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MACARIOLA v. ASUNCION ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish
114 SCRA 77
FACTS:
On August 6, 1968, petitioner,
BernaditaMacariola charged respondent Judge Elias
Asuncion of CFI of Leyte, now Associate Justice of CA,
with acts unbecoming of a judge when the latter
purchased a property which was previously the
subject of litigation on which he rendered decision.
Respondent and his wife were also members of
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. to
which their shares and interests in said property were
conveyed. According to the petitioner, respondent
allegedly violated Article 1491 (5) of the New Civil
Code and Article 14 (1) and (5) of Code of Commerce,
Sec. 3 of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Sec. 12
XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of Canons
of Judicial Ethics.
ISSUE:Is Article 14 of the Code of Commerce still in
force?
HELD:
Article 14 partakes of the nature of a political
law as it regulates the relationship between the
government and certain public officers and employees
like justices and judges. Said provision must be
deemed to have been abrogated because where there
is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the
former sovereign are automatically abrogated. As
such, Article 14 is not in force. The respondent is not
found to have violated the articles invoked by the
petitioner but he was advised by the Court to be more
discreet in his private and business activities.
People v. Perfecto
G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922
FACTS:
The issue started when the Secretary of the
Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero, discovered that
the documents regarding the testimony of the
witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had
disappeared from his office. Then, the day following
the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion
edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto
published an article against the Philippine Senate.
Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article
256 of the Spanish Penal Code provision that
punishes those who insults the Ministers of the
Crown. Hence, the issue.
Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be applied in
the case at bar?
HELD:
No.The Court stated that during the Spanish
Government, Article 256 of the SPC was enacted to
protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King.
However, the Court explains that in the present case,
we no longer have Kings nor its representatives for the
provision to protect. Also, with the change of
sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to
American, it means that the invoked provision of the
SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court
determined Article 256 of the SPC to be political in
nature for it is about the relation of the State to its
inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that it is a
general principle of the public law that on acquisition
of territory, the previous political relations of the
ceded region are totally abrogated.Hence, Article 256
of the SPC is considered no longer in force and cannot
be applied to the present case. Therefore, respondent
was acquitted.
Legaspi vs. Minister of Finance Xel
Vera vs. Avelino Fernandez
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito
GR L-1123, 5 March 1947
FACTS:
Three senators and eight representatives had
been proclaimed by a majority vote of the
Commission on Elections as having been elected
senators and representatives in the elections held on
23 April 1946. The three senators were suspended by
the Senate shortly after the opening of the first
session of Congress following the elections, on
account of alleged irregularities in their election. The
eight representatives since their election had not been
allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part
in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason,
although they had not been formally suspended. A
resolution for their suspension had been introduced in
the House of Representatives, but that resolution had
not been acted upon definitely by the House when the
petition for prohibition was filed. As a consequence
these three senators and eight representatives did not
take part in the passage of the congressional
resolution, designated "Resolution of both houses
proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto,"
nor was their membership reckoned within the
computation of the necessary three-fourths vote
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which is required in proposing an amendment to the
Constitution. If these members of Congress had been
counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the
proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of
Congress. The petition for prohibition sought to
prevent the enforcement of said congressional
resolution, as it is allegedly contrary to the
Constitution. The members of the Commission on
Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor
General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are
made defendants. Eight senators, 17 representatives,
and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the
Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party.
ISSUE:Whether the Court may inquire upon the
irregularities in the approval of the resolution
proposing an amendment to the Constitution.
HELD:
It is a doctrine too well established to need
citation of authorities that political questions are not
within the province of the judiciary, except to the
extent that power to deal with such questions has
been conferred upon the courts by express
constitutional or statutory provision. This doctrine is
predicated on the principle of the separation of
powers, a principle also too well known to require
elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies
in determining what matters fall within the meaning
of political question. The term is not susceptible of
exact definition, and precedents and authorities are
not always in full harmony as to the scope of the
restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle
with the actions of the political departments of the
government. If a political question conclusively binds
the judges out of respect to the political departments,
a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges
under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect. If
ratification of an amendment is a political question, a
proposal which leads to ratification has to be a
political question. The two steps complement each
other in a scheme intended to achieve a single
objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory
process as provided in section I of Article XV of the
Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct
parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in
attaching political character to one and withholding
that character from the other. Proposal to amend the
Constitution is a highly political function performed by
the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and
committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The
exercise of this power is even in dependent of any
intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of
expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be
needed to safeguard public interest, there is less
reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a
proposal then into that of ratification.
Gonzales vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
