Republic vs Huan Te Fu

Naturalization: A Foreigner Living In A Foreign Land Should Conduct Himself Accordingly In This
Country With Care, Circumspect, And Respect For The Laws Of The Host. ..
MAY 22, 2015 BY THE LAWYER'S POST

The Facts:

Huang Te Fu, a.k.a. Robert Uy, a Chinese businessman allegedly engaged in the business of
manufacturing zippers, married to Irene D. Chan, and born in Taiwan, filed a petition for
naturalisation with RTC of Quezon City. Highlights of his petition to prove compliance with C.A.
473 are the following:he had resided continuously in the Philippines for 23 years; received
primary, secondary and tertiary education in Philippine schools; and he derive a monthly income
of P15,000.00 from their family business of manufacturing zippers.
After trial, the RTC granted the petition for naturalisation filed by Huang, hence the OSG
appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its brief, the OSG pointed to the following disqualifications
warranting the reversal of Huangs grant of naturalisation: he does not own real estate in the
Philippines; he does not possess a lucrative trade or profession, and is not even included in the
payroll of the company; does not have sufficient monthly income since he merely receives salary
from the family corporation which is not even sufficient for his family, much less lucrative; in a
Deed of Sale executed on August, 2001 for a parcel of land in Antipolo City, Huang signed in the
Deed of Sale and falsely misrepresented himself as a Filipino, exhibiting his lack of good moral
character; and, his income tax returns for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 reveal that his actual
monthly income differs from his monthly income as declared in his petition for naturalization,
leading to the conclusion that either he is evading taxes or concealing the truth regarding his
income; and, on cross-examination by petitioner, he could not cite any of the principles
underlying the Philippine Constitution which he is supposed to believe in. In his Comment,
Huang alleged that he merely signed and did not prepare the Deed of Sale; he does not prepare
his income tax returns; most of his expenses are taken care of by his parents who own the
corporation; his tailure to cite particular principles underlying the Philippine Constitution were
brought about by his not having been confronted about it.
The CA denied the OSGs appeal hence, the OSG elevated the case to the Supreme Court on
petition for review via certiorari.
The Issue/s:
Whether or not the grant of Philippine citizenship to Huang was proper.
The Courts ruling:
The Court finds for petitioner.
In Republic v. Hong,1 it was held in essence that an applicant for naturalization must show full
and complete compliance with the requirements of the naturalization law; otherwise, his
petition for naturalization will be denied. This ponente has likewise held that [t]he courts must
always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public
interest. Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
government and against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full
and complete compliance with the requirements of law.2
Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law or CA 473 requires, among others, that an applicant
for naturalization must be of good moral character and must have some known lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation. In regard to the requirement that the applicant must have a
known lucrative trade, this ponente declared:
Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation means not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his
ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such
that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for
an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus
avoid ones becoming the object of charity or a public charge. His income should permit him
and the members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing
standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our
civilization.
Moreover, it has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative income, the courts
should consider only the applicants income; his or her spouses income should not be included
in the assessment. The spouses additional income is immaterial for under the law the
petitioner should be the one to possess some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful
occupation to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen. Lastly, the Court has consistently held
that the applicants qualifications must be determined as of the time of the filing of his
petition.3 (Emphasis supplied)
From the above, it may be concluded that there is no basis for the CA finding that respondent is
engaged in a lucrative trade. Indeed, his supposed income of P15,000.00 to P18,000.00 per
month as found by the CA is not enough for the support of his family. By his own admission,
most of his familys daily expenses are still shouldered by his parents who own the zipper
manufacturing business which employs him. This simply means that respondent continues to be
a burden to, and a charge upon, his parents; he lives on the charity of his parents. He cannot
support his own family on his own.
Indeed, it is even doubtful that respondent is carrying on a trade at all. He admitted during trial
that he was not even listed or included in the payroll of his familys zipper business. If this is the
case, then he may not be considered an employee thereof. One of the most effective pieces of
evidence to prove employment aside from the employment contract itself and other
documents such as daily time records4 is a workers inclusion in the payroll. With this
admitted fact, one may not be faulted for believing that respondents alleged employment in his
familys zipper business was contrived for the sole purpose of complying with the legal
requirements prior to obtaining Philippine citizenship.
On the other hand, even assuming that respondent was indeed employed by his parents, his
non-inclusion in the payroll for all the years he has worked in his parents business5 suggests
as correctly argued by petitioner an intent to evade taxes or to conceal the true nature of his
employment and the amount of his salary or income. It is concealment of the truth; an attempt
to circumvent with impunity the tax laws, labor laws relative to the employment of aliens, and
other laws that would otherwise regulate respondents actions during his stay in this
country. Indeed, without payroll records, it can never be said that respondent works for his
parents zipper business. If such is the case, then respondent is not required to state in his
income tax return as is the case his employer and what he actually receives as salary
therefrom; he is free to conveniently declare any amount of income in his tax returns.
Either way, respondents deliberate non-inclusion in the payroll of his parents business can have
only the most unpleasant connotations. And his consent to be part of such scheme reflects
negatively on his moral character. It shows a proclivity for untruthfulness and dishonesty, and an
unreserved willingness and readiness to violate Philippine laws.
The appellate courts reliance upon the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals6 is misplaced. In
that case, there was only a discrepancy between the applicants estimate of his income in his
application and that declared by him during his direct testimony. In the present case,
respondent is not at all listed on the payroll of his parents business, where he is supposed to be
its general manager. As a result, there is absolutely no basis for the correct determination of his
income; instead, he invites Us to conveniently rely on his income tax returns and his unilateral
declarations. As We have earlier said, if We are to believe them, then still, they are insufficient
to generate a conclusion that respondent is carrying on a lucrative trade; he cannot support his
family from his declared income.
Moreover, respondents admitted false declaration under oath contained in the August 2001
deed of sale that he is a Filipino citizen which he did to secure the seamless registration of the
property in the name of his wife is further proof of respondents lack of good moral
character. It is also a violation of the constitutional prohibition on ownership of lands by foreign
individuals.7 His defense that he unknowingly signed the deed is unacceptable. First of all, as a
foreigner living in a foreign land, he should conduct himself accordingly in this country with
care, circumspect, and respect for the laws of the host. Finally, as an educated and experienced
businessman, it must be presumed that he acted with due care and signed the deed of sale with
full knowledge of its import.8
Having decided in the foregoing manner, We must conclude the instant case and disregard the
other issues and arguments of the parties; they are deemed irrelevant and will not alter the
conclusion arrived at. As far as this Court is concerned, respondent has failed to satisfy the law
which renders him completely undeserving of Filipino citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The November 29, 2011 Decision and March 7, 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91213 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
September 24, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96 in Nat.
Case/Spec. Proc. No. Q-05-55251 is likewise ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the respondents
Petition for Naturalization in said case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 200983, March 18, 2015, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PETITIONER, VS. HUANG TE FU, A.K.A. ROBERT UY, RESPONDENT.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
1 520 Phil. 276, 285 (2006).
2 Republic v. Ong, G.R. No. 175430, June 18, 2012, 673 SCRA 485, 498.
3 Id. at 499-500.
4 See Ang v. San Joaquin, Jr., G.R. No. 185549, August 7, 2013, 703 SCRA 269, 287.
5 Or since 2000.
6 354 Phil. 733 (1998).
7 CONSTITUTION, Article XII, Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands
shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
8 See Development Bank of the Philippines v. National Merchandising Corporation, 148-B Phil.
310 (1971).
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS KAMRAN F. KABARSI

