Wesleyan University Philippines vs. Wesleyan Faculty and Staff Assoc.

,March 12, 2014

FACTS:

On December 2003, the parties signed a 5-year CBA effective June 1, 2003 until May 31, 2008. On August 16, 2005, Atty.
Guillermo T. Maglaya, President of the University, issued a Memorandum providing guidelines on the implementation of vacation and
sick leave credits as well as vacation leave commutation. The memorandum stipulated that:

1. Vacation and sick leaves are earned. 1 month is equal to 1.25 days of sick leave. At the end of one year, vacation and sick
leave credits of 15 days become complete. Those who take VL or SL beyond their credits will have to file leave without pay

2. Only Vacation leave can be monetized and effected after the second year of work.

The Unions President, Cynthia de Lara, informed Maglaya that she is not Amenable to the unilateral changes. She said the
changes violated their CBA because the workers are entitled to vacation leave without having to earn it

On Feb. 8, 2006, a Labor Management Committee meeting was held where the University told the Union to file a grievance
complaint. The University said it also planned a one-retirement policy even though the Union said there were two: one from the
Private Education Retirement Annuity Association (PERAA) Plan and another from the CBA Retirement Plan.

Because they were not able to settle in the grievance level, the brought the matter to a voluntary arbiter who ruled in favor of the
Union. It was brought to the CA who ruled that the decison of the voluntary arbiter was supported by substantial evidence. The issue
was the brought to the SC.

Issue:

Whether the CA and Arbiter were wrong

Held:

NO.

1)The Non-Diminution Rule found in Article 100 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits employers from eliminating or reducing
the benefits received by their employees. This rule, however, applies only if the benefit is based on an express policy, a written
contract, or has ripened into a practice. To be considered a practice, it must be consistently and deliberately made by the employer
over a long period of time.

An exception to the rule is when the practice is due to error in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question
of law. The error, however, must be corrected immediately after its discovery; otherwise, the rule on Non-Diminution of Benefits
would still apply.

In the case presented, the Universihas been giving two retirement benefits as early as 1997.The granting of two retirement
benefits to retiring employees had already ripened into a consistent and deliberate practice.

2) The CBA clearly states that the employees are entitled to the vacation and sick leaves but the Memorandum states these are
earned from a month-to-month basis. when the provision of the CBA is clear, leaving no doubt on the intention of the parties, the
literal meaning of the stipulation shall govern.
WENPHIL CORPORATION vs. ALMER R. ABING and ANABELLE M. TUAZON,

G.R. No. 207983 April 7, 2014

Facts:

On December 8, 2000, LA Geobel A. Bartolabac ruled that the respondents had been illegally dismissed in which it ordered Wenphil
to pay the respondents their backwages from February 3, 2000 until the date of their actual reinstatement. Wenphilthen appealed to the
NLRC on April 16, 2001.

On October 29, 2001, while the appeal with the NLRC was still ongoing, Wenphil and the respondents entered into a compromise
agreement, in which they agreed to the respondents payroll reinstatement with accumulated salaries for the payroll period from April
5, 2001 until October 15, 2001. As for the remaining payroll period starting October 16, 2001, Wenphil committed itself to credit the
respective salaries of the respondents to their ATM payroll accounts until such time that the questioned decision of LA Bartolabac is
either modified, amended or reversed by the Honorable National Labor Relations Commission.

On January 30, 2002, the NLRC affirmed LA Bartolabacs decision with modifications. Instead of ordering the respondents
reinstatement, the NLRC directed Wenphil to pay the respondents their respective separation pay at the rate of one (1) month salary
for every year of service. Wenphil thereafter went up to the CA via a petition for certiorari, in which on August 27, 2003 the CA
rendered its decision reversing the NLRCs finding that the respondents had been illegally dismissed. According to the CA, there was
enough evidence to show that the respondents had been guilty of serious misconduct; thus, their dismissal was for a valid cause. On
appeal on the SC, the court only affirmed the decision in the CA in which it becomes final and executor on February 15, 2007.

