petitioner's lumberyard was open, the team went inside and saw an owner-type jeep with a
trailer loaded with lumber. Upon investigation, the team was informed that the lumber
loaded on the trailer was to be delivered to the petitioner's customer. It also came upon the
sales invoice covering the transaction. The members of the team then introduced themselves
to the caretaker, one Ms. Chua, who turned out to be the wife of the petitioner's president
and general manager, Mr. Ri Chuy Po, who was then out of town. The team's photographer
was able to take photographs of the stockpiles of lumber including newly cut ones, fresh dust
around sawing or cutting machineries and equipment, and the transport vehicles loaded with
lumber. The team thereupon effected a constructive seizure of approximately 20,000 board
feet of lauan lumber in assorted sizes stockpiled in the premises by issuing a receipt
therefor.[10]
As a consequence of this 17 September 1990 incident, the petitioner filed with the RTC
of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The case (hereinafter, the SECOND CIVIL
CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54610 and assigned to Branch 24 of the said court.
In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint against
the petitioner's president and general manager, Ri Chuy Po, for violation of Section 68 of P.D.
No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. After appropriate preliminary investigation, the
investigating prosecutor, Claro Arellano, handed down a resolution [11] whose dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed
against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of
lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in
violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987.
It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs
covered by legal documents be released to the rightful owner, Malupa.[12]
This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III, who
served as Chairman of the Task Force on Illegal Logging.[13]
On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on 5 June 1991 by the DOJ with
Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy Po with the violation of Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 (hereinafter,
the CRIMINAL CASE). The accusatory portion of the information reads as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto, within the
premises and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully, have in his possession truckloads of almaciga and
lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including
almaciga and supa, without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations.[14]
On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered its decision[15] in the FIRST
CIVIL CASE, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered as follows:
1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the DENR, the Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., dated 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation in favor of the
Government the approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga
lumber, shorts and sticks, found inside and seized from the lumberyard of the
petitioner at Fortune Drive, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, on April 4, 1990 (Exhibit 10), is hereby set aside and vacated, and
instead the respondents are required to report and bring to the Hon. Adriano
Osorio, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
the said 311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa and almaciga Lumber, shorts and
sticks, to be dealt with as directed by law;
2. The respondents are required to initiate and prosecute the appropriate action
before the proper court regarding the lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted
sizes and dimensions loaded in petitioner's truck bearing Plate No. CCK-322
which were seized on April 1, 1990;
3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on August 2, 1990 shall
be rendered functus oficio upon compliance by the respondents with paragraphs
1 and 2 of this judgment;
4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the lauan, supa and almaciga lumber,
shorts and sticks mentioned above in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment be
returned to said petitioner, is withheld in this case until after the proper court
has taken cognizance and determined how those lumber, shorts and sticks
should be disposed of; and
5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search and
seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner's truck, which was moving out from the
petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes of
lumber without covering document showing the legitimacy of its source or origin
did not offend the constitutional mandate that search and seizure must be
supported by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of the settled and accepted
exceptions where warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a search of a moving
vehicle.[16] As to the seizure of a large volume of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and
shorts effected on 4 April 1990, the trial court ruled that the said seizure was a continuation
of that made the previous day and was still pursuant to or by virtue of the search warrant
issued by Executive Judge Osorio whose validity the petitioner did not even question. [17] And,
although the search warrant did not specifically mention almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber
and shorts, their seizure was valid because it is settled that the executing officer is not
required to ignore contrabands observed during the conduct of the search.[18]
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990 ordering
the confiscation of the seized articles in favor of the Government for the reason that since
the articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio
they should have been returned to him in compliance with the directive in the warrant.
As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary Factoran, the trial court ruled
that the same had been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of the petitioner's
lumber-dealer's permit on 25 September 1990, a fact the petitioner admitted in its
memorandum.
The petitioner forthwith appealed from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE to the
Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 25510.
On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to Quash
and/or to Suspend Proceedings based on the following grounds: (a) the information does not
charge an offense, for possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is not penalized in
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls within
the purview of the said section, the same may not be used in evidence against him for they
were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 of
the RTC of Manila, the FIRST CIVIL CASE, then pending before the Court of Appeals, which
involves the legality of the seizure, raises a prejudicial question.[19]
The prosecution opposed the motion alleging that lumber is included in Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, and possession thereof without the required legal documents is
penalized therein. It referred to Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, series of
1989, for the definitions of timber and lumber, and then argued that exclusion of lumber
from Section 68 would defeat the very purpose of the law, i.e., to minimize, if not halt, illegal
logging that has resulted in the rapid denudation of our forest resources.[20]
In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL CASE, [21] respondent Judge Teresita
Dizon-Capulong granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case on the ground that
"possession of lumber without the legal documents required by forest laws and regulations is
not a crime."[22]
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in the order of 18 October
1991,[23] the People filed a petition for certiorari with this Court in G.R. No. 106424, wherein
it contends that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the
motion to quash and in dismissing the case.
On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision[24] in CA-G.R. SP No.
25510 dismissing for lack of merit the petitioner's appeal from the decision in the FIRST
CIVIL CASE and affirming the trial court's rulings on the issues raised. As to the claim that
the truck was not carrying contraband articles since there is no law punishing the possession
of lumber, and that lumber is not timber whose possession without the required legal
documents is unlawful under P.D. No. 705, as amended, the Court of Appeals held:
This undue emphasis on lumber or the commercial nature of the forest product involved
has always been foisted by those who claim to be engaged in the legitimate business of
lumber dealership. But what is important to consider is that when appellant was required to
present the valid documents showing its acquisition and lawful possession of the lumber in
question, it failed to present any despite the period of extension granted to it. [25]
The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its resolution of 3 March 1992.[26] Hence, the petitioner came to this Court by way
of a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 104988, which was filed on 2 May 1992.[27]
On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila handed down a decision in the
SECOND CIVIL CASE dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition because (a) the
petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies; (b) when the seizure was made on 17
September 1990 the petitioner could not lawfully sell lumber, as its license was still under
suspension; (c) the seizure was valid under Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended; and
(d) the seizure was justified as a warrantless search and seizure under Section 80 of P.D. No.
705, as amended.
The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the
appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 33778.
In its decision[28] of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioner's appeal
in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 for lack of merit and sustained the grounds relied upon by the trial
court in dismissing the SECOND CIVIL CASE. Relying on the definition of "lumber" by
Webster, viz., "timber or logs, especially after being prepared for the market," and by the
Random House Dictionary of the English Language, viz., "wood, esp. when suitable or
adapted for various building purposes," the respondent Court held that since wood is
included in the definition of forest product in Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, lumber is necessarily included in Section 68 under the term forest product.
The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest officer or employee can seize the
forest product involved in a violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 pursuant to Section 80
thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1775, which provides in part as follows:
SEC. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. A forest officer or employee of the Bureau or
any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police shall arrest even
without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the
offenses defined in this chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the
Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the offense, or the forest products
cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the process of committing the offense.
Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in said Section 80 are the
cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products or possession of
timber or other forest products without the required legal documents.
Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in the
resolution of 6 February 1996, the petitioner filed with this Court on 27 February 1996 a
petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 123784.
We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R. 106424 with which the other
two were consolidated.
G.R. No. 106424
The petitioner had moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 on
the ground that it does not charge an offense. Respondent Judge Dizon-Capulong granted
the motion reasoning that the subject matter of the information in the CRIMINAL CASE is
LUMBER, which is neither "timber" nor "other forest product" under Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, and hence, possession thereof without the required legal documents is not
prohibited and penalized under the said section.
Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an information may be
quashed on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense. It has
been said that "the test for the correctness of this ground is the sufficiency of the averments
in the information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, constitute
the elements of the offense,[29] and matters aliunde will not be considered." Anent the
sufficiency of the information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires, inter alia,
that the information state the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.
Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended by E.O. No. 277, which provides:
SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,
without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in
the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in
addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber
or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or
forest products are found.
Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of
timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and
(b) possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations.
Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But conceding ex gratia that
this omission amounts to an exclusion of lumber from the section's coverage, do the facts
averred in the information in the CRIMINAL CASE validly charge a violation of the said
section?
A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an infallible conclusion
that lumber is not solely its subject matter. It is evident therefrom that what are alleged to
be in the possession of the private respondent, without the required legal documents, are
truckloads of
(1) almaciga and lauan; and
(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including
almaciga and supa.
The almaciga and lauan specifically mentioned in no. (1) are not described as lumber. They
cannot refer to the lumber in no. (2) because they are separated by the words approximately
200,000 bd. ft. with the conjunction and, and not with the preposition of. They must then be
raw forest products or, more specifically, timbers under Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, which reads:
SEC. 3. Definitions.
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Forest product means timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil,
honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering
plant, the associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational and geological
resources in forest lands.
It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the information. The
public and the private respondents obviously miscomprehended the averments in the
information.Accordingly, even if lumber is not included in Section 68, the other items therein
as noted above fall within the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the information
validly charges an offense.
Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests in his dissenting opinion that
this Court go beyond the four corners of the information for enlightenment as to whether the
information exclusively refers to lumber. With the aid of the pleadings and the annexes
thereto, he arrives at the conclusion that only lumber has been envisioned in the indictment.
The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his proposition violates the rule
that only the facts alleged in the information vis-a-vis the law violated must be considered in
determining whether an information charges an offense.
Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are insufficient to justify his
conclusion. On the contrary, the Joint Affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng,
which is one of the annexes he referred to,[30] cannot lead one to infer that what the team
seized was all lumber. Paragraph 8 thereof expressly states:
8. That when inside the compound, the team found approximately four (4) truckloads
of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs and a negligible amount of narra lumber, and
approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and
supa which are classified as prohibited wood species. (Italics supplied)
In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution[31] of the investigating
prosecutor, which served as the basis for the filing of the information, does not limit itself
to lumber; thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed
against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of
almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 63 of
PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987. (Italics supplied)
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an affirmance of
the respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68
of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus possession thereof without the required legal
documents is not a crime. On the contrary, this Court rules that such possession is penalized
in the said section because lumber is included in the term timber.
