RE: Letter of the UP Law Faculty Entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the

University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation
in the Supreme Court

A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC

March 8, 2011

Background/ Facts of the Case:

Then Associate Justice del Castillo was the ponencia in Vinuya, et.al v. Executive Secretary. It was
a petition filed by Filipino women (Malaya Lolas) who were abused by Japanese occupants, asking for
indemnity from the Japanese government for the abuses they suffered. The petition was dismissed by the
Supreme Court. The counsels of Malaya Lolas, Atty. Harry Roque and Atty. Bagares filed a supplemental
motion for reconsideration. They raised plagiarism as one of the grounds for the motion. They assert that
the ponente plagiarized at least three (3) sources, and twisting the same in order to fit to the ponencias
decision, when in fact the plagiarized sources even make a stronger case for the petitions claims.

In line with the alleged plagiarism, there were various publications made. One of which is the
subject of this administrative matter. The UP College of Law Faculty published a copy of their statement on
the issue of plagiarism. Through Dean Leonen, a copy of the statement was sent to the Supreme Court on
August 11, 2010 (see a copy of the statement in the full text for reference). As noted in the earlier
decision, the Court found that the members of the Faculty violated canons of the CPR, particularly Canons
10, 11, 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05. The Court found that the letter of the UP Faculty was an institutional
attack, and treated the matter as more than an established fact, but the truth. Thus, the Supreme Court
issued a Show Cause Order against the 37 lawyers who signed the statement why they should not be
disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of the CPR. Hence, this administrative matter.

Rule 1.02: A Lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.

Canon 10: A Lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the Court.

Canon 11: A Lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and to the Judicial
officers and should insist on Similar Conduct by others.

Rule 11.05: A Lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities
only.

Canon 13: A Lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which
tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the Court.
 In compliance with the Show Cause Order, 35 out of 37 professors (exclusion of Prof. Owen Lynch
and Prof. Raul Vasquez) submitted their compliance before the Supreme Court. In their compliance,
respondents stressed that they issued the Statement in the discharge of the solemn duties and trust
reposed upon them as teachers in the profession of law, and as members of the Bar to speak out on a
matter of public concern and one that is of vital interest to them. It was based on their pure intentions, and
pointed out that none of them was a counsel in the Vinuya case. They also emphasized that their intention
was focusing on constructive action.

It was also their defense that they published the said statement because of their belief that the
Court would not act on the plagiarism issue, and downplay the same. They likewise maintained their view
that the charges of plagiarism against Del Castillo were correct. There were other defenses as well. In sum,
these were the defenses by the professors: (1) Noble intentions; (2) The correctness that Del Castillo
committed plagiarism, and should be held accountable with the standards of academic writing; (3) they
were singled out, as there were other publications expressing their sentiments to the issue; (4) Freedom of
Expression; and (5) Academic Freedom. The compliance of two other professors adopted the common
compliance with some modifications.

Issues:

(1) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom of expression?
(2) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their academic freedom?
(3) Whether or not they should be disciplined.
(4) Whether or not the respondents are entitled to a hearing.

Ruling:

Issue 1: On the Right to Freedom of Expression

The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of expression. A reading of
the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was neither the fact that respondents had criticized a
decision of the Court nor that they had charged one of its members of plagiarism that motivated the said
Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the contumacious language by which respondents, who
are not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in
the said pending case for the "proper disposition" and consideration of the Court that gave rise to said
Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court
considered excessive and uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and
later submission to this Court of the UP Law facultys Restoring Integrity Statement. To reiterate, it was not
the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that Justice Del Castillo was guilty of plagiarism but
rather their expression of that belief as "not only as an established fact, but a truth"111 when it was "[o]f
public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth of such
allegations."
 Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents submissions, this Court has
held that the right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial
concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. In cases
where the critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the
authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers,
whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency.

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux
and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic,
more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to
conduct himself "with all good fidelity x x x to the courts;" and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to
observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." The first canon of legal
ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."

