CASES ON PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

AND SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

MAY AUGUST 2016

SUBMITTED BY:
ALCAZAREN, Cherina Concepcion
CORPUZ, Jose Miguel
DIMER, Aruie A.
FRANCISCO, Ma. Francesca DL
MALLARI, Felipe
RETUBA, Gemma
RODRIGUEZ, Lila

Saturday l 3-5 PM
 PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT (RULE 57)

Purpose and function of an attachment

In the case of REPUBLIC vs. MEGA PACIFIC SOLUTIONS, INC., G.R. No. 184666,
June 27, 2016, the Supreme Court discussed the issue on fraud in relation to the grounds for the
application for a writ of preliminary attachment.
A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued upon the order of the
court where an action is pending. Through the writ, the property or properties of the defendant
may be levied upon and held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever
judgment might be secured by the attaching creditor against the defendant. The provisional remedy
of attachment is available in order that the defendant may not dispose of the property attached, and
thus prevent the satisfaction of any judgment that may be secured by the plaintiff from the former.
The purpose and function of an attachment or garnishment is twofold. First, it seizes upon
property of an alleged debtor in advance of final judgment and holds it subject to appropriation,
thereby preventing the loss or dissipation of the property through fraud or other means. Second, it
subjects the property of the debtor to the payment of a creditor's claim, in those cases in which
personal service upon the debtor cannot be obtained. This remedy is meant to secure a contingent
lien on the defendant's property until the plaintiff can, by appropriate proceedings, obtain a
judgment and have the property applied to its satisfaction, or to make some provision for unsecured
debts in cases in which the means of satisfaction thereof are liable to be removed beyond the
jurisdiction, or improperly disposed of or concealed, or otherwise placed beyond the reach of
creditors.

Fraud in relation to the grounds for the application for a writ of preliminary attachment

In the case of REPUBLIC vs. MEGA PACIFIC SOLUTIONS, INC., G.R. No. 184666,
June 27, 2016, the Supreme Court discussed the issue on fraud in relation to the grounds for the
application for a writ of preliminary attachment.
Petitioner relied upon Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court as basis for its
application for a writ of preliminary attachment.
This provision states:
Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. At the commencement
of the action or at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper
party may have the property of the adverse party attached as security for the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following cases:

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 xx xx (d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in
contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought
or in the performance thereof.
For a writ of preliminary attachment to issue under the above-quoted rule, the applicant
must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud.
An amendment to the Rules of Court added the phrase "in the performance thereof' to
include within the scope of the grounds for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment those
instances relating to fraud in the performance of the obligation. Fraud is a generic term that is used
in various senses and assumes so many different degrees and forms that courts are compelled to
content themselves with comparatively few general rules for its discovery and defeat. For the same
reason, the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case are allowed to bear heavily on the
conscience and judgment of the court or jury in determining the presence or absence of fraud. In
fact, the fertility of man's invention in devising new schemes of fraud is so great that courts have
always declined to define it, thus, reserving for themselves the liberty to deal with it in whatever
form it may present itself. 68 Fraud may be characterized as the voluntary execution of a wrongful
act or a willful omission, while knowing and intending the effects that naturally and necessarily
arise from that act or omission.69 In its general sense, fraud is deemed to comprise anything
calculated to deceive including all acts and omission and concealment involving a breach of legal
or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed-resulting in damage to or in undue advantage
over another. Fraud is also described as embracing all multifarious means that human ingenuity
can device, and is resorted to for the purpose of securing an advantage over another by false
suggestions or by suppression of truth; and it includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling, and
any other unfair way by which another is cheated. While fraud cannot be presumed, it need not be
proved by direct evidence and, can well be inferred from attendant circumstances. Fraud by its
nature is not a thing susceptible of ocular observation or readily demonstrable physically; it must
of necessity be proved in many cases by inferences from circumstances shown to have been
involved in the transaction in question.
In the case at bar, petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of demonstrating the
commission of fraud by respondent MPEI in the execution of the automation contract. Respondent
MPEI had perpetrated a scheme against petitioner to secure the automation contract by using MPC
as supposed bidder and eventually succeeding in signing the automation contract as MPEI alone,
an entity which was ineligible to hid in the first place.
Fraud on the part of respondent MPEI was further shown by the fact that despite the
failure of its ACMs to pass the tests conducted by the DOST, respondent still acceded to being
awarded the automation contract.