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the
former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is
found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of Processing plant; which
reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for
the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood,
wallboard, block-board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw
material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the
1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is
defined, inter alia, as timber or logs after being prepared for the market.[32] Simply put,
lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases
used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. [33] And
insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section
68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed
timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distanguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of Branch 172 of the RTC of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to
quash the information in the CRIMINAL CASE and in dismissing the said case.
G.R. No. 104988
We find this petition to be without merit. The petitioner has miserably failed to show
that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in its assailed decision of 29
November 1991.
It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's truck with Plate No. CCK-
322 was coming out from the petitioner's lumberyard loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber
of different sizes and dimensions which were not accompanied with the required invoices and
transport documents. The seizure of such truck and its cargo was a valid exercise of the
power vested upon a forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended
by P.D. No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in
the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the search was conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search could
be lawfully conducted without a search warrant.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
constitutional mandate[34] that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause. The
other exceptions are (1) search as an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in
plain view, (3) customs searches, and (4) consented warrantless search.[35]
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the
search on 4 April 1990 was a continuation of the search on 3 April 1990 done under and by
virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section
9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could
be served at any time within the said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be
accomplished in one day, the same may be continued the following day or days until
completed. Thus, when the search under a warrant on one day was interrupted, it may be
continued under the same warrant the following day, provided it is still within the ten-day
period.[36]
As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal because possession of
lumber without the required legal documents is not illegal under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705,
as amended, since lumber is neither specified therein nor included in the term forest product,
the same hardly merits further discussion in view of our ruling in G.R. No. 106424.
G.R. No. 123784
The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in this case palpably fail to
show prima facie that a reversible error has been committed by the Court of Appeals in its
challenged decision of 31 July 1995 and resolution of 6 February 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No.
33778. We must, forthwith, deny it for utter want of merit. There is no need to require the
respondents to comment on the petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's appeal from the judgment of
the trial court in the SECOND CIVIL CASE. The petitioner never disputed the fact that its
lumber-dealer's license or permit had been suspended by Secretary Factoran on 23 April
1990. The suspension was never lifted, and since the license had only a lifetime of up to 25
September 1990, the petitioner has absolutely no right to possess, sell, or otherwise dispose
of lumber. Accordingly, Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative had the authority
to seize the lumber pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which provides as
follows:
Section 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or his Duly Authorized
Representative to Order Confiscation. In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest
laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative may
order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or
abandoned. . . .
The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale of lumber is not penalized must also
fail in view of our disquisition and ruling on the same issue in G.R. No. 106424. Besides, the
issue is totally irrelevant in the SECOND CIVIL CASE which involves administrative seizure as
a consequence of the violation of the suspension of the petitioner's license as lumber dealer.
All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are nothing more than rituals to
cover up blatant violations of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 705), as
amended. They are presumably trifling attempts to block the serious efforts of the DENR to
enforce the decree, efforts which deserve the commendation of the public in light of the
urgent need to take firm and decisive action against despoilers of our forests whose
continuous destruction only ensures to the generations to come, if not the present, an
inheritance of parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The Government must not tire in its
vigilance to protect the environment by prosecuting without fear or favor any person who
dares to violate our laws for the utilization and protection of our forests.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b) SETTING ASIDE and
ANNULLING, for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion, the
challenged orders of 16 August 1991 and 18 October 1991 of respondent Judge
Teresita Dizon-Capulong, Branch 172, Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Ri
Chuy Po; (c) REINSTATING the information in the said criminal case; and (d)
DIRECTING the respondent Judge on her successor to hear and decide the case
with purposeful dispatch; and
2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R. No. 123784 for utter
failure of the petitioner to show that the respondent Court of Appeals committed
any reversible error in the challenged decisions of 29 November 1991 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 25510 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and of 31 July 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No.
33778 in the SECOND CIVIL CASE.
Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.JEAN BALINGAN Y
BOBBONAN alias "SUSAN", "JANE" and "JUANA", accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
On April 4, l989, appellant Jean Bobbonan Balingan was arraigned and pleaded not guilty1 to
the charge of Violation of Sec. 4, Art. II of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as "The
Dangerous Drugs Act," under an Information, dated October 24, 1988, which alleges:
That on or about the 31st day of August, 1988, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly transport and deliver
prohibited drugs consisting of marijuana leaves weighing, more or less, three
(3) kilos and 500 grams from Baguio City to Metro Manila, in violation of the
above-mentioned provisions of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
At the trial that ensued, the prosecution and the accused presented divergent versions of
what occurred on August 31, 1988.
The prosecution evidence established that on August 31, 1988, the Narcotics Intelligence
Division of the Baguio City Police Station received a telephone call from an unnamed male
informant. He passed the information that appellant was going to Manila with a
bag filled with marijuana. Acting on the information, then P/Lt. Manuel Obrera2 formed a
surveillance team monitor appellant's movements.3 The team was deployed at different
places in Baguio City, including appellant's house on Brookside and bus stations. 4
The surveillance yielded positive results. The conduct of the operations which led to the
apprehesion of appellant was accurately narrated by the trial court in its Decision, viz.:
. . . Cpl. Garcia soon reported seeing Balingan move out from her residence
at Brookside and board a taxicab which proceeded to the direction of
Bonifacio Street. Balingan was wearing a pink dress and carrying a gray
luggage (like a "maleta") with orange or yellow belts. She also reported the
make and place number of the taxicab which Balingan boarded. Upon
receiving the report, Lt. Obrera ordered Cpl. Garcia to proceed to the
Philippine Rabbit Terminal in case Balingan would go there.
Pat. Kimay, who must have intercepted Cpl. Garcia's message, also reported
that the taxicab described by the latter passed along Bonifacio Rotunda. Lt.
Obrera instructed him to move out and proceed to the Police Checkpoint at
Kennon Road going to the Philippine Military Academy.
From his post at the Dangwa Bus Station, Pat. Bueno informed
Lt. Obrera that Balingan boarded a Dangwa Bus with plate number NTU-153
bound for Manila. Lt. Obrera promptly proceeded to the bus station to verify
the report. There, he went up the bus described by Pat. Bueno, and he saw
Balingan on the third or fourth seat behind the driver's seat. (I)n the luggage
carrier above her head was the gray luggage earlier described by Cpl. Garcia.
He then left and positioned himself with Ong at the Lakandula burned area
to wait for the bus to depart.
At about 11:00 o'clock of the same morning, the bus moved out (on its way)
to Manila via Kennon Road. Lt. Obrera instructed Pat. Kimay, who was at the
Kennon Road Checkpoint, to stop the bus when it reaches the place.
Meanwhile, Lt. Obrera and Lt. Ong tailed the bus at about fifteen to twenty
meters behind. As instructed, Pat. Kimay stopped the bus at the Kennon
Road Checkpoint. That was already at 11:30 o'clock in the morning. Lt.
Obrera and Pat. Ong arrived at the checkpoint less than a minute after the
bus (did) and immediately boarded it. Lt. Obrera announced a routinary
check-up identified himself as a policeman to Balingan and asked her
permission to check her luggage . . . (S)he did not respond and just looked
outside the window. He opened the luggage in the luggage carrier overhead
and above Balingan and found suspected marijuana in it. He pulled out the
luggage and turned it over to Lt. Obrera.
Thereupon, Lt. Obrera tries to arrest Balingan but the latter resisted and
tried to bite his hand and furthermore held tightly (onto) the window pane.
Lt. Obrera asked Pat. Ong to fetch Cpl. Garcia from the Philippine Rabbit
Terminal in the City proper, so that she would be the one to bring out
Balingan from the bus. In the meantime, he remained inside the bus holding
the confiscated luggage while the other passengers alighted from the bus.
After some thirty minutes, Garcia arrived and pulled Balingan out of the bus
and brought her to the Baguio City Police Station and there locked her up in
jail.5
The gray bag confiscated from appellant contained suspected marijuana flowering tops
divided into four bundles separately wrapped in plastic bags.6 Samples were taken from the
bundles and preliminary tests were conducted on them by Pat. Juanito G. Kimay Jr. 7 Using
the Duquonois levine reagent test, he found traces of THC, an active component of
marijuana, in the samples.8 Further laboratory examinations concluded on the contents of the
bag by P/Capt. Carlos V. Figueroa,9 forensic chemist and chief of the PC-INP Crime
Laboratory at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet yielded the following:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave
POSITIVE result to the test of marijuana, a prohibited
drug.10
Appellant, as lone witness, denied the prosecution's version. She claimed that prior to her
arrest, she was living at Asin Road, Baguio City, in the house of her employer, Esper
Chinonchon. Part of her duties was to go to Manila to pick up orders for Chinonchon's
woodcarving enterprise. She was allegedly on such an errand when she was arrested by
narcotics agents on August 31, 1988. 11
Appellant testified that she left Asin Road early in the morning of that fateful August day;
carrying nothing but her purse and handkerchief. 12 Instead of going directly to the bus
station, she passed by her daughter's boarding house at Brookside to drop off some money.
From there, she went by jeep to the Dangwa bus terminal where she boarded a bus going to
Manila.13
It was around eleven o'clock in the morning (11:00 a.m.) when the Dangwa bus she was
riding left the terminal. 14Shortly after, the vehicle was flagged down by policemen at a
checkpoint at Kennon Road. Several officers boarded the bus, and one of them took a gray
bag from somewhere. Despite her protestations, the officer insisted that she was "Susan"
and that she owns the gray bag. Appellant was arrested and brought to the Baguio City
Police Station, where she was investigated and consequently incarcerated. During he
interrogation, appellant insisted on her innocence.15
After trial, appellant was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch
4, 16 and sentenced as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares the accused JEAN BALINGAN Y
BOBBONAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
transportation of prohibited drugs as charged, and hereby sentences her to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment; to pay a fine of P20,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
In the service of her sentence, the accused shall be certified with her
preventive imprisonment under the terms and conditions prescribed in Article
29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The confiscated marijuana flowering tops are hereby declared forfeited in
favor of the Government; and upon the finality of this decisions, the Branch
Clerk of the Court is directed to turn them over to the Dangerous Drugs
Custodian (NBI) for disposition in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
In this appeal, appellant submits that the trial court erred in: (1) not acquitting her on the
ground that her guilt had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt; (2) not considering
material evidence on record, which if considered will lead to her acquittal; (3) convicting her
based entirely on conclusions based on hearsay and conducted evidence; (4) holding that
she was caught in the act of transporting the subject prohibited drugs based on hearsay
evidence; (5) holding that there was sufficient probable cause for the police officers to
believe that she was then and there committing a crime so as to justify the warrantless
search and seizure of the bag; and (6) not including the subject prohibited drugs which are
clearly products of an illegal search. 17
We are not persuaded by appellant's arguments. We affirm the trial court's Decision.