With the finality of the case in the SC, the respondents filed with LA Bartolabac a motion for computation and issuance of writ of
execution as they were still entitled to backwages from the time of their dismissal until the NLRCs decision finding them to be
illegally dismissed was reversed with finality.LA Bartolabac granted the respondents motion directed Wenphil to pay each
complainant their salaries on reinstatement covering the period from February 15, 2002 (the date Wenphil last paid the respondents
respective salaries) to November 8, 2002 (since the NLRCs decision finding the respondents illegally dismissed became final and
executory on February 28, 2002).

In appeal on NLRC,Wenphil contends that its obligation to pay the respondents backwages should cease as soon as LA Bartolabacs
decision was "modified, amended or reversed" by the NLRC. However, respondents posited that the period for payment should end,
not on November 8, 2002, but on February 14, 2007, since the SCs decision which upheld the CAs ruling became final and
executory on February 15, 2007. NLRC howeveraffirmed in toto the LAs order.

In appeal on CA, it ruled that the period for computation should end when it promulgated its decision reversing that of the NLRC, and
not on the date when the SC affirmed its decision. It likewise held that the compromise agreement did not contain any waiver of rights
for any award the respondents might have received when the NLRC changed or modified the LAs award.

Issues:

1. Whether reinstatement and backwages are reliefs available to an illegally dismissed employee.

NO. The normal consequences of a finding that an employee has been illegally dismissed are: first, that the employee
becomes entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights; and second, the payment of backwages covers
the period running from his illegal dismissal up to his actual reinstatement. These two reliefs are not inconsistent with one another and
the labor arbiter can award both simultaneously. The relief of separation pay may be granted in lieu of reinstatement but it cannot be a
substitute for the payment of backwages. In instances where reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations between
the employee and the employer, separation pay should be granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee should be entitled to
either reinstatement if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer be viable, plus backwages in either instance.

In the present case, the parties compromise agreement simply provided that Wenphils obligation to pay the respondents
backwages shall end the moment the NLRC modifies, amends or reverses the illegal dismissal decision of LA Bartolabac. On its face,
there is nothing invalid with such stipulation. Indeed, had the NLRC reversed the LA, the obligation to pay backwages would have
stopped. The NLRC, however, did not decree a reversal of the finding of illegal dismissal. In fact, it affirmed the illegal dismissal
conclusion, confining itself merely to a modification of the consequences of the illegal dismissal from reinstatement to the payment
of separation pay.

Thus, until a higher courts or tribunals reversal of the finding that an employee had been illegally dismissed, the employee
would be entitled to receive his reinstatement salary or backwages during the period of appeal until such reversal. This is in line with
the Labor Codes policy that an order of reinstatement, which can either be actual or through the payroll, is immediately executory and
is not affected by the period of appeal.

2. Whether the period for computation for backwages ends on February 14, 2007 since the SC decision becomes final and executory.

NO. he period for computing the backwages due to the respondents during the period of appeal should end on the date that a
higher court reversed the labor arbitration ruling of illegal dismissal. In this case, the higher court which first reversed the NLRCs
ruling was not the SC but rather the CA. In this light, the CA was correct when it found that that the period of computation should end
on August 27, 2003. The date when the SCs decision became final and executory need not matter as the rule merely referred to the
date of reversal, not the date of the ultimate finality of such reversal.
 Southeastern Shipping Group, LTD vs Federico U. Navarra, Jr.

GR No. 167678, June 22, 2010

Facts:

Petitioner Southeastern Shipping, on behalf of its foreign principal, petitioner Southeastern Shipping Group, Ltd., hired Federico to work on board
the vessel "George McLeod." Federico signed 10 successive separate employment contracts of varying durations covering the period from October
5, 1995 to March 30, 1998. His latest contract was approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) on January 21, 1998
for 56 days extendible for another 56 days. He worked as roustabout during the first contract and as a motorman during the succeeding contracts.

On March 6, 1998, Federico, while on board the vessel, complained of having a sore throat and on and off fever with chills. He also developed a soft
mass on the left side of his neck. He was given medication.

