Possessor in GF
amounting to P37, 455,410.54 including the P2, 000,000.00 paid to franco.
1. RP vs Ballocanag - Jayson
Loss or unlawful deprivation of a Movable
2. Domalsin vs Valencio - Robert
3. Dizon vs Suntay - Maii
4. Pica vs CFI Rizal - Mals
G.R. No. L-36434 October 27, 1973
Pica Lawful owner of the motor vehicle.
Private respondent Anatolio Carigo - claims ownership of the same vehicle by
purchase from one Monico Maniquiz
Maniquiz SPA had no authority to, and could not, transfer title of the car to
Maniquiz from whom respondent claims to have "free from all liens and
encumbrances."
A long-established doctrinal jurisprudence that petitioner as owner of the car
of which she had been unduly deprived may recover the same as against the
possessor (without reimbursement of the sum received in a private sale by the
embezzler or wrongdoer from the possessor) even assuming that the possessor
had purchased the same in good faith, since an owner cannot be dispossessed
of his property without his consent and the wrongdoer cannot transfer to
another a title that he does not have.
5. Ledesma vs CA - JM
6. BPI vs Franco Riza
(Negotiable Instruments-Money as a medium of exchange)
FACTS:
Franco opened 3 accounts with BPI the total amount of P2,
000,000.00. The said amount used to open these accounts is traceable to a
check issued by Tevesteco. The funding for the P2,000,000.00 check was part
of the P80,000,000.00 debited by BPI from FMCIs account (with a deposit
of P100,000,000.00) and credited to Tevestecos account pursuant to an
Authority to Debit which was allegedly forged as claimed by FMIC.
PROPERTY
ARGUELLES.BAUTISTA R. BAUTISTA M. CORDERO
IPORAC.LAURIO.ORTEGA.URFILLA
Tevesteco effected several withdrawals and already from its account
Franco issued two checks which were dishonoured upon presentment
for payment due to garnishment of his account filed by BPI.
BPI claimed that it had a better right to the amounts which consisted
of part of the money allegedly fraudulently withdrawn from it by Tevesteco
and ending up in Francos account. BPI urges us that the legal consequence of
FMICs forgery claim is that the money transferred by BPI to Tevesteco is its
own, and considering that it was able to recover possession of the same when
the money was redeposited by Franco, it had the right to set up its ownership
thereon and freeze Francos accounts.
ISSUE:
WON the bank has a better right to the deposits in Francos account.
HELD:
No. significantly, while Article 559 permits an owner who has lost or
has been unlawfully deprived of a movable to recover the exact same thing
from the current possessor, BPI simply claims ownership of the equivalent
amount of money,i.e., the value thereof, which it had mistakenly debited from
FMICs account and credited to Tevestecos, and subsequently traced to
Francos account.
Money bears no earmarks of peculiar ownership, and this
characteristic is all the more maniefest in the instant case which involves
money in a banking transaction gone awry. Its primary function is to pass
from hand to hand as a medium of exchange, without other evidence of its
title. Money, which had been passed through various transactions in the
general course of banking business, even if of traceable origin, is no exception.
Usufruct
7. Bachroach vs Seifer and Eliianoff Gerwin
1
The estate of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares of stock of the Atok-
Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc., received from the latter 54,000 shares
representing 50 per cent stock dividend on the said 108,000 shares.
Is a stock dividend fruit or income, which belongs to the usufructuary, or is it
capital or part of the corpus of the estate, which pertains to the
remainderman?
Held:
Any dividend, whether cash or stock, represents surplus profits.
Thus, the 108,000 shares of stock are part of the property in usufruct. The
54,000 shares of stock dividend are civil fruits of the original investment.
8. Reyes vs Grey Alecs
Facts:
Prior to the appointment of the administrator for the estate of the deceased
Remedios Grey, and as the result of certain judicial proceedings had against
her surviving husband (the plaintiff in the case at bar), his usufructuary
interest in the estate of his deceased wife was sold under execution and deeds
issued therefor to the purchaser, the defendant Jose Grey. Such deeds still
subsist in full force and effect, no steps ever having been taken either to annul
or set them aside or to redeem the interest of the plaintiff thus sold.
Counsel for the plaintiff now insists that a usufructuary interest in real
property is not such an interest or right as can be sold under execution.
Issue:
Whether or not a usufructuary interest can be sold under execution.
Ruling:
SEC. 450. Property liable to execution. All goods, chattels, moneys, and
other property, both real and personal, or any interest therein of the judgment
debtor, not excempt by law, and all property and rights of property seized and
PROPERTY
ARGUELLES.BAUTISTA R. BAUTISTA M. CORDERO
IPORAC.LAURIO.ORTEGA.URFILLA
held under attachment in the action, shall be liable to execution. Shares and
interests in any corporation or company, and debts, credits, and all other
property, both real and personal, or any interest in either real or personal
property, and all other property not capable of manual delivery, may be
attached on execution, in like manner as upon writs of attachment.itc-alf
The term "property" as here applied to lands comprehends every species of
title, inchoate or complete; legal or equitable. This statute authorizes the sale
under execution of every kind of property, and every interest in property
which is, or may be, the subject of private ownership and transfer. It deals with
equitable rights and interests as it deals with legal, without anywhere
expressly recognizing or any distinction between them.