Appellant raises two (2) basic issues. The first issue is whether the required quantum of
proof to support her guilt was established by the prosecution; the second is whether the
search done inside the Dangwa bus and the consequent seizure of the marijuana flowering
tops were some in violation of the Constitution.
We hold that the prosecution was able to adduce evidence to prove appellant's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Witness Obrera clearly set forth in his three-day testimony 18 the events
that led to appellant's arrest, starting from the receipt by him of an informant's tip. He was
able to establish that: appellant had physical possession of the subject gray luggage bag
from the time she left her house at Brookside until she boarded and sat on the third row
behind the driver of Dangwa bus with plate number NTU-153 bound for Manila; conducted a
search of the same bus at the Kennon Road checkpoint, they found the subject gray bag on
the overhead luggage compartment corresponding to appellant's seat; upon inspection, the
bag was found to contain suspected marijuana flowering tops which even during preliminary
tests yielded positive for the presence of THC, an active component of marijuana.
After a painstaking analysis the trial court found Obrera's testimony credible, and we find no
cogent reason to set aside its characterization. Contrary to the contention of appellant, there
were no major discrepancies in Obrera's testimony that would compromise his credibility as a
witness. Furthermore, that he alone testified on the whole surveillance, search, seizure, and
arrest proceedings does not detract at all from the prosecution's case, since as the trial court
stated in the impugned Decision:
The prosecution also offered the testimonies of Cpl. Garcia and Pat. Ong but
after the direct testimony of Garcia and even before Ong could take the
stand, the defense admitted that their testimonies would be corroborative to
Lt. Obrera's; and, hence, the cross examination of Garcia and the
presentation of Ong were dispensed with. 19
The prosecution clinched its evidence against appellant with the uncontested finding of
P/Capt. Carlos V. Figueroa that the bundles found inside the gray luggage bag seized from
appellant contained marijuana.
We also find no merit in appellant's argument that the marijuana flowering tops
should be excluded as evidence, they being the products of an alleged illegal
warrantless search. The search and seizure in the case at bench happened in a moving,
public vehicle. In the recent case of People vs. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 (1991), this Court
gave its approval to a warrantless search done on a taxicab which yielded the illegal drug
commonly known as shabu. In that case, we raciocinated:
Anent the first assignment of error, appellant contends that the warrantless
search and seizure made against the accused is illegal for being violative of
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. He reasons that the FC-CIS officers
concerned could very well have procured a search warrant since they had
been informed of the date and time of arrival of the accused at the NAIA
well ahead of time, specifically two (2) days in advance. The fact that the
search and seizure in question were made an a moving vehicle, appellant
argues, does not automatically make the warrantless search herein fall within
the coverage of the well-known exception to the rule of the necessity of a
valid warrant to effect a search because, as aforementioned, the anti-
narcotics agents had both time and opportunity to secure a search warrant.
 The contentions are without writ. As correctly averred by appellee, that IN VIEW WHEREOF, the conviction of appellant JEAN BOBBONAN BALINGAN is affirmed in
search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute toto. Cost against appellant.
rule. There are at least three (3) well-recognized exceptions thereto. As set
forth in the case of Manipon, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, these are: [1] a search SO ORDERED.
incidental to an arrest, [2] a search of a moving vehicle, and [3] seizure of
evidence in plain view (emphasis supplied). The circumstances of the case
clearly show that the search in question was made as regards a moving THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEILA JOHNSON
vehicle. Therefore, a valid warrant was not necessary to effect the search on Y REYES, accused-appellant.
appellant and his co-accused.

In this connection, We cite with approval the averment of the Solicitor

General, as contained in the appellee's brief, that the rules governing search DECISION
and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving MENDOZA, J.:
vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so
considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and
This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated May 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court,
persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing
Branch 110, Pasay City, finding accused-appellant Leila Johnson y Reyes guilty of violation of
judge a requirement which boarders on the impossible in the case of
16 of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by R.A. No. 7659, and sentencing
smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport
her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the
contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a
costs of the suit.
warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is
not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly The information against accused-appellant alleged:
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought." That on June 26, 1998 inside the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named Accused did then and there willfully,
In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the unlawfully and feloniously possess three plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
trial court that the authorities had reasonable ground to believe that regulated drug, each bag weighing:
appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the
country. The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from #1 ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN POINT FIVE (187.5) grams;
surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate, of which appellant was
touted to be a member. Aside from this, they were also certain as to the
#2 ONE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT POINT ZERO (198.0) grams; and
expected date and time of arrival of the accused from China. But such
knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill the requirements
for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is that #3 ONE HUNDRED NINETY FOUR POINT SEVEN (194.7) grams, respectively,
there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still
be present in such a case. (Citations omitted.) or a total of FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY POINT TWO (580.2) grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Unquestionably, the warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable
cause. The Baguio INP Narcotics Intelligence Division received an information that appellant That the above-named accused does not have the corresponding
was going to transport marijuana in a bag to Manila. Their surveillance operations revealed
that appellant, whose movements had been previously monitored by the Narcotics Division license or prescription to possess or use said regulated drug.
boarded a Dangwa bus bound for Manila carrying a suspicious looking gray luggage bag.
When the moving, public bus was stopped, her bag, upon inspection, yielded marijuana. CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Under those circumstances, the warrantless search of appellant's bag was not illegal.
Upon being arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty,[3] whereupon trial was held.
 The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, NBI Forensic Chemist George de
Lara, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, duty frisker Olivia Ramirez, and SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. The
defense presented accused-appellant who testified in her own behalf.
The facts are as follows:
Accused-appellant Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a
widow, and a resident of Ocean Side, California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who
was naturalized as an American on June 16, 1968 and had since been working as a
registered nurse, taking care of geriatric patients and those with Alzheimers disease, in
convalescent homes in the United States.[4]
On June 16, 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her sons family in Calamba,
Laguna. She was due to fly back to the United States on July 26. On July 25, she checked in
at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the traffic on the way to the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next day, June 26, 1998. [5]
At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16
of the NAIA departure area. Her duty was to frisk departing passengers, employees, and
crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods, and explosives.[6]
When she frisked accused-appellant Leila Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the
United States via Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt something hard on the latters
abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles
as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. [7]
Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4
Reynaldo Embile, saying Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po iyon. (Sir, I do not
believe that it is just a panty.) She was directed to take accused-appellant to the nearest
womens room for inspection. Ramirez took accused-appellant to the rest room, accompanied
by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Embile stayed outside.[8]
Inside the womens room, accused-appellant was asked again by Ramirez what the hard
object on her stomach was and accused-appellant gave the same answer she had previously
given. Ramirez then asked her to bring out the thing under her girdle. Accused-appellant
brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over to Embile, outside the
womens room.[9]
The confiscated packs, marked as Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3, contained a total of 580.2
grams of a substance which was found by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.[10]
Embile took accused-appellant and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and
Security Office (1st RASO) at the arrival area of the NAIA, where accused-appellants passport
and ticket were taken and her luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her personal
belongings were itemized.[11]
In her defense, accused-appellant alleged that she was standing in line at the
last boarding gate when she was approached by Embile and two female
officers. She claimed she was handcuffed and taken to the womens room. There, she was
asked to undress and was then subjected to a body search. She insisted that nothing was
found on her person. She was later taken to a room filled with boxes, garbage, and a
chair. Her passport and her purse containing $850.00 and some change were taken from her,
for which no receipt was issued to her. After two hours, she said, she was transferred to the
office of a certain Col. Castillo.
After another two hours, Col. Castillo and about eight security guards came in and threw
two white packages on the table. They told her to admit that the packages were hers. But
she denied knowledge and ownership of the packages. She was detained at the 1st RASO
office until noon of June 28, 1999 when she was taken before a fiscal for inquest. [13] She
claimed that throughout the period of her detention, from the night of June 26 until June 28,
she was never allowed to talk to counsel nor was she allowed to call the U.S. Embassy or any
of her relatives in the Philippines.[14]
On May 14, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:[15]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused LEILA JOHNSON Y REYES,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 16 of Republic Act
6425 as amended and hereby imposes on her the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and
condemns said accused to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00)
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of suit.
The Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) having a total net weight of 580.2 grams
(Exhibits G, C-2 and C-3) are hereby confiscated in favor of the government and the Branch
Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to cause the transportation thereof to the Dangerous Drugs
Board for disposition in accordance with law.
The accused shall be credited in full for the period of her detention at the City Jail of Pasay
City during the pendency of this case provided that she agreed in writing to abide by and
comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail.
SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court convicted her: (1) despite failure of the
prosecution in proving the negative allegation in the information; (2) despite failure of the
prosecution in proving the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride; (3) despite violation
of her constitutional rights; and (4) when guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.[16]
First. Accused-appellant claims that she was arrested and detained in gross violation of
her constitutional rights. She argues that the shabu confiscated from her is inadmissible
against her because she was forced to affix her signature on the plastic bags while she was
detained at the 1st RASO office, without the assistance of counsel and without having been
informed of her constitutional rights. Hence, she argues, the methamphetamine
hydrochloride, or shabu, should have been excluded from the evidence.[17]
The contention has no merit. No statement, if any, was taken from accused-appellant
during her detention and used in evidence against her. There is, therefore, no basis for
accused-appellants invocation of Art. III, 12(1) and (3). On the other hand, what is involved
in this case is an arrest in flagrante delicto pursuant to a valid search made on her person.