On March 30, 1998, Federico arrived back in the Philippines. On April 21, 1998 the specimen excised from his neck lymph node was found negative
for malignancy.[5] On June 4, 1998, he was diagnosed at the Philippine General Hospital to be suffering from a form of cancer called Hodgkin's
Lymphoma, Nodular Sclerosing Type (also known as Hodgkin's Disease). This diagnosis was confirmed in another test conducted at the Medical
Center Manila on June 8, 1998.

On September 6, 1999, Federico filed a complaint against petitioners with the arbitration branch of the NLRC claiming entitlement to disability
benefits, loss of earning capacity, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

During the pendency of the case, on April 29, 2000, Federico died. His widow, Evelyn, substituted him as party complainant on her own behalf and
in behalf of their three children. The claim for disability benefits was then converted into a claim for death benefits.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

On May 10, 2000, Labor Arbiter Ermita T. Abrasaldo-Cuyuca rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint on the ground that "Hodgkin's
Lymphoma is not one of the occupational or compensable diseases or the exact cause is not known," the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
Evelyn appealed the Decision to the NLRC.

Ruling of the NLRC

On May 7, 2003, the NLRC rendered a Decision reversing that of the Labor Arbiter,
Death compensation - US$ 50,000.00
Minor child allowance
(3 x US$ 7,000) - 21,000.00
Burial expense - 1,000.00
Total US$ 72,000.00

Plus 10% of the total monetary awards as and for attorney's fees.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC. They, thus, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA found that the claim for benefits had not yet prescribed despite the complaint being filed more than one year after Federico's return to the
Philippines. It also found that although Federico died 17 months after his contract had expired, his heirs could still claim death benefits because the
cause of his death was the same illness for which he was repatriated. WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit and the May 7, 2003 Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is hereby AFFIRMED en toto.

Issue:
1.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT HODGKIN'S DISEASE IS A
COMPENSABLE ILLNESS.
2. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR THE
DEATH OF THE RESPONDENT AS SUCH DEATH WAS DURING THE TERM OF HIS EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACT
Held:

Section 20 of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels states:
 A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH

1. In case of death of the seafarer during the term of his contact, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the
Philippine currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US Dollars (US$50,000) and an additional
amount of Seven Thousand US Dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not
exceeding four children, at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.
the death of a seaman during the term of employment makes the employer liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits, but if the seaman dies
after the termination of his contract of employment, his beneficiaries are not entitled to the death benefits.[17] Federico did not die while he was under
the employ of petitioners. His contract of employment ceased when he arrived in the Philippines on March 30, 1998, whereas he died on April 29,
2000. Thus, his beneficiaries are not entitled to the death benefits under the Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers.

Moreover, there is no showing that the cancer was brought about by Federico's stint on board petitioners' vessel. The records show that he got sick a
month after he boarded M/V George Mcleod. He was then brought to a doctor who diagnosed him to have acute respiratory tract infection. It was
only on June 6, 1998, more than two months after his contract with petitioners had expired, that he was diagnosed to have Hodgkin's Disease. There
is no proof and we are not convinced that his exposure to the motor fumes of the vessel, as alleged by Federico, caused or aggravated his Hodgkin's
Disease.

While the Court adheres to the principle of liberality in favor of the seafarer in construing the Standard Employment Contract, we cannot allow
claims for compensation based on surmises. When the evidence presented negates compensability, we have no choice but to deny the claim, lest we
cause injustice to the employer.

The law in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer there may be cases where the
circumstances warrant favoring labor over the interests of management but never should the scale be so tilted as to result in an injustice to the
employer.[18]

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 31, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85584 holding
that the claim for death benefits has not yet prescribed is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that petitioners are not liable to pay to respondents
death compensation benefits for lack of showing that Federicos disease was brought about by his stint on board petitioners vessels and also
considering that his death occurred after the effectivity of his contract.
ROGELIO BARONDA v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AND HIDECO SUGAR MILLING CO., INC., October 14, 2015

FACTS:

Hideco Sugar Milling Co., Inc. (HIDECO) employed Baronda as a mud press truck driver. On May 1, 1998, he hit HIDECO's
transmission lines while operating a dump truck, causing a total factory blackout from 9:00 pm until 2:00 am of the next day. Power
was eventually restored but the restoration cost HIDECO damages totaling P26,481.11. Following the incident, HIDECO served a
notice of offense requiring him to explain the incident within three days from notice. He complied. Thereafter, the management
conducted its investigation, and, finding him guilty of negligence, recommended his dismissal. On June 15, 1998, the resident
manager served a termination letter and informed him of the decision to terminate his employment effective at the close of office
hours of that day. Hence, HIDECO no longer allowed him to report to work on the next day.