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 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (RULE 58)

Remedies of a third person whose property is seized by the sheriff

In the case of MILAGROS HERNANDEZ vs EDWNA C. OCAMPO, G.R. NO. 181268,

August 15, 2016, the Supreme Court discussed the remedies of a third person whose property is
seized by the sheriff.
A third person, who is not the judgment debtor, or his agent, can vindicate his claim to a
property levied through the remedies of (1) terceria to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or
wrongly taken hold of the property not belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor and (2) an
independent "separate action."
A third-party claimant may also resort to an independent "separate action," the object of
which is the recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as
damages arising from wrongful seizure and detention of the property despite the third-party claim.
If a "separate action" is the recourse, the third-party claimant must institute in a forum of competent
jurisdiction an action, distinct and separate from the action in which the judgment is being
enforced, even before or without need of filing a claim in the court that issued the writ. Both
remedies are cumulative and may be availed of independently of or separately from the other.
In this case, Hernandez has already filed a separate action of annulment of title, which was
a separate and distinct action from the ex parte petitions for issuance of writ of possession filed by
PSB and Metro bank. It is in this action of annulment of title that Hernandez filed her urgent
motion for issuance of a writ of temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. Hernandez's
entitlement to the injunctive writ hinges on her prima facie right to the properties subject of Civil
Case No. B-6191, However, her claims of possession and ownership are belied by the banks' own
claims. From these alone, it is clear that Hernandez failed to discharge the burden of showing a
clear and unmistakable right to be protected. Where the complainant's right or title is doubtful or
disputed, injunction is not proper.

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 REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS OR RESOLUTIONS OF THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT (RULE 64)

Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65

In the case of DR. WENIFREDO T. OATE vs COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No.

213660, July 5, 2016, the Supreme Court ruled on a case where Rule 64 may be used in relation
to Rule 65.
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court
(Rules), to reverse the Commission on Audit (COA) Decision No. 2014-1261 dated June 20, 2014,
which ruled that the payment of the legal services of Atty. Alex A. Arejola shall be the personal
liability of petitioner Dr. Wenifredo T. Onate (Dr. Onate).
COA Circular No. 95-011 stresses that public funds shall not be utilized for the payment
of services of a private legal counsel or law firm to represent government agencies in court or to
render legal services for them. Despite this, the same circular provides that in the event that such
legal services cannot be avoided or is justified under extraordinary or exceptional circumstances,
the written conformity and acquiescence of the OSG or the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC), as the case may be, and the written concurrence of the COA shall first be secured
before the hiring or employment of a private lawyer or law firm. The prohibition covers the hiring
of private lawyers to render any form of legal service - whether or not the legal services to be
performed involve an actual legal controversy or court litigation. The purpose is to curtail the
unauthorized and unnecessary disbursement of public funds to private lawyers for services
rendered to the government, which is in line with the COA's constitutional mandate to promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance
of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses of
government funds and properties.
The Court has invariably sustained the statutory authority of the OSG and the OGCC as
well as the necessity of COA concurrence in the cases of government-owned and/or controlled
corporations, local government units, and even a state college like the CNSC. We see no legal
justification to deviate from the settled jurisprudence. Here, the COA noted, and Dr. Onate never
disputed, that while the OSG authorization was obtained the CNSC belatedly requested for the
COA's concurrence on May 27, 2010, which is less than a week prior to the expiration of the
contract on June 1, 2010. The rule is absolute, partial compliance or honest mistake due to
ignorance of the law is not and can never be a valid defense.
Thus, certiorari is proper.

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 CERTIORARI, MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION (RULE 65)

Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues
and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials as
there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law

In the case of MARIA CONCEPCION S. NOCHE, et. Al vs HON. JANETTE L. GARIN,

et al, G.R. No. 221866, August 24, 2016, the Supreme Court discussed that certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials as there is no other plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
One of the subjects of the disposition of the case is the petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,
Mandamus with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction. In resolving the petitions, it behooves the Court to first
address the issues on whether the petitioners have locus standi to file the subject petitions and
whether their resort to the subject recourse is proper.
As held by the Court, the petitioners have locus standi considering that the Court in Imbong
case already declared that the issues of contraception and reproductive health in relation to the
right to life of the unborn child were indeed of transcendental importance, and considering also
that the petitioners averred that the respondents unjustly caused the allocation of public funds for
the purchase of alleged abortifacients which would deprive the unborn of its right to life, the Court
finds that the petitioners have locus standi to file these petitions. As to the contention that the
subject recourse is improper as it involves the FDAs exercise of its regulatory powers, suffice it
to say that the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when
proper, acts of legislative and executive officials as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Thus, certiorari is proper.

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 CERTIORARI

When Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 may be availed of

In the case of TRIFONIA D. GABUTAN ET. AL vs DANTE D. NACALABAN, G.R.

