Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 11

CASES ON PROVISIONAL REMEDIES AND

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS


MAY AUGUST 2016

SUBMITTED BY:
ALCAZAREN, Cherina Concepcion
CORPUZ, Jose Miguel
DIMER, Aruie A.
FRANCISCO, Ma. Francesca DL
MALLARI, Felipe
RETUBA, Gemma
RODRIGUEZ, Lila

Saturday I 3-5 PM
MANDAMUS

JOSEPH OMAR O. ANDAYA vs RURAL BANK OF CABADBARAN

G.R. NO. 188769

August 3, 2016

DOCTRINE:

The registration of a transfer of shares of stock is a ministerial duty on the part of the corporation.
Aggrieved parties may then resort to the remedy of mandamus to compel corporations that wrongfully
or unjustifiably refuse to record the transfer or to issue new certificates of stock. This remedy is available
even upon the instance of a bona fide transferee who is able to establish a clear legal right to the
registration of the transfer.

Accordingly, a writ of mandamus to enforce a ministerial act may issue only when petitioner is
able to establish the presence of the following: (1) right clearly founded in law and is not doubtful; (2) a
legal duty to perform the act; (3) unlawful neglect in performing the duty enjoined by law; (4) the
ministerial nature of the act to be performed; and (5) the absence of other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Respondents primarily challenge the mandamus suit on the grounds that the transfer violated the
bank stockholders' right of first refusal and that petitioner was a buyer in bad faith. Both parties refer to
Section 98 of the Corporation Code to support their arguments. It must be noted that Section 98 applies
only to close corporations. Hence, before the Court can allow the operation of this section in the case at
bar, there must first be a factual determination that respondent Rural Bank of Cabadbaran is indeed a
close corporation.
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

MILAGROS HERNANDEZ vs EDWNA C. OCAMPO

G.R. NO. 181268

August 15, 2016

DOCTRINE:

A third person, who is not the judgment debtor, or his agent, can vindicate his claim to a property
levied through the remedies of (1) terceria to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken
hold of the property not belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor and (2) an independent "separate
action."

A third-party claimant may also resort to an independent "separate action," the object of which
is the recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising
from wrongful seizure and detention of the property despite the third-party claim. If a "separate action"
is the recourse, the third-party claimant must institute in a forum of competent jurisdiction an action,
distinct and separate from the action in which the judgment is being enforced, even before or without
need of filing a claim in the court that issued the writ. Both remedies are cumulative and may be availed
of independently of or separately from the other.

In this case, Hernandez has already filed a separate action of annulment of title, which was a
separate and distinct action from the ex parte petitions for issuance of writ of possession filed by PSB and
Metro bank. It is in this action of annulment of title that Hernandez filed her urgent motion for issuance
of a writ of temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. Hernandez's entitlement to the
injunctive writ hinges on her prima facie right to the properties subject of Civil Case No. B-6191, However,
her claims of possession and ownership are belied by the banks' own claims. From these alone, it is clear
that Hernandez failed to discharge the burden of showing a clear and unmistakable right to be protected.
Where the complainant's right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper.
UNLAWFUL DETAINER AND FORCIBLE ENTRY

BALIBAGO FAITH BAPTIST CHURCH vs FAITH IN CHRIST JESUS BAPTIST CHURCH, INC.

G.R. NO. 191527

August 22, 2016

DOCTRINE:

Unlawful detainer and forcible entry are entirely distinct causes of action, to wit: (a) action to
recover possession founded on illegal occupation from the beginning - forcible entry; and (b) action
founded on unlawful detention by a person who originally acquired possession lawfully - unlawful
detainer.

It should then be stressed that what determines the cause of action is the nature of defendants'
entry into the land. If entry is illegal, then the cause of action which may be filed against the intruder
within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, entry is legal but thereafter possession
became illegal, the case is one of illegal detainer which must be filed within one year from the date of the
last demand.

This case would have to fall under the concept of forcible entry as it has been long settled that in
forcible entry cases, no force is really necessary. The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful
possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is
necessary.
CERTIORARI

FILOMENA CABLING vs RODRIGO DANGCALAN

G.R. No. 187696

June 15, 2016

DOCTRINE:

We already declared that all cases involving title to or possession of real property with an assessed
value of less than P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila, fall under the original jurisdiction of the municipal
trial court. This pronouncement was based on Republic Act No. 7691, which was approved by Congress
on 25 March 1994. We clarified that the actions envisaged are accion publiciana and reivindicatoria. To
determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, the complaint must allege the assessed value of
the real property subject of the complaint. The Court explained further in Penta Pacific Realty Corporation
v. Ley Construction and Development Corporation that its jurisdiction would now be determined by the
assessed value of the disputed land, or of the adjacent lots if it is not declared for taxation purposes. If
the assessed value is not alleged in the complaint, the action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The reason behind this rule is that the trial court is not afforded the means of determining from the
allegations of the basic pleading whether jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action pertains to it
or to another court. After all, courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of lands.
CERTIORARI
DR. WENIFREDO T. OATE vs COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 213660
July 5, 2016