In sum, the Court said that while lawyers may have the right to freedom of speech, that
freedom should be exercised differently from an ordinary citizen when it comes to commentaries or
opinions about the courts. This is so, because lawyers have the duty to uphold and respect the
Court in consonance with the CPR. Thus, lawyers must responsibly choose the manner in which
they would like to express their thoughts.

Second Issue: Academic Freedom

The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents academic freedom. It is not contested
that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence, guaranteed academic freedom and undisputably,
they are free to determine what they will teach their students and how they will teach. We must point out
that there is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon respondents the subject matter they
can teach and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of academic
freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and
speech, coupled with undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without observing proper
procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.

A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not been passed upon in any previous case
before this Court, is the question of whether lawyers who are also law professors can invoke academic
freedom as a defense in an administrative proceeding for intemperate statements tending to pressure the
Court or influence the outcome of a case or degrade the courts.
Applying by analogy the Courts past treatment of the "free speech" defense in other bar discipline cases,
academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in this case. The implicit ruling in the
jurisprudence discussed above is that the constitutional right to freedom of expression of members of the
Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to uphold
the publics faith in the legal profession and the justice system. To our mind, the reason that freedom of
expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater force to the academic freedom
of law professors.

Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents proposition in the Common Compliance that
their issuance of the Statement was in keeping with their duty to "participate in the development of the legal
system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of
justice" under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have fulfilled
that same duty in keeping with the demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect to legal processes
and the courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to influence the courts. Members of the Bar cannot be
selective regarding which canons to abide by given particular situations. With more reason that law
professors are not allowed this indulgence, since they are expected to provide their students exemplars of
the Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole and not just their preferred portions thereof.

On other Defenses: Good Faith, Noble Intention, and Correctness of Plagiarism Charges.

The Court has already clarified that it is not the expression of respondents staunch belief that
Justice Del Castillo has committed a misconduct that the majority of this Court has found so unbecoming in
the Show Cause Resolution. No matter how firm a lawyers conviction in the righteousness of his cause
there is simply no excuse for denigrating the courts and engaging in public behavior that tends to put the
courts and the legal profession into disrepute. This doctrine, which we have repeatedly upheld in such
cases as Salcedo, In re Almacen and Saberong, should be applied in this case with more reason, as the
respondents, not parties to the Vinuya case, denounced the Court and urged it to change its decision
therein, in a public statement using contumacious language, which with temerity they subsequently
submitted to the Court for "proper disposition." Whether or not respondents views regarding the plagiarism
issue in the Vinuya case had valid basis was wholly immaterial to their liability for contumacious speech
and conduct. These are two separate matters to be properly threshed out in separate proceedings. The
Court considers it highly inappropriate, if not tantamount to dissembling, the discussion devoted in one of
the compliances arguing the guilt of Justice Del Castillo. Notwithstanding their professed overriding interest
in said ethics case, it is not proper procedure for respondents to bring up their plagiarism arguments here
especially when it has no bearing on their own administrative case.

This brings to our mind the letters of Dr. Ellis and Prof. Tams which were deliberately quoted in full
in the narration of background facts to illustrate the sharp contrast between the civil tenor of these letters
and the antagonistic irreverence of the Statement. In truth, these foreign authors are the ones who would
expectedly be affected by any perception of misuse of their works. Notwithstanding that they are beyond
the disciplinary reach of this Court, they still obviously took pains to convey their objections in a deferential
and scholarly manner. It is unfathomable to the Court why respondents could not do the same. These
foreign authors letters underscore the universality of the tenet that legal professionals must deal with each
other in good faith and due respect. The mark of the true intellectual is one who can express his opinions
logically and soberly without resort to exaggerated rhetoric and unproductive recriminations (look at the
letters of the alleged infringed authors, the tone was respectful and constructive).