FACTS:
On June 25, 2002, Kamran F. Kabarsi filed a petition for naturalization with the RTC where he
alleged the following:
His full name is Kamran F. Karbasi;
He is recognized as a Person of Concern by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) as shown in a certification duly issued by the UNHCR;
He is presently residing with his family at 341 Burgos Street, Dipolog City, since early part of June
2000 and more so has resided continuously in the Philippines for not less than 11 years
immediately preceding the date of this petition; to wit, since 11 July 1990 and in Dipolog City for
more than one (1) year;
His last place of foreign residence was Pakistan and his other places of residence, prior to his
present residence, were as follows (i) Panay Ave., Quezon City; (ii) Sta. Filomena, Dipolog City;
(iii) Capitol Area, Dumaguete City; (iv) Dohinob, Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte;

He was born on 4 September 1966 in Tehran, Iran, as shown in his identity card which also
serves as his birth certificate;
He is married and is the father of one (1) child;
His wife Cliji G. Lim Karbasi is a Filipino citizen, 22 years old and born on 10 August 1979 in Cebu
City, whom he married on 12 October 2000 in Dipolog City, as shown in their certificate of
marriage;
His child, Keenyji L. Karbasi, l-year old , was born on 9 June 2001 in Dipolog City and presently
residing with him and his wife at 341 Burgos Street, Dipolog City;
He arrived in Manila, Philippines, under an assumed name (Syed Gul Agha) from Pakistan on 11
July 1990 specifically at the Manila International Airport on board Philippine Airlines Flight No.
731, per UNHCR certification containing reference to his Pakistani passport issued under said
assumed name;
Due to his marriage, he is entitled to the benefit of Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 473,
which reduced to five years the ten year requirement of continuous residence;
He speaks and writes English and Visayan;
His trade or occupation is as a repair technician in which he has been engaged since 1998 and, as
such, he derives an average annual income of Php 80,000.00 more or less;
He has all the qualifications required under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under
Section 4, of the Commonwealth Act No. 473;

He has complied with the requirements of the Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473)
regarding the filing with the Office of the Solicitor General of his bona fide intention to become a
citizen of the Philippines, as shown in his Declaration of Intention duly filed on 25 May 2001;

It is his intention in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely
and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and
particularly to Iran of which, at this time, he is a citizen or subject; that he will reside
continuously in the Philippines from the date of filing of this petition up to the time of his
admission to Philippine citizenship;

Dominador Natividad Tagulo, of legal age, Filipino, married and residing at ABC Compound,
Quezon Ave., Miputak, Dipolog City and Alton C. Ratificar, of legal age, Filipino, married and
residing at 047 Burgos Street, Dipolog City, who are Filipino citizens, whose affidavits are
attached to his petition, will appear and testify as witnesses at the hearing thereof.

After finding that the petition is sufficient in form, the petitioner submitted his witnesses, and
thereafter, took the witness stand himself. He narrated that he is an Iranian national. He and his
brother left Iran in 1986 beacause of the war between Iran and Iraq at that time. Their
government confiscated their passport so they travelled by camel to Pakistan where they stayed
for 3 years, but was not granted a refugee status there. They decided to come to the Philippines
since one of his brothers was already studying in the country. They procured Pakistani passports
under assumed names.

Upon his arrival in the Philippines on July n, 1990, he submitted himself to the United Nations in
Manila. After several interviews, he was admitted as a refugee and, later on, as a person of
concern. As a refugee, he was granted by the United Nations allowances, medical benefits and
protection to some extent.

On January 17, 2007, the RTC found Karbasi's evidence sufficient to support his petition. Finding
Karbasi as possessing all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino
citizen, the RTC rendered its decision granting the petition for naturalization.
Not in conformity, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), interposed an appeal to the CA, based mainly on the ground that the RTC erred in
granting Karbasi's petition as he failed to comply with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
473 (Naturalization Law) on character, income and reciprocity. Specifically, the OSG pointed out
that Karbasi failed to establish that: 1] Iran grants reciprocal rights of naturalization to Filipino
citizens; 2] he has a lucrative income as required under the law; and 3] he is of good moral
character as shown by his disregard of Philippine tax laws when he had underdeclared his
income in his income tax returns (ITRs) and overstated the same in his petition for naturalization.

The CA ruled that the alleged under declaration in Karbasi's ITRs was prepared in good faith
because he was of the belief that he no longer needed to include the income he received as
payment of his services to Daewoo Electronics Electronics Services, Inc. (Daewoo) and Kolins
Philippines International, Inc. (Kolins), because the same were already withheld at source. The
CA likewise affirmed the RTC finding that Karbasi, as a refugee, need not prove reciprocity
between Philippine and Iranian laws.

ISSUE:
WON reciprocity is necessary in the naturalization of refugees?

HELD: NO
Although it is True that the Naturalization Law disqualifies citizens or subjects of a foreign
country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects. A
perusal of Karbasi's petition, both with the RTC and the CA, together with his supplemental
pleadings filed with the Court, however, reveals that he has successfully established his refugee
status upon arrival in the Philippines. In effect, the country's obligations under its various
international commitments come into operation. Articles 6 and 34 of the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the Philippines is a signatory, must be considered in
this case, to wit:

Article 6 of the 1951 Convention:

For the purposes of this Convention, the term "in the same circumstances" implies that any
requirements (including requirements as to length and conditions of sojourn or residence) which
the particular individual would have to fulfill for the enjoyment of the right in question, if he
were not a refugee, must be fulfilled by him, with the exception of requirements which by their
nature a refugee is incapable of fulfilling.