Article 480 of the Civil Code reads:
The usufructuary may personally enjoy the thing in usufruct, lease it to
another person, or alienate his right to the usufruct, even for a good
consideration; . . . .
If the usufructuary right is one which may be leased or sold, it must logically
and necessarily follow that such a right is an "interest" in real property within
the meaning of section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure, above quoted. It
was the plaintiff's usufructuary right in real property which was sold under
execution. This right was conferred upon him at the death of his wife by
operation of law, and by virtue of such a right he was entitled to receive all the
natural, industrial, and civil fruits of said real property in usufruct. He was
entitled to hold the actual, material possession of such property during his
lifetime, and was obligated only to preserve its form and substance. In other
words, he was entitled, subject to his restriction, to use the property as his
own. He was the real owner of this interest, and article 480, supra, conferred
upon him the right to enjoy the possession of the property or lease it to another
or to sell such interest outright. We think the real test, as to whether or not
property can be attached and sold upon execution
is does the judgment debtor hold such a beneficial interest in such property
that he can sell or otherwise dispose of it for value? If he does, then the
property is subject to execution and payment of his debts. The right of usufruct
is such an interest, and when the sheriff sold the plaintiff's usufructuary right
by virtue of an execution, he had no further interest in said property.
2
 9. NHA vs CA - Jayson
10. Moralidad vs Pernes - Robert
Easement
11. Fajardo vs Freedom to Build - Maii
12. Liwag vs Happy Glen Loop Jomeowner Association - Mals
G.R. No. 189755 July 4, 2012
An easement for water facility exists on Lot 11, Block 5 of Happy Glen Loop
Subdivision
Easements or servitudes are encumbrances imposed upon an immovable for
the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner,28 for the
benefit of a community, 29 or for the benefit of one or more persons to whom
the encumbered estate does not belong.30
The law provides that easements may be continuous or discontinuous and
apparent or non-apparent. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code are
quoted below:
Art. 615. Easements may be continuous or discontinuous, apparent or non-
apparent.
Continuous easements are those the use of which is or may be incessant,
without the intervention of any act of man.
Discontinuous easements are those which are used at intervals and depend
upon the acts of man.
Apparent easements are those which are made known and are continually
kept in view by external signs that reveal the use and enjoyment of the same.
Non-apparent easements are those which show no external indication of
their existence.
In this case, the water facility is an encumbrance on Lot 11, Block 5 of the
Subdivision for the benefit of the community. It is continuous and apparent,
because it is used incessantly without human intervention, and because it is
PROPERTY
ARGUELLES.BAUTISTA R. BAUTISTA M. CORDERO
IPORAC.LAURIO.ORTEGA.URFILLA
continually kept in view by the overhead water tank, which reveals its use to
the public.
The Civil Code provides that continuous and apparent easements are acquired
either by virtue of a title or by prescription of 10 years. It is therefore clear that
an easement of water facility has already been acquired through prescription.
Residents of the Subdivision, they had even benefited for almost 30 years from
its existence. Therefore, petitioner cannot be shielded by the principle of
indefeasibility and conclusiveness of title, as she was not an innocent
purchaser in good faith and for value.
13. Limense vs de Ramos JM
14. Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Coop. vs Obias Riza
FACTS:
The Bicol Sugar Development Corporation (BISUDECO) was
established at Himaao, Pili, Camarines Sur. In the same year, BISUDECO
constructed a road (the disputed road) measuring approximately 7 meters
wide and 2.9 kilometers long. The disputed road was used by BISUDECO in
hauling and transporting sugarcane and from its mill site (Pensumil) and has
thus become indispensable to its sugar milling operations.
Respondents unjustifiably barricaded the disputed road by placing
bamboos, woods, placards and stones across it, preventing petitioners and the
sugar planters vehicles from passing through the disputed road, thereby
causing damage and prejudice to petitioner.
Petitioner alleged that BISUDECO constructed the disputed road
pursuant to an agreement with the owners of the ricefields and roads
traversed. The agreement provides that BISUDECO shall employ the children
and relatives of the landowners in exchange for the construction of the road
on their properties. Petitioner contends that through prolonged and
continuous use of the disputed road, BISUDECO acquired a right of way over
the properties of the landowners, which right of way in turn was acquired by
it when it bought BISUDECOs assets. Petitioner prayed that respondents be
permanently ordered to restrain from barricading the disputed road and from
obstructing its free passage.