Baronda filed a case of illegal dismissal with the Voluntary Arbiter Antonio C. Lopez, Jr. He found that Baronda was illegally
dismissed and ordered reinstatement. Lopez deemed he seaparation pay as as a suspension from work without pay, and commanded
him to pay on installment basis the damages sustained by HIDECO because of the incident he caused. Baronda moved for a motion
for execution and insisted he was entitled to back wages. The Voluntary Arbitrator denied the petitioner's motion for execution on the
ground that the decision did not award any backwages; and granted HIDECO's motion for execution by directing the petitioner to pay
HIDECO P26,484.41 at the rate of P1,500.00/month.

Upon motion for reconsideration, Barondafiled another motion for execution praying that a writ of execution requiring HIDECO
to pay to him unpaid wages, 13th month pay and bonuses from January 16, 2001, the date when his reinstatement was effected, until
his actual reinstatement. The VA ruled in favor of Baronda because HIDECO did not reinstate him. This was because the law states:
the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned,
shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the order of reinstatement of the petitioner by the Voluntary Arbitrator was immediately executory or not

HELD:

YES. Although the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration or of an appeal forestalls the finality of the decision or award of
the Voluntary Arbitrator, the reinstatement aspect of the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision or award remains executory
regardless of the filing of such motion for reconsideration or appeal.

We also see no reason to obstruct the reinstatement decreed by the Voluntary Arbitrator, or to treat it any less than the
reinstatement that is ordered by the Labor Arbiter. Voluntary arbitration really takes precedence over other dispute settlement devices.
Such primacy of voluntary arbitration is mandated by no less than the Philippine Constitution, and is ingrained as a policy objective of
our labor relations law. The reinstatement order by the Voluntary Arbitrator should have the same authority, force and effect as that of
the reinstatement order by the Labor Arbiter not only to encourage parties to settle their disputes through this mode, but also, and more
importantly, to enforce the constitutional mandate to protect labor, to provide security of tenure, and to enhance social justice.

The reinstatement decreed by the Voluntary Arbitrator was immediately executory upon the receipt of the award or decision by
the parties.
RICHARD RIVERA vs. GENESIS TRANSPORT SERVICES, August 3, 2015

FACTS:

Rivera was employed by respondent Genesis Transport Service, Inc. (Genesis) beginning June 2002 as a bus conductor. He was
required to post a cash bond of P6,000.00. In his Position Paper before the Labor Arbiter, Rivera acknowledged that he was dismissed
by Genesis on account of a discrepancy in the amount he declared on bus ticket receipts. He remitted only P198.00 instead of the
admittedly correct amount of P394.00 worth of bus ticket receipts. He responded that it was an honest mistake, which he was unable
to correct "because the bus encountered mechanical problems."

The discrepancy between the reported and remitted amount as against the correct amount was detailed in the "Irregularity
Report" prepared by Genesis' Inspector, Arnel Villaseran.

Genesis served on Rivera a written notice informing him that a hearing of his case was set on July 23, 2010. Despite his
explanations, Rivera's services were terminated through a written notice dated July 30, 2010.14 Contending that this termination was
arbitrary and not based on just causes for terminating employment, he filed the Complaint for illegal dismissal.

Riza A. Moises, President of Genesis, claimed that Rivera's misdeclaration of the amount in the bus ticket receipts and failure to
remit the correct amount clearly violated Genesis' policies and amounted to serious misconduct, fraud, and willful breach of trust;
thereby justifying his dismissal. Labor Arbiter Gaudencio P. Demaisip ruled in favor of Genesis. The NLRC did the same and so did
the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner Richard N. Rivera's employment was terminated for just cause.