Article 34 of the 1951 Convention:

The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of
refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to
reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings.
In the same vein, Article 729 of the said Convention expressly provides exemptions from
reciprocity, while Article 34 states the earnest obligation of contracting parties to "as far as
possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees." As applied to this case,
Karbasi's status as a refugee has to end with the attainment of Filipino citizenship, in consonance
with Philippine statutory requirements and international obligations. Indeed, the Naturalization
Law must be read in light of the developments in international human rights law specifically the
granting of nationality to refugees and stateless persons.
Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999
Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar
vs.
Vicente D. Ching, petitioner

Facts:
Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien Chinese father, was born on
April 11, 1964 in Tubao La Union, under the 1935 Constitution. He has resided in the Philippines

He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July 1998, filed an application to take the
1998 Bar Examination.
The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he submit to the Court the
following documents as proof of his Philippine Citizenship:

1. Certification issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a certified accountant;

2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered
voter of his place; and

3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao,
La Union .

On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath taking ceremony was scheduled on
May 5, 1999.

Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take oath.
He was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. The Office of the Solicitor
General was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the Philippine Bar.
In his report:

1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and continue to be so, unless upon
reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship, under the compliance with the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 265 "an act providing for the manner in which the option
to elect Philippine citizenship shall be declared by a person whose mother is a Filipino citizen"

2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship, and if ever he does, it
would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by the present jurisprudence.

Issue:
Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable time".

Rulings:
1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within a
reasonable time. The reasonable time means that the election should be made within 3 years
from upon reaching the age of majority", which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected Philippine
citizenship 14 years after reaching the age of majority which the court considered not within the
reasonable time. Ching offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship,
as procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is
required is an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file the same with the nearest civil
registry.
Co v. HRET (Re: Citizenship issue only) [consti1]
Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representative
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND
JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: citizenship
Date: July 30, 1991
Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident
of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.

Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative
district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private
respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following
grounds:
1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was,
however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

Issue: WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

Ratio:
The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in the
Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on
land which he bought from the fruits of hard work. As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to
obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought
by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of
Samar.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed
Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose
Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got
married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice. The couple bore eight children, one of
whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948. Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this
country. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in
Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in
Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an
unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance
of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.

On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On
May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April
28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate
of naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years
old, finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar.

There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs
and practices of the local populace were concerned.

After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better
education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He
found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in
the hardware business of his family in Manila.

In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in
drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the
basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full
brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the
meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.

The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect
Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino
mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in question was enacted to correct
the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was
automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not,
under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born

Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural
born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority.

To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age
is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a
natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9)
years old.

He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would
be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite
of his already having been a citizen since 1957.

In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary
procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old
In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established
his life here in the Philippines.

Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his
premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
S_C_:_ _T_h_e_ _C_o_u_r_t_ _c_a_n_n_o_t_ _g_o_ _i_n_t_o_ _t_h_e_ _c_o_l_l_a_t_e_r_a_l_
_p_r_o_c_e_d_u_r_e_ _o_f_ _s_t_r_i_p_p_i_n_g_ _r_e_s_p_o_n_d_e_n_t_s_ _f_a_t_h_e_r_
_o_f_ _h_i_s_ _c_i_t_i_z_e_n_s_h_i_p_ _a_f_t_e_r_ _h_i_s_ _d_e_a_t_h_._ _A_n_
_a_t_t_a_c_k_ _o_n_ _a_ _p_e_r_s_o_n_s_ _c_i_t_i_z_e_n_s_h_i_p_ _m_a_y_ _o_n_l_y_
_b_e_ _d_o_n_e_ _t_h_r_o_u_g_h_ _a_ _direct action for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court
to declare the grant of Philippine c_i_t_i_z_e_n_s_h_i_p_ _t_o_ _r_e_s_p_o_n_d_e_n_t_s_
_f_a_t_h_e_r_ _a_s_ _n_u_l_l_ _a_n_d_ _v_o_i_d_ _w_o_u_l_d_ _r_u_n_ _a_g_a_i_n_s_t_
_t_h_e_ _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_l_e_ _o_f_ _d_u_e_ _process because he has already been laid to rest
BENGSON VS. HRET AND CRUZ
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
r_e_q_u_i_r_e_m_e_n_t_ _t_h_a_t_ _n_o_ _p_e_r_s_o_n_ _s_h_a_l_l_ _b_e_ _a_
_M_e_m_b_e_r_ _o_f_ _t_h_e_ _H_o_u_s_e_ _o_f_ _R_e_p_r_e_s_e_n_t_a_t_i_v_e_s_
_u_n_l_e_s_s_ _h_e_ _i_s_ _a_ _natural-b_o_r_n_ _c_i_t_i_z_e_n_._ _
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino
parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his
Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine
Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
c_i_t_i_z_e_n_s_h_i_p_ _b_y_,_ _a_m_o_n_g_ _o_t_h_e_r_,_ _r_e_n_d_e_r_i_n_g_
_s_e_r_v_i_c_e_ _t_o_ _o_r_ _a_c_c_e_p_t_i_n_g_ _c_o_m_m_i_s_s_i_o_n_ _i_n_ _t_h_e_
_a_r_m_e_d_ _f_orces o_f_ _a_ _f_o_r_e_i_g_n_ _c_o_u_n_t_r_y_._ _

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act
Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by
Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States
(1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the
1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET
claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-
born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution. HRET rendered its
decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD: petition dismissed

YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization, 2. by repatriation, and 3. by direct act of Congress. **
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces; 2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War
II; 3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and 5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen.
On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides: Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering
service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after
separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in
the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same
in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision,
Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he
acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation
allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]

FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered
the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending
petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of
the Philippines but of the United States. From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is
both a Filipino and a US citizen. The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as
candidate for said elective position. However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en
banc, the disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have
renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and registered himself as a
voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998. Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-
Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998. Thus the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the
philippines.