The case is an original action for prohibition,
with preliminary injunction. The main facts are not
disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the
House of Representatives passed the following
resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, -
proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the
Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to
increase the membership of the House of
Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided
in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to
be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly
as may be according to the number of their respective
inhabitants, although each province shall have, at
least, one (1) member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, - calling a convention to propose
amendments to said Constitution, the convention to
be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each
representative district, to be "elected in the general
elections to be held on the second Tuesday of
November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, -proposing that Section 16, Article VI,
of the same Constitution, be amended so as to
authorize Senators and members of the House of
Representatives to become delegates to the
aforementioned constitutional convention, without
forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon
approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became
Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the
amendments to the Constitution proposed in the
aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be
submitted, for approval by the people, at the general
elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
ISSUE:Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress,
acting as a constituent assembly, violates the
Constitution.
HELD:
In as much as there are less than eight (8)
votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B.
H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the
petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are
hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for
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denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It
is so ordered.
As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot
be assailed collaterally. It may not be contested except
directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may
the validity of his acts be questioned upon the ground
that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons
are obvious:
(1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title
to the office; and
(2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the
competence of his office, are valid, insofar as
the public is concerned.
"The judicial department is the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent
units thereof."
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote
of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and
of the House of Representatives voting separately,
may propose amendments to this Constitution or call
a contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall
be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by
a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification.
From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the
Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate
knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to
retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run
for and assume the functions of delegates to the
Convention.
Santiago vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin,
president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with
COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift
the term limits of elective officials, through Peoples
Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2
of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right
of the people to exercise the power to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution.
Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing
the publication of the petition and of the notice of
hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the
hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-
Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law
Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco
filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the
ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC.
The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander
Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against
COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several
arguments, such as the following: (1) The
constitutional provision on peoples initiative to
amend the constitution can only be implemented by
law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been
passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited
to amendments to the Motions for Intervention.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987
Constitution is a self-executing provision.
(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in
the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such
initiative.
(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective
officials would constitute a revision or an amendment
of the Constitution.
HELD:
1. Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self
executory, thus, without implementing legislation the
same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has
recognized or granted the right, the people cannot
exercise it if Congress does not provide for its
implementation.
2. The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which
prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void.
It has been an established rule that what has been
delegated, cannot be delegated (potestasdelegata non
delegaripotest). The delegation of the power to the
COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly
promulgate rules and regulations to implement
the exercise of the right to peoples initiative.
3. The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a
revision, as it would affect other provisions of the
Constitution such as the synchronization of elections,
the constitutional guarantee of equalaccess to
opportunities for public service, and prohibiting
politicaldynasties. A revision cannot be done by
initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in
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the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the
petition is a revision or amendment has
becomeacademic.
Lambino vs. COMELEC
October 25, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering
signatures for an initiative petition tochange the 1987
constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite that willratify their initiative petition under RA 6735.
Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M
individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the
constitution. Their petition changes the1987 constitution by
modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by
adding Art 18.the proposed changes will shift the present
bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral-
parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of
enabling law governing initiative petitionsand invoked the
Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to
implement the initiativepetitions.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition
complies with Section 2, Article XVII of theConstitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.
2. Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago
declaring RA 6735 incomplete,inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative
clause onproposals to amend the Constitution.
3. Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying due course to theLambino Groups petition.
Held:
According to the SC the Lambino group failed
to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a
peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not
grave abuse of discretionon dismissing the Lambino petition.1.
The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on DirectProposal by the People. The
petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must
be informed at the time of thesigning of the nature and effect,
failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which
renderstheinitiative void.2. The Initiative Violates Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision
throughInitiatives. The framers of the constitution intended a
clear distinction between amendment and revision, it
isintended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the
constitution may propose onlyamendments to the constitution.
Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical
change,therefore a constitutes a revision.3. A Revisit of Santiago
v. COMELEC is Not NecessaryEven assuming that RA 6735 is
valid, it will not change the result because the present
petitionviolated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first
comply with the constitution before complyingwith RA
6735Petition is dismissed.
Lambino vs. COMELEC Resolution
November 21, 2006
Tolentino vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into
being by virtue of two resolutionsof the Congress
approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly
convened for thepurpose of calling a convention to
propose amendments to the Constitution.
Afterelection of delegates held on November 10,
1970, the Convention held its inauguralsession on
June 1, 1971.
In the morning of September 28, 1970, the
Conventionapproved Organic Resolution No. 1 which
is entitled as, A RESOLUTION AMENDINGSECTION 1
OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION SO AS TO
LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18. On September 30,
1971, the COMELEC resolved to followthe mandate
of the Convention, that it will hold the said plebiscite
together with the senatorial elections on November 8,
1971.
Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for
prohibition, its main thrust being that Organic
Resolution No. 1 and the necessary implementing
resolutions subsequently approved have no force and
effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding
of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial
elections, on the ground that the calling and holding
of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power
lodged exclusively in Congress as a legislative body
and may not be exercised by the
Convention, and that, under Article XV Section 1 of
the 1935 Constitution, the proposed amendment in
question cannot be presented to the people for
ratification separately from each and all other
amendments to be drafted and proposed by the
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of
the 1971 ConstitutionalConvention violative to the
Constitution.
HELD:
NO. All the amendments to be proposed by
the same Convention must besubmitted to the people
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in a single election or plebiscite. In order that a
plebiscite forthe ratification of a Constitutional
amendment may be validly held, it must provide
thevoter not only sufficient time but ample basis for
an intelligent appraisal of the nature ofthe
amendment per se but as well as its relation to the
other parts of the Constitutionwith which it has to
form a harmonious whole. In the present context,
where theConvention has hardly started considering
the merits, if not thousands, of proposals to
amend the existing Constitution, to present to the
people any single proposal or a few of them cannot
comply with this requirement.
U.S. Vs. Bull
15 PHIL 259
FACTS:
The information alleged the following: That on
and for many months to December 2, 1908, H. N. Bull
was the master of a steam sailing known as the
steamship Standard, the said vessel is engaged in
carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos, and other
animals from a foreign port and city of Manila,
Philippines. That the accused Bull while being the
master of the said vessel on or about the 2nd day of
December 1908, wilfully, and wrongfully carry,
transport and bring into the port and city of Manila
677 head of cattle and carabaos from the port of
Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable means
for securing said animals while in transit, so as to
avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said
animals. In this, to wit, the accused as the master of
the vessel, did then and there fail to provide stalls for
said animals so in transit and suitable means for trying
and securing said animals in a proper manner, and did
then and there cause some of said animals to be tied
by means of rings passed through their noses, and
allow and permit others to be transported loose in the
hold and on the deck of said vessel without being tied
or secured in stalls, and all without bedding; that by
reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the
accused to provide suitable means for securing said
animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said
animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals
were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said
vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.
All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No.
275 of the Philippine Commission.
ISSUE:
1. The complaint does not state facts sufficient to
confer jurisdiction upon the court.
2. That under the evidence the trial court was
without jurisdiction to hear and determine the
case.
RULING:
1. Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the
offense created thereby on Courts of First Instance or
any provost court organized in the province or port in
which such animals are disembarked, and there is
nothing inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136, which
provides generally for the organization of the courts of
the Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely extends the
general jurisdiction of the courts over certain offenses
committed on the high seas, or beyond the
jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the waters
of the Philippine Islands on board a ship or water craft
of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine
Islands, in accordance with the laws thereof. (U.S. vs.
Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep., 614.) This jurisdiction may be
exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province
into which such ship or water upon which the offense
or crime was committed shall come after the
commission thereof. Had this offense been committed
upon a ship carrying a Philippine registry, there could
have been no doubt of the Jurisdiction of the court,
because it is expressly conferred, and the Act is in
accordance with well recognized and established
public law. But the Standard was a Norwegian vessel,
and it is conceded that it was not registered or
licensed in the Philippine Islands under the laws
thereof. We have then the question whether the court
