XVI.
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND WRIT OF Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia when the massacre
AMPARO
A. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
1. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG
SALIBO, DATUKAN MALANG
SALIBO, Petitioner,
vs.
WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX,
BJMP BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA,
TAGUIG CITY and all other persons acting on his
behalf and/or having custody of DATUKAN
MALANG SALIBO, Respondents.
FACTS
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived
of liberty due to mistaken identity. In such cases, the
person is not under any lawful process and is continuously
being illegally detained.
This is a Petition for Review1 on Certiorari of the Court
of Appeals Decision2 reversing the Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City (Taguig
Hall of Justice) granting Datukan Malang Salibos
Petition for Habeas Corpus.
From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan
Malang Salibo (Salibo) and other Filipinos were allegedly
in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage.4 "While in Saudi
Arabia, . . . Salibo visited and prayed in the cities of
Medina, Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah."5 He returned to
the Philippines on December 20, 2009.6
On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of
Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him
to be Butukan S. Malang.7
Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57
counts of murder for allegedly participating in the
November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He had a
pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in
People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et
al.
When Datukan Malang Salibo learned that the police
officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao
suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang, he presented
himself to clear his name. Salibo presented to the police
pertinent portions of his passport, boarding passes and
other documents tending to prove that a certain Datukan
happened. The authorities, however, apprehended and
detained him. He questioned the legality of his detention
via Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA,
maintaining that he is not the accused Batukan S. Malang.
The CA issued the writ, making it returnable to the judge
of RTC Taguig. After hearing of the Return, the trial court
granted Salibos petition and ordered his immediate
release from detention.
On appeal by the Warden, the CA reversed the RTC
ruling. The CA held that even assuming Salibo was not
the Batukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of
Arrest, orderly course of trial must be pursued and the
usual remedies exhausted before the writ of habeas corpus
may be invoked. Salibos proper remedy, according to the
CA, should have been a motion to quash information
and/or warrant of arrest.
On the other hand, Salibo believes that the Warden erred
in appealing the RTC decision before the CA. Salibo
argued that although the CA delegated to the RTC the
authority to hear the Wardens Return, the RTCs ruling
should be deemed as the CA ruling, and hence, it should
have been appealed directly before the SC.
ISSUE AND RULING
Issue 1: W/N Salibo properly availed the remedy of a
petition for writ of habeas corpus
HELD: Yes. Habeas corpus is the remedy for a person
deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In such cases,
the person is not under any lawful process and is
continuously being illegally detained.
First, it was Butukan S. Malang, not Salibo, who was
charged and accused in the Information and Alias Warrant
of Arrest issued in the case of People vs Ampatuan. Based
on the evidences presented, Salibo sufficiently
established that he could not have been Butukan S.
Malang. Therefore, Salibo was not arrested by virtue of
any warrant charging him of an offense, nor restrained
under a lawful process or an order of a court. Second,
Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. When
he was in the presence of authorities, he was neither
committing nor attempting to commit an offense, and the
police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense
that he might have committed. Salibo was also not an
escape prisoner.
The police officers have deprived him of his liberty
without due process of law. Therefore, Salibo correctly
availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
1
Issue 2: W/N a motion to quash information and/or
warrant of arrest is the proper remedy in cases where a
person with a mistaken identity is detained
HELD. No, the CAs contention is not correct. Salibos
proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information
and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds for filing
a Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if
petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he
alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of
the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the
name of the accused appearing in the Information and/or
Warrant of Arrest from Butukan S. Malang to Datukan
Malang Salibo will not cure the lack of preliminary
investigation in this case. Likewise, a motion for
reinvestigation will not cure the defect of lack of
preliminary investigation.
decision where a court determines the legality of the
restraint.
Between the issuance of the writ and the final
decision on the petition for its issuance, it is the
issuance of the writ that is essential. The issuance of
the writ sets in motion the speedy judicial inquiry on
the legality of any deprivation of liberty. Courts
shall liberally issue writs of habeas corpus even if the
petition for its issuance on its face is devoid of
merit. Although the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus may be suspended in cases of invasion,
rebellion, or when the public safety requires it, the
writ itself may not be suspended.

Issue 3: W/N the Warden correctly appealed the RTC

ruling on the Return before the CA

HELD: Yes. An application for a writ of habeas corpus

may be made through a petition filed before CA or any of
its members, the CA or any of its members in instances
authorized by law, or the RTC or any of its presiding
judges. The court or judge grants the writ and requires the
officer or person having custody of the person allegedly
restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ. A hearing
on the return of the writ is then conducted.

The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from

that which issued the writ. Should the court issuing the
writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made
returnable, the lower court shall proceed to decide the
petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation,
the lower court acquires the power and authority to
determine the merits of the petition for habeas corpus.
Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision
appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over
decisions of the lower court.

ADDITIONAL:

Distinction between the Writ vs the Final Decision

on Petition for the Issuance of the Writ

The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final

decision on the petition for the issuance of the
writ. It is the writ that commands the production of
the body of the person allegedly restrained of his or
her liberty. On the other hand, it is in the final
2
 B. WRIT OF AMPARO
2. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE VS
MANALO
The writ of amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of
silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.
Facts:
Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted
by military men belonging to the CAFGU on the
suspicion that they were members and supporters of the
NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture, the
brothers escaped. Ten days after their escape, they filed a
Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents
from depriving them of their right to liberty and other
basic rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The
Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus
motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition.
The Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the Writ of
Amparo. The CA ordered the Secretary of National
Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the
Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial
investigation reports as to the Manalos custody, confirm
the present places of official assignment of two military
officials involved, and produce all medical reports and
records of the Manalo brothers while under military
custody. The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief
of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to reverse
and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.
Issue:
Whether the respondents should be granted the privilege
of the Writ of Amparo.
Ruling:
YES. The possibility of respondents being executed
stared them in the eye while they were in detention. With
their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent,
more so now that they have surfaced and implicated
specific officers in the military not only in their own
abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons
known to have disappeared.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have
been under concealment and protection by private citizens
because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The
threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit
their movements or activities. Precisely because
respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of
their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence
of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or
written threats to their life, liberty and
security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents
abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably
support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that
they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even
executed. These constitute threats to their liberty,
security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ
of amparo. Hence, the respondents right to security as
freedom from threat is violated by the apparent threat to
their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to
security as a guarantee of protection by the government is
likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and
protection on the part of the military.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life,
liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from
victims of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. The writ of amparo is a tool that gives
voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret
walls
3. GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., et al. v.
MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS
The purpose of Writ of Amparo is to address
uncertainity. The framers of the Amparo Rule never
intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in
stating the threatened or actual violation of a victims
rights
Facts:
Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, a consultant for the World
Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic
Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was
last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Kunnong and Muhammad
Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies
and Tagitis fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported
Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo Police Station.
More than a month later, Mary Jean B. Tagitis, the wife
of Morced, filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo with
the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P.
Arcilla. The petition was directed against the petitioners.
In the petition, Tagitis alleged her husband was forcibly
taken by men believed to be police intelligence operatives
and despite efforts to locate the whereabouts of Engr.
Tagitis, he was nowhere to be found. According to
reliable information she received, subject Engr. Tagitis is
3
in the custody of police intelligence operatives,
specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being
held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to
involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different
terrorist groups particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah or JI.
She further averred that she has exhausted all
administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and
under the circumstances, she has no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy to protect and get the release of her
husband, Engr. Morced Tagitis, from the illegal clutches
of his captors, their intelligence operatives and the like
which are in total violation of the subjects human and
constitutional rights, except the issuance of a Writ of
Amparo.
In their verified Return, the petitioners denied any
involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis alleged
abduction. They argued that the allegations of the petition
were incomplete and did not constitute a cause of action
against them; were baseless, or at best speculative; and
were merely based on hearsay evidence. In addition, they
all claimed that they exhausted all means, particularly
taking pro-active measures to investigate, search and
locate Tagitis and to apprehend the persons responsible
for his disappearance.
Issue:
Whether the privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be
extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.
Ruling:
YES. The disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis is
classified as an enforced disappearance, thus the privilege
of the Writ of Amparo applies. There was no direct
evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared.
The direct evidence at hand only shows that Tagitis went
out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room
key with the hotel desk and was never seen nor heard of
again. The undisputed conclusion, however, from all
concerned the petitioner, Tagitis colleagues and even
the police authorities is that Tagistis disappeared under
mysterious circumstances and was never seen again.
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section
5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the
threatened or actual violation of a victims rights. As in
any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course
state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action,
omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition,
however, this requirement must be read in light of the
nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a
situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to
describe with certainty how the victim exactly
disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or
arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because
these information may purposely be hidden or covered up
by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of
situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and
precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into
the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of
judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights
to life, liberty and security.
The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather
than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine
if the required elements namely, of the disappearance,
the State or private action, and the actual or threatened
violations of the rights to life, liberty or security are
present.
Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings for the
writ and to facilitate the resolution of the petition, the
Amparo Rule incorporated the requirement for supporting
affidavits, with the annotation that these can be used as
the affiants direct testimony. This requirement, however,
should not be read as an absolute one that necessarily
leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly
followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has
substantially complied with the requirement by
submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the
facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement
that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. The
failure to attach the required affidavits was fully cured
when the respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin)
personally testified in the CA hearings held to swear to
and flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, even on
this point, the petition cannot be faulted
4. BURGOS VS MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
621 scra 481 (2010)
around one oclock in the afternoon of April 28, 2007,
Jonas Joseph T. Burgos a farmer advocate and a member
of Kilusang Magbubukid sa Bulacan (a chapter of the
militant peasant organization Kilusang Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas) was forcibly taken and abducted by a group of
four (4) men and a woman from the extension portion of
Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of
Ever Gotesco Mall. On his way out of the restaurant,
Jonas told the manager, Maam aktibista lang po
ako! When a security guard tried to intervene, after he
noticed that the group was forcibly dragging a male
person out of the restaurant, he was told, Pare, pulis! The
4
guard then backed off but was able to see that Jonas was
forced into the rear portion of a plain maroon colored
Toyota Revo. The guard then noted the plate number and
reported the incident to his superiors as well as to the
police on duty in the said mall.
On April 30, 2007, the petitioner held a press conference
and announced that her son Jonas was missing. That same
day, the petitioner sought confirmation from the guard if
the person abducted was her son Jonas. Upon subsequent
police investigation and LTO verification, it was
discovered that plate number was registered to a 1991
Isuzu XLT vehicle owned by a certain Mauro B.
Mudlong. It was also later confirmed by employees of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) that Mudlong was arrested and his 1991 Isuzu
XLT vehicle was seized on June 24, 2006 by Cpl. Castro
Bugalan and Pfc. Jose Villea of the 56thInfantry Battalion
(IB) of the Philippine Army for transporting timber
without permit. As agreed upon by the DENR employees
and officers of the 56th IB, the vehicle with the license
plate no. TAB 194 was impounded in the 56th IB
headquarters whose commanding officer at that time was
Lt. Col. Noel Clement.
The established facts also show that Lt. Col. Clement and
the soldiers of the 56th IB went on retraining at the
Headquarters of the First Scout Rangers Regiment (Camp
Tecson) in Brgy. Tartaro, San Miguel, Bulacan starting
November 28, 2006. A left-behind force or a squad
remained in the camp of the 56th IB to secure the premises
and equipment as it awaited the arrival of the 69th IB,
headed by Lt. Col. Edison Caga, which took over the
56th IBs area of responsibility for the duration of the
retraining. The 69th IB arrived at Camp Tecson on
December 1, 2006, and remained there until March 7,
2007, when the 56th IB returned. There was no formal
turnover or inventory of equipment and vehicles when the
69th IB arrived on December 1, 2006.
Meanwhile, on January 17, 2007, Lt. Col. Melquiades
Feliciano took command of the 56th IB from Lt. Col.
Clement. The actual turnover of command took place
at Camp Tecson where the 56th IB was retraining. At the
time Jonas was abducted on April 28, 2007, Lt. Col.
Feliciano was the 56th IBs commanding officer. Earlier,
on March 23, 2007, 2nd Lt. Dick A. Abletes, a member of
the 56th IB, was caught on video talking to two persons, a
male and a female, at McDonalds Bocaue. In the video,
he was seen handing a document to the two persons. On
March 26, 2007, 2nd Lt. Abletes was arrested and charges
were soon filed against him with the Judge Advocate
General for violations of Articles 82, 96 and 97 of the
Articles of War.
Prior to Jonas abduction, Mudlongs 1991 Isuzu XLT
vehicle remained impounded at the 56th IBs
Headquarters. In May 2007, right after Jonas abduction
was made public, it was discovered that plate number
TAB 194 of this 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle was missing,
and the engine and other spare parts were cannibalized.
On direct examination, the petitioner testified before the
CA that the police was able to generate cartographic
sketches of two (one male and one female) of the
abductors of Jonas based on its interview of
eyewitnesses.[7]The petitioner narrated further that these
cartographic sketches were identified by State Prosecutor
Emmanuel Velasco of the Department of Justice (DOJ);
that when she went to see State Prosecutor Velasco
personally, he gave her five names who were allegedly
involved in the abduction of Jonas (namely T/Sgt. Jason
Roxas, Cpl. Joana Francisco, M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo, and
1st Lt. Jaime Mendaros);[8] and that the information from
State Prosecutor Velascos sources corroborated the same
information she received earlier from her own
sources.[9] The petitioner also testified that nothing came
out of the information given by State Prosecutor Velasco
because he was pulled out from the investigation by the
DOJ Secretary,[10] and that the police, particularly P/Supt.