RULING: The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854
Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance
on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive
act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result
of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." Consequently, persons
with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of
their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons
with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states. By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same
time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby
terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state
and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of
no moment. When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he
renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes
his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and
complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the
provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province
and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the
legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation
and application. The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed
to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as
a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not
a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said
before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the
Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received
his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. His declarations will be taken
upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust,
there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through
expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the
denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction
can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship. The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
 Ramon Labo, Jr. vs Commission on Elections
176 SCRA 1 _Law on Public Officers _Election Laws _Citizenship of a Public Officer _Dual
Citizenship _Labo Doctrine
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a
petition for quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen
hence disqualified; that he was naturalized as an Australian after he married an Australian. Labo
avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best he has
dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian when he
married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian
was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if h_e_s_
_c_o_n_s_i_d_e_r_e_d_ _a_s_ _a_n_ _A_u_s_t_r_a_l_i_a_n_,_ _h_i_s_ _l_a_c_k_ _o_f_
_c_i_t_i_z_e_n_s_h_i_p_ _i_s_ _j_u_s_t_ _a_ _m_e_r_e_ _t_e_c_h_n_i_c_a_l_i_t_y_
_w_h_i_c_h_ _s_h_o_u_l_d_ _not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for
him by a vast majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty race, can
replace Labo in the event Labo is disqualified.
HELD:
1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was
naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an
Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the
government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian passport to return to
the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that
he is a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He
cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To
restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a Filipino
through an act of Congress _none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should
not overcome the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have,
even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo had they
known he is Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total
allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the
Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding, that he
s_h_o_u_l_d_ _b_e_ _d_e_c_l_a_r_e_d_ _t_h_e_ _m_a_y_o_r_ _b_y_ _r_e_a_s_o_n_ _o_f_
_L_a_b_o_s_ _d_i_s_q_u_a_l_i_f_i_c_a_t_i_o_n_ _b_e_c_a_u_s_e_ _L_a_r_d_i_z_a_b_a_l_
_o_b_t_a_i_n_e_d_ _the second highest number of vote. It would be extremely repugnant to
the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the
majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do
not choose him. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have
received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental
idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure
can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in
the election.
YU vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
GR No. L-83882, January 24, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner Yu was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971. On February 10, 1978, he was
naturalized as a Philippine citizen. Despite his naturalization, he applied for and was issued
Portuguese Passport by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo on July 21,
1981. Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. He also
declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the
Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
The CID detained Yu pending his deportation case. Yu, in turn, filed a petition for habeas corpus.
An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. The Court en
banc denied the petition. When his Motion for Reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed a
Motion for Clarification.
ISSUE:

W_h_e_t_h_e_r_ _o_r_ _n_o_t_ _p_e_t_i_t_i_o_n_e_r_s_ _a_c_t_s_ _c_o_n_s_t_i_t_u_t_e_

_r_e_n_u_n_c_i_a_t_i_o_n_ _o_f_ _h_i_s_ _P_h_i_l_i_p_p_i_n_e_ _c_i_t_i_z_e_n_s_h_i_p_ _

HELD:
Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and
explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal
capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine
citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of
his Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had
become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese
citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his Philippine citizenship
should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become
unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look into the facts
and satisfy itself on whether or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is
meritorious.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when
required and suppressed when convenient.
FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC (1996)
G.R. No. 120295, June 28 1996, 257 SCRA 727
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won. Raul R. Lee questioned his
citizenship. He then petitioned for repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 and was able
to take his oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen.
However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had already ruled based on his
previous attempts to run as governor and acquire citizenship, and had proclaimed Lee, who got
the second highest number of votes, as the newly elect Governor of Sorsogon.

ISSUE:
W_h_e_t_h_e_r_ _o_r_ _n_o_t_ _F_r_i_v_a_l_d_o_s_ _r_e_p_a_t_r_i_a_t_i_o_n_ _w_a_s_
_v_a_l_i_d_._ _

HELD:
The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal and because of the curative nature of
Presidential Decree No. 725, his repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of his application
to run for governor. The steps to reacquire Philippine Citizenship by repatriation under
Presidential Decree No. 725 are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3)
taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is only upon taking the oath of
allegiance that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the
decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then
it should not have explicitly provided otherwise. He is therefore qualified to be proclaimed
governor of Sorsogon.
 AKBAYAN YOUTH VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147066, March 26 2001
FACTS:
Petitioner Akbayan Youth seek to direct the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a
special registration before May 2001 General Elections for new voters ages 18 to 21. According
to petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000
deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189.
A request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17 and 18,
2001 was passed but it was denied by the COMELEC. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8189 explicitly
provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty
(120) days before a regular election and that the Commission has no more time left to
accomplish all pre-election activities.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court can compel respondent COMELEC, to conduct a special registration of
new v_o_t_e_r_s_ _d_u_r_i_n_g_ _t_h_e_ _p_e_r_i_o_d_ _b_e_t_w_e_e_n_ _t_h_e_
_C_O_M_E_L_E_C_s_ _i_m_p_o_s_e_d_ _D_e_c_e_m_b_e_r_ _2_7_,_ _2_0_0_0_ _deadline
and the May 14, 2001 general elections.

HELD:
The Supreme Court could not compel Comelec to conduct a special registration of new voters.
The right to suffrage is not absolute and must be exercised within the proper bounds and
framework of the Constitution. Petitioners failed to register, thus missed their chance. However,
court took judicial notice of the fact that the President issued a proclamation calling Congress to
a Special Session to allow the conduct of special registration for new voters and that bills had
been filed in Congress to amend Republic Act No. 8189. Read full text
 MACALINTAL VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 157013, July 10 2003
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a
member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No.
9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming
that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that
public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition
as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 9189 violates the residency requirement in
Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution.
(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law violates the constitutional mandate under
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-
President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress.
(3) Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created
in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections, promulgate without
violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution.