As for the claim that the respondents noble intention is to spur the Court to take "constructive action" on
the plagiarism issue, the Court has some doubts as to its veracity. For if the Statement was primarily meant
for this Courts consideration, why was the same published and reported in the media first before it was
submitted to this Court? It is more plausible that the Statement was prepared for consumption by the
general public and designed to capture media attention as part of the effort to generate interest in the most
controversial ground in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed in the Vinuya case by Atty.
Roque, who is respondents colleague on the UP Law faculty.

In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of fidelity and due respect to the
Court, particularly when respondents knew fully well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision
and the merits of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statements issuance, were still both sub
judice or pending final disposition of the Court. These facts have been widely publicized. On this point,
respondents allege that at the time the Statement was first drafted on July 27, 2010, they did not know of
the constitution of the Ethics Committee and they had issued the Statement under the belief that this Court
intended to take no action on the ethics charge against Justice Del Castillo. Still, there was a significant
lapse of time from the drafting and printing of the Statement on July 27, 2010 and its publication and
submission to this Court in early August when the Ethics Committee had already been convened. If it is true
that the respondents outrage was fueled by their perception of indifference on the part of the Court then,
when it became known that the Court did intend to take action, there was nothing to prevent respondents
from recalibrating the Statement to take this supervening event into account in the interest of fairness.

Issue on being Singled-Out

Speaking of the publicity this case has generated, we likewise find no merit in the respondents
reliance on various news reports and commentaries in the print media and the internet as proof that they
are being unfairly "singled out." On the contrary, these same annexes to the Common Compliance show
that it is not enough for one to criticize the Court to warrant the institution of disciplinary137 or
contempt138 action. This Court takes into account the nature of the criticism and weighs the possible
repercussions of the same on the Judiciary. When the criticism comes from persons outside the profession
who may not have a full grasp of legal issues or from individuals whose personal or other interests in
making the criticism are obvious, the Court may perhaps tolerate or ignore them. However, when law
professors are the ones who appear to have lost sight of the boundaries of fair commentary and worse,
would justify the same as an exercise of civil liberties, this Court cannot remain silent for such silence would
have a grave implication on legal education in our country.
Sanctions

The Court was not persuaded of the defenses of the respondents, but ruled that their intentions
were mitigating. Prof. Vasquez was also commended because he acknowledged that he might have been
remiss failing to assess the effect of the language of the Statement and could have used more care.
According to the Court, this is all that they wanted. The Court wanted not for them to sacrifice their
principles but only that they recognize that they themselves may have committed some ethical lapse in this
affair. We commend Prof. Vaquez for showing that at least one of the respondents can grasp the true
import of the Show Cause Resolution involving them. For these reasons, the Court finds Prof. Vasquezs
Compliance satisfactory.

Issue on the Request for Hearing: Unmeritorious

This is not an indirect contempt proceeding, but an administrative matter. The Court relied
on Rule 139-B, Section 13 (Rules of Court) formal investigation is merely directory to the Court.
Administrative hearings do not require a trial type hearing. In relation to bar discipline cases, we have
had the occasion to rule in Pena v. Aparicio143 that:

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not
involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there
is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is
its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end
in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice
by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture,
there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the Show Cause Resolution that the respondents issued
a Statement with language that the Court deems objectionable during the pendency of the Vinuya case and
the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, respondents need to go no further than the four corners of the
Statement itself, its various versions, news reports/columns (many of which respondents themselves
supplied to this Court in their Common Compliance) and internet sources that are already of public
knowledge.

Considering that what respondents are chiefly required to explain are the language of the Statement and
the circumstances surrounding the drafting, printing, signing, dissemination, etc., of its various versions, the
Court does not see how any witness or evidence in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo could possibly
shed light on these facts. To be sure, these facts are within the knowledge of respondents and if there is
any evidence on these matters the same would be in their possession.