Jonnel C. Estomo, failed to investigate and act upon these
leads.[11]
On August 30, 2007, P/Supt. Estomo (the lead
investigator in the investigation conducted by the
Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group [PNP-CIDG]) testified before the CA
that he did not investigate or look into the identities of the
cartographic sketches of the two abductors provided by
the PNP Criminal Investigation Unit, Quezon
City.[12] P/Supt. Estomo testified further that he showed
the photos of Cpl. Bugalan and Pfc.Villea to witness Larry
Marquez for identification but failed to show any photos
of the other officers and men of the 56th IB.[13] Finally,
P/Supt. Estomo also testified that he did not propound any
clarificatory questions regarding the disappearance of
Jonas Burgos to Lt. Cols. Feliciano, Clement, and Caga
of the 56th IB who merely voluntarily submitted their
statements.[14]
On August 29, 2007, the PNP-CIDG presented Emerito
Lipio @ KA TIBO/KA CRIS, Marlon D. Manuel @ KA
CARLO, and Melissa Concepcion Reyes @ KA
LISA/RAMIL to support the theory that elements of the
New Peoples Army (NPA) perpetrated the abduction of
5
Jonas.[15] In his Sworn Statement, Lipio admitted that he
is a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP)/NPA and that the NPA was behind the abduction
of Jonas. Lipio revealed that Jonas is known as @KA
RAMON in the communist movement. He claimed
further that he and @KA RAMON belonged to the
Bulacan Party Committee, assigned to the White Area
Committee doing intelligence work for the movement
under the leadership of Delfin de Guzman @ KA BASTE,
and that @KA RAMON was their political instructor and
head of the intelligence unit in the province.[16]
Sometime early April of 2007, Lipio was present in a
meeting between @KA BASTE and @KA RAMON. At
this meeting, the two had a heated argument. For this
reason, @KA BASTE instructed Lipio to place @KA
RAMON under surveillance as they suspected him of
pilfering funds from the party and of acting as a military
agent.[17]
Lipio further averred that upon instruction of @KA
BASTE, he and a certain @KA CARLO proceeded to
Ever Gotesco Mall on April 28, 2007 to monitor the
reported meeting between @KA RAMON and other party
members. At one oclock in the afternoon, Lipio and @KA
CARLO (who stationed themselves near the entrance/exit
of the mall) saw a man, who they recognized as @KA
RAMON, forcibly taken by four men, brought outside of
the mall, and shoved inside a Toyota Revo. Lipio further
alleged that he recognized two of the abductors as @KA
DANTE and @KA ENSO who he claims to be members
of the CPP/NPAs guerilla unit (RYG).[18]
In his Sworn Statement, Manuel affirmed and
substantiated Lipios statement that @KA RAMON and
Jonas are one and the same person and that he is a member
of the communist movement in Bulacan. Manuel also
corroborated Lipios statement regarding the
circumstances of the abduction of @KA RAMON at Ever
Gotesco Mall on April 28, 2007; he confirmed that he and
@ KA TIBO witnessed the abduction.[19]
Reyes, a rebel-returnee, provided in her Sworn Statement
additional material information regarding the
disappearance of Jonas. Reyes alleged that she was
supposed to meet with @KA RAMON and another
comrade in the movement (whom she identified as @KA
JO) to discuss the possibility of arranging a meeting with
a contact in the military. She averred that she met @KA
JO at about 11:30 a.m. at the Baliaug Transit Terminal,
Cubao enroute to Ever Gotesco mall where they would
meet with a certain @KA RAMON. Reyes further
narrated that they arrived about noon at Ever Gotesco
mall; @KA JO left her at McDonalds and told her to wait
while he went to look for @KA RAMON. After an hour,
@KA JO arrived without @KA RAMON and told Reyes
to go home and just keep in touch through text
messaging. Reyes alleged further that she has not heard
from @KA JO since
RULING
Considering the findings of the CA and our review of the
records of the present case, we conclude that the PNP and
the AFP have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive and
meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas
Burgos, and to exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the
performance of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo requires. Because of these investigative
shortcomings, we cannot rule on the case until a more
meaningful investigation, using extraordinary diligence,
is undertaken.
From the records, we note that there are very
significant lapses in the handling of the investigation -
among them the PNP-CIDGs failure to identify the
cartographic sketches of two (one male and one female)
of the five abductors of Jonas based on their interview of
eyewitnesses to the abduction. This lapse is based on the
information provided to the petitioner by no less than
State Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco of the DOJ who
identified the persons who were possibly involved in the
abduction, namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine
Army), Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air
Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), and
an alias T.L., all reportedly assigned with Military
Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the
AFP.[24] No search and certification were ever made on
whether these persons were AFP personnel or in other
branches of the service, such as the Philippine Air
Force. As testified to by the petitioner, no significant
follow through was also made by the PNP-CIDG in
ascertaining the identities of the cartographic sketches of
two of the abductors despite the evidentiary leads
provided by State Prosecutor Velasco of the
DOJ. Notably, the PNP-CIDG, as the lead investigating
agency in the present case, did not appear to have lifted a
finger to pursue these aspects of the case.
We note, too, that no independent investigation appeared
to have been made by the PNP-CIDG to inquire into the
veracity of Lipios and Manuels claims that Jonas was
abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and a certain @KA
ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG. The records
do not indicate whether the PNP-CIDG conducted a
follow-up investigation to determine the identities and
6
whereabouts of @KA Dante and @KA ENSO. These
omissions were aggravated by the CA finding that the
PNP has yet to refer any case for preliminary investigation
to the DOJ despite its representation before the CA that it
had forwarded all pertinent and relevant documents to the
DOJ for the filing of appropriate charges against @KA
DANTE and @KA ENSO.
Based on these considerations, we conclude that
further investigation and monitoring should be
undertaken. While significant leads have been provided
to investigators, the investigations by the PNP-CIDG, the
AFP Provost Marshal, and even the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR) have been less than complete. The
PNP-CIDGs investigation particularly leaves much to be
desired in terms of the extraordinary diligence that the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. For this reason, we
resolve to refer the present case to the CHR as the Courts
directly commissioned agency tasked with the
continuation of the investigation of the Burgos abduction
and the gathering of evidence, with the obligation to
report its factual findings and recommendations to this
Court. We take into consideration in this regard that the
CHR is a specialized and independent agency created and
empowered by the Constitution to investigate all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights
and to provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights of all persons within
the Philippines.[25]
Under this mandate, the CHR is tasked to conduct
appropriate investigative proceedings, including field
investigations acting as the Courts directly commissioned
agency for purposes of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparowith the tasks of: (a) ascertaining the identities
of the persons appearing in the cartographic sketches of
the two alleged abductors as well as their whereabouts;
(b) determining based on records, past and present, the
identities and locations of the persons identified by State
Prosecutor Velasco alleged to be involved in the
abduction of Jonas, namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas
(Philippine Army); Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco
(Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine
Air Force), and an alias T.L., all reportedly assigned with
Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of
the AFP; further proceedings and investigations, as may
be necessary, should be made to pursue the lead allegedly
provided by State Prosecutor Velasco on the identities of
the possible abductors; (c) inquiring into the veracity
of Lipios and Manuels claims that Jonas was abducted by
a certain @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO of the
CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG; (d) determining based on
records, past and present, as well as further investigation,
the identities and whereabouts of @KA DANTE and
@KA ENSO; and (e) undertaking all measures, in the
investigation of the Burgos abduction that may be
necessary to live up to the extraordinary measures we
require in addressing an enforced disappearance under the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and for the
foregoing reasons, the Court RESOLVES to:
(1) DIRECT the Commission on Human Rights to
conduct appropriate investigative proceedings, including
field investigations acting as the Courts directly
commissioned agency for purposes of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo - with the tasks of: (a) ascertaining the
identities of the cartographic sketches of two of the
abductors as well as their whereabouts; (b) determining
based on records, past and present, the identities and
locations of the persons identified by State Prosecutor
Velasco alleged to be involved in the abduction of Jonas
namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army), Cpl.
Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt.
Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), and an alias T.L., all
reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15
of Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines; further proceedings and investigations, as
may be necessary, should be made to pursue the lead
allegedly provided by State Prosecutor Velasco on the
identities of the possible abductors; (c) inquiring into the
veracity of Lipios and Manuels claims that Jonas was
abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO of
the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG; (d) determining based
on records, past and present, as well as further
investigation, the identities and whereabouts of @KA
DANTE and @KA ENSO; and (e) undertaking all
measures, in the investigation of the Burgos abduction,
that may be necessary to live up to the extraordinary
measures we require in addressing an enforced
disappearance under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
(2) REQUIRE the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police to make available and to provide copies, to the
Commission on Human Rights, of all documents and
records in their possession and as the Commission on
Human Rights may require, relevant to the case of Jonas
Joseph T. Burgos, subject to reasonable regulations
consistent with the Constitution and existing laws;
(3) DIRECT the PNP-CIDG and its incumbent Chief to
submit to the Commission on Human Rights the records
and results of the investigation the PNP-CIDG claimed to
7
have forwarded to the Department of Justice, which were
not included in their previous submissions to the
Commission on Human Rights, including such records as
the Commission on Human Rights may require, pursuant
to the authority granted under this Resolution;
(4) Further DIRECT the PNP-CIDG to provide direct
investigative assistance to the Commission on Human
Rights as it may require, pursuant to the authority granted
under this Resolution;
(5) AUTHORIZE the Commission on Human Rights to
conduct a comprehensive and exhaustive investigation
that extends to all aspects of the case (not limited to the
specific directives as outlined above), as the extraordinary
measures the case may require under the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo; and
(6) REQUIRE the Commission on Human Rights to
submit to this Court a Report with its recommendations,
copy furnished the petitioner, the incumbent Chiefs of the
AFP, the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and all the
respondents, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this
Resolution.
In light of the retirement of Lt. General Alexander Yano
and the reassignment of the other respondents who have
all been impleaded in their official capacities, all
subsequent resolutions and actions from this Court
shall also be served on, and be directly enforceable by,
the incumbents of the impleaded offices/units whose
official action is necessary. The present respondents shall
continue to be personally impleaded for purposes of the
responsibilities and accountabilities they may have
incurred during their incumbencies.
The dismissal of the petitions for Contempt and for the
Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is hereby AFFIRMED
653 scra 512 (2011)
Facts/ Issues:
In 2007, Jonas Burgos was abducted at about 1:30 pm by
4 armed men and a woman in civilian clothes while
having lunch at theHapagKainan Restaurant in Ever
Gotesco Mall, Quezon City.
On the same year, Jonass family files a complaint at
the Commission on Human Rights alleging military
involvement in the abductionof Jonas after tracing the
license plate number of the vehicle used in the abduction
to a vehicle impounded in the 56th InfantryBattalion of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Burgos family
also filed a complaint with the Intelligence Service of the
ArmedForces of the Philippines, and Task Force-
USIG National Capital Region.
The Burgos family files a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the Philippine Court of Appeals asking that the
government produceJonas to the court which was denied,
however, by the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Almost five years since the disappearance of Jonas
Burgos, the Burgos family concluded their presentation of
witnesses andevidences for the Habeas Corpus Petition.
The defense shall start presenting their witnesses in May
2012.
In light of the latest developments on the abduction case
of Jonas Burgos, the Supreme Court reviews the Court of
Appeals decision on the consolidated petitions of Edita
Burgos for Habeas Corpus, Contempt and Writ of
Amparo.
The assailed CA decision dismissed the petition for the
issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus; denied the
petitioner's motion to declare the respondents in
Contempt; and partially granted the privilege of the
Writ of Amparo
Last 2010, the Supreme Court issued a resolution
ordering the Commission on Human Rights to continue
the investigation regardingthe abduction of Jonas Burgos.
The Court tasked the CHR to conduct further
investigations because of the lapses by the PNP-CIDG
In this same Resolution, we also affirmed the CA's
dismissal of the petitions for Contempt and for the
issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to President
Macapagal-Arroyo, as she is entitled as President to
immunity from suit.
8
March 15, 2011 The Commission on Human Rights
submits its report to the Supreme Court
The Commission Submitted the following findings:
a. Based on the facts developed by evidence obtaining in
this case, the CHR finds that the enforced disappearance
of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos had transpired; and that his
constitutional rights to life liberty and security were
violated by the Government havebeen fully determined.
b. In his SinumpaangSalaysay, Jeffrey had a clear
recollection of the face of HARRY AGAGEN
BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal abductors, apart
from the faces of the two abductors in the cartographic
sketches that he described to the police, after he was
shown by the Team the pictures in the PMA Year Book
of Batch Sanghaya 2000 and group pictures of men taken
some yearsthereafter. The same group of pictures were
shown to detained former 56th IB Army trooper Edmond
M. Dag-uman (Dag-uman),who also positively identified
Lt. Harry Baliaga, Jr. Daguman's
SinumpaangSalaysay states that he came to know Lt.
Baliaga as aCompany Commander in the 56th IB while
he was still in the military service (with Serial No.
800693, from 1997 to 2002) also withthe 56th IB but
under 1Lt. UsmalikTayaban, the Commander of Bravo
Company
c. Most if not all the actual abductors would have been
identified had it not been for what is otherwise called as
evidentiary difficulties shamelessly put up by some police
and military elites. The deliberate refusal of TJAG Roa to
provide the CHRwith the requested documents does not
only defy the Supreme Court directive to the AFP but ipso
facto created a disputablepresumption that AFP personnel
were responsible for the abduction and that their superiors
would be found accountable, if notresponsible, for the
crime committed. This observation finds support in the
disputable presumption " That evidence
willfullysuppressed would be adverse if produced."
(Paragraph (e), Section 3, Rule 131 on Burden of Proof
and Presumptions, Revised Ruleson Evidence of the
Rules of Court of the Philippines).
d. As regards the PNP CIDG, the positive identification
of former 56th IB officer Lt. HARRY A. BALIAGA, JR.
as one of the principal abductors has effectively crushed
the theory of the CIDG witnesses that the NPAs abducted
Jonas. Baliaga's true identity and affiliationwith the
military have been established by overwhelming evidence
corroborated by detained former Army trooper Dag-uman
e. Interview with VirgilioEustaquio, Chairman of the
Union Masses for Democracy and Justice (UMDJ),
revealed that the maleabductor of Jonas Burgos appearing
in the cartographic sketch was among the raiders who
abducted him and four others, identifiedas Jim Cabauatan,
Jose Curament, Ruben Dionisio and Dennis Ibona
otherwise known as ERAP FIVE.