had jurisdiction over an offense of this character,
committed on board a foreign ship by the master
thereof, when the neglect and omission which
constitutes the offense continued during the time the
ship was within the territorial waters of the United
States. No court of the Philippine Islands had
jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on
the high seas or within the territorial waters of any
other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a
line drawn from the headlines which embrace the
entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial
waters, and a new set of principles became applicable.
The ship and her crew were then subject to the
jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject through
the proper political agency. This offense was
committed within territorial waters. From the line
which determines these waters the Standard must
have traveled at least 25 miles before she came to
anchor. During that part of her voyage the violation of
the statue continued, and as far as the jurisdiction of
the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the same
conditions may have existed while the vessel was on
the high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated
at the port of departure in Formosa, was a continuing
one, and every element necessary to constitute it
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existed during the voyage across the territorial waters.
The completed forbidden act was done within
American waters, and the court therefore had
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the offense and
the person of the offender.
The offense then was thus committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court, but the objection
to the jurisdiction raises the further question whether
that jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the
nationality of the ship. Every state has complete
control and jurisdiction over its territorial waters.
According to strict legal right, even public vessels may
not enter the ports of a friendly power without
permission, but it is now conceded that in the absence
of a prohibition such ports are considered as open to
the public ship of all friendly powers. The exemption
of such vessels from local jurisdiction while within
such waters was not established until within
comparatively recent times.
Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of
peace to come and go freely. Local official exercise but
little control over their actions, and offenses
committed by their crew are justiciable by their own
officers acting under the laws to which they primarily
owe allegiance. This limitation upon the general
principle of territorial sovereignty is based entirely
upon comity and convenience, and finds its
justification in the fact that experience shows that
such vessels are generally careful to respect local laws
and regulation which are essential to the health,
order, and well-being of the port. But comity and
convenience does not require the extension of the
same degree of exemption to merchant vessels. There
are two well-defined theories as to extent of the
immunities ordinarily granted to them, According to
the French theory and practice, matters happening on
board a merchant ship which do not concern the
tranquillity of the port or persons foreign to the crew,
are justiciable only by the court of the country to
which the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore
claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on
board French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one
member of the crew against another.
Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States has
recently said that the merchant vessels of one country
visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade,
subject themselves to the laws which govern the ports
they visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in
war as in peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty.
(U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520-525.)
The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts
of jurisdiction over offenses committed on board a
merchant vessel by one member of the crew against
another which amount to a disturbance of the order
or tranquility of the country, and a fair and reasonable
construction of the language requires us to hold that
any violation of criminal laws disturbs the order or
tranquility of the country. The offense with which the
appellant is charged had nothing to so with any
difference between the captain and the crew. It was a
violation by the master of the criminal law of the
country into whose port he came. We thus find that
neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the
place of the commission of the offense, or the
prohibitions of any treaty or general principle of public
law, are the court of the Philippine Islands deprived of
jurisdiction over the offense charged in the
information in this case.
It is further contended that the complaint is defective
because it does not allege that the animals were
disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation
which it is claimed is essential to the jurisdiction of the
court sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant
upon this issue would be to construe the language of
the complaint very strictly against the Government.
The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in
order to constitute the completed offense, and a
reasonable construction of the language of the statute
confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port
into which the animals are bought. They are then
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the
mere fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far
as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be different if
the disembarkation of the animals constituted a
constitutional element in the offense, but it does not.
The evidence shows not only that the defendants acts
were knowingly done, but his defense rests upon the
assertion that according to his experience, the
system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in
the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and
comfort of the animals. It was conclusively proven
that what was done was done knowingly and
intentionally.
2. Whether a certain method of handling cattle
is suitable within the meaning of the Act cannot be
left to the judgment of the master of the ship. It is a
question which must be determined by the court from
the evidence. On December 2, 1908, the defendant
Bull brought into and disembarked in the port and city
of Manila certain cattle, which came from the port of
Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable means
for securing said animals while in transit, so as to
avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to said
animals, contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act
No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The
trial court found the abovementioned facts true and
all of which are fully sustained by the evidence.
The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay
a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos, with subsidiary
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imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs. The sentence and judgment is affirmed. So
ordered.
PLANAS VS. COMELEC
49 SCRA 105; January 22, 1973
Ponente: Concepcion, C.J.
FACTS:
While the 1971 Constitution Convention was
in session on September 21, 1972, the president
issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the Philippines
under martial law. On November 29,1972 the
Convention approved its proposed constitution. The
next day the president issued PD No. 73 submitting to
the people for ratification or rejection the proposed
constitution as well as setting the plebiscite for said
ratification. On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed
a petition to enjoin respondents from implemented
PD No. 73 because the calling of the plebiscite among
others are lodged exclusively in the Congress. On
December 17, 1972, the president issued an order
temporarily suspending the effects of PD 1081 for the
purpose of free and open debate on the proposed
constitution. On December 23, the president
announced the postponement of the plebiscite, as
such, the Court refrained from deciding the cases. On
January 12, the petitioners filed for an urgent
motion praying that the case be decided as soon as
possible.
ISSUES:
1. Is validity of PD 73 justiciable?
2. Is PD 73 valid?
3. Does the 1971 Constitutional Convention
have the authority to pass the proposed
constitution?
HELD:
The Court may pass upon constitutionality of
PD 73 not only because of a long list of cases decided
by the Court but also of subdivision (1) of Section 2,
Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution which expressly
provides for the authority of the Court to review cases
revolving such issue. The validity of the decree itself
was declared moot and academic by the Court. The
convention is free to postulate any amendment as
long as it is not inconsistent to what is known as Jus
Cogens.
JAVELLANA VS THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
50 SCRA 30; March 31, 1973
FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed a
prohibition case to restrain respondents from
implementing any of the provisions of the proposed
constitution not found in the present constitution.
Javellana maintained that the respondents are acting
without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing
proposed constitution and that the president is
without power to proclaim the ratification of the
constitution. Similar actions were filed by Vidal Tan,
Gerardo Roxas, among others. Petitioners pray for the
nullification of Proclamation 1102 (Citizens
Assemblies) and any order, decree, and proclamation
which are similar in objective.
ISSUES:
1. Is the validity of Proclamation No. 1102
justiciable?
2. Was the constitution proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention ratified validly
in compliance to applicable laws?
3. Was the proposed Constitution
acquiesced by the people?
4. Are the petitioners entitled relief?
5. Is the proposed Constitution in force?
HELD:
Whether a constitutional amendment has
been properly adopted according to an existing
constitution is a judicial question as it is the absolute
duty of the judiciary to determine whether the
Constitution has been amended in the manner
required by the constitution. The Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Convention was not validly
ratified in accordance with Article XV section 1 of the
1935 Constitution which provides only one way for
ratification (election or plebiscite held in accordance
with law and only with qualified voters). Due to the
environmental and social conditions in the Philippines
(i.e. martial law) the Court cannot honestly say that
the people acquiesced to the proposed Constitution.
The majority ruled to dismiss the cases as the
effectivity of the proposed Constitution is the basic
issue posed by the cases which considerations other
than judicial are relevant and unavoidable. The new
constitution is in force as there are not enough votes
to say otherwise.
Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC
140 SCRA 455
January 7, 1986
FACTS:
11 petitions were filed for prohibition against
the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special
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national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap
elections) for the offices of President and Vice
President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with
the constitution in that it allows the President to
continue holding office after the calling of the special
election.
Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter
of conditional resignation did not create the actual
vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the
Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of
a special election for President and Vice President
earlier than the regular elections for such positions in
1987. The letter states that the President is:
irrevocably vacating the position of President
effective only when the election is held and after the
winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by
taking his oath office ten (10) days after his
proclamation.
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict
compliance with the cited constitutional provision that
the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his
office and turn it over to the Speaker of the
BatasangPambansa as acting President, their standard
bearers have not filed any suit or petition in
intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the
scheduled election. They have not insisted that
President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the
election is clean, fair and honest.
ISSUE: Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the
Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the
holding of the elections
HELD:
The petitions in these cases are dismissed and
the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining
respondents from holding the election on February 7,
1986, in as much as there are less than the required
10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.
The events that have transpired since December 3,as
the Court did not issue any restraining order, have
turned the issue into a political question (from the
purely justiciable issue of the questioned
constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the
actual vacancy of the Presidents office) which can be
truly decided only by the people in their sovereign
capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no
issue more political than the election. The Court
cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide
through their ballot, either to give the incumbent
president a new mandate or to elect a new president.
LAWYERS LEAGUE VS. AQUINO
ET AL. G.R. No. 73748
May 22, 1986
FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued
providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by stating that the new
government was installed through a direct exercise of
the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of
the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.
ISSUE:Whether or not the government of Corazon
Aquino is legitimate
HELD:
As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had
already voted to dismiss the petitions for the reasons
to be stated below.
On April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano as counsel for the
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and 73972 withdrew
the petitions and manifested that they would pursue
the question by extra-judicial methods. The
withdrawal is functusoficio.The legitimacy of the
Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people
of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have
made the judgment; they have accepted the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino. The
