MENDOZA VS.

FERMIN

G.R. No. 177235 July 7, 2014

Petitioner: SERCONSISION R. MENDOZA

Respondent: AURORA MENDOZA FERMIN

Ponente: J. Peralta

FACTS:

Leonardo G. Mendoza, who died on November 25, 1986, is married to petitioner

Serconsision R. Mendoza. His legitimate and eldest daughter, respondent Aurora Mendoza
Fermin, was appointed as one of the administratix in the testate proceedings of her fathers
estate. In March 1989, petitioner submitted to probate court the inventory of her husbands
properties including Lot 39, Block 12 of the consolidation and subdivision plan Pcs-04-00250 in
Paraaque City. In 1990, respondent discovered the sale of this property to certain Eduardo c.
Sanchez through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated on September 22, 1986 for an amount of
Php150, 000. However, the sale was registered in the Register of Deeds of Paraaque Cityonly
on April 30, 1991, five (5) years after the alleged transfer. The information as to the new owner
was unknown to the tenants and the petitioner continued to collect rentals after the alleged sale.
Convinced that the signature of her father on the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged,
respondent filed for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title and
Damages praying that:
1. Deed of Absolute Sale and the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 52593 registered in
the name of Eduardo C. Sanchez be declared null and void.
2. Ofelia E. Abueg-Sta. Maria, in her capacity as the Register of Deeds of Paraaque City,
be ordered to revive and reinstate TCT No. 48946 in the name of Leonardo G. Mendoza and
Serconsision R. Mendoza.
3. Petitioner and Eduardo Sanchez be ordered to pay respondent the sum of Php 50,000
as moral damages, Php 20,000 as corrective damages, and Php 50,000 as attorneys fees, as
well as the cost of suit.
In support of her allegation, the respondent:
1. Claimed that she is familiar with her fathers signature, having worked as his private
secretary when the latter is still a Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas.
2. Presented witnesses in the names of:
a. Noel Cruz (NBI Document Examiner) who testifies that the sample signatures of the
respondents father are different from that of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
b. Teresita Rosales (Tenant of Subject Property until July 11, 1990) who testifies that
petitioner forged the signature of her husband in her request for a marriage contract and also in
the payment of rental receipt dated November 24, 1986. She added that, the petitioner even
boasted that she was the one signing documents for her husband because of the latters poor
eyesight.
In addition, respondent had also, at hand, the Certifications from Office of the Clerk of
Court of Pasay City and City of Manila as evidences to show that Atty. Julian Tubig was not
commissioned as notary public of Pasay City at the time the Deed of Absolute Sale was
notarized.
In view of these claims, the petitioner denied by presenting an expert in the name of
Zacarias Semacio, Document Examiner III of the Philippine National Police (PNP) at Camp
Crame, Quezon City who testified that there was no forgery in the signature of petitioners
husband on the Deed of Absolute Sale compared to the latters sample signatures.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent had the right to seek for the annulment of the Deed of Absolute
Sale of her fathers estate.

HELD:

YES. The subject property was part of the conjugal property of the spouses as it can be
gleaned from TCT No. 48946 wherein it states that it is owned by Leonardo G. Mendoza &
Serconsision R. Mendoza, both of legal age. Although Aurora has not adduced any proof to
substantiate her allegation that Serconsision was just the common-law wife of her father.

The applicable provision in governing the property relations of the spouses is Article 172
of the Civil Code of the Philippines which states that the wife cannot bind the conjugal
partnership without the husbands consent. However, in Felipe vs. Heirs of Maximo Aldon, the
Supreme Court ruled that the sale of a land belonging to the conjugal partnership made by the
wife without the consent of the husband is voidable as supported by Article 173 of the Civil
Code which states that contracts entered by the husband without the consent of the wife when
such consent is required are annullable at her instance during the marriage and within ten years
from the transaction questioned. However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts
will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that
the wife did not give her consent.

In the present case, the Court ruled that as a result of the forged signatures, the sale
should be annulled for lack of consent on Leonardos part since it was executed on September
22, 1986, one month after the latter died.

Since the Deed of Absolute Sale is concluded before the Family Code took effect,
thetransaction could still be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code.

Article 173 provides the remedy available to Leonardo in this case wherein his wife
disposed their conjugal property without his consent:

Article 173.The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the
husband entered intowithout her consent, when such consent is required, or
any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her
interest inthe conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise
this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may
demand the value of the property fraudulently alienated by the
husband.

In view of the fact that Leonardo is already dead means he can no longer exercise this
right and this death led to the dissolution of their marriage. Therefore, as one of the heirs and
administratix of her fathers estate, the respondent had the right to seek for the annulment of the
Deed of Absolute Sale as it deprived her and other legal heirs of their hereditary rights.
 G.R. No. L-34529 January 27, 1983
MAXIMO MARCIA, AMALIA MOJICA, TIRSO YAP, DAMIANA MARCIA, EDGAR MARCIA,
and RENATO YAP, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FELARDO PAJE, and VICTORY
LINER, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
On December 23, 1956, in the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, a passenger bus
operated by private respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee. Private
respondent Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's
death and in physical injuries to herein petitioners, Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. Thereupon,
an information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed
against Felardo Paje in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Criminal Case No. 2745).
On January 23, 1957, an action for damages (Civil Case No. 4425) was filed in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap, together with their respective
parents. Against the Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje, alleging that, the mishap was due to
the reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving the passenger bus.
While said Civil Case No. 4425 was in progress in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
the criminal action proceeded in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Criminal Case No.
2745). Accused Felardo Paje was convicted of the offense charged but was acquitted on appeal
ruling that appellant was not even guilty of civil negligence and that it was a case of pure
accident. The Court of First Instance of Rizal subsequently dismissed the civil case.
Petitioners appealed the case to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 38964-R) alleging
that the acquittal of Paje in the criminal action for homicide and serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence "is not a ground for dismissing the complaint in the instant civil action; that
the instant civil action is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action and shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, so that whatever may have been the result of the
criminal action is irrelevant to this civil action; that Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
and not Section 3, paragraph (c) of the said rule applies; that the statement in the decision of
the Court of Appeals in the criminal action that defendant Paje as accused therein was not guilty
of civil negligence is without the jurisdiction of the said Court to make and is to be completely
disregarded as an extraneous, officious and void statement which cannot affect in any way the
instant civil action; that the records of the criminal action against defendant Paje are
inadmissible evidence; that it has been established in the case at bar, not only by
preponderance of evidence but by uncontradicted, conclusive evidence that petitioners suffered
damages amounting to P250,817.96, and that the latter should be sentenced, jointly and
severally, to pay the same to petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil action is an independent one, entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action.
RULING:
Decision affirmed. Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states: Independent civil
action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right
is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in
Article 33 of the Civil Code which provides: In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries,
a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought
by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. It speaks only of defamation, fraud and
physical injuries. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of
criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil action for
damages may be instituted in connection therewith.

The charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for
reckless imprudence or criminal negligence resulting in homicide and physical injuries suffered
by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. They are not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33
of the Civil Code and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution.
Furthermore, Section 3 (c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states: Extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In the
other cases, the persons entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the
manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and
reparation or indemnity for the damages suffered.
However, since Felardo Paje has already been acquitted, an acquittal based on the
finding that the facts upon which civil liability did not exist, it bars the filing of the independent
civil action if it is based on the crime.
FORTICH- CELDRAN v CELDRAN
G.R. No. L-22677, February 28, 1967
Facts:
Plaintiffs were the children of the deceased, Pedro Celdran Sr. from the first marriage.
Defendants were Josefa Vda. De Celdran(spouse of the deceased by 2nd marriage), their seven
children and Pablo Celdran (child of the deceased by the first marriage who refused to join as
plaintiff). When the defendants answered on May 28, 1954, Ignacio Celdran withdrew as co-
plaintiffs, alleging that his signature in the document was forged and falsified. On March 6,
1959, the parties except for Ignacio Celdran made an amicable settlement recognizing the
validity of the extrajudicial partition. Later on July 19, 1961, the court declare extrajudicial
partition as valid for having been ratified by the latter, upon receipt of P 10, 000.00 plus two
residential lots. Ignacio appealed to the Court of Appeal docketed as CA-GR No. 30499-R
shown in the record as still pending. On March 22, 1963 at the instance of Ignacio Celdran, an
information for falsification of public document was also filed in the CFI of Misamis Occidental
against the children of the first marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the proceedings in the criminal case on the ground of prejudicial question
are suspended for the reason that alleged falsification of document on withdrawal is at issue in
the case pending in the Court of Appeals.
Held:
The court held the action poses a prejudicial question to the criminal prosecution for
alleged falsification. The authenticity of the document was assailed in the same civil action. The
resolution in the civil case can be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
pending criminal suit. As such, it is a prejudicial question which should be first decided before
the prosecution can proceed in the criminal case. A prejudicial question is defined as that which
arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and
the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be
determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question
must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused. The civil case involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal case.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review- ordering suspension of
Criminal Case No. 5719, People v. Pedro Fortich- Celdran, et. al., pending before the Court of
First Instance of Misamis Occidental, until after Civil Case, C.A,- GR No. 30499- R, Pedro A.
Celdran, et al. v. Pedro Fortich- Celdran III, et al., shall have been decided- is hereby affirmed,
with costs against appellant.
So ordered.
 MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE
FLORENTINO TUAZON JR.
G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000
FACTS:
Meynardo Beltran and Charmaine Felix were married in 1973. After 24 years of marriage
and four children, Meynardo filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with Charmaine
on the ground of psychological incapacity. Charmaine in her answer alleged that it was in fact
Meynardo who left the conjugal home, and is now living with his paramour, a woman named
Milagros Salting. Charmaine then filed a case for concubinage against Meynardo before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City, which ordered the filing of an Information against
him for concubinage. To prevent the court from issuing a warrant for his arrest, Meynardo filed
a Motion to Defer Proceedings in the Metropolitan Trial Court, reasoning out that the pendency
of the petition for nullity of his marriage with Charmaine poses a prejudicial question to the
criminal case. The lower court denied the motion as well as the motion for reconsideration filed
by Meynardo, hence he filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court to stop the lower court from trying his
case. The RTC denied his petition and the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked as a prejudicial
question in the case at bar.
HELD:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the case for
declaration of nullity of Meynardos marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage
case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the
suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only
that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only
legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other
evidence is acceptable.
In a case for concubinage, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring his
marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other
than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.
 With regard to Beltrans argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of
concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a
subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for
all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not
pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.
 PIMENTEL VS. PEOPLE
GR NO. 172060, September 20, 2010

Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial

question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

FACTS:
Private respondent Maria Chrysantine Pimentel filed an action for frustrated parricide
last October 25, 2004 against the petitioner Joselito R. Pimentelbefore the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City.
On February 7, 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo City, for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
On February 11, 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings
before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner
asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in
parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed
against him before the RTC Quezon City.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against
petitioner?
RULLING:

The resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the
suspension of the criminal action. There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue
raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case.

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of
parricide, which punishes any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse. The
relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from
murder or homicide. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately
related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the
offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since
petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts
of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will.
At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were
married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-
7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the
subsistence of the marriage.
In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner
could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he
was still married to respondent.
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial
to Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No.
04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
SO ORDERED.