ISSUE
WON the CHR report on the disappearance of Jonas
Burgos is sufficient enough for the SC to issue a final
ruling and to:
1) Issue a writ of Habeas corpus YES
2) Declare respondents in contempt NO
3) Issue a writ of Amparo NO
RULING
Courts Ruling on the AMPARO
1. After reviewing the evidence in the present case, the
CA findings and our findings in our June 22, 2010
Resolution heretofore mentioned,including the recent
CHR findings that Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., (Lt. Baliaga)
of the 56th Infantry Battalion, 7th Infantry Division,
Philippine Armyis one of the abductors of Jonas, we
resolve to hold in abeyance our ruling on the merits in
the Amparo aspect of the present case and referthis case
back to the CA in order to allow Lt. Baliaga and the
present Amparo respondents to file their respective
Comments on the CHR Reportwithin a non-extendible
period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution.
2. The Court of Appeals shall continue hearing on
the Amparo petition.
3. On the non-compliance of the Office of the Judge
Advocate General (TJAG) to provide the CHR with
copies of documents relevant to thecase of Jonas, and
thereby disobeyed our June 22, 2010 Resolution.
4. Acting on the CHR's recommendation and based on the
above considerations, we resolve to require General Roa
of TJAG, AFP, and theDeputy Chief of Staff
for Personnel, JI, AFP, at the time of our June 22, 2010
Resolution, and then incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP,
to show causeand explain, within a non-extendible period
of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, why
9
they should not be held in contempt ofthis Court for
defying our June 22, 2010 Resolution
Habeas Corpus
1. In light of the new evidence, the Court hereby
dismisses the Court of Appeals decision to dismiss the
habeas corpus petition.
2. For this purpose, we also order that Lt. Baliaga be
impleaded as a party to the habeas corpus petition and
require him - together with theincumbent Chief of Staff,
AFP; the incumbent Commanding General, Philippine
Army; and the Commanding Officer of the 56th IB at the
timeof the disappearance of Jonas, Lt. Col. Feliciano - to
produce the person of Jonas and to show cause why he
should not be released fromdetention
Petition of Contempt
1. Two types of Contempt: Criminal contempt is "conduct
directed against the authority and dignity of the court or a
judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring the
court into disrepute or disrespect." On the other hand,
civil contemptis the failure to do something ordered to be
done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing
party therein and is therefore, anoffense against the party
in whose behalf the violated order was made. If the
purpose is to punish, then it is criminal in nature; but if
tocompensate, then it is civil.
2. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is
presumed innocent and the burden is on the prosecution
to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. The
presumption of innocence can be overcome only by proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which meansproof to
the satisfaction of the court and keeping in mind the
presumption of innocence that precludes everyreasonable
hypothesis except that for which it is given. It is not
sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even
though strong, that thefact charged is more likely true than
the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a
reasonable certainty and moral certainty- a certainty that
convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those
who are to act upon it.
3. For the petitioner to succeed in her petition to declare
the respondents in contempt for filing false returns in the
habeas corpus proceedings before the CA, she has the
burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the
respondents had custody of Jonas.4. In light of
the dismissal of the petitions against President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo who is no the longer the President of
the Republic of thePhilippines, she should now be
dropped as a party-respondent in these petitions
5. NAVIA VS PARDICO
In an Amparo petition, proof of disappearance
alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to establish
that such disappearance was carried out with the direct
or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the
government.
Facts:
Due to a report from a certain Mrs. Emphasis that
Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben) were
involved in removing a lamp from a post in Grand Royale
Subdivision, they were invited to the office of the security
department of Asian Land by Ruben Dio and Andrew
Buising (petitioners), who both work as security guards at
the Asian Land security department. After such
investigation, Ben was never seen again. Petitioners
denied having custody of Ben. As a proof, they presented
their logbook stating that Ben was released the night he
was invited and such logbook was signed by Ben, Bong
and Lolita M. Lapore. Due to the continued disappearance
of Ben, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo before
the RTC of Malolos City which issued an Order directing,
among others, the issuance of a Writ of Amparo and the
production of the body of Ben. Later, the RTC granted the
petition for Writ of Amparo. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is
proper.
Ruling:
NO. For the protective Writ of Amparo to issue,
allegation and proof that the person subject thereof is
missing are not enough. The petitioner in an Amparo case
has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
indispensable element of government participation. It is
essential to establish that such disappearance was carried
out with the direct or indirect authorization, support or
acquiescence of the government. This indispensable
element of State participation is not present in this case.
The petition does not contain any allegation of State
complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to
show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated
Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials,
or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginias
10
amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable
persons.
Under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a Writ of
Amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But
even if the person sought to be held accountable or
responsible in an Amparo petition is a private individual
or entity, still, government involvement in the
disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here,
petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale
Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their
principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not
work for the government and nothing has been presented
that would link or connect them to some covert police,
military or governmental operation. As discussed above,
to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in
relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be
attended by some governmental involvement. This
hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced
disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing
person
6. DE LIMA VS GATDULA
The "Decision" under Section 19 of the Rule on Writ of
Amparo pertains to the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.
Facts:
Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of
a Writ of Amparo in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
This case raffled to the sala of Judge Silvino T. Pampilo,
Jr. The Amparo was directed against Justice Secretary
Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and
Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National
Bureau of Investigation. Instead of deciding on whether
to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued summons and
ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer. He also set the
case for hearing. During that hearing, counsel for De
Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is
appropriate for Amparo cases.
In an Order, Judge Pampilo insisted that "since no writ
has been issued, return is not the required pleading but
answer". The judge noted that the Rules of Court apply
suppletorily in Amparo cases. He opined that the Revised
Rules of Summary Procedure applied and thus required
an Answer. Judge Pampilo then proceeded to conduct a
hearing on the main case. Later, the RTC rendered a
"Decision" granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.
It further denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
De Lima, et al. De Lima then filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari via Rule 45 as enunciated in Section 19 of
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Issues:
1. Whether the appeal is proper.
2. Whether the insistence of the judge to file an answer is
appropriate.
3. Whether the holding of a hearing on the main case prior
to the issuance of the writ and the filing of
Return is proper.
Ruling:
1. NO. It is the Courts view that the "Decision"
granting the writ of Amparo is not the judgment or final
order contemplated under Rule 45. Hence, a Petition for
Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy
at this time.
The "Decision" assailed by the petitioners could not be
the judgment or final order that is appealable under
Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. This is
clear from the tenor of the dispositive portion of the
"Decision. This "Decision" pertained to the issuance of
the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo, not the judgment under Section 18. The
"Decision" is thus an interlocutory order, as suggested by
the fact that temporary protection, production and
inspection orders were given together with the decision.
The temporary protection, production and inspection
orders are interim reliefs that may be granted by the court
upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is
rendered.
2. NO. It is the Return that serves as the
responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs
of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary
to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy
to those whose right to life, liberty and security are
violated or are threatened to be violated. In utter disregard
of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted
on issuing summons and requiring an Answer.
It is clear from Section 1 of the 1991 Revised Rules of
Summary Procedure that summary procedure only applies
to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this
rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside
from that, this Court limited the application of summary
procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of
Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which
11
a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact. NO. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides
It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application for the coverage of the Writ and when it should be availed.
of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
misplaced. disappearances or threats thereof. In the case of Lozada,
Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Supreme Court explicitly
3. NO. Without a Return, the issues could not declared that the Writ of Amparo is confined only to cases
have been properly joined. The procedural irregularities of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or
in the RTC affected the mode of appeal that petitioners to threats thereof.
used in elevating the matter to this Court. The Petition for
Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly
order denominated as "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 separating her from her child and placing the latter up for
adoption, supposedly without complying with the
necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for
7. CARAM VS SEGUI
adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a
The writ of amparo is confined only to cases of lost child but asserting her parental authority over the
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to child and contesting custody over him. Since it is extant
threats thereof. from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue
of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a
Facts: child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally
Ma. Christina Yusay Caram had a child with Marcelino considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be
Gicano Constantino III as a result of their amorous properly applied
relationship. Later, the child was given up for adoption
without the knowledge of Marcelino. Due to the death of
Marcelino, Christina disclosed to Marcelinos family that 8. SANTIAGO VS TULFO
she and the deceased had a son that she gave up for
adoption. Thereafter, the family vowed to help her
recover and raise the baby. In the meantime, the DSWD,
through Secretary Esperanza I. Cabral issued a certificate
declaring Baby Julian as "Legally Available for
Adoption." Baby Julian was "matched" with the spouses
Vergel and Filomina Medina.
Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption,
wrote a letter to the DSWD asking for the suspension of
Baby Julians adoption proceedings. The request was
denied due to prescription and Christina was advised that
should she wish to reacquire her parental authority over
Baby Julian or halt the adoption process, she may bring
the matter to the regular courts as the reglementary period
for her to regain her parental rights had already lapsed
under Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9523.
Due to this, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a
Writ of Amparo before the RTC of Quezon City. The RTC
dismissed the petition for issuance of a Writ of Amparo
and held that Christina availed of the wrong remedy to
regain custody of her child Baby Julian.
Issue: Whether a Petition for a Writ of Amparo is the
proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and
custody of a minor child.
Ruling:
12
XVII. SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
1. GARCIA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS:
On October 13, 2004, the Provost Martial General of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Col. Henry A.
Galarpe, by command of Vice-Admiral De Los Reyes,
issued a Restriction to Quarters containing the following:
1. Pursuant to Article of War 70 and the directive of the
Acting Chief of Staff, AFP to the undersigned dtd 12
October 2004, you are hereby placed under Restriction to
Quarters under guard pending investigation of your case.
2. You are further advised that you are not allowed to
leave your quarters without the expressed permission
from the Acting Chief of Staff, AFP.
3. In case you need immediate medical attention or
required by the circumstance to be confined in a hospital,
you shall likewise be under guard.
Thereafter, a Charge Sheet dated October 27, 2004 was
filed with the Special General Court Martial NR 2
presided by Maj. Gen. Emmanuel R. Teodosio, AFP,
(Ret.), enumerating the following violations allegedly
committed by petitioner:
CHARGE 1: VIOLATION OF THE 96TH ARTICLE OF
WAR (CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN OFFICER
AND GENTLEMAN).
SPECIFICATION 1: In that MAJOR GENERAL
CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law,
did, on or about 16 March 2004, knowingly, wrongfully
and unlawfully fail to disclose/declare all his existing
assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities
and Net Worth for the year 2003 as required by Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act
6713, such as the following: cash holdings with the
Armed Forces Police Savings and Loans Association, Inc.
(AFPSLAI) in the amount of six million five hundred
[thousand] pesos (P6,500,000.00); cash dividend received
from AFPSLAI from June 2003 to December 2003 in the
amount of one million three hundred sixty-five thousand
pesos (P1,365,000.00); dollar peso deposits with Land
Bank of the Philippines, Allied Banking Corporation,
Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of Philippine
Islands, United Coconut Planter's Bank and Planter's
Development Bank; motor vehicles registered under his
and his wifes names such as 1998 Toyota Hilux Utility
Vehicle with Plate Nr. WRY-843, Toyota Car with Plate
Nr. PEV-665, Toyota Previa with Plate Nr. UDS-195,
1997 Honda Civic Car with Plate Nr. FEC 134, 1997
Mitsubishi L-300 Van with Plate Nr. FDZ 582 and 2001
Toyota RAV 4 Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. FEV-498,
conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.
SPECIFICATION 2: In that MAJOR GENERAL
CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law,
did, on or about 11 March 2003, knowingly, wrongfully
and unlawfully fail to disclose/declare all his existing
assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities
and Net worth for the year 2002 as required by Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act
6713, such as the following: his cash holdings with the
Armed Forces Police Savings and Loans Association, Inc.
(AFPSLAI) in the amount of six million five hundred
[thousand] pesos (P6,500,000.00); cash dividend received
form AFPSLAI in June 2002 and December 2002 in the
total amount of one million four hundred thirty-five
thousand pesos (1,435,000.00), dollar and peso deposits
with Land Bank of the Philippines, Allied Banking
Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of the
Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's Bank and
Planter's Development Bank; motor vehicles registered
under his and his wifes names such as 1998 Toyota Hilux
Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. WRY-843, Toyota Car with
Plate Nr. PEV-665, Toyota Previa with Plate Nr. UDS-
195, 1997 Honda Civic Car with Plate Nr. FEC-134, 1997
Mitsubishi L-300 Van with Plate Nr. FDZ-582, and 2001
Toyota RAV 4
Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. FEV-498, conduct
unbecoming an officer and gentleman.
SPECIFICATION 3: In that MAJOR GENERAL
CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law,
did, while in the active military service of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, knowingly, wrongfully and
unlawfully violate his solemn oath as a military officer to
uphold the Constitution and serve the people with utmost
loyalty by acquiring and holding the status of an
immigrant/permanent residence of the United
States of America in violation of the State policy
governing public officers, thereby causing dishonor and
disrespect to the military professional and seriously
compromises his position as an officer and exhibits him
as morally unworthy to remain in the honorable
profession of arms.
13
CHARGE II: VIOLATION OF THE 97TH ARTICLE
OF WAR (CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD
ORDER AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE).
SPECIFICATION 1: In that MAJOR GENERAL
CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law,
did, on or about 16 March 2004, knowingly, wrongfully
and unlawfully make untruthful statements under oath of
his true assets in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities
and Net worth for the year 2003 as required by Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act
6713, conduct prejudicial to good order and military
discipline.
SPECIFICATION NO. 2: In that MAJOR GENERAL
CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law,
did, on or about 11 March 2003, knowingly, wrongfully
and unlawfully make untruthful statements under oath of
his true assts in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities and
Net worth for the year 2002 as required by Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713,
conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline.
Petitioner, upon arraignment on November 16, 2004,
pleaded not guilty on all the charges.
