XII.

CONTRACT CLAUSE Issue:

1. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES
UNION- NUBE v. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK
2. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO. v.
WMC RESOURCES INTL. PTY. LTD., WMC
PHILIPPINES, INC. and SAGITTARIUS MINES,
INC.
G.R. No. 162331, November 20, 2006, CHICO-
NAZARIO,
A law which changes the terms of a legal
contract between parties, either in the time or mode of
performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses
with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction
something different from that provided in its terms, is a
law which impairs the obligation of a contract and is
therefore null and void.
Facts:
In 1995, the Philippine Government and WMC
Philippines executed a Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (denominated as Columbio
FTAA) for the purpose of large scale exploration,
development, and commercial exploration of possible
mineral resources in the provinces South Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur, and North Cotabato in
accordance with Executive Order No. 279 and
Department Administrative Order No. 63, Series of
1991. The Columbio FTAA is covered in part by 156
mining claims held under various Mineral Production
Sharing Agreements (MPSA) by Southcot Mining
Corporation, Tampakan Mining Corporation, and
Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (collectively called the Tampakan
Companies), in accordance with the Tampakan Option
Agreement entered into by WMC Philippines and the
Tampakan Companies for purposes of exploration of the
mining claims in Tampakan, South Cotabato. The Option
Agreement, among other things, provides for the grant of
the right of first refusal to the Tampakan Companies in
case WMC Philippines desires to dispose of its rights
and interests in the mining claims covering the area
subject of the agreement.
Whether the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 can
be given retroactive application to the Columbio FTAA
(Note: The Columbio FTAA was entered into by the
Philippine Government and WMC Philippines on 22
March 1995, undoubtedly before the Philippine Mining
Act of 1995 took effect on 14 April 1995).
Ruling:
NO. It is engrained in jurisprudence that the
constitutional prohibition on the impairment of the
obligation of contract does not prohibit every change in
existing laws, and to fall within the prohibition, the
change must not only impair the obligation of the
existing contract, but the impairment must be substantial.
Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995
requiring the approval of the President with respect to
assignment or transfer of FTAAs, if made applicable
retroactively to the Columbio FTAA, would be
tantamount to an impairment of the obligations under
said contract as it would effectively restrict the right of
the parties thereto to assign or transfer their interests in
the said FTAA. By imposing a new condition apart from
those already contained in the agreement, before the
parties to the Columbio FTAA may assign or transfer its
rights and interest in the said agreement, Section 40 of
the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, if made to apply to
the Columbio FTAA, will effectively modify the terms
of the original contract and thus impair the obligations of
the parties thereto and restrict the exercise of their vested
rights under the original agreement. Such modification
to the Columbio FTAA, particularly in the conditions
imposed for its valid transfer is equivalent to an
impairment of said contract violative of the Constitution.

WMC Philippines sold its interests over the

Columbio FTAA in favor of Sagittarius Mines, Inc. This
sale was approved by the DENR Secretary. Aggrieved by
the sale, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co, appealed the
DENR Secretarys decision to the Office of the
President. Lepanto invoked Sec. 40 of the Philippine
Mining Act, which requires approval of the President
with respect to assignment or transfers of FTAAs.

XIII. POVERTY AND LEGAL PROTECTION
1. RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI
RE EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL AND FILING
FEES OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD FOUNDATION,
INC
A. M. NO. 09-6-9-SC, August 19, 2009, Bersamin, J.
The free access clause of the Constitution
applies only to a natural person who suffers from
poverty.
Facts:
In his letter addressed to the Chief Justice, Mr.
Roger C. Prioreschi, administrator of the Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc., questioned OCA Circular No. 42-2005
and Rule 141 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines
that reserve the privilege of exemption from docket and
filing fees to indigent persons. He questioned why the
rules excluded foundations or associations that work
with and for the most indigent persons, as in the case of
the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. which had been
reaching out since 1985 to the poorest among the poor,
the newly born and abandoned babies, children who
never saw the smile of their mother, old people who
cannot afford a few pesos to pay for common
prescriptions, broken families who returned to a normal
life, whom the Philippine Government and the Filipino
society could not reach to or had rejected or abandoned.
Issue:
Whether Good Shepherd Foundation is
exempted from payment of legal fees granted to indigent
litigants.
Ruling:
NO. The basis for the exemption from legal and
filing fees is the free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11,
Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that
free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any
person by reason of poverty.
In implementation of the right of free access
under the Constitution, the Supreme Court promulgated
rules, specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court, and
Sec. 19, Rule 141, Rules of Court. The Court held that
the clear intent and precise language of the provisions
indicated that only a natural party litigant may be
regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the
State with a juridical personality separate and distinct
from that of its members, is a juridical person. As a
juridical person, it cannot be accorded the exemption
from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants.
The Court added that extending the exemption to a
juridical person on the ground that it works for indigent
and underprivileged people may be prone to abuse (even
with the imposition of rigid documentation
requirements), particularly by corporations and entities
bent on circumventing the rule on payment of the fees
and that the scrutiny of compliance with the
documentation requirements may prove too time-
consuming and wasteful for the courts.
2ND VERSION
In Re: Query of Mr. Roger Prioreschi
Facts:
In his letter dated May 22, 2009 addressed to the Chief
Justice, Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi, administrator of the
Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., questioned OCA
Circular No. 42-2005 and Rule 141 of the Rules of Court
of the Philippines that reserve the privilege of exemption
from docket and filing fees to indigent persons. He
questioned why the rules excluded foundations or
associations that work with and for the most Indigent
persons, as in the case of the Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc. which had been reaching out since 1985
to the poorest among the poor, the newly born and
abandoned babies, children who never saw the smile of
their mother, old people who cannot afford a few pesos
to pay for common prescriptions, broken families who
returned to a normal life, whom the Philippine
Government and the Filipino society could not reach to
or had rejected or abandoned.
To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Supreme
Court held that it could not grant to foundations like the
Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. the same exemption
from payment of legal fees granted to indigent litigants
even if the foundations are working for indigent and
underprivileged people. The basis for the exemption
from legal and filing fees is the free access clause,
embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides that free access to the courts and quasi
judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty.
Held:
In implementation of the right of free access under the
Constitution, the Supreme Court promulgated rules,
specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court, and Sec. 19,
Rule 141, Rules of Court.
The Court held that the clear intent and precise language
of the aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court
indicated that only a natural party litigant may be
regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the
State with a juridical personality separate and distinct
from that of its members, is a juridical person. Among
others, it has the power to acquire and possess property
of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or
criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and
regulations of their organization. As a juridical person, it
cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing
fees granted to indigent litigants.

The Court stated that the free access clause of the

Constitution applies only to a natural person who suffers
from poverty. It added that extending the exemption to a
juridical person on the ground that it works for indigent
and underprivileged people may be prone to
abuse (even with the imposition of rigid
documentation requirements), particularly by
corporations and entities bent on circumventing the rule
on payment of the fees and that the scrutiny of
compliance with the documentation requirements may
prove too time-consuming and wasteful for the courts

XIV. RIGHTS OF SUSPECTS
A. General Considerations
1. ESCOBEDO VS ILLINOIS
Brief Fact Summary. The petitioner Danny Escobedo
asked to speak with his lawyer while in police custody
but before being formally charged and was denied.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Not allowing someone to
speak with an attorney, and not advising them of their
right to remain silent after they have been arrested and
before they have been interrogated is a denial of
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
Facts. After being arrested and taken into police custody
as a suspect in the murder of his brother-in-law, the
petitioner asked to speak to his attorney. His attorney
arrived at police headquarters soon after the petitioner
did and was not allowed to speak to his client as the
officers said they had not completed questioning. The
petitioner also was not warned of his right to remain
silent before the interrogation. He was convicted of
murder and the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed. He
was then granted certiorari.
Issue. If a suspect has been taken into police custody and
interrogated by police without their request to see an
attorney being honored, nor being advised of their right
to remain silent, have they been denied effective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment?
Held. Yes. Reverse the petitioners conviction and
remand the case.
The Sixth Amendment protects the right to effective
assistance of counsel. Here, because the police
investigation focused on the accused as a suspect rather
than a less specific investigation, refusing to allow an
accused to speak with his attorney is a denial of this
Sixth Amendment right. The incriminating statements he
made must thus not be admitted into evidence.
A law enforcement system that relies too much on the
confession is more subject to abuses than one that
depends on evidence obtained through skillful
investigation. The result here recognizes this idea.
Dissent. Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented on
grounds that this result will place obstacles in the way of
legitimate methods of criminal law enforcement. Also,
he thought Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958)
demanded a different result.
Justice Potter Stewart believed that the right to
assistance of counsel should not arise until indictment or
arraignment, and that this contrary result would cause
problems for fair administration of criminal justice.
Justice Byron White expressed the opinion that this
result would make statements made to police
inadmissible without the accused waiving their right to
counsel. He believed this would effectively render the
voluntariness test of the Fourteenth Amendment
useless, and make law enforcement more difficult.
Discussion. This case caused a lot of confusion for
scholars, as some believed it had widespread application,
and others thought it only applied to the specific facts
here. There is a great deal of language within it that is
very hostile to confessions, but at other points it says that
proper investigative efforts are appropriate. It
mentions that a subject asserting their rights should not
be something the system is afraid of, but that it would
render interrogation much less effective. This case is
really best understood as the precursor to the warnings
that would arise from.
2ND VERSION
Facts:
Petitioner, a 22-year-old of Mexican extraction, was
arrested with his sister and taken to police headquarters
for interrogation in connection with the fatal shooting,
about 11 days before, of his brother-in-law. He had been
arrested shortly after the shooting, but had made no
statement, and was released after his lawyer obtained a
writ of habeas corpus from a state court. Petitioner made
several requests to see his lawyer, who, though present in
the building, and despite persistent efforts, was refused
access to his client. Petitioner was not advised by the
police of his right to remain silent and, after persistent
questioning by the police, made a damaging statement to
an Assistant State's Attorney which was admitted at the
trial. Convicted of murder, he appealed to the State
Supreme Court, which affirmed the conviction.
2nd Version of Facts: Danny Escobedo's brother-in-law
was killed on January 19, 1960. Escobedo was arrested
the next morning and interrogated for several hours. He
refused to give a statement to the police and was
released. Another suspect in police custody gave a
statement to the police indicating that Escobedo killed
his brother-in-law because he was mistreating
Escobedo's sister.
On January 30, 1960, Escobedo was arrested again. The
police told him about the statement that the other suspect
made. The police and prosecutors informed Escobedo
that though he wasn't formally charged, he was in
custody and could not leave. They kept him handcuffed
and questioned him for fourteen and a half hours and
refused his repeated request to speak with his attorney.
Escobedo's attorney went to the police station and asked
to speak with Escobedo, and he too was denied.
A Spanish-speaking officer was left alone with Escobedo
and allegedly told him that if he blamed the other
suspect for the murder, then he would be free to go.
Escobedo confronted the suspect at the police
department and blamed him for the murder. Though he
never confessed, this was the first of several statements
that Escobedo made about having knowledge of the
crime. Escobedo was charged with murder, and the
statements that he made to the police were used against
him. Based on those statements, he was convicted.
Escobedo appealed based on the fact that he was denied
the right to counsel.
Held: Under the circumstances of this case, where a
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect in police custody who has been refused an
opportunity to consult with his counsel and who has not
been warned of his constitutional right to keep silent, the
accused has been denied the assistance of counsel in
violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and
no statement extracted by the police during the
interrogation may be used against him at a trial. Crooker
v. California, 357 U.S. 433, and Cicenia v. Lagay, 357
U.S. 504, distinguished, and, to the extent that they may
be inconsistent with the instant case, they are not
controlling. Pp. 479-492
2) MIRANDA V ARIZONA
FACTS:
The Supreme Courts decision in Miranda v.
Arizona addressed four different cases involving
custodial interrogations. In each of these cases, the
defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives,
or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut
off from the outside world. In none of these cases was
the defendant given a full and effective warning of his
rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all the
cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions and, in
three of them, signed statements that were admitted at
trial.
Miranda v. Arizona: Miranda was arrested at his home
and taken in custody to a police station where he was
identified by the complaining witness. He was then
interrogated by two police officers for two hours, which
resulted in a signed, written confession. At trial, the oral
and written confessions were presented to the jury.
Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape and
was sentenced to 20-30 years imprisonment on each
count. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held
that Mirandas constitutional rights were not violated in
obtaining the confession.
Vignera v. New York: Vignera was picked up by New
York police in connection with the robbery of a dress
shop that had occurred three days prior. He was first
taken to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters. He was
then taken to the 66th Detective Squad, where he orally
admitted the robbery and was placed under formal arrest.
He was then taken to the 70th Precinct for detention,
where he was questioned by an assistant district attorney
in the presence of a hearing reporter who transcribed the
questions and answers. At trial, the oral confession and
the transcript were presented to the jury. Vignera was
found guilty of first degree robbery and sentenced to 30-
60 years imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed
without opinion by the Appellate Division and the Court
of Appeals.
Westover v. United States: Westover was arrested by
local police in Kansas City as a suspect in two Kansas
City robberies and taken to a local police station. A
report was also received from the FBI that Westover was
wanted on a felony charge in California. Westover was
interrogated the night of the arrest and the next morning
by local police. Then, FBI agents continued the
interrogation at the station. After two-and-a-half hours of
interrogation by the FBI, Westover signed separate
confessions, which had been prepared by one of the
agents during the interrogation, to each of the two
robberies in California. These statements were
introduced at trial. Westover was convicted of the
California robberies and sentenced to 15 years
imprisonment on each count. The conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
California v. Stewart: In the course of investigating a
series of purse-snatch robberies in which one of the
victims died of injuries inflicted by her assailant, Stewart
was identified as the endorser of checks stolen in one of
the robberies. Steward was arrested at his home. Police
also arrested Stewarts wife and three other people who
were visiting him. Stewart was placed in a cell, and, over
the next five days, was interrogated on nine different
occasions. During the ninth interrogation session,
Stewart stated that he had robbed the deceased, but had
not meant to hurt her. At that time, police released the
four other people arrested with Stewart because there
was no evidence to connect any of them with the crime.
At trial, Stewarts statements were introduced. Stewart
was convicted of robbery and first-degree murder and
sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of California
reversed, holding that Stewart should have been advised
of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.
ISSUES
Whether statements obtained from an individual who is
subjected to custodial police interrogation are
admissible against him in a criminal trial and whether
procedures which assure that the individual is accorded
his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself
are necessary.
SUPREME COURT HOLDING
The Court held that there can be no doubt that the Fifth
Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal
court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all
settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in
any significant way from being compelled to incriminate
themselves. As such, the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way.
The Court further held that without proper safeguards
the process of in-custody interrogation of persons
suspected or accused of crime contains inherently
compelling pressures which work to undermine the
individuals will to resist and to compel him to speak
where he would otherwise do so freely. Therefore, a
defendant must be warned prior to any questioning that
he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Arizona in Miranda, reversed the
judgment of the New York Court of Appeals in Vignera,
reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Westover, and affirmed the judgment of
the Supreme Court of California in Stewart.
Argued: Feb. 28, March 1 and 2, 1966
Decided: June 13, 1966
Vote: 5-4
Majority opinion written by Chief Justice Warren and
joined by Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and Fortas.
Dissenting opinion written by Justice Harlan and joined
by Justices Stewart and White.
Dissenting in part opinion written by Justice Clark.
3) DICKERSON V US
FACTS OF THE CASE
During questioning about a robbery he was connected to,
Charles Dickerson made statements to authorities
admitting that he was the getaway driver in a series of
bank robberies. Dickerson was then placed under arrest.
The timing of his statement is disputed. The FBI and
local detectives testified that Dickerson was advised of
his Miranda rights, established in Miranda v. Arizona,
and waived them before he made his statement.
Dickerson said he was not read his Miranda warnings
until after he gave his statement. After his indictment for
bank robbery, Dickerson filed a motion to suppress the
statement that he made on the ground that he had not
received Miranda warnings before being interrogated.
The government argued that even if the Miranda
warnings were not read, the statement was voluntary and
therefore admissible under 18 USC Section 3501, which
provides that "a confession shall be admissible in
evidence if it is voluntarily given." The District Court
granted Dickerson's motion, finding that he had not been
read his Miranda rights or signed a waiver until after he
made his statement, but the court did not address section
3501. In reversing, the Court of Appeals acknowledged
that Dickerson had not received Miranda warnings, but
held that section 3501 was satisfied because his
statement was voluntary. The court held that "Congress
enacted section 3501 with the express purpose of
legislatively overruling Miranda and restoring
voluntariness as the test for admitting confessions in
federal court."
QUESTION
May Congress legislatively overrule Miranda v. Arizona
and its warnings that govern the admissibility of
statements made during custodial interrogation?
CONCLUSION
No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William
H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Miranda governs the
admissibility of statements made during custodial
interrogation in both state and federal courts. "Miranda
has become embedded in routine police practice to the
point where the warnings have become part of our
national culture," wrote Rehnquist. "Miranda announced
a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede
legislatively. We decline to overrule Miranda ourselves,"
concluded the Chief Justice. Dissenting, Justice Antonin
Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, blasted the
Court's ruling, writing that the majority opinion gave
needless protection to "foolish (but not compelled)
confessions."
4) PEOPLE V JOSE
This case is now before us by virtue of the appeal
interposed by Basilio Pineda, Jr., Edgardo Aquino, and
Jaime Jose, and for automatic review as regards Rogelio
Caal. However, for practical purposes all of them shall
hereafter be referred to as appellants. Facts: It was that at
about 4:30 o'clock in the morning of June 26, 1967, Miss
De la Riva, homeward bound from the ABS Studio on
Roxas Blvd., Pasay City, was driving her bantam car
accompanied by her maid Helen Calderon, who was also
at the front seat. She was already near her destination
when a Pontiac two-door convertible car with four men
came abreast of her car and tried to bump it. She stepped
on her brakes to avoid a collision, and then pressed on
the gas and swerved her car to the left, at which moment
she was already in front of her house gate; but because
the driver of the other car (Basilio Pineda, Jr.) also
accelerated his speed, the two cars almost collided for
the second time. This prompted Miss De la Riva, who
was justifiably annoyed, to ask: "Ano ba?" Forthwith,
Pineda stopped the car which he was driving, jumped out
of it and rushed towards her. f events that she
Undaunted, Pineda opened the door of Miss De la Riva's
car and grabbed the lady's left arm. The girl held on
tenaciously to her car's steering wheel and, together with
her maid, started to scream. Her strength, however,
proved no match to that of Pineda, who succeeded in
pulling her out of her car. Seeing her mistress'
predicament, the maid jumped out of the car and took
hold of Miss De la Riva's right arm in an effort to free
her from Pineda's grip. The latter, however, was able to
drag Miss De la Riva toward the Pontiac convertible car,
whose motor was all the while running. She was later
brought to Swanky hotel where the accused Jaime Jose,
Edgardo AquinoBasilio Pineda, Jr. And Rogelio Caal
raped her. Later that night she was then release by the
accused and threaten her that they will throw acid on her
face if she tell anyone what happened. When maggie got
home she disclose to her mother that she was raped.
Then her mother told her to doughed herself not to get
infected or pregnant. It was four days later when they
reported the incident to the police.
ISSUE: whether or not the the rights of the accused was
violated
HELD: No, Jose and Caal seek the exclusion of their
extra-judicial statements from the mass of evidence on
the grounds that they were secured from them by force
and intimidation, and that the incriminating details
therein were supplied by the police investigators. We are
not convinced that the statements were involuntarily
given, or that the details recited therein were concocted
by the authorities. The statements were given in the
presence of several people and subscribed and sworn to
before the City Fiscal of Quezon City, to whom neither
of the aforesaid appellants intimated the use of
inordinate methods by the police. They are replete with
details which could hardly be known to the police; and
although it is suggested that the authorities could have
secured such details from their various informers, no
evidence at all was presented to establish the truth of
such allegation. While in their statements Jose and Caal
admitted having waited - together with the two other
appellants - for Miss De la Riva at the ABS Studi, each
of them attempted in the same statements to exculpate
himself: appellant Jose stated that only Pineda and
Aquino criminally abused the complainant; while
appellant Caal would make it appear that the
complainant willingly allowed him to have sexual
intercourse with her. Had the statements been prepared
by the authorities, they would hardly have contained
matters which were apparently designed to exculpate the
affiants. It is significant, too, that the said two appellants
did not see it fit to inform any of their friends or relatives
of the alleged use of force and intimidation by the police.
Dr. Mariano Nario of the Quezon City Police
Department, who examined appellant Caal after the
latter made his statement, found no trace of injury on any
part of the said appellant's body in spite of the claims
that he was boxed on the stomach and that one of his
arms was burned with a cigarette lighter. In the
circumstances, and considering, further, that the police
officers who took down their statements categorially
denied on the witness stand that the two appellants were
tortured, or that any detail in the statements was supplied
by them or by anyone other than the affiants themselves,
We see no reason to depart from the trial court's well-
considered conclusion that the statements were
voluntarily given. However, even disregarding the in-
custody statements of Jose and Caal, We find that the
mass of evidence for the prosecution on record will
suffice to secure the conviction of the two. The
admissibility of his extrajudicial statements is likewise
being questioned by Jose on the other ground that he was
not assisted by counsel during the custodial
interrogations. He cites the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Messiah vs. U.S. (377 U.S.
201), Escobedo vs. Illinois (378 U.S. 478) and Miranda
vs. Arizona (384 U.S. 436). The provision of the
Constitution of the Philippines in point is Article III (Bill
of Rights), Section 1, par. 17 of which provides: "In all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall . . . enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel . . ." While the
said provision is identical to that in the Constitution of
the United States, in this jurisdiction the term criminal
prosecutions was interpreted by this Court, in U.S. vs.
Beecham, 23 Phil., 258 (1912), in connection with a
similar provision in the Philippine Bill of Rights
(Section 5 of Act of Congress of July 1, 1902) to mean
proceedings before the trial court from arraignment to
rendition of the judgment. Implementing the said
constitutional provision, We have provided in Section 1,
Rule 115 of the Rules of Court that "In all criminal
prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled . . . ( b) to be
present and defend in person and by attorney at every
stage of the proceedings, that is, from the arraignment to
the promulgation of the judgment." The only instanes
where an accused is entitled to counsel before
arraignment, if he so requests, are during the second
stage of the preliminary investigation (Rule 112, Section
11) and after the arrest (Rule 113, Section 18). The rule
in the United States need not be unquestioningly adhered
to in this jurisdiction, not only because it has no binding
effect here, but also because in interpreting a provision
of the Constitution the meaning attached thereto at the
time of the adoption thereof should be considered. And
even there the said rule is not yet quite settled, as can be
deduced from the absence of unanimity in the voting by
the members of the United States Supreme Court in all
the three above-cited cases.
5) MAGTOTO VS. MANGUERA
FACTS: Extrajudicial confessions were taken prior to
the grant of the constitution of custodial rights of the
accused. The courts did not grant this rights to the
accused on grounds that such rights do not retroact.
ISSUE: Whether or not, the constitutional mandate
should be given a retroactivity effect
RULING: No, it should not be given a retroactive effect
Constitutional Provision in Question: No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and
to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free
will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained
in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence,
Specifically, the portion thereof which declares
inadmissible a confession obtained from a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense who has
not been informed of his right (to remain silent and) to
counsel.
We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional
mandate has and should be given a prospective and not a
retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession obtained
from a person under investigation for the commission of
an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to
silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the
same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New
Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such
confession is admissible in evidence against the accused,
if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of
the New Constitution, even if presented after January 17,
1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right
to counsel, since no law gave the accused the right to be
so informed before that date.
Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution granted,
for the first time, to a person under investigation for the
commission of an offense, the right to counsel and to be
informed of such right. And the last sentence thereof
which, in effect, means that any confession obtained in
violation of this right shall be inadmissible in evidence,
can and should be given effect only when the right
already existed and had been violated. Consequently,
because the confessions of the accused in G.R. Nos. L-
37201-02, 37424 and 38929 were taken before the
effectivity of the New Constitution in accordance with
the rules then in force, no right had been violated as to
render them inadmissible in evidence although they were
not informed of "their right to remain silent and to
counsel," "and to be informed of such right," because,
We repeat, no such right existed at the time.
Inadmissible evidence rule cannot be gainsaid to be
found in Art. 125 par. 2 of RPC because it only confers
to the accused the right to be informed of the cause as to
why he is detained and the assistance of counsel upon
his request
None of these statutes requires that police investigators
inform the detained person of his "right" to counsel.
They only allow him to request to be given counsel. It is
not for this Court to add a requirement and carry on
where both Congress and the President stopped.
The history behind the new right granted to a detained
person by Section 20, Article IV of the New constitution
to counsel and to be informed of said right under pain of
a confession taken in violation thereof being rendered
inadmissible in evidence, clearly shows the intention to
give this constitutional guaranty not a retroactive, but a
prospective, effect so as to cover only confessions taken
after the effectivity of the New Constitution.
Furthermore, Extrajudicial confessions of the accused in
a criminal case are universally recognized as admissible
in evidence against him, based on the presumption that
no one would declare anything against himself unless
such declarations were true. Accordingly, it has been
held that a confession constitutes an evidence of a high
order since it is supported by the strong presumption that
no person of normal mind would deliberately and
knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth
and conscience.
The fundamental rule is that a confession, to be
admissible, must be voluntary. And the first rule in this
connection was that before the confession could be
admitted in evidence, the prosecution must first show to
the satisfaction of the Court that the same was freely and
voluntarily made, as provided for in Section 4 of Act 619
of the Philippine Commission (U.S. vs. Pascual, August
29, 1903, 2 Phil. 458). But with the repeal of said
provision of law by the Administrative Code in 1916, the
burden of proof was changed. Now, a confession is
admissible in evidence without previous proof of its
voluntariness on the theory that it is presumed to be
voluntary until the contrary is proved
And once the accused succeeds in proving that his
extrajudicial confession was made involuntarily, it stands
discredited in the eyes of the law and is as a thing which
never existed. It is incompetent as evidence and must be
rejected.
Miranda vs. Arizona : To summarize, we hold that when
an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way
and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against
self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards
must be employed to protect the privilege *[384 U.S.
479]* and unless other fully effective means are adopted
to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure
that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously
honored, the following measures are required. He must
be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right
to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise
these rights must be afforded to him throughout the
interrogation. After such warning have been given, and
such opportunity afforded him, the individual may
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree
to answer questions or make statement. But unless and
until such warning and waiver are demonstrated by the
prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him.
However, this is not applied in our jurisdiction as seen in
the case of People vs. Jose
The Constitutional Convention at the time it deliberated
on Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution was
aware of the Escobedo and Miranda rule which had been
rejected in the case of Jose. That is the reason why the
Miranda-Escobedo rule was expressly included as a new
right granted to a detained person in the present
provision of Section 20, Article IV of the New
Constitution.
When Delegate de Guzman (A) submitted the draft of
this Section 20, Article IV to the October 26, 1972
meeting of the 17-man committee of the Steering
Council, Delegate Leviste (O) expressly made of record
that "we are adopting here the rulings of US Supreme
Court in the Miranda-Escobedo cases." And We cannot
agree with the insinuation in the dissenting opinion of
Justice Castro that the Delegates did not know of the
existence of the second paragraph of Art. 125 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Hence, We repeat, this historical background of Section
20, Article IV of the New Constitution, in Our
considered opinion, clearly shows that the new right
granted therein to a detained person to counsel and to be
informed of such right under pain of his confession
being declared inadmissible in evidence, has and should
be given a prospective and not a retroactive effect. It did
not exist before its incorporation in our New
Constitution, as We held in the Jose and Paras cases
Furthermore, to give a retroactive effect to this
constitutional guarantee to counsel would have a great
unsettling effect on the administration of justice in this
country. It may lead to the acquittal of guilty individuals
and thus cause injustice to the People and the offended
parties in many criminal cases where confessions were
obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution
and in accordance with the rules then in force although
without assistance of counsel. The Constitutional
Convention could not have intended such a a disastrous
consequence in the administration of justice. For if the
cause of justice suffers when an innocent person is
convicted, it equally suffers when a guilty one is
acquitted.
Lastly, retroactivity effect of penal laws are not
applicable to the case at bar
First, because of the inclusion We have arrived at that the
constitutional provision in question has a prospective
and not a retrospective effect, based on the reasons We
have given; second, because the "penal laws" mentioned
in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code refer to
substantive penal laws, while the constitutional provision
in question is basically a procedural rule of evidence
involving the incompetency and inadmissibility of
confessions and therefore cannot be included in the term
"penal laws;" and third, because constitutional
provisions as a rule should be given a prospective effect.
6) MORALES JR. VS. ENRILE
FACTS: In April 1982, Morales and some others were
arrested while driving a motor vehicle in Laong-Laan St,
QC. They were charged in CFI Rizal for rebellion
punishable under the RPC. Morales alleged that they
were arrested without any warrant of arrest; that their
constitutional rights were violated, among them the right
to counsel, the right to remain silent, the right to a
speedy and public trial, and the right to bail.
Respondents countered that the group of Morales were
already under surveillance for some time before they
were arrested and that the warrantless arrest done is valid
and at the same time the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus was already suspended.
ISSUE: Whether or not their constitutional rights while
being detained is violated
RULING: No, such rights was not violated
Regarding their warrantless arrest: Valid
An arrest may be made with or without a warrant.
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Our Constitution clearly defines the persons who may
issue a warrant of arrest and limits them to a "judge, or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by
law." It also lays down in unmistakable terms the
procedure required before a search warrant or warrant of
arrest may issue.
A Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order is a
warrant of arrest issued by the President of the
Philippines. Its issuance must therefore comply with the
requirements of the Constitution, in the same manner
and to the same extent, as a warrant of arrest issued by a
judge issuance must therefore comply with the
requirements of the Constitution, in the same manner
and to the same extent, as a warrant of arrest by a judge.
The Memorandum to the President dated April 21, 1982
from Gen. Fabian C. Ver, Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, wherein he reported the arrest
of petitioners, the subversive documents seized from
them and the results of the ensuing tactical interrogation,
with a recommendation for the issuance of a Presidential
Arrest and Commitment Order, was approved by the
President only on April 23, 1982. Indeed, therefore,
petitioners were arrested without a warrant. However,
months before their arrest, petitioners were already
under surveillance on suspicion of committing rebellion.
From the results of the said surveillance, the evidence
then at hand, and the documents seized from them at the
time of their arrest, it would appear that they had
committed or were actually committing the offense of
rebellion. Their arrest without a warrant for the said
offense is therefore clearly justified.
Right to Bail: Cannot post bail due to suspension of writ
of habeas corpus and crime charged is rebellion
In all criminal prosecutions the accused is presumed
innocent. Because of this presumption and inasmuch as
every man has a natural desire to be free, our
Constitution laid down the right to bail in these words:
SEC. 18. All persons, except those charged with
capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
Although martial law was terminated on January 17,
1981, by virtue of Proclamation No. 2045 of the
President of the Philippines, the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus continues to be suspended in the two
autonomous regions in Mindanao and in all other places
with respect to certain offenses
Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is
bailable. But because the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus remains suspended "with respect to persons at
present detained as well as other who may hereafter be
similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit
such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses
committed by them in furtherance of or on the occasion
thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith,"
the natural consequence is that the right to bail for the
commission of anyone of the said offenses is also
suspended. To hold otherwise would defeat the very
purpose of the suspension. Therefore, where the offense
for which the detainee was arrested is anyone of the said
offenses he has no right to bail even after the charges are
filed in court.
The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance thereof or in connection
therewith constitute direct attacks on the life of the State.
Just as an individual has right to self-defense when his
life is endangered, so does the State. The suspension of
the privilege of the writ is to enable the State to hold in
preventive imprisonment pending investigation and trial
those persons who plot against it and commit acts that
endanger the State's very existence. For this measure of
self-defense to be effective, the right to bail must also be
deemed suspended with respect to these offenses.
7) PEOPLE VS. GALIT
FACTS: Accused was charged with the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide
Prosecution witness Florentino Valentino testified that he
heard accused Francisco Galit and his wife having an
argument in connection with the robbery and killing of
the victim, Natividad Fernando. It appears that on
August 18, 1977, accused Galit and two others, namely,
Juling Dulay and a certain "Pabling" accidentally met
each other at Marikina, Rizal, and in their conversation,
the three agreed to rob Natividad Fernando; that it was
further agreed among them to enter the premises of the
victim's house at the back yard by climbing over the
fence; that once inside the premises, they will search
every room, especially the aparador and filing cabinets,
with the sole aim of looking for cash money and other
valuables.
Early dawn of August 23, 1977 when the three were able
to gain entrance into the house of the victim; as the three
could not find anything valuable inside the first room
that they entered, Juling Dulay destroyed the screen of
the door of the victim, Natividad Fernando; that upon
entering the room of the victim, the three accused
decided to kill first the victim, Natividad Fernando,
before searching the room for valuables; that Juling
Dulay, who was then holding the bolo, began hacking
the victim, who was then sleeping, and accused Galit
heard a moaning sound from the victim; that after the
victim was killed, the three accused began searching the
room for valuables.
Before the trial: The prisoner was arrested for killing the
victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He had been
detained and interrogated almost continuously for five
days, to no avail. He consistently maintained his
innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the
crime. Obviously, something drastic had to be done. A
confession was absolutely necessary. So the
investigating officers began to maul him and to torture
him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his
innocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must
be obtained. So they continued to maltreat and beat him.
'They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face
into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner
could not take any more. His body could no longer
endure the pain inflicted on him and the indignities he
had to suffer. His will had been broken. He admitted
what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and
he signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his
will, he posed for pictures as directed by his
investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment.
Trial court found him guilty for the crime charged and
sentenced him with the capital punishment of death
to visit him. His statement does not even contain any
waiver of right to counsel and yet during the
investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed
reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel
of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his
rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not his rights as an accused is