The trial court held:
The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under
custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(Underscoring supplied)
xxxx
A custodial investigation has been defined in People. v. Ayson 175 SCRA 230 as the
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken [in] custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way. This presupposes that he is
suspected of having committed an offense and that the investigator is trying to elicit
information or [a] confession from him."
The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused above falls in either paragraph (a)
or (b) of the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial
investigation is far from being accurate.[18]
The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk
at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of
privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.[19] Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over
airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nations
airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors;
their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray
scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches
are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches
are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved,
and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. [20] Indeed, travelers are
often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets
that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such
would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that
ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do
not apply to routine airport procedures.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained
through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against the
accused-appellant herein.Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise
without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and
recovery of shabu in her person in flagrante delicto.
Anent her allegation that her signature on the said packs (Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3
herein) had been obtained while she was in the custody of the airport authorities without the
assistance of counsel, the Solicitor General correctly points out that nowhere in the records is
it indicated that accused-appellant was required to affix her signature to the packs. In fact,
only the signatures of Embile and Ramirez thereon, along with their testimony to that effect,
were presented by the prosecution in proving its case.
There is, however, no justification for the confiscation of accused-appellants passport,
airline ticket, luggage, and other personal effects. The pictures taken during that time are
also inadmissible, as are the girdle taken from her, and her signature thereon. Rule 126, 2 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the search and seizure only of the
following:
Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of
personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
Accordingly, the above items seized from accused-appellant should be returned to her.
 Second. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to fully ascertain the
quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride to justify the imposition of the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, states:
Section 20 - Application Of Penalties, Confiscation And Forfeiture Of The Proceeds or
Instrument Of The Crime The penalties for offenses under Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article
II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act, shall be applied if the dangerous
drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu, or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp of marijuana;
6. 50 grams of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride; or
8. In case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic
requirements as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public
consultation/hearings conducted for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall
range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
Under this provision, accused-appellant therefore stands to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death for her possession of 580.2 grams of shabu.
Accused-appellant attempts to distinguish between a quantitative and a qualitative
examination of the substance contained in Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3. She argues that the
examination conducted by the NBI forensic chemist was a qualitative one which merely
yielded positive findings for shabu, but failed to establish its purity; hence, its exact quantity
remains indeterminate and unproved.
This contention is likewise without merit.
The expert witness, George De Lara, stated that the tests conducted would have
indicated the presence of impurities if there were any. He testified:
PROS. VELASCO By mixing it twice, Mr. Witness, if there are any adulterants or impurities,
it will be discovered by just mixing it?
WITNESS If some drugs or additives were present, it will appear in a thin layer
chromatographic examination.
PROS. VELASCO Did other drugs or other additives appear Mr. Witness?
WITNESS In my thin layer chromatographic plate, it only appears one spot which
resembles or the same as the Methamphetamine Hydrochloride sample
....
PROS. VELASCO So, Mr. Witness, if there are any adulterants present in the chemicals
you have examined, in chemical examination, what color it will register, if any?
WITNESS In sample, it contained a potassium aluminum sulfate, it will not react with the
reagent, therefore it will not dissolve. In my examination, all the specimens reacted
on the re-agents, sir.
PROS. VELASCO And what is potassium aluminum sulfate in laymans term?
WITNESS It is only a tawas.
....
COURT In this particular case, did you find any aluminum sulfate or tawas in the
specimen?
WITNESS None, your Honor.
....
ATTY. AGOOT I will cite an example, supposing ten grams of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride is mixed with 200 grams of tawas, you will submit that to qualitative
examination, what will be your findings, negative or positive, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS It will give a positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.
ATTY. AGOOT That is qualitative examination.
WITNESS And also positive for aluminum sulfate.[21]
A qualitative determination relates to the identity of the material, whereas a quantitative
analysis requires the determination of the percentage combination of the components of a
mixture. Hence, a qualitative identification of a powder may reveal the presence of heroin
and quinine, for instance, whereas a quantitative analysis may conclude the presence of 10
percent heroin and 90 percent quinine.[22]
 De Lara testified that he used a chromatography test to determine the contents of
Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3. Chromatography is a means of separating and tentatively
identifying the components of a mixture. It is particularly useful for analyzing the
multicomponent specimens that are frequently received in a crime lab. For example, illicit
drugs sold on the street may be diluted with practically any material that is at the disposal of
the drug dealer to increase the quantity of the product that is made available to prospective
customers. Hence, the task of identifying an illicit drug preparation would be an arduous one
without the aid of chromatographic methods to first separate the mixture into its
components.[23]
The testimony of De Lara established not only that the tests were thorough, but also
that the scientifically correct method of obtaining an accurate representative sample had
been obtained.[24] At any rate, as the Solicitor-General has pointed out, if accused-appellant
was not satisfied with the results, it would have been a simple matter for her to ask for an
independent examination of the substance by another chemist. This she did not do.
Third. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the negative
allegation in the information that she did not have a license to possess or use
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Art. III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 provides:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding
license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
Accused-appellant claims that possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu,a regulated drug, is not unlawful unless the possessor or user does not have the
required license or prescription. She points out that since the prosecution failed to present
any certification that she is not authorized to possess or use regulated drugs, it therefore
falls short of the quantum of proof needed to sustain a conviction.
The contention has no merit.
The question raised in this case is similar to that raised in United States v. Chan
Toco.[25] The accused in that case was charged with smoking opium without being duly
registered. He demurred to the information on the ground that it failed to allege that the use
of opium had not been prescribed as a medicine by a duly licensed and practicing physician.
This Court denied the motion and said:
The evident interest and purpose of the statute is to prohibit and to penalize generally the
smoking of opium in these Islands. But the legislator desired to withdraw from the operation
of the statute a limited class of smokers who smoked under the advice and by prescription of
a licensed and practicing physician . . . . Hence where one is charged with a violation of the
general provisions of the Opium Law, it is more logical as well as more practical and
convenient, if he did in fact smoke opium under the advice of a physician, that he should set
up this fact by way of defense, than that the prosecution should be called upon to prove that
every smoker, charged with a violation of the law, does so without such advice or
prescription. Indeed, when it is considered that under the law any person may, in case of
need and at any time, procure the advice of a physician to use opium or some of its
derivatives, and that in the nature of things no public record of prescriptions of this kind is or
can be required to be kept, it is manifest that it would be wholly impracticable and absurd to
impose on the prosecution the burden of alleging and proving the fact that one using opium
does so without the advice of a physician. To prove beyond a reasonable doubt, in a
particular case, that one using opium does so without the advice or prescription of a
physician would be in most cases a practical impossibility without the aid of the defendant
himself, while a defendant charged with the illegal use of opium should find little difficulty in
establishing the fact that he used it under the advice and on the prescription of a physician, if
in fact he did so.[26]
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not
perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to
meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is an easy thing for him to do,
he has no one but himself to blame.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, there is nothing in R.A. No.
6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, which requires the prosecution to present a
certification that accused-appellant has no license or permit to possess shabu. Mere
possession of the prohibited substance is a crime per se and the burden of proof is upon
accused-appellant to show that she has a license or permit under the law to possess the
prohibited drug.
Fourth. Lastly, accused-appellant contends that the evidence presented by the
prosecution is not sufficient to support a finding that she is guilty of the crime charged.
This contention must likewise be rejected.
Credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who
are law enforcers. When police officers have no motive to testify falsely against the accused,
courts are inclined to uphold this presumption. In this case, no evidence has been presented
to suggest any improper motive on the part of the police enforcers in arresting accused-
appellant. This Court accords great respect to the findings of the trial court on the matter of
credibility of the witnesses in the absence of any palpable error or arbitrariness in its
findings.[27]
It is noteworthy that, aside from the denial of accused-appellant, no other witness was
presented in her behalf. Her denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses.[28] As has been held, denial as a rule is a weak form of defense,
particularly when it is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The defense of
denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can
just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[29]
The Court is convinced that the requirements of the law in order that a person may be
validly charged with and convicted of illegal possession of a dangerous drug in violation of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended, have been complied with by the prosecution in this case. The
decision of the trial court must accordingly be upheld.
As regards the fine imposed by the trial court, it has been held that courts may fix any
amount within the limits established by law.[30] Considering that five hundred eighty point
two (580.2) grams of shabu were confiscated from accused-appellant, the fine imposed by
the trial court may properly be reduced to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 110,
finding accused-appellant guilty of violation of 16 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and
imposing upon her the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the fine imposed on accused-appellant is reduced to P50,000.00. Costs
against appellant.
The passport, airline ticket, luggage, girdle and other personal effects not yet returned
to the accused-appellant are hereby ordered returned to her.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO
ASPIRAS, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Metro
Manila, Branch 259 finding accused-appellant Rolando Aspiras and accused Rodolfo San
Lorenzo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of unlawfully selling marijuana, a prohibited drug, in
violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. 6425, as amended, and sentencing each of them
to suffer imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6)
years of prision correccional as maximum. For violation of Section 8 thereof, only accused-
appellant Aspiras was found guilty of possessing prohibited drugs and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand
pesos P500,000.00.
In Criminal Case No. 95-1009 accused-appellant Aspiras and accused Lorenzo were
charged with violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The information
reads:
That on or about the 27th day of December 1994 in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping one
another, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any prohibited
drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to
another for P50.00 dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in five (5) separate aluminum
foils weighing 9.7034 grams, which is a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [1]
In Criminal Case No. 95-1010 the information against accused-appellant Aspiras alleged:
That on or about the 27th day of December 1994, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any prohibited drug, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his
control and custody 1.4440 kilograms of dried marijuana flowering tops in two bricks which is
a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
In Criminal Case No. 80148, accused Lorenzo was similarly charged with possession of
1.440 kilograms of dried marijuana, to wit:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1994, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any prohibited drug, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his
control and custody 1.440 kilograms of dried marijuana flowering tops in two bricks which is
a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Upon motion of the defense counsel, the cases were consolidated and jointly tried. [4]
On February 9, 1995, in Criminal Case No. 95-1009, only accused Lorenzo was arraigned
and pleaded not guilty to the charge.[5] Meanwhile, the arraignment of accused-
appellant Aspiras in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-1009 and 95-1010 was deferred pending the
ascertainment of the quantity of prohibited drug stated in the information.[6]
On February 21, 1995, accused-appellant Aspiras was arraigned and entered a plea of
not guilty in both criminal cases.[7]
 At the trial, police aid Jerry Sabino and PO3 Jose Soreta testified for the prosecution.