3
 Respondents denied having enetered into an agreement with
BISUDECO regarding the construction and the use of the disputed road. They
alleged that BISUDECO, surreptitiously and without their knowledge and
consent, constructed the disputed on their properties and has since then
intermittently and discontinuously used the disputed road for hauling
sugarcane despite their repeated protests. Respondents claimed they
tolerated BISUDECO in the construction and the use of the road since
BISUDECO was a government-owned and controlled corporation, and the
entire country was then under Martial Law. Respondents likewise denied that
the road has become a public road, since no public funds were used for its
construction and maintenance.
The RTC ruled that petitioner failed to present any concrete evidence
to prove that there was an agreement between BISUDECO and respondent for
the construction of the disputed road. Moreover, it held that petitioner did not
acquire the same by prescription.
The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that there was no conclusive
proof to sufficiently establish the existence of an agreement between
BISUDECO and respondents regarding the construction of the disputed road.
Moreover, the CA also declared that an easement of right of way is
discontinuous and as such cannot be acquired by prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the principles of prescription, laches and estoppels is
applicable in this case.
HELD:
No. It is already well-established that a right of way is discontinuous and, as
such, cannot be acquired by prescription
Continuous and apparent easements are acquired by virtue of a title or by
prescription of ten years.
Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements are either continuous or
discontinuous according to the manner they are exercised, not according to
the presence of apparent signs or physical indications of the existence of such
easements. Thus, easements is continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant
PROPERTY
ARGUELLES.BAUTISTA R. BAUTISTA M. CORDERO
IPORAC.LAURIO.ORTEGA.URFILLA
without the intervention of any act of man, like the easement of drainage, and
it is discontinuous if it is used at intervals and depends on the act of man, like
the easement of right of way.
15. Abellana vs CA - Gerwin
The petitioners sued to establish an easement of right of way over a
subdivision road which used to be a mere footpath and they claimed they had
acquired through prescription. Hence, they asked that the walls enclosing the
subdivision be removed.
May a footpath be acquired through prescription?
Held:
No
The use of a footpath or road may be apparent but it is not a continuous
easement because its use is at intervals and depends upon the acts of man.
Hence, a right of way is not acquirable by prescription
16. Lunod vs Meneses Alecs
Facts:
Plaintiffs owned a farmlands situated in the places known as Maytunas and
Balot, near a small lake named Calalaran. Defendant is the owner of a fish-
pond and a strip of land situated in Paraanan, adjoining the said lake on one
side, and the River Taliptip on the other. From time immemorial, and
consequently for more than twenty years before 1901, there existed and still
exists in favor of the rice fields of the plaintiffs a statutory easement permitting
the flow of water over the said land in Paraanan, which easement the said
plaintiffs enjoyed until the year 1901 and consisted in that the water collected
upon their lands and in the Calalaran Lake flow through Paraanan into the
Taliptip River. From that year however, the defendant, without any right or
reason, converted the land in Paraanan into a fishpond and by means of a dam
and a bamboo net, prevented the free passage of the water through said place
into the Taliptip River.
4
It appears to have been clearly proven in the case that the lands owned by the
plaintiffs in the aforesaid barrio, as well as the small adjoining lake, named
Calalaran, are located in places relatively higher than the sitio called Paraanan
where the land and fish pond of the defendant are situated.
Issue:
Whether or not the land of defendant is subject to statutory easement
Ruling:
According to article 530 of the Civil Code, an easement is charge imposed
upon one estate for the benefit of another estate belonging to a different
owner, and the realty in favor of which the easement is established is called
the dominant estate, and the one charged with it the servient estate.
The lands of Paraanan being the lower are subject to the easement of receiving
and giving passage to the waters proceeding from the higher lands and the
lake of Calalaran; this easement was not constituted by agreement between
the interested parties; it is of a statutory nature, and the law had imposed it
for the common public utility in view of the difference in the altitude of the
lands in the barrio Bambang.
Article 552 of the Civil code provides:
Lower estates must receive the waters which naturally and without the
intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the stone or
earth which they carry with them.
Neither may the owner of the lower estates construct works preventing this
easement, nor the one of the higher estate works increasing the burden.
Article 563 of the said code reads also:
The establishment, extent, form, and conditions of the easements of waters to
which this section refers shall be governed by the special law relating thereto
in everything not provided for in this code.
The special law cited in the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, article 111 of
which, treating of natural easements relating to waters, provides:
PROPERTY
ARGUELLES.BAUTISTA R. BAUTISTA M. CORDERO
IPORAC.LAURIO.ORTEGA.URFILLA
Lands situated at a lower level are subject to receive the waters that flow
naturally, without the work of man, from the higher lands together with the
stone or earth which they carry with them.