HELD:
(1) No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified voting under this Act. It
disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country.
However, an exception is provided i.e. unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit
prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years from approval of registration. Such
affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to
return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from
the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in
absentia.
Petitioner claims that this is violative of the residency requirement in Section 1 Article V of the
Constitution which requires the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one yr,
and a resident in the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6 months immediately
preceding an election.
However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present, and that the Court
may have to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of the controversy: Affidavit for without it,
the presumption of abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain. The qualified Filipino abroad
who executed an affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines and
presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. Section 5 of RA
No. 9189 does not only require the promise to resume actual physical permanent residence in
the Philippines not later than 3 years after approval of registration but it also requires the
Filipino abroad, WON he is a green card holder, a temporary visitor or even on business trip,
must declare that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, he/she must
return to the Philippines otherwise consequences will be met according to RA No. 9189.
Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has exercised his right to
vote, the Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal or modify it if
such law is found to be impractical. However, it can be said that the Congress itself was
conscious of this probability and provided for deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to
return as promised
stands to lose his right of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes he cast shall not be invalidated
because he was qualified to vote on the date of the elections.
Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets down plainly its whole meaning, the Court is
prevented from making it mean what the Court pleases. In fine, considering that underlying
intent of the Constitution, as is evident in its statutory construction and intent of the framers,
which is to grant Filipino immigrants and permanent residents abroad the unquestionable right
to exercise the right of suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court finds that Section 5 of RA No. 9189
is not constitutionally defective.
(2) Yes. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally
belongs to it. The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for
President and Vice President for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress as its
duty and power under Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to
proclaim the winning candidates only for Senators and Party-list Reps.
(3) No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the Implementing
Rules & Regulations for RA No. 9189, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional
authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the
COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual
silence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional. Read full text
Ichong vs Hernandez
FACTS: The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was
to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the peoples
economic life.
_a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital
of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade
_aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their
business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary
retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the
expiration of term.

Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.
_provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws
on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to
trade, commerce and industry.
_provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail
business of additional stores or branches of retail business

Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:
1. it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty
and property without due process
2. the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
3. the Act violates international and treaty obligations
4. the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru
hereditary succession

ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.

HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal
protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between
an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification adopted.

RATIO: The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The classification is actual, real and
reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike. The difference in status between
citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police
power. Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the
retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the legislatures target in the enactment of
the Act. The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the
national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the
Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to
the State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency. While the citizen
holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country, the alien may
become the potential enemy of the State.
The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he
makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien now
enjoys a monopolistic control on the nations economy endangering the national security in
times of crisis and emergency.
GONZALES VS HECHANOVA
Posted by kaye lee on 12:36 PM
G.R. No. L-21897 October 22 1963 [Executive Agreements]

FACTS:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation of foreign rice to be purchased from
private sources. Gonzales filed a petition opposing the said implementation because RA No. 3542
which allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207, prohibits the importation of rice and corn "by
the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency."
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is to be authorized by the
President of the Philippines, and by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines. They add
that after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any other government agency from
importing rice and corn, S. 10 of RA 3542 indicates that only private parties may import rice
under its provisions. They contended that the government has already constitute valid executive
agreements with Vietnam and Burma, that in case of conflict between RA 2207 and 3542, the
latter should prevail and the conflict be resolved under the American jurisprudence.

ISSUE:
W/N the executive agreements may be validated in our courts.

RULING:
No. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive agreements has
been sufficiently established. Even assuming that said contracts may properly considered as
executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional
viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207
and 3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional system enter into
executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive
agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.

Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. He may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except
in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired
the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for
the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
Agustin v. Edu, G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979, 88 SCRA 195

Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the constitutionality of Letter of Instruction
229 and its implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO Commissioner Romeo Edu. His car already
had warning lights and did not want to use this.
The letter was promulgation for the requirement of an early warning device installed on a
vehicle to reduce accidents between moving vehicles and parked cars.

The LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate of not more than 15% of the acquisition cost.

The triangular reflector plates were set when the car parked on any street or highway for 30
minutes. It was mandatory.

Petitioner: 1. LOI violated the provisions and delegation of police power, equal protection, and
due process/

2. It was oppressive because the make manufacturers and car dealers millionaires at the expense
f car owners at 56-72 pesos per set. Hence the petition.

The OSG denied the allegations in par X and XI of the petition with regard to the
unconstitutionality and undue delegation of police power to such acts.

The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna convention of UN on road signs as a
regulation. To the petitioner, this was still an unlawful delegation of police power.

Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of
Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to
equip them with a pair of reflectorized triangular early warning devices. Agustin is arguing that
this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are
already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other
motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning
devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.

HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive,
for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said
motor vehicles, 2) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, 3) built-in
reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles, or 4) well-lighted two (2)
petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the
said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least
400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a
reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways,
will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road,
highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which
obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the
aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get
adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an
emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or
uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of
collision.

On Police Power

The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is
conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the
former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due
process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was
mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was
originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision,
as nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty was
stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: Justice Laurel, in the first leading
decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with
state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order
to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.
Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a
competence being referred to as the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The concept
was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted
by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the
greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, the
most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers, extending as Justice Holmes aptly
pointed out to all the great public needs. Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of
the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past
may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent
changes with the time. The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon
its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an
individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact that the
particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It
would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of
that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The
latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment
conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a
statute, the purpose of which was: To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on
roads and streets designated as national roads . . . As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be
nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner
failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.
IBP VS ZAMORA
G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy clause]

FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President
Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with
each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP
questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law
enforcement.

ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is
subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of
judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an
actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy
clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for
civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility
patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the
deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the
Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be
properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the
deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police
force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the military in the task of law
enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
GUDANI VS. SENGA
GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006 [Article VI Sec. 22: Congress' Power of Inquiry; Legislative
Investigation]

FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud
and the surfacing of the Hello Garci tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the
executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative
inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting
Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without
Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a
directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for
allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the Chain of
Command. Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court
Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP
preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.

RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is
liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the
appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate
remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons
to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined,
the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military
officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the
duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior
consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In
doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed
that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the
President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive
privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and
speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief
are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the
legislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised
for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly
detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative
inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway
despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today
that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the
clash may soon loom or actualize.

The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the
appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed
with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is
nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.
Gonzalez et al. vs. Gen. Abaya
G.R. No. 164007, Aug. 10, 2006

The nature of the military justice system

Coup d'etat vis-a-vis violation of the Articles of War

FACTS:

On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted
men of the AFP entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala
Avenue, Makati City, where they disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices
around the building. They then declared their withdrawal of support from their Commander-in-
Chief and demanded that she resign as President of the Republic.

After much negotiation, the group finally laid down their arms. Subsequently, an Information for
coup detat was filed against them with the RTC, at the same time that they were tried at court
martial for conduct unbecoming an officer. They question the jurisdiction of the court martial,
contending that the RTC ordered that their act was not service-connected and that their
violation of Art. 96 of the Articles of War (RA 7055) was absorbed by the crime of coup detat.