The testimony of Forensic Chemist Edwin Purificando was dispensed with since the parties
adopted his testimonial and documentary evidence given before MTC Branch 77 in Criminal
Case No. 80148[8] prior to its consolidation with Criminal Cases Nos. 95-1009 to 95-1010. For
the defense, accused-appellant Aspiras and accused San Lorenzo testified.
The prosecution established the following facts:
On December 26, 1994, Sr. Inspector Valdez of Paraaque Philippine National Police
Drug Enforcement Unit received a telephone call, informing him that a certain alias Rolly,
later identified as Rolando Aspiras, herein accused-appellant, of Tambo Paraaque was
peddling prohibited drugs. Upon such information, Sr. Insp. Valdez constituted PO3
Jose Soreta, Police Aides (P/A) Abelardo Soto and Jerry Sabino to conduct a surveillance
operation on Rolando Aspiras. On the same day, surveillance was conducted at
J. Puyat Compound where the house of the suspected peddler was located. Afterwards, the
surveillance team went back to the police station and planned a buy-bust operation.
On December 27, 1994, at around 7 in the evening, P/A Jerry Sabino acted as the poseur-
buyer while PO3 Soreta, P/A Soto and Crisanto Cruz positioned themselves approximately ten
meters away from Aspiras house. When Sabino called for Aspiras, Rodolfo Aha San Lorenzo
alias Bukol went out and inquired what Sabino wanted. Sabino related to San Lorenzo that he
wanted to score or buy marijuana for P50.00 pesos. Sabino then gave to San Lorenzo the
marked 5 pieces of ten peso bills worth P50.00. Upon receipt of such amount, San
Lorenzo entered Aspiras house. Soon after, Aspirascame out and asked Sabino if he was the
one who wanted to score. When Sabino confirmed, Aspiras handed five (5) pieces of
aluminum foils. Upon verifying its contents as marijuana, Sabino signaled his companions to
make the arrest. When Aspiras saw the rest of Sabinos companions, he rushed inside his
house and the police team sought after him. Thereat, the marked money was recovered
from Aspiras while PO3 Soreta seized two bricks of marijuana flower tops wrapped in plastic
bag under a table. Afterwards, Aspiras and San Lorenzo were brought to the headquarters
and the marijuana flower tops were sent to the NBI for examination. Charges were then filed
against Aspiras and San Lorenzo for violation of Sections 4 and 8 of R.A. 6425, as amended.
The defense told an entirely different story. Accused-appellant Aspiras testified that
on December 27, 1994 at around 5:00 in the afternoon, he was in his house at 16th St. Puyat
Compound Tambo, Paraaque with his wife and five (5) children. At around 7 in the evening,
PO3 Soreta, wearing a police uniform, and his three (3) companions, in civilian clothes,
forcibly entered his house while one (1) stayed outside. At gunpoint, he was ordered to stand
and was handcuffed by Soreta. He asked what the problem was and the police asked him
where he hid the shabu. Upon responding that there was none, the police began searching
but nothing was found. Soreta instructed him to bow his head. Thereafter,
P/A Sabino proceeded to the kitchen. Aspiras noticed that there was something bulging in
P/A Sabinos jacket as the latter approached the kitchen. After less than 2
minutes, Sabino came out and
uttered: Sir, meron pa lang itinatagong marijuana dito. Aspiras denied ownership of the
marijuana. He was informed that the marijuana bricks were taken from the
ceiling. Afterwhich, Aspiras was brought out of his house and walked more or less 20 meters
towards Rodolfo Aha San Lorenzos residence. When they arrived at San Lorenzos house,
accused-appellant Aspiras saw San Lorenzo in handcuffs and both of them were brought to
the Coastal Police Headquarters.
For his part, accused Rodolfo San Lorenzo testified that on December 27, 1994 at
around 5:00 to 6:00 p.m. while he was resting in his house with his wife and children
in PuyatCompound, he heard someone knocking at his door. When he opened the door, he
saw P/A Soto who invited him to go to the police station at Coastal. Upon inquiring for the
reason, P/A Soto asked if he was selling shabu. When he told him that he has no knowledge
thereof, P/A Soto pushed him inside his house and PO3 Soreta and P/A Sabino immediately
followed and forced their way in and started to search the house. While the search ensued,
P/A Sabino asked accused San Lorenzo about his source of the prohibited drugs. San
Lorenzo replied that he could not show any shabu. Thereafter, he was brought out of his
house where he saw accused-appellant Aspiras in handcuffs. They were brought to the
Coastal police headquarters and detained. The following day, both him and accused-
appellant Aspiras were investigated by Chief Inspector Valdez and charges for violation of
R.A. 6425, as amended were filed against them.
On January 30, 1996, the trial court rendered its judgment convicting accused-
appellant Aspiras and accused San Lorenzo of selling marijuana in violation of Section 4,
Article II of R.A. 6425, as amended. With respect to the charge of possessing prohibited
drugs under Section 8 thereof, accused San Lorenzo was acquitted while accused-
appellant Aspiras was convicted. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court finds both Rolando Aspiras y Layuga and
Rodolfo Aha San Lorenzo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Sec. 4 Article II,
R.A. 6425 as amended.
Section 4 reads as follows:
Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and transportation of Prohibited Drugs The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos
to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall
sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
Section 17, R.A. 7659 further reads:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments
of the Crime. The penalties for offenses under Sections 3,4,8 and 9 of Art. II and Sections
14, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved in any
of the following quantities:
1. 40 grams or more opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more shabu or methilamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana;
6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride;
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic
requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public
consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall
range from prision correctional to reclusion perpetua depending on the quantity.
Both accused Rolando Luyaga Aspiras and Rodolfo Aha San Lorenzo are therefore sentenced
to serve an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS of Arresto Mayor as the minimum to
SIX (6) YEARS of prision correctional as the maximum thereof.
Further, this Court finds Rolando Aspiras GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of
Sec. 8 Art. II R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659, Sec. 13 of R.A. 7659 reads as follows:
xxx Sec. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon
any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject
to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
Accused Rolando Aspiras is therefore sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA there being no aggravating circumstances and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS.
There being no sufficient evidence against San Lorenzo as regards his knowledge or
participation with respect to the marijuana bricks found in the house of Rolando Aspiras the
Court pronounces him NOT GUILTY of the crime of Violation of Section 8 Article II R.A. 6425
as amended in Crim. Case No. 80148.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Only Rolando Aspiras appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals raising the
following errors:[10]
I. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE DEFENSE PUT UP BY
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ROLANDO ASPIRAS; and
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION OF
SEC.8 ARTICLE II OF R. A. 6425, AS AMENDED
On March 31, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the conviction
of accused-appellant Aspiras in Criminal Case No. 95-1009 for violation of Sec 4, Art. II of
R.A. 6425, as amended. As for violation of Sec. 8 thereof, considering that the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua, the cases were certified to this Court for final determination
and appropriate action. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PURSUANT TO Section 13, Rule 124, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedures and
Article 8, Section 5 of the Constitution of the Philippines and finding the appealed decision in
Criminal Case No. 95-1009 to be in accordance with law and the evidence, the same must be
affirmed; and further, finding Rolando Aspiras y Luyaga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of violation of Section 8, Article II, R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659 with the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, we certify these cases to the Honorable Supreme Court for
final determination and appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In this appeal, accused-appellant Aspiras questions the existence of the buy-bust
operation, imputes ill-motive on the police officers and asserts that the evidence against him
is planted.
Is the evidence presented before the trial court sufficient to warrant accused-appellants
conviction?
The evidence shows that upon an information of alleged involvement of accused-
appellant in the sale of prohibited drugs, the PNP-Drug Enforcement Unit surveyed the area
and identified accused-appellants residence. After the surveillance, a buy-bust operation was
planned and the serial numbers of five (5) pieces of P10.00 bills were written in the office
logbook. Then, the day after the surveillance, the buy-bust operation was conducted.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to catch a
malefactor in flagrante delicto. It has been defined as the employment of such ways and
means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. The idea to commit the crime
originates from the accused; nobody induces or prods him into committing the offense. [12]
 The testimonies of P/A Sabino and PO3 Soreta had sufficiently established how the
crime was committed. The fact that accused-appellant handed to P/A Sabino the five
marijuana aluminum foils amounting to P50.00 pesos constitute the illegal sale of marijuana.
There is no fixed procedure for conducting buy-bust operation and no rule of law requires the
simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the prohibited or regulated drug between
the poseur-buyer and the pusher or seller. The well-entrenched principle is that the crime of
illegal sale is committed as soon as the sale transaction is consummated, whether payment
precedes or follows delivery of the drug sold.[13]
The trial court found the version offered by the defense to be totally without merit and
unworthy of belief. The prosecution has established that the buy-bust team was able to buy
from accused-appellant five pieces of aluminum foils containing dried marijuana flower tops
worth P50.00 pesos. Through the buy-bust operation, accused-appellant was
caught in flagranteselling marijuana.
The trial court correctly pointed out that there is no improper motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses to testify against accused-appellant. The buy-bust operation was
formed by the police officers precisely to test the veracity of the tip and in order to
apprehend the perpetrator. The testimonies of the apprehending officers who caught
accused-appellant red-handed should be given full faith and credence since they are
presumed to be in the regular performance of their official duties as police officers.