violated

RULING: Yes, his rights were violated

After a review of the records, We find that the evidence

presented by the prosecution does not support a
conviction. In fact, the findings of the trial court relative
to the acts attributed to the accused are not supported by
competent evidence. The principal prosecution witness,
Florentino Valentino merely testified that he and the
accused were living together in one house in Marikina,
Rizal, on August 23, 1977, because the mother of his
wife is the wife of the accused; that when he returned
home at about 4:00 o'clock in the morning from the
police station of Marikina, Rizal, the accused and his
wife were quarreling (nagtatalo); that he heard that the
accused was leaving the house because he and his
companions had robbed "Aling Nene", the owner of a
poultry farm and piggery in Montalban, Rizal; that the
wife of the accused was imploring him not to leave, but
the latter was insistent; that he saw the accused carrying
a bag containing about two handfuls (dakot) of coins
which he had taken from Aling Nene; that upon learning
of what the accused had done, he went to the Montalban
police the next day and reported to the police chief about
what he had heard; and that a week later, Montalban
policemen went to their house and arrested the accused.

There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from

the accused, no state witnesses, and not even fingerprints
of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only
evidence against the accused is his alleged confession. It
behooves Us therefore to give it a close scrutiny.

Upon informing him of his rights prior to the arrest the

court ruled that: Such a long question followed by a
monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements
of the law that the accused be informed of his rights
under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should
be several short and clear questions and every right
explained in simple words in a dialect or language
known to the person under investigation. Accused is
from Samar and there is no showing that he understands
Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was
not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative,
or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not
know that he had been brought to the NBI for
investigation and it was only about two weeks after he
had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed

B. SUSPECTS, ARREST AND APPLICATION
8) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. SAMUEL MARRA y ZARATE, ALLAN
TAN, alias "Allan Yao," PETER DOE, PAUL DOE
and TOM DOE, accused. SAMUEL MARRA y
ZARATE, accused-appellant.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after
the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular
suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police
carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to
eliciting incriminating statements that the rule (Sec. 12,
Article III of the Constitution) begins to operate.
FACTS:
In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 43, Dagupan City, Samuel Marra y Zarate, John
Doe, Peter Doe, Paul Doe and Tom Doe were charged
with the crime of murder for the fatal shooting of one
Nelson Tandoc on March 7, 1992.
Duly assisted by counsel, appellant pleaded not guilty
upon arraignment on May 15, 1992. 5 After trial on the
merits, judgment was rendered by the court below on
October 8, 1992 finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, attended by the
aggravating circumstance of nighttime, and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The prosecution's eyewitness, Jimmy Din, positively
identified appellant as the triggerman in the killing of
Nelson Tandoc. Din recounted that, he and his friend,
Nelson Tandoc, were conversing with each other in front
of Lucky Hotel which was owned by the witness' father.
He noticed a man pass by on the opposite side of the
street. The man made a dirty sign with his finger and Din
informed Tandoc thereof. The man repeated his offensive
act and called them by waving his hands. Infuriated, they
followed the man until the latter stopped. They
demanded an explanation from the man but they were
not given any.
At that instant, two men arrived and one of them
inquired what was going on. Tandoc informed him that
they were just demanding an explanation from the man.
Din was surprised when Tandoc unexpectedly slapped
one of the two men. A brawl ensued, with Tandoc
clashing with the two men while Din exchanged blows
with the man who made the dirty finger sign. After the
fisticuffs, their three opponents ran away in a westward
direction.
Tandoc and Din then decided to walk back to the hotel.
When they were about to enter the place, they noticed
that the men with whom they just had a fight were
running towards them. Sensing danger, they ran inside
the annex building of the hotel and immediately secured
the lock of the sliding outer door. After ten to fifteen
minutes, thinking that the men were no longer in the
vicinity, they left the room. Din saw Appellant, who at
that time was wearing a security guard's uniform, shoot
Tandoc with a revolver. Tandoc was shot in the middle of
the chest and he fell down. Then, Din saw four to five
men scamper away from the scene
Din and his wife then brought Tandoc to the Villaflor
Hospital. The victim was taken to the emergency room
but he expired an hour later.
 SPO3 Reynaldo de Vera of the Dagupan City Police
Station received a report about a shooting incident at the
annex building of the Lucky Hotel. He proceeded to the
crime scene along with two other police officers. Upon
their arrival, they were informed by the wife of Jimmy
Din that the victim had been brought to the Villaflor
Hospital. They proceeded to the hospital where Din
informed them that he could recognize the man who
killed Tandoc and that the killer was, at that time,
wearing the polo shirt of a security guard's uniform.
Seeing the security guard of a nearby bus company, they
inquired from him if he knew of any unusual incident
that happened in the vicinity. The guard said that he saw
the guard of "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw," together with some
companions, chasing two persons running. He further
added that the man was wearing a polo shirt of a security
guard's uniform.
Asked where that particular guard might be, he pointed
to a man eating inside the eatery nearby. They
approached the man and inquired whether he was the
security guard of "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw," which the latter
answered in the affirmative. After a series of questions,
they learned that he was Samuel Marra. and that the
firearm issued to him was in his house. Upon their
request to see the firearm, they proceeded to Marra's
residence.
When they arrived, Marra took a .38 caliber revolver
from inside an aparador and handed it to De Vera. De
Vera also found five live bullets and one spent shell.
Smelling gunpowder from the barrel of the gun, De Vera
asked Marra when he last fired the gun but the latter
denied ever having done so. Marra at first denied the
accusation but when informed that someone saw him do
it, he said that he did so in self-defense, firing at the
victim only once. Marra also admitted that prior to the
incident, he chased the victim and Din. The officers then
took Marra to the police station where he was detained.
During the investigation, De Vera also found out that
Marra had not firearm license.
Understandably, appellant gave a different version of the
incident. Marra declared in court that he used to work as
a security guard at "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw. At around four
o'clock down of the following day, he went home to
change his clothes. He proceeded to the Five Star Bus
Terminal which was adjacent to "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw." He
saw Neneng, the cashier of said eatery, and together they
ordered. Later, he was approached by four policemen
who inquired if he was a security guard. He answered in
the affirmative. He was also asked about his sidearm.
When he answered that it was at his residence, they all
went to his house to look for it. After he handed over the
firearm to the policemen, he was brought to the city hall
where he was detained.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was violation of rights of suspects
under custodial investigation when policemen asked the
appellant questions prior to his arrest
RULING
In the case at bar, appellant was not under custodial
investigation when he made the admission. There was no
coercion whatsoever to compel him to make such a
statement. Indeed, he could have refused to answer
questions from the very start when the policemen
requested that they all go to his residence. The police
inquiry had not yet reached a level wherein they
considered him as a particular suspect. They were just
probing into a number of possibilities, having been
merely informed that the suspect was wearing what
could be a security guard's uniform. Thus, there was no
violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution or
the constitutional procedure on custodial investigation.
In addition, the law provides that the declaration of an
accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged
or of any offense necessarily included therein may be
given in evidence against him and, in certain
circumstances, this admission may be considered as part
of the res gestae or the facts that may be admitted as
evidence.
However, while we agree that the crime committed by
appellant was murder qualified by treachery, we reject
the finding that the same was aggravated by nighttime.
No evidence was presented by the prosecution to show
that nocturnity was specially sought by appellant or
taken advantage of by him to facilitate the commission
of the crime or to ensure his immunity from capture.
9) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs JOSE TING
LAN UY, JR. (Acquitted),
The right of the accused to counsel begins to be
available only when the person is already in custody.
FACTS
For allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the
National Power Corporation (NPC) intended for the
purchase of US Dollars from the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB), Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., Ernesto
Gamus,[1] Jaime Ochoa and Raul Gutierrez were indicted
before the Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of
Malversation through Falsification of Commercial
Documents.
Upon arraignment, Gamus, Uy and Ochoa pleaded not
guilty to the charge, while Gutierrez has remained at
large.
Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. On May 28, 2002,
the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision, which states
that Jaime B. Ochoa is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation thru
falsification of Commercial Document.
However, accused JOSE TING LAN UY, Jr. is hereby
ACQUITTED of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Commercial Document. However,
because of preponderance of evidence, he is CIVILLY
LIABLE for the damages.
Aggrieved, Ochoa interposed this appeal alleging that he
should be acquitted since his conviction was based on
his sworn statement, transcript of stenographic notes
which are incompetent evidence. He contends that his
sworn statement was taken without the benefit of
counsel, in violation of his constitutional right under
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether there was a violation of the invoked
constitutional right.
RULING
The rights enumerated by the constitutional provision
invoked by accused-appellant are not available before
government investigators enter the picture. Neither does
the constitutional provision on custodial investigation
extends to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through
questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby the accused orally admits having
committed the crime, nor to a person undergoing an
audit examination because an audit examiner is not a law
enforcement officer. Thus, the flaw in appellants
argument in this regard becomes immediately apparent
vis--vis the foregoing legal yardsticks, considering that
his statement was taken during the administrative
investigation of NPCs audit team and before he was
taken into custody. As such, the inquest was still a
general inquiry into an unsolved offense at the time and
there was, as yet, no specific suspect.
10) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee,
vs.
DOMINGO REYES y PAJE, ALVIN ARNALDO y
AVENA and JOSELITO FLORES y
VICTORIO, Accused-Appellants.
A lawyer provided by the investigators is
deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise
any objection to the counsels appointment during the
course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter
subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the
swearing officer.
FACTS
On 11 August 1999, an Information4 was filed before the
RTC charging appellants with the special complex crime
of kidnapping for ransom with homicide.
the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another and grouping themselves
together with Juanito Pataray y Cayaban, Federico
Pataray y Cabayan and Rommel Libarnes y Acejo, who
are still at large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation and
with use of firearms, carry away and deprive Robert Yao,
Yao San, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Raymond Yao, Ronald
Matthew Yao, Lennie Yao, Charlene Yao, Jona
Abagatnan ang Josephine Ortea against their will and
consent on board their Mazda MVP van for the purpose
of extorting money in the amount of Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00), that during the detention of Chua Ong
Ping Sim and Raymong Yao, said accused with intent to
kill, willfully and unlawfully strangled Chua Ong Ping
Sim and Raymond Yao to death to the damage and
prejudice of their heirs in such amount as may be
awarded to them by this Honorable Court.
During their arraignment,5 appellants, assisted by a
counsel de oficio, pleaded "Not guilty" to the charge.
Trial on the merits thereafter followed.
The prosecution presented as witnesses. Their
testimonies, taken together, attest to the following:
The Yao family owns and operates a poultry farm in
Barangay Santo Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
the Yao family, on board a Mazda MVP van, arrived at
the their poultry farm in Barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose
del Monte, Bulacan. Yao San alighted from the van to
open the gate of the farm. At this juncture, appellant
Reyes and a certain Juanito Pataray (Pataray)
approached, poked their guns at Yao San, and dragged
him inside the van. Appellant Reyes and Pataray also
boarded the van. Thereupon, appellants Arnaldo and
Flores, with two male companions, all armed with guns,
arrived and immediately boarded the van. Appellant
Flores took the drivers seat and drove the van.
Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their cohorts then
blindfolded each member of the Yao family inside the
van with packaging tape.
After about 30 minutes of traveling on the road, the van
stopped. Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and
Jona Abagatnan (Abagatnan) stepped out of the van with
appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one of their
male companions.7 Appellant Flores, with the other male
companion, drove the van with the remaining members
of the Yao family inside the vehicle.
Later, the van stopped again. Appellant Flores and his
male companion told Yao San to produce the amount of
five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) as ransom in
exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert,
Raymond and Abagatnan. Upon sensing that the
kidnappers had already left, Yao San drove the van
towards the poultry farm and sought the help of relatives
appellants and their cohorts tried to contact Yao San
regarding the ransom demanded, but the latter could not
be reached. Thus, appellants instructed Abagatnan to
look for Yao San in the poultry farm.
Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and one male companion
escorted Abagatnan in proceeding to the poultry farm.
Upon arriving therein, Abagatnan searched for Yao San,
but the latter could not be found so they went back to the
safe-house.11
In the safe-house, appellants told Robert that they would
release him so he could help Abagatnan in locating Yao
San. Robert then ran towards the poultry farm. Upon
arriving at the poultry farm, Robert found Yao San and
informed him about the ransom demanded by the
appellants. Robert also told Yao San that Chua Ong Ping
Sim and Raymond were still held by appellants and their
cohorts
appellants called Yao San through a cellular phone and
demanded the ransom of P5 million for Chua Ong Ping
Sim and Raymond. Yao San acceded to appellants
demand
appellants again called Yao San via a cellular phone and
threatened to kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond
because of newspaper and radio reports regarding the
incident. Appellants then instructed Yao San to appear
and bring with him the ransom of P5 million. Yao San
arrived at the designated place of the pay-off at 4:00
p.m., but none of the appellants or their cohorts showed
up. Yao San waited for appellants call, but none came.
Thus, Yao San left.
the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were
found at the La Mesa Dam, Novaliches, Quezon City.
Both died of asphyxia by strangulation.
Appellant Arnaldo surrendered to the Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). He identified
appellants Reyes and Flores, Pataray and a certain Tata
and Akey as his co-participants in the incident. Appellant
Arnaldo also described the physical features of his
cohorts and revealed their whereabouts.
For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of
appellants, Marina Reyes, Irene Flores Celestino,
Wilfredo Celestino, Jr., Rachel C. Ramos, and Isidro
Arnaldo. Appellants denied any liability and interposed
alibis and the defense of frame-up.
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dated 26
February 2002 convicting appellants of the special
complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide
and sentencing each of them to suffer the supreme
penalty of death. Appellants were also ordered to pay
jointly and severally the Yao family.
WHEREFORE, finding herein three (3) accused
DOMINGO REYES y PAJE, ALVIN ARNALDO y
AVENA, and JOSELITO FLORES y VICTORIO guilty
as principals beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH (DOUBLE)
HOMICIDE as charged, they are hereby sentenced each
to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH as mandated by
law, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of
deceased Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao
ISSUE
Whether there was a violation of the constitutional rights
of the appellants
RULING
NO. Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides that an accused is entitled to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. The phrase "preferably of his own choice"
does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer
by a person under investigation is exclusive as to
preclude other equally competent and independent
attorneys from handling the defense. A lawyer provided
by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused
when he does not raise any objection to the counsels
appointment during the course of the investigation, and
the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the
statement before the swearing officer. Appellants
Arnaldo and Flores did not object to the appointment of
Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous as their lawyers,
respectively, during their custodial investigation. Hence,
appellants Arnaldo and Flores are deemed to have
engaged the services of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous,
respectively
11) PEOPLE VS SEQUIO
FACTS
Accused-appellants Ermelito Sequio, Vicente Tumangan
and Nenito Melvida appeal from the decision of 24
February 1994 (promulgated on 1 March 1994) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 21, in
Criminal Case No. CBU-22486, finding them guilty of
the crime of robbery with homicide as charged in an
information.
on April 24, 1991, Eugenio Godinez, overseer since
1952 of Hacienda Jose Ancajas in Medellin, Cebu, and
Pedro Broniola, the haciendas bookkeeper, went to the
Medellin Rural Bank, located three kilometers from the
hacienda, to withdraw P50,557.17 to pay for the wages
of the hacienda workers. The banks cashier instructed
Jimmy Serafin, janitor and motorcycle driver of the
bank, to drive Godinez and Broniola back to the
hacienda on one of the banks motorcycles. Serafin drove
the motorcycle with Godinez behind him and Broniola
behind Godinez. Godinez carried the money in a money
bag which he hung over his left shoulder.[5]
As the three were nearing the hacienda, the accused,
armed with guns, block their path and ordered them to
stop. Godinez recognized the armed men because Nenito
Melvida and Emerlindo Sequio used to work in the
hacienda while Vicente Tumangans parents were
Godinezs neighbors.[6]
Serafin drove on, but as the motorcycle went past the
accused, he and Godinez heard a gunshot. [7] Godinez
noticed that Broniola had fallen off the
motorcycle. Serafin leapt from the motorcycle and ran
away. The motorcycle toppled over Godinez, pinning
him to the ground. Accused Tumangan, with gun in
hand, approached Godinex, took the money from the
money bag, and fled. Godinez ran home, leaving
Broniola behind.[8] Meanwhile, Serafin had proceeded to
the house of the Broniolas which was near the crime
scene, and informed Broniolas wife of the incident. [9]
SPO Elpidio Luna, received a report from another
policeman about a robbery. Together with other
policemen and some Cafgus, Luna went to the crime
scene he found an abandoned motorcycle. People around
the site informed Luna that the culprit had already
fled. Luna noticed that the bushes were compressed and
found a piece of paper utilized as toilet paper with a
stool on it [which] was somewhat newly delivered. The
paper was a bio-data sheetwith the name Melvida,
Nenito and the entry for the fathers name filled in with
Elpidio Melvida.
One bystander volunteered to take Luna to Elpidio
Melvidas house where, however, Elpidio told Luna that
Nenito Melvida was not there but was at his (Nenitos)
brothers house. Elpidio took Luna to the said house
where Luna saw the accused Nenito Melvida playing
cards with other persons. Luna asked Melvida to go with
him to the barangay captains house.
The barangay captain was not home, so Luna took
Melvida to the police station instead. Melvida was kept
at the station the whole evening of 24 April 1991 for
investigation conducted, first, by Luna, then, by his
fellow policemen Sgt. Pablo Ygot, Cpl. Alfredo
Mondigo and Eliseo Tepait, as Luna had to take his
supper. Melvida was allowed to go home the next day,
but only after the police had filed criminal charges
against him and he had posted bail. Melvida was not
assisted by counsel during the police investigation,
although Luna assured the trial judge that the Municipal
Mayor of Medellin, who is a lawyer, was present, While
Luna claimed he asked the Mayor to act as Melvidas
counsel, he admitted that his request did not appear in
the record of the investigation. Lunas investigation of
Melvida was not reduced into writing.[13]
In the course of Lunas investigation, Melvida admitted
that he kept his share the loot in his house. Melvida then
was brought to his house where he got P9,000.00, in one
hundred peso bills, placed inside a shoe which he
delivered to the policemen.[14]
During the investigation, Melvida admitted that his
(Melvidas) companions during the robbery were Vicente
Tumangan and Ermelindo Sequio, who were staying in
the house of Juanito Hones. Immediately, Mondigo and
policeman Proniely Artiquela proceeded to the house of
Hones where they saw Tumangan and Sequio on the
porch. Noticing something bulging on the waist of
Tumangan, Mondigo and Artiquela approached
Tumangan and asked him what was that bulging at his
waist. Tumangan did not answer. So, Mondigo patted the
bulge which turned out to be a .38 caliber Squires
Bingham revolver with holster and four bullets. [16] When
asked if he had a license for the firearm, Tumangan
answered in the negative. Mondigo and Artiquela then
brought Tumangan and Sequio to the police
station. Tumangan was then investigated in the presence
of the Municipal mayor. Tumangan admitted that he was
one of the holdupppers.[17]
ISSUE:
Fourth assignment of error is when it failed to consider
the non-observance of the constitution in the
investigation with the accused by the police, as when the
court says the court, however, must express its dismay
over the questionable methods by the police officers
concerned mocked the constitution, which they
themselves have sworn to honor and revere, when they
did not remind the accused of their right to remain silent
and to be assisted by counsel
RULING
What was recovered from accused Melvida
was P9,000.00 which, he admitted, was his share of the
loot.[41] As to the difference between P22,526.00
and P9,000.00, no evidence was adduced how and from
whom it was recovered. Police officer Mariano Remulta
merely declared that the P26,526.00 was entrusted to
him by the station commander who told him that the
amount was recovered in connection with the highway
robbery case.[42]
Since the recovery of P9,000.00 from Melvida was due
to his admission in the course of the custodial
interrogation made in violation of paragraph (1) of
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution and thus
inadmissible in evidence pursuant to paragraph (3) of the
said section then the P9,000.00 cannot also be admitted
in evidence as a fruit of the poisonous tree.The rule is
settled that once the primary source (the tree) is shown
to have been unlawfully obtained -- as the admission of
Melvida in this case -- any secondary or derivative
evidence (the fruit) derived from it - - the P9,000.00
obtained from Melvida as a consequence of his
admission - - is also inadmissible.
The statement of the trial court may, be considered mere
surplusage since, in the final analysis, it did not take into
account against the accused whatever admission they
made during police interrogation. We need to elaborate,
however, why such admissions are inadmissible in
evidence.
Regardless of Lunas claim to the contrary, accused
Nenito Melvida was arrested. An arrest is the taking of a
person into custody in order that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense,and it is made
by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by
his submission to the custody of the person making the
arrest. Melvidas voluntarily going with Luna upon
invitation was a submission to Lunas custody, and Luna
believed that Melvida was a suspect in the robbery
charged herein, hence, Melvida was being held to answer
for the commission of the said offense.
Since he was arrested without a warrant, the inquiry
must now be whether a valid warrantless arrest was
effected. Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful . -- A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
The first and last conditions enumerated above are not
applicable in this case; and under the facts herein,
neither does the second condition apply. Lunas basis for
arresting Melvida was the bio-data sheet with Melvidas
name on it found at the crime scene. By no means can
this indicate that Melvida committed the offense
charged. It does not even connote that Melvida was at
the crime scene for the bio-data sheet could have been
obtained by anyone and left at the crime scene long
before or after the crime was committed. Luna, thus, had
no personal knowledge of facts indicating Melvidas
guilt; at best, he had an unreasonable
suspicion. Melvidas arrest was thus illegal.
After his unlawful arrest, Melvida underwent custodial
investigation. The custodial investigation commenced
when the police pinpointed Melvida as one of the
authors of the crime or had focused on him as a suspect
thereof.[46] This brought into operation paragraph (1) of
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing
the accuseds rights to remain silent and to counsel. And
his right to be informed of these rights. [47] The said
paragraph provides:
SEC. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
There was no showing that Melvida was ever informed
of these rights, and Luna admitted that Melvida was not
assigned by counsel during the
investigation. Indisputably, the police officers concerned
flouted these constitutional rights of Melvida and
Tumangan and deliberately disregarded the rule
regarding an investigators duties prior to and during
custodial interrogation laid down in Morales vs.
Enrile[48] and reiterated in a catena of subsequent cases.
12) PEOPLE VS CHAVEZ
FACTS
In the information dated November 8, 2006, Mark Jason
Chavez y Bitancor (Chavez) was charged with the crime
of robbery with homicide:
That on or about October 28, 2006, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain
and means of force, violence and intimidation upon the
person of ELMER DUQUE y OROS, by then and there,
with intent to kill, stabbing the latter repeatedly with a
kitchen knife, thereby inflicting upon him mortal stab
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of
his death thereafter, and on the saidoccasion or by reason
thereof, accused took, robbed and carried away the
following:
One (1) Unit Nokia Cellphone; One (1) Unit Motorola
Cellphone; Six (6) pcs. Ladies Ring; Two (2) pcs.
Necklace; One (1) pc. Bracelet All of undetermined
value and undetermined amount of money, all belonging
to said ELMER DUQUE y OROS @ BARBIE to the
damage and prejudice of the said owner/or his heirs, in
the said undetermined amount in Philippines currency.
On October 28, 2006, Peamante arrived home at around
2:45 a.m., coming from work.When he was about to go
inside his house at 1326 Tuazon Street, Sampaloc,
Manila, he saw a person wearing a black, long-sleeved
shirt and black pants and holding something while
leaving the house/parlor of Elmer Duque (Barbie).
There was a light at the left side of the house/parlor of
Barbie, his favorite haircutter, so Peamante stated that
he was able to see the face of Chavez and the clothes he
was wearing.6
Sometime after 10:00 a.m., the Scene of the Crime
Office (SOCO) team arrived, led by PCI Cayrel. The
team noted that the lobby and the parlor were in disarray,
and they found Barbies dead body inside. 12 They took
photographs and collected fingerprints and other pieces
of evidence such as the 155 pieces of hair strands found
clutched in Barbies left hand.
At around 11:00 a.m., Peamantes landlady woke him
up and told him that Barbie was found dead at 9:00 a.m.
He then informed his landlady that he saw Chavez
leaving Barbies house at 2:45 a.m.15
Dr. Salen conducted an autopsy on the body and found
that the time of death was approximately 12 hours prior
to examination.16 There were 22 injuries on Barbies
body 21 were stab wounds in various parts of the
body caused by a sharp bladed instrument, and one
incised wound was caused by a sharp object. 17 Four (4)
of the stab wounds were considered fatal.18
The next day, the police invited Peamante to the Manila
Police Station to give a statement. Peamante described
to SPO3 Casimiro the physical appearance of the person
he saw leaving Barbies parlor.19
Accompanied by his mother, Chavez voluntarily
surrendered to SPO3 Casimiro at the police
station.20 Chavez was then 22 years old. 21 His mother
told the police that she wanted to help her son who might
be involved in Barbies death.
SPO3 Casimiro informed them ofthe consequences in
executing a written statement without the assistance of a
lawyer. However, Chavezs mother still gave her
statement, subscribed by Administrative Officer Alex
Francisco.23She also surrendered two cellular phones
owned by Barbie and a baseball cap owned by Chavez. 24
The next day, Peamante was again summoned by SPO3
Casimiro to identify from a line-up the person he saw
leaving Barbies house/parlor that early morning of
October 28, 2006.25 Peamante immediately pointed to
and identified Chavez and thereafter executed his written
statement.26 There were no issues raised in relation to the
line-up.
On the other hand, Chavez explained that he was athome
on October 27, 2006, exchanging text messages
withBarbie on whether they could talk regarding their
misunderstanding.27 According to Chavez, Barbie
suspected that he was having a relationship with Barbies
boyfriend, Maki.28 When Barbie did not reply to his text
message, Chavez decided to go to Barbies house at
around 1:00 a.m. of October 28, 2006.29 Barbie allowed
him to enter the house, and he went home after.
RULING
There is a disputable presumption that "a person found in
possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act;
otherwise, thatthing which a person possesses, or
exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by
him."74 Thus, when a person has possession of a stolen
property, hecan be disputably presumed as the author of
the theft.75
Barbies missing cellular phones were turned over to the
police by Chavezs mother, and this was never denied by
the defense.Chavez failed to explain his possession of
these cellular phones.The Court of Appeals discussed
that "a cellular phone has become a necessary accessory,
no person would part with the same for a long period of
time, especially in this case as it involves an expensive
cellular phone unit, as testified by Barbies kababayan,
witness Raymond Seno[f]a."78
However, with Chavez and Barbies close relationship
having been established, there is still a possibilitythat
these cellphones were lent to Chavez by Barbie.
The integrity of these cellphones was also compromised
when SPO3 Casimiro testified during cross-examination
that the police made no markings on the cellphones, and
their SIM cards were removed.
The other missing items were no longer found, and no
evidence was presented to conclude that these weretaken
by Chavez. The statement of Chavezs mother mentioned
that her son pawned one of Barbies necklaces is mere
hearsay.
It is contrary to human nature for a mother to voluntarily
surrender her own son and confess that her son
committed a heinous crime.
Chavez was 22 years old, no longer a minor, when he
voluntarily went to the police station on November 5,
2006 for investigation,83 and his mother accompanied
him. SPO3 Casimiro testified that the reason she
surrendered Chavez was because "she wanted to help her
son"84 and "perhaps the accused felt that [the
investigating police] are getting nearer to him.
Chavezs mother "turned-over (2) units of Cellular-
phones and averred that her son Mark Jason told her that
said cellphones belong[ed] to victim Barbie. . . [that]
NOY was wounded in the incident and that the fatal
weapon was put in a manhole infront[sic] of their
residence."87 The records are silent on whether Chavez
objected to his mothers statements. The records also do
not show why the police proceeded to get his mothers
testimony as opposed to getting Chavezs testimony on
his voluntary surrender.
At most, the lower court found thatChavezs mother was
informed by the investigating officer at the police station
of the consequences in executing a written statement
withoutthe assistance of a lawyer. 88 She proceeded to
give her statement dated November 7, 2006 on her sons
confession of the crime despite the warning.
The booking sheet and arrest report states that "when
[the accused was] appraised [sic] of his constitutional
rights and nature of charges imputed against him,
accused opted to remain silent."91 This booking sheet and
arrest report is also dated November 7, 2006, or two
days after Chavez, accompanied by his mother, had
voluntarily gone to the police station.
The right to counsel upon being questioned for the
commission of a crime is part of the Miranda rights,
which require that:
. . . (a) any person under custodial investigation has the
right to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will
be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right
totalk to an attorney before being questioned and to have
his counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he
cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before
any questioning if he so desires.92
The Miranda rightswere incorporated in our Constitution
but were modified to include the statement thatany
waiver of the right to counsel must be made "in writing
and in the presence of counsel."93
The invocation of these rights applies during custodial
investigation, which begins "when the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun tofocus on a particular
suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the
interrogation and propounds questions to the person to
elicit incriminating statements."94
It may appear that the Miranda rightsonly apply when
one is "taken into custody by the police," such as during
an arrest. These rights are intended to protect ordinary
citizens from the pressures of a custodial setting:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda
are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick
captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the
"inherently compelling pressures" "generated by the
custodial setting itself," "which work to undermine the
individuals will to resist," and as much as possible to
free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases
to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular
confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are
implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons
suspected of misdemeanours as they are by questioning
of persons suspected of felonies.95 (Emphasis supplied)
Republic Act No. 743896 expanded the definition of
custodial investigation to "include the practice ofissuing
an invitation to a person who is investigated in
connection with an offense he is suspected to have
committed, without prejudice to the liability of the
inviting officer for any violation of law."97
This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered
before a police officer must be apprised of their Miranda
rights. For one, the same pressures of a custodial setting
exist in this scenario. Chavez is also being questioned by
an investigating officer ina police station. As an
additional pressure, he may have been compelled to
surrender by his mother who accompanied him to the
police station.
This court, thus, finds that the circumstantial evidence
sufficiently proves beyond reasonable doubt that Chavez
is guilty of the crime of homicide, and not the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide.
Finally, this court laments thatobject evidence retrieved
from the scene of the crime were not properly handled,
and no results coming from the forensic examinations
were presented to the court. There was no examination
of the fingerprints found on the kitchen knife retrieved
from the manhole near the house of Chavez. 100 There
were no results of the DNA examination done on the hair
strands found with the knife and those in the clutches of
the victim. Neither was there a comparison made
between these strands of hair and Chavezs. There was
no report regarding any finding of traces of blood on the
kitchen knife recovered, and no matching with the blood
of the victim or Chavezs. The results of this case would
have been rendered with more confidence at the trial
court level had all these been done. In many cases,
eyewitness testimony may not be as reliable or would
have been belied had object evidence been properly
handled and presented.
We deal with the life of a personhere. Everyones life
whether it be the victims or the accuseds is valuable.
The Constitution and our laws hold these lives in high
esteem. Therefore, investigations such as these should
have been attended with greaterprofessionalism and
more dedicated attention to detail by our law enforcers.
The quality of every conviction depends on the evidence
gathered, analyzed, and presented before the courts. The
publics confidence on our criminal justice system
depends on the quality of the convictions we promulgate
against the accused. All those who participate in our
criminal justice system should realize this and take this
to heart.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Mark Jason Chavez y
Bitancor alias "Noy" is hereby declared GUILTYbeyond
reasonable doubt of the separate and distinct crime of
HOMICIDE. Inasmuch as the commission of the crime
was not attended by any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, accused-appellant Chavez is hereby
SENTENCEDto suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging
from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum
13) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE, VS. ANACLETO Q. OLVIS,
ACQUITTED, ROMULO VILLAROJO,
LEONARDO CADEMAS AND DOMINADOR
SORELA
G.R. No. 71092, September 30, 1987
FACTS:
1. Deosdedit Bagon had been in fact missing since
two days before. He was last seen by his wife in the
afternoon on his way home. She did not, however, find
him there when she arrived in the evening.
2. It was Captain Encabo himself who led a search
party to mount an inquiry. Captain Encabo's men
chanced upon an unnamed volunteer, who informed
them that Deosdedit Bagon was last seen together with
Dominador Sorela, one of the accused. Encabo then
instructed one of his patrolmen to pick up Sorela.
3. Sorela bore several scratches on his face, neck,
and arms when the police found him. According to him,
he sustained those wounds while clearing his ricefield.
Apparently unconvinced, Captain Encabo had Sorela
take them to the ricefield where he sustained his injuries.
But half way there, Sorela allegedly broke down, and, in
what would apparently crack the case for the police,
admitted having participated in the killing of the missing
Bagon.
Sorela allegedly confessed having been with
Deosdedit Bagon in the evening after some marketing.
They were met by Romulo Villarojo and Leonardo
Cademas, Sorela's co-accused, who led them to a
secluded place in the ricefields.
It was then that Villarojo allegedly attacked Bagon
with a bolo, hacking him at several parts of the body
until he, Bagon, was dead. Moments later, Sorela fled,
running into thick cogon grasses where he suffered facial
and bodily scratches.
4. The police soon picked up Villarojo and
Cademas. Together with Sorela, they were turned over to
the custody of Captain Encabo.
5. The police thereafter made the three re-enact the
crime. Patrolman Dionisio Capito directed Sorela to lead
them to the grounds where Deosdedit Bagon was
supposed to have been buried. But it was Villarojo who
escorted them to a watery spot somewhere in the
ricefields, where the sack-covered, decomposing cadaver
of Bagon lay in a shallow grave.
6. The body was transported to the municipal hall
the following day. It was displayed, morbidly, in front of
the building where Mrs. Catalina Bagon, widow of the
deceased, and her four children viewed it. (It was
photographed)
7. The "ceremonies" continued in the parish church
where the body of the victim was transferred. It was laid
on the altar, in full public view. (It was also
photographed)
8. But it was only later on that the body itself was
uncovered from the sack that had concealed it.
Thereupon, it was readied for autopsy.
9. Initial findings of investigators disclosed that the
threesome of Solera, Villarojo, and Cademas executed
Deosdedit Bagon on orders of Anacleto Olvis, then
municipal mayor, for a reward of P3,000.00 each.
10. While in custody, the three executed five
separate written confessions each.
The first confessions were taken on September 9,
1975 in the local Philippine Constabulary headquarters. -
accused pointed to the then accused Anacleto Olvis as
principal by inducement, who allegedly promised them a
reward of P3,000.00 each.
The second were made before the Polanco police.
On September 18, 1975, the three accused reiterated
the same confessions before the National Bureau of
Investigation Dipolog City sub-office. - they
categorically denied Olvis' involvement in the killing.
On September 21, 1975 and September 25, 1975,
they executed two confessions more, again before the
Philippine Constabulary and the police of Polanco -
where the said accused again pointed to the then accused
Anacleto Olvis as principal by inducement, who
allegedly promised them a reward of P3,000.00 each.
11. Based on these subsequent statements, the trial
rendered separate verdicts on the three accused on the
one hand, and Anacleto Olvis on the other. Olvis was
acquitted, while the three were all sentenced to die for
the crime of murder.
Contentions:
The accused-appellants subsequenty repudiated
their alleged confessions in open court alleging threats
by the Polanco investigators of physical harm if they
refused to "cooperate" in the solution of the case. They
likewise alleged that they were instructed by the Polanco
police investigators to implicate Anacleto Olvis in the
case. They insisted on their innocence. The accused
Romulo Villarojo averred, specifically, that it was the
deceased who had sought to kill him, for which he acted
in self- defense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the confessions are admissible as
evidence in court
RULING:
The three accused- appellants' extrajudicial
confessions are inadmissible in evidence.
The rule with respect to extrajudicial confessions
were laid down in People v. Decierdo,:
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned
that
(1) he has a right to remain silent,
(2) that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and
(3) that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed. (presence of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his
behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of
the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf.)(people
vs galit)
The defendant, may waive effectuation of those
rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently. - No effective waiver of the
right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized
unless specifically made after the warnings we here
delineate have been given.
If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any
stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an
attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning.
Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in
any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the
police may not question him.
The mere fact that he may have answered some
questions or volunteered some statements on his own
does not deprive him of the right to refrain from
answering any further inquiries until he has consulted
with an attorney and thereafter consent to be questioned.
Like the Decierdo confessions, the confessions in
the case at bar suffer from a Constitutional infirmity. In
their supposed statements dated September 9, 14, and 21,
1975, the accused-appellants were not assisted by
counsel when they "waived" their rights to counsel. As
we said in Decierdo, the lack of counsel "makes those
statements, in contemplation of law, involuntary,' even
if it were otherwise voluntary, technically."
RE-ENACTMENT
Forced re-enactments, like uncounselled and
coerced confessions come within the ban against self-
incrimination. The 1973 Constitution, the Charter
prevailing at the time of the proceedings below, says:
"No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself."
This constitutional privilege has been defined as a
protection against testimonial compulsion, but this has
since been extended to any evidence "communicative in
nature" acquired under circumstances of duress.
Essentially, the right is meant to "avoid and prohibit
positively the repetition and recurrence of the certainly
inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal
or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence
necessary for his conviction."
This should be distinguished, parenthetically, from
mechanical acts the accused is made to execute not
meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain
physical attributes determinable by simple observation.
This includes requiring the accused to submit to a
test to extract virus from his body, or compelling him to
expectorate morphine from his mouth, or making her
submit to a pregnancy test or a footprinting test, or
requiring him to take part in a police lineup in certain
cases. In each case, the accused does not speak his guilt.
It is not a prerequisite therefore that he be provided with
the guiding hand of counsel.
But a forced re-enactment is quite another thing.
Here, the accused is not merely required to exhibit some
physical characteristics; by and large, he is made to
admit criminal responsibility against his will. It is a
police procedure just as condemnable as an uncounselled
confession.
Accordingly, we hold that all evidence based on
such a re-enactment to be in violation of the Constitution
and hence, incompetent evidence.
Sorela's admission while with Captain Encabo
What is to be borne in mind is that Sorela was
himself under custody. Any statement he might have
made thereafter is therefore subject to the Constitutional
guaranty.
By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way.
Chavez v. Court of Appeals tells us:
Compulsion as it is understood here does not
necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the
product of unintentional statements. Pressure which
operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a
free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for
rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So
is moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the
unwilling lips of the defendant."
In such a case, he should have been provided with
counsel.
DELAY
Indeed, the three accused-appellants had languished
in jail for one year and two months before the
information was filed, and only after they had gone to
court on an application for habeas corpus. For if the
authorities truly had a case in their hands, we are puzzled
why they, the accused, had to be made to suffer
preventive imprisonment for quite an enormous length of
time.
ADJUDICATION
The accused-appellants Leonardo Cademas and
Dominador Sorela are ACQUITTED on the ground of
reasonable doubt. The accused-appellant Romulo
Villarojo is found guilty of homicide.
14) PEOPLE VS. CAYAGO
312 SCRA 623 (1999)
FACTS:
For killing his own wife through strangulation and
with evident premeditation, appellant was indicted for
parricide. He was tried and subsequently sentenced to
die and ordered to pay damages to the victims heirs. The
lower court judge, after making a twelve page summary
of the testimonies of the witnesses, arrived at a
conclusion that appellant is guilty of parricide, in just
one short paragraph, which reads:
After considering the prosecution and the defense
evidence, the Court is convinced that the version of the
defense is not credible. In his redirect examination, he
admitted that his wife was reported missing as embodied
in his first sworn statement, which had been marked in
evidence as Exhibit K. Said sworn statement is entirely
wrong because his wife was not missing as mentioned by
the accused, but killed her. In the said first statement to
the police, he merely wanted to mislead the police by
concocting a lie that his wife is missing, when in truth
and in fact, he had killed her and left her at the comfort
room of the abandoned barangay hall, already lifeless.
Culled from the evidence on record are the
following facts which was condensed in the Appellees
Brief, to wit:
At about 1:25 oclock in the afternoon of August 2,
1995, SPO2 Belino Zinampan, Jr. was at the police
headquarters at Pasig City where he received the report
of Rolando Cayago that he saw the decomposing body of
his wife at the abandoned barangay hall of Santolan,
Pasig City.
Zinampan, SPO2 Antonio Paulite, a police
photographer and Cayago proceeded to the said
abandoned barangay hall to verify the report.
Thereat, the group saw the dead and decomposing
body of a woman. Zinampan requested Cayago to
identify the body and on recognizing the shoes worn by
the deceased, let out a loud cry and thereafter lost
consciousness for about five minutes.
Thereafter, Cayago, in answer to Zinampans
question, answered that he does not know who killed his
wife. Zinampan and Cayago then returned to the police
headquarters where the latters statement was taken by
the former.
At the time Cayagos statement was being taken,
Police Sr. Inspector Pajota noticed Cayagos several
inconsistent statements. Pajota subsequently instructed
Zinampan, SPO2 Paulite and SPO2 Delos Reyes to
further interrogate Cayago and, who, thereafter
concluded that Cayago was reluctant and inconsistent in
answering our simple questions. Pajota then advised
Cayago to undergo a polygraph examination at Camp
Crame.
On August 3, 1995, when Cayago was about to be
brought to Camp Crame for a polygraph test, he
requested permission to go to the nearby church. Cayago
requested that he be accompanied by SPO2 Delos Reyes,
who agreed.
Thereat, Cayago admitted to SPO2 Delos Reyes
that he killed his wife Myra Cayago and was willing to
give his statement relative to said killing. SPO2 Delos
Reyes and Cayago returned to the police station and
upon such information, Sr. Inspector Pajota instructed
Zinampan to secure a lawyer to assist Cayago. Zinampan
then requested Atty. Reynario Campanilla, who agreed to
assist Cayago. Atty. Campanilla conferred with Cayago
at the Office of the Investigation Division.
After apprising Cayago of his constitutional rights,
Cayago admitted that he killed his wife. Atty.
Campanilla then advised Cayago to personally write
down his confession which Cayago did for about an hour
in the presence of Atty. Campanilla. Thereafter, with the
aid of a tape recorder, requested Cayago to read his
admission.
After informing Cayago of his constitutional rights
against self-incrimination, SPO2 Delos Reyes started
taking down Cayagos extra-judicial confession again in
the presence of Atty. Campanilla and who signed said
statement together with Cayago.
In the case at bar, it is clear that appellant
strangulated his wife resulting to her death. This is
supported by appellants own testimony, his confession to
the police and the medical findings corroborating that
she died of asphyxia by strangulation.
In his testimony, appellant claims that he embraced
his wife so tight but did not notice she had stopped
breathing due to the tightness of the embrace.
He admitted that in an attempt to confuse
authorities as to the true cause of his wifes death,
appellant removed all her clothing including her panty
and bra to make it appear that she was raped. This shows
the probability that the victim sustained injuries in her
vaginal opening and lacerations in her uterus, as found in
the autopsy report.
ISSUE: W/N Appellants statement is inadmissible
because it was given without affording him the right to
counsel.
RULING: NO.
Appellants contention that the statement he gave to the
police is inadmissible in evidence because it was given
without affording him the right to counsel guaranteed by
the Constitution has no merit.
It is undisputed that appellant was not arrested because
the authorities were not yet aware of the crime. It was he
himself who reported the incident to the police after he
went to the abandoned barangay hall two days later and
discovered that his wifes body was still there.
Appellant himself admitted that since he did not know
what to do after seeing his wifes relatives whom he
feared for reprisal, he decided to report the matter to the
Pasig police. The right to counsel is afforded by Section
12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution only to
person(s) under investigation for the commission of an
offense. On their way to Camp Crame, appellant asked
that he be accompanied by an officer to the Pasig
Church. There, he volunteered information to the officer
on the whereabouts of his wife and stated that he is
willing to put his statement in writing. Custodial rights
of a person are not available whenever he volunteers
statements without being asked. He was not investigated
by the authorities.
In fact, after appellant admitted to the police officer that
he killed his wife, the officer told him that he will be
provided with a lawyer to assist him. In any case, during
the subsequent events the investigation in the precinct -
appellant was assisted by a lawyer, namely, Atty.
Campanilla.
At the trial, the latter testified that he talked to appellant,
advised him of his constitutional rights and was present
when the latter wrote his extrajudicial statement
admitting that he killed his wife. Atty. Campanilla even
asked for appellants identification card to verify
whether the signature he will sign in his statement is his
own.
WHEREFORE, appellants conviction for parricide is
AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION that the
penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua. He is also
ORDERED TO PAY P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to
the children of the victim, in addition to the award of
P26,000.00 as actual damages. The award of moral
damages is deleted for lack of evidence.
SYNOPSIS (PEOPLE VS. CAYAGO)
Appellant and his wife went to his aunt at about 11
oclock in the evening to borrow money, but was
ashamed to wake her up because it was already to late in
the night. Unable to get the money, his wife started
pushing him asking him to produce the money. He then
invited her to the abandoned barangay hall to talk. There
she kept on pushing him. He embraced her so tight that
she suddenly died.
Two days later appellant reported the incident to the
police after he went to the abandoned barangay hall and
discovered that his wife's body was still there. When
appellant was about to be brought to Camp Crame for
polygraph test, he asked that he be accompanied by an
officer to the nearby church. There, he admitted to the
police officer that he killed his wife and was willing to
give his statement relative to the said killing.
During the investigation, appellant was assisted by
a lawyer who advised him of his constitutional
rights. The lawyer was present when appellant wrote his
extrajudicial statement admitting that he killed his
wife. Thereafter, appellant was indicted for parricide for
killing his own wife through strangulation and with
evident premeditation.
He was tried and subsequently found guilty of the
crime charged.Appellant was sentenced to the penalty of
death and ordered to pay actual and moral damages to
the victim's heirs. The Solicitor General recommended
the affirmance of the sentence arguing that the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and uninhabited
place concurred in the killing. Appellant, on the other
hand, alleged that the statement he gave to the police
was inadmissible because it was given without affording
him the right to counsel.
The Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction
for parricide with modification as to the penalty imposed
and as to the award of damages. It was clearly
established that the victim is appellant's lawful wife and
that he strangulated her resulting to her death. The Court
found no merit in appellant's contention that his
extrajudicial statement was inadmissible in evidence.
The right to counsel is afforded only to person(s)
under investigation for the commission of an
offense. Appellant volunteered the information to the
officer as to the whereabouts of his wife. Custodial rights
of a person are not available whenever he volunteers
statements without being asked.
The Court, however, did not agree with the
imposition of the death penalty. Parricide is punishable
with reclusion perpetua to death. The higher penalty of
death may be imposed only if there is an aggravating
circumstance that concurs in the commission of the
crime.
The Court found no sufficient evidence to prove
that appellant took advantage of nighttime and
uninhabited place to consummate the crime. Thus,
pursuant to Article 63 of the revised Penal Code, when
the penalty provided for by law are two indivisible
penalties and there is neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance, the lower penalty shall be
imposed. Forthwith, the death penalty imposed by the
court a quo was reduced to the indivisible penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS;
RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED; CUSTODIAL
RIGHTS; NOT AVAILABLE WHENEVER
ACCUSED VOLUNTEERS STATEMENTS
WITHOUT BEING ASKED.- Appellants contention
that the statement he gave to the police is inadmissible in
evidence because it was given without affording him the
right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution has no
merit.
It is undisputed that appellant was not arrested
because the authorities were not yet aware of the crime.
It was he himself who reported the incident to the police
after he went to the abandoned barangay hall two days
later and discovered that his wifes body was still there.
Appellant himself admitted that since he did not
know what to do after seeing his wifes relatives whom
he feared for reprisal, he decided to report the matter to
the Pasig police.
The right to counsel is afforded by Section 12(1),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution only to person(s)
under investigation for the commission of an offense.
On their way to Camp Crame, appellant asked that
he be accompanied by an officer to the Pasig Church.
There, he volunteered information to the officer on the
whereabouts of his wife and stated that he is willing to
put his statement in writing.
Custodial rights of a person are not available
whenever he volunteers statements without being asked.
He was not investigated by the authorities.
In fact, after appellant admitted to the police officer
that he killed his wife, the officer told him that he will be
provided with a lawyer to assist him. In any case, during
the subsequent events - the investigation in the precinct -
appellant was assisted by a lawyer, namely, Atty.
Campanilla.
At the trial, the latter testified that he talked to
appellant, advised him of his constitutional rights and
was present when the latter wrote his extrajudicial
statement admitting that he killed his wife.
Atty. Campanilla even asked for appellants
identification card to verify whether the signature he will
sign in his statement is his own.
15) PEOPLE VS AYSON
Two months after, a crime of estafa was charged against
Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the
prosecution contained Ramos written admission and
statement, to which defendants argued that the
confession was taken without the accused being
represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit
those stating that accused was not reminded of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel.
A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors
was denied. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the respondent judge is correct in
making inadmissible as evidence the admission and
statement of accused.
Ruling:
NO. It is clear that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense
under custodial interrogation, as the term should be
properly understood, prior to and during the
administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities
in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand.
The constitutional rights of a person under custodial
interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no
relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos
had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the
first day of the administrative investigation and agreed
that the proceedings should be recorded. The answer to
the questions posed to him was a free and even
spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded
on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not
been accorded to Ramos

Custodial interrogation means questioning

initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way.