ISSUE:

Whether the act complained of was service-connected and therefore cognizable by court martial
or absorbed by the crime of coup d'etat cognizable by regular courts

RULING:

The military justice system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the highest form of
discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of military efficiency. Military law is established
not merely to enforce discipline in times of war, but also to preserve the tranquility and security
of the State in times of war, but also to preserve the tranquility and security of the State in time
of peace; for there is nothing more dangerous to the public peace and safety than a licentious
and undisciplined military body. The administration of military justice has been universally
practiced. Since time immemorial, all the armies in almost all countries of the world look upon
the power of military law and its administration as the most effective means of enforcing
discipline. For this reason, the court martial has become invariably an indispensable part of any
organized armed forces, it being the most potent agency in enforcing discipline both in peace
and in war.

The Court held that the offense is service-connected. xxx It bears stressing that the charge
against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend
the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor
and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional
conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the service-connected nature of
the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same dismissal from the service imposable only
by the military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to
cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military
discipline.
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC (IDCP) vs. Office of the Executive Secretary,
et al (2003)

FACTS: Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under DSWD, is a non-governmental

organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim
communities. Among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient
manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and
manufacturers. On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46
5 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office on
Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the
exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities.
Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of
Church and State and that it is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and
guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious
organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims.

ISSUE: Whether the EO is violates the constitutional provision as to freedom of religion

RULING: The Court grants the petition. OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and economic
concerns of the Muslim community as a "national cultural community" and not as a religious
group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State, the latter
must make sure that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-
establishment clause and the "free exercise of religion" provision found in Article III, Section 5 of
the 1987 Constitution. Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our
fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that
it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live,
consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good." Without doubt, classifying a
food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the
Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal,
EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to
interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by
arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims
to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. Only the prevention of
an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the
infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a
democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its
citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious
activity. There is no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations,
like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise
that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the
exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim
Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by
government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for
human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the
religious freedom of Muslims. With these regulatory bodies given detailed functions on how to
screen and check the quality and safety of food products, the perceived danger against the
health of Muslim and non-Muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided. The halal certifications issued
by petitioner and similar organizations come forward as the official religious approval of a food
product fit for Muslim consumption. The petition is GRANTED. Executive Order 46, s. 2000, is
hereby declared NULL AND VOID.
TABASA VS CA
Posted by kaye lee on 10:16 PM
G.R. No. 125 793, 29 August 2006 [Naturalization; Reacquisition; R.A. No. 8171]

FACTS:
When he was 7 years old, Joevanie A. Tabasa acquired American citizenship when his father
became a naturalized citizen of the US. In 1995, he arrived in the Philippines and was admitted
as "balikbayan"; thereafter, he was arrested and detained by the agent of BIR. Th Consul General
of the US embassy of Manila filed a request with the BID that his passport has been revoked and
that Tabasa had a standing warrant for several federal charges against him.
Petitioner alleged that he acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with the RA
No. 8171, and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by
the BID.

ISSUE:
Whether or not he has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171 and therefore, is
not an undocumented alien subject to deportation.

RULING:
No. Petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. The only person
entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 is either a Filipino woman who lost her Philippine
citizenship by marriage to an alien, or a natural-born Filipino, including his minor children who
lost Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
Petitioner was already 35 years old when he filed for repatriation. The act cannot be applied in
his case because he is no longer a minor at the time of his repatriation in 1996. The privilege
under RA 8171 only belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of filing of the petition
for repatriation.
ALTAREJOS VS COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 9:25 PM
G.R. No. 163256, 10 Nov 2004 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]

FACTS:
Private respondents filed with the COMELEC to disqualify and deny due course or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Ciceron P. Altarejos, on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and
that he made a false representation in his COC that he was not a permanent resident of the
Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate, the town he's running for as mayor in the May 10, 2004
elections. Altarejos answered that he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the
Special Committee on Naturalization in December 17, 1997.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the registration of petitioners repatriation with the proper civil registry and with
the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation.

RULING:
Yes. The registration of certificate of repatriation with the proper local civil registry and with the
Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting repatriation. Petitioner completed all the
requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty
position but before the elections. Petitioners repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his
application and was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in
the May 10, 2004 elections.
AAJS, CALILUNG VS. DATUMANONG
Posted by kaye lee on 1:32 PM
G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2009 [Dual Citizenship; Dual Allegiance; RA 9225 - Citizenship
Reacquisition Act of 2003]

FACTS:
Petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing RA
9225, or Act Making the Citizenship of the Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship
Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, as Amended, and for Other
Purposes. Petitioner avers that said Act is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of
the 1987 Constitution: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law."

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9225 is unconstitutional by recognizing and allowing dual allegiance.

RULING:
No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of policy and is not self-executing
provision.

What RA 9225 does is to allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
their Philippine citizenship, by reason of naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. In its face,
it does not recognize dual allegiance.
MOY YA LIM YAO VS. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
G.R. No. L-21289, October 4 1971, 41 SCRA 292

FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8
February 1961. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary
visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon,
Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand
uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a
period of one month.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake,
among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before
the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his
discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly
allow.

After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13
February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the
Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate
deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction. At
the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen
Yeung could not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not
name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names
of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied
the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to
a Filipino citizen.

HELD:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he
takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the
naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of
an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go
through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it
should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to
treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today,
there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of
a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she
may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a
transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that
the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of
citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born
Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or
administrative case. Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to
have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962
NICOLAS-LEWIS v COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioners were successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225,
which accords to such applicants the right to suffrage, among others. Long before the May 2004
national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification as
overseas absentee voter only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States
that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003, they
have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence
requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the different
Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voters registration, as the
residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain individuals who would
likely be eligible to vote in future elections.
However, the COMELEC denied petition of the petitioners on the ground that to
exercise absentee voting; the one-year residency requirement should be fulfilled.
HELD:
RA 9189 provides a list of those who cannot avail themselves of the absenteevoting mechanism.
However, Section 5(d) of the enumeration respecting Filipino immigrants and permanent
residents in another country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule. Section
5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is
recognized as such in the host country because immigration or permanent residence in
another country implies renunciation of ones residence in his country of origin.
However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter
for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile
in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that all
citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law must be entitled to exercise the
right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if
actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the
Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.
After what appears to be a successful application for recognition of Philippine citizenship under
R.A. 9189, petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy political rights, specifically the right of
suffrage, pursuant to Section 5 thereof.
As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law R.A. 9225 requiring duals
to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise
their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals are most
likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted
an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in
essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the
residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to
vote.
It is clear from these discussions of the Constitutional Commission that [it] intended to
enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their
domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting
age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as
voters for the first time.
Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope
of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that duals may now
exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters.
R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the following wise:
Absentee Voting refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad
exercise their right to vote;
Overseas Absentee Voter refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and
vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections.
Burca vs. Republic