The Office of the Chief of Staff, through a Memorandum
directed the transfer of confinement of petitioner from his
quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo to the ISAFP
Detention Center. On the same day, petitioner, having
reached the age of fifty-six (56), compulsorily retired
from military service after availing of the provisions of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1650, amending Sections
3 and 5 of P.D. 1638, which establishes a system of
retirement for military personnel of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines.
Pursuant to a Resolution dated June 1, 2005 of the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was transferred
from the ISAFP Detention Center to the Camp Crame
Custodial Detention Center.
After trial, at the Special General Court Martial No. 2, on
December 2, 2005, the findings or the After-Trial
Report5of the same court was read to the petitioner. The
report contains the following verdict and sentence:
MGEN CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 AFP the
court in closed session upon secret written ballot 2/3 of all
the members present at the time the voting was taken
concurring the following findings. Finds you:
On Specification 1 of Charge 1 Guilty except the words
dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Phils, dollar peso
deposits with Allied Bank, Banco de Oro, Universal
Bank, Bank of the Philippine Island, United Coconut
Planters Bank and Planters Development Bank.
On Specification 2 of Charge 1 Guilty except the words
dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Phils, dollar peso
deposits with Allied Bank, Banco de Oro, Universal
Bank, Bank of the Philippine Island, United Coconut
Planters Bank and Planters Development Bank.
On Specification 3 of Charge 1 Guilty
On Specification 1 of Charge 2 Guilty
On Specification 2 of Charge 2 Guilty
And again in closed session upon secret written ballot 2/3
all the members are present at the time the votes was taken
concurrently sentences you to be dishonorably
[discharged] from the service, to forfeit all pay and
allowances due and to become due and to be confined at
hard labor at such place the reviewing authority may
direct for a period of two (2) years. So ordered.
(Emphases supplied)
Afterwards, in a document dated March 27, 2006, the
Staff Judge Advocate stated the following recommended
action:
IV. RECOMMENDED ACTION:
The court, after evaluating the evidence, found accused:
GUILTY on Charge 1, GUILTY on Specification 1 on
Charge 1 except the words dollar deposits with Land
Bank of the Philippines, dollar and peso deposits with
Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal
Bank, Bank of the Philippine Islands, United Coconut
Planter's Bank and Planter's Development Bank;
GUILTY on Charge 1, Specification 2 except the words
dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, dollar
and peso deposits with Allied Banking Corporation,
Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine
Islands, United Coconut Planters Bank and Planter's
Development Bank; GUILTY on Specification 3 of
Charge 1; GUILTY on Charge 2 and all its specifications.
The sentence imposed by the Special GCM is to be
dishonorably discharged from the service, to forfeit all
pay and allowances due and to become due; and to be
confined at hard labor at such place the reviewing
authority may direct for a period of two (2) years. As it is,
the sentence is proper and legal. Recommend that the
sentence be approved. The PNP custodial facility in Camp
14
Crame, Quezon City, is the appropriate place of
confinement. The period of confinement from 18 October
2004 shall be credited in his favor and deducted from the
two (2) years to which the accused was sentenced. Thus,
confinement will expire on 18 October 2006. Considering
that the period left not served is less than one (1) year,
confinement at the National Penitentiary is no longer
appropriate.
4. To carry this recommendation into effect, a draft
"ACTION OF THE REVIEWING AUTHORITY" is
hereto attached.
In an undated document, the AFP Board of Military
Review recommended the following action:
8. RECOMMENDED ACTION:
A. Only so much of the sentence as provides for the
mandatory penalty of dismissal from the military service
and forfeiture of pay and allowances due and to become
due for the offenses of violation of AW 96 (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and for
violation of AW 97 (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order
and Military Discipline) be imposed upon the Accused.
B. The records of the instant case should be forwarded to
the President thru the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of
National Defense, for final review pursuant to AW 47, the
Accused herein being a General Officer whose case needs
confirmation by the President.
C. To effectuate the foregoing, attached for CSAFP's
signature/approval is a proposed 1st
Indorsement to the President, thru the Secretary of
National Defense, recommending approval of the
attached prepared "ACTION OF THE PRESIDENT."
After six (6) years and two (2) months of preventive
confinement, on December 16, 2010, petitioner was
released from the Camp Crame Detention Center.
The Office of the President, or the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP and acting as the
Confirming Authority under the Articles of War,
confirmed the sentence imposed by the Court Martial
against petitioner. The Confirmation of Sentence, reads in
part:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, the
President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, do hereby confirm the sentence imposed
by the Court Martial in the case of People of the
Philippines versus Major General Carlos Flores Garcia
AFP:
a) To be dishonorable discharged from the service;
b) To forfeit all pay and allowances due and to become
due; and
c) To be confined for a period of two (2) years in a
penitentiary.
FURTHER, pursuant to the 48th and 49th Articles of War,
the sentence on Major General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP
shall not be remitted/mitigated by any previous
confinement. Major General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP
shall serve the foregoing sentence effective on this date.
DONE, in the City of Manila, this 9th day of September,
in the year of our Lord, Two Thousand and Eleven.
Consequently, on September 15, 2011, respondent
Secretary of National Defense Voltaire T. Gazmin, issued
a Memorandum to the Chief of Staff, AFP for strict
implementation, the Confirmation of Sentence in the
Court Martial Case of People of the Philippines Versus
Major General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP.
On September 16, 2011, petitioner was arrested and
detained, and continues to be detained at the National
Penitentiary, Maximum Security, Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed with this Court the present
petition for certiorari and petition for habeas corpus,
alternatively. However, this Court, in its Resolution dated
October 10, 2011, denied the petition for habeas corpus.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration dated
November 15, 2011, but was denied by this Court on
December 12, 2011.
RULING:
In the present case, there is no question that petitioner
raised the violation against his own right to speedy
disposition only when the respondent trial judge reset the
case for rehearing. It is fair to assume that he would have
just continued to sleep on his right a situation amounting
to laches had the respondent judge not taken the
initiative of determining the non-completion of the
records and of ordering the remedy precisely so he could
dispose of the case. The matter could have taken a
different dimension if during all those ten years between
1979 when accused filed his memorandum and 1989
when the case was reraffled, the accused showed signs of
asserting his right which was granted him in 1987 when
15
the new constitution took effect, or at least made some
overt act (like a motion for early disposition or a motion
to compel the stenographer to transcribe stenographic
notes) that he was not waiving it. As it is, his silence
would have to be interpreted as a waiver of such right.
While this Court recognizes the right to speedy
disposition quite distinctly from the right to a speedy trial,
and although this Court has always zealously espoused
protection from oppressive and vexatious delays not
attributable to the party involved, at the same time, we
hold that a party's individual rights should not work
against and preclude the people's equally important right
to public justice. In the instant case, three people died as
a result of the crash of the airplane that the accused was
flying. It appears to us that the delay in the disposition of
the case prejudiced not just the accused but the people as
well. Since the accused has completely failed to assert his
right seasonably and inasmuch as the respondent judge
was not in a position to dispose of the case on the merits
due to the absence of factual basis, we hold it proper and
equitable to give the parties fair opportunity to obtain (and
the court to dispense) substantial justice in the premises.
Time runs against the slothful and those who neglect their
rights. In fact, the delay in the confirmation of his
sentence was to his own advantage, because without the
confirmation from the President, his sentence cannot be
served.
2. COSCOLLUELLA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of Negros
Occidental for three full terms which ended on June 30,
2001. During his tenure, Nacionales served as his Special
Projects Division Head, Amugod as Nacionales
subordinate and Malvas as Provincial Health Officer.
On November 9, 2001, a letter-complaint from Peoples
Graftwatch was received by the Office of the
Ombudsman, requesting for assistance to investigate the
anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural
equipment for the province in the amount of P
20,000,000.00. After the Case Building Team of the
Office of the Ombudsman conducted its investigation, a
Final Evaluation Report dated April 16, 2002 upgraded
the complaint into a criminal case against petitioners.
A Resolution dated March 27, 2003, was prepared by
Graft Investigation Officer Butch Caares, finding
probable cause against petitioners for violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Information
prepared and signed by Caares was submitted to Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas Primo Miro who
recommended the approval of the Information on June 5,
2003. However, the final approval of Acting Ombudsman
Orlando Casimiro came only on May 21, 2009, and on
June 19, 2009, the Information was filed before the
Sandiganbayan.
Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash on July 9, 2009,
arguing that his constitutional right to speedy disposition
of cases was violated as the criminal charges against him
were resolved only after almost eight (8) years since the
complaint was instituted. Nacionales, Malvas and
Amugod later adopted Coscolluelas motion. An
Opposition to Motion to Quash dated August 27, 2009,
was filed by the respondents on the ground that the
Information has to go through careful review and revision
before its final approval.
The Sandiganbayan denied petitioners Motion to Quash
in a Resolution dated October 6, 2009 for lack of merit. It
held that the period of delay cannot be deemed as
inordinate and petitioners constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases was not violated. On November 6 and
9, 2009, petitioners filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration, which were later denied by the
Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated February 10, 2010,
for lack of merit.
Hence, these consolidated Petitions for Certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
in finding that petitioners right to speedy disposition of
cases was not violated.
Held:
The petitions are meritorious. The Court holds that
petitioners right to a speedy disposition of their criminal
case had been violated due to the following grounds:
First, it is observed that the preliminary investigation
proceedings took a protracted amount of time to
complete;
Second, the delay in the Ombudsman resolution of the
case largely remains unjustified;
16
Third, the Court deems that petitioners cannot be faulted
for their alleged failure to assert their right to speedy
disposition of cases; and
Fourth, the Court finally recognizes the prejudice caused
to the petitioners by the lengthy delay in the proceedings
against them.
Perforce, the October 6, 2009 and February 10, 2010
Resolutions of Sandiganbayan must be set aside and the
criminal case against petitioners be dismissed. The
acquittal of the petitioners does not necessarily follow that
petitioners are entirely exculpated from any civil liability
as provided for by Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, unless the judgment of acquittal explicitly declares
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist.
Moreover, the Court is unable to make a definite
pronouncement as to whether petitioners indeed
committed the acts or omissions from which any civil
liability on their part might arise as prescribed under
Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, thus, the
Province is not precluded from instituting a subsequent
civil case based on the delict if only to recover the amount
of P 20, 000, 000.00 in public funds attributable to
petitioners alleged malfeasance.

17
XVIII. SELF INCRIMINATION CLAUSE
A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. VILLAFLOR VS. SUMMERS
FACTS:
In a criminal case pending before the CFI of
Manila, EMETERIA VILLAFLOR and FLORENTINO
SOUINGCO are charged with the crime of adultery. On
this case coming on for trial before the Hon. Pedro
Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon the petition of
the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court ordered
the defendant Villaflor, petitioner herein, to submit her
body to the examination of one or two competent doctors
to determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused
refused to obey the order on the ground that such
examination of her person was a violation of the
constitutional provision relating to self-
incrimination. Thereupon she was found in contempt of
court and was ordered to be imprisoned in Bilibid Prison
until she should permit the medical examination required
by the court.
The sole legal issue arising from the facts is whether the
compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined
by physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that
portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights and that portion of
the Code of Criminal Procedure which find their origin in
the Constitution of the United States, providing that no
person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.
Counsel for petitioner argues that such bodily exhibition
is an infringement of the constitutional provision; the
representative of the city fiscal contends that it is not an
infringement of the constitutional provision. The trial
judge in the instant case has held with the fiscal; while it
is brought to our notice that a judge of the same court has
held on an identical question as contended for by the
attorney for the accused and petitioner.
ISSUE: WON compelling a woman to be examined by
physicians to determine if she is pregnant violates her
right against self-incrimination.
RULING: Here before us is presented what would seem
to be the most extreme case which could be
imagined. While the United States Supreme Court could
nonchalantly decree that testimony that an accused person
put on a blouse and it fitted him is not a violation of the
constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court of
Nevada could go so far as to require the defendant to roll
up his sleeve in order to disclose tattoo marks, and while
the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands could permit
substances taken from the person of an accused to be
offered in evidence, none of these even approach in
apparent harshness an order to make a woman, possibly
innocent, to disclose her body in all of its sanctity to the
gaze of strangers. We can only consistently consent to the
retention of a principle which would permit of such a
result by adhering steadfastly to the proposition that the
purpose of the constitutional provision was and is merely
to prohibit testimonial compulsion.
Here in the Philippines, being in the agreeable state of
breaking new ground, we would rather desire our
decision to rest on a strong foundation of reason and
justice than on a weak one of blind adherence to tradition
and precedent. Moreover, we believe that an unbiased
consideration of the history of the constitutional provision
will disclose that our conclusion is in exact accord with
the causes which led to its adoption.
Perhaps the best way to test the correctness of our position
is to go back once more to elementals and ponder on what
is the prime purpose of a criminal trial. As we view it,
the object of having criminal laws is to purge the
community of persons who violate the laws to the great
prejudice of their fellow men. Criminal procedure, the
rules of evidence, and constitutional provisions, are then
provided not to protect the guilty but to protect the
innocent. No rule is intended to be so rigid as to
embarrass the administration of justice in its endeavor to
ascertain the truth. No accused person should be afraid of
the use of any method which will tend to establish the
truth. For instance, under the facts before us, to use
torture to make the defendant admit her guilt might only
result in inducing her to tell a falsehood. But no evidence
of physical facts can for any substantial reason be held to
be detrimental to the accused except in so far as the truth
is to be avoided in order to acquit a guilty person.
Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under
the due process of law clause of the Constitution every
person has a natural and inherent right to the possession
and control of his own body. It is extremely abhorrent to
one's sense of decency and propriety to have to decide that
such inviolability of the person, particularly of a woman,
can be invaded by exposure to another's gaze. As Mr.