Facts:

Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the

Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station. It
was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the
sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him
of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation
was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of
Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining
Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines
Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos
pertained. The findings of the Audit team were given to
him and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets.

C. COUNSEL COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT
16) PEOPLE VS PATUNGAN
FACTS
At about 10:00 p.m. of May 22, 1994, Antonio
Altarejos and his girlfriend Antonia Eluzon with a few
other friends were having a drinking spree beside the
chapel along Laura Calderon St., Purok 2, Barangay Old
Balara, Quezon City. Antonio and Antonia noticed the
van of their neighbor Alejandro Patungan parked in front
of the chapel and saw two men seated inside, one is the
accused Elmerto Pulga at the drivers seat and the other is
the accused Edgar Acebuche.[1] Sometime that
evening Elmerto Pulga drove the van away from the
chapel and towards a vacant lot near Commonwealth
Avenue to allow another car to park right in front of the
chapel. After the drinking spree, at about 3:00 to 3:30
a.m., the following morning, the lovers Antonio and
Antonia went to the basketball court to talk. Moments
later they saw Alejandro Patungan and his wife Marietta
come out of their house and walk toward the
road. Marietta however, went back to their house while
Alejandro proceeded without her.[2]
At about 3:45 p.m. of May 24, 1994, the
decomposing body of Alejandro Patungan was found
inside his van parked along Don Quixote St. Sampaloc,
Manila. The body was bloated and in the state of
decomposition. The face was dark colored, eyeballs,
bulging, tongue half protruding and thick upper and
lower lips. Bullae formation in the chest, abdomen and
extremities with greenish discoloration in the inguinal
regions spreading towards the abdomen. The abdomen
was distended with gas
On August 16, 1994 an Information was filed against
Marietta Patungan for parricide and against Elmerto
Pulga and Edgar Acebuche for murder
In addition to the testimonies of Antonio and Antonia,
the prosecution presented the extra-judicial confession of
the accused Elmerto Pulga, the testimonies of the police
officers who took the statement, of the lawyer from the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter,
Atty. Pedro Rudio, who allegedly assisted the accused
Elmerto Pulga during the custodial investigation and of
the medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy. The
extra-judicial confession[6] of accused Elmerto Pulga
dated August 11, 1994 linked Marietta to the killing of
her husband.
To establish the alleged motive in the killing of
Alejandro, the prosecution also presented Adelaida
Patungan, the sister of the deceased, who testified that
her sister-in-law, the accused Marietta Patungan, had an
affair with one of the helpers in the flower shop, who is
her own cousin Jun Acebuche. Thus, witness stated that
she saw the two eating together from the same plate and
that she caught them holding hands. One time she saw
Jun kiss Marietta. Her brother allegedly found out about
the affair and dismissed Jun from work but he forgave
Marietta for the sake of their children. [8]
The mother of the victim testified to establish the
amount of funeral expenses incurred at P80,000.00,
which amount the defense admitted.[9]
For the defense, accused Marietta Patungan admitted in
court that she was with her husband at early dawn of
May 23, 1994 and were on their way to buy flowers for
their flower shop but she went back to their house to get
a betamax tape and that her husband proceeded without
her.[10] On August 9, 1994 she was invited by the police
for questioning and that she was in fact questioned about
her complicity in her husbands death at the police station
without the assistance of counsel. [11] The other accused
Edgar Acebuche denied participation in the murder of
the victim and stated that sometime on August 8, 1994
he went to his cousin Mariettas flower shop in Cubao to
look for a job when the police mistook him for Jun
Acebuche and arrested him. He was also subjected to
custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel.
[12]
In court, accused Elmerto Pulga repudiated his extra-
judicial confession and stated that he was coerced by the
police to admit participation in the murder of Alejandro
Patungan and to implicate his sister Marietta as
mastermind and cousin Edgar as co-conspirator. He
narrated that he was arrested at around 9 a.m., August 9,
1994 and that he was detained and tortured by
electrocution by the police until the following day,
August 10, 1994, when he agreed to sign a prepared
document. On August 11, 1994 he was brought to the
IBP office where he met Atty. Rudio who signed the
prepared extra-judicial confession as counsel for the
accused.[13] A motion to withdraw the plea of not guilty
to the offense charged to a plea of guilty to a lesser
offense i.e., homicide, was filed by counsel for the
accused. The trial court denied the motion and treated it
instead as a motion to recall the accused Elmerto Pulga
for further testimony.[14] On recall, accused Elmerto
Pulga, admitted stabbing the deceased three times until
he fell unconscious, after which he lost control of
himself and stabbed the victim some more. He found a
rope and pulled the victim by the neck to the back of the
van. He stated that he alone was responsible for the
death of his brother-in-law.
the trial court upheld the validity of the extra-judicial
confession and rendered judgment convicting the three
accused guilty of the crime charged.
ISSUE
W/N extra-judicial confession of appellant Elmerto
Pulga is admissible in evidence for having been obtained
without effective assistance of counsel
RULING
It is inadmissible.
Considering the totality of the evidence, it appears that
the principal evidence presented by the prosecution to
establish the alleged conspiracy among the appellants to
commit murder is the extra-judicial confession of
accused Elmerto Pulga. The rest of the evidence
presented is at most circumstantial to establish motive
and the presence of the appellants at or near the place of
the commission of the crime.
Section 12 (1), Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 12(1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
(1) No torture, force violence threat, intimidation or any
other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
(2) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of
this or section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
An extra-judicial confession to be admissible in evidence
must be express and voluntarily executed in writing with
the assistance of an independent and competent
counsel[16] and a person under custodial investigation
must be continuously assisted by counsel from the very
start thereof[17] The presence of counsel is intended to
secure the voluntariness of the extra-judicial confession.
[18]
The presence of a lawyer alone, will not suffice to
fulfill the requirement of the constitutional
provision. The assistance of counsel must be
independent and competent that is, providing full
protection to the constitutional rights of the accused. [19] A
lawyer who simply goes through the motion of reciting
the rights of the accused, or acts as a witness to a pre-
prepared document containing the extra-judicial
confession of the accused or holds an interest contrary to
that of the accused does not qualify as independent and
competent counsel.[20]
To establish the validity of Pulgas extra-judicial
confession, the police investigator PO3 Jovencio
Villacorte testified that appellant Pulga voluntarily
surrendered to the police and told them the whole story
of how his younger sister appellant Marietta Patungan
masterminded the murder of her husband to be able to
marry her lover, and how he and his cousin appellant
Edgar Acebuche accomplished Mariettas bidding.
[21]
Atty. Pedro Rudio of the IBP, Quezon City Chapter,
who supposedly assisted Pulga during the taking of the
extra-judicial confession, testified that Pulga expressed
his consent to be assisted by said counsel and signified
that his confession is voluntary. Atty. Rudio stated that
he even raised Pulgas shirt to check if he had been
subjected to physical violence and found none.
Contrary to PO3 Villacortes assertion that Pulga was
taken into custody on August 10, 1994, the police officer
who actually took all three appellants into custody, SPO2
Orlando Gacute, testified that the appellants were all
invited to the police station on August 9, 1994 and that
they were all subjected to custodial investigation without
counsel.[24] This means that the appellants, and appellant
Pulga, in particular, were in police custody and subjected
to custodial investigation for two and a half days without
the assistance of counsel before he decided to
confess. Villacorte himself admitted that Pulga at first
did not want to confess and pointed to another suspect as
the perpetrator of the crime. This statement negates the
polices claim of voluntary surrender and places in
serious doubt the voluntariness of Pulgas extra-judicial
confession.
Pulga testified that he was arrested on August 9,
1994. He narrated in court that during custodial
investigation he was blindfolded with hands tied behind
him and was electrocuted by the police investigators
while he was either sitting on a steel bar or had a piece
of wet cloth placed on his feet, to compel him to admit
commission of the crime charged. He simply cried and
could not do anything else but to accede to his
tormentors demand. He stated that he signed a pre-
prepared document at the precinct before he was taken to
the IBP office near the Sulo Restaurant in Quezon City
on August 11, 1994.[25]He explained that he narrated his
ordeal only for the first time in court because he could
not complain to the IBP lawyer, the fiscal nor to the
medical officer out of fear of his police investigators and
when he was taken to a medical officer for examination,
the police escort answered the questions for him. None
of his relatives visited him in jail and he only saw his
lawyer in court.[26] Until he was brought to court he had
no one to confide to and he was at the mercy of the
police investigators while he was detained at the Quezon
City Jail.[27] As a detention prisoner he was always
escorted by the police when he was before the IBP
lawyer, the fiscal and the medical officer and Pulga did
not find the opportunity to complain to the
authorities. To our mind, appellant Pulgas fear of his
police escorts is well founded and his delay in revealing
what he underwent during custodial investigation does
not cast doubt on its veracity, as the prosecution
suggests.
We also note from the above testimonies that it was only
after appellant Pulga verbally confessed at the police
precinct, without the assistance of counsel, when he was
brought to the IBP office allegedly for the actual
transcription of his confession in writing in the presence
of a lawyer. It would appear to us that whatever
statement Pulga allegedly gave to the police for
transcription in the presence of counsel is the product of
two and a half days of coercive and uncounselled
custodial investigation. We are inclined to believe that
when he was brought to the IBP office his body and his
will were in no position to raise any objection much less
to complain to the IBP lawyer about what he has gone
through. The situation was not at all alleviated by the
counsel who was supposed to assist Pulga at the taking
of the extra-judicial confession. Said lawyer admitted
that he was working on an appeal in another case two to
three meters away from the police investigator who was
then taking Pulgas statement. He stated that he was not
totally concentrated on the appealed case because he
could still hear the investigation being conducted then.
[28]
Villacorte testified that while he was taking Pulgas
statement the IBP lawyer was working on something else
using two other tables four meters apart. [29] The mere
presence of a lawyer is not sufficient compliance with
the constitutional requirement of assistance of
counsel. Assistance of counsel must be effective, vigilant
and independent.[30] A counsel who could just hear the
investigation going on while working on another case
hardly satisfies the minimum requirements of effective
assistance of counsel. Not only was Pulga subjected to
custodial investigation without counsel, he was likewise
denied effective assistance of counsel during the actual
taking of his extra-judicial confession.
For the reasons above stated, We find that the extra-
judicial confession of appellant Elmerto Pulga is
inadmissible in evidence for having been obtained
without effective assistance of counsel.
17. PEOPLE V. SUELA, 373 SCRA 163 (2002)
In this Decision, the Court visits and applies
existing jurisprudence on the right to competent and
independent counsel of persons under custodial
investigation. It also reiterates the long-standing judicial
policy that procedural laws which are favorable to the
accused shall be given retroactive effect. Inasmuch as
the aggravating circumstance of disguise was not alleged
in the Information, it cannot now be appreciated to
increase the penalty to death, notwithstanding the fact
that the new rule requiring such allegation was
promulgated only after the crime was committed and
after the trial court had already rendered its Decision.
The Case
For automatic review by this Court is the Decision
dated January 26, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, (Branch 95), finding appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and
simple robbery. The decretal portion of the Decision penalized by Rep. Act. 6539, as amended by Rep. Act
reads as follows: 7659, and hereby ACQUITS them for failure of the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the reasonable doubt.
following:
The Sony TV set (Exh. E) and the Citizen gold wrist
1. In Crim. Cases Nos. Q-96-64616 and Q-96-65071, the watch (Exh. T-1) are hereby ordered returned to
Court finds the accused Nerio Suela y Hembra and Director Nilo Rosas upon the final disposition of the
Edgar Suela y Hembra and Edgardo Batocan GUILTY cases.
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide defined in and penalized by paragraph I, The motorcycle (Exh. FF) under the name of the
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by accused Edgardo Batocan shall be kept by the Court
R.A. 7659, and, there being one aggravating until the final disposition of the cases.
circumstance of disguise (par. 14, Art. 14, Revised Penal
Code) and no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, All the three (3) accused are ordered to pay the costs.
each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
DEATH and are ordered to indemnify the heirs of the IT IS SO ORDERED.[2]
late Geronimo Gabilo y Hostallero the amount
The Information[3] against Nerio Suela and
of P50,000.00, as death indemnity; P20,000.00 as
Edgar Suela in Criminal Case No. Q-96-64616 reads as
exemplary damages; P125,250.00, as actual and
follows:
compensatory damages; and P2,8[8]0,000.00, as loss of
earnings based on the formula (2/3 x (80-44) or 24 years
That on or about the 26th day of July 1995,
life expectancy by P120,000.00 reasonable average net
in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
annual earnings.
conspiring, confederating with another person whose
true name, identity and whereabouts have not as yet been
The three accused are further ordered to return to
ascertained and mutually helping one another, by means
Director Nilo Rosas the three (3) cameras
of force upon things, did then and there wilfully,
worth P25,000.00; assorted jewelry worth P120,000.00
unlawfully and feloniously rob one GERONIMO
and cash money in the amount of P500,000.00. If the
GABILO Y HOSTALLERO in the following manner, to
three (3) cameras and the assorted jewelry can no longer
wit: on the date and place aforementioned said accused
be returned, the three (3) accused are hereby ordered to
managed to enter the house of complainant located at
instead pay the value thereof in the total amount
No. 95 B-5 A. Melchor St., Xavierville Subd., Loyola
of P145,000.00;
Heights, this City, by barging into the door of said house
and once inside took, robbed and carried away the
2. In Crim. Case No. Q-96-64618, the Court finds the
following, to wit:
accused Edgar Suela y Hembra GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Robbery
one (1) 14 Sony Trinitron
defined in and penalized by paragraph 5, Article 294, of
colored TV P 12,000.00
the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer
three (3) cameras 25,000.00
the indeterminate penalty of from six (6) months and one
assorted jewelries 120,000.00
(1) day of prision correccional minimum, as the
cash money 500,000.00
minimum penalty to four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional maximum, as the
all in the total amount of P657,000.00, Philippine
maximum penalty; and,
Currency, and on the occasion of said Robbery, the said
accused pursuant to their conspiracy, with intent to kill,
3. In Crim. Cases Nos. Q-96-64617 and Q-96-65072, the
attacked, assaulted and employed personal violence upon
Court finds the accused Nerio Suela y Hembra,
the person of said GERONIMO GABILO Y
Edgar Suela y Hembra and Edgardo Batocan NOT
HOSTALLERO, by stabbing him, thereby inflicting
GUILTY of the Crime of Carnapping as defined in and
upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
Geronimo Gabilo y Hostallero, in the total amount
aforementioned.
The Information[4] against Edgardo Batocan in
Criminal Case No. Q-96-65071 reads as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of July, 1995,
in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating with NERIO SUELA Y
HEMBRA and EDGAR SUELA Y HEMBRA who are
being charged with the same offense at Regional Trial
Court Branch 79 and docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-
64616, and mutually helping one another, by means of
force upon things, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously rob one NILO ROSAS Y LANETE in
the following manner, to wit: on the date and
place afor[e]mentioned said accused entered the house of
complainant located at 95 Melchor St. Xavierville Subd.,
Loyola Heights, this City, by barging into the door of
said house and inside took, robbed and carried away the
following, to wit:
one (1) 14 Sony Trinitron
colored TV - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - P12,000.00
three (3) cameras - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - 25,000.00
assorted jewelries - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - 120,000.00
cash money - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 500,000.00
all in the total amount of P657,000.00, Philippine
Currency, to the damage and prejudice of Nilo Rosas
y Lanete in the aforementioned amount of P657,000.00,
and on the occasion of said Robbery, the said accused
pursuant to their conspiracy, with intent to kill, attacked,
assaulted and employed personal violence upon the
person of said GERONIMO GABILO Y
HOSTALLERO, by stabbing him, thereby inflicting
upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
Geronimo Gabilo y Hostallero.
The Information[5] against Edgar Suela in Criminal
Case No. Q-96-64618 reads as follows:
That on or about the 18 th day of January 1996,
in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, with intent
to gain, and by means of intimidation against person, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
rob/extort one NILO ROSAS Y LANETE in the manner
as follows: on the date and place aforementioned, the
said accused called up by phone the Executive Secretary
of said complainant and demanded the amount
of P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, in exchange for the
information regarding the robbery case and slaying of
Geronimo Gabilo on July 26, 1995, as in fact said
accused, took, robbed and carried away the aforesaid
amount of P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, to the
damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
When arraigned on September 24, 1996, appellants,
with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty. [6] In
due course, they were tried and found guilty by the
court a quo.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The court a quo ruled that appellants had been
assisted by competent and independent counsel during
the execution of their extrajudicial confessions. It gave
credence to the testimonies of Atty. Sansano and the
police officers and thus admitted in evidence the said
confessions.
The letter of Nerio Suela addressed to Director
Rosas asking for forgiveness, as well as the discovery of
the stolen TV set and knife in the formers house, further
convinced the trial court of appellants guilt. Finding the
presence of one aggravating circumstance (disguise)
with no mitigating circumstance to offset it, the trial
court sentenced them to death.
Hence, this automatic review before us. [9]
Assignment of Errors
In his Brief, Appellant Edgardo Batocan ascribes to
the trial court the following alleged errors:[10]
I. The trial court gravely erred in
considering Edgardo Batocans extra
judicial confession as admissible evidence
against him.
 II. The trial court erred in admitting and
appreciating the wristwatch as evidence
against Edgardo Batocan.
III.The trial court erred in convicting
Appellant Batocan of robbery with
homicide.
Appellants Nerio and Edgar Suela, on the other
hand, fault the trial court with the following supposed
errors:[11]
I. The court a quo erred in considering
the extr[a]-judicial confessions of
Edgar Suela and Nerio Suel[a] are
admissible against them;
II. The court a quo erred in considering the
letter of Nerio Suela to Director Nilo Rosas
as evidence against him;
III. The court a quo erred in convicting
Edgar Suela for simple robbery under Art.
294, no. 5, of the Revised Penal Code.
IV. The court a quo erred in convicting
Edgar Suela and Nerio Suela [of] robbery
with homicide.
Basically, the assigned errors boil down to four: (1)
whether the extrajudicial confessions of appellants are
admissible in evidence; (2) whether the wristwatch and
the letter (of NerioSuela) are admissible in evidence; (3)
whether appellants can be convicted of robbery with
homicide; and (4) whether Edgar Suela is guilty of
robbery for demanding P200,000 as payment for
information on the robbery-slay case.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
First Issue: Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confessions
Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or
any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incomunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of
this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
x x x x x x x x x.
In People v. Labtan,[12] we explained that [t]he right
to counsel is a fundamental right and contemplates not a
mere presence of the lawyer beside the
accused. Furthermore, an effective and vigilant counsel
necessarily and logically [requires] that the lawyer be
present and able to advise and assist his client from the
time the confessant answers the first question asked by
the investigating officer until the signing of the
extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer should
ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that
the person under investigation fully understands the
nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial
confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A
contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the
constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to
be presumed innocent.[13]
True, counsel does not necessarily have to dissuade
the person under investigation from confessing. But his
bounden duty is to properly and fully advise his clients
on the nature and consequences of an extrajudicial
confession.
In People v. Deniega,[14] the Court explained:
The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial
investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer
merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a
meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person
undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so cursory
as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired. If the lawyers
role is reduced to being that of a mere witness to the
signing of a pre-prepared document albeit indicating
therein compliance with the accuseds constitutional
rights, the constitutional standard guaranteed by Article
III, Section 12(1) is not met. The process above-
described fulfills the prophylactic purpose of the Evidently, Atty. Sansano did not understand the
constitutional provision by avoiding the 'pernicious exact nature of appellants rights to counsel and to remain
practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or silent during their custodial investigations. He viewed a
confessions from the lips of the person undergoing refusal to answer as an obstruction in the
interrogation for the commission of the offense' and investigation. This shows that he was incapable or
ensuring that the accuseds waiver of his right to self unwilling to advise appellants that remaining silent was
incrimination during the investigation is an informed one a right they could freely exercise without fear of any
in all aspects. untoward consequence. As counsel, he could have
stopped his clients from answering the propounded
The modifier competent and independent in the
questions and advised them of their right to remain
1987 Constitution is not an empty rhetoric. It stresses the
silent, if they preferred to do so.That the process of
need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful
investigation could have been obstructed should not have
conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed
concerned him because his duty was to his clients and
judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent
not to the prosecution or to the police investigators.
and capable lawyer.[15]
Moreover, when he interviewed appellants, he did
With respect Edgardo Batocan, we hold that his
not even bother to find out the gist of their proposed
extrajudicial confession was obtained in violation of his
statements in order to be able to inform them properly of
constitutional rights. This appellant did not finish first
the nature and consequences of their extrajudicial
year high school.[16] Yet Atty. Rous, who is touted by the
confessions. Clearly and sadly, appellants were not
prosecution as a competent and independent counsel,
accorded competent and independent counsel whom they
interviewed Batocan -- before the latter gave his
could rely on to look after their interests.
confession -- for only around five minutes. [17] After this
initial interview, Atty. Rous just listened nonchalantly to
In People v. dela Cruz, we stated that a confession made
the questions propounded by the police and to the
in an atmosphere characterized by deficiencies in
answers given by Batocan. Counsel was not even sure
informing the accused of all rights to which he is entitled
that he had explained to appellant the consequences of
would be rendered valueless and inadmissible,
his extrajudicial confession. Furthermore,
perforated, as it is, by non-compliance with the
Atty. Rous attention was divided while attending the
procedural and substantive safeguards to which an
custodial investigation as he was also looking over
accused is entitled under the Bill of Rights and as now
another paper work on his desk.[18]
further implemented and ramified by statutory law. [22]
In view of these proven circumstances, we are not
Where the prosecution failed to discharge the States
convinced that counsel had fully explained
burden of proving with clear and convincing evidence
to Batocan his constitutional rights and what they
that the accused had enjoyed effective and vigilant
entailed or the nature and the consequences of an
counsel before he extrajudicially admitted his guilt, the
extrajudicial confession -- explanations that would have
extrajudicial confession cannot be given any probative
enabled him to make an informed judgment on whether
value.[23]
to confess; and if so, on what matters. There is no
showing that Atty. Rous properly explained the choices The extrajudicial confessions of all three appellants
or options open to appellant, a duty expected of any are thus inadmissible in evidence.
counsel under the circumstances. In sum, he did not turn
out to be the competent and independent counsel
envisioned by the Constitution. Second Issue: Admissibility of Wristwatch and Letter