An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. Republic (51 SCRA 248[1973]),
viz:We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a party in a case is definitely
resolved by a court or by an administrative agency, as a material issue in the controversy,
after a full blown hearing with the active participation of the Solicitor General or his
authorized representative, and this finding or the citizenship of the party is affirmed by this
Court, the decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof of such party's citizenship in
any other case or proceeding. But it is made clear that in no instance will a decision on the
question of citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any other case or
proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with the procedure herein stated. Thus, in order that
the doctrine of res judicata
may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present: 1) a person's citizenship
must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a
party;2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in
the resolution thereof, and 3) the finding of citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)

FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first
complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the
Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are
entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a
distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License
Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no
cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed
for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court
to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge
gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not
agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said
right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many
other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of
E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the
governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the
country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in
Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of
1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined
the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they
represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance
the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to
respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that
the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their
right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no
further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough
to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded
jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom
of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates
the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is
not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause
cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by

the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and
general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET
ASIDE.
Basco vs. PAGCOR (G.R. No. 91649) - Digest
Facts:
Petitioner is seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
Charter -- PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and
because it constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law. It waived the Manila Cit governments right to impose taxes and license fees, which is
recognized by law. For the same reason, the law has intruded into the local governments right
to impose local taxes and license fees. This is in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined
principle of local autonomy.

Issue:
Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1869 is valid.

Ruling:
1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes.
Their charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power, otherwise the
municipality cannot assume it. Its power to tax therefore must always yield to a legislative act
which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the inherent power to
tax.

The Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that municipal
corporations are mere creatures of Congress, which has the power to create and abolish
municipal corporations due to its general legislative powers. Congress, therefore, has the
power of control over the Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the
power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

2. The City of Manilas power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked by P.D.
No. 771 and vested exclusively on the National Government. Therefore, only the National
Government has the power to issue license or permits for the operation of gambling.

3. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.

PAGCOR is government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, P.D. No. 1869.
All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. PAGCOR has a dual role, to
operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the
category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the
Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its
operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local Government.

4. Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by
P.D. No. 1869.

Article 10, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution:

Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to
levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may
provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall
accrue exclusively to the local government.

SC said this is a pointless argument. The power of the local government to impose taxes and
fees is always subject to limitations which Congress may provide by law. Besides, the principle
of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means decentralization. It does not
make local governments sovereign within the state.

Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.

CASE DIGEST

Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC
declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide
campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered
political party with a national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the
COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section
26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to
those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties.
The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the
presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the
office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous
national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international
campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.

ISSUE:

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level
of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests
such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally
considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different
treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II,
the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies
a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to
any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that
would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as
written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is
difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means
and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed
under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access,"
"opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their
inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people
an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be
sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations.
Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations
apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not
violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are
meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar,
there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they
create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of
candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The
State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and
orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting
elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for
logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation
for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous
enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable
campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies
which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged
by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the
instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The
basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the
reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of
further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a
nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is
thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under
the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born
citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years
of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by
issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to
the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes.
Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices
including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department
for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the
issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military
in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by
E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid
and constitutional?

RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive
privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information
must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege
being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to
Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in
enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is
sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground
that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be
respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S.
$ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples
Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007
hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were
using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared
in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos
of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He
further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner
refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that
the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down
in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an
order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v.
Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way
diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates
to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military
and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-
in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of
separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality
than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational
proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome
by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important
evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials necessary in her executive and
policy decision-making process and, that the information sought to be disclosed might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put,
the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating
to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President
to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a
close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive
privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not
appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September
26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly
manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only
of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III
provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by
issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to
the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes.
Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices
including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department
for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the
issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military
in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by
E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid
and constitutional?

RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive
privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information
must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege
being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to
Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in
enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is
sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground
that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be
respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
CASE DIGEST - AKBAYAN VS. AQUINO
Facts: The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) at the
sidelines of the Asia-Europe Summit in Helsinki in September 2006 was hailed by both Japanese
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a
milestone in the continuing cooperation and collaboration, setting a new chapter of strategic
partnership for mutual opportunity and growth (for both countries).
JPEPA which has been referred to as a mega treaty is a comprehensive plan for opening up of
markets in goods and services as well as removing barriers and restrictions on investments. It is a
deal that encompasses even our commitments to the WTO.
The complexity of JPEPA became all the more evident at the Senate hearing conducted by the
Committee on Trade and Commerce last November 2006. The committee, chaired by Senator
Mar Roxas, heard differing views and perspectives on JPEPA. On one hand the committee heard
Governments rosy projections on the economic benefits of JPEPA and on the other hand the
views of environmental and trade activists who raised there very serious concerns about the
country being turned into Japans toxic waste basket. The discussion in the Senate showed that
JPEPA is not just an issue concerning trade and economic relations with Japan but one that
touches on broader national development concerns.

Issues:

1. Do the therein petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus in their capacity as
citizens of the Republic, as taxpayers, and as members of the Congress

2. Can this Honorable Court exercise primary jurisdiction of this case and take cognizance of the
instant petition.

3. Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted from
the general rules on transparency and full public disclosure such that the Philippine government
is justified in denying access thereto.

Rulings:

The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16, 2008 its ruling on the case of Akbayan
Citizens Action Party et al vs. Thomas G. Aquino et al (G.R. No. 170516). The Highest Tribunal
dismissed the Petition for mandamus and prohibition, which sought to compel respondents
Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et al to furnish petitioners
the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) and the lists of
the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent
attachments and annexes thereto.

In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the JPEPA has been made accessible to the
public since 11 September 2006, and thus the demand to be furnished with copy of the said
document has become moot and academic. Notwithstanding this, however, the Court lengthily
discussed the substatives issues, insofar as they impinge on petitioners' demand for access to
the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.

The Court held: Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the
final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be 'ample
opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved' the offers exchanged by the parties
during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is
reasonable to conclude that the Japenese representatives submitted their offers with the
understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could
impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign
governments in future negotiations.