Nos. 185857-58/G.R. Nos. 194314-15, June 29, 2016 the Supreme Court discussed when the
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 may be availed of.
Rule 65 is a limited form of review and is a remedy of last recourse. This extraordinary
action lies only where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. In Malayang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Phils., Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Comission, we held that appeal would still be the proper remedy from a judgment on the merits,
final order or resolution even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of
discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision, order or resolution. The existence
and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the
requirements for the latter remedy is that there should be no appeal. We have always declared that
a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was
lost through fault or negligence.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the proper remedy to obtain a reversal
of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution is an appeal. The Resolution dated August 17,
2010 of the CA, which affirmed its Decision dated December 11, 2008, was a final resolution that
disposed of the appeal by Nacalaban, et al. and left nothing more to be done by the CA in respect
to the said case. Thus, Nacalaban, et al. should have filed an appeal in the form of a petition for
review on certiorari and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which is a special civil action.

Other instances when Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 may be availed of

In the case of MUNICIPALITY OF CORDOVA vs PATHFINDER DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, G.R. No. 205544, June 29, 2016 the Supreme Court discussed of other
instances wherein Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 may be availed of.
While there exists a settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final order
when appeal is available, a petition for certiorari may be allowed when: (a) the broader interest of
justice demands that certiorari be given due course to avoid any grossly unjust result that would
otherwise befall the petitioners; and (b) the order of the RTC evidently constitutes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. In the past, the Court has considered certiorari as
the proper remedy despite the availability of appeal, or other remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court has declared that "the requirement

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that there must be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law admits of exceptions, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and
injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment;
(c) where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow,
inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public
interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency."
If appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy, the
availability of appeal as a remedy cannot constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party
from making use of certiorari It is mere inadequacy, not the absence of all other legal remedies,
and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must determine the propriety of certiorari.
A remedy is said to be plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from
the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency. It is
understood, then, that a litigant need not resort to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have
an order annulled and set aside for being patently void. And even assuming that certiorari is not
the proper remedy against an assailed order, the petitioner should still not be denied the recourse
because it is better to look beyond procedural requirements and to overcome the ordinary
disinclination to exercise supervisory powers in order that a void order of a lower court may be
made conformable to law and justice.
Verily, the instances in which certiorari will issue cannot be strictly defined, because to do
so is to destroy the comprehensiveness and usefulness of the extraordinary writ. The wide breadth
and range of the discretion of the Court are such that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari
is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus, and that in the exercise of
superintending control over inferior courts, a superior court is to be guided by all the circumstances
of each particular case as the ends of justice may require. Therefore, when, as in this case, there is
an urgent need to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice, the writ will be granted.

Exception to the rule that a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of
the parties

In the case of PHILIPPINE ASSET TWO INC. AND PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT

BANK VS FASTECH SYNERGY PHILIPPINES INC ET., AL, G.R. No. 206528, June 28,
2016 the Supreme Court discussed a situation wherein the rule that a final and executory judgment
can no longer be attacked by the parties may be relaxed.
As a General rule, a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the
parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land. However, this
Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice, considering (a) matters of life,
liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits
of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by

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the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous
and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
In the present case, PDB was represented by both Janda Asia & Associates and Divina
Law. It was not disputed that Janda Asia & Associates, which remained a counsel of record, albeit,
as collaborating counsel, received notice of the CA's March 5, 2013 Resolution on March 12, 2013.
As such, it is from this date, and not from Divina Law's receipt of the notice of said resolution on
April 3, 2013 that the fifteen (15)-day period to file the petition for review on certiorari before the
Court started to run. After a meticulous scrutiny of this case, the Court finds that the unjustified
rehabilitation of respondents, by virtue of the CA ruling if so allowed to prevail, warrants the
relaxation of the procedural rule violated by petitioners in the higher interest of substantial justice.
The reasons therefor are hereunder explained.