We now go to the extrajudicial confessions of Edgar

and Nerio Suela. Atty. Sansano supposedly stood as
counsel for the Suela brothers during their custodial
investigation. He testified on how he discharged his
duties as follows:
Wristwatch
Edgardo Batocan allegedly confessed in Leyte that
the stolen Citizen wristwatch had been given to his
girlfriend. When he rendered this confession, he did not
execute any written waiver of his right to remain silent
or of his right to counsel. Any admission wrung from the
accused in violation of his constitutional rights is
inadmissible in evidence against him.[24]Therefore, his
alleged statement as to the location of the wristwatch is
inadmissible.
Furthermore, the prosecutions claim that the
wristwatch was recovered from his girlfriend is hearsay
and hence, has limited probative value. [25] The
prosecution did not present anyone who had actually
witnessed the alleged recovery of the wristwatch from
the girl. S/Insp. Benjamin Labadia recounted the incident
in this plainly insufficient manner:
Q: Alright Mr. Witness, you said that a wrist
watch was also a part of the loot and
that Batocan told your team that it was in
the custody of his sweetheart. When so
informed that this wrist watch was in the
custody of his sweetheart, what did the
police operatives do?
A: The police operatives together
with Edgardo Batocan went to the place
and when they came back, I did not go
with them, the wrist watch was already in
the possession of the Quezon City Police
operative, Sir.
Q: Did you actually see, Mr. Witness when the
team proceeded to the place where the
sweetheart of
accused Edgardo Batocan was staying,
give this wrist watch to the Quezon City
Police operatives?
A: I said, Sir. I did not accompany them. [26]
As for the wristwatch itself, we agree with appellant
that its seizure, if it was really taken
from Batocans girlfriend, was irregular. As succinctly
explained in Batocans Brief:
x x x. Clearly, the watch was taken without a search
warrant and not as an incident of a valid arrest. The
seizure was irregular. There is also no evidence on
record that it was taken under any of the exempting
circumstances where a warrantless seizure is
permissible. It was not shown if the girlfriend voluntarily
and validly consented to the taking x x x. Lacking such
evidence, no presumption of regularity can be assumed.
Where the search was conducted with irregularity, i.e.
without a warrant, the Court cannot appreciate consent
based merely on the presumption of regularity of the
performance of duty. (People vs. Encinada, 280 SCRA
72).
The wristwatch is clearly a fruit of a fruit of a poisonous
tree. As such, it should not have been admitted and
appreciated against the accused.[27]
Letter
Nerio Suela also contends that his January 31,
1996 letter to Director Rosas is inadmissible in
evidence. The letter reads as follows:
Jan-31-96
Dearest Sir DIR. NILO ROSAS
Sir matagal kona sana ito ipagtapat sa iyo dahil tuwing k
itay nakikita na lumoloha ka parang hindi ako maka hing
a ng sisikip and aking dibdib. Tuwing tayoy nasa simbah
an homihinge ako ng tawad sapanginoon ang nagawa ko
ng ito nararamdaman ko na parabang hinde niya tinatang
gap.
Sir napakalaki ng nagawa kong kasalanan sa iyo at sana
bigyan mo
pa ako ng isang pagkakataon pagsisihan ko lahat ang pag
kakasala sa iyo babagohin ko na ang buhay ko magliling
kod ako sa diyos.
Sir nandito ako sa likod ng bakal na rihas halos lahat ng
oras ng dadasal ako bigyan mo
pa ako ng isang pagkakataon patawaring mo ako.
Sir alam ng diyos na hindi ako ang kriminal may kinala
man lang ako inamin ko na lang. Para naman magkaroon
ng lonas yong problima mo hindi narin ako makatiis hin
di pa makatolog. Lalo na nakikita kitana ng hihirap ang i
nyong katawan lalo na ang in kalooban sana sir bigyan
mo
pa ako ng isang pagkakataon patawarin mo ako isa rin ak
o na anak ng diyos na naligaw ng langdas ngayon pinags
isihan ko lahatang nagawa kong kasalanan sir ayaw ko p
ang mamatay maliliit ang aking mga anak mahal ako ng
aking asawa.
Sir. Edgardo Batokan ang pumatay kay Sir
JERRY sangayon nandoon siya sa Jaro Leyte Bo.
San Agostin. Sir hinde ko maggawang pomatay ng tao s
omama lang ako dahil baka kayo ang patayin nang doonl
ang ako sa may pito.
Yung kapatid ko namana siya ang may baril siya and nan
otok si Edgardo Batokan siya ang komoha ng pira tapos
omalis na kami ako ang ng drive ng kotse. Tapos inewan
namin sa Rictotapos ng hiwalay hiwa na kame yon tike.
Dian ng kapatid ko.
Sir patawarin mo na ako hinde naman akong masamang t
ao na pasama lang ako.
Sana po &
sir babaan mo naman ang aking sintinesia ayaw ko pang
mamatay.
Nerio Suela
(signed)
Quezon City Jail
Sir. Sagotin mo naman
itong sulat ko,
(
[28]
signed)
This letter was properly identified. Nerio was no
longer under custodial investigation when he wrote it. In
open court, he admitted having written it. Thus, contrary
to his contention, the fact that he was not assisted by
counsel when he wrote it will not make the letter
inadmissible in evidence. Constitutional procedures on
custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the
authorities.[29] Hence, the letter is admissible in evidence.
Edgardo Batocans confession to Rosas who is not a
police officer is admissible in evidence. [38] The Rules
state that the declaration of an accused acknowledging
his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense
necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence
against him.[39] Batocans verbal declarations are not
covered by Sections 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution,[40] because they were not extracted while he
was under custodial investigation.
In People v. Tawat,[41] the Court declared:
The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as a
witness, who heard the confession, is competent to
testify as to the substance of what he heard is he heard
and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be
repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in
its substance.
Proof of the contents of an oral extrajudicial confession
may be made by the testimony of a person who testifies
that he was present, heard, understood, and remembers
the substance of the conversation or statement made by
the accused.
These pieces of evidence sufficiently prove beyond
reasonable doubt the commission of the crime of robbery
with homicide.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is
hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED and the appealed
Decision MODIFIED. We AFFIRM the judgment insofar
as it refers to Criminal Case Nos. Q-96-64616 and Q-96-
65071 but REDUCE the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
The award of civil indemnities is also AFFIRMED. In
Criminal Case No. Q-96-64618 for simple robbery,
Edgar Suela y Hembra is ACQUITTED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,
C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago,
De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio,
JJ., concur.
18. PEOPLE V. JANUARIO, 276 SCRA 608 (1997)
History:
The 1987 Constitution was crafted and ordained at a
historic time when our nation was reeling from ghastly
memories of atrocities, excesses and outright violations
of our peoples rights to life, liberty and property. Hence,
our bill of rights was worded to emphasize the sanctity
of human liberty and specifically to protect persons
undergoing custodial investigations from ignorant,
overzealous and/or incompetent peace officers.
The Constitution so dearly values freedom and
voluntariness that, inter alia, it unequivocally guarantees
a person undergoing investigation for the commission of
an offense not only the services of counsel, but a lawyer
who is not merely (a) competent but also (b) independent
and (c) preferably of his own choice as well.
 xxx
FACTS:
The main evidence relied upon for the conviction of
appellants were their own extrajudicial confessions
which admittedly were extracted and signed in the
presence and with the assistance of a lawyer who was
applying for work in the NBI. Such counsel cannot in
any wise be considered independent because he cannot
be expected to work against the interest of a police
agency he was hoping to join, as a few months later, he
in fact was admitted into its work force. For this
violation of their constitutional right to independent
counsel, appellants deserve acquittal. After the
exclusion of their tainted confessions, no sufficient and
credible evidence remains in the Courts records to
overturn another constitutional right: the right to be
presumed innocent of any crime until the contrary is
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Judgment is hereby rendered finding accused:
(1) RENE JANUARIO Y ROLDAN
and-
(2) EFREN CANAPE Y BAYOT
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Violation of Sec. 14 last sentence of R.A. No. 6539,
otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Law. Thus, this
Court hereby imposes upon the said accused, the
supreme penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or life
imprisonment.
The Issues
(1) The trial procedure, particularly the presentation and
admission of the testimony of Atty. Carlos Saunar, was
irregular and prejudicial to the appellants; and
(2) The extra-judicial confessions of the appellants are
inadmissible in evidence for having been extracted in
violation of their constitutional right to counsel.
Insisting that his guilt had not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, appellant Januario contends that the
trial court erred in admitting in evidence his sworn
statement before the NBI and the testimony of Atty.
Saunar as rebuttal or additional witness after the
prosecution had rested its case, he (appellant Januario)
had filed his memorandum, and the decision had been
scheduled for promulgation.[38]
For his part, appellant Canape also claims that his
guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He
questions the trial court's having given "weight and
sufficiency" to his extra-judicial confession. [39]
Appellant Januario contends that the trial court
erred in allowing the presentation of Saunar as a witness
after the prosecution had closed its case and offered its
documentary evidence. Saunar could not in any guise be
considered as a rebuttal witness simply because there
was no defense evidence to rebut.
The Courts Ruling
The First Issue: Order of Trial
The pertinent provisions of Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court state:
"Sec. 3. Order of trial.- The trial shall proceed in the
following order:
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the
charge, and in the proper case, the civil liability.
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his
defense, and damages, if any, arising from the issuance
of any provisional remedy in the case.
(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting
evidence only, unless the court, in the furtherance of
justice, permits them to present additional evidence
bearing upon the main issue.
(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the cases shall be
deemed submitted unless the court directs the parties to
argue orally or to submit memoranda.
(e) However, when the accused admits the act or
omission charged in the complaint or information but
interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be
modified accordingly." (Emphasis supplied.)
The trial procedure as outlined in this rule is
ordinarily followed to insure the orderly conduct of
litigations to attain the magisterial objective of the Rules
of Court to protect the parties' substantive rights.
[40]
However, strict observance of the Rules depend upon
the circumstances obtaining in each case at the discretion
of the trial judge. Thus, as early as 1917, this Court
explained:
 "x x x. The orderly course of proceedings
requires, however, that the prosecution shall go
forward and should present all of its proof in the
first instance; but it is competent for the judge,
according to the nature of the case, to allow a party
who has closed his case to introduce further
evidence in rebuttal. This rule, however, depends
upon the particular circumstances of each particular
case, and falls within the sound discretion of the
judge, to be exercised or not as he may think
proper."[41]
Hence, the court may allow the prosecutor, even
after he has rested his case or even after the defense has
moved for dismissal, to present involuntarily omitted
evidence.[42] The primary consideration is whether the
trial court still has jurisdiction over the case. Thus
"The claim that the lower court erred in allowing the
prosecuting attorney to introduce new evidence is devoid
of any merit, for while the prosecution had rested, the
trial was not yet terminated and the cause was still under
the control and jurisdiction of the court and the latter, in
the exercise of its discretion, may receive additional
evidence. Sec. 3(c), Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
clearly provides that, in the furtherance of justice, the
court may grant either of the parties the right and
opportunity to adduce new additional evidence bearing
upon the main issue in question."[43]
Saunars testimony was admitted in evidence before
the trial court rendered its Decision. Undoubtedly then,
the court a quo retained its jurisdiction even though the
prosecution had rested its case. As to appellants, Saunar
was an additional prosecution witness, not a rebuttal
witness, because the defense waived presentation of
evidence after the prosecution had rested its case.
[44]
Saunar was, therefore, a rebuttal witness with respect
to accused Cid.[45]
The Second Issue: Appellants Right to Counsel
Proof of Saunar's presence during the custodial
investigation of appellants is, however, not a guarantee
that appellants' respective confessions had been taken in
accordance with Article III, Section 12 (1) of the
Constitution. This constitutional provision requires that
a person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have no less than "competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own
choice." Elucidating on this particular constitutional
requirement, this Court has taught:
It is noteworthy that the
modifiers competent and independent were terms absent
in all organic laws previous to the 1987
Constitution. Their addition in the fundamental law of
1987 was meant to stress the primacy accorded to the
voluntariness of the choice, under the uniquely stressful
conditions of a custodial investigation, by according the
accused, deprived of normal conditions guaranteeing
individual autonomy, an informed judgment based on the
choices given to him by a competent and independent
lawyer.
Thus, the lawyer called to be present during such
investigation should be as far as reasonably possible, the
choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the
lawyer were one furnished in the accused's behalf, it is
important that he should be competent and independent,
i.e., that he is willing to fully safeguard the constitutional
rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who
would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and
meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional
rights. In People v. Basay, this Court stressed that an
accused's right to be informed of the right to remain
silent and to counsel `contemplates the transmission of
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial
and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle.'
Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual
facing custodial investigation (if the latter could not
afford one) `should be engaged by the accused (himself),
or by the latter's relative or person authorized by him to
engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition
of the accused or person authorized by the accused to
file such petition. Lawyers engaged by the police,
whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity
and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in
many areas, the relationship between lawyers and law
enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.
Let us for the moment grant arguendo that Saunar's
competence as a lawyer is beyond question. Under the
circumstances described by the prosecution however, he
could not have been the independent counsel solemnly
spoken of by our Constitution. He was an applicant for a
position in the NBI and therefore it can never be said
that his loyalty was to the confessants. In fact, he was
actually employed by the NBI a few months after. As
regards appellant Januario, Saunar might have really
been around to properly apprise appellant of his
constitutional right as reflected in the written sworn
statement itself.
However, the same cannot be said about appellant
Canape. Clearly, he was not properly informed of his
constitutional rights. Perfunctorily informing a confession which, in turn, is defined in Section 33 of the
confessant of his constitutional rights, asking him if he
wants to avail of the services of counsel and telling him
that he could ask for counsel if he so desires or that one
could be provided him at his request, are simply not in
compliance with the constitutional mandate.[51] In this
case, appellant Canape was merely told of his
constitutional rights and posthaste, asked whether he was
willing to confess. His affirmative answer may not, by
any means, be interpreted as a waiver of his right to
counsel of his own choice.
Furthermore, the right of a person under custodial
investigation to be informed of his rights to remain silent
and to counsel implies a correlative obligation on the
part of the police investigator to explain and to
contemplate an effective communication that results in
an understanding of what is conveyed. [52] Appellant
Canape's sworn statement, which reads and sounds so
lifeless on paper, fails to reflect compliance with this
requirement. Neither does the aforequoted testimony of
NBI Agent Toribio. Bearing in mind that appellant
Canape reached only the fifth grade, the NBI agents
should have exerted more effort in explaining to him his
constitutional rights.
Moreover, there is enough reason to doubt whether
appellant Canape was in fact and in truth assisted by
counsel. Atty. Saunar affirmed on the witness stand that
he assisted appellants on March 28, 1988. [53] However,
the sworn statement itself reveals that it was taken on
March 27, 1988. No satisfactory explanation was made
by the prosecution on this discrepancy. All that Agent
Vela stated was that they conducted an oral investigation
in Naga City on March 27, 1988 and that investigation at
the NBI Manila head office was made in the afternoon of
March 28, 1988.[54]
The law enforcement agents' cavalier disregard of
appellants' constitutional rights is shown not only by
their failure to observe Section 12 (1) of Article III of the
Constitution. They have likewise forgotten the third
paragraph of Section 12 of the same article which
mandates that an admission of facts related to a crime
must be obtained with the assistance of counsel
otherwise it would be inadmissible in evidence against
the person so admitting.[55]
An admission, which, under Section 26 of Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, is an "act, declaration or omission
of a party as to a relevant fact" is different from a
same Rule as the "declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any
offense necessarily included therein." Both may be
given in evidence against the person admitting or
confessing. In People vs. Lorenzo,[56] the Court
explained that in a confession there is an
acknowledgment of guilt while in an admission the
statements of fact by the accused do not directly involve
an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to
commit the offense with which the accused is charged.
Appellants verbally intimated facts relevant to the
commission of the crime to the NBI agents in Naga
City. This is shown by the testimony of NBI Agent Vela
that, based on the facts gathered from interviews of
people in that city, they "invited" and questioned
appellants, thus:
Prior to the execution of the sworn statements at the
NBI head office, appellants had already made verbal
admissions of complicity in the crime. Verbal
admissions, however, should also be made with the
assistance of counsel. Thus:
"The verbal admissions allegedly made by both
appellants of their participation in the crime, at the
time of their arrest and even before their formal
investigation, are inadmissible, both as violative of
their constitutional rights and as hearsay
evidence. These oral admissions, assuming they
were in fact made, constitute uncounselled
extrajudicial confessions within the meaning of
Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution."[60]
That appellants indeed admitted participation in the
commission of the crime in Naga City is shown by the
fact that the NBI agents brought them to Manila to
facilitate apprehension of the other culprits who could
be either in Cavite or Manila. Because their
uncounselled oral admissions in Naga City resulted in
the execution of their written confessions in Manila, the
latter had become as constitutionally infirm as the
former. In People vs. Alicando,[61] this Court explained
the ramifications of an irregularly counselled confession
or admission:
"We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda
warnings in our jurisdiction. We have also adopted the
libertarian exclusionary rules known as the `fruit of the
poisonous tree,' a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix
Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v. United
States. According to this rule, once the primary
source (the `tree') is shown to have been unlawfully
obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the
`fruit') derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated
otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as
a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the `fruit of the
poisonous tree' is the indirect result of the same illegal
act. The `fruit of the poisonous tree is at least once
removed from the illegally seized evidence, but is
equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle
that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not
be used to gain other evidence because the originally
illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence
subsequently obtained."
Appellants might have indeed committed the crime
in concert with Eliseo Sarita and Eduardo
Sarinos. However, what could have been their valuable
admissions and confessions as far as the prosecution was
concerned were sullied and rendered inadmissible by the
irregular manner by which the law enforcement agents
extracted such admissions and confessions from
appellants. Without such statements, the remaining
prosecution evidence -- consisting mostly of hearsay
testimony and investigation reports -- is sorely
inadequate to prove appellants participation in the crime.
Notably, these law enforcers did not only defy the
mandate of Section 12 of the Bill of Rights but, after
making "inquiries" from appellants about the crime, they
likewise illegally detained appellants as shown by the
admission of one of the NBI agents that appellants were
deprived of their liberty while in their custody.
[62]
Appellants were even made to travel for ten (10)
hours[63] from Naga City to Manila just so their formal
confessions could be executed in the latter
city. According to NBI Agent Vela, they "actually
arrested" the appellants when the court issued the
warrant for their arrest.[64] The records show however
that the NBI turned appellants over to the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Silang-Amadeo in Cavite only on
March 30, 1989. On the same day, the same court turned
them back to the NBI for "detention during pendency of
the case."
Epilogue
The Court understands the difficulties faced by law
enforcement agencies in apprehending violators of the
law especially those involving syndicates. It
sympathizes with the public clamor for the bringing of
criminals before the altar of justice. However, quick
solution of crimes and the consequent apprehension of
malefactors are not the end-all and be-all of law
enforcement. Enforcers of the law must follow the
procedure mandated by the Constitution and the
law. Otherwise, their efforts would be
meaningless. And their expenses in trying to solve
crimes would constitute needless expenditures of
taxpayers money.
This Court values liberty and will always insist on
the observance of basic constitutional rights as a
condition sine qua non against the awesome
investigative and prosecutory powers of
government. The admonition given by this Court to
government officers, particularly those involved in law
enforcement and the administration of justice, in the case
of People vs. Cuizon,[66]where NBI agents mishandled a
drug bust operation and in so doing violated the
constitutional guarantees against unlawful arrests and
illegal searches and seizures, is again called for and thus
reiterated in the case at bench, to wit:
x x x In the final analysis, we in the
administration of justice would have no right to
expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do
not insist on the full protection of their
rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may
still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure
as long as the law enforcers show the alleged
evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by
which they were obtained. This kind of attitude
condones law-breaking in the name of law
enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more
rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the
eventual denigration of society. While this Court
appreciates and encourages the efforts of law
enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the
peace and security of society, we nevertheless
admonish them to act with deliberate care and
 within the parameters set by the Constitution and
the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.
WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 in Tagaytay
City, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellants Rene Januario and Efren Canape
are ACQUITTED.
The accused-appellants are hereby ORDERED
RELEASED immediately unless they are being detained
for some other legal cause.
SO ORDERED.
19) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
REY DENIEGA y MACOY, and HOYLE DIAZ y
URNILLO, defendants-appellants.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The naked body of Marlyn Canoy was found on
a heap of garbage in an ill-frequented back
corner on the left side of the Mt. Carmel Church
in New Manila, Quezon City. Her hands were
tied behind her back by a shoestring and pieces
of her own clothing. The body bore thirty nine
(39) stab wounds. There was evidence that she
had been brutally assaulted, physically and
sexually, before she was murdered.
Police authorities investigating the gruesome
crime on August 31, 1989, arrested Rey Daniega
y Macoy on information that the victim was last
seen with Daniega, 1 a waiter at the Gathering
Disco where Canoy used to work. Friends of
Canoy volunteered the information that the
former had just broken off from a stormy
relationship with Daniega. 2The latter, it was
bruited, 3 desperately tried to patch up the
relationship.
Following the latter's arrest, and on the basis of a
confession obtained by police authorities from
him during custodial investigation (where he
allegedly admitted raping and killing
Canoy), 4 appellant Hoyle Diaz y Urnillo was
invited by the investigators for questioning. A
second sworn statement, substantially similar
and corroborating many of the details of
Daniega's sworn affidavit, was later extracted
from Diaz. In the said statement, Diaz admitted
his participation in the rape of Canoy, but denied
that he had something to do with the victim's
death. 5
Armed with the said extra-judicial
confessions, an Information was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, 6 charging petitioners with the crime of
Rape with Homicide
At trial, the confessions obtained by law
enforcement authorities during their (separate)
custodial investigations formed the centerpiece
of the prosecution's case for Rape with
Homicide against both accused. 7 These
confessions allegedly disclosed details of the
killing.
In their defense, appellants, during the course
of the trial, vehemently denied the claim that
they had voluntarily executed the said
confessions. 9 Appellants Daniega and Diaz went
to the extent of seeking the assistance of the
National Bureau of Investigation, and there
executed a sworn statement to the effect that
their respective confessions were coerced and
obtained through torture. 10 Both testified that
they were subjected to electrocution and water
treatment. They contended that they were
arrested without warrants of arrest and that
the confessions obtained from them
immediately thereafter were made without
the assistance of counsel.
The lower court, on August 31, 1991 rendered
its Decision convicting the accused-appellants of
the crime of Rape with Homicide. In dismissing
appellant's principal defense that their
confessions were obtained in violation of their
constitutional rights, the trial court held that:
The court finds it hard to believe that (Atty.
Sansano and Atty. Rous), both of whom are
officers of the Legal Aid Committee of the IBP
and are prominent practitioners of great
integrity, would act as the accused said they did.
The two counsels testified that they precisely
segregated the accused from their police escorts
to cull out the truth and the accused volunteered
to confess to the crime at bar.
Issue:
 Whether or not the lower court erred in
convicting the appellants based on their
extrajudicial confession.
Held:
The court held that under rules laid down by the
Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence,
a confession to be admissible must satisfy all of
four fundamental requirements: 1) the
confession must be voluntary 2) the
confession must be made with the assistance
of competent and independent counsel; 3) the
confession must be express and 4) the
confession must be in writing.
The court noted that the assistance of a counsel
provided for the accused was inadequate to meet
the standard requirements of the constitution for
custodial investigation. It seems that the lawyers
were not around throughout the custodial
investigation. Citing People vs Javar, the court
reiterated that any statement obtained in
violation of the constitutional provision, or in
part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if
the confession speaks the truth, if it was made
without the assistance of counsel, it becomes
inadmissible in evidence regardless of the
absence of coercion or even if it had been
voluntarily given. Thus, because of these
defects in observing the proper procedural
requirements of the constitution on custodial
investigation the accused-appellants were
acquitted.
20) PEOPLE VS. LABTAN [GR 127493, 8
DECEMBER 1999]
FACTS:
On 28 March 1993, at more or less 10:30 p.m.
while inside a motor vehicle in the national
highway at Barangay Agusan up to the road at
Camaman-an, all of Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, Henry Feliciano y Lagura and
Orlando Labtan y Daquihon took away, through
intimdation or violence, cash amounting to
P720.00, pioneer stereo, booster and twitters
owned by and belonging to Roman S. Mercado,
and a Seiko Diver wristwatch owned by Ismael
P. Ebon, all in all amounting to P10,800.00.
Later on, on or about 16 April 1993, at about
2:30 p.m., more or less, at Buntong, Camaman-
an, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, Feliciano,
Orlando Labtan, and Jonelto Labtan robbed
Florentino Bolasito of P30 in cash money. In the
course thereof, Orlando and Jonelto Labtan
stabbed Bolasito to death.
On 23 April 1993, an information was filed
against Feliciano, Orlando Labtan, and Jonelto
Labtan charging them with robbery with
homicide (as per 16 April 1993 incident).
Subsequently, another information dated 20 May
1993 was filed against Feliciano and Orlando
Labtan charging them with highway robbery (as
per 28 March 1993 incident). Only Feliciano
pleaded not guilty to the two charges. Orlando
Labtan had escaped the Maharlika Rehabilitation
and Detention Center in Carmen, Cagayan de
Oro City where he was detained while Jonelto
Labtan has eluded arrest. The two cases were
tried together.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan
de Oro City, Branch 25 found Feliciano guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct
participation in the crime of robbery with
homicide
The trial court also found Feliciano guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
highway robbery
The trial court convicted Feliciano on the basis
of his sworn which he repudiated during the
trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sworn-statement executed
by accused Feliciano in theabsence of a
competent counsel of his choice, is admissible
in evidence.
Whether the counselling of Atty. Pepito
Chavez to Feliciano cured the initial lack of
counsel.
HELD:
Under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution, the rights of persons under
custodial investigation are provided as follows:
(1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to
 have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiate
the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible against him.
At that point, accused-appellant had been
subjected to custodial investigation without a
counsel. In Navallo v. Sandiganbayan 15, we said
that a person is deemed under custodial
investigation where the police investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
but has began to focus on a particular suspect
who had been taken into custody by the police
who carry out a process of interrogation that
lends itself to elicit incriminating statements.
The prosecution tried to establish that Atty.
Pepito Chavez provided effective and
independent counselling to accused-appellant
Feliciano which cured the initial lack of counsel.
However, this is belied by the very testimony of
Atty. Chavez showing he performed his duty in a
lackadaisical fashion.
The right to counsel is a fundamental right and
contemplates not a mere presence of the lawyer
beside the accused.
Atty. Chavez did not provide the kind of
counselling required by the Constitution. He did
not explain to accused-appellant the
consequences of his action that the sworn
statement can be used against him and that it is
possible that he could be found guilty and sent to
jail.
We also find that Atty. Chavez's independence
as counsel is suspect he is regularly engaged
by the Cagayan de Oro City Police as counsel de
officio for suspects who cannot avail the services
of counsel. He even received money from the
police as payment for his services:
We also find the fact that Atty. Chavez notarized
the sworn statement seriously compromised his
independence. By doing so, he vouched for the
regularity of the circumstances surrounding the
taking of the sworn statement by the police. He
cannot serve as counsel of the accused and the
police at the same time. There was a serious
conflict of interest on his part. 22
On the charge of robbery with homicide, the
only evidence presented by the prosecution was
the sworn statement which we have found
inadmissible. Thus, we are forced to absolve
accused-appellant of this charge. With respect to
the charge of highway robbery, the prosecution
presented the testimony of Ismael Ebon.
However, Ebon failed to identify Feliciano as
the perpetrator when he reported to the police
immediately after the incident.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the trial
court is SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Henry
Feliciano is ACQUITTED on both charges of
robbery with homicide and highway robbery due
to lack of evidence to sustain a conviction.
21) PEOPLE V. BASAY
FACTS:
Teodoro Basay and Jaime Ramirez were charged with
Multiple Murder with Arson in a criminal complaint
filed on 24 March 1986 with the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Pamplona-Amlan-San Jose in the
Province of Negros Oriental.
The spouses Zosimo and Beatrice Toting, together with
one of their daughters, Bombie, were hacked inside their
home. In order to conceal the crime, the perpetrators also
burned the said house. Because of the fire, the spouses
other daughter, Manolita, was burned to death, while one
of their sons, Manolo, suffered second and third degree
burns. Bombie survived the hacking and the burning and
was found alive around forty meters away from the dead
bodies of her family members almost two days after the
crime was committed. Upon being found, Bombie
allegedly related to the authorities that Jaime Ramirez
and Teodoro Basay killed their parents and burned their
house. She died a day later while confined in the
hospital.
After Bombie told the authorities who the perpetrators
were, they went to Jaimes house, and Jaime, upon
seeing the police, tried to run. He was then turned over
to the Pamplona police station and brought to the
chamber of Judge Teopisto Calumpang, accompanied by
Elpedio Catacutan, a barrister and a COMELEC registrar
of the place, who acted as Jaimes counsel. An affidavit
(Exhibit F), referred to as Jaimes extrajudicial
confession, was produced before the Judge, previously
typed by a police investigating officer. The Judge then
made the court interpreter translate the allegations of the
sworn statement into the local dialect for Jaime, who did
not understand English. Afterwards, Jaime and
Catacutan signed the document in the presence of the
Judge. After Teodoro was also apprehended by the
police, he and Jaime allegedly executed a Joint Waiver
wherein it was stated that for their safety and security,
they voluntarily decided to be detained and that they
killed the spouses and thereafter burned the spouses
house which resulted in the death of one and
hospitalization of two Toting children.
During the trial, Jaime testified that he did not read the
document that he signed before Judge Calumpang
because he did not know how to read. He also did not
understand when it was read to him because it was in
English. He also stated that Catacutan was not his lawyer
and that he did not know him, but only saw him for the
first time in the Pamplona Municipal Hall while the
latter was going upstairs.
The trial court disregarded the joint waiver insofar as it
tended to incriminate the accused and because when they
signed the same, they were not represented by counsel,
in violation of their rights as provided in Section 12,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. There being no other
evidence against Teodoro, the court acquitted him.
However, it admitted in evidence Jaimes extrajudicial
confession, considered as part of the res gestae the
statement given by Bombie identifying Jaime and
Teodoro as the perpetrators of the crime, and considered
as flight which is indicative of guilt Jaimes running
away when he saw the law enforcers. It further ruled that
Jaime signed the extrajudicial confession voluntarily and
in the presence of counsel so it is therefore admissible
against him.
Jaime neither filed a notice of appeal, nor orally
manifested his intention to appeal. However, the lower
court transmitted the records of the case to the Supreme
Court because in view of the penalty imposed life
imprisonment the lower court ratiocinated that such
decision is subject for automatic review by the Supreme
Court. Although erroneous, the Supreme Court
nonetheless accepted the appeal in the interest of justice.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC erred in finding the appellant guilty as
charged on the basis of Exhibit F (affidavit) which was
executed in violation of his Constitutional rights and on
the basis of hearsay evidence and on the presumption of
guilt.
RULING:
The Court find merit in the appeal. The Court does not
hesitate to rule that this purported extra-judicial
confession belonging to appellant Jaime Ramirez and
obtained during custodial interrogation was taken in
blatant disregard of his right to counsel, to remain silent
and to be informed of such rights, guaranteed by Section
20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution the governing
law at that time. Said section reads:
"SECTION 20. No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself. Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence."
The source of this provision is Miranda v. Arizona, in
connection therewith, this Court stated in People v.
Caguioa that:
". . . The landmark opinion of Miranda v. Arizona,
decided in 1966, as noted above, the source of this
constitutional provision, emphasized that statements
made during the period of custodial interrogation to be
admissible require a clear intelligent waiver of
constitutional rights, the suspect being warned prior to
questioning that he has a right to remain silent, that any
utterance may be used against him, and that he has the
right to the presence of a counsel, either retained or
appointed. In the language of Chief Justice Warren: Our
holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the
pages which follow, but briefly stated, it is this: the
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory
or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of
the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we
mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless
other fully effective means are devised to inform accused
persons of their right of silence and to assure a
continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following
measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the
person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does not make (sic) may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to
the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.
The defendant may waive effectuation of those rights,
provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and
at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with
an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning.
Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any
manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the
police may not question him. The mere fact that he may
have answered some questions or volunteered some
statements on his own does not deprive him of the right
to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he
has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to
be questioned."
Then, in Morales v. Enrile, in the light of the said
Section 20, prescribed the procedure to be followed by
peace officers when making an arrest and when
conducting a custodial investigation. Thus:
"7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of
the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the
arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any.
He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he
might make could be used against him. The person
arrested shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means by telephone if possible or by
letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the
arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No
custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in
the presence of counsel engaged by the reason arrested,
by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court
upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone
on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but
the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in
violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence."
In People v. Nicandro, this Court declared that ones
right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to
counsel contemplates "the transmission of meaningful
information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle." Thus, is not enough for the interrogator to
merely repeat to the person under investigation the
provisions of section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, now Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution; the former must also explain the effects of
such provision in practical terms e.g., what the person
under interrogation may or may not do - and in a
language the subject fairly understands. The right "to be
informed" carries with it a correlative obligation on the
part of the police investigator to explain, and
contemplates effective communication which results in
the subjects understanding of what is conveyed. Since it
is comprehension that is sought to be attained, the degree
of explanation required will necessarily vary and depend
on the education, intelligence and other relevant personal
circumstances of the person undergoing investigation. In
further ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that
the subject is informed of such right; he should also be
asked if he wants to avail of the same and should be told
that he could ask for counsel if he so desired or that one
could be provided him at his request. If he decides not to
retain counsel of his choice or avail of one to be
provided for him and, therefore, chooses to waive his
right to counsel, such waiver, to be valid and effective,
must still be made with the assistance of counsel. That
counsel must be a lawyer.
The foregoing pronouncements are now synthesized in
paragraphs 1 and 3, Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
"SECTION 12(1). Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence to appear before Judge Calumpang. His presence
of counsel. before the latter did not change the situation. As this
Court stated in People v. Burgos, the securing of counsel
x x x to help the accused when the latter subscribed under oath
to his statement at the Fiscals Office was too late and
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of
had no palliative effect; it did not cure the absence of
this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
counsel at the time of the custodial investigation when
evidence against him."
the extra-judicial statement was being taken.
The adjectives competent and independent, which
(f) Furthermore, Elpedio Calumpang is not a lawyer;
qualify the kind of counsel an accused is entitled to
according to the trial court, he is "a barister (sic)." In
during investigation, were not found in the previous
fact, he candidly admitted that he is not a lawyer but that
Constitution. Their incorporation in the 1987
he obtained a law degree from the Siliman University in
Constitution was thus meant to stress the primacy of this
1959. Unfortunately, however, he failed in three Bar
right to counsel.
Examinations.
A close scrutiny of the questioned extra-judicial
(g) There is no showing that the so-called extra-judicial
confession in the case at bar reveals all possible
confession, which is in English, was correctly explained
violations of the appellants right to remain silent, to
and translated to the appellant by Judge Calumpang.
counsel and to be informed of such rights, and of the
Although the latter claimed in his testimony on direct
safeguards prescribed by this Court for the holding of
examination that he translated the same in the local
custodial interrogations.
dialect to the appellant before the latter affixed his
(a) The interrogation was the conducted and the signature thereto, Elpedio Catacutan categorically
confession was written in English a language the declared that it was the interpreter, one Pedro Rodriguez,
appellant, a farmer in a remote barangay of Pamplona, who translated it to the appellant.
cannot speak and does not understand; he only finished
(h) Finally, the kind of "advice" proffered by the
Grade II. There is no evidence to show that the
unidentified interrogator belongs to that stereotyped
interrogator, who was not even presented as a witness
class a long question by the investigator informing
and remains unidentified, translated the questions and
the appellant of his right followed by a monosyllabic
the answers into a dialect known and fairly understood
answer which this Court has condemned for being
by the appellant.
unsatisfactory. The investigator gave his advice
(b) Appellant was not told that he could retain a counsel perfunctorily or in a pro-forma manner, obviously to pay
of choice and that if he cannot afford to do so, he could mere lip service to the prescribed norms.
be provided with one.
Consequently, Exhibit "F", which is indisputably an
(c) He did not sign any waiver of his right to remain uncounselled confession or admission, is inadmissible in
silent and to counsel. evidence. The trial court, therefore, committed a fatal
error in admitting it.
(d) He was not assisted by any counsel during the
investigation. Instead, a certain Elpedio Catacutan, who Hence, the appellants guilt was not established with
claimed to have appeared for him as a "friend-counsel," moral certainty. He should be acquitted.
was present only at the time that appellant was brought
WHEREFORE, the challenged of the Regional Trial
to the office of Judge Catacutan for the preparation of
Court of Negros Oriental is REVERSED and appellant
the jurat.
JAIME RAMIREZ alias "NEBOY" is hereby
(e) Assuming arguendo that Elpedio Catacutan may have ACQUITTED with costs de oficio.
been summoned to act as appellants counsel, he was,
nevertheless, not present during the custodial
interrogation which, by the way, was conducted exactly a
week before he appeared or more correctly, was made