Basically, accused-appellants assignment of errors is focused on the issue of
credibility. The rule is settled that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent any
clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances
of weight or substance which could have affected the result of the case. [14] We do not find
any such oversight on the part of the trial court.
While the conviction of accused-appellant in selling prohibited drugs is warranted,
accused-appellant should be liable only for such crime and his acquittal for possessing two
bricks of marijuana flower tops is called for.
It appears that the police officers justification for the seizure of the prohibited drugs was
rooted from the fact that the intrusion and search was pursuant to accused-appellants lawful
arrest after selling marijuana to a member of the buy-bust team. A search incident to a
lawful arrest is limited to the person of one arrested and the premises within his immediate
control. [15]
Under the plain view doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view of an officer who
has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented in evidence.[16] Nonetheless, the seizure of evidence in plain view must comply
with the following elements: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest
in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence
was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search.[17]
The record shows that the two bricks of marijuana flower tops with the total weight of
1.440 kilograms were recovered under the table, wrapped in a plastic bag. On this note, PO3
Jose Soreta testified:
FISCAL RAMOLETE:
Q: At whose house were you able to recover the said marijuana flowering tops?
A: From the house of Alias Rolly.
Q: Rolando Aspiras, the accused in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Would you inform this Honorable Court the quantity of the dried marijuana
flowering tops which you recovered inside the house of Rolly Aspiras?
A: One and a half bricks, sir.
Q: Showing to you a brick of dried marijuana flowering tops marked earlier for the
prosecution as Exh. D-1 and another half brick marked as Exh. D on May 18,
1995 with markings RLA, dated December 27, 1994, 7:00 pm, will you please
go over these two items and inform this Honorable Court what relation has
these got to do with the bricks of marijuana flowering tops recovered inside
the house of Rolando Aspiras?
A: These are the bricks of marijuana I recovered under the table in the house of
Rolando Aspiras.
Q: Why did you say that those are the very ones that you recovered from or inside
the house of Rolando Aspiras?
A: It was wrapped in plastic placed under the table.
Q: And you are referring to a plastic marked Uniwide Warehouse Club with
markings DDM-94-824 Ecp/NM. By the way, there are markings on the half
brick 27 December 1994 RLA, would you happen to know, whose marking are
these?
A: Those are the markings of SPO2 Nestor Serona.
Q: What was his participation?
A: He was the investigator.[18]
In the recent case of People vs. Salanguit,[19] we declared inadmissible the marijuana
recovered that was wrapped in newsprint. We likewise reiterated our previous decision that
rendered inadmissible the marijuana seized by the NARCOM agents because the said drugs
were contained in a plastic bag which gave no indication of its contents. As explained by this
Court-
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the
kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag
contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana.
Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police officers eyes, the
NARCOM agents in this case could not have recovered the inculpatory nature of the contents
of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents
inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their plain view, what may be
said to be the object in their plain view was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The
incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from
the plain view of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its
contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or otherwise, that its
contents are obvious to an observer.
While it is true that the police officers had prior justification for intrusion, permitting
a warrantless seizure of any piece of evidence incriminating an accused, nonetheless,
applying the plain view doctrine, such must be limited to those evidence that the police
officer came across inadvertently. The prosecution failed to show whether or not the plastic
bag was transparent that would prove beyond reasonable doubt that the plain view of such
plastic bag would readily disclose that its contents are marijuana. In our criminal justice
system, the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the
accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. [20] If
the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt,
then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction.[21] Corollarily, the two bricks of marijuana are inadmissible in evidence against
accused-appellant.
With the foregoing facts duly established, accused-appellant must be, and is hereby held
liable, only for the sale of marijuana.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from finding accused-appellant
Rolando Aspiras guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended is hereby AFFIRMED. For violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A.
6425, as amended, accused-appellant Aspiras is hereby ACQUITTED.
It appearing that accused-appellant has been detained since December 27, 1994 per
Order of Judge Zosimo V. Escano dated January 30, 1996,[22] much beyond the maximum
range of his indeterminate sentence, his immediate release from custody is hereby ordered,
unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. QUE MING KHA alias
ALFONSO GO and KIM QUE YU alias ALFONSO QUE, accused-appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
On May 16, 1997, around 5:00 in the afternoon, members of the Central Police
District, Batasan Station No. 6 intercepted a van carrying nine (9) sacks of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu near Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon
City. The police arrested the driver of the van, Que Ming Kha alias Alfonso Go (Go),
and his companion, Kim Que Yu alias Alfonso Que (Que).
Go and Que were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City with
violation of Sec. 15, Article III in relation to Sec. 2(e), (f), (m), Article I of R.A. 6425
as amended by P.D. 1683, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, in an
information that reads as follows:
That on or about the 16 day of May, 1997 in Quezon City, Philippines, the
th
said accused conspiring together, confederating with other persons whose
true names, identities and whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained and
mutually helping one another, not having been authorized by law to sell,
dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly transport or distribute
253.8609 kilograms of white crystalline substance known as "SHABU"
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
Go and Que were found guilty of the charge and were given the death
sentence. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Que
Ming Kha (a.k.a. Alfonso Go or Que Beng Kha) and Kim Que Yu (a.k.a.
Alfonso Que) GUILTY as principals beyond reasonable doubt of
transporting in large scale 253.8609 kilos of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a.k.a. shabu, in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as
amended, (R.A. 6425), and they are hereby sentenced to DEATH.
In case their sentences on appeal are commuted, it is advised that they be
ordered deported after service of sentence as they are both in the Philippines
illegally.
Inasmuch as the bulk of the shabu involved in this case has already been
destroyed at the San Lazaro Crematorioum in Manila on July 21, 1997 in
the presence of the Secretary of Justice Teofisto Guingona, the Director of
the Dangerous Drugs Board, Manuel Supnet, the Vice-Mayor of Quezon
City Herbert Bautista, prosecutor Luis Maceren, defense counsel Godwin
Valdez, a representative of the NBI, the PNP Chemists and other officials,
the remaining shabu retained for purposes of evidence and other related
paraphernalia of contraband are ordered confiscated in favor of the
Government and destroyed pursuant to law upon finality of this decision.
The Khia Pride (sic) van, color blue with Plate No. UPN 595 is ordered
forfeited in favor of the State. For this purpose, the Philippine National
Police officer in custody of said van is hereby ordered to transfer and
surrender said vehicle to the Clerk of Court Mercedes Gatmaitan of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to be used for official purposes.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Chairman of the Bureau of
Immigration.[2]
The case is now before us on automatic review.
From the prosecution evidence, it appears that on May 16, 1997, Chief Inspector
Gilbert Dela Fuente, Head of the Intelligence and Investigation Division, Station 6,
Central Police District, received a phone call from an informant that a blue Kia Pregio
van with plate number UPN 595 which was being used in the transport of shabu has
been seen within the vicinity of Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City.Dela Fuente
immediately dispatched the three teams to monitor the van. Team 3, composed of
team leader Police Inspector Raul Espejon and team members PO3 Justo Curameng,
SPO1 Joselito Velasquez and PO3 Jovencio Villacorte, positioned themselves at Don
Antonio Avenue, Barangay Holy Spirit. Around 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, the
team spotted the blue Kia van on the opposite side of the street going toward the
direction of Commonwealth Avenue. Before reaching Commonwealth Avenue, in
front of Andok's Litson Manok, the van hit a seven-year old boy. The van sped away,
leaving its young victim behind. A concerned motorist picked up the boy and rushed
him to the hospital. Espejon, in the meantime, reported to Dela Fuente that they have
spotted the blue Kia van. They followed the van after it sped away and intercepted it
at Commonwealth Avenue corner Zuzuarregui Street. The members of the team
alighted from their vehicle and approached the van. They introduced themselves as
police officers to the driver and passenger of the van. The police noted that Go was
on the driver's seat while Que sat on the passenger's seat. Espejon informed Go that
he just committed the crime of reckless imprudence and asked for his driver's
license. The police peered through the window of the van and noticed several sacks
placed on the floor at the back of the van. The sacks have Chinese markings and had a
logo which looked like the head of a pig. One of the sacks was open and they noticed
that it contained several plastic bags containing white crystalline substance. The
police also asked for the identification of Go's companion. The latter handed his
driver's license which revealed his name as Kim Que Yu. The police handcuffed Go
and Que, confiscated their driver's license and their cellular phones found at the front
seat of the van, and brought them to Police Station No. 6 for investigation. PO3
Curameng drove the van to the police station. They passed by the Kabayan Center to
check on the condition of the boy who was hit by the van. Upon reaching Police
Station No. 6, the monitoring team turned over the suspects and the seized articles to
the desk officer. Dela Fuente informed Superintendent Hercules Cataluna, Chief of
the Central Police District, about the incident. The police inspected the contents of the
van in the presence of Superintendent Cataluna and several officials of Barangay
Holy Spirit. They counted nine sacks, eight of which were sealed and one open,
revealing several plastic bags which contained white crystalline substance suspected
to be shabu.[3] The arresting officers thereafter forwarded the seized substance to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. Each of the nine sacks contained 253 plastic
bags which contained around one kilo of the white crystalline substance.[4] Upon
examination, the substance was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu.[5]
Both Go and Que claim ignorance about the presence of shabu at the back of the
van.
