Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166,2 declaring that
(1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for
that purpose.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they
applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They
had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When
the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in
order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March
1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got
married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went
back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the childs
birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her
private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City (trial court.3 In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the
latter has "reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as his wife and Reinna Tricia as
his child."4
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the
marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the
marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her
pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He
also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never seen nor
acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared
petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case
to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis
of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child when the latter is not, and could
not have been, his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting
until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born
during the subsistence and validity of the parties marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon
petitioners refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state
with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that petitioners "forgetfulness
should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and reward him of his being
irresponsible."6 Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner,
wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court
to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There was no
participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion
between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The
burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in
an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court
should have been limited to the obligation of petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of the
marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and respondent.7 The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626,
is AFFIRMED with theMODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate
child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March 1995 between
the appellant and the appellee valid until properly annulled by a competent court in a proceeding
instituted for that purpose. Costs against the appellant.8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of Appeals.9 Hence this
petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent because as
shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated without a marriage
license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a false narration
of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife. The false affidavit
should never be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of a marriage license.10 Petitioner
additionally argues that there was no need for the appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case
because it is only an ordinary action for support and not an action for annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the
invalidity of their marriage since it was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant action for
support. Citing several authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the subject of a collateral
attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute another independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of
the marriage between the parties. The refiling of another case for declaration of nullity where the same
evidence and parties would be presented would entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-
consuming for the parties, and would increase the burden of the courts.12 Finally, petitioner claims that in
view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the childs paternity and filiation,
the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to file their respective comments on the petition.13
In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of
the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court, she argues that
the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only be repudiated or contested in a
direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. With regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that
compared to her candid and straightforward testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering
questions about their sexual encounters. Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and from
the trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation.15
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the trial court
to declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for support. Citing the case
of Nial v. Bayadog,16 it states that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in an action for support,
since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence
presented during the proceedings in the trial court showed that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for at least five years) was false.
Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly held that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not
valid.17 In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child of
petitioner and thus entitled to support.18
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the
validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second, whether the
child is the daughter of petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked.19 Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.20
Likewise, in Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario,21 the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass
upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Nial,
we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
marriage an absolute nullity.22
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable.23 In the
instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage
license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been
living together for more than five years.24 However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the
affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination, thus
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and wife for the
last five years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.25
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage.
The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together
and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five
years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame
and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due
to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license.26 In the instant case, there was no
"scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which
petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever;
it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to
obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage voidab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioners illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to
support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.28
The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit
waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child, thus
stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on November 3,
1995 at Better Living, Paraaque, Metro Manila;30
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only by the
testimony of the latter, but also by respondents own admission in the course of his testimony
wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used
to visit petitioner at the latters house or clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As a
result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage,
though invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely forced to undergo the
marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3,"
"C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and
"G-2" and "H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is seen
putting the wedding ring on petitioners finger and in another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2")
respondent is seen in the act of kissing the petitioner.31
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig
City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24,
1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent
Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage
license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their fathers death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging
that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioners
successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no
cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment
of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient"
to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking
for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G.
Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their
father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with
defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second
marriage after it was dissolved due to their fathers death. [1]
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void
their fathers marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the
Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for
annulment of marriage. Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure
[2]
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioners
averment that the allegations in the petition are true and correct." It was thus treated as an
unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997
Rules. However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and
[3]
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
[5]
Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant
[6]
to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58. The requirement and issuance of marriage license is
[7] [8]
the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. This interest proceeds from the
[9]
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording
protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." Specifically, the [10]
marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" and case law considers it "not just an
[12]
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license
is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a
[14]
man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The
rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a
valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. The
publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their
status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
[15]
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law
deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement. Sdaa miso
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent Norma was celebrated
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have
attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." The only issue that needs to
[16]
be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil
Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from
securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated
to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife
during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment
to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened
sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife
for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the
basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special
contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be
a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing
with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be
respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with
every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape
ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage
license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be
noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be
united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the
union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. The Civil Code provides:
[17]
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the
local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons
under oath. x x x" Sdaad
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar
thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to the local civil
registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof
and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any
marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
[18]
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the
contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered
felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. The law sanctions monogamy.
[19]
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day.
From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent,
only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other
that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation
was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that
is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract.
Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact
from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual
severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by
either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife". Scs daad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence
of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare
their fathers marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code cannot be applied even
[20]
by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment
of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment
suit "at any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the
grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid
until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as
having never to have taken place and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
[21]
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be
ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while
a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned
even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for
[22]
nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the
parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the
properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint
contribution, and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article
[23]
50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the
contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership
and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Sup rema
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father extinguished the alleged
marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a
wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should
be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the
death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage. "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to
[24]
restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence
of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for
the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." "Under ordinary
[25]
circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights
upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for
no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of
marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at
any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and
upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as
non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally
attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the
death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40
[26]
of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of
a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such [27]
absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the
[28]
law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or
[29]
the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible. Juris
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior
existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R.
Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-
Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit
filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to
him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.[1] Four children
were born out of that marriage.[2] On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage
with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.[3] When respondent Judge solemnized said
marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract
clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage
between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was
that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of
marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.[4] According to him, had he known that the late Manzano
was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be
charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being
designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that
respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit
the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the
complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two
separate affidavits[5] of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of
his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly
stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their
respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had
never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the
basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34
of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to
marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before
any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state
under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must
concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before
the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and
are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of
the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.[6]
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their
separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their
marriage contract, it was indicated that both were separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.[7] In fact, in his Comment, he
stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from
contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos
subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were
subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time
already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of
legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not
severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the
parties to remarry.This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at
bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda
Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation,
free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a
subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals
who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage
license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage
vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and
bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special application to
judges,[8] who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law
and basic legal principles.[9] And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to
know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[10]
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with
the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is
increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 175581
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
- versus -
JOSE A. DAYOT,
Respondent.
x------------------x
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, G.R. No. 179474
Petitioner,
Present:
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,*
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO,** and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
JOSE A. DAYOT,
Respondent. March 28, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474
are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the
Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the
Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab
initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at
the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.[2] In lieu
of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,[3] also dated 24
November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that
being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the
same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he
came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks
later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she
could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City
Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper
approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package
could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him,
and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned
about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the
man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had
contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of
the table at the sala of Felisas house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was
a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned
ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the
validity of their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man
and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had
deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference.[5] In her pre-
trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter
contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3
June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an
administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and
Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board.[6] The
Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and
meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year without
emolument.[7]
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage
celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Joses
version of the story as implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt
to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already
detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to
get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of
paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could
have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told
him that her brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it
took him, more or less, three months to discover that the pieces of paper that he
signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be
that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be taken in for a ride by [Felisa.]
[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the
fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisas]
name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on
May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now
claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the
name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court
does not believe that the only reason why her name was written in his company
I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse
because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have
written instead the name of his sister.
When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she
testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the
marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further
testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the
signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract
(page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by
the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really
chosen by her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all the
more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.[10]
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had prescribed. It
cited Article 87[11] of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of
marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of
the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was
obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have
filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible
opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage
contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest
instance. x x x.[12]
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of
Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to
be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and
Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate
court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of
marriage under Article 86[14] of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the
parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud
was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck
down Joses appeal in the following manner:
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his marriage to
Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was
solemnized under Article 76[16] of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the
parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that
the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband
and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the marriage,
seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained therein. In this
manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing
officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal
side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated
that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties
and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed
Joses argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas
V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56[17] of the Civil Code
did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to
the solemnizing officers church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in
Article 7[18] of the Family Code which does not govern the parties marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the
exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully
attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and
the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years
before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation
executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself.
Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET
ASIDE and another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot
and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay
City.[19]
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court
in Nial v. Bayadog,[20] and reasoned that:
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying
that the Court of Appeals Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set
aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid
and subsisting.Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474,
similarly assailing the appellate courts Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court
resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings
in similar cases brought before it for resolution.[23]
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the
allowance of its Petition, to wit:
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS
AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN
FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach
a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented
bypetitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the
presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa
echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage
by citing this Courts ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.[26] To buttress its assertion,
the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November
1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years,
which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republics position that the falsity
of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the
essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not
required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic
opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was
wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties
incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and
wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties marriage
contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It
also bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a
primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the
following documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12
May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisas name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July
1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting
that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3)
Joses company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisas name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of
a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in
order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24
November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code
governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of
marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with:
Article 58[27] makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license
first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting
party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the
Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.[28] Article 80(3)[29] of the Civil Code makes it
clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this
being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license
is the essence of the marriage contract.[30] This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage
Law,[31] whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void. The
rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it
is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper
government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.[32]
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter
2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages
in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote
places, (2) consular marriages,[33] (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious
ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed
marriages.[34]
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman
who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or
minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he
took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting
parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,[35] as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the
publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a
state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.[36]
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed
without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that they
have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to
marry each other.[37] One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the
falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short
of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for
lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly[38] but reasonably
construed.[39] They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.[40] Where
a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the
former or add to the latter by implication.[41] For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is
a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of
majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five
years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The
Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely
five months before the celebration of their marriage.[43] The Court of Appeals also noted
Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel,
sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution.[44] The appellate court
also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to
live in her house.[45]
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding
on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals
and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory
findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the
Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The
factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such
findings are supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.[48]
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose
and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond
question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in
the parties affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and
formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it
cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the
formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal
requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the
same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a
presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.[49]Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special
to the case, to be in fact married.[50] The present case does not involve an apparent
marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that
Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence,
compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code[51] that every intendment of law
or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties marriage, and
extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa
was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent
requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a
marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be
used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which
was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a
prerequisite for a valid marriage.[52] The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid
one as well.[53] To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to
allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the
institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal
measures set forth in our laws.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based
on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot
thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that
equity finds no room for application where there is a law.[54] There is a law on the
ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the
Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of
the parties marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability.[55]
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed
estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is
claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses
subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven
years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year
common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed
back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it
not been for the absence of a marriage.[57] It covers the years immediately preceding the
day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved
at any time within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.[58]
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court
of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage
of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice
to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
CARLO
TA DEL
GADO V
DA. DE
DE LA
ROSA a
nd othe
r HEIRS
OF LUI
S
DELGA
DO,
namely,
HEIRS
OF CON
CHA
VDA. D
E AREV
ALO, H
EIRS O
F LUISA
DELGA
DO VDA
. DEDA
NAO, A
NGELA
DELGA
DO ARE
SPACO
CHAGA,
TERES
A
DELGA
DO
PERLAS
,
CAROLI
NA
DELGA
DO-
ARESP
ACOCH
AGA,
RODOL
FO
DELGA
DO, BE
NJAMIN
DELGA
DO,
GLICER
IA
DELGA
DO and
CLEOF
AS
DELGA
DO; and
HEIRS
OF
GORGO
NIO
DELGA
DO,
namely,
RAMON
DELGA
DO
CAMPO,
CARLO
S
DELGA
DO
CAMPO,
CLARIT
A
DELGA
DO
CAMPO
-REIZA,
YOLAN
DA
DELGA
DO
ENCINA
S,
FELISA
DELGA
DO
CAMPO
-
ENCINA
S and
MELIN
DA
DELGA
DO
CAMPO
-
MADAR
ANG,
Petitioners, Present :
HEIR
S OF
MAR
CIAN
A
RUST
IA
VDA.
DE
DAMI
AN,
NAMEL
Y,
GUIL
LERM
O R.
DAMI
AN
AND
JOSE
R.
DAMI
AN;
HEIR
S OF
HORT
ENCI
A
RUST
IA
CRUZ
,
NAMEL
Y,
TERE
SITA
CRUZ
-
SISO
N,
HORA
CIO
R.
CRUZ
,
JOSE
FINA
CRUZ
-
RODI
L,
AMEL
IA
CRUZ
-
ENRI
QUEZ
ANDF
IDEL
R. CR
UZ,
JR.;
HEIR
S OF
ROM
AN
RUST
IA,
SR.,
NAMEL
Y,
JOSE
FINA
RUST
IA
ALBA
NO,
VIRGI
NIA
RUST
IA
PARA
ISO,
ROM
AN
RUST
IA,
JR.,
SERG
IO
RUST
IA,
FRAN
CISC
O
RUST
IA,
LETI
CIA
RUST
IA-
MIRA
NDA;
AND
GUIL
LERM
INA
RUST
IA, AS
OPPOS
ITORS;
[1] AND
GUIL
LERM
A
RUST
IA, AS
INTER
VENOR
,[2]
Respondents.[3] Promulga
ted :
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With
no children of their own, they took into their home the
youngsters GuillerminaRustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children,
never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local
dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage
to father an illegitimate child,[19] the intervenor-
respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According
to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh
and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous possession of that
status from her birth in 1920 until her fathers demise. In
fact, Josefa Delgados obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia,
named the intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her
report card from the University of Santo Tomas identified
Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian.[20]
SO ORDERED.[28]
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals[34] partially set aside the
trial courts decision. Upon motion for reconsideration,[35] the Court of
Appeals amended its earlier decision.[36] The dispositive portion of the
amended decision read:
and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of
them as spouses.
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia,
Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated Josefas estate all to
himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by
an heir of the decedents entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit
is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950),
illegitimate children absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian
edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted
certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on condition
that they were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent.