If respondents have chosen not to include certain pieces of evidence in their respective compliances or
chosen not to make a full defense at this time, because they were counting on being granted a hearing, that
is respondents own look-out. Indeed, law professors of their stature are supposed to be aware of the
above jurisprudential doctrines regarding the non-necessity of a hearing in disciplinary cases. They should
bear the consequence of the risk they have taken.

Except for Atty. Vasquez, everyone else were reprimanded.

DISSENTING OPINIONS:

Carpio:

Found that all compliance were satisfactory. He found that the Courts decision on the
matter expands the Courts Administrative powers and abridge the freedom of speech.

The plagiarism by Del Castillo is an issue of public concern. The alleged plagiarism was
published by the media beforehand, and an answer by Del Castillo (echoed in an earlier statement
made by the Chief of the Courts Public Information Office) citing good faith and non-liability generated an
all-important public issue affecting no less than the integrity of this Courts decision-making its core
constitutional function thus inexorably inviting public comment. The statement made by the UP Law
Professors is prime political speech critical of conduct of public officials and institution, delivered in public
forum. Under the scheme of our constitutional values, this species of speech enjoys the highest
protection,16 rooted on the deeply-held notion that "the interest of society and the maintenance of good
government demand a full discussion of public affairs."17 Indeed, preceding western jurisprudence by
nearly five decades, this Court, in the first score of the last century, identified the specific right to criticize
official conduct as protected speech, branding attempts by courts to muzzle criticism as "tyranny of the
basest sort.

Furthermore, applying the clear and present danger test, to determine whether a speech is
unprotected, the Courts subsequent punishment would fail the test. There was no evil that should be
prevented here. t appears that the evil consequences the UP law faculty statement will supposedly spawn
are (1) the slurring of this Courts dignity and (2) the impairment of its judicial independence vis--vis the
resolution of the plagiarism complaint in Vinuya. Both are absent here. On the matter of institutional
degradation, the 12-paragraph, 1,553-word statement of the UP law faculty, taken as a whole, does not
exhibit that "irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy the courts and their
members" typical of unprotected judicial criticism.21 On the contrary, the statement, taken as a whole,
seeks to uphold the bedrock democratic value of keeping judicial processes free of any taint of dishonesty
or misrepresentation. Thus, the UP law faculty statement is far removed from speech the Court has rightly
sanctioned for proffering no useful social value, solely crafted to vilify its members and threaten its very
existence.22

On the alleged danger of impairment of this Courts judicial independence in resolving the
plagiarism charge in Vinuya, this too, did not come to pass. In the Resolution of 8 February 2011 in A.M.
No. 10-17-17-SC,23 the Court denied reconsideration to its earlier ruling finding no merit in
the Vinuya petitioners claim of plagiarism. Not a single word in the 8 February 2011 Resolution hints that
the UP law faculty statement pressured, much less threatened, this Court to decide the motion for
reconsideration for the Vinuya petitioners. Thus, the 8 February 2011 Resolution gives the lie to the
conclusion that the UP law faculty statement posed any danger, much less one that is "extremely serious,"
to the Courts independence

On another ground, the Court heavily relied on insulting remarks found in the Statement instead of
reading everything as a whole. This approach defies common sense and departs from this Courts
established practice in scrutinizing speech critical of the judiciary. People v. Godoy24 instructs that speech
critical of judges must be "read with contextual care," making sure that disparaging statements are not
"taken out of context."25 Using this approach, and applying the clear and present danger test, the Court
in Godoy cleared a columnist and a publisher of liability despite the presence in the assailed news article of
derogatory yet isolated statements about a judge. We can do no less to the statement of the members of
the UP law faculty, who, after all, were impelled by nothing but their sense of professional obligation to
"speak out on a matter of public concern and one that is of vital interest to them."26

On the supposed unpleasant tone of the statement, critical speech, by its nature, is caustic and
biting. It is for this same reason, however, that it enjoys special constitutional protection. "The constitution
does not apply only to sober, carefully reasoned discussion. There may be at least some value in permitting
cranky, obstreperous, defiant conduct by lawyers on the ground that it encourages a public culture of
skepticism, anti-authoritarianism, pluralism, and openness. It is important to remember that the social
function of lawyers is not only to preserve order, but also to permit challenges to the status quo.. Supreme
Court Justices, as public officials, and the Supreme Court, as an institution, are entitled to no greater
immunity from criticism than other public officials and institutions.28 The members of this Court are
sustained by the peoples resources and our actions are always subject to their accounting.29 Thus, instead
of shielding ourselves with a virtual lese-majeste rule, wholly incompatible with the Constitutions vision of
public office as a "public trust,"30we should heed our own near century-old counsel: a clear conscience, not
muzzled critics, is the balm for wounds caused by a "hostile and unjust accusation" on official conduct

Fourth. The academic bar, which the UP law faculty represents, is the judiciarys partner in a
perpetual intellectual conversation to promote the rule of law and build democratic institutions. It serves the
interest of sustaining this vital relationship for the Court to constructively respond to the academics
criticism. Instead of heeding the UP law facultys call for the Court to "ensur[e] that not only the content, but
also the processes of preparing and writing its own decisions, are credible and beyond question," the
majority dismisses their suggestion as useless calumny and brands their constitutionally protected speech
as "unbecoming of lawyers and law professors." The Constitution, logic, common sense and a humble
awareness of this Courts role in the larger project of dispensing justice in a democracy revolt against such
response.
Sereno:

The Court being put into bad light cannot be attributed solely to UPs Statement. Despite the
many who expressed their sentiments to the Court on the issue, only UPs statement were issued a
Show Cause Order. The Show Cause Order went so far as to hold the respondent faculty members
responsible for threatening the independence of the judiciary.

Despite the assertion that the present case is merely an exercise of the Courts disciplinary authority over
members of the bar, a closer look reveals the true nature of the proceeding as one for indirect contempt,
the due process requirements of which are strictly provided for under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The
majority attempts to skirt the issue regarding the non-observance of due process by insisting that the
present case is not an exercise of the Courts contempt powers, but rather is anchored on the Courts
disciplinary powers. Whatever designation the majority may find convenient to formally characterize this
proceeding, however, the pretext is negated by the disposition in the Resolution of 19 October 2010 itself
and its supporting rationale.

Justice Sereno insisted on the proceedings being a proceeding for indirect contempt, rather than a
purely administrative matter. The Court cited jurisprudence on contempt, and even noted on the
Show Cause Order that that acts of the professors are punishable by contempt.

The central argumentation in the Show Cause Order is evidence of the original intent of the proceeding.
The allegation and conclusion that the faculty members purportedly "undermine the Courts honesty,
integrity, and competence," make it clear that the true nature of the action is one for indirect contempt. The
discussion in the Resolution of 19 October 2010 hinged on the tribunals need for self-preservation and
independence, in view of the "institutional attacks" and "outside interference" with its functions charges
which more appropriately fall under its contempt authority, rather than the authority to determine fitness of
entering and maintaining membership in the bar.

The Show Cause Order failed to specify which particular mode of contempt was committed by the
respondents (as required in the Rules of Court). Its language and tenor also explicitly demonstrated that the
guilt of respondents had already been prejudged. Page three (3) of the Order states: "The opening
sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead." Page four (4) makes the
conclusion that: "The publication of a statementwas totally unnecessary, uncalled for, and a rash act of
misplaced vigilance."

The Order also violated respondents right to due process because it never afforded them the categorical
requirements of notice and hearing. The requirements for Indirect Contempt as laid out in Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court demand strict compliance: 1) a complaint in writing which may either be a motion for
contempt filed by a party or an order issued by the court requiring a person to appear and explain his
conduct, and 2) an opportunity for the person charged to appear and explain his conduct.

As Justice Carpio Morales finds in her Dissenting Opinion to the Resolution of 19 October 2010, this action
of the Court is tainted with injudiciousness precisely because:

"the Resolution is not what it purports to be. Ostensibly, the Resolution is a show cause order that
initiates what would become a newly docketed regular administrative matter. There is more than meets the
eye, however. When stripped of its apparent complexion, the Resolution shows its true colors and presents
itself as a pronouncement of guilt of indirect contempt without proper recourse left to the parties." 19

Thus, Justice Carpio Morales reiterates in her Dissenting Opinion to the current Decision her belief that this
proceeding is in essence one for indirect contempt:

"Consistent with my dissent from the Courts October 19, 2010 Resolution, I maintain my position that there
was no reasonable ground to motu proprio initiate the administrative case, in view of (i) the therein
discussed injudiciousness attending the Resolution, which was anchored on an irregularly concluded
finding of indirect contempt with adverse declarations prematurely describing the subject Statement, that
could taint the disciplinary action."

The power to cite for contempt, as well as the power to discipline, are mechanisms to be exercised solely
towards the orderly administration of justice. Such powers must be weighed carefully against the
substantive rights of the public to free expression and academic freedom. In this critical balancing act, the
tribunal must therefore utilize, to the fullest extent, soundness and clarity of reasoning, and must not appear
to have been swayed by momentary fits of temper.

Instead of regarding criticism as perpetually adversarial, the judiciary would do well to respect it, both as an
important tool for public accountability, and as the only soothing balm for vindication of felt injustice. Judicial
legitimacy established through demonstrated intellectual integrity in decision-making rightly generates
public acceptance of such decisions, which makes them truly binding. William Howard Taft, who served as
a federal appellate judge before becoming the President of the United States, understood the weight of
public evaluation in this wise: "If the law is but the essence of common sense, the protest of many average
men may evidence a defect in a judicial conclusion though based on the nicest reasoning and profoundest
learning."

Lawyers like other citizens are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly. In
particular, they shall have the right to take part in public discussion of matters concerning the law, the
administration of justice and the promotion and protection of human rights and to join or form local, national
or international organizations and attend their meetings, without suffering professional restrictions by
reason of their lawful action or their membership in a lawful organization

The Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers "have been formulated to assist Member States in their task of
promoting and ensuring the proper role of lawyers," and these "should be respected and taken into account
by Governments within the framework of their national legislation and practice and should be brought to the
attention of lawyers as well as other persons, such as judges, prosecutors, members of the executive and
legislature, and the public in general." Thus, faced with the duty of balancing lawyers fundamental right to
free speech which has now been expressly recognized in the international arena, against this Courts
desire to preserve its exalted role in society by disciplining for offensive language, this Court must examine
whether it has already encroached into constitutionally-prohibited interference with the basic rights of
individuals. The realm of public opinion is where the academe, especially our schools and universities,
plays a most crucial role in ensuring judicial legitimacy. Not by blindly legitimizing its acts, but by constantly
reminding the judiciary of its presence as a helpful but critical ally. The academe is not to be an applause
machine for the judiciary; it is to help guide the judiciary by illuminating new paths for the judiciary to take,
by alerting the judiciary to its inconsistent decisions, and by identifying gaps in law and jurisprudence.
Those who occupy the most powerful positions in this country must always be ready to hold themselves
accountable to the people. I believe that the tradition of deference to the judiciary has limits to its
usefulness and these times do not call for the unbroken observance of such deference as much as they call
for a public demonstration of honesty in all its forms.

I dissent from the Majority Decision admonishing Dean Marvic M. V. F. Leonen and issuing a warning to the
thirty-five faculty members in connection with the "Restoring Integrity" Statement. I find the Common
Compliance of the thirty-five faculty members, dated 18 November 2010, as well as the Compliance
submitted by Professor Rosa Maria T. Juan Bautista on 18 November 2010 and by Professor Raul
Vasquez on 19 November 2010, to be satisfactory. I also find the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen
dated 18 November 2010 and of Professor Owen J. Lynch dated 19 November 2010 similarly satisfactory,
and vote to consider this matter closed and terminated.