Hence, the owner of the lower lands can not erect works that will impede or
prevent such an easement or charge, constituted and imposed by the law upon
his estate for the benefit of the higher lands belonging to different owners;
neither can the latter do anything to increase or extend the easement.
17. Andres vs Sta. Lucia Realty - Jayson
18. Quimen vs CA - Robert
19. Encarnacion vs CA - Maii
20. Unisource Commercial and Dev't. Corpo. Vs Chung -Mals
G.R. No. 173252 July 17, 2009
Petitioner Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation is the
registered owner of a parcel of land. The title contains a memorandum of
encumbrance of a voluntary easement which has been carried over from the
Original Certificate of Title to Sandico.
Sandicos property was transferred to several owners, the memorandum of
encumbrance of a voluntary easement in favor of Francisco M. Hidalgo.
By order, it is declared that Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico has the right to
open doors in the course of his lot. Hidalgos property was eventually
transferred to respondents.
The appellate court ruled that Article 631(3)13 of the Civil Code, which was
cited by the trial court, is inapplicable since the presence of an adequate outlet
to a highway extinguishes only legal or compulsory easements but not
voluntary easements like in the instant case. There having been an agreement
between the original parties for the provision of an easement of right of way
in favor of the dominant estate, the same can be extinguished only by mutual
agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.
21. Lao vs Alburo - Mals
G.R. No. L-10372 December 24, 1915
Lao application for four properties.
5
The administrator of the estate of the deceased Lorenza Alburo filed in court
a written objection, alleging that the stone wall in the 2nd parcel of the plan
belong exclusively to Alburo for more than 35 years.
Issue: Is the stone wall a party wall?
NO.
Article 572 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of party walls is
presumed, unless there is a title or exterior mark or proof to the contrary in
the dividing walls of adjoining buildings up to the common point of elevation.
As the court held judgment appealed from that the wall which lies between the
properties of the applicant and the objectors was a party wall, and as the
applicants appealed from this ruling, it devolves upon us to decide whether it
is in fact a party wall, as counsel for the administrator of the estate of the
deceased Alburo or for her heirs finally admitted that it was in assenting to
that decision, although he averred in his written objection that it was the
exclusive property of the objectors; or whether, on the contrary, this wall is a
part of property marked No. 2 on the plan Exhibit A, as the applicants claims.
Article 573 of the Civil Code also declares that it shall be understood that there
are exterior signs which conflict with the easement of party wall, when, among
other circumstances, the entire wall is built on one of the lots and not on the
line dividing the two adjoining parcels; when the dividing wall, being
constructed of stone and cement, has stone projecting at intervals from the
surface on one side only and not on the other; and when it supports joists,
beams, floors, and the roof timbers of one of the houses but not of the
adjoining building
The objectors have not proved that a part or one-half of the wall in litigation
was erected on the land that belonged to the deceased Lorenza Alburo. The
fact that the owners of the objectors' property may have surreptitiously
inserted some of the timbers or joists of their building in the wall belonging to
the applicants is not enough to convert this latter into a party wall, when there
are so many exterior signs to indicate the exclusive ownership of the wall and
to conflict with the existence of the easement that the objectors endeavor to
establish. The wall in litigation is fully proven by the record to belong
exclusively to the applicants.
PROPERTY
ARGUELLES.BAUTISTA R. BAUTISTA M. CORDERO
IPORAC.LAURIO.ORTEGA.URFILLA
22. Pilar Development - Riza
Important Doctrine
Thus, the above proves that petitioners right of ownership and possession has
been limited by law with respect to the 3-meter strip/zone along the banks of
Mahabang Ilog Creek. Despite this, the court cannot agree with the trial
courts opinion, as to which the CA did not pass upon, that respondents have
a better right to possess the subject portion of the land because they are
occupying an area reserved for public easement purposes. Similar to
petitioner, respondents have no right or title over it precisely because it is
public land.
Likewise, we repeatedly held that squatters have no possessory rights over the
land intruded upon. The length of time that they may have physically occupied
the land is immaterial; they are deemed to have entered the same in bad faith,
such that the nature of their possession is presumed to have retained the same
character throughout their occupancy.
As to the issue of who is the proper party entitled to institute a case with
respect to the 3-meter strip/zone, we find and so hold that both the Republic
of the Philippines, through the OSG and the local government of Las Pias
City, may file an action depending on the purpose sought to be achieved. The
former shall be responsible in case of action for reversion under CA 141, while
the latter may also bring an action to enforce the relevant provisions of
Republic Act No. 7278 (otherwise known as the Urban Development and
Housing Act of 1992).
Under RA 7279, which was enacted to uplift the living conditions in the poorer
sections of the communities in urban areas and was envisioned to be the
antidote to the pernicious problem of squatting in the metropolis, all local
government units (LGUs) are mandated to evict and demolish persons or
entitles occupying danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage
dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as
sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds.
6