The judicial inquiry in a special civil action for certiorari in labor litigation ascertains only
whether or not the NLRC acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction

In the case of SUGARSTEEL INDUSTRIAL, INC. and MR. BEN YAPJOCO vs

VICTOR ALBINA, VICENTE UY and ALEX VELASQUEZ, G.R. No. 168749, June 06, 2016,
the Supreme Court discussed that The judicial inquiry in a special civil action for certiorari in labor
litigation ascertains only whether or not the NLRC acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
The petition for review on certiorari lacks merit. The CA acted in accordance with the
pertinent law and jurisprudence. As a rule, the certiorari proceeding, being confined to the
correction of acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion that amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction, is limited in scope and narrow in character.
As such, the judicial inquiry in a special civil action for certiorari in labor litigation ascertains only
whether or not the NLRC acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
We find that the CA did not exceed its jurisdiction by reviewing the evidence and deciding
the case on the merits despite the judgment of the NLRC already being final. We have frequently
expounded on the competence of the CA in a special civil action for certiorari to review the factual
findings of the NLRC. In Univac Development, Inc. v. Soriano, for instance, we have pronounced
that the CA is "given the power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual
issues," without contravening the doctrine of the immutability of judgments. The power of the CA
to pass upon the evidence flows from its original jurisdiction over the special civil action for
certiorari, by which it can grant the writ of certiorari to correct errors of jurisdiction on the part of
the NLRC should the latter's factual findings be not supported by the evidence on record; or when
the granting of the writ of certiorari is necessary to do substantial justice or to prevent a substantial
wrong; or when the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the LA; or when the granting of the
writ of certiorari is necessary to arrive at a just decision in the case. The premise is that any decision
by the NLRC that is not supported by substantial evidence is a decision definitely tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. Should the CA annul the decision of the NLRC upon its finding of
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jurisdictional error on the part of the latter, then it has the power to fully lay down whatever the
latter ought to have decreed instead as the records warranted. The judicial function of the CA in
the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction over the NLRC extends to the careful review of the
NLRC's evaluation of the evidence because the factual findings of the NLRC are accorded great
respect and finality only when they rest on substantial evidence. Accordingly, the CA is not to be
restrained from revising or correcting such factual findings whenever warranted by the
circumstances simply because the NLRC is not infallible. Indeed, to deny to the CA this power is
to diminish its corrective jurisdiction through the writ of certiorari.
The policy of practicing comity towards the factual findings of the labor tribunals does not
preclude the CA from reviewing the findings, and from disregarding the findings upon a clear
showing of the NLRC's capricious, whimsical or arbitrary disregard of the evidence or of
circumstances of considerable importance crucial or decisive of the controversy. In such
eventuality, the writ of certiorari should issue, and the CA, being also a court of equity, then enjoys
the leeway to make its own independent evaluation of the evidence of the parties as well as to
ascertain whether or not substantial evidence supported the NLRC's ruling.

MANDAMUS

Aggrieved parties may then resort to the remedy of mandamus to compel corporations that
wrongfully or unjustifiably refuse to record the transfer or to issue new certificates of stock

In the case of JOSEPH OMAR O. ANDAYA vs RURAL BANK OF CABADBARAN,

G.R. NO. 188769, August 3, 2016, the Supreme Court discussed as to when a writ of mandamus
to enforce a ministerial act may issue.
It is already settled jurisprudence that the registration of a transfer of shares of stock is a
ministerial duty on the part of the corporation. Aggrieved parties may then resort to the remedy of
mandamus to compel corporations that wrongfully or unjustifiably refuse to record the transfer or
to issue new certificates of stock. This remedy is available even upon the instance of a bona fide
transferee who is able to establish a clear legal right to the registration of the transfer. This legal
right inherently flows from the transferee's established ownership of the stocks, a right that has
been recognized by this Court.
Consequently, transferees of shares of stock are real parties in interest having a cause of
action for mandamus to compel the registration of the transfer and the corresponding issuance of
stock certificates.
We also rule that Andaya has been able to establish that he is a bona fide transferee of the
shares of stock of Chute. In proving this fact, he presented to the RTC the following documents
evidencing the sale: (1) a notarized Sale of Shares of Stocks showing Chute's sale of 2,200 shares
of stock to petitioner; (2) a Documentary Stamp Tax Declaration/Return; (3) a Capital Gains Tax
Return; and (4) stock certificates covering the subject shares duly endorsed by Chute. The