It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations
would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during
negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations normally involve a process
of quid pro quo, where negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of lesser
importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest.

In the same Decision, the Court took time to address the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno. It said: We are aware that behind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to
protect our people's right to information against any abuse of executive privilege. It is a zeal that
We fully share. The Court, however, in its endeavour to guard against the abuse of executive
privilege, should be careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point that it would
strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise thereof.
Rulings:
Pelaez vs Auditor General
undue delegation of legislative power

Caption: PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL

G.R. No. L-23825 15 SCRA 569 December 24, 1965
EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.

Facts:
The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating
thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice
President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ
of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as
his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section
68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960 and
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 2370, reads: Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their
names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Issues:
Whether or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power.

Discussions:
Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise
general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the
laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the
exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This
power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are
concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more
authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform
their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with
local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority.
Rulings:
Yes. It did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers. The alleged power of the President to
create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority
even greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or
offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to
comply with the constitutional mandate. Instead of giving the President less power over local
governments than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it
reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over
municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or
offices.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA
G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED
VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO,
JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D.
LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.

Facts:
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA)
9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a
system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund)
and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of
RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and
incentives, the law transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into
mercenaries and bounty hunters as they will do their best only in consideration of such
rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the
constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should
not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to
the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA
9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue
collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue
targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President
without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and
unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that
it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the
congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law.

Issues:
Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the President.
Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a
congressional oversight committee.

Discussions:
The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, which states that
the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of
the laws upon all citizens of the State.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in
speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it
goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality.
The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a
sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be
sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegates authority, announce the
legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is clear that congressional
oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an
encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional
separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the
over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

Rulings:
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its
expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should
logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC
because they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national
government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities
through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions taxation. Indubitably,
such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence,
the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy
the demands of equal protection.
R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue
targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and
4 of the said Act. Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards:
public interest, justice and equity, public convenience and welfare and simplicity,
economy and welfare.33 In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.
The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA
9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR)
formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said
IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged
encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be
considered moot and academic.
Sultan Osop Camid vs. The Office of the President
Posted on September 11, 2012
Sultan Osop Camid vs. The office of the President
G.R. No. 161414 January 14, 2005
Facts:
The municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur, is a town that is not supposed to exist yet is actually
insisted by some as alive and thriving. The creation of the putative municipality was declared
void ab initio by the Supreme Court four decades ago, but the present petition insists that
Andong thrives on and, hence, its legal personality should be given judicial affirmation.
xxx
The factual antecedents derive from the ruling in Pelaez vs.Auditor General in 1965. Then
President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive Orders creating 33 municipalities in
Mindanao.
President Macapagal justified the creation of these municipalities citing his powers
under Sec.68 of the Revised Admin. Code. Then VP Emmanuel Pelaez filed a special civil action
for a writ of prohibition alleging that the EOs were null and void, Sec. 68 having been repealed by
RA 2370, and said orders constituting an undue delegation of legislative power.
After due deliberation, the SC ruled that the challenged EOs were null and void since Sec. 68 of
the Revised Admin. Code did not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of
legislative power to the executive branch.
Among the EOs annulled was EO 107 which created the Municipality of Andong.
Petitioner represents himself as a current resident of Andong and alleged that Andong has
metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to
handle essential services for the municipality and its constituents, despite the fact that no
person has been appointed, elected or qualified to serve any of the local government offices of
Andong since 1968.
Camid imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of DILG in not classifying [Andong] as a
regular existing municipality and in not including said municipality in its records and official
database as [an] existing regular municipality. He argues that Pelaez has already been modified
by supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence, particularly citing
Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez wherein the court affirmed the unique status of the
Municipality of San Andres as a de facto municipal corporation. Camid also cites Sec. 442(d) of
the Local Government Code of 1991 as basis for the recognition of the impugned municipality.
Issue:
Whether the judicial annulment of the Municipality of Andong continues despite the petitioners
allegation that Andong has thrived into a full-blown municipality
Held:
Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has
claimed and exercised corporate functions with the knowledge and acquiescence of the
legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by
prescription. What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by
the municipal corporation of its corporate powers, as well as the acquiescence thereto by
instrumentalities of the state. Camids plaint should have undergone the usual administrative
gauntlet and, once that was done, should have been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which
at least would have had the power to make the necessary factual determinations. Petitioners
seeming ignorance of the principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of
courts, as well as the concomitant prematurity of the present petition, cannot be countenanced.
The question as to whether a municipality previously annulled by the Supreme Court may attain
recognition in the absence of any curative/reimplementing statute has never been decided
before. The effect of Sec. 442(d) of the Local Government Code on municipalities such as
Andong warrants explanation.
EO 107 which established Andong was declared null and void ab initio in 1965 by the Supreme
Court in Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965), along with 33 other EOs. The phrase
ab initio means from the beginning. Pelaez was never reversed by the SC but was rather
expressly affirmed in the cases of Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva, Municipality of Malabang v.
Benito, and Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya. No subsequent ruling declared Pelaez as
overturned/inoperative. No subsequent legislation has been passed since 1965 creating the
Municipality of Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong
does not exist as a duly constituted municipality.
Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the President has no power to create municipalitiesyet
limited its nullificatory effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before
this Court. With the promulgation of the LGC in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the
municipalities similarly created by executive order but not judicially annulled Sec. 442(b) of the
LGC deemed curative whatever legal defects to title these municipalities had labored under.
There are eminent differences between Andong and municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia
and Sinacaban. Most prominent is the fact that the EO creating Andong was expressly annulled
by the SC in 1965. Court decisions cannot lose their efficacy due to sheer defiance by the parties
aggrieved.
Sec. 442(d) of the LGC does not serve to affirm/reconstitute the judicially dissolved
municipalities which had been previously created by presidential issuances/EOs. The provision
only affirms the legal personalities of those municipalities which may have been created using
the same infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled. On
the other hand, the municipalities judicially dissolved remain inexistent unless recreated through
specific legislative enactments.
The legal effect of the nullification of a municipality in Pelaez was to revert the constituent
barrios of the voided town back to their original municipalities.
If there is only a strong impulse for the reconstitution of the municipality nullified in Pelaez,
the solution is through the legislature and not judicial confirmation of void title. The time has
come for the light to seep in and for the petitioner and like-minded persons to awaken to legal
reality.