Go stated that two months prior to his apprehension, he came to Manila from
Cebu and was employed as driver by a certain Ah Chai. On May 16, 1997, Ah Chai
instructed him to meet with him at Ever Gotesco in Commonwealth Avenue. Go took
a taxicab from Ah Chai's residence in Pasig to their meeting place. After waiting for
some time, Go saw Ah Chai arrive, driving the blue Kia van. Go took over the wheel
but relied on Ah Chai for the direction. Suddenly, a boy crossed the street, prompting
Go to swerve to the left. But the van still hit the boy. Ah Chai lost no time in picking
up the boy to bring him to the hospital. He hailed a tricycle and instructed the driver
to bring them to the nearest hospital. Before he left, Ah Chai instructed Go to watch
over the van and assured him that he would return shortly.Curious onlookers,
meanwhile, gathered around the scene of the accident. Then, a car pulled over and a
man in civilian clothes approached him. The man introduced himself as a police
officer. He asked Go several questions, but since he was having difficulty with the
language, he remained silent. The man slapped him several times because of his
refusal to answer. While he was being interrogated by the police officer, he saw a
taxicab stop in front of them and his friend from China, Alfonso Que, alighted from
the cab. Que asked him what happened and offered to help him. Go related to him in
Chinese the events that transpired before he arrived. Que talked with the police
officer in Go's behalf. Que told Go that the police officer invited them to the police
station for interview. Go agreed after being assured that nothing bad would happen to
them. Go rode with the police officer while Que drove the van to the police
station. When they reached the police station, Go was made to stay in a small room
and his hands were handcuffed. Que, meanwhile, continued to talk with the police
officers outside. Later, Que entered the room. His hands were also handcuffed. He
was fuming mad. Que asked him about the contents of the van. But Go denied any
knowledge about the cargo. After they were interrogated by the police officers, they
were brought to the Criminal Investigation Division of the Central Police District
where they were detained. Go denied any involvement in the commission of the
offense. He also said that he did not own any of the cellular phones confiscated inside
the van.[6]
Que, on the other hand, testified that he runs his own business together with his
cousin, Lorenzo Que. They buy and sell corn, soya beans and other hog feeds. On
May 16, 1997, after taking an early lunch, he went to see his cousin at 12th Avenue,
Caloocan City. From Caloocan, he took a jeepney to Novaliches to see a certain Mr.
Chua of Liberty Farm to offer him some of their products. But since Mr. Chua was
not at his office at the time, Que proceeded to Uniwide in Novaliches. From there, he
took a taxicab going to Fairview. He wanted to visit his friend, Henry Co, and offer
him a business proposal. He instructed the taxi driver to take a short cut at Sauyo
Road. Que, however, did not reach his destination. While they were traversing Don
Antonio Avenue, Que saw his friend from China, Alfonso Go who seemed to be in
trouble. He noticed a small crowd gathered around him and a man was talking to
him. He got off the taxicab and approached Go. He asked him what happened. Go
told Que that the van he was driving had sideswiped a boy and his employer brought
the boy to the hospital, but the latter has not returned. Go told him that the name of
his employer was Ah Chai. The policeman invited them to go to the police
station. The police officer requested Que to drive the van because he wanted Go to
ride with him in the car. Upon reaching the police station, he handed the key to a
police officer. The policeman told him to stay in the office while Go was locked
inside a small cell. They were told to wait for a while until Go's employer comes back
from the hospital. After waiting for quite some time, a police personnel came in and
reported that they found sacks of shabu inside the van. The police handcuffed Que.
He protested. He denied any knowledge about the contents of the van. But he was
nonetheless placed inside the cell with Go.[7] The police later brought Que and Go to
the Batasan Police Detachment. Que testified that he did not see Espejon at the scene
of the accident. He only saw him at the Batasan Police Detachment when he
interrogated Go. He belied the testimony of the police officers who testified before
the court. Que stated that from Batasan Police Station No. 6, they were transferred to
Criminal Investigation Division of the Central Police District where they were
detained.[8]
To corroborate Que's testimony, the defense also presented other witnesses who
were allegedly at the scene of the accident at the time of the apprehension of Go and
Que.
Pedro Loreto, a tricycle driver, testified that on May 16, 1997, around 5:00
oclock in the afternoon, he took a passenger to Don Antonio Avenue in Quezon
City. When they got to Don Antonio, he saw a crowd gathered in front of Andok's
Litson Manok. After his passenger got off the tricycle, he tried to see what the
commotion was all about. He saw a blue Kia van parked in front of his tricycle. Then
he saw a Chinese man carrying a young boy. The Chinese and the boy boarded his
tricycle and the former instructed him to bring them to the hospital. He brought them
to Malvar Hospital along Commonwealth Avenue. The Chinese paid him P100.00
and then alighted from the tricycle together with the boy. Loreto went back to ply his
route. When asked to identify the person who brought the boy to the hospital, he said
that the man was not in the courtroom. He, however, identified Alfonso Go as the
driver of the van.[9]
Fermin Dagumang testified that on May 16, 1997, around 5:00 oclock in the
afternoon, he took a tricycle to Commonwealth Avenue. When he alighted in front of
Andok's Litson Manok at Don Antonio, he saw a blue van parked nearby. The driver
of the van was short and stocky and Chinese-looking. Then he noticed a crowd
gathered in front of the store. He went closer and he saw a child lying on the road.A
tall skinny person who looked Chinese took him into his arms. The man, at that time,
was looking for a vehicle to bring the child to the hospital. Dagumang then left the
scene. Dagumang said that the man who carried the boy was not in the courtroom.[10]
 Elmar Cawiling, the seven-year old boy who was hit by the van, also took the
witness stand. He stated that on May 16, 1997, after the van hit him, a small, Chinese-
looking man immediately picked him up and brought him to the hospital. When asked
if it was Alfonso Go who brought him to the hospital, he replied in the negative.[11]
Go raised the following assignment of errors in his Brief:
1. The lower court [sic] was so full of bias and prejudice against appellant that he
was incapable of rendering a fair, just and correct judgment in the case.
2. The lower court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the policemen who
testified for the prosecution that they were tailing the Kia Pregio van when it hit
the 7-year old ambulant vendor, Elmar Cawiling;that after hitting the boy, the
van sped away; that the policemen chased the van until they overtook it at the
corner of Zuzuarregui Avenue; and that when they overtook the van they found
appellant Que Ming Kha and his co-accused Kim Que Yu inside the van.
3. The lower court erred in not holding that the shabu was the product of illegal
search and seizure, hence not admissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding.
4. The lower court erred in holding that appellant Que Ming Kha distributed or
transported shabu within the meaning of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425.[12]
Que, on the other hand, cited the following errors:
1. Appellant was denied the right to an impartial and unbiased court.
2. Testimony of the prosecution witnesses is plainly self-serving, concocted and full
of discrepancies.
3. Discovery of the drugs was accidental and not the result of monitoring or
surveillance by the police.
4. Testimony of actual eyewitnesses was disregarded while that of police officers
who were latecomers to the scene was credited.
5. Eleven reasons given by the trial court as grounds for its decision are products of
bias and prejudice.
6. Owner of shabu is Ah Chai, a person entirely different from appellant Alfonso
Que.
7. Fact of warrantless search sustains defense apart from violating constitutional
rights of Que.
8. Presumption of innocence must prevail because an honest analysis of the
evidence clearly shows innocence or, at the very least, reasonable doubts.[13]
We reverse the decision of the trial court in so far as it found accused-appellant
Que guilty of the charge.
In People v. Pagaura[14] we made the cautionary warning that the court must be
extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the
unusually heavy penalties for drug offenses x x x. In our criminal justice system the
overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused
but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. x x x In the case at bar,
no less than the Solicitor General himself entertains doubt on the guilt of Que
and recommends his acquittal. When the prosecution itself says it failed to prove
Ques guilt, the Court should listen and listen hard, lest it locks up a person who has
done no wrong.
We fully agree with the Solicitor General that persistent doubt exists on the full
veracity of the prosecutions theory as regards his (Ques) participation in the
crime.[15] Eye contact with the evidence of the prosecution against Que will establish
that it is incredible as it goes against the grain of our natural experience and
expectation. Right from the start, the prosecution story cannot but raise the quizzical
eyebrow. According to the story, five (5) days before the apprehension of the
accused, the policemen had already gathered detailed data about the Kia Pregio van
that would be used in moving a big quantity of shabu in Quezon City. They knew
exactly its model, plate number, color, etc. Despite the wide time lead, the
prosecution does not explain its failure to flush out the true owner of the van who
could well be the drug lord in the case at bar. Certainly, it was not too difficult to
discover his identity from the vans registration papers with the LTO and thereafter
monitor the vehicles movement. Instead, the policemen meandered around the city,
hoping they would encounter the van by chance. We cannot be made to believe that
our policemen catch drug syndicates by using the calculus of chance.
Equally unexplainable in the prosecution story is the reaction of the policemen
when they spotted the van transporting the shabu which they have been hunting for
five (5) days. They knew it was carrying shabu of big quantity. They ought to suspect
that its passengers pose a clear danger to their lives. Yet, nothing in the records shows
that PO1 Raul Espejon and PO3 Jesus Curameng called for reinforcement when they
first saw the van. They just serenely tailed the van until it bumped an ice cream-on-
sticks vendor. Again, such an act of throwing caution to the wind strains the seams of
credibility of the policemen-witnesses.
 More astonishing is the hit and run story peddled by the prosecution. Don
Antonio Avenue, the place where the van swiped Elmar Cawiling, a 7-year old
ambulant vendor, is just a few yards away from the main Commonwealth road. The
street intersects a main road and is a bustling place especially at 5:00 p.m. or after
office hours. On both sides of the street can be found commercial establishments like
banks, pharmacies and eating places while the giant Ever Gotesco mall stands across
Commonwealth Avenue. To compound the traffic jam in the area, numerous tricycles
that ply the nearby subdivisions parks operate in the corner of Commonwealth
Avenue and Don Antonio Avenue. Given the usual traffic mess in the area, it is
inconceivable that the van could speed away after swiping the vendor
Cawiling.Indeed, there is no credible evidence that there were no vehicles in front of
the van that could have impeded its movement. The defense version that the van
stopped after hitting Cawiling and that it did not move as people surrounded it is
more worthy of credence as it accords with the traffic situation in the venue of the
accident.
Similarly, the prosecution story on how the accused were arrested and the van
brought to the police station defies reason. To repeat, the policemen declared that
they have been on the alert for the van carrying shabu for about five days. When by
chance they spotted the van, they followed it until it sped away after sideswiping
Cawiling. They gave the van a hot pursuit and overtook it after a one kilometer
chase. Again, the expectation is that confronted with a dangerous drug syndicate, the
apprehending officers, with ready guns, would order the driver and passenger of the
van to go down with upraised hands, search them for weapons, handcuff them and
then inspect the van for the suspected shabu. The evidence, however, does not show
that policemen Espejon and Curameng followed this standard police procedure for
their own safety.
