617 Phil.

45

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 164435, September 29, 2009
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court, praying that the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution[2] dated July
8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.

On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117 under the
following Information in Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:

INFORMATION

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor

accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the
crime of BIGAMY, committed as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of

November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo,
being previously united in lawful marriage
with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the
 said marriage having been legally dissolved,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage
with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which
marriage was only discovered on January
12, 1999.

Contrary to law.

On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during

arraignment and, thereafter, trial proceeded.

The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by

the CA, are as follows.

On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and

Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil
wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon.
Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor
of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1, H-
2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated
November 17, 2000).

On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael

Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a
church wedding ceremony before Rev.
Angel Resultay in San Carlos City,
Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated
November 17, 2000). Out of the marital
union, appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle
J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975 (Exhs. F,
R, R-1).

Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter

contracted a subsequent marriage with
Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, at the City
Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then
Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on November
26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1, pp. 15-
18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).

On April 16, 1995, appellant and

Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows
anew in a church wedding in Manila (Exh.
E).

In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the

appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for
annulment of marriage before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila.

Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged

with bigamy before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City x x x.

xxxx

Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed

against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000,
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of
nullity of their marriage.

On July 9, 2001, the court a quo

promulgated the assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, upon the

foregoing premises, this court
hereby finds accused Victoria
Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of
BIGAMY.

Accordingly, said accused is

hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of SIX (6)
YEARS of prision correccional,
as minimum, to TEN (10)
YEARS of prision mayor, as
maximum.

This court makes no

pronouncement on the civil
aspect of this case, such as the
nullity of accused's bigamous
marriage to Uy and its effect on
their children and their property.
This aspect is being determined
 by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila in Civil Case No. 99-
93582.

Costs against the accused.

The motion for reconsideration was

likewise denied by the same court in that
assailed Order dated 2 August 2001.[3]

For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974

and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null and void
because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a
certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration
of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo
and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid
marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed,
since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far
back as 1978.

On appeal to the CA, petitioner's conviction was

affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated July 21, 2003,
the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when
she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy
because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo
had not yet been declared null and void by the court.
This being so, the presumption is, her previous
marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time of
her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for
lack of sufficient evidence, petitioner's contentions
that her marriages were celebrated without a
marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her
previous marriage as far back as 1978.

In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch

140, rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003,
declaring petitioner's 1974 and 1975 marriages to
Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of
Alocillo's psychological incapacity. Said decision
became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her
motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said
declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of
her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July
8, 2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,[4]
denied reconsideration and ruled that "[t]he
subsequent declaration of nullity of her first marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity, while it
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not
without legal consequences, among which is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy."[5]

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where petitioner
alleges that:

V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS

COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE
DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A
CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO
THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.

V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS

COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION
OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME
OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE
SUPERVENING PROOF THAT THE
FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF
PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD
BEEN DECLARED BY FINAL
JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO.

V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS

COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT
THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT
OF MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT BRANCH 38
BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS
AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.

V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS

COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE
INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD
 ALREADY PRESCRIBED.

V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS

COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE
MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO
AND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS
NO VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.

V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS

COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN
ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER
THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND
THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
LAW.

The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely

related, shall be discussed jointly. It is true that right
after the presentation of the prosecution evidence,
petitioner moved for suspension of the proceedings
on the ground of the pendency of the petition for
declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriages to
Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a
prejudicial question. In her appeal, she also asserted
that the petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a ground
for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied
her motion for suspension, while the CA struck
down her arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[6] the
Court categorically stated that:

x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who

contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case
the criminal case may not be
suspended on the ground of the
pendency of a civil case for declaration
of nullity. x x x

xxxx

x x x The reason is that, without a judicial

declaration of its nullity, the first
marriage is presumed to be subsisting.
In the case at bar, respondent was for all
legal intents and purposes regarded as a
married man at the time he contracted his
second marriage with petitioner. Against
this legal backdrop, any decision in the
civil action for nullity would not erase
the fact that respondent entered into a
second marriage during the subsistence
of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in
the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It
 is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
x x x[7]

The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado

v. People,[8] where it was held thus:

The subsequent judicial declaration of the

nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the
crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
petitioner's assertion would only delay the
prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an
accused could simply file a petition to declare his
previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of
that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal
case. We cannot allow that.

The outcome of the civil case for

annulment of petitioner's marriage to
[private complainant] had no bearing
upon the determination of petitioner's
innocence or guilt in the criminal case
for bigamy, because all that is required
for the charge of bigamy to prosper is
that the first marriage be subsisting at
the time the second marriage is
contracted.

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one

which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
 valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner
eventually obtained a declaration that his
first marriage was void ab initio, the point is,
both the first and the second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled.[9]

For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-

quoted cases, petitioner's conviction of the crime of
bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioner's two marriages to
Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the
crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted
a second marriage without the previous one having
been judicially declared null and void, the crime of
bigamy was already consummated because at the
time of the celebration of the second marriage,
petitioner's marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet
been declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting.
Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of
petitioner's marriage to Uy make any difference.[10]
As held in Tenebro, "[s]ince a marriage contracted
during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage
is not per se an argument for the avoidance of
criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of
[Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore,
would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act
of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage."[11]

Petitioner's defense of prescription is likewise

doomed to fail.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,

bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, which is
classified under Article 25 of said Code as an
afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides that
"[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties
shall prescribe in fifteen years," while Article 91
states that "[t]he period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or
their agents x x x ."

Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous

marriage as far back as 1978; hence, prescription
began to run from that time. Note that the party who
raises a fact as a matter of defense has the burden of
proving it. The defendant or accused is obliged to
produce evidence in support of its defense;
otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains
self-serving.[12] Thus, for petitioner's defense of
prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her
to adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy
already obtained knowledge of her previous
marriage.
A close examination of the records of the case
reveals that petitioner utterly failed to present
sufficient evidence to support her allegation.
Petitioner's testimony that her own mother told Uy
in 1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to
Alocillo does not inspire belief, as it is totally
unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial
court correctly observed that:

x x x She did not call to the witness stand

her mother - the person who allegedly
actually told Uy about her previous
marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious
that without the confirmatory testimony of
her mother, the attribution of the latter of
any act which she allegedly did is
hearsay.[13]

As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,[14] "the

prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should
be counted only from the day on which the said
crime was discovered by the offended party, the
authorities or their [agents]," as opposed to being
counted from the date of registration of the
bigamous marriage.[15] Since petitioner failed to
prove with certainty that the period of prescription
began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore,
ineffectual.

Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA

imposed an erroneous penalty under the Revised
Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.

The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the

accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could
be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code,
and the minimum of which shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the
Code for the offense, without first considering any
modifying circumstance attendant to the commission
of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves
it entirely within the sound discretion of the court to
determine the minimum penalty, as long as it is
anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower
without any reference to the periods into which it
might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances
are considered only in the imposition of the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.[16]

Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the

penalty imposed on petitioner is proper. Under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable
penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. The penalty next
lower is prision correccional, which ranges from 6
months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty
of six years imposed by the trial court is, therefore,
correct as it is still within the duration of prision
correccional. There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances proven in this case, the prescribed
penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in its
medium period, which is from 8 years and 1 day to
10 years. Again, the trial court correctly imposed a
maximum penalty of 10 years.

However, for humanitarian purposes, and

considering that petitioner's marriage to Alocillo has
after all been declared by final judgment[17] to be void
ab initio on account of the latter's psychological
incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was
subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it
proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower
courts. Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1
day of prision mayor, as maximum.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is

PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution
dated July 8, 2004 are hereby MODIFIED as to the
penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in all other
respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2)
years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Velasco,

Jr., and Nachura, JJ., concur.

Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P.

[1]

Abesamis, with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr.

and Jose C. Mendoza, concurring; rollo, pp. 8-21.

Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with

[2]

Associate Justices Mariano C. del Castillo and Jose C.

Mendoza, concurring; rollo, pp. 22-23.

[3] Rollo, pp. 9-10.

[4] 467 Phil. 723 (2004).

[5] CA rollo, p. 404.

[6] 391 Phil. 648 (2000).

[7] Id. at 655-657. (Emphasis supplied.)

[8] G.R. No. 159218, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 562.

[9] Id. at 567-568. (Emphasis supplied.)

[10] Abunado v. People, supra note 8; Tenebro v. Court of

Appeals, supra note 4, at 752.

[11] Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 742.

Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. v. Trans-Asia

[12]

Shipping Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 151890, June 20, 2006,

491 SCRA 411, 433.

[13] Records, p. 383.

[14] G.R. No. 109454, June 14, 1994, 233 SCRA 155.

[15] Id. at 161.

[16] Abunado v. People, supra note 8, at 568.

See Decision of the Regional Trial Court of

[17]

Makati City in Civil Case No. 00-1217, CA rollo, pp.

343-347.

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