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existence, genuineness, and due execution of these documents have been admitted and remain
undisputed. There is no doubt that Andaya had the standing to initiate an action for mandamus to
compel the Rural Bank of Cabadbaran to record the transfer of shares in its stock and transfer book
and to issue new stock certificates in his name. As the transferee of the shares, petitioner stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the instant petition, a judgment that will either order the
bank to recognize the legitimacy of the transfer and petitioner's status as stockholder or to deny
the legitimacy thereof.
This Court further finds that the reliance of the RTC on Ponce in finding that petitioner had
no cause of action for mandamus against the defendant bank was misplaced. In Ponce, the issue
resolved by this Court was whether the petitioner therein had a cause of action for mandamus to
compel the issuance of stock certificates, not the registration of the transfer. Ruling in the negative,
the Court said in that case that without any record of the transfer of shares in the stock and transfer
book of the corporation, there would be no clear basis to compel that corporation to issue a stock
certificate. By the import of Section 63 of the Corporation Code, the stock and transfer book would
be the main reference book in ascertaining a person's entitlement to the rights of a stockholder.
Consequently, without the registration of the transfer, the alleged transferee could not yet be
recognized as a stockholder who is entitled to be given a stock certificate.
In the instant case, however, the submitted documents did not merely consist of an
endorsement. Rather, petitioner presented several undisputed documents, among which was
respondent Oraiz's letter to Chute denying her request to transfer the stock standing in her name in
favor of Andaya. This letter clearly indicated that the registered owner herself had requested the
registration of the transfer of shares of stock. There was therefore no sensible reason for the RTC
to perfunctorily extract the pronouncement in Ponce and then disregard it in the face of admitted
facts in addition to the duly endorsed stock certificates.
Accordingly, a writ of mandamus to enforce a ministerial act may issue only when
petitioner is able to establish the presence of the following: (1) right clearly founded in law and is
not doubtful; (2) a legal duty to perform the act; (3) unlawful neglect in performing the duty
enjoined by law; (4) the ministerial nature of the act to be performed; and (5) the absence of other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Respondents primarily challenge
the mandamus suit on the grounds that the transfer violated the bank stockholders' right of first
refusal and that petitioner was a buyer in bad faith.
It must be noted that Section 98 applies only to close corporations. Hence, before the Court
can allow the operation of this section in the case at bar, there must first be a factual determination
that respondent Rural Bank of Cabadbaran is indeed a close corporation. There needs to be a
presentation of evidence on the relevant restrictions in the articles of incorporation and bylaws of
the said bank. From the records or the RTC Decision, there is apparently no such determination or
even allegation that would assist this Court in ruling on these two major factual matters. With the
foregoing, the validity of the transfer cannot yet be tested using that provision. These are the factual
matters that the parties must first thresh out before the RTC.

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 EXPROPRIATION (RULE 67)

Stages of expropriation proceedings

In the case of MUNICIPALITY OF CORDOVA vs PATHFINDER DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, G.R. No. 205544, June 29, 2016 the Supreme Court discussed the stages of
expropriation proceedings.
Under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, expropriation proceedings are comprised of two
stages: (1) the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the surrounding facts, and (2) the
determination of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The first stage ends, if
not in a dismissal of the action, with an order of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for public use or purpose.
Pathfinder and Topanga contend that the trial court issued an Order of Condemnation of
the properties without previously conducting a proper hearing for the reception of evidence of the
parties. However, no hearing is actually required for the issuance of a writ of possession, which
demands only two requirements: (a) the sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint, and
(b) the required provisional deposit. The sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint for
expropriation can be determined by the mere examination of the allegations of the complaint. Here,
there is indeed a necessity for the taking of the subject properties as these would provide access
towards the RORO port being constructed in the municipality. The construction of the new road
will highly benefit the public as it will enable shippers and passengers to gain access to the port
from the main public road or highway.

Determination of just compensation

In the case of LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. APOLONIO KHO, G.R. No.
214901, June 15, 2016, the Supreme Court discussed how the amount of the just compensation is
determined.
Case law dictates that when the acquisition process under PD 27 is still incomplete, such
as in this case where the just compensation due to the landowner has yet to be settled, just
compensation should be determined and the process concluded under RA 6657, as amended.
For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated
property is determined by its character and its price at the time of the taking, or the time when the
landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when the title is transferred
in the name of the beneficiaries. In addition, the factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657,
as amended, i.e., (a) the acquisition cost of the land, (b) the current value of like properties, (c) the

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nature and actual use of the property, and the income therefrom, (d) the owners sworn valuation,
(e) the tax declarations, (f) the assessment made by government assessors, (g) the social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the
property, and (h) the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing
institution on the said land, if any, must be equally considered.

The owner of the property to be expropriated is entitled to the interest in case of delay in the
payment of just compensation