HELD:

Our laws on labor, foremost of which is the Labor Code, are pieces of social legislation. They have been adopted pursuant to the
constitutional recognition of "labor as a primary social economic force" and to the constitutional mandates for the state to "protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare" and for Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, [and] reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." They are means for
effecting social justice, i.e., the "humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in
the rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated."

Conformably, liberal construction of Labor Code provisions in favor of workers is stipulated by Article 4 of the Labor Code.
This case is quintessentially paradigmatic of the need for the law to be applied in order to ensure social justice. The resolution of this
case should be guided by the constitutional command for courts to take a preferential view in favor of labor in ambitious cases.

Misconduct and breach of trust are just causes for terminating employment only when attended by such gravity as would leave
the employer no other viable recourse but to cut off an employee's livelihood. The Labor Code recognizes serious misconduct, willful
breach of trust or loss of confidence, and other analogous causes as just causes for termination of employment.

Misconduct is defined as the "transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment." For serious misconduct to justify dismissal, the
following requisites must be present: (a) it must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee's duties; and (c) it
must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer.
 It is not enough for an employee to be found to have engaged in improper or wrongful conduct. To justify termination of
employment, misconduct must be so severe as to make it evident that no other penalty but the termination of the employee's livelihood
is viable.

The social justice suppositions underlying labor laws require that the statutory grounds justifying termination of employment
should not be read to justify the view that bus conductors should, in all cases, be free from any kind of error. Not every improper act
should be taken to justify the termination of employment.

We take judicial notice of bus conductors' everyday work. Bus conductors receive, exchange, and keep money paid by
passengers by way of transportation fare. They keep track of payments and make computations down to the last centavo, literally on
their feet while a bus is in transit. Thus, while they do handle money, their circumstances are not at all the same as those of regular
cashiers. They have to think quickly, literally on their feet.

However, handling passengers' fare payments is not their sole function. Bus conductors assist drivers as they maneuver buses
through tight spaces while they are in transit, depart, or park. They often act as dispatchers in bus stops and other such places, assist
passengers as they embark and alight, and sometimes even help passengers load and unload goods and cargo. They manage the
available space in a bus and ensure that no space is wasted as the bus accommodates more passengers. Along with drivers, bus
conductors commit to memory the destination of each passenger so that they can anticipate their stops. There are several ways to
manifest the severity that suffices to qualify petitioner's alleged misconduct or breach of trust as so grave that terminating his
employment is warranted. It may be through the nature of the act itself: spanning an entire spectrum between, on one end, an
overlooked error, made entirely in good faith; and, on another end, outright larceny. It may be through the sheer amount mishandled. It
may be through frequency of acts. It may be through other attendant circumstances, such as attempts to destroy or conceal records and
other evidence, or evidence of a motive to undermine the business of an employer. We fail to appreciate any of these in this case. To
reiterate, what is involved is a paltry amount of P196.00. All that has been proven is the existence of a discrepancy. No proof has been
adduced of ill-motive or even of gross negligence. From all indications, petitioner stood charged with a lone, isolated instance of
apparent wrongdoing. The records are bereft of evidence showing a pattern of discrepancies chargeable against petitioner. Seen in the
context of his many years of service to his employer and in the absence of clear proof showing otherwise, the presumption should be
that he has performed his functions faithfully and regularly. It can be assumed that he has issued the correct tickets and given accurate
amounts of change to the hundreds or even thousands of passengers that he encountered throughout his tenure. It is more reasonable to
assume thatexcept for a single error costing a loss of only P196.00the company would have earned the correct expected margins
per passenger, per trip, and per bus that it allowed to travel. Absent any other supporting evidence, the error in a single ticket issued by
petitioner can hardly be used to justify the inference that he has committed serious misconduct or has acted in a manner that runs afoul
of his employer's trust. More so, petitioner cannot be taken to have engaged in a series of acts evincing a pattern or a design to defraud
his employer. Terminating his employment on these unfounded reasons is manifestly unjust. To infer from a single error that
petitioner committed serious misconduct or besmirched his employer's trust is grave abuse of discretion. It is an inference that is
arbitrary and capricious. It is contrary to the high regard for labor and social justice enshrined in our Constitution and our labor laws.