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as
such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling,
or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30)
days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that the administration be granted to some other person, it
may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990
decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed
October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the
following modifications:
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
MAY D. AONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS and JOHN DESANTIS NERI, Petitioners,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G. JALANDONI, represented by BERNARDINO G. JALANDONI as
Special Administrator, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
On appeal1 is the Decision2 dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576. In the
said decision, the Court of Appeals nullified, on certiorari, the Orders3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40,
of Negros Occidental (intestate court) allowing herein petitioners and their siblings4 to intervene in the estate
proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni.5 The decretal portion of the decision of the appellate court
reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the assailed Orders dated July 2, 2004 and
January 26, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court in Spec. Proc. No. 338 are hereby SET ASIDE and
NULLIFIED, and a permanent injunction is hereby issued enjoining respondents [petitioners], their agents
and anyone acting for and in their behalves, from enforcing the assailed Orders. No costs.6
Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate on 20 December 1966.7 He died without issue.8
On 28 April 1967, Bernardino G. Jalandoni (Bernardino), the brother of Rodolfo, filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration9 with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to commence the
judicial settlement of the latters estate. The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 338 and is currently
pending before the intestate court.10
On 17 January 2003, the petitioners and their siblings filed a Manifestation11 before the intestate court. In the
Manifestation, they introduced themselves as the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis (Sylvia)who, in turn,
was revealed to be the daughter of Isabel Blee (Isabel) with one John Desantis.12
The petitioners and their siblings contend that their grandmotherIsabelwas, at the time of Rodolfos
death, the legal spouse of the latter.13 For which reason, Isabel is entitled to a share in the estate of Rodolfo.
Seeking to enforce the right of Isabel, the petitioners and their siblings pray that they be allowed to intervene
on her behalf in the intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni.14 As it was, by the time the
Manifestation was filed, both Sylvia and Isabel have already passed away with the former predeceasing the
latter.15
To support their cause, the petitioners and their siblings appended in their Manifestation, the following
documents:
It is the assertion of the petitioners and their siblings that the foregoing pieces of evidence sufficiently
establish that Isabel was the spouse of Rodolfo, and that they are her lawful representatives.
The respondent intestate estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, now represented by Bernardino as its Special
Administrator, however, begged to differ. It opposed the intervention on the ground that the petitioners and
their siblings have failed to establish the status of Isabel as an heir of Rodolfo. The very evidence presented
by the petitioners and their siblings showed that Isabel had a previous and subsisting marriage with John
Desantis at the time she was purportedly married to Rodolfo.
In its Comment to the Manifestation,19 the respondent called attention to the entries in the birth certificate of
Sylvia, who was born on 14 February 1946.20 As it turned out, the record of birth of Sylvia states that she
was a "legitimate" child of Isabel and John Desantis.21 The document also certifies the status of both Isabel
and John Desantis as "married."22 The respondent posits that the foregoing entries, having been made in an
official registry, constitute prima facie proof of a prior marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.23
According to the respondent, Isabels previous marriage, in the absence of any proof that it was dissolved,
made her subsequent marriage with Rodolfo bigamous and void ab initio.24
On 2 July 2004, the intestate court issued an order allowing the petitioners and their siblings to take part in
the settlement proceedings.25 The intestate court was convinced that the evidence at hand adequately
establish Isabels status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo and, by that token, permitted the petitioners and their
siblings to intervene in the proceedings on her behalf.26
The intestate court also held that the birth certificate of Sylvia was insufficient to prove that there was a
previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.27 It ventured on the possibility that the entries in the
birth record of Sylvia regarding her legitimacy and the status of her parents, may have been made only in
order to save Isabel and her family from the social condemnation of having a child out of wedlock.28
The respondent sought for reconsideration, but was denied by the intestate court in its order dated 26
January 2006.29 Undeterred, the respondent hoisted a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
On 31 May 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and nullified the orders of the intestate court. 30
In coming to its conclusion, the Court of Appeals found that it was an error on the part of the intestate court
to have disregarded the probative value of Sylvias birth certificate.31 The appellate court, siding with the
respondent, held that Sylvias birth certificate serves as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated
which includes the civil status of her parents.32 Hence, the previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis
should have been taken as established.
The Court of Appeals added that since the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer any other evidence
proving that the marriage of Isabel with John Desantis had been dissolved by the time she was married to
Rodolfo, it then follows that the latter marriagethe Isabel-Rodolfo unionis a nullity for being
bigamous.33 From that premise, Isabel cannot be considered as the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The petitioners
and their siblings, therefore, failed to show that Isabel has any interest in the estate of Rodolfo.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals erred when it nullified the orders of the
intestate court allowing the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the settlement proceedings.