18
Justice Gray in Union Pacific Railway
Co. vs.Botsford said, "To compel any one, and especially
a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit to the touch
of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity, an
assault, and a trespass." Conceded, and yet, as well
suggested by the same court, even superior to the
complete immunity of a person to be let alone is the
interest which the public has in the orderly administration
of justice. Unfortunately, all too frequently the modesty
of witnesses is shocked by forcing them to answer,
without any mental evasion, questions which are put to
them; and such a tendency to degrade the witness in
public estimation does not exempt him from the duty of
disclosure. Between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of
truth to personal considerations, between a disregard of
the public welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and
justice cannot hesitate.
Fully conscious that we are resolving a most extreme case
in a sense, which on first impression is a shock to one's
sensibilities, we must nevertheless enforce the
constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in accord with
the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by merely
sentimental influences. Once again we lay down the rule
that
the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory
testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the
proposition is that, on a proper showing and under an
order of the trial court, an ocular inspection of the
body of the accused is permissible.
The proviso is that torture or force shall be
avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the rule
with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided
as cases arise.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by
reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be
taken not to use violence and not to embarrass the patient
any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no
objection to the physical examination being made by the
family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex
can be seen.
Although the order of the trial judge, acceding to the
request of the assistant fiscal for an examination of the
person of the defendant by physicians was phrased in
absolute terms, it should, nevertheless, be understood as
subject to the limitations herein mentioned, and therefore
legal. The writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby
denied. The costs shall be taxed against, the petitioner.
2. FRANCISCO BELTRAN v. FELIX SAMSON,
Judge of the Second Judicial District, and
FRANCISCO JOSE, Provincial Fiscal of Isabela
G.R. No. 32025, September 23, 1929, Romualdez, J.
The act of writing for the purpose of comparing a
persons handwriting constitutes evidence against himself
within the scope and meaning of the right against self-
incrimination.
Facts:
Petitioner Beltran complains that respondent Judge
Samson ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal
to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter.
The order was given upon petition of Fiscal Jose for the
purpose of comparing the Beltran's handwriting and
determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain
documents supposed to be falsified.
Issue:
Whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by
the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's
handwriting constitutes evidence against himself within
the scope and meaning of the right against self-
incrimination.
Ruling:
YES. Writing is something more than moving the body,
or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely
mechanical act, because it requires the application of
intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing
means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to
determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition
of the respondent fiscal clearly states.
The Court ruled that purposes of the constitutional
privilege, there is a similarity between one who is
compelled to produce a document, and one who is
compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in
both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence
against himself. The present case is more serious than that
of compelling the production of documents or chattels,
because here the witness is compelled to write and create,
by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not
exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier.
19
3. ARNEL L. AGUSTIN v. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and MINOR MARTIN JOSE
PROLLAMANTE, represented by his
mother/guardian FE ANGELA PROLLAMANTE
The kernel of the right against self-incrimination is not
against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion. It does not apply where the evidence sought
to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object
evidence.
Facts:
Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins
alleged biological father, Arnel L. Agustin, for support
and support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106. For his part, Agustin
denied being the father of the child. Later, Fe and Martin
moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties
to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant
to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. Arnel opposed said
motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The trial court ordered the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the
applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Thus, this petition.
Issue:
Whether DNA paternity testing can be considered as a
violation of the constitutional right against self-
incrimination.
Ruling:
NO. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion,
but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-
incrimination is simply against the legal process of
extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of
guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be
excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object
evidence.
4. CHAVEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
This is a petition for habeas corpus. Petitioner invoking
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court that he is entitled to be
freed from imprisonment upon ground that trial which
resulted his conviction, HE WAS DENIED OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE
COMPELLED TO TESTIFY AGAINST HIMSELF.
Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor
vehicle (thunderbird car together with accessories)
An information was filed against the accused together
with other accused, that they conspired, with intent to gain
and abuse of confidence without the consent of owner Dy
Lim, took the vehicle.
All the accused plead not guilty.
During the trial, the fiscal grecia (prosecution) asked
roger Chavez to be the first witness. Counsel of the
accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused
(Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not an state
witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will only
incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in favor of the
fiscal on the grounds that (1) the right of the prosecution
to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand
including the accused (2) If there should be any question
that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to
interpose his objection and the court will sustain him if
and when the court feels that the answer of this witness to
the question would incriminate him. (3) Counsel has all
the assurance that the court will not require the witness to
answer questions which would incriminate him.
Prosecution version of what happened:
Chavez saw Lee driving the thunderbird(car) and
asked if it is for sale. Lee answered yes. Chavez met
Sumilang and informed about the car. The two went to
Asistio and made a plan to capitalize on Romeo Vasquez'
reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce him as a
buyer to someone who was selling a car and, after the
deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run away with the
car. Asistio would then register it, sell it to a third person
for a profit. Chavez known to be a car agent was included
in the plan. He furnished the name of Johnson Lee who
was selling his Thunderbird. Chavez arranged the meeting
with Lee. They agreed on the price and went to Dy Sunk
which is the registered owner of the car. Deed of sale was
drawn and signed by Sumilang. At Eugene's, a man
approached Sumilang with a note which stated that the
money was ready at the Dalisay Theater. Sumilang then
wrote on the same note that the money should be brought
to the restaurant. At the same time he requested Lee to
exhibit the deed of sale of the car to the note bearer. The
two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. The two
Chinese could not locate Sumilang and Chavez. They
went out to the place where the Thunderbird was parked,
found that it was gone. They then immediately reported
20
its loss to the police. Much later, the NBI recovered the
already repainted car and impounded it. Chavez,
Sumilang and Asistio converged that same day at Barrio
Fiesta, a restaurant at Highway 54 near the Balintawak
monument in Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to
Sumilang P1,000.00 cash and a golf set worth P800.00 as
the latter's share in the transaction. On the 14th of
November, the registration of the car was transferred in
the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and three days later,
in the name of Asistio in Caloocan.
Sumilangs verson (one of the accused):
Sumilang saw Chavez at gas station and told
about the Thunderbird. They raised the money. Chavez
went to Sumilang house and asked if he was ready for the
rest of money. He affirmed. At Eugenes Sumilang saw
Pascual and warned Chavez was a smart agent and
advised that Sumilang should be careful. Then the deed of
sale was executed. Two or three days after, Asistio offered
to buy the car of Sumilang and tendered the down
payment.
Trial court gave credence to the testimony of Sumilang.
As to Chavez, his testimony established his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and branded him Self confessed
culprit.
Trial court decision: freed all other accused except
Chavez who was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Chavez appealed to the Court of appeals but it was
dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self
incrimination had been violated?
HELD:
Petitioner claims that there was a violation of right against
self incrimation.
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily
connote the use of violence; it may be the product of
unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to
overbear his will, disable him from making a free and
rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational
judgment would in our opinion be sufficient
During the trial, the petitioner declined to be a witness but
the judge had impliedly forced him by saying that the
prosecution has the right and that his testimony will not
be used against him.
Petitioner was enveloped by a coercive force; they
deprived him of his will to resist; they foreclosed choice.
With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that
petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in
full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It
cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did
not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he
did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he
claimed the right upon being called to testify.
There is no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a
waiver must be certain and unequivocal, and intelligently,
understandably, and willingly made; such waiver
following only where liberty of choice has been fully
accorded. After a claim a witness cannot properly be held
to have waived his privilege on vague and uncertain
evidence
The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas
corpus is a high prerogative writ. 31 It is traditionally
considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person
whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the
accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. A void
judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights
are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being
worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are
equally worthless.
Supreme Court decision: Petition granted. Accused must
be discharge.
5. CABAL VS. KAPUNAN JR.
FACTS:
Col. Jose C. Maristela filed with the Secretary of National
Defense a letter-complaint charging petitioner Manuel
Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the AFP, with "graft, corrupt
practices, unexplained wealth, and other equally
reprehensible acts". The President of the Philippines
created a committee to investigate the charge of
unexplained wealth. The Committee ordered petitioner
herein to take the witness stand in the administrative
proceeding and be sworn to as witness for Maristela, in
support of his aforementioned charge of unexplained
wealth. Petitioner objected to the order of the Committee,
invoking his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The Committee insisted that petitioner take
the witness stand and be sworn to, subject to his right to
refuse to answer such questions as may be incriminatory.
This notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully refused to be
sworn to as a witness to take the witness stand.
21
The Committee referred the matter to the Fiscal of
Manila, for such action as he may deem proper. The City
Fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a
"charge" of contempt for failing to obey the order of the
Committee to take the witness stand. The "charge" was
assigned to the sala of respondent judge Kapunan.
Petitioner filed with respondent Judge a motion to quash,
which was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari and
prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Committee's order requiring
petitioner to take the witness stand violates his
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
HELD: Yes.
Although the said Committee was created to investigate
the administrative charge of unexplained wealth, it seems
that the purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply
the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes
the forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or
employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his
salary as such public officer or employee and his other
lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property. However, such forfeiture has been held to
partake of the nature of a penalty. As a consequence,
proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed
criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of
defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be
witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto.
No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself. This prohibition against
compelling a person to take the stand as a witness against
himself applies to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal
proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for
forfeiture of property by reason of the commission of an
offense, but not a proceeding in which the penalty
recoverable is civil or remedial in nature.
The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not
infringed by merely asking the witness a question which
he refuses to answer. The privilege is simply an option of
refusal, and not a prohibition of inquiry. A question is not
improper merely because the answer may tend to
incriminate but, where a witness exercises his
constitutional right not to answer, a question by counsel
as to whether the reason for refusing to answer is because
the answer may tend to incriminate the witness is
improper.
The possibility that the examination of the witness will be
pursued to the extent of requiring self-incrimination will
not justify the refusal to answer questions. However,
where the position of the witness is virtually that of an
accused on trial, it would appear that he may invoke the
privilege in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and
all questions.
Note: It is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case
may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions,
but, also, to take the witness stand.
6. PASCUAL, JR. VS. BOARD OF MEDICAL
EXAMINERS
Facts:
Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for
prohibition against the Board of Medical Examiners. It
was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an
administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for
complainants announced that he would present as his first
witness the petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner,
through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on
the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness
against himself. Petitioner then alleged that to compel him
to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was
guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion
for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-
incrimination.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the
facts stressed that it could call petitioner to the witness
stand and interrogate him, the right against self-
incrimination being available only when a question
calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness.
They likewise alleged that the right against self-
incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative
hearing.
Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that
he could not be compelled to be the first witness of the
complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an
administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal
by respondent Board.
Issue:
Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first
witness of the complainants violates the Self-
Incrimination Clause.
22
Held:
The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing
against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice,
respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot,
consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel
the person proceeded against to take the witness stand
without his consent. The Court found for the petitioner in
accordance with the well-settled principle that "the
accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer
incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness
stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify against
himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of property but
the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The
constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to
silence: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent
and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his
guilt." It is the right of a defendant to forego testimony, to
remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand
with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free
genuine will."
The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with
other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that
while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth
must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be
accomplished according to means or methods offensive to
the high sense of respect accorded the human personality.
More and more in line with the democratic creed, the
deference accorded an individual even those suspected of
the most heinous crimes is given due weight. The
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the
respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and
integrity of its citizens.
B. IMMUNITY STATUTES
7) GALMAN V. PAMARAN
The individual testimonies of respondents in a case
cannot be admitted against them in all criminal
proceeding. This is true regardless of absence of claim of
constitutional privilege or of the presence of a grant of
immunity by law.
Facts:
Due to the death of Former Senator Benigno S. Aquino,
Jr. and Rolando Galman, P.D. 1886 was promulgated
creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board (Agrava Board)
which is tasked to determine the facts and circumstances
surrounding the killing and conduct exhaustive
investigation of all aspects of the tragedy.
Upon the termination of the investigation, private
respondents were charged as accessories. In the course of
the trial, the Prosecution marked and offered as part of its
evidence, the individual testimonies of private
respondents before the Agrava Board. Private
respondents objected to the admission of said exhibits
contending that its admission will be in derogation of his
constitutional right against self-incrimination and
violative of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886. For their
part, TANODBAYAN contended that the immunity
relied upon by the private respondents in support of their
motions to exclude their respective testimonies, was not
available to them because of their failure to invoke their
right against self-incrimination before the ad hoc Fact
Finding Board.
Issue:
Whether the testimonies given by private
respondents who did not invoke their rights against self-
incrimination before the Agrava Board are admissible.
Ruling:
NO. Their continued testifying may be construed as a
waiver of their rights to remain silent and not to be
compelled to be a witness against themselves if they have
the option to do so. But in the light of the first portion of
Section 5 of P.D. 1886 and the awesome contempt power
of the Board to punish any refusal to testify or produce
evidence, the Court is not persuaded that when they
testified, they voluntarily waived their constitutional
rights not to be compelled to be a witness against
themselves much less their right to remain silent.
Furthermore, the privilege has consistently been held to
extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all
cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a
witness, whether a party or not. If in a mere forfeiture
case where only property rights were involved, "the right
not to be compelled to be a witness against himself" is
secured in favor of the defendant, then with more reason
it cannot be denied to a person facing investigation before
a Fact Finding Board where his life and liberty, by reason
of the statements to be given by him, hang on the balance.
Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to testify
against himself" applies to the herein private respondents
notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava
Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case for it is
23
not the character of the suit involved but the nature of the
proceedings that controls.
8) PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR., and J. LORENZO
VERGARA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
Immunity statues, in effect, compels a person to disclose
information which such person may otherwise refuse to
disclose on the ground of his right against self-
incrimination. Those given the privilege of immunity paid
a high price for it the surrender of their precious right
to be silent. Our hierarchy of values demands that the
right against self-incrimination and the right to be silent
should be accorded greater respect and protection.
FACTS:
To insure the conviction of the Marcoses for the violation
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(RICO), the prosecution solicited the testimonies of
witnesses. Among these witnesses were petitioners
Vergara and Mapa who were then facing charges for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(R.A. 3019) with the Sandiganbayan.
Later, the Philippine Government, through the PCGG,
and the petitioners agreed in writing to make themselves
available as a witness in exchange of immunity from
investigation, prosecution and punishment for any offense
with reference to which their testimony and information
are given, including any offense and commission of
which any information, directly or indirectly derived from
such testimony or other information is used as basis
thereof, except a prosecution for perjury and/or giving
false testimony.