D. BARANGAY CAPTAINS AND
NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH GROUPS
22) PEOPLE VS. MALNGAN
FACTS:
(This case is a review of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, affirming with modification the Judgment of
the Regional Trial Court finding appellant Edna Malngan
y Mayo (Edna) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide or Arson
resulting to the death of six (6) people, and sentencing
her to suffer the penalty of death.)
It was at around 4:45 a.m. on January 2, 2001 when
Remigio Bernardo and his tanods saw the accused-
appellant EDNA, one hired as a housemaid by Roberto
Separa, Sr., with her head turning in different directions,
hurriedly leaving the house of her employer at No. 172
Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila. She was seen to
have boarded a pedicab which was driven by a person
later identified as Rolando Gruta. She was heard by the
pedicab driver to have instructed that she be brought to
Nipa Street, but upon her arrival there, she changed her
mind and asked that she be brought instead to Balasan
Street where she finally alighted, after paying for her
fare.
Thirty minutes later, Barangay Chairman Bernardos
group later discovered that a fire gutted the house of the
employer of the housemaid. They responded and firemen
from the Fire District 1-NCR arrived at the fire scene to
contain the fire. Accused appellant EDNA was later
apprehended in Balasan Street where she was seen
acting strangely and suspiciously. She was brought to the
Barangay Hall for investigation. Upon inspection, a
disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellant
EDNAs bag. Thereafter, accused-appellant EDNA
confessed to Barangay Chairman Bernardo that she set
her employers house on fire because she had not been
paid her salary for about a year and that she wanted to go
home to her province but her employer told her to just
ride a broomstick in going home.
Mercedita Mendoza, whose house was also burned and
identified EDNA as the housemaid of the victims, went
to the San Lazaro Fire Station, where EDNA was later
turned over, to give her sworn statement. She had the
opportunity to ask EDNA why she did the burning of her
employers house and accused-appellant EDNA replied
that she set the house on fire because when she asked
permission to go home to her province, the wife of her
employer told her to just ride a broomstick in going
home. And when Mercedita Mendoza asked how she
burned the house, she told her: Naglukot ako ng
maraming diyaryo, sinindihan ko ng disposable lighter at
hinagis ko sa ibabaw ng lamesa sa loob ng bahay.
The fire resulted in the destruction of the house of
Roberto Separa, Sr. and other adjoining houses and the
death of Roberto Separa, Sr. and Virginia Separa
together with their four children.
A trial thereafter ensued. Barangay Chairman Bernardo,
Mercedita Mendoza, and other three witnesses were
presented in court.
Accused-appellant questions the admissibility of her
uncounselled extrajudicial confession given to
prosecution witnesses, namely Remigio Bernardo and
Mercedita Mendoza. Accused-appellant Edna contends
that being uncounselled extrajudicial confession, her
admissions to having committed the crime charged
should have been excluded in evidence against her for
being violative of Article III, Section 12(1) of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
WON the Honorable Court erred in allowing and giving
credence to the uncounselled admissions allegedly given
by the accused to the witnesses Barangay Chairman
Bernando and Mercedita Mendoza.
RULING:
The Court partly disagrees.
Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution in part
provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of
this Section or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
The Court have held that the above-quoted provision
applies to the stage of custodial investigation when the
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person
as a suspect. Said constitutional guarantee has also been
extended to situations in which an individual has not
been formally arrested but has merely been invited for
questioning.
To be admissible in evidence against an accused, the
extrajudicial confessions made must satisfy the
following requirements:
(1) It must be voluntary;
(2) It must be made with the assistance of competent
and independent counsel;
(3) It must be express; and
(4) It must be in writing.
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay
Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as
law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article
III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When
accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in
the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a
suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed
several houses as well as killed the whole family of
Roberto Separa, Sr. She was, therefore, already under
custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by
Article III, Section 12(1), of the Constitution should
have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-
appellants confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio
Bernardo was made in response to the interrogation
made by the latter admittedly conducted without first
informing accused-appellant of her rights under the
Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this
reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to
Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well as the
lighter found by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in
evidence against her as such were obtained in violation
of her constitutional rights.
Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of accused-
appellants confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio
Bernardo and the lighter as evidence do not
automatically lead to her acquittal. It should well be
recalled that the constitutional safeguards during
custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited
through questioning by the police or their agents but
given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused
verbally admits to having committed the offense as what
happened in the case at bar when accused-appellant
admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, to having started the
fire in the Separas house. The testimony of Mercedita
Mendoza recounting said admission is admissible in
evidence against her and is not covered by the aforesaid
constitutional guarantee. Article III of the Constitution,
or the Bill of Rights, solely governs the relationship
between the individual on one hand and the State (and its
agents) on the other; it does not concern itself with the
relation between a private individual and another private
individual as both accused-appellant and prosecution
witness Mercedita Mendoza undoubtedly are. Here,
there is no evidence on record to show that said witness
was acting under police authority, so appropriately,
accused-appellants uncounselled extrajudicial confession
to said witness was properly admitted by the RTC.
23. PEOPLE VS. LAUGA (2010)
FACTS:
Prosecutions Version
In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was left alone
at home. AAAs father, the appellant, was having a
drinking spree at the neighbors place. Her mother
decided to leave because when appellant gets drunk, he
has the habit of mauling AAAs mother. Her only brother
BBB also went out in the company of some neighbors.
At around 10:00 oclock in the evening, appellant woke
AAA up; removed his pants, slid inside the blanket
covering AAA and removed her pants and underwear;
warned her not to shout for help while threatening her
with his fist; and told her that he had a knife placed
above her head. He proceeded to mash her breast, kiss
her repeatedly, and "inserted his penis inside her vagina."
Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying.
Appellant claimed he scolded her for staying out late.
BBB decided to take AAA with him. While on their way
to their maternal grandmothers house, AAA recounted
her harrowing experience with their father. Upon
reaching their grandmothers house, they told their
grandmother and uncle of the incident, after which, they
sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting.
Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house
wearing only his underwear. He invited appellant to the
police station, to which appellant obliged. At the police
outpost, he admitted to him that he raped AAA because
he was unable to control himself.
The following day, AAA submitted herself to physical
examination. Dra. Josefa Arlita L. Alsula, Municipal
Health Officer of x x x, Bukidnon, issued the Medical
Certificate, which reads:
hyperemic vulvae with 4 oclock & 6 oclock freshly
lacerated hymen; (+) minimal to moderate bloody
discharges 2 to an alleged raping incident.
Defenses Version
only appellant testified for the defense. He believed that
the charge against him was ill-motivated because he
sometimes physically abuses his wife in front of their
children after engaging in a heated argument, and beats
the children as a disciplinary measure. He went further
to narrate how his day was on the date of the alleged
rape.
He alleged that on 15 March 2000, there was no food
prepared for him at lunchtime. Shortly after, AAA
arrived. She answered back when confronted. This
infuriated him that he kicked her hard on her buttocks.
Appellant went back to work and went home again
around 3 oclock in the afternoon. Finding nobody at
home, he prepared his dinner and went to sleep.
Later in the evening, he was awakened by the members
of the "Bantay Bayan" headed by Moises Boy Banting.
They asked him to go with them to discuss some matters.
He later learned that he was under detention because
AAA charged him of rape.
RTC: Rape qualified by relationship and minority
CA: Affirmed but modified indemnification
(increased both the civil indemnity and moral
damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00)
The lone assignment of error in the appellants brief is
that, the trial court gravely erred in finding him guilty as
charged despite the failure of the prosecution to establish
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because: (1) there
were inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her
brother BBB; (2) his extrajudicial confession before
Moises Boy Banting was without the assistance of a
counsel, in violation of his constitutional right; and (3)
AAAs accusation was ill-motivated.
ISSUE:
1. WON the extrajudicial confession made before the
Bantay Bayan without the presence of counsel is
admissible as evidence.
2. WON the accused is still guilty despite the
inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her
brother.
HELD:
1. NO. The confession to Moises Boy Banting, a
"bantay bayan was inadmissible in evidence because
Lauga was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no
valid waiver of such requirement.
In the case of People v. Malngan, the accuseds
extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman
were found to be inadmissible, but the verbal admission
not elicited through questioning by the police or their
agents but given in an ordinary manner to a neighbor of
the private complainant is not covered by constitutional
safeguards during custodial investigations. The Court
distinguished that the barangay tanods, including the
Barangay Chairman, in such case, may be deemed as law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III,
Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When
accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall, she
was already a suspect in the fire that destroyed several
houses. She was, therefore, already under custodial
investigation and the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution should have already been observed or
applied to her. Accused-appellants confession to
Barangay Chairman was made in response to the
interrogation made by the latter admittedly conducted
without first informing accused-appellant of her rights
under the Constitution or done in the presence of
counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-
appellant, given to Barangay Chairman, as well as the
lighter found in her bag are inadmissible in evidence
against her. However, it did not automatically lead to her
acquittal. The constitutional safeguards during custodial
investigations do not apply to those not elicited through
questioning by the police or their agents but given in an
ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits in
the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to
Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of the private
complainant.
Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan,
Court ascertained that a "bantay bayan" may be
deemed a law enforcement officer within the
contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the
Constitution.
In People of the Philippines v. Buendia, the nature of a
"bantay bayan," that is, "a group of male residents
living in [the] area organized for the purpose of
keeping peace in their community[,which is] an
accredited auxiliary of the PNP.
Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to
Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11
November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order
Committee in each barangay shall be organized "to serve
as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and
Order Council at the Barangay level."61 The
composition of the Committee includes, among others:
(1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman
of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of the
Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at
least three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based
Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non
Government Organization Representative well-known in
his community.
This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based
volunteer organizations in the nature of watch
groups, as in the case of the "bantay bayan," are
recognized by the local government unit to perform
functions relating to the preservation of peace and
order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on
the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting,
and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities
delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the
authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any
inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function
and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to
his constitutional rights provided for under Article III,
Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the
Miranda Rights, is concerned.
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of
appellant, which was taken without a counsel,
inadmissible in evidence.
2. YES. The conviction of the appellant was not deduced
solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but
"from the confluence of evidence showing his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt." Also, the testimony of AAA
does not run contrary to that of BBB. Both testified that
they sought the help of a "bantay bayan." Their
respective testimonies differ only as to when the help
was sought for, which this Court could well attribute to
the nature of the testimony of BBB, a shortcut version of
AAAs testimony that dispensed with a detailed account
of the incident. The assailed inconsistency is too trivial
to affect the veracity of the testimonies. In fact,
inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or
inconsequential circumstances even strengthen the
credibility of the witnesses, as they erase doubts that
such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed.
The jurisprudence in Bartocillo vs. CA, that "where the
testimonies of two key witnesses cannot stand together,
the inevitable conclusion is that one or both must be
telling a lie, and their story a mere concoction" is not
applicable in this case because in Bartocillo, the two
testimonies could not simply stand together.
Moreover, the contention that AAA charged him of rape
only because she bore grudges against him is
unmeritorious. Mere disciplinary chastisement is not
strong enough to make daughters in a Filipino family
invent a charge that would not only bring shame and
humiliation upon them and their families but also
bring their fathers into the gallows of death. Even
when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain amount
of psychological depravity for a young woman to
concoct a story which would put her own father to jail
for the most of his remaining life and drag the rest of the
family including herself to a lifetime of shame. It is
highly improbable for AAA against whom no proof of
sexual perversity or loose morality has been shown to
fake charges much more against her own father. In fact
her testimony is entitled to greater weight since her
accusing words were directed against a close relative.
Elements of Rape and Aggravating/Qualifying
Circumstances
It may be added that the self-serving defense of appellant
cannot prevail over the positive and straightforward
testimony of AAA. Settled is the rule that, "alibi is an
inherently weak defense that is viewed with suspicion
because it is easy to fabricate." "Alibi and denial must be
supported by strong corroborative evidence in order to
merit credibility." Moreover, for the defense of alibi to
prosper, the accused must establish two elements (1)
he was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was
committed; and (2) it was physically impossible for him
to be at the scene at the time of its commission.
The presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority
and relationship with the offender in the instant case has
likewise been adequately established. Both qualifying
circumstances were specifically alleged in the
Information, stipulated on and admitted during the pre-
trial conference, and testified to by both parties in their
respective testimonies. Also, such stipulation and
admission, as correctly pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, are binding upon this Court because they are
judicial admissions within the contemplation of Section
4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 provides that rape is

committed, among others, by a man who shall have
carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat or
intimidation. The death penalty shall be imposed if it is
committed with aggravating/qualifying circumstances,
which include, when the victim is under eighteen (18)
years of age and the offender is a parent."

The consistent and forthright testimony of AAA detailing

how she was raped, culminating with the penetration of
appellants penis into her vagina, suffices to prove that
appellant had carnal knowledge of her. When a woman
states that she has been raped, she says in effect all that
is necessary to show that rape was committed. Further,
when such testimony corresponds with medical findings,
there is sufficient basis to conclude that the essential
requisites of carnal knowledge have been established.

The element of force or intimidation is not essential

when the accused is the father of the victim, in as much
as his superior moral ascendancy or influence substitutes
for violence and intimidation. At any rate, AAA was
actually threatened by appellant with his fist and a knife
allegedly placed above AAAs head.

E. ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS TO
PRIVATE PERSONS AND MASS MEDIA
24. PEOPLE VS. ANDAN (1997)
FACTS:
Prosecutions Version:
On February 19, 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in Concepcion
Subdivision, Baliuag, Bulacan, Marianne Guevarra,
twenty years of age and a second-year student at the
Fatima School of Nursing, left her home for her school
dormitory in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. She was to
prepare for her final examinations on February 21, 1994.
Marianne wore a striped blouse and faded denim pants
and brought with her two bags containing her school
uniforms, some personal effects and more than
P2,000.00 in cash.
Marianne was walking along the subdivision when
appellant invited her inside his house. He used the
pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's grandmother
should be taken. Marianne agreed to take her blood
pressure as the old woman was her distant relative. She
did not know that nobody was inside the house.
Appellant then punched her in the abdomen, brought her
to the kitchen and raped her. His lust sated, appellant
dragged the unconscious girl to an old toilet at the back
of the house and left her there until dark. Night came and
appellant pulled Marianne, who was still unconscious, to
their backyard. The yard had a pigpen bordered on one
side by a six-foot high concrete fence. On the other side
was a vacant lot. Appellant stood on a bench beside the
pigpen and then lifted and draped the girl's body over the
fence to transfer it to the vacant lot. When the girl
moved, he hit her head with a piece of concrete block.
He heard her moan and hit her again on the face. After
silence reigned, he pulled her body to the other side of
the fence, dragged it towards a shallow portion of the lot
and abandoned it.
At 11:00 A.M. of the following day, February 20, 1994,
the body of Marianne was discovered. She was naked
from the chest down with her brassiere and T-shirt pulled
toward her neck. Nearby was found a panty with a
sanitary napkin.
The autopsy conducted by Dr. Alberto Bondoc revealed
that Marianne died of "traumatic injuries" sustained.
Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and
prompted Mayor Cornelio Trinidad of Baliuag to form a
crack team of police officers to look for the criminal.
Searching the place where Marianne's body was found,
the policemen recovered a broken piece of concrete
block stained with what appeared to be blood. They also
found a pair of denim pants and a pair of shoes which
were identified as Marianne's.
Appellant's nearby house was also searched by the police
who found bloodstains on the wall of the pigpen in the
backyard. They interviewed the occupants of the house
and learned from Romano Calma, the stepbrother of
appellant's wife, that accused-appellant also lived there
but that he, his wife and son left without a word. Calma
surrendered to the police several articles consisting of
pornographic pictures, a pair of wet short pants with
some reddish brown stain, a towel also with the stain,
and a wet T-shirt. The clothes were found in the laundry
hamper inside the house and allegedly belonged to
appellant.
The police tried to locate appellant and learned that his
parents live in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. On
February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a police team led by Mayor
Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. They took
him aboard the patrol jeep and brought him to the police
headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially,
appellant denied any knowledge of Marianne's death.
However, when the police confronted him with the
concrete block, the victim's clothes and the bloodstains
found in the pigpen, appellant relented and said that his
neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed
Marianne and that he was merely a lookout. He also said
that he knew where Larin and Dizon hid the two bags of
Marianne. Immediately, the police took appellant to his
house. Larin and Dizon, who were rounded up earlier,
were likewise brought there by the police. Appellant
went to an old toilet at the back of the house, leaned over
a flower pot and retrieved from a canal under the pot,
two bags which were later identified as belonging to
Marianne. Thereafter, photographs were taken of
appellant and the two other suspects holding the bags.
Appellant and the two suspects were brought back to the
police headquarters. The following day, February 25, a
physical examination was conducted on the suspects by
the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Orpha Patawaran.
Appellant was found to sustain multiple scratches on the
right side of his neck, as well as chest and back.
By this time, people and media representatives were
already gathered at the police headquarters awaiting the
results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived and
proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the
mayor, appellant approached him and whispered a
request that they talk privately. The mayor led
appellant to the office of the Chief of Police and
there, appellant broke down and said "Mayor,
patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the
one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the
door of the room to let the public and media
representatives witness the confession. The mayor
first asked for a lawyer to assist appellant but since
no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings
photographed and videotaped. In the presence of the
mayor, the police, representatives of the media and
appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his
guilt. He disclosed how he killed Marianne and
volunteered to show them the place where he hid her
bags. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon
whom he falsely implicated saying he did it because of
ill-feelings against them. He also said that the devil
entered his mind because of the pornographic magazines
and tabloid he read almost everyday. After his
confession, appellant hugged his wife and son and asked
the mayor to help him. His confession was captured on
videotape and covered by the media nationwide.
Appellant was detained at the police headquarters. The
next two days, February 26 and 27, more newspaper,
radio and television reporters came. Appellant was
again interviewed and he affirmed his confession to
the mayor and reenacted the crime.
Defenses Version
On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of
"not guilty." He testified that in the afternoon of
February 19, 1994 he was at his parent's house in
Barangay Tangos attending the birthday party of his
nephew. He, his wife and son went home after 5:00 P.M.
His wife cooked dinner while he watched their one-year
old son. They all slept at 8:00 P.M. and woke up the next
day at 6:00 in the morning. His wife went to Manila to
collect some debts while he and his son went to his
parents' house where he helped his father cement the
floor of the house. His wife joined them in the afternoon
and they stayed there until February 24, 1994 when he
was picked up by the police.
Appellant was brought by the police to a hotel at Bagong
Nayon, Baliuag. In one of the rooms, the policemen
covered his face with a bedsheet and kicked him
repeatedly. They coerced him to confess that he raped
and killed Marianne. When he refused, they pushed his
head into a toilet bowl and injected something into his
buttocks. Weakened, appellant confessed to the crime.
Thereafter, appellant was taken to his house where he
saw two of his neighbors, Larin and Dizon. He was
ordered by the police to go to the old toilet at the back of
the house and get two bags from under the flower pot.
Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was told.
RTC: Pablito Andan is found guilty by proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
Information (Special Complex Crime of Rape with
Homicide).
On automatic review, Andan contends that the
inadmissibility of the testimonies of the policemen, the
mayor and the news reporters because they were made
during custodial investigation without the assistance of
counsel. Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III
of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
ISSUE:
1. WON the extra judicial confession is admissible (1)
as to the police officers, (2) as to the mayor and (3) as
to the news reporters.
2. WON the absence of spermatozoa in the autopsy
conducted on the victim, as well as other real and
testimonial evidence, is enough to convict Andan as
charged
HELD:
1. The extrajudicial confession to the police officers is
inadmissible, but the ones made to the mayor and the
news reporters were admissible.
As to the police officers:
NO. The rights under Section 12 are accorded to any
person under investigation for the commission of an
offense." An investigation begins when it is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus
on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police
investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession
from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.
When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer
engaged in a general inquiry about the death of
Marianne. Andan was already a prime suspect even
before the police found him at his parents' house so he is
already under custodial investigation when he
confessed to the police. It is admitted that the police
failed to inform appellant of his constitutional rights
when he was investigated and interrogated. His
confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too
were the two bags recovered from appellant's house,
because the victim's bags were the fruits of appellant's
uncounseled confession to the police. They are tainted
evidence, hence also inadmissible.
As to the mayor:
YES. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational
supervision and control" over the local police and may
arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for
purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III
of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to
the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation
by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question
appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to
talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who
spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor
for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that
appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When
appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as
a law enforcement officer, his uncounseled confession to
him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has
been held that the constitutional procedures on
custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the
authorities, but given in an ordinary manner
whereby appellant orally admitted having committed
the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory
disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The
rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the
slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the
accused to admit something false, not to prevent him
from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, we
hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was
correctly admitted by the trial court.
As to the news reporters:
YES. Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise
properly admitted. The confessions were made in
response to questions by news reporters, not by the
police or any other investigating officer. We have held
that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to
news reporters on a televised interview are deemed
voluntary and are admissible in evidence. Such are
not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of
the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern
itself with the relation between a private individual
and another individual. It governs the relationship
between the individual and the State. The prohibitions
therein are primarily addressed to the State and its
agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual
exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that
may not be taken away by government, rights that
government has the duty to protect. Governmental power
is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these
limitations to protect the individual against aggression
and unwarranted interference by any department of
government and its agencies.
The confessions to the news reporters were given free
from any undue influence from the police authorities.
The news reporters acted as news reporters when they
interviewed appellant. They were not acting under the
direction and control of the police. They were there to
check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not
force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact
the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his
permission before interviewing him. They interviewed
him on separate days not once did appellant protest
his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his
guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the
commission of the crime, and consented to its
reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters
were witnessed by his family and other relatives.
There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of
appellant by the news reporters.
2. The absence of spermatozoa in the vagina does not
negate the commission of rape nor does the lack of
complete penetration or rupture of the hymen. What is
essential is that there be penetration of the female
organ no matter how slight. Dr. Aguda testified that
the fact of penetration is proved by the lacerations found
in the victim's vagina. The lacerations were fresh and
could not have been caused by any injury in the first
autopsy.
Dr. Aguda's finding and the allegation that the victim
was raped by appellant are supported by other evidence,
real and testimonial, obtained from an investigation of
the witnesses and the crime scene,:
(1) The victim, Marianne, was last seen walking
along the subdivision road near appellant's
house;
(2) At that time, appellant's wife and her step
brother and grandmother were not in their house;
(3) A bloodstained concrete block was found
over the fence of appellant's house, a meter away
from the wall. Bloodstains were also found on
the grass nearby and at the pigpen at the back of
appellant's house;
(4) The victim sustained bruises and scars
indicating that her body had been dragged over a
flat rough surface. This supports the thesis that
she was thrown over the fence and dragged to
where her body was found;
(5) Appellant's bloodstained clothes and towel
were found in the laundry hamper in his house;
(6) The reddish brown stains in the towel and T-
shirt of appellant were found positive for the
presence of blood type "B," the probable blood
type of the victim. 61 Marianne 's exact blood
type was not determined but her parents had
type "A" and type "AB." The victim's pants had
bloodstains which were found to be type "O,"
appellant's blood type;
(7) Appellant had scratch marks and bruises in
his body which he failed to explain;
(8) For no reason, appellant and his wife left
their residence after the incident and were later
found at his parents' house in Barangay Tangos,
Baliuag, Bulacan;
In fine, appellant's extrajudicial confessions together
with the other circumstantial evidence justify the
conviction of appellant.
Appellant 's defense of alibi cannot overcome the
prosecution evidence. His alibi cannot even stand the
test of physical improbability at the time of the
commission of the crime. Barangay Tangos is only a few
kilometers away from Concepcion Subdivision and can
be traversed in less than half an hour.
25. PEOPLE V. ENDINO
YIELDING to mans brutish instinct for revenge, Edward
Endino, with the aid of Gerry Galgarin alias Toto, slew
Dennis Aquino in the presence of a lady whose love they
once shared.
FACTS: On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City, Gerry
Galgarin, uncle of accused Edward Endino, suddenly
and without warning lunged at Dennis and stabbed him
repeatedly on the chest. Dennis girlfriend Clara Agagas
who was with him, stunned by the unexpected attack,
pleaded to Galgarin to stop. Dennis struggled and
succeeded momentarily to free himself from his
attacker. Dennis dashed towards the nearby Midtown
Sales but his escape was foiled when from out of
nowhere Edward Endino appeared and fired at
Dennis. As Dennis staggered for safety, the two (2)
assailants fled in the direction of the airport. Meanwhile,
Dennis, wounded and bleeding, sought refuge inside
the Elohim Store where he collapsed on the floor. He was
grasping for breath and near death. Clara with the help of
some onlookers took him to the hospital but
subsequently Dennis died.
As a result thereof, an Information for the murder of
Dennis Aquino was filed against Edward Endino and
accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin and warrants were
issued for their arrest. However, as both accused
remained at large.
Gerry Galgarin was arrested through the combined
efforts of the Antipolo and Palawan police forces at a
house in Sitio Sto. Nio, Antipolo, Rizal.
He was taken into custody of Antipolo Police then
transferred to Palawan.
On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-
CBN television station where accused Galgarin was
interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the interview
were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while
pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the
gunman. According to Galgarin, after attacking Aquino,
they left for Roxas, Palawan, where his
sister Langging who is Edward's mother, was
waiting. Langging gave them money for their fare for
Manila. They took the boat for Batangas, where they
stayed for a few days, and proceeded to Manila where
they separated, with him heading for Antipolo. Galgarin
appealed for Edward to give himself up to the
authorities.His interview was shown over the ABS-CBN
evening news program TV Patrol.
For his part, accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin
disclaimed having taking part in the slaying of
Dennis. Gerry asserted that on the date of the incident he
was in Antipolo to help his common-law wife Maria
Marasigan give birth to their first born. The midwife
who delivered his son, supported the alibi of accused-
appellant. However, she admitted that when she
registered the childs birth on 13 December 1993 or more
than two (2) years after the delivery, she informed the
civil registrar that the childs father was "unknown."
Accused-appellant disowned the confession which he
made over TV Patrol and claimed that it was induced by
the threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted
that the videotaped confession was constitutionally
infirmed and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule
provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of the Constitution.[8]
The trial court however admitted the video footages on
the strength of the testimony of the police officers that
no force or compulsion was exerted on accused-
appellant and upon a finding that his confession was
made before a group of newsmen that could have
dissipated any semblance of hostility towards him.
convicted of murder qualified by treachery[9] and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
RULING:
The admission of accused-appellants videotaped
confession is proper.
The interview was recorded on video and it showed
accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly,
openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such
confession does not form part of custodial investigation
as it was not given to police officers but to media men in
an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the
public. Besides, if he had indeed been forced into
confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the
newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been
symphatetic with him. As the trial court stated in its
Decisio
We agree. However, because of the inherent danger
in the use of television as a medium for admitting ones
guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several
cases,[14] it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that
extreme caution must be taken in further admitting
similar confessions. For in all probability, the police,
with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners,
may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial
confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule
by having an accused admit an offense on
television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the
guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our
criminal justice system.
We do not suggest that videotaped confessions
given before media men by an accused with the
knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are
impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and
invalid police techniques and conduct is a difficult one to
draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is
essential to make sharp judgments in determining
whether a confession was given under coercive physical
or psychological atmosphere.
A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should
never presume that all media confessions described as
voluntary have been freely given. This type of
confession always remains suspect and therefore should
be thoroughly examined and scrutinized. Detection of
coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult and arduous
task for the courts to make. It requires persistence and
determination in separating polluted confessions from
untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to be vigilant and
protective of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding
accused-appellant GERRY GALGARIN alias Toto guilty
of Murder qualified by Treachery
F. WAIVER AT TRIAL
26) PEOPLE VS. SAMUS
Appellant was a farmer, tilling and living in the land of
Miguel Completo at Barangay Niugan, Cabuyao,
Laguna. The victims, sixty two (62) year old Dedicacion
Balisi and her grandson, six (6) year old John Ardee
Balisi, were the neighbors of appellants father. Police
officers received a telephone call from a local barangay
official informing them of the victims deaths. The
investigators likewise found a pair of maong pants, a
white T-shirt, a handkerchief and dirty slippers in the
bathroom and roof of the house. A pair of earrings worn
by Dedicacion Balisi was likewise reported missing from
her body
An acquaintance (Poncianos) of appellant, happened to
meet appellant at Sammy Pachecas house in the same
barangay where appellant asked Ponciano to accompany
him to Poncianos wife to pawn a pair of
earrings. Poncianos wife was mad at first but upon
Poncianos prodding, gave appellant P300.00 with no
interest. The earrings were placed in a jewelry box;
thereafter, appellant received another P250.00.
Criminal Investigation Group received information that
appellant was the principal suspect in the killing of the
two (2) victims . He was arrested.
NP Fingerprint Examiner Reigel Allan Sorra took
fingerprint samples from appellant. His prints exactly
matched with a set of prints found at the crime scene
Mario Bitos was able to recover the pawned earrings
from Ponciano
For his defense, Samus denied the accusations against
him. He testified that he was a farmer, he was harvesting
palay with Eligio Completo; that he never left the
farm. He took his lunch at the hut of Miguel Completo;
that he arrived home at 6:00 in the afternoon, took his
dinner then went to sleep.
He also testified that he was forced to execute a
document admitting the killing. He was forced to sign
said document. He did not know Atty. Juliano and did
not talk to him. The victims were the neighbors of his
father in the province.
Likewese, he testified that, it took less than 15 minutes
to travel, and he also mentioned that the media
interviewed him 2 days after his arrest.He and his
relatives in Laguna did not have the capacity to
hire/secure the services of a lawyer.
First Issue:
Arrest of Appellant
The police officers version of the arrest is incredible. Not
only are their allegations uncertain and inconsistent, they
are also contrary to human experience. We find it hard to
believe that anyone would jump from the roof of a two-
story house to escape and, after landing on the ground
without any broken bones, make a complete turnaround
and just meekly surrender without further ado. Even if
this story were true, jumping from a roof is not a crime
that would justify the warrantless arrest of appellant.
MOREOVER, He was not a prisoner. The killing of
Dedicacion and John Ardee Balisi was not done in the
presence of the arresting officers. Since it took place on
September 2, 1996, it could not have been considered as
having just been committed. Evidently, they unlawfully
arrested appellant on September 10, 1996. When they
did so, we cannot ascribe to them the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions,
contrary to the court a quos finding.
Considering that the arrest of appellant was
unlawful, the apprehending officers uncertainty and
reluctance in admitting it becomes understandable.
Thus, the apprehending officers contend that the
constitutional rights of appellant were not violated, since
they were not the ones who had investigated and elicited
evidentiary matters from him.
We are not persuaded. The events narrated by the
law enforcers in court are too good to be true. Their
Sworn Statements given a day after the arrest contradict
their testimonies and raise doubts on their credibility.
Second Issue:
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
Appellant claims that his alleged confession to the
media while in police custody cannot be admitted in
evidence. He further contends that the pair of earrings,
the turnover receipt, as well as the testimonies of
Pontaos and Bitos, relative thereto should be excluded
for being fruits of the poisonous tree.
We clarify. After being illegally arrested, appellant
was not informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to have competent and independent
counsel. Hence, any admission elicited from him by the
law enforcers during custodial investigation are normally
inadmissible in evidence.
In their affidavits, the police officers readily
admitted that appellant was subjected to a preliminary
interview. Yet, during their examination in open court,
they tried to skirt this issue by stating that it was only the
media that had questioned appellant, and that they were
merely present during the interview.
In the absence of testimony from any of the media
persons who allegedly interviewed appellant, the
uncertainties and vagueness about how they questioned
and led him to his confession lead us to believe that they
themselves investigated appellant and elicited from him
uncounselled admissions. This fact is clearly shown by
the Affidavits they executed on September 11, 1997, as
well as by their testimonies on cross-examination.
Nonetheless, even if the uncounselled admission per
se may be inadmissible, under the present circumstances
we cannot rule it out because of appellants failure to
make timely objections. Indeed, the admission is
inadmissible in evidence under Article III, Section 12(1)
and (3) of the Constitution, because it was given under
custodial investigation and was made without the
assistance of counsel. However, the defense failed to
object to its presentation during the trial, with the result
that the defense is deemed to have waived objection to
its admissibility.[20]
Can the testimony of Pontaos and the picture of a
pair of earrings together with the turnover receipt, which
appellant identified during his testimony, be considered
inadmissible as the fruit of the poisonous tree and hence
be disregarded at this stage of appeal?
Upon examination of the records, we find that
during the entire examination in court of Prosecution
Witness Pontaos, appellant did not question or object to
the admissibility of the formers testimony. Worse, the
latters counsel even freely cross-examined the witness
without any reservations. Having made no objection
before the trial court, appellant cannot raise this question
for the first time on appeal.[21] The evidence having been
admitted without objection, we are not inclined to reject
it.
If only appellant had made a timely objection to the
admissibility of the said testimony, the prosecution could
have been warned of the need to present additional
evidence to support its case. To disregard
unceremoniously a major portion of its case at this late
stage when it can no longer present additional evidence
as substitute for that which is now claimed to be
inadmissible goes against fundamental fairness.
PENALTIES
Treachery qualified the killing of six-year-old John
Ardee Balisi as murder.
As for the death of Dedicacion Balisi, however,
none of the qualifying circumstances alleged in the
Information was proven by the prosecution. Hence,
appellant can be convicted of homicide only.
In either of the two cases, the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling cannot be appreciated against
appellant, simply because it was not alleged in the
Information.[27]
There being no aggravating circumstances, the
imposable penalty for the homicide [28] of Dedicacion
Balisi is reclusion temporal in its medium period. In this
case, appellant is entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. For the same
reason, reclusion perpetua-- not death -- is the correct
penalty that should be imposed on appellant for the
murder[29] of John Ardee Balisi.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Calamba, Laguna (Branch 36) is
hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS : in Criminal Case No.
5015-96-C, the maximum of the penalty is reduced to 17
years and four months of reclusion temporal medium; in
Criminal Case No. 5016-96-C, the penalty is reduced
to reclusion perpetua.Costs de oficio.
XV. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
A. CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS
1) PEOPLE VS ESTRADA, 333 SCRA 699 (2000)
The sacrament of confirmation was being performed at
St. John's Cathedral, Dagupan City by the Roman
Catholic Bishop when Roberto Estrada went up and
walked towards the center of the altar and sat on the
Bishop's chair. Crisanto Santillan, who was assisting the
Bishop at the rites, approached Estrada and requested
him to vacate the Bishop's chair. Gripping the chair's
armrest, accused-appellant replied in Pangasinese: "No
matter what will happen, I will not move out!" Hearing
this, Santillan moved away.
Rogelio Mararac, the security guard at the cathedral
went near Estrada and told him to vacate the Bishop's
chair. Estrada stared intensely at the guard. Mararac then
held his nightstick and tapped twice Estrada's hand on
the armrest. When Mararac was about to tap again,
Estrada suddenly drew a knife from his back, lunged at
Mararac and stabbed him twice, causing the death of the
latter. Then Estrada got up, went to the microphone and
shouted: "Anggapuy nayan dia!" (No one can beat me
here!). He returned to the Bishop's chair and sat on it
again.
The police came and when they frisked appellant, they
found a leather scabbard tucked around his waist. He
was brought to the police station and placed in jail. Then
Jail Warden Wilfredo Valdez requested the court to allow
Estrada, to be treated at the Baguio General Hospital to
determine whether he should remain in jail or be
transferred to some other institution as other prisoners
were allegedly not comfortable with appellant because
he had been exhibiting unusual behavior; he would shout
at the top of his voice and cause panic among the jail
inmates and personnel; he had not been eating and
sleeping; and his co-inmates had been complaining of
not getting enough sleep for fear of being attacked by
him while asleep; that once, while they were sleeping, he
took out all his personal effects and waste matter and
burned them inside the cell which again caused panic
among the inmates.
Dr. Gawidan, testified that the illness of accused-
appellant, i.e., schizophrenia, paranoid type, is a
"lifetime illness" and that this requires maintenance
medication to avoid relapses. After accused-appellant
was discharged on February 22, 1993, he never returned
to the hospital, not even for a check-up.
Contention of the Accused:
He claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the crime
of murder because there was no evidence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery; that there was
unlawful aggression by the victim when he tapped
accused-appellant's hand with his nightstick; and that
accused-appellant did not have sufficient ability to
calculate his defensive acts because he was of unsound
mind.
Contention of the State:
The accused "pretended to be weak, tame and of
unsound mind;" that after he made the first stab, he
"furiously continued stabbing and slashing the victim to
finish him off undeterred by the fact that he was in a
holy place where a religious ceremony was being
conducted".
Ruling:
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of
the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The
accused must be "so insane as to be incapable of
entertaining a criminal intent." He must be deprived of
reason and act without the least discernment because
there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a
total deprivation of freedom of the will.
There is no direct proof that Estrada was afflicted with
insanity at the time he killed Mararac. The absence of
direct proof, nevertheless, does not entirely discount the
probability that appellant was not of sound mind at that
time. It was highly unusual for a sane person to go up to
the altar and sit in the Bishop's chair while the Bishop
was administering the Holy Sacrament of Confirmation.
It goes against normal and ordinary behavior for Estrada
without sufficient provocation from the security guard,
to stab the latter at the altar, during sacramental rites and
in front of all the Catholic faithful to witness. Estrada did
not flee, or at least attempt to flee after the stabbing. He
casually approached the microphone and, over the public
address system, uttered words to the faithful which the
rational person would have been made. He then returned
to the Bishop's chair and sat there as if nothing
happened.
Mere allegation of insanity is insufficient. There must be
evidence or circumstances that raise a "reasonable
doubt" or a "bona fide doubt" as to defendant's
competence to stand trial. Estradas plea was not an
unconditional admission of guilt because he was "not in
full possession of his mental faculties when he killed the
victim;" and thereby ordered that he be subjected to the
necessary medical examination to determine his degree
of insanity at the time of commission of the crime.
2) ISIDRO T. HILDAWA vs. ENRILE
FACTS:
Petitioners Isidro T. Hildawa and Ricardo C.
Valmonte in these Special Civil Actions pray that a
"preliminary injunction issue directing respondents to
recall the crimebusters and restraining them from
fielding police teams or any of this sort with
authority/license to kill and after hearing, declaring the
order of respondents fielding crimebusters null and void
and making the injunction permanent." They alleged that
the formation and fielding of secret marshals and/or
crimebusters with absolute authority to kill thieves,
holduppers, robbers, pickpockets and slashers are
violative of the provisions of the New Constitution under
Sections 1, 17,19, 20 and 21 of Article III (Bill of
Rights).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the creation and deployment of
special operations team to counter the resurgence of
criminality is violative of the provisions of the
Constitution.
HELD:
The Supreme held that there is nothing wrong in
the creation and deployment of special operation teams
to counter the resurgence of criminality, as there is
nothing wrong in the formation by the police of special
teams/squads to prevent the proliferation of vices,
prostitution, drug addiction, pornography and the like.
That is the basic job of the police. It is the alleged use of
violence in the implementation of the objectives of the
special squads that the court is concerned about. It is our
way of life that a man is entitled to due process which
simply means that before he can be deprived of his life,
liberty or property, he must be given an opportunity to
defend himself. Due process of law requires that the
accused must be heard in court of competent jurisdiction,
proceeded against under the orderly process of law, and
only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon
notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a
judgment awarded within the authority of a
constitutional law.
3) OLAGUER VS. MILITARY COMMISSION
In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by
military personnel and they were placed in Camp
Bagong Diwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians.
They were charged with (1) unlawful possession of
explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to
assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to
assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile,
Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to
assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo and
Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6)
attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro
Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver;
and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and
inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the petitioners
went to the SC and filed the instant Petition for
prohibition and habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be
granted.
HELD: The petition for habeas corpus has become moot
and academic because by the time the case reached the
SC Olaguer and his companions were already released
from military confinement. When the release of the
persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of
habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the
issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. 18
Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released
from their confinement in military detention centers, the
instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus should be dismissed for having become moot and
academic. But the military court created to try the case
of Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still continues
to subsist.
ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a
military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while
the civil courts are open and functioning.
HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all
decisions rendered by the military courts or tribunals
during the period of martial law in all cases involving
civilian defendants. A military commission or tribunal
cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the
period of martial law, over civilians for offenses
allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts
are open and functioning, and that any judgment
rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and
void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military
tribunal concerned.
2ND VERSION: OLAGUER V. MILITARY
COMMISSION
Olaguer v Military Commission No. 34
GR No. L-54558 May 22, 1987
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-
Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period
not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours
from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
President shall submit a report in person or in writing to
the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of
at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension,
which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in
the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and
public safety requires it.cralaw
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four
hours following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call.cralaw
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.cralaw
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of
the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.cralaw
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected
with, invasion.cralaw
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained
shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise
he shall be released.cralaw
GANCAYCO, J:
FACTS:
June 13. 1980 -the respondent Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines 3 created the
respondent Military Commission No 34 to try criminal
case filed against the petitioners.
July 30, 1980 - an amended charge sheet was filed for
seven (7) offenses, namely:
 (1) Unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary
devices;
(2) Conspiracy to assassinate President, and Mrs.
Marcos;
(3) Conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan
Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno;
(4) Conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco,
Jose Roo and Onofre Corpus;
(5) Arson of nine buildings;
(6) Attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez,
Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and
Fabian Ver; and
(7) Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and
inciting to rebellion.
December 4, 1984 - pending the resolution of the
Petition, the respondent Military Commission No. 34
passed sentence convicting the petitioners and imposed
upon them the penalty of death by electrocution.
The thrust of petitioners arguments is that military
commissions have no jurisdiction to try civilians for
offenses alleged to have been committed during the
period of martial law. They also maintain that the
proceedings before the respondent Military Commission
No. 34 are in gross violation of their constitutional right
to due process of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to
try civilians while the civil courts are open and
functioning
HELD:
WHEREFORE,
DISMISSED - the Petitions for habeas corpus are for
having become moot and academic.
GRANTED - The Petitions for certiorari and prohibition.
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL - The creation of
the respondent Military Commission No. 34 to try
civilians like the petitioners is hereby declared
unconstitutional and all its proceedings are deemed null
and void. The temporary restraining order issued against
the respondents enjoining them from executing the
Decision of the respondent Military Commission No. 34
is hereby made permanent and the said respondents are
permanently prohibited from further pursuing Criminal
Case No. MC-34-1 against the petitioners. The sentence
rendered by the respondent Military Commission No. 34
imposing the death penalty on the petitioners is hereby
vacated for being null and void, and all the items or
properties taken from the petitioners in relation to the
said criminal case should be returned to them
immediately.
RATIO:
(1) Military commissions or tribunals have no
jurisdiction to try civilians for alleged offenses when the
civil courts are open and functioning. Due process of law
demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where the
accused stands to lose either his life or his liberty), the
accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial.
Civilians like (the) petitioner placed on trial for civil
offenses under general law are entitled to trial by judicial
process, not by executive or military process.
(2) Judicial power exists only in the courts, which have
"exclusive power to hear and determine those matters
which affect the life or liberty or property of a citizen.
In Toth v. Quarles, 40 the U.S. Supreme Court further
stressed that the assertion of military authority over
civilians cannot rest on the President's power as
Commander-in-Chief or on any theory of martial law.
(3) Following the principle of separation of powers
underlying the existing constitutional organization of the
Government of the Philippines, the power and the duty
of interpreting the laws as when an individual should be
considered to have violated the law) is primarily a
function of the judiciary. It is not, and it cannot be the
function of the Executive Department, through the
military authorities. And as long as the civil courts in the
land remain open and are regularly functioning, as they
do so today and as they did during the period of martial
law in the country, military tribunals cannot try and
exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses
committed by them and which are properly cognizable
by the civil courts.
(4) Respondent Military Commission No. 34 appears to
have been rendered too hastily to the prejudice to the
petitioners, and in complete disregard of their
constitutional right to adduce evidence on their behalf.
Thus, even assuming arguendo that the respondent
Military Commission No. 34 does have the jurisdiction
to try the petitioners, the Commission should be deemed
ousted of its jurisdiction when, as observed by the
Solicitor General, the said tribunal acted in disregard of
the constitutional rights of the accused. Indeed, it is well-
settled that once a deprivation of a constitutional right is
shown to exist, the tribunal that rendered the judgment in
question is deemed ousted of jurisdiction.
(5) Proclamation No. 2045 (dated January 17, 1981)
officially lifting martial law in the Philippines and
abolishing all military tribunals created pursuant to the
national emergency effectively divests the respondent
Military Commission No. 34 (and all military tribunals
for that matter) of its supposed authority to try civilians,
including the herein petitioners. The said proclamation
states:
"The military tribunals created pursuant thereto are
hereby dissolved upon final determination of case's
pending therein which may not be transferred to the civil
courts without irreparable prejudice to the state in view
of the rules on double jeopardy, or other circumstances
which render prosecution of the cases difficult, if not
impossible."
(6) Certainly, the rule of stare decisis is entitled to
respect because stability in jurisprudence is desirable.
Nonetheless, reverence for precedent, simply as
precedent, cannot prevail when constitutionalism and the
public interest demand otherwise. Thus, a doctrine which
should be abandoned or modified should be abandoned
or modified accordingly. After all, more important than
anything else is that this Court should be right.
4) GALMAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: Assassination of former Senator Benigno
"Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that
had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His
brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the
back of his head by an assassin. The military
investigators reported within a span of three hours that
the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then
supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days
later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired
gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down
in turn.
President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board
to investigate due to large masses of people who joined
in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for
the truth, justice and freedom.
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were
one in rejecting the military version stating that "the
evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had
no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the
staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that
Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military
conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference
between the two reports is that the majority report found
all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in
the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; "
while the chairman's minority report would exclude
nineteen Of them.
Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that
Galman was the killer.
Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining
respondent court from rendering a decision in the two
criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-
two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for.
The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to
file a reply to respondents' separate comments and
respondent Tanod bayan a three-day period to submit a
copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.
But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-
vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and
to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same
Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-
day period counted from receipt of respondent
Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which
apparently was not served on them).
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal
ground for such action and urging that the case be set for
a full hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to
due process.
However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision
acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring
them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil
liability. Respondents submitted that with the
Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had
become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court
majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit.
Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their
second motion for reconsideration alleging that
respondents committed serious irregularities constituting
mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross
violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners
and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due
process of law.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights
as an accused.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double
jeopardy clause.
RULING: Petitioners' second motion for
reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the
said cases which should be conducted with deliberate
dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of
due process.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose
15 months later when former Pres. was no longer
around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for
reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan
Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by
Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case.
Malacaang wanted dismissal to the extent that a
prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel.
Malacaang Conference planned a scenario of trial
where the former President ordered then that the
resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of
each respondent; decided that the presiding justice,
Justice Pamaran, (First Division) would personally
handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner room
of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal
Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the President. The
conferees were told to take the back door in going to the
room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape
notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see
the President. During the conference, and after an
agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay,
mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way
out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to the
group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.
The Court then said that the then President (code-named
Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacaang
Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling
and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and
that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the
Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the
compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond
their capacity to resist.
Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of
total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of
all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up
with a public statement aired over television that Senator
Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a
communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of
wonder that President Marcos would want the case
disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced
theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his
name and his administration of any suspected guilty
participation in the assassination.
such a procedure would be a better arrangement because,
if the accused are charged in court and subsequently
acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of
double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if
some other witnesses shall appear when President
Marcos is no longer in office.
More so was there suppression of vital evidence and
harassment of witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses
two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J.
Herrera, "nobody was looking for these persons because
they said Marcos was in power. The assignment of the
case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that
the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle,
except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran
himself.
The custody of the accused and their confinement in a
military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The
monitoring of proceedings and developments from
Malacaang and by Malacaang personnel. The
partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision:
That President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six
accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering
its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring
the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor
of the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence
presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and
disregarded.
The record shows that the then President misused the
overwhelming resources of the government and his
authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of
the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases.
"This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our
Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall
address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority
with respect to any case or business coming within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice."
Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law.
This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment
of the cases by public respondents at the secret
Malacaang conference (and revealed only after fifteen
months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely
disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab
initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to
exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of
injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress
the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people
and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the
integrity of our judicial system is at stake.
There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of
acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued
without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches,
therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no
judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither
binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing
out of it are void.
Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved
ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition
and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan
from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of
by the Court which had required the respondents',
including the Sandiganbayan's, comments.
Although no restraining order was issued anew,
respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately
issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused
pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of
the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion
on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which
substantively prejudiced the petitioner.
With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the
cases must now be tried before an impartial court with
an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now
face trial for the crimes charged against them before an
impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due
process.
The function of the appointing authority with the
mandate of the people, under our system of government,
is to fill the public posts. Justices and judges must ever
realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority
nor minority but serve only the public interest as they
see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only
the Constitution and their own conscience and honor.
5. SALAZAR VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Petitioner, Anamer E. Salazar and one Nena
Jaucian Timario were charged with estafa before the
Legazpi City Regional Trial Court. Said estafa case
stemmed from the payment of a check worth 214,000
php to private respondent, J.Y Brothers Marketing
Corporation through their representative, Jerson Yao for
the purchase of 300 cavans of rice. The check was drawn
against Prudential Bank by Nena Jaucian Timario and
was dishonored as it was drawn against a closed account.
Salazar replaced the check with a new one which was
drawn against Solid Bank and it was again dishonored
for being drawn against uncollected deposit (DAUD)
which in banking parlance means means that the account
had sufficient funds but was still restricted because the
deposit, usually a check, had not yet been cleared.
After the prosecution rested its case, the
petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of
Court. The trial court granted.
On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered
judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime charged
but ordering her to remit to the private complainant the
amount of the check as payment for her purchase. The
trial court ruled that the evidence for the prosecution did
not establish the existence of conspiracy beyond
reasonable doubt between the petitioner and the issuer of
the check, her co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario, for the
purpose of defrauding the private complainant. In fact,
the private complainant, Jerson Yao, admitted that he had
never met Nena Jaucian Timario who remained at
large. As a mere indorser of the check, the petitioners
breach of the warranty that the check was a good one is
not synonymous with the fraudulent act of falsely
pretending to possess credit under Article 315(2)(d)
RPC.
Salazar filed a motion for reconsideration on the
civil aspect of the decision with a plea to be allowed to
present evidence. Trial Court denied MFR. Hence,
petition for review on certiorari before SC alleging she
was denied due process as the trial court did not give her
opportunity to adduce evidence to controvert her civil
liability.
ISSUE: WON Salazar was denied due process
RULING:
YES. Petitioner should have been given by the
trial court the opportunity to present evidence as regards
to the civil aspect of the case. Under the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the Court explained the demurrer
to evidence partakes of a motion to dismiss the case for
failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.
 In a case where the accused files a demurrer to
evidence without leave of court, he thereby waives his
right to present evidence and submits the case for
decision on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution.
On the other hand, if the accused is granted leave to file
a demurrer to evidence, he has the right to adduce
evidence not only on the criminal aspect but also on the
civil aspect of the case if his demurrer is denied by the
court.
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the
court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on
the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares
that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist. If the trial court issues an order
or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to
evidence of the accused and acquitting him but also on
the civil liability of the accused to the private offended
party, said judgment on the civil aspect of the case would
be a nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of
the accused to due process is thereby violated.
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that
he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.