In the case of LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SPOUSES ANTONIO AND
CARMEN AVANCENA, G.R. No. 190520, May 30, 2016the Supreme Court discussed that the
owner of the property to be expropriated is entitled to the interest in case of delay in the payment
of just compensation.
The CA found that the title to respondent spouses' land was canceled and a new title was
issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines in December 1991, but there was no showing
that petitioner had made payments prior to the taking of the land.
Thus, there was delay in the payment of just compensation which entitles the respondents
spouses to the payment of interest from the time the property was transferred in the name of the
government in December 1991 up to the time petitioner deposited the valuation in the account of
the respondents-spouses in July 1996. We agree with the CA that petitioner should pay interest for
the delay in the payment of just compensation. However, such payment of interest should be
computed up to the full payment of just compensation.
The certificate of title to respondents-spouses' land was canceled and a new certificate was
issued in the government's name in December 1991 without giving the former just compensation
for such taking. We have allowed the grant of interest in expropriation cases where there is delay
in the payment of just compensation. We recognize that the owner's loss is not only his property
but also its income-generating potential. Thus, when property is taken, full compensation of its
value must immediately be paid to achieve a fair exchange for the property and the potential
income lost. The rationale for imposing the interest is to compensate the landowners for the income
they would have made had they been properly compensated for their properties at the time of the
taking.
Thus, the CA did not err in imposing interest on the just compensation which will be
determined after the remand of the case to the SAC. The interest should be computed from
December 1991 up to the full payment of just compensation and not only up to the time petitioner
deposited the valuation in 1996 as the CA ruled. The concept of just compensation embraces not
only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also payment
within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being
immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually
receiving the amount necessary to cope with loss.

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 The award of interest is imposed in the nature of damages for delay in payment which, in
effect, makes the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance to ensure prompt
payment of the value of the land and limit the opportunity loss of the owner. The just compensation
due respondents-spouses shall earn legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum computed from the
time of taking in December 1991 until June 30, 2013.23 And from July 1, 2013 until full payment,
the interest will be at the new legal rate of 6% per annum, in accordance with the revisions
governing the rate of interest established by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board Circular
No. 799, Series of 2013. The amount which petitioner had already paid respondents-spouses by
virtue of the RTC's Order granting the issuance of the Writ of Execution dated October 2, 2000
shall be deducted from the amount of the just compensation which will be awarded after the
remand of this case.
Petitioner's reliance on our Third Division's December 19, 2007 Resolution in the case of
Apo Fruits Corporation v. CA wherein we declared that the payment of interest for the delay of
payment cannot be applied where there is prompt and valid payment of just compensation as
initially determined, even if the amount of just compensation was later on increased pursuant to
the Court's judgment, is misplaced. We found then that as Land Bank had deposited pertinent
amounts in favor of the landowners within fourteen months after the latter filed their complaint for
determination of just compensation with the SAC, there was no unreasonable delay in the payment
of just compensation which entitled the landowners to the payment of 12% interest per annum on
the unpaid just compensation.
However, such resolution was subsequently reversed and set aside in our En Banc
Resolution dated October 12, 2010 where we granted the landowners' motion for reconsideration.
We ordered the Land Bank to pay the landowners an interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the
unpaid balance of the just compensation, computed from the date the Government took the
properties on December 9, 1996, until the respondent Land Bank fully paid the balance of the
principal amount on May 9, 2008. We ruled that notwithstanding that the Land Bank had
immediately paid the remaining unpaid balance of the just compensation as finally determined by
the court, however, 12 long years had passed before the landowners were fully paid. Thus, the
landowners were entitled to legal interest from the time of the taking of the property until the actual
payment in order to place the owner in a position as good as, but not better than, the position he
was in before the taking occurred. The imposition of such interest was to compensate the
landowners for the income they would have made had they been properly compensated for their
properties at the time of the taking.

Mode of payment

In the case of LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SPOUSES ANTONIO AND
CARMEN AVANCENA, G.R. No. 190520, May 30, 2016the Supreme Court discussed the
mode of payment of just compensation.
Petitioner argues that it had made a deposit on October 17, 1991, i.e., prior to the
cancellation of the title of the respondents-spouses, and submitted with us a Certification dated
October 22, 1991 issued by the petitioner's Bonds Servicing Department stating that it had

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earmarked the sum of Pl,877,516.09 in cash and in LBP bonds as compensation for the parcel of
lands covered by RT-2937 in the name of respondents spouses on October 17, 1991 pursuant to
RA 6657 through voluntary offer. However, such certification was not among those that the
petitioner offered as evidence during the trial. More importantly, we had rejected the practice of
earmarking funds and opening trust accounts for purposes of effecting payment, hence, the law
requires payment of just compensation in cash or Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) bonds, not
by trust account.

Reckoning point of the computation of legal interest

In the case of LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SPOUSES ANTONIO AND
CARMEN AVANCENA, G.R. No. 190520, May 30, 2016the Supreme Court discussed the
reckoning point from when the legal interest to be imposed is computed.

The landowners were entitled to legal interest from the time of the taking of the property
until the actual payment in order to place the owner in a position as good as, but not better than,
the position he was in before the taking occurred. The imposition of such interest was to
compensate the landowners for the income they would have made had they been properly
compensated for their properties at the time of the taking. Thus, we held:
Let it be remembered that shorn of its eminent domain and social justice
aspects, what the agrarian land reform program involves is the purchase by the
government, through the LBP, of agricultural lands for sale and distribution to
farmers. As a purchase, it involves an exchange of values the landholdings in
exchange for the LBPs payment. In determining the just compensation for this
exchange, however, the measure to be borne in mind is not the taker's gain but
the owner's loss since what is involved is the takeover of private property under
the States coercive power. As mentioned above, in the value-for-value exchange
in an eminent domain situation, the State must ensure that the individual whose
property is taken is not short changed and must hence carry the burden of
showing that the just compensation requirement of the Bill of Rights is satisfied.

The owner's loss, of course, is not only his property but also its income-
generating potential. Thus, when property is taken, lull compensation of its value
must immediately be paid to achieve a fair exchange for the property and the
potential income lost. The just compensation is made available to the property
owner so that he may derive income from this compensation, in the same manner
that he would have derived income from his expropriated property. If full
compensation is not paid for property taken, then the State must make up for the
shortfall in the earning potential immediately lost due to the taking, and the
absence of replacement property from which income can be derived; interest on
the unpaid compensation becomes due as compliance with the constitutional
mandate on eminent domain and as a basic measure of fairness.

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Legal interest rate

In the case of NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. HEIRS OF GREGORIO

RAMORAN, ET AL., G.R. No. 193455, June 13, 2016, the Supreme Court discussed the legal
interest rate applicable in expropriation proceedings.
The case invoked by petitioner was overturned in 2002 by Republic v. Court of Appeals.
In Republic, this Court said that just compensation amounted to an effective forbearance on the
part of the state. Applying Eastern Shipping Lines, the Court fixed the applicable interest rate at
12% per annum, computed from the time the property was taken until the full amount of just
compensation was paid, in order to eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of
the value of the currency over time.
Nevertheless, in line with the recent circular of the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas (BSP-MB) No. 799, Series of 2013, effective 1 July 2013, the prevailing rate of
interest for loans or forbearance of money is six percent (6%) per annum, in the absence of an
express contract as to such rate of interest.

Concept of delay in expropriation proceedings

In the case of NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. HEIRS OF GREGORIO

RAMORAN, ET AL., G.R. No. 193455, June 13, 2016, the Supreme Court discussed concept of
delay in expropriation proceedings.
Petitioner appears to have misunderstood the concept of delay in expropriation cases.
The term does not pertain to the length of time that elapsed from the filing of the Complaint until
its resolution. Rather, it refers to the fact that property was taken for public use before
compensation was deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case. The argument that
the resolution of the case was prolonged by several factors is therefore unmeritorious.
Clearly, there was delay because property was taken for public use before compensation
was paid or deposited with the court. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered just, for property owners are made to suffer the consequences of being immediately
deprived of their land, while being made to wait for a decade or more, before actually receiving
the amount necessary to cope with their loss. Hence, between the taking of the property and the
actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owners in a position as good as the
position they were in before the taking occurred.

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When immediate entry may be effected

In the case of MUNICIPALITY OF CORDOVA vs PATHFINDER DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, G.R. No. 205544, June 29, 2016 the Supreme Court discussed when immediate
entry to the expropriated property may be effected.
The requisites for authorizing immediate entry are the filing of a complaint for
expropriation sufficient in form and substance, and the deposit of the amount equivalent to fifteen
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax
declaration. Upon compliance with these requirements, the petitioner in an expropriation case is
entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right and the issuance of the writ becomes ministerial.
Indubitably, since the complaint was found to have been sufficient in form and substance and the
required deposit had been duly complied with, the issuance of the writ had aptly become ministerial
on the part of the RTC. It cannot be said, therefore, that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it found the taking of the properties of Topanga and Pathfinder proper.

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 FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER (RULE 70)