Likewise, the agreement states that cases both civil and
criminal which the Republic filed or intends to file against
Mapa and Vergara shall be dismissed or they shall be
exclude as party defendant or respondent.
The petitioners complied with their respective
undertaking. But despite their availability and willingness
to testify, the US prosecutors decided not to call them to
the witness stand. As a result, the case against Marcos was
dismissed. Later, petitioners moved to dismiss the cases
against them before the Sandiganbayan however it was
denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioners' motion to dismiss.
RULING:
YES. Contrary to the ruling of the respondent court, the
failure of petitioners to testify in the RICO cases against
the Marcoses in New York cannot nullify their immunity.
They have satisfied the requirements both of the law and
the parties' implementing agreements. Under section 5 of
E.O. No. 14, as amended, their duty was to give
information to the prosecution, and they did.
Under their Memorandum of Agreement, they promised
to make themselves available as witnesses in the said
RICO cases, and they did.
Their failure to testify was not of their own making. It was
brought about by the decision of the US prosecutors who
may have thought that their evidence was enough to
convict the Marcoses.
Since petitioners' failure to testify was not of their own
choosing nor was it due to any fault of their own, justice
and equity forbid that they be penalized by the withdrawal
of their immunity.
The right against self-incrimination was stripped of its
absoluteness. Immunity statutes in varying shapes were
enacted which would allow government to compel a
witness to testify despite his plea of the right against self-
incrimination.
To insulate these statutes from the virus of
unconstitutionality, a witness is given what has come to
be known as transactional or a use-derivative-use
immunity.
Quite clearly, these immunity statutes are not a bonanza
from government. Those given the privilege of immunity
paid a high price for it the surrender of their precious
right to be silent.
Our hierarchy of values demands that the right against
self-incrimination and the right to be silent should be
accorded greater respect and protection.
Laws that tend to erode the force of these preeminent
rights must necessarily be given a liberal interpretation in
favor of the individual. The government has a right to
solve crimes but it must do it, rightly.
24
9) TANCHANCO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
The decision to grant immunity from prosecution
is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to
prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed
a crime to obtain the conviction of the more guilty
criminals, who, otherwise, will probably elude the long
arm of the law.
Facts:
Tanchanco served as NFA Administrator during
the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos. Tanchanco and the
PCGG entered into a Cooperation Agreement, occasioned
by the desire of Tanchanco to cooperate with the
government in the location and pursuit of government
properties purloined by Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos,
their agents and others. The Agreement provides that
Tanchanco shall provide complete truthful disclosures to
any inquiries in connection with the investigations.
In exchange, the Philippines shall not bring any civil or
criminal charges against Tanchanco arising from (a)
Service in or for the Marcos government; (b) any other
actions revealed by Tanchanco pursuant to his
cooperation.
However, 22 Informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan against Tanchanco. Tanchanco filed a
Motion to Quash all 22 cases since he was granted
immunity based on the Cooperation Agreement.
The Sandiganbayan denied the motion declaring that the
charges could not be considered as falling within the
immunity granted to Tanchanco as the offenses were not
related or connected to the testimony or information
furnished by Tanchanco in a proceeding concerning the
recovery of the purported ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses.
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the charges
despite its lack of jurisdiction due to the Cooperation
Agreement.
Ruling:
YES. The undertakings expressed by the
Philippine government through the PCGG in the
Cooperation Agreement are quite clear-cut, even if broad
in scope. It seemingly encompasses three classes of
actions committed by Tanchanco: those committed while
he was in the service of the Marcos government; those
committed in behalf of the Marcos government; and any
other act revealed by him in the course of his cooperation
with the PCGG.
The Sandiganbayan had not given a careful consideration
to the Cooperation Agreement when it ruled on the motion
to dismiss.
It resorted to generalizations such as the offenses are not
related to or connected with the testimony or information
furnished by Tanchanco or the subject matter of the
informations are NFA funds and the records do not
indicate that they have any relation whatsoever to the ill-
gotten wealth of the Marcoses or their cronies.
Yet from the results of the investigations that led to the
institution of the charges, it is clear that the cases against
Tanchanco arose from the following acts or irregularities:
(1) the transfer of NFA funds either to Tanchanco's
personal account, the account of "Oplan Wag-Wag", or a
private institution; (2) the failure to account for several
classes of funds received by Tanchanco, including
discretionary funds, amounts contributed to the Food
Production and Nutrition Fund, and other donations.
It is clear that the PCGG had precisely investigated the
anomalous transfer of NFA funds during the Marcos
Administration, particularly the use of discretionary or
intelligence funds of the NFA, and that Tanchanco had
given information relating to such investigation.
The scope of the Cooperation Agreement itself precludes
the prosecution of Tanchanco under the subject charges.
The Cooperation Agreement, validly undertaken between
the PCGG and Tanchanco as it was, precludes the
prosecution of Tanchanco under the subject charges.
The Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
in refusing to dismiss the charges despite its lack of
jurisdiction to continue hearing the cases against
Tanchanco.
25
C. INCRIMINATION IN FOREIGN
JURISDICTIONS
10) UNITED STATES V. BALSYS
Facts of the case
Aloyzas Balsys was subpoenaed by the Justice
Department's Office of Special Investigations (OSI) to
testify about his wartime activities between 1940 and
1944 and his subsequent immigration to the United States.
Fearing prosecution by a foreign nation, Balsys refused
the subpoena by claiming his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. On appeal from an appellate
court's reversal of a district court ruling granting OSI's
subpoena enforcement petition, the Supreme Court
granted the United States certiorari.
Question
Is fear of foreign prosecution sufficient grounds to justify
the invocation of the Firth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination?
Conclusion
No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that although
resident aliens are entitled to the same Fifth Amendment
protections as citizen "persons" the risk of their
deportation is not sufficient to sustain a self-incrimination
privilege intended to apply only to the United States
government. The Court explained that since the Fifth
Amendment does not bind foreign governments, and that
would not be subject to domestic enforcement of
immunity-for-testimony deals, one could not assert a self-
incrimination protection against possible prosecution at
their hands.

26
XIX. POLITICAL PRISONERS AND The authority to establish such rules and
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE regulations for the conduct of all persons as may
be conducive to the public interest.
1) U.S. V. POMPEYA Blackstone, in his valuable commentaries on the common
laws, defines police power as "the defenses, regulations,
- A Municipal Ordinance was enacted by the Province of
and domestic order of the country, whereby the
Iloilo pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1309,
inhabitants of a state, like members of a well-governed
the specific purpose of which is to require each able-
family, are bound to conform their general behaviour
bodied male resident of the municipality, between the
to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood, and
ages of 18 and 55, as well as each householder when so
good manners, and to be decent, industrious, and
required by the president, to assist in the maintenance of
inoffensive in their respective stations."
peace and good order in the community, by apprehending
ladrones, etc., as well as by giving information of the
The police power of the state may be said to embrace
existence of such persons in the locality. The amendment
the whole system of internal regulation, by which the
contains a punishment for those who may be called upon
state seeks not only to preserve public order and
for such service, and who refuse to render the same.
to prevent offenses against the state, but also to establish,
for the intercourse of citizen with citizen, those rules of
A complaint was filed by the prosecuting attorney of the
good manners and good neighborhood, which are
Province of Iloilo against Pompeya with violation of the
calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and to
said ordinance for failing to render service on patrol duty
insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his
required under the same defendant argued that the
own, so far as is reasonably consistent, with a like
municipal ordinance alleged to be violated is
enjoyment of the rights of others. The police power of
unconstitutional because it is repugnant to the Organic
the state includes not only the public health and safety,
Act of the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the
but also the public welfare, protection against
citizens
impositions, and generally the public's best best interest.
ISSUE:
It so extensive and all pervading, that the courts refuse to
lay down a general rule defining it, but decide each
whether or not the ordinance upon which said complaint
specific case on its merits
was based is constitutional.
It will also be noted that the law authorizing the president
HELD: Yes
of the municipality to call upon persons, imposes certain
conditions as prerequisites:
The right or power conferred upon the municipalities by
Act No. 1309 falls within the police power of the state and
(1) The person called upon to render such services must
the state was fully authorized and justified in
be an able-bodied male resident of the municipality;
conferring the same upon the municipalities of
(2) he must be between the ages of 18 and 55[50], and
the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the
(3) certain conditions must exist requiring the services of
provisions of said Act are constitutional andnot in
such persons
violation nor in derogation of the rights of the persons
affected thereby
It will not contended that a nonresident of the
municipality would be liable for his refusal to obey the
Police power has been defined as the power of the
call of the president; neither can it be logically contended
government, inherent in every sovereign, and cannot be
that one under the age of 18 or over the age of 55 [50]
limited.
would incur the penalty of the law by his refusal to obey
the command of the president.
The power vested in the legislature to make such laws as
they shall judge to be for the good of the state and its
Moreover, the persons liable for the service mentioned in
subjects.
the law cannot be called upon at the mere whim or caprice
of the president.
The power to govern men and things, extending to the
protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet
There must be some just and reasonable ground, at least
of all persons, and the protection of all property within
sufficient in the mind of a reasonable man, before the
the state.
president can call upon the the persons for the service

27
mentioned in the law. The law does not apply to all
persons.
The law does not apply to every condition. The law
applies to special persons and special conditions
A complaint based upon such a law, in order to be free
from objection under a demurrer, must show that the
person charged belongs to the class of persons to
which the law is applicable
Even admitting all of the facts in the complaint in the
present case, the court would be unable to impose the
punishment provided for by law, because it does not show
(a) that the defendant was a male citizen of the
municipality;
(b) that he was an able-bodied citizen;
(c) that he was not under 18years of age nor over 55 [50];
nor (d) that conditions existed which justified the
president of the municipality in calling upon him for the
services mentioned in the law
ANOTHER VERSION:
U.S. V. POMPEYA
- police power of the state
- "general welfare" clause
FACTS:
This case is regarding the complaint filed by the
prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo, charging
Silvestre Pompeya with violation of the municipal
ordinance of Iloilo for willfully, illegally, and criminally
and without justifiable motive failing to render service on
patrol duty, required under said municipal ordinance.
Upon arraignment, Pompeya presented a demurrer,
stating that the acts charged in the complaint do not
constitute a crime and that the municipal ordinance is
unconstitutional for being repugnant to the Organic Act
of the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the
citizens.
The trial judge sustained said demurrer and ordered the
dismissal of the complaint.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N the facts stated in the complaint are sufficient to
show a cause of action under the said law
W/N said law is in violation of the provisions of the
Philippine Bill in depriving citizens of their rights therein
guaranteed
HELD:
Is the assailed municipal ordinance a violation of the
Philippine Bill?
The municipal ordinance was enacted pursuant to the
provisions of Act No. 1309, the specific purpose of which
is to require each able-bodied male resident of the
municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55, as well as
each householder when so required by the president, to
assist in the maintenance of peace and good order in the
community, by apprehending ladrones, etc., as well as by
giving information of the existence of such persons in the
locality. The amendment contains a punishment for those
who may be called upon for such service, and who refuse
to render the same.
The question asked by the Supreme Court is whether there
is anything in the law, organic or otherwise, in force in the
Philippine Islands, which prohibits the central
Government, or any governmental entity connected
therewith, from adopting or enacting rules and regulations
for the maintenance of peace and good government?
In answering this, the Supreme Court cited the tribal
relations of the primitive man, the feudal system, the days
of the "hundreds" -- all of which support the idea of an
ancient obligation of the individual to assist in the
protection of the peace and good order of his community.
The Supreme Court held that the power exercised under
the provisions of Act No. 1309 falls within the police
power of the state and that the state was fully authorized
and justified in conferring the same upon the
municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that,
therefore, the provisions of the said Act are constitutional
and not in violation nor in derogation of the rights of the
persons affected thereby.
Is there a cause of action?
The complain is unable to show (a) that the defendant was
a male citizen of the municipality; (b) that he was an able-
bodied citizen; (c) that he was not under 18 years of age
nor over 55; nor (d) that conditions existed which justified
the president of the municipality in calling upon him for
the services mentioned in the law.
"For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered."
28
XX. EXCESSIVE FINES AND CRUEL
PUNISHMENTS
1) WEEMS V. UNITED STATES
Facts
Weems had been posted in Philippines as an officer of the
Bureau of the Coast Guard. He was sent there by the
United States government because he had met the
qualifications to be appointed as such. However, he was
charged with fraud. He was sentenced according to the
Philippine penal code to 15 years on prison life with hard
labor. He was also in chains most of the time. He was
fined and lost all his rights after imprisonment. He
appealed on the grounds of unusual punishment and
cruelty against his person.
Issues
The question before the court was what constituted
unusual and cruel punishment? The court was also to
determine whether the sentenced handed to the accused
was cruel punishment for the offence committed? Were
the government agencies to be deterred from carrying out
this punishment as handed down by the court?
Rule
The punishment meted towards an individual must be
proportionate to the crime that the accused has been found
guilty for. Moreover, the provision of legislations and
constitution should be interpreted progressively in light of
enlightening the administration of justice and attaining
human justice. Moreover the 8th amendment should be
upheld.
Application
The Supreme Court held that the sentence handed to the
accused was indeed cruel and an unusual punishment.
The court reasoned in line with the proportionality
principle that has been enshrined in the Eighth
Amendment. The sentence should be proportionate to the
crime committed otherwise the court will be meting out
an injustice at the table of where justice is served.
Moreover, the court also sought to have a clear definition
of what entails cruel and unusual punishment. In the
ordinary sense of the word, this constitutes inhuman and
degrading treatment.
Conclusion
Other scholars have also argued that long-term
imprisonment also constitutes a form of cruel and unusual
punishment and which does not serve justice to the society
and to the victims too. This was also replicated in the case
of McDonald v. Commonwealth. Furthermore, it is vital
to realize that as time changes and new dawns emerge
with regard to the respect of human rights and realization
of human dignity, new conditions and intents must also be
upheld by the law. The law, therefore, must be able to be
applied in a much wider application by the judiciary more
than the mischief that the legislature intended to cure.