community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of
the present government. All the eleven members of
this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the
fundamental law of the Republic under her
government.
IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ G.R. No. 76180
October 24, 1986
In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no
respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first
paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously
stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986
Constitution, which provides in full as follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President
and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986
election is, for purposes of synchronization of
elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-
President under this Constitution shall be held on the
second Monday of May, 1992.
Claiming that the said provision is not clear as to
whom it refers, he then asks the Court to declare and
answer the question of the construction and
definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent
President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador
Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred
to under the said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986
Constitution refers to, .
The petition is dismissed outright for lack of
jurisdiction and for lack for cause of action.
Prescinding from petitioners lack of personality to sue
or to bring this action, (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA
677), it is elementary that this Court assumes no
jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. More
importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit
against the incumbent President of the Republic,
President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally
elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune
from suit or from being brought to court during the
period of their incumbency and tenure.
The petition furthermore states no cause of action.
Petitioners allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of
the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it
being a matter of public record and common public
knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers
therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and
Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other
persons, and provides for the extension of their term
to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of
synchronization of elections. Hence, the second
paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding
on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first
regular elections for the President and Vice-President
under said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the
legitimacy of the government of President Corazon C.
Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned with the
claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973
Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright
by this court which held that:
Petitioners have no personality to sue and their
petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy
of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people
of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have
made the judgment; they have accepted the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is
in effective control of the entire country so that it is
not merely a de facto government but in fact and law
a de jure government. Moreover, the community of
nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government. All the eleven members of this Court, as
reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental
law of the Republic under her government. (Joint
Resolution of May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748
[Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs.
President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.]; G.R. No. 73972
[Peoples Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution.
etc. vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al.]; and G.R. No. 73990
[Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et
al.])
De Leon v. Esguerra
153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987
FACTS:
On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De
Leon was elected Barangay Captain together with the
other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay
Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a
Barangay election held under Batas PambansaBlg.
222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of
1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a
Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but
signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin
Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent
Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay
Dolores and the other respondents as members of
Barangay Council of the same Barangay and
Municipality.
Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the
subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared
null and void and that respondents be prohibited by
taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and
Barangay Councilmen.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the
Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their
terms of office shall be six years which shall
commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until
their successors shall have elected and shall have
qualified. It was also their position that with the
ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution,
respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority
to replace them and to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the
terms of office of elective and appointive officials
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1

were abolished and that petitioners continued in

office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional
Constitution and not because their term of six years
had not yet expired; and that the provision in the
Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of
Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have
been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art.
3 of the Provisional Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of

respondents to replace petitioners was validly made
during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25,
1987.

RULING: Supreme Court declared that the

Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8,
1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain
and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay,
Rizal has no legal force and effect.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on

Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution
must be deemed to have superseded. Having become
inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely
on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to
the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution
further provides in part:

"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials,

except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years x xx."

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been

determined by aw, therefore, the term of office of 6
years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of
1982 should still govern.

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