The difference between unlawful detainer and forcible entry

In the case of BALIBAGO FAITH BAPTIST CHURCH vs FAITH IN CHRIST JESUS

BAPTIST CHURCH, INC., G.R. NO. 191527, August 22, 2016, the Supreme Court discussed
the difference between unlawful detainer and forcible entry.
Unlawful detainer and forcible entry are entirely distinct causes of action, to wit: (a) action
to recover possession founded on illegal occupation from the beginning - forcible entry; and (b)
action founded on unlawful detention by a person who originally acquired possession lawfully -
unlawful detainer.
The rule is that the allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and
the jurisdiction of the court. The cause of action in a complaint is not what the designation of the
complaint states, but what the allegations in the body of the complaint define and describe. The
designation or caption is not controlling, more than the allegations in the complaint in themselves
are, for it is not even an indispensable part of the complaint. The complaint must specifically allege
the facts constituting unlawful detainer or forcible entry if the complaint filed was for unlawful
detainer, or forcible entry, respectively. It cannot be made to depend on the exclusive
characterization of the case by one of the parties, jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss or in a motion for reconsideration.
It should then be stressed that what determines the cause of action is the nature of
defendants' entry into the land. If entry is illegal, then the cause of action which may be filed
against the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, entry is legal
but thereafter possession became illegal, the case is one of illegal detainer which must be filed
within one year from the date of the last demand.
Indeed, to vest the court of jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary
that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts which brings the party clearly within
the class of cases for which the statute provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in
nature. The complaint must show enough on its face the courts jurisdiction without resort to parole
testimony.
This case would have to fall under the concept of forcible entry as it has been long settled
that in forcible entry cases, no force is really necessary. The act of going on the property and
excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the
property, and this is all that is necessary. However, while BFBC sufficiently alleged that they had
prior physical possession of the subject property, nothing has been said on how prior physical
possession of the subject property, nothing has been said on how FCJBs entry was effected or
when dispossession started. It is in this light that we rule that the present complaint is similarly
defective even if we are to treat the same as forcible entry as it failed to allege how and when entry

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was effected. The bare allegation of BFBC that it turned out that defendants have an interest in the
subject premises and defendant Reynaldo Galvan formed and incorporated the defendant FCJBC
and too control of the subject premises, would not suffice since it only shows that FCJBC entered
the land and occupied the house thereon without BFBC and PBSBCs consent or permission which
are constitutive of forcible entry. Unfortunately, BFBC and PBSCs failure to allege when the
dispossession took place and how it was effected leaves the complaint wanting in jurisdictional
ground.

Reckoning point of the one-year period

In the case of BALIBAGO FAITH BAPTIST CHURCH vs FAITH IN CHRIST JESUS

BAPTIST CHURCH, INC., G.R. NO. 191527, August 22, 2016, the Supreme Court discussed
the reckoning point of the one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry was
made through stealth.
Suffice it to say, the one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry
was made through stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned
thereof. If the dispossession did not occur by any of the means stated in Section 1, Rule 70, as in
this case, the proper recourse is to file a plenary action to recover possession with the Regional
Trial Court.

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 CONTEMPT (RULE 71)
Contempt is not warranted in the absence of a clear contumacious act against the Court with
respect to the TRO

In the case of MARIA CONCEPCION S. NOCHE, et. Al vs HON. JANETTE L. GARIN,

et al, G.R. No. 221866, August 24, 2016, the Supreme Court discussed that contempt is not
warranted in the absence of a clear contumacious act against the Court with respect to the TRO.
In the absence of a clear contumacious act committed against the Court with respect to
the TRO, contempt is not warranted. It has been shown that the questioned acts were performed or
done prior to the issuance of the TRO. Moreover, the charge that the respondents are continuing
to engage in the distribution of the contraceptive drugs Implanon and Implanon NXT has not been
substantiated. The mere fact that the subject drugs were re-certified up to May 29, 2020 is not
proof that they continue to violate the TRO. In fact, the respondents are praying that it be lifted
which is an indication that they are respecting and observing it.
At any rate, this controversy would not have been brought about if only the public
respondents acted in accordance with the mandate of the Court in Imbong. Despite the Courts
pronouncements in Imbong, they have not amended the RH-IRR to conform to the said
pronouncements. Several provisions were struck down by the Court as unconstitutional, but they
remain in the RH-IRR. Positive steps should have been taken by the concerned agencies.
Moreover, the Court notes that the RH-IRR has failed to provide the procedural mechanism
by which the oppositors may challenge the safety and the non-abortifacient character of
contraceptive drugs and devices. The FDA should address this glaring omission.
To be sure, and to avoid any dispute in the future, the Court will adopt and embody I the
dispositive portion the studied instructions of one of their esteemed colleagues, Hon. Mariano C.
Castillo, in his Concurring Opinion in Imbong. Due to the inaction of the public respondents, the
Court will adopt them as part of this resolution to serve as guidelines for all concerned.
In line with pronouncements made herein and in the decision of the Court in Imbong, the
FDA should afford the petitioners their constitutional rights to due process by conducting a
summary hearing on the applications and oppositions, guided by the cardinal rights of parties laid
down in Ang Tibay as stated above, within thirty (30) days from receipt of his disposition.

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