To be sure, it is critical to ascertain whether the van sped away or whether it
remained stationary after hitting the vendor Cawiling. The pieces of evidence on this
issue are hopelessly at odds. The testimonies of policemen Espejon and Curameng
tend to establish that the van with Go and Que inside sped away and they intercepted
it after a kilometer long chase. In contrast, Que declared that he was just passing by
Don Antonio Avenue on board a taxi when he saw his friend Go in the middle of the
street after the accident. He alighted to find out Gos problem. At that time, the van
was already parked by the streetside. As Go was unfamiliar with Tagalog, Que
interpreted to him the questions of the policeman. Later, Go and the van were brought
to the police station for investigation. He agreed to accompany Go who had
communication problems. In the station, the van was found to be carrying shabu. He
was arrested together with Go. Only disinterested witnesses could clear the fog of
evidence on this important factual issue. None of the disinterested witnesses,
namely, Cawiling, the boy vendor, Loreto, the tricycle driver who brought
Cawiling to the hospital, and Dagumang, the passenger of Loreto, corroborated
the prosecution story that the van carrying Go and Que sped away after
sideswiping Cawiling. Consequently, the trial court erroneously calibrated the
evidence against Que and in favor of the prosecution.
We fully concur with the following analysis of the defense evidence made by the
Solicitor General, viz:
Elmar Cawiling, the ambulant vendor sideswiped by the van, testified that it
was not accused-appellant Kim Que Yu who picked him up but another
Chinese looking man. Pedro Loreto, driver of the tricycle who brought
Elmar Cawiling to the hospital, corroborated the testimony of the
latter. Pedro Loreto further testified that there were no police officers at
the scene when the accident happened, until the time he brought the
boy to the hospital along with a Chinese looking man. He also identified
appellant Que Ming Kha as the other person inside the van who was seated
at the drivers seat. Loreto was later asked if the other Chinese man, who
brought the boy to the hospital, was in the courtroom to which he politely
said no. The defense claims that appellant Kim Que Yu arrived at the scene
only after the tricycle carrying the boy to the hospital had left.
xxxxxxxxx
x x x the records will show that the defense testimonies sufficiently
establish that the other man in the van, aside from the driver, is not Kim
Que Yu alias Alfonso Que, but a certain Ah Chai whom the driver,
Appellant Que Ming Kha, identified as Chiang Lai On. Further, verification
from the records of Malvar Medical Foundation, to where the boy, Elmar
Cawiling was brought, reveals that it was Chiang Lai On who brought the
boy there as shown by his drivers license No. 96-215658. Thus, Kim Que
Yu alias Alfonso Que could not have been the owner of the illegal
contraband as there were only two Chinese looking men seen inside the van
when the accident happened. Appellee cannot see its way clear to concur
with the conviction of Kim Que Yu which might result in the forfeiture of
his life, when persistent doubt exists on the full veracity of the prosecutions
theory as regards his participation in the crime. Que had nothing to do
with the loading and transport of the shabu. Not one reliable eyewitness
pointed to him as having been with Go inside the van when it hit Elmar
Cawiling. Not one witness saw him get off the van when the accident
happened. Not one credible eyewitness testified that Kim Que Yu was
seen at the vicinity of the bumping of the child at the time of the
accident until shortly before the police arrived.
On the contrary, the undisputed civilian eyewitnesses confirmed Kim
Que Yus story that he just chanced upon the accident and that he got off the
taxicab where he was riding when he saw his fellow Fookienese in some
kind of trouble with a crowd of curious onlookers milling around the
accident scene. The testimony of disinterested eyewitnesses shows that
when Que arrived, the injured child had already been brought to the
hospital. Que did not see him. The police who arrived even later than Que
did not see the accident victim. Much less did they see the accident
itself. As will be shown later, the testimonies of the policemen who were
the only prosecution witnesses on the accident are shot through and
through with discrepancies and obvious fabrication.
The eyewitnesses who corroborated the testimony of Que were Elmar
Cawiling, the boy victim of the accident; Pedro Loreto, the tricycle driver
who drove Cawiling to the hospital; and Fermin Dagumang, the passenger
of the tricycle who got off to give way to the accident victim.
It is beyond dispute that they were at the scene of the accident. There is no
reason to doubt the truth of their testimony, especially when it bears the
hallmarks of being spontaneous, straightforward, categorical and remains
consistent.[16]
The judgment of the trial court convicting Que despite the paucity of the
prosecution evidence can only be attributed to the racial bias of the trial judge
against Chinese. The trial judge unblushingly revealed this racial prejudice in his
decision itself when he wrote:[17]
The Chinese in this country ever since the Spanish regime are known to buy
people. By default and other reasons, they are lording it over our land
economically despite Dr. Jose P. Rizal, Andres Bonifacio, and others. They
are known to be cheapskates or kuripot, but, not when they want to attain
certain things. Since the large contraband involved here belongs clearly to a
criminal syndicate, such syndicate of Chinese ruffians would have spared no
amount to pollute our justice system as indeed the illegal entry and stay of
Alfonso Go and Alfonso Que have shown, together with their contemptuous
disregard of our penal laws on falsification and use of aliases and our tax
laws by their non-payment of any tax since 1987.
Even the Solicitor General denounced the relentless prejudice of the trial judge, viz:[18]
The judge from the very start attempted to conduct trial even if there was no
preliminary investigation (May 23, 1997 hearing). In his own words an
exculpatory existence has to be proved in court (May 27, 1997
hearing). Only after being reminded of the requirements of due process did
he postpone arraignment so that the preliminary investigation could be
conducted.
During arraignment, the judge ignored the unfamiliarity of appellant Que
Ming Kha with English or Tagalog.
Contrary to the familiarity with Tagalog and Visayan, respectively, to
enable the understanding of the highly technical terms in an arraignment
(July 15, 1997 hearing).
Up to the end of trial, this prejudice against one he wrongly believed was an
undocumented alien namely Kim Que Yu colored the courts judgment.
The manner and attitude of the judge in the aforesaid proceedings bespeaks
of his partiality. His prejudgment or hasty conclusions does (sic) not speak
well relative to the utmost circumspection he should exercise in the
discharge of his duties to preclude suspicion on his impartiality (Jarquete vs.
Boncuaras, 60 SCRA 217; Yanuario vs. Paraguay, 71 SCRA 11).
The unfortunate bias of the judge against the Chinese is expressed in the
decision. The judge presumed an accused as guilty because he is
Chinese. The accused is prejudged guilty because of his nationality and his
status as an illegal overstaying alien.
More need not be said.
Every accused in a criminal case is presumed innocent until proven otherwise. It
is the prosecution that has the burden of proving his guilt and it is required that his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. This Court has ruled time and again that it
is only when the mind is satisfied that the crime has been committed by the person on
trial that the judgment should be for conviction.[19] If the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent
with the innocence of the accused of the crime charged and the other consistent with
their guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to support a conviction.[20] The all too clear reason for the age-old ruling is
the failure of the prosecution to discharge its duty to overcome the presumption of
innocence. Such is the case at bar with respect to Que. His conviction cannot be
rooted on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty accorded to the
police officers who made the apprehension. This presumption cannot be used against
Que when the Solicitor General himself concedes that their testimonies are
obvious fabrications. Appellant Que cannot rot in jail on a sentence of reclusion
perpetua on the basis of these obvious fabrications.
We now come to the appeal of accused-appellant Go. It has been established that
Go was driving the van that carried the contraband at the time of its discovery. He
was therefore caught in the act of transporting a regulated drug without authority
which is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act. Section 15, Article III of the
Dangerous Drugs Act penalizes "any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug."
To exonerate himself, Go claimed that he was not aware of the existence of the
contraband at the back of the van. We are not persuaded. The crime under
consideration is malum prohibitum. In such case, the lack of criminal intent and good
faith do not exempt the accused from criminal liability. Thus, Go's contention that he
did not know that there were illegal drugs inside the van cannot constitute a valid
defense. Mere possession and/or delivery of a regulated drug without legal authority
is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.[21]
Go further argued that the search made on the van was illegal and therefore the
shabu discovered from that search is inadmissible as evidence. We do not agree.
The Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any
evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. The rule is, however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made
without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the
following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving
motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in
plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.[22] The search made in the case at bar falls under the fourth
exception. We held in People vs. Doria:[23]
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position
to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and
may be introduced in evidence. The 'plain view' doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item
he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion
or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In
the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and
hand and its discovery inadvertent.
The facts show that while the van was traversing Don Antonio Avenue in
Quezon City, it accidentally hit a seven-year old ambulant vendor. The van stopped
and the owner got off to bring the boy to the hospital. A police officer who witnessed
the accident approached the van to apprehend the driver for reckless imprudence. As
he stood near the van, he saw through the lightly tinted window of the van several
sacks placed at the back of the van. One of the sacks was open, revealing several
plastic bags containing white crystalline substance which the police suspected to be
shabu. Clearly, the prohibited substance was within the plain view of the police
officer who was in a position to be near the van at the time. The substance is therefore
not a product of an illegal search and not inadmissible as evidence.
 We now discuss the penalty that should be imposed on the guilty
appellant. Section 15, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act imposes the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) to ten million pesos (P10,000,00.00) for the offense. The law thus
prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties. Under Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code, in such case, when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be applied. There being no mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance in this case, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should
be imposed on Go.[24]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds accused-appellant Que Ming Kha
alias Alfonso Go GUILTY as charged. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA. Accused-appellant Kim Que Yu alias Alfonso Que is
ACQUITTED. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to order his
immediate release and to report to this Court his compliance with this order within
five (5) days from notice hereof. The remaining shabu retained for purposes of
evidence and other related paraphernalia are ordered confiscated in favor of the
government and destroyed in accordance with law.
SO ORDER ED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. QUE MING KHA alias

ALFONSO GO and KIM QUE YU alias ALFONSO QUE, accused-appellants.