DOCTRINE:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court (Rules),
to reverse the Commission on Audit ( COA) Decision No. 2014-1261 dated June 20, 2014, which ruled that
the payment of the legal sevices of Atty. Alex A. Arejola shall be the personal liability of petitioner Dr.
Wenifredo T. Ofiate (Dr. Onate). The Court has invariably sustained the statutory authority of the OSG and
the OGCC as well as the necessity of CbA concurrence in the cases of government-owned and/or
controlled corporations, local government units, and even a state college like the CNSC. We see no legal
justification to deviate from the settled jurisprudence. Here, the COA noted, and Dr. Ofiate never
disputed, that while the OSG authorization was obtained the CNSC belatedly requested for the COA's
concurrence on May 27, 2010, which is less than a week prior to the expiration of the contract on June 1,
2010. The rule is abso!ute; partial compliance or honest mistake due to ignorance of the law is not and
can never be a valid defense.
CERTIORARI
SUGARSTEEL INDUSTRIAL, INC. and MR. BEN YAPJOCO vs VICTOR ALBINA, VICENTE UY and ALEX
VELASQUEZ
G.R. No. 168749
June 06, 2016

DOCTRINE:
The petition for review on certiorari lacks merit. The CA acted in accordance with the pertinent
law and jurisprudence. As a rule, the certiorari proceeding, being confined to the correction of acts
rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion that amounts to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, is limited in scope and narrow in character. As such, the judicial inquiry in a
special civil action for certiorari in labor litigation ascertains only whether or not the NLRC acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction.
We find that the CA did not exceed its jurisdiction by reviewing the evidence and deciding the
case on the merits despite the judgment of the NLRC already being final. We have frequently expounded
on the competence of the CA in a special civil action for certiorari to review the factual findings of the
NLRC.
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

REPUBLIC vs. MEGA PACIFIC SOLUTIONS, INC.

G.R. No. 184666

June 27, 2016

DOCTRINE:

Petitioner relied upon Section l ( d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court as basis for its application for
a writ of preliminary attachment. This provision states:

Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. At the commencement of the action
or at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of
the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered
in the following cases:

xx xx

(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or
incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought or in the performance thereof.
(Emphasis supplied).

For a writ of preliminary attachment to issue under the above-quoted rule, the applicant must
sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud.

Respondent MPEI had perpetrated a scheme against petitioner to secure the automation
contract by using MPC as supposed bidder and eventually succeeding in signing the automation contract
as MPEI alone, an entity which was ineligible to hid in the first place.

Fraud on the part of respondent MPEI was further shown by the fact that despite the failure
of its ACMs to pass the tests conducted by the DOST, respondent still acceded to being awarded the
automation contract.
CERTIORARI
SUGARSTEEL INDUSTRIAL, INC. and MR. BEN YAPJOCO vs VICTOR ALBINA, VICENTE UY and ALEX
VELASQUEZ
G.R. No. 168749
June 06, 2016

DOCTRINE:
The petition for review on certiorari lacks merit. The CA acted in accordance with the pertinent
law and jurisprudence. As a rule, the certiorari proceeding, being confined to the correction of acts
rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion that amounts to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, is limited in scope and narrow in character. As such, the judicial inquiry in a
special civil action for certiorari in labor litigation ascertains only whether or not the NLRC acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction.
We find that the CA did not exceed its jurisdiction by reviewing the evidence and deciding the
case on the merits despite the judgment of the NLRC already being final. We have frequently expounded
on the competence of the CA in a special civil action for certiorari to review the factual findings of the
NLRC.
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

RICHARD TOM vs SAMUEL N. RODRIGUEZ

G.R. No. 215764

July 13, 2016

DOCTRINE:

For the Courts resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dissolve the Injunctive
Writ filed by the respondent.

In granting the injunctive writ, the Court upheld the established rule that a corporation exercises
its powers through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents, except in instances
where the Corporation Code requires stockholders approval for certain specific acts. To be sure, Section
23 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 68. However, this does not apply in this case as contended by Rodriguez that
the elements necessitating the issuance of an injunctive writ no longer exist because of the Memorandum
of Agreement entered by the parties which clearly a direct contravention of the foregoing precepts.

Hence, the Court resolves to deny with finality the Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to
Dissolve the Injunctive Writ filed by the respondent.
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS

MARIA CONCEPCION S. NOCHE, et. Al vs HON. JANETTE L. GARIN, et al

G.R. No. 221866

August 24, 2016

DOCTRINE:

One of the subjects of the disposition of the case is the petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,
Mandamus with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction. In resolving the petitions, it behooves the Court to first address
the issues on whether the petitioners have locus standi to file the subject petitions and whether their
resort to the subject recourse is proper.

As held by the Court, the petitioners have locus standi considering that the Court in Imbong case
already declared that the issues of contraception and reproductive health in relation to the right to life of
the unborn child were indeed of transcendental importance, and considering also that the petitioners
averred that the respondents unjustly caused the allocation of public funds for the purchase of alleged
abortifacients which would deprive the unborn of its right to life, the Court finds that the petitioners have
locus standi to file these petitions. As to the contention that the subject recourse is improper as it involves
the FDAs exercise of its regulatory powers, suffice it to say that the Court has unequivocally declared that
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials as there is no other
plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Thus, certiorari is proper.