The petitioners answer in the affirmative. They proffer the following arguments:
One. The Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of review under a writ of certiorari.35 In nullifying the intestate
courts order, the appellate court did not confine itself to the issue of whether the same was issued with
grave abuse of discretion.36 Rather, it chose to re-assess the evidence and touch upon the issue pertaining
to Isabels right to inherit from Rodolfo.37
Had the appellate court limited itself to the issue of whether grave abuse of discretion exists, it would have
found that the intestate court did not act whimsically or capriciously in issuing its assailed orders.38 Grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the intestate court is belied by the fact that the said orders may be
supported by the two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo.39
Second. Assuming ex-gratia argumenti that the Court of Appeals was correct in addressing the issue of
whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that Isabel has a right to inherit from Rodolfo, it nevertheless
erred in finding that there was none.40 A proper evaluation of the evidence at hand does not support the
conclusion that Isabel had a previous marriage with John Desantis.41
To begin with, the respondent was not able to produce any marriage certificate executed between Isabel
and John Desantis.42 The conspicuous absence of such certificate can, in turn, only lend credibility to the
position that no such marriage ever took place.
Moreover, the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia do not carry the necessary weight to be able to prove a
marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.43 In assessing the probative value of such entries, the Court of
Appeals should have taken note of a "typical" practice among unwed Filipino couples who, in order to "save
face" and "not to embarrass their families," concoct the illusion of marriage and make it appear that a child
begot by them is legitimate.44
Since the alleged previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis was not satisfactorily proven, the Court of
Appeals clearly erred in finding that her marriage with Rodolfo is bigamous.
First Argument
The first argument raised by the petitioners is specious at best. The question of whether the intestate court
gravely abused its discretion is intricately linked with the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to
establish Isabels status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo.
A courts power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by the basic
demand of sound judicial procedure that only a person with interest in an action or proceeding may be
allowed to intervene.45Otherwise stated, a court has no authority to allow a person, who has no interest in an
action or proceeding, to intervene therein.46
Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and allows an uninterested person to intervene in a case
the mistake is not simply an error of judgment, but one of jurisdiction. In such event, the allowance is made
in excess of the courts jurisdiction and can only be the product of an exercise of discretion gravely abused.
That kind of error may be reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari.
Verily, the Court of Appeals was acting well within the limits of review under a writ of certiorari, when it
examined the evidence proving Isabels right to inherit from Rodolfo. The sufficiency or insufficiency of such
evidence determines whether the petitioners and their siblings have successfully established Isabels
interest in Rodolfos estatewhich, as already mentioned, is an indispensable requisite to justify any
intervention. Ultimately, the re-assessment of the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings
will tell if the assailed orders of the intestate court were issued in excess of the latters jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion.
Second Argument
The second argument of the petitioners is also without merit. We agree with the finding of the Court of
Appeals that the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel was
the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The very evidence of the petitioners and their siblings negates their claim that
Isabel has interest in Rodolfos estate.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Isabel and
John Desantis was adequately established. This holds true notwithstanding the fact that no marriage
certificate between Isabel and John Desantis exists on record.
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the
sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.47 Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven
by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.48 Hence, even a persons birth certificate may be
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.49
In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent evidence of marriage
between Isabel and John Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains the following notable entries: (a) that
Isabel and John Desantis were "married" and (b) that Sylvia is their "legitimate" child.50 In clear and
categorical language, Sylvias birth certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage between Isabel and John
Desantis.
Pursuant to existing laws,51 the foregoing entries are accorded prima facie weight. They are presumed to be
true. Hence, unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, they can, and will, stand as proof of the facts
attested.52In the case at bench, the petitioners and their siblings offered no such rebuttal.
The petitioners did no better than to explain away the entries in Sylvias birth certificate as untruthful
statements made only in order to "save face."53 They urge this Court to take note of a "typical" practice
among unwed Filipino couples to concoct the illusion of marriage and make it appear that a child begot by
them is legitimate. That, the Court cannot countenance.
The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and unsupported by any other evidence, do not diminish
the probative value of the entries. This Court cannot, as the petitioners would like Us to do, simply take
judicial notice of a supposed folkway and conclude therefrom that the usage was in fact followed. It certainly
is odd that the petitioners would themselves argue that the document on which they based their interest in
intervention contains untruthful statements in its vital entries.
Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings themselves which, properly
appreciated, supports the finding that Isabel was, indeed, previously married to John Desantis.
Consequently, in the absence of any proof that such marriage had been dissolved by the time Isabel was
married to Rodolfo, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void
ab initio.
The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present evidence to prove that Isabels prior marriage was
dissolved results in a failure to establish that she has interest in the estate of Rodolfo. Clearly, an
intervention by the petitioners and their siblings in the settlement proceedings cannot be justified. We affirm
the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the decision dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson