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Mark J. Valencia
1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This essay describes the maritime geostrategic context and changing security paradigm
in Asia, delineating where, how, and why the maritime perceptions, strategies, and policies
of key Asian actors clash with those of their neighbors and the U.S.
Main Argument
The political and legal defense of U.S. military activities in foreign exclusive economic
zones (EEZ), such as Chinas, is not guaranteed to succeed. Law and practice in this regard
are evolving. Unless some understanding and accommodation are reached regarding various
red lines, serious international incidents are likely to increase in frequency and intensity.
Possible ways forward, which are not mutually exclusive, include managing the evolution
of the status quo, U.S.-China bilateral agreements, international arbitration, and a regional
agreement, perhaps led by ASEAN.
Policy Implications
A more effective approach to U.S. military operations in foreign EEZs that would
enhance U.S. soft power would be to discuss, negotiate, and, if feasible, accommodate
other countries main security concerns.
Ratification of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) would greatly
strengthen the U.S. political and legal position in these matters.
The U.S. should consider taking the lead in negotiating a set of voluntary guidelines
regarding foreign military activities in EEZs that would be conducive to a stable and
secure maritime environment in Asia.
If the U.S. continues its military activities in foreign EEZs, eschews agreements or
voluntary guidelines, and does not ratify the UNCLOS, a regime may evolve without
U.S. input, which would not be in U.S. interests.
G
eographically and strategically, Asia has a significant maritime component that is
sometimes neglected in security analyses of the region. Over the past four decades,
multilateral discussions concerning the law of the sea and a growing recognition of the
importance of marine resourcestheir uses, as well as their fragility and limitshave
resulted in widespread claims to maritime space by many of the worlds nations. The 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an intricately negotiated agreement that went into
effect on November 16, 1994, is now the governing regime for the oceans. Indeed, the state rights
and responsibilities defined in the UNCLOS are international law for the vast majority of nations
that have ratified it, including all those active in Asia, except for Cambodia, Thailand, North
Korea, and the United States. In particular, the convention created exclusive economic zones (EEZ)
extending two hundred nautical miles (nm) from the shores of coastal states and developed new
principles relating to the rights and responsibilities of coastal and maritime states in these EEZs,
including scientific research and environmental protection.
The 1982 UNCLOS also introduced new uncertainties and flashpoints into the region,
particularly in regard to continental shelf and EEZ claims and boundaries. Indeed, the perception
of the very scope of the nation is changing, and with it, the maritime dimension of the security
paradigm. Maritime issues have now risen to the forefront of regional security concerns. Many
relatively new concerns such as the proliferation of WMDs; maritime terrorism; piracy; safety and
security of sea lines of communication; the smuggling of arms, drugs, and humans; pollution from
oil spills; illegal fishing; and exploitation of others offshore resources are essentially maritime.
These issues necessitate acceptance of broader responsibilities and a reordering of priorities by
military authorities, both for force-structure development and for operations and training.
Along with the requirements for defense self-reliance and force modernization, these concerns
are reflected in the significant maritime dimension of current arms acquisition programs in the
region: maritime surveillance and intelligence collection systems, multirole fighter aircraft with
maritime attack capabilities, modern surface combatants, submarines, antiship missiles, naval
electronic warfare systems, and mine warfare capabilities. Because some of these new systems
have offensive capabilities, they can be seen as provocative, and thus destabilizing, by those
countries that do not have such capabilities and lack the means to acquire them. Possession of
these systems undoubtedly increases the risk of inadvertent escalation in times of conflict. It is
therefore particularly important that mechanisms be instituted to address hot button maritime
issues emerging on this broad, new geopolitical canvas. This is especially true regarding the regime
for intelligence-gathering and military activities in EEZs, which are at the geographic and political
frontier of the developing dialectic between coastal states and maritime powers.
There are several specific driving factors that bring this set of issues to the fore. First, military
activities in the EEZ were a controversial issue during the negotiation of the text of the 1982
UNCLOS and continue to be so in practice. Some coastal states in Asia, such as Bangladesh,
Malaysia, India, and Pakistan, contend that other states cannot carry out military exercises or
maneuvers in or over their EEZs without their consent. In what Aaron Friedberg calls a quiet
drama unfolding for over a decade,1 China by its actions (e.g., the EP-3, Impeccable, and Bowditch
incidents) is leaning in this direction, challenging unfettered U.S. naval preeminence. Coastal
countries are concerned that such uninvited military activities could become gunboat diplomacy,
1 Aaron Friedberg, Get Ready for More Naval Sparring with China, Foreign Policy, Shadow Government web log, March 13, 2009, http://
shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/03/13/get_ready_for_more_naval_sparring_with_china.
2 EEZ Group 21, Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone: A Commentary, Ocean Policy Research
Foundation, March 2006, available from the Nippon Foundation Library, http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2005/00817/mokuji.htm.
Geostrategic Context
It is often asserted that the strategic priorities of the United States, a status quo great power, and
a rising China will inevitably clash. But where and how are they likely to do so, and how are recent
incidents involving a Lockheed EP-3 aircraft, the USNS Bowditch, and the USNS Impeccable both
symbolic and symptomatic of such a clash of interests?
3 Clinton Unveils U.S. Policy toward Asia-Pacific Region, Xinhua, January, 13, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010-01/13/
content_12801629.htm.
4 Gates on China: Speaking the Truth Makes the Pacific a Safer Place, Wall Street Journal, June 6, 2010.
5 Joey Long, The 2010 U.S. Quadrennial Defence Review: Implications for Southeast Asia, RSIS Commentaries, no. 19, February 17, 2010; and
Richard A. Bitzinger, The Dog That Didnt Bark? The 2010 Quadrennial Defence Review, RSIS Commentaries, no. 18, February 17, 2010.
6 Michael Richardson, Chinas Navy Changing the Game, Japan Times, May 13, 2010.
7 Seoul Must Beware of U.S.-China Naval Competition, Chosun Ilbo, English edition, July 6, 2010.