Therefore, the language used in the statute should not be
used to undermine the progressive nature that laws have
acquired after many years of consistent reforms and
deliberations.
2) PEOPLE V. ECHEGARAY
FACTS:
The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming
the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of
raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been
committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the
Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-
appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty
of death.
The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of
the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the
alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. This
was dismissed.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the
defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the
services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free
Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines.
A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by
the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant.
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal
matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2)
alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former
counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1)
absolutely abolished the death penalty.
29
RATIO:
One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power
to secure society against threatened and actual
evil. Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government
enacts criminal laws that define and punish illegal acts
that may be committed by its own subjects, the
executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary
tries and sentences the criminals in accordance with these
laws.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the
form of a constitutional question of whether or not the
death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription
against cruel and unusual punishments.
Harden- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel,
unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S.,
436, the United States Supreme Court said that
'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel,
within the meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment
of life.
Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who
honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally
wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that
penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our
criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases,
it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the
law regardless of their private opinions,"
Munoz- A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will
readily show that there is really nothing therein which
expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The
provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be
imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if
already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still
plain enough
Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III,
Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution than the form in
which the legislature took the initiative in re-imposing the
death penalty.
The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the
constitution, to enact legislation re-imposing the death
penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the Senate
proceeded to a two-step process consisting of: first, the
decision, as a matter of policy, to re-impose the death
penalty or not; and second, the vote to pass on the third
reading the bill re-imposing the death penalty for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7)
negative votes and no abstention, the Chair declared that
the Senate has voted to re-incorporate death as a penalty
in the scale of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal
Code.
The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By
this amendment, the death penalty was not
completely abolished by the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it
merely suspended the death penalty and
gave Congress the discretion to review it at the propitious
time.
We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element
of heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly
identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of
death. As to the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished
by reclusion perpetua to death, they are admittingly no
less abominable than those mandatorily penalized by
death.
The proper time to determine their heinousness in
contemplation of law, is when on automatic review, we
are called to pass on a death sentence involving crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No.
7659, with the trial court meting out the death sentence in
exercise of judicial discretion. This is not to say,
however, that the aggravating circumstances under the
Revised Penal Code need be additionally alleged as
establishing the heinousness of the crime for the trial court
to validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under
R.A. No. 7659 which are punished with the flexible
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in
the Senate and in the House of Representatives reveals
that, while both Chambers were not wanting of oppositors
to the death penalty, the Lower House seemed less
quarrelsome about the form of the death penalty bill as a
special law specifying certain heinous crimes without
regard to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and
more unified in the perception of what crimes are heinous
and that the fact of their very heinousness involves the
compulsion and the imperative to suppress, if not
completely eradicate, their occurrence.
30
Be it the foregoing general statement of Representative
Sanchez or the following details of the nature of the
heinous crimes enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by
Representative Miguel L. Romero of Negros Oriental,
there was clearly, among the hundred or so re-
impositionists in the Lower House, no doubt as to their
cause.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly
vests in Congress the power to re-impose the death
penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes". This power is not subsumed in the plenary
legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear
showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes."
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-
impose the death penalty entails (1)
that Congress define or describe what is meant by
heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and penalize
by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in
accordance with the definition or description set in the
death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case,
death can only be imposed upon the attendance of
circumstances duly proven in court that characterize
the crime to be heinous in accordance with the
definition or description set in the death penalty bill;
and (3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty
bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes."
It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that
the test of heinousness must be squarely applied.
We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness
and compulsion are inseparable and are, in fact,
interspersed with each other.
Because the subject crimes are either so revolting and
debasing as to violate the most minimum of the human
standards of decency or its effects, repercussions,
implications and consequences so destructive,
destabilizing, debilitating, or aggravating in the context of
our socio-political and economic agenda as a developing
nation, these crimes must be frustrated, curtailed and
altogether eradicated.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply
states that congress, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty.
Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that
for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive
manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime
should first be perceived and statistically proven
following the suspension of the death penalty.
Neither does the said provision require that the death
penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other
criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in
society.
It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites
that there has been an "alarming upsurge of such crimes",
for the same was never intended by said law to be the
yardstick to determine the existence of compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes.
Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the
Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule
of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the
penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling
reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes."
3) ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
Brief Fact Summary. Atkins contention was that the
execution of a mentally retarded criminal is a cruel and
unusual punishment which contravenes the Eighth
Amendment. He made this contention when he was
sentenced to death for committing murder. Atkins (D) had
an IQ 0f 59 at the time of his conviction.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Under the Eighth Amendment,
the capital punishment of a mentally retarded convict is
cruel and unusual.
Facts. Atkins Daryl (D) was sentenced to death for
shooting a patron of an automated teller machine and for
robbery, after he was found guilty of abduction, capital
murder and armed robbery. A verdict of mildly mentally
retarded pertaining to the health of Atkins (D), was given
by a forensic psychologist. This verdict of the
psychologist was based on the interview he had with
Atkins (D) and with others who knew him, review of
school and court records of other crimes and a standard
intelligence test which showed that Atkins (D) had a full
scale IQ of 59. Atkins (D) however appealed against the
ruling of the trial court on the ground that sentencing a
mentally retarded criminal to death was a cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
Issue. Under the Eighth Amendment, is the capital
punishment of a mentally retarded convict cruel and
unusual?
31
Held. (Stevens, J.) Yes. Under the Eighth Amendment,
the capital punishment of a mentally retarded convict is
cruel and unusual. Mentally retarded persons should be
tried and punished when they commit crimes once they
meet the laws requirement. Mentally retarded persons do
not act with the level of moral culpability that
characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct
because of their disabilities in the areas of reasoning,
control of impulses and judgment.
Hence, the enactment of the federal government which
exempts the mentally retarded from execution has
provided a strong evidence in which the society view the
mentally retarded offenders as less culpable than the
average criminal.
The mentally retarded persons disposition often portrays
that they lack remorse for their crimes and they are also
poor witnesses because they are not capable of assisting
their counsel. Reversed and remanded.
Dissent. (Scalia, J) the decision taken in this case as no
ground in the Eighth Amendments text or history, no
ground in contemporary attitudes towards the death
penalty, relies on nothing more than the personal
preferences of the members of todays majority and the
Courts death-is-different jurisprudence is taken to the
extreme. So, not making use of the death penalty belongs
to the legislatures and abolishing it one small increment
at a time should not be sought by this Court.
Discussion. the Supreme Court in Atkins observed that
the execution of mentally retarded criminals in the states
that permitted it was not common and also noted that the
practice of such executions has become truly unusual
and developing a national consensus against it was fair.
ANOTHER VERSION:
Atkins v. Virgina
Facts and Procedural History:
Petitioner was convicted of abduction, armed robbery,
and capital murder.
In the penalty stage, a forensic psychologist who had
evaluated Atkins before trial concluded that he was
mildly mentally retarded. His conclusion was based on
interviews with people who knew Atkins, a review of
school and court records, and the administration of a
standard intelligence test, which indicated that Atkins had
a full scale IQ of 59. Compared to the population at large,
that means he was in the lowest one percentile in
intelligence.
The jury sentenced Atkins to death, but the Virginia
Supreme Court ordered a second sentencing hearing
because the trial court had used a misleading verdict form.
At the re-sentencing, the State presented an expert rebuttal
witness, who expressed the opinion that Atkins was not
mentally retarded, but rather was of average intelligence,
at least, and diagnosable as having antisocial personality
disorder. The jury again sentenced Atkins to death.
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the imposition
of the death penalty, and relying on the holding in Penry
rejected the contention that Atkins thus could not be
sentenced to death.
The court was not willing to commute Atkins' sentence
of death to life imprisonment merely because of his IQ
score. However, dissenters concluded that the
imposition of the sentence of death upon a criminal
defendant who has the mental age of a child between the
ages of 9 and 12 is excessive.
Because of the gravity of the concerns expressed by the
dissenters, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue Presented to the Court:
Is the execution of a defendant with mental retardation
cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment?
Outcome of the Case:
In its reasoning the Court confirms the previous opinions
that a punishment is excessive if it is not graduated and
proportioned to the offense and that such claim should be
judged by evolving standards of decency.
Proportionality review under those evolving standards
should be informed by objective factors, the most reliable
of which legislation enacted by states.
In particular, the large number of States prohibiting the
execution of mentally retarded persons (and the complete
absence of legislation reinstating such executions)
provides powerful evidence that today society views
mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable
than the average criminal.
32
The Court, next, makes an independent evaluation of the
issue and agrees with the legislative consensus for the
following two reasons.
First, retribution and deterrence of capital crimes,
principal justifications for the death penalty, do not apply
to mentally retarded offenders. Second, mentally retarded
defendants face a special risk of wrongful execution
because of the possibility that they will unwittingly
confess to crimes they did not commit, their lesser ability
to give their counsel meaningful assistance, and the facts
that they are typically poor witnesses and that their
demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack
of remorse for their crimes.
Holding: Executions of mentally retarded criminals are
cruel and unusual punishments prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment.
4) CORPUZ V. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy
pieces of jewelry with an obligation to sell the same and
remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not
sold, after the expiration of 30 days.
The period expired without Corpuz remitting anything to
Tangcoy.
When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he
will pay, but to no avail.
Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of confidence
against Corpuz.
Corpuz argued as follows:
a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is
inadmissible for being a mere photocopy.
b. The information was defective because the date when
the jewelry should be returned and the date when crime
occurred is different from the one testified to by Tangcoy.
c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved.
d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for
conviction
ISSUES and RULING
Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of
document without violating the best evidence rule
(only original documents, as a general rule, is
admissible as evidence)?
Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed
to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they
were offered in evidence, such objection shall be
considered as waived.
Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the
said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and
testified upon in court by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to
raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecutions
formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed
the said receipt.
Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa
cases with abuse of confidence?
No. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with
abuse of confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1,
subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or
conversion of money or property received to the prejudice
of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a
material ingredient of the crime. Hence, the exclusion of
the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the
crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the
latter fatally defective.
Further, the following satisfies the sufficiency of
information:
1. The designation of the offense by the statute;
2. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense;
3. The name of the offended party; and
4. The approximate time of the commission of the offense,
and the place wherein the offense was committed.
The 4th element is satisfied. Even though the information
indicates that the time of offense was committed on or
about the 5th of July 1991, such is not fatal to the
prosecutions cause considering that Section 11 of the
same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only
when the same is a material ingredient of the offense.
What is the form of demand required in estafa with
abuse of confidence? Note first that the elements of
estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows:
33
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is
received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same;
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property by the offender or denial on his part of
such receipt;
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is
to the prejudice of another; and
(d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on
the offender.
No specific type of proof is required to show that there
was demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may be
verbal. The specific word demand need not even be
used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person
charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of
the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount
to a demand.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally
inquired about the money entrusted to the accused, the
query was tantamount to a demand.
May a sole witness be considered credible?
Yes. Note first that settled is the rule that in assessing the
credibility of witnesses, SC gives great respect to the
evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and
their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity
denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the
records of the case.
The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and
binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence,
especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA. Truth
is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the
quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value
and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be
weighed not numbered.
ABOUT THE PENALTY:
As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division
was deliberating on this case, the question of the
continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of
crimes involving property came up. The legislature
apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the
money and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised
Penal Code. Since the members of the division reached no
unanimity on this question and since the issues are of first
impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en
banc for consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici
curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give their
academic opinions on the matter. Among those that
graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno,
Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar,
the Senate President, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral
arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L.
Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments
presented on the matter, this Court finds the following:
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by
the range of penalties that the courts continue to impose
on crimes against property committed today, based on the
amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty
years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the
said range of penalties because that would constitute
judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceived
failure in amending the penalties provided for in the said
crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions,
as that would be encroaching upon the power of another
branch of the government. This, however, does not render
the whole situation without any remedy. It can be
appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by
including Article 5, which reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which
should be repressed but which are not covered by the law,
and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court
has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to
repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render
the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons
which induce the court to believe that said act should be
made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending
the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement
of the provisions of this Code would result in the
imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into
consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused
by the offense.18
34
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states
that for acts bourne out of a case which is not punishable
by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy
is to render the proper decision and thereafter, report to
the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
the reasons why the same act should be the subject of
penal legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act
is present but is not the subject of any penal legislation,
thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of
the need to make that act punishable by law through
legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first
except for the situation wherein the act is already
punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is
deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy therefore,
as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of
the sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the
reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be
non-commensurate with the act committed. Again, the
court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive, this time, of
the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19
Guillermo B. Guevara opined that in Article 5, the duty of
the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with
a recommendation for an amendment or modification of
the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum
crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that is, that there can exist
no punishable act except those previously and specifically
provided for by penal statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making
body does not deem it necessary to prohibit its
perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will
be entirely powerless to punish such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot
suspend the execution of a sentence on the ground that the
strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would
cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court could
do in such eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief
Executive with a recommendation for an amendment or
modification of the legal provisions which it believes to
be harsh.20
Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the
sentence, retired Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and
retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, in
their book, The Revised Penal Code,21 echoed the above-
cited commentary, thus:
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the
humanitarian principle that justice must be tempered with
mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with the
wisdom or justness of the penalties fixed by law.
"Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law upon
conviction of violations of particular statutes are too
severe or are not severe enough, are questions as to which
commentators on the law may fairly differ; but it is the
duty of the courts to enforce the will of the legislator in
all cases unless it clearly appears that a given penalty falls
within the prohibited class of excessive fines or cruel and
unusual punishment." A petition for clemency should be
addressed to the Chief Executive.22
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in
crimes against property be based on the current inflation
rate or at the ratio of P1.00 is equal to P100.00 . However,
it would be dangerous as this would result in
uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the
penalties. It must be remembered that the economy
fluctuates and if the proposed imposition of the penalties
in crimes against property be adopted, the penalties will
not cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-
amending law. Had the framers of the RPC intended that
to be so, it should have provided the same, instead, it
included the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is also
improper to presume why the present legislature has not
made any moves to amend the subject penalties in order
to conform with the present times. For all we know, the
legislature intends to retain the same penalties in order to
deter the further commission of those punishable acts
which have increased tremendously through the years. In
fact, in recent moves of the legislature, it is apparent that
it aims to broaden the coverage of those who violate penal
laws. In the crime of Plunder, from its original minimum
amount of P100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature
lowered it to P50,000,000.00. In the same way, the
legislature lowered the threshold amount upon which the
Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply, from
P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00.
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and
Estafa, the present penalties do not seem to be excessive
compared to the proposed imposition of their
corresponding penalties. In Theft, the provisions state
that:
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be
punished by:
35
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more
than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but
if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount
the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one
prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each
additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties
which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed
prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more
than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, if the value of the property stolen is more
than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the
property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200
pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5
pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if
such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the
theft is committed under the circumstances enumerated in
paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of
the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value
exceeds said amount, the provision of any of the five
preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not
exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is
not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under
the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning
a livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is
P6,000.00, the above-provision states that the penalty is
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods
(6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Applying
the proposal, if the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00,
the penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor in its
medium period to prision correccional minimum period
(2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months). It would
seem that under the present law, the penalty imposed is
almost the same as the penalty proposed. In fact, after the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law under the
existing law, the minimum penalty is still lowered by one
degree; hence, the minimum penalty is arresto mayor in
its medium period to maximum period (2 months and 1
day to 6 months), making the offender qualified for
pardon or parole after serving the said minimum period
and may even apply for probation. Moreover, under the
proposal, the minimum penalty after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto menor in its
maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period
(21 days to 2 months) is not too far from the minimum
period under the existing law. Thus, it would seem that
the present penalty imposed under the law is not at all
excessive. The same is also true in the crime of Estafa.23
Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to
the value of the thing stolen in the crime of Theft and the
damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between the
minimum and the maximum amounts, which is the basis
of determining the proper penalty to be imposed, would
be too wide and the penalty imposable would no longer
be commensurate to the act committed and the value of
the thing stolen or the damage caused:
I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the
value would be modified but the penalties are not
changed:
1. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00 will become P1,200,000.00
to P2,200,000.00, punished by prision mayor minimum to
prision mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).
2. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to
P1,200,000.00, punished by prision correccional medium
and to prision correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months
and 1 day to 6 years).24
3. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to
P600,000.00, punishable by prision correccional
minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and
1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
4. P50.00 to P200.00 will become P5,000.00 to
P20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor medium to
prision correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2
years and 4 months).
5. P5.00 to P50.00 will become P500.00 to P5,000.00,
punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6
months).
36
6. P5.00 will become P500.00, punishable by arresto
mayor minimum to arresto mayor medium.
II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the
value would also be modified but the penalties are not
changed, as follows:
1st. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00, will become
P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00, punishable by prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (4
years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years).25
2nd. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00
to P1,200,000.00, punishable by prision correccional
minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and
1 day to 4 years and 2 months).26
3rd. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to
P600,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum to
prision correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2
years and 4 months).
4th. P200.00 will become P20,000.00, punishable by
arresto mayor maximum (4 months and 1 day to 6
months).
An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one
of our esteemed amici curiae, is that the incremental
penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates
the Equal Protection Clause.
The equal protection clause requires equality among
equals, which is determined according to a valid
classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here
and yonder is that of reasonableness,27 which has four
requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule
(IPR) does not rest on substantial distinctions as
P10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is
not so today, which violates the first requisite; the IPR
was devised so that those who commit estafa involving
higher amounts would receive heavier penalties;
however, this is no longer achieved, because a person who
steals P142,000.00 would receive the same penalty as
someone who steals hundreds of millions, which violates
the second requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3,
considering that the IPR is limited to existing conditions
at the time the law was promulgated, conditions that no
longer exist today.
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean
Diokno and declares the incremental penalty in Article
315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection
clause, what then is the penalty that should be applied in
case the amount of the thing subject matter of the crime
exceeds P22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses
more questions than answers, which leads us even more
to conclude that the appropriate remedy is to refer these
matters to Congress for them to exercise their inherent
power to legislate laws.
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court
declares the IPR unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to
Congress.
Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers
that the United States Federal Supreme Court has
expanded the application of a similar Constitutional
provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, to
the duration of the penalty, and not just its form. The court
therein ruled that three things must be done to decide
whether a sentence is proportional to a specific crime,
viz.; (1) Compare the nature and gravity of the offense,
and the harshness of the penalty; (2) Compare the
sentences imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction, i.e., whether more serious crimes are subject
to the same penalty or to less serious penalties; and (3)
Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the
same crime in other jurisdictions.
However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in
the present case, because in Solem what respondent
therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state
court of South Dakota after it took into account the latters
recidivist statute and not the original penalty for uttering
a "no account" check. Normally, the maximum
punishment for the crime would have been five years
imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless,
respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole under South Dakotas recidivist
statute because of his six prior felony convictions. Surely,
the factual antecedents of Solem are different from the
present controversy.
With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it
is true that the imposable penalty for the offense is high.
Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a higher
penalty against a domestic servant is the fact that in the
commission of the crime, the helper will essentially
37
gravely abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon her
by her employer. After accepting and allowing the helper
to be a member of the household, thus entrusting upon
such person the protection and safekeeping of the
employers loved ones and properties, a subsequent
betrayal of that trust is so repulsive as to warrant the
necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the
commission of such wrongful acts.
There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or
imprisonment are dependent on the subject matter of the
crime and which, by adopting the proposal, may create
serious implications. For example, in the crime of
Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on the amount
of the money malversed by the public official, thus:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property;
Presumption of malversation. Any public officer who,
by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for
public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or
shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person
to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially,
or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved in the misappropriation or malversation
does not exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
and medium periods, if the amount involved is
more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed
six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum
period to reclusion temporal in its minimum
period, if the amount involved is more than six
thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand
pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its
medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but
is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the
amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also
suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and
a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal
to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming
any public funds or property with which he is chargeable,
upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be
prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds
or property to personal use.
The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the
Government loses money due to the unlawful acts of the
offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount
malversed is P200.00 (under the existing law), the amount
now becomes P20,000.00 and the penalty is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years
4 months and 1 day to 6 years). The penalty may not be
commensurate to the act of embezzlement of P20,000.00
compared to the acts committed by public officials
punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019
or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically
Section 3,31 wherein the injury caused to the government
is not generally defined by any monetary amount, the
penalty (6 years and 1 month to 15 years)32 under the
Anti-Graft Law will now become higher. This should not
be the case, because in the crime of malversation, the
public official takes advantage of his public position to
embezzle the fund or property of the government
entrusted to him.
The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery
with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited) where
the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act of
unlawful entry are the bases of the penalty imposable, and
also, in Malicious Mischief, where the penalty of
imprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost of the
damage caused.
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or
uninhabited), if we increase the value of the thing
unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole
basis of the penalty will now be the value of the thing
unlawfully taken and no longer the element of force
employed in entering the premises. It may likewise cause
an inequity between the crime of Qualified Trespass to
Dwelling under Article 280, and this kind of robbery
because the former is punishable by prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months
and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00
(P100,000.00 now if the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to
the premises is with violence or intimidation, which is the
main justification of the penalty. Whereas in the crime of
Robbery with force upon things, it is punished with a
penalty of prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years)
if the intruder is unarmed without the penalty of Fine
despite the fact that it is not merely the illegal entry that
is the basis of the penalty but likewise the unlawful taking.
38
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the
offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or
compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction
that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense
only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil
indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in
addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the
offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a
sum of money as restitution. Clearly, this award of civil
indemnity due to the death of the victim could not be
contemplated as akin to the value of a thing that is
unlawfully taken which is the basis in the imposition of
the proper penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the reasoning
in increasing the value of civil indemnity awarded in some
offense cannot be the same reasoning that would sustain
the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent
from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum
amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is P3,000.00.
The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the
minimum amount for the award cannot be changed,
increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be
validly modified and increased when the present
circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages
under Article 222039 of the Civil Code also does not fix
the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is
discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental
anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The
amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil
indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the
award of civil indemnity.
In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law
for the offense committed as tantamount to cruel
punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh,
being punitive in nature. Whether or not they are
excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a matter that
should be left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the
courts to apply the law, especially when they are clear and
not subject to any other interpretation than that which is
plainly written.
Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice
Antonio Carpios opinions is that the incremental penalty
provision should be declared unconstitutional and that the
courts should only impose the penalty corresponding to
the amount of P22,000.00, regardless if the actual amount
involved exceeds P22,000.00. As suggested, however,
from now until the law is properly amended by Congress,
all crimes of Estafa will no longer be punished by the
appropriate penalty. A conundrum in the regular course of
criminal justice would occur when every accused
convicted of the crime of estafa will be meted penalties
different from the proper penalty that should be imposed.
Such drastic twist in the application of the law has no legal
basis and directly runs counter to what the law provides.
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced
in the dispensation of criminal justice by the Ramos
Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 765940 in
December 1993. The said law has been questioned before
this Court. There is, arguably, no punishment more cruel
than that of death. Yet still, from the time the death
penalty was re-imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by
Republic Act No. 9346,41 the Court did not impede the
imposition of the death penalty on the ground that it is a
"cruel punishment" within the purview of Section 19
(1),42 Article III of the Constitution. Ultimately, it was
through an act of Congress suspending the imposition of
the death penalty that led to its non-imposition and not via
the intervention of the Court.
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel
punishment, the Court cannot declare the provision of the
law from which the proper penalty emanates
unconstitutional in the present action. Not only is it
violative of due process, considering that the State and the
concerned parties were not given the opportunity to
comment on the subject matter, it is settled that the
constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked
collaterally because constitutionality issues must be
pleaded directly and not collaterally,43 more so in the
present controversy wherein the issues never touched
upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code.
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form
or character of the punishment rather than its severity in
respect of duration or amount, and applies to punishments
which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete,
for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the
pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel,
disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment
would not thus be within the prohibition.44
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of
proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the
Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by
the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual.
Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come
under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and
plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the
nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community."45
39
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the
Congress to amend the law and adapt it to our modern
time.
The solution to the present controversy could not be
solved by merely adjusting the questioned monetary
values to the present value of money based only on the
current inflation rate. There are other factors and variables
that need to be taken into consideration, researched, and
deliberated upon before the said values could be
accurately and properly adjusted.
The effects on the society, the injured party, the accused,
its socio-economic impact, and the likes must be
painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon in order to
arrive at a wholistic change that all of us believe should
be made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-
equipped, has no resources, and lacks sufficient personnel
to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and
surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised
Penal Code. This function clearly and appropriately
belongs to Congress. Even Professor Tadiar concedes to
this conclusion, to wit:
Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria
Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the view that the role of the
Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active
duty to prevent injustice. Thus, in order to prevent
injustice in the present controversy, the Court should not
impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three years ago,
but consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply
compensating for inflation. Furthermore, the Court has in
the past taken into consideration "changed conditions" or
"significant changes in circumstances" in its decisions.
Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is
not delving into the validity of the substance of a statute.
The issue is no different from the Courts adjustment of
indemnity in crimes against persons, which the Court had
previously adjusted in light of current times, like in the
case of People v. Pantoja.47 Besides, Article 10 of the
Civil Code mandates a presumption that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail.
With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced
by the Chief Justice and my Colleagues, all the proposals
ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of
being repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is
truly beyond the powers of the Court to legislate laws,
such immense power belongs to Congress and the Court
should refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide. With
regard to civil indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers
to civil liability which is awarded to the offended party as
a kind of monetary restitution. It is truly based on the
value of money. The same cannot be said on penalties
because, as earlier stated, penalties are not only based on
the value of money, but on several other factors. Further,
since the law is silent as to the maximum amount that can
be awarded and only pegged the minimum sum,
increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not
proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted in light of current
conditions.
Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present
case, the CA modified the ruling of the RTC. The RTC
imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional in its medium
period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as
maximum. However, the CA imposed the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each additional
P10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this
Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v. People48 is highly
instructive, thus:
With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall
defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed
22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum,
the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in
its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or
reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of
only two, not three, periods, in which case, Article 65 of
the same Code requires the division of the time included
in the penalty into three equal portions of time included in
the penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of the
three portions. Applying the latter provisions, the
40
maximum, medium and minimum periods of the penalty March 22, 2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007
prescribed are: of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the
Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City,
Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
20 days crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-
paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are hereby
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty
10 days49 imposed is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
To compute the maximum period of the prescribed ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS
penalty, prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor and ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as
minimum should be divided into three equal portions of minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion
time each of which portion shall be deemed to form one temporal as maximum.
period in accordance with Article 6550 of the RPC.51 In Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a
the present case, the amount involved is P98,000.00, Copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the
which exceeds P22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of
imposable should be within the maximum period of 6 Justice.
years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor.
Article 315 also states that a period of one year shall be Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President
added to the penalty for every additional P10,000.00 of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
defrauded in excess of P22,000.00, but in no case shall the Representatives.
total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years. SO ORDERED.
Considering that the amount of P98,000.00 is P76,000.00
more than the P22,000.00 ceiling set by law, then, adding
one year for each additional P10,000.00, the maximum
period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of
prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7 years.
Taking the maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is
8 years, plus an additional 7 years, the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty is 15 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the
penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against
petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence
should be anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years
and 2 months.
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance
to perform its primordial duty of lawmaking. The Court
should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent
powers of making and enacting laws. While it may be the
most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a
dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on
prohibited judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari
dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito Corpuz is
hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated
41