When the accused files a demurrer to evidence,

the accused has not yet adduced evidence both on the
criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence
on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the
trial court should do is to issue an order or partial
judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and
acquitting the accused; and set the case for continuation
of trial for the petitioner to adduce evidence on the civil
aspect of the case.

This is where the trial court, in this case, erred by

rendering acquittal of Salazar and at the same time,
ordering her to pay for the purchases even before the
petitioner could adduce evidence in a proper civil case,
thereby denying her of due process.

Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article III

of the Constitution which are elementary and deeply
imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are
mandatory and indispensable. The principles find
universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-
quoted statement that procedural due process cannot
possibly be met without a law which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial

Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the

Constitution
B. BAIL

6. PEOPLE VS. VALDEZ & SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

Respondent, Valdez was charged with eight

cases four of which (SB-14-CRM-0317 to 0320) were
for Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
while the remaining half (SB-14-CRM-0321 to 0324)
were for the complex crime of Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents
under Articles 217 and 171 in relation to Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Based on the post-audit of the disbursement

vouchers (D.V.) of the Bacolod City Government where
among the subjects thereof were the reimbursements of
expenses of private respondent Luzviminda S. Valdez a
former mayor of Bacolod City, it was alleged that the
cash slips were altered/falsified to enable Valdez to
claim/receive reimbursement from the Government the
total amount of P279,150.00 instead of only P4,843.25;
thus, an aggregate overclaim of P274,306.75.

Case was brought before the Public Assistance

and Corruption Prevention Office (PACPO), Office of
the Ombudsman Visayas and was resolved adverse to
Valdez. The Ombudsman recommended "no bail" in SB-
14-CRM-0321, 0322, and 0324.

Valdez, who is still at-large, caused the filing of

a Motion to Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and to
Fix the Amount of Bail. She argued that the three cases
are bailable as a matter of right because no aggravating
or modifying circumstance was alleged; the maximum of
the indeterminate sentence shall be taken from the
medium period that ranged from 18 years, 8 months and
1 day to 20 years; and applying Article 48 of the RPC,
the imposable penalty is 20 years, which is the
maximum of the medium period.
Petitioner, in its Comment/Opposition said that
the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL) is inapplicable as
the attending circumstances are immaterial because the
charge constituting the complex crime has the
corresponding penalty of reclusion Perpetua. Since the
offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, bail is
discretionary. Instead of a motion to fix bail, a summary
hearing to determine if the evidence of guilt is strong is,
therefore, necessary conformably with Section 13,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 4, Rule
114 of the Rules.
Due to the issuance and release of a warrant of
arrest, Valdez subsequently filed an Urgent Supplemental
Motion to the Motion to Set Aside No Bail
Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail with
Additional Prayer to Recall/Lift Warrant of Arrest.
Public respondent (Sandiganbayan) granted the
motions of Valdez. It recalled the arrest order issued in
Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322 and 0324.
In lieu thereof, a new arrest order was issued, fixing the
bail for each offense charged in said cases in the amount
of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).
Without filing a motion for reconsideration,
petitioner elevated the matter before SC to resolve the
lone issue of whether an accused indicted for the
complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an
amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is entitled to bail as a
matter of right.
ISSUE:WON accused is entitled to bail as a matter of
right
RULING:
YES. The accused is entitled to bail as a matter
of right.
The court first resolved the issue on how the
term punishable must be construed in relation to
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution and Sections 4
and 7 Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure which provides for granting bail to the
accused. Notably, the word used is ["punishable,"] which
practically bears the same meaning as "imposable." It is
only logical that the reference has a direct correlation
with the time frame "before conviction" since trial is
yet to begin; hence, it can only be the penalty imposable
of the offense charged that can be considered for
purposes of bail.
In this case, the offenses charged are the
complex crimes of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents. In
determining the penalty imposable, it is the penalty for
the most serious crime which is considered (Art. 48
RPC). Between Malversation and Falsification, it is
Malversation which provides the graver penalty. As thus
provided under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code,
if the amount exceeds 22,000, the penalty shall be
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
Perpetua The penalty, however, cannot be immediately
applied in its maximum period, or reclusion Perpetua,
since this will already consider the application of the
penalty in the event of a conviction.
The trial, however, is yet to proceed and the
prosecution must still prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. It is not amiss to point that in
charging a complex crime, the information should allege
each element of the complex offense with the same
precision as if the two (2) constituent offenses were the
subject of separate prosecutions. Where a complex crime
is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as
to one of the component offenses, the defendant can be
convicted of the offense proven. There is no certainty
that Valdez would be found guilty of Malversation of
Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public
Documents involving an amount that exceeds
P22,000.00. Falsification, like an aggravating
circumstance, must be alleged and proved during the
trial.
For purposes of bail proceedings, it would be
premature to rule that the supposed crime committed is a
complex crime since it is only when the trial has
terminated that falsification could be appreciated as a
means of committing malversation. Further, it is possible
that only the elements of one of the constituent
offenses, i.e., either malversation or falsification, or
worse, none of them, would be proven after full-blown
trial.
It would be the height of absurdity to deny
Valdez the right to bail and grant her the same only after
trial if it turns out that there is no complex crime
committed. Likewise, it is unjust for the court to give a
stamp of approval in depriving the accused person's
constitutional right to bail for allegedly committing a
complex crime that is not even considered as inherently
grievous, odious and hateful.
Pursuant to the lenity rule, when the court is
faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute,
one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is
favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an
interpretation which is more lenient to the accused. Since
the complex crimes have not yet been proven, Valdez is
entitled to bail
SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Pursuant thereto, Sections 4 and 7, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:
SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons
in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right,
with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as
prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after
conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction
by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment. (4a)
SEC. 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. -
No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence
of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution. (7a)
7) ENRILE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD
DIVISION)
Date of Promulgation: August 18, 2015
Ponente: Bersamin, J
Petition: Certiorari
Petitioner: Juan Ponce Enrile
Respondents: Sandiganbayan (Third Division), and
People of the Philippines
FACTS:
On June 5, 2014 Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was charged
by the Office of the Ombudsman with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported
involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF). The case is a petition for
certiorari to annul the decision of the Sandiganbayan
denying his Motion to fix bail and Motion for
Reconsideration on the following grounds: (a) The
prosecution failed to show conclusively that Enrile, if
ever convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; (b)
The prosecution failed to show that evidence of Enriles
guilt is strong; (c) Enrile is not a flight risk.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Enrile can bail -YES
RULING:
The purpose of the bail is to guarantee the appearance of
the accused at the trial.
It is the Philippines responsibility in the international
community under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights .of protecting and promoting the right of
every person to liberty and due processunder the
obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the
right to be admitted to bail.
Enrile is not a flight risk because of his social and
political standing and his having immediately
surrendered to the authorities upon being charged in
court.
The currently fragile state of Enriles health is a
compelling justification for his admission to bail.
(Chronic hypertension, diffuse atherosclerotic
cardiovascular disease, Atrial and Ventricular
Arrhythmia, etc.)
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Bail is not a matter of right in cases where the crime
charged is plunder and the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua. The grant of bail is a special accommodation
for the petitioner.
The prosecution should have been given the opportunity
to rebut the allegation that petitioner suffers from
medical conditions.
The invocation of a general human rights principle does
not provide clear legal basis for the grant of bail on
humanitarian grounds. It is neither presently provided in
our Rules of Court nor found in any statue or provision
of the Constitution. This sets a dangerous precedent for
the granting of bail on the basis of humanitarian
conditions, which is determined by the personal
discretion of the trial judge.
The grant of provisional liberty to petitioner without any
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong
violates the clear and unambiguous text of the
constitution.
8) LEVISTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner
Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of
homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal
as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of
Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application
for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced
age and health condition, and claiming the absence of
any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners
application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in
the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to
extend bail during the course of appeal should be
exercised with grave caution and only for strong
reasons.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied
ISSUE:
Whether or not bail should automatically be granted
absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
filed by an appellant pending appeal?
RULING:
NO. Absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 means that a less
stringent approach in granting bail only subject to the
discretion of the court to grant bail.
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is discretionary.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail,
or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following
or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions
of his bail without a valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under
probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit
another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of
bail to an accused may be summarized in the following
rules:
xxx xxx xxx
e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court
wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years
but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of
the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar
circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of
discretion (Sec. 5);
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court
imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years
but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances
stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is
present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court
(Sec. 5); x x x1[24] (emphasis supplied
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on
the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment
exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with the
circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely,
recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or
commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance
of reiteration; previous escape from legal confinement,
evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his
bail without a valid justification; commission of the
offense while under probation, parole or conditional
pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight
if released on bail; undue risk of committing another
crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar
circumstances) not present. The second scenario
contemplates the existence of at least one of the said
circumstances.
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial
discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant
or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may
be denied even if the bail-negating 2[26] circumstances in
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In
1 custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to
2
other words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending
appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does
not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the
appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that
is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated
circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no
other option except to deny or revoke bail pending
appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail
pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be
committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore,
any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed
from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination
of discretion stage, where the appellate court must
determine whether any of the circumstances in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will
establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise
sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the
application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise
of discretion stage where, assuming the appellants case
falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of
sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all
relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the
demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it
may either allow or disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the
second scenario, the appellate courts stringent discretion
requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on
the determination of the proof of the presence of any of
the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of
bail. This is so because the existence of any of those
circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke
bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said
circumstances is present will not automatically result in
the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the
court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.
9) GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION V. OLALIA JR.
Bail, Section 1, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure - is the surety for the release of a person in
guarantee his appearance before any court as required
under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be
given in the form of corporate surety, property bond,
cash deposit, or recognizance.
FACTS:
Respondent Muoz was charged of 3 counts of offences
of accepting an advantage as agent, and 7 counts of
conspiracy to defraud, punishable by the common law of
Hongkong. The Hongkong Depoartment of Justice
requested DOJ for the provisional arrest of respondent
Muoz; the DOJ forward the request to the NBI then to
RTC. On the same day, NBI agents arrested him.
Respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for
preliminary mandatory injunction and writ of habeas
corpus questioning the validity of the order of arrest.
The CA declared the arrest void. Hence this petition by
the Hongkong Department of Justice thru DOJ.
DOJ filed a petition for certiorari in this Court and
sustained the validity of the arrest.
Hongkong Administrative Region then filed in the RTC
petition for extradition and arrest of respondent.
Meanwhile, respondent filed a petition for bail, which
was opposed by the petitioner, initially the RTC denied
the petition holding that there is no Philippine Law
granting bail in extradition cases and that private
responded is a flight risk.
Motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent,
which was granted. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not right to bail can be avail in
extradition cases.
HELD:
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that
the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara
v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per
Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional
provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition,
where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
In Purganan case, the right to bail was not included in
the extradition cases, since it is available only in
criminal proceedings.
However the Supreme Court, recognised the following
trends in International Law.
1. The growing importance of the individual person in
publican international law who, in the 20th century
attained global recognition.
2. The higher value now being given in human rights
in international sphere
3. The corresponding duty of countries to observe
these human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations
4. The of duty of this court to balance the rights of the
individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and
the law on extradition on the other.
The modern trend in the public international law is the
primacy placed on the sanctity of human rights.
Enshrined the Constitution The state values the dignity
of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights. The Philippines therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of
every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that
those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceeding before the a court, to enable it to decide
without delay on the legality of the detention and order
their release if justified.
Examination of this Court in the doctrines provided for
in the US Vs Purganan provide the following.
1. The exercise of the States police power to deprive a
person of his liberty is not limited to criminal
proceedings.
2. To limit the right to bail in the criminal proceeding
would be to close our eyes to jurisprudential history.
Philippines has not limited the exercise of the right to
bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has
admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal
proceedings. In fact, bail has been involved in this
jurisdiction to persons in detention during the tendency
of administrative proceedings, taking into cognisance the
obligation of the Philippines under international
conventions to uphold human rights.
not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and
processes of the extradition court.
However in the case at bar, the respondent was not able
to show and clear and convincing evidence that he be
entitled to bail. Thus the case is remanded in the court
for the determination and otherwise, should order the
cancellation of his bond and his immediate detention.

EXTRADITION, is defined as the removal of an

accused from the Philippines with the object of placing
him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the
requesting state or government to hold him in connection
with criminal investigation directed against him or
execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal
and criminal law of the requesting state or government.
Thus characterized as the right of the a foreign power,
created by treaty to demand the surrender of one accused
or convicted of a crimes within its territorial jurisdiction,
and the correlative obligation of the other state to
surrender him to the demanding state.

The extradited may be subject to detention as may be

necessary step in the process of extradition, but the
length of time in the detention should be reasonable.
In the case at bar, the record show that the respondent,
Muoz has been detained for 2 years without being
convicted in Hongkong.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant
of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a
right to due process under the Constitution.
C. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
10) PEOPLE VS. FRAGO
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an
investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to
ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or
admissions from the respondent/accused
FACTS:

The Philippines has the obligation of ensuring the ORLANDO FRAGO was charged before the court a quo
individual his right to liberty and due process and should with rape and attempted rape, docketed as Crim. Cases
not therefor deprive the extraditee of his right to bail Nos. 9144 and 9145, respectively.
PROVIDED that certain standards for the grant is
Crim. Case No. 9144:
satisfactorily met. In other words there should be
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. In the early morning of 26 September 1990, at about four
o'clock, in the poblacion of Quezon, Palawan, the
In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate
accused Orlando Frago entered the sleeping room of the
Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed
house belonging to Fortunato Moral where JICELYN
that a new standard which he termed "clear and
LANSAP was sleeping, thereby Jicelyn Lansap was
convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in
bodily carried by accused Orlando Frago to a nearby
extradition cases. According to him, this standard should
house belonging to Dado Andor and with lewd design
be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee
lay with and have carnal knowledge with said Jicelyn
must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is
Lansap who at that time was deeply asleep, against her
will and without her consent, to the damage and
prejudice of Jicelyn Lansap.
Crim. Case No. 9145:
In the early morning of 26 September 1990, at about
three forty-five, in the poblacion of Quezon, Palawan,
the accused Orlando Frago entered the room of the
dwelling house of Philip Pastera where one RONALYN
PASTERA, a girl 9 years of age, was sleeping, and once
inside the room, with lewd design did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously hold her head and
bodily carry said Ronalyn Pastera, thus commencing the
commission of a felony of Rape directly by overt acts
but did not perform all the acts of execution which
would produce the said felony by reason of causes other
than the spontaneous desistance of the accused, that is,
Ronalyn Pastera was awakened and shouted for help,
thus forcing the accused to release Ronalyn Pastera and
ran away.
Prosecutions Version:
Before proceeding to the boarding house of Jicelyn
Lansap, the accused, an ice cream vendor, first went to
the residence of Ronalyn Pastera at around three forty-
five in the morning and surreptitiously entered Ronalyn's
bedroom where she was sleeping. He fanned her face
with his handkerchief and then lifted her bodily from the
floor. He was about to take her out of the room when she
suddenly woke up and screamed for help thus prompting
her father to respond immediately by switching on the
lights. As a consequence, the accused had to drop
Ronalyn on the floor and run out of the house. The
prosecution would seem to infer that from the house of
Ronalyn where he failed in his alleged attempt to defile
her, the accused next went to the boarding house of
Jicelyn some fifty meters away.
According to Jicelyn, she and her cousins went to bed at
about eight o'clock in the evening of 25 September 1990.
Then at around five-thirty the following morning, she
was awakened by appellant who was already strangling
her. She shouted for help so that he immediately ran
away. She felt pain all over her body, more particularly
in her private part, and discovered that she was no longer
wearing her skirt and underwear. To her consternation,
she found herself in the vacant house of a certain Dado
Andor. So she lost no time looking for her way home.
Upon reaching her boarding house, she narrated her
harrowing experience to her cousins who in turn related
the incident to her mother.
Jicelyn and her mother went to the hospital where she
was examined by Dr. Marcela Remegio who found
Jicelyn with "Labia Majora and Minora still coaptated
and with sign of external struggle, contusion, abrasion
all over face, around neck, scratch marks on both medial
surface of thigh, vulva swollen, presence of fresh
hymenal laceration at six o'clock, [e]xamination for the
presence of spermatoza was positive, physical virginity
lost.
Defenses Version
Appellant seeks sanctuary in the alcove of denial and
alibi. He claims that at nine o'clock in the evening of 25
September 1990, he was already asleep with his wife and
children. He woke up at six o'clock the following
morning. He was very tired that night because he was
vending ice cream in the poblacion the whole day. In his
appeal, appellant imputes error to the trial court in
convicting him on the basis of an identification which
was made without the assistance of counsel and
according credence to the story of Jicelyn, which he
considers fantastic, thereby denying his constitutional
right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
Appellant argues that it was during his detention, when
he was not assisted by counsel, that he was identified by
Jicelyn. Thus he invokes People v. Hassan where this
Court affirmed the right of an accused to counsel at all
stages of the proceedings, the most crucial of which is
his identification, and denial thereof entitles him to
acquittal.
In Crim. Case No. 9145 for attempted rape, the accused
was acquitted on "reasonable doubt occasioned by lack
of clear and convincing evidence that the accused
Orlando Frago indeed performed against Ronalyn
Pastera
ISSUE: Whether or not positive identification of the
victim is accepted to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of the accused
RULING:
No. Orlando Frago was singled out by Jicelyn in a police
line-up composed of ten persons. In Gamboa v. Cruz, we
were explicit The right to counsel attaches upon the
start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating
officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or
confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused.
As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the
police line-up (at least, in this case) was not part of the
custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled,
at such stage, to counsel. When petitioner was identified
by the complainant at the police line-up, he had not been
held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The police
line-up is not a part of the custodial inquest, hence, he
was not yet entitled to counsel. Since petitioner in the
course of his identification in the police line-up had not
yet been held to answer for a criminal offense, he was,
therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted by
counsel because the accusatory process had not yet set
in.
But we sustain the defense on the insufficiency of the
identification of appellant Orlando Frago. A careful
dissection of the testimony of Jicelyn herself indubitably
shows that she has no reliable basis for pointing to the
accused as the person who raped her. The only evidence
of sexual intercourse is the result of the medical
examination. There was no positive identification of
Orlando Frago by Jicelyn. Her testimony on direct
examination supports this conclusion. While she would
make it appear that she was able to positively identify
the accused, her account of the incident proved
otherwise. It appears highly incredible that Jicelyn could
be bodily lifted from her room in her boarding house and
taken some three hundred meters away to the vacant
house of Dado Andor. Only when the conscience is
satisfied that the crime has been committed by the
person on trial should the sentence be for conviction. 21
Unfortunately for the prosecution, its evidence has
miserably failed to pass that conscience test.
11. PEOPLE VS. GODOY, 250 SCRA 676 (1995)
Facts:
Godoy was charged with the crimes of rape and
kidnapping with serious illegal detention.
According to complainant Mia Taha, at around 7:00 P.M.
of January 21, 1994, she went to the boarding house of
her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, at Pulot Center,
Brooke's Point which is near the Palawan National
School (PNS), Pulot Branch, where she was studying.
When she saw that the house was dark, she decided to
pass through the kitchen door at the back because she
knew that there was nobody inside. As soon as she
opened the door, somebody suddenly grabbed her, poked
a knife on her neck, dragged her by the hand and told her
not to shout. She was then forced to lie down on the
floor. Although it was dark, complainant was able to
recognize her assailant, by the light coming from the
moon and through his voice, as accused-appellant Danny
Godoy who was her Physics teacher at PNS.
When she was already on the floor, appellant removed
her panty with one hand while holding the knife with the
other hand, opened the zipper of his pants, and then
inserted his private organ inside her private parts against
her will. She felt pain because it was her first experience
and she cried. Throughout her ordeal, she could not utter
a word. She was very frightened because a knife was
continually pointed at her. She also could not fight back
nor plead with appellant not to rape her because he was
her teacher and she was afraid of him. She was
threatened not to report the incident to anyone or else
she and her family would be killed.
Thereafter, while she was putting on her panty, she
noticed that her skirt was stained with blood. Appellant
walked with her to the gate of the house and she then
proceeded alone to the boarding house where she lived.
She did not see where appellant went after she left him at
the gate. When she arrived at her boarding house, she
saw her landlady but she did not mention anything about
the incident.
The following morning, January 22, 1994, complainant
went home to her parents' house at Ipilan, Brooke's
Point. She likewise did not tell her parents about the
incident for fear that appellant might make good his
threat. At around 3:00 P.M. of that same day, appellant
arrived at the house of her parents and asked permission
from the latter if complainant could accompany him to
solicit funds because she was a candidate for "Miss PNS
Pulot." When her parents agreed, she was constrained to
go with appellant because she did not want her parents to
get into trouble.
Appellant and complainant then left the house and they
walked in silence, with Mia following behind appellant,
towards the highway where appellant hailed a passenger
jeep which was empty except for the driver and the
conductor. She was forced to ride the jeep because
appellant threatened to kill her if she would not board
the vehicle. The jeep proceeded to the Sunset Garden at
the poblacion, Brooke's Point where they alighted.
At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in and brought
her to a room where they staye d for three days. During
the entire duration of their stay at the Sunset Garden,
complainant was not allowed to leave the room which
was always kept locked. She was continuously guarded
and constantly raped by appellant. She was, however,
never drunk or unconscious. Nonetheless, she was forced
to have sex with appellant because the latter was always
carrying a knife with him.
In the early morning of January 25, 1994, appellant
brought her to the house of his friend at Edward's
Subdivision where she was raped by him three times.
She was likewise detained and locked inside the room
and tightly guarded by appellant. After two days, or on
January 27, 1994, they left the place because appellant
came to know that complainant had been reported and
indicated as a missing person in the police blotter. They
went to see a certain Naem ** from whom appellant
sought help. On that same day, she was released but only
after her parents agreed to settle the case with appellant.
Immediately thereafter, Mia's parents brought her to the
District Hospital at Brooke's Point where she was
examined by Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia who made the
following medical findings:
GENERAL: Well developed, nourished, cooperative,
walking, conscious, coherent Filipina.
BREAST: Slightly globular with brown colored areola
and nipple.
EXTERNAL EXAM.: Numerous pubic hair, fairly
developed labia majora and minora, hymenal opening
stellate in shape, presence of laceration superficial,
longitudinal at the fossa navicularis, approximately 1/2
cm. length.
INTERNAL EXAM.: Hymenal opening, stellate in
shape, laceration noted, hymenal opening admits 2
fingers with slight resistance, prominent vaginal rugae,
cervix closed.
CONCLUSION: Hymenal opening admits easily 2
fingers with slight resistance, presence of laceration,
longitudinal at the fossa navicularis approximately 1/2
cm. length. Hymenal opening can admit an average size
penis in erection with laceration. 4
Dr. Divinagracia further testified that the hymenal
opening was in stellate shape and that there was a
laceration, which shows that complainant had
participated in sexual intercourse. On the basis of the
inflicted laceration which was downward at 6 o'clock
position, he could not say that there was force applied
because there were no scratches or bruises, but only a
week-old laceration. He also examined the patient bodily
but found no sign of bruises or injuries. The patient told
him that she was raped.
During the cross-examination, complainant denied that
she wrote the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2"; that
she never loved appellant but, on the contrary, she hated
him because of what he did to her; and that she did not
notice if there were people near the boarding house of
her cousin. She narrated that when appellant started to
remove her panty, she was already lying down, and that
even as appellant was doing this she could not shout
because she was afraid. She could not remember with
which hand appellant held the knife. She was completely
silent from the time she was made to lie down, while her
panty was being removed, and even until appellant was
able to rape her.
When appellant went to their house the following day,
she did not know if he was armed but there was no threat
made on her or her parents. On the contrary, appellant
even courteously asked permission from them in her
behalf and so they left the house with appellant walking
ahead of her. When she was brought to the Sunset
Garden, she could not refuse because she was afraid.
However, she admitted that at that time, appellant was
not pointing a knife at her. She only saw the cashier of
the Sunset Garden but she did not notice if there were
other people inside. She likewise did not ask the
appellant why he brought her there.
Complainant described the lock in their room as an
ordinary doorknob, similar to that on the door of the
courtroom which, even if locked, could still be opened
from the inside, and she added that there was a sliding
lock inside the room. According to her, they stayed at
Sunset Garden for three days and three nights but she
never noticed if appellant ever slept because everytime
she woke up, appellant was always beside her. She never
saw him close his eyes.
Helen Taha, the mother of complainant, testified that
when the latter arrived at their house in the morning of
January 22, 1994, she noticed that Mia appeared weak
and her eyes were swollen. When she asked her daughter
if there was anything wrong, the latter merely kept silent.
That afternoon, she allowed Mia to go with appellant
because she knew he was her teacher. However, when
Mia and appellant failed to come home at the expected
time, she and her husband, Adjeril, went to look for them
at Ipilan. When they could not find them there, she went
to the house of appellant because she was already
suspecting that something was wrong, but appellant's
wife told her that he did not come home.
allowed to graduate. Her father died two months later,
supposedly because of what happened.
Issue:
Can Godoy be convicted of rape and kidnapping with
illegal detention?

Early the next morning, she and her husband went to the Ruling:
Philippine National Police (PNP) station at Pulot,
Brooke's Point and had the incident recorded in the No. They were in fact lovers.
police blotter. The following day, they went to the office
This notwithstanding, the basic rule remains that in all
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) at Puerto
criminal prosecutions without regard to the nature of the
Princess City, then to the police station near the NBI, and
defense which the accused may raise, the burden of
finally to the radio station airing the Radyo ng Bayan
proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to
program where she made an appeal to appellant to return
establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the
her daughter. When she returned home, a certain Naem
accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any material
was waiting there and he informed her that Mia was at
element, and the prosecution is then unable to overcome
Brooke's Point. He further conveyed appellant's
this evidence, the prosecution has failed to carry its
willingness to become a Muslim so he could marry Mia
burden of proof of the guilt of the accused beyond a
and thus settle the case. Helen Taha readily acceded
reasonable doubt and the accused must be acquitted.
because she wanted to see her daughter.
There are three well-known principles that guide an
In the morning of January 27, 1994, she went to the
appellate court in reviewing the evidence presented in a
house of Naem who sent somebody to fetch
prosecution for the crime of rape. These are: (1)while
complainant. She testified that when Mia arrived, she
rape is a most detestable crime, and ought to be severely
was crying as she reported that she was raped by
and impartially punished, it must be borne in mind that it
appellant, and that the latter threatened to kill her if she
is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but
did not return within an hour. Because of this, she
harder to be defended by the party accused, though
immediately brought Mia to the hospital where the latter
innocent;(2) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the
was examined and then they proceeded to the municipal
crime of rape where only two persons are usually
hall to file a complaint for rape and kidnapping. Both
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
Mia and Helen Taha executed separate sworn statements
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) that the
before the PNP at Brooke's Point.
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its
Later, Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant, went to their own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from
house and offered P50,000.00 for the settlement of the the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
case. On their part, her husband insisted that they just
In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which
settle, hence all three of them, Adjeril, Helen and Mia
amply demonstrate and ineluctably convince this Court
Taha, went to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
that there was no rape committed on the alleged date and
where they met with the mother of appellant who gave
place, and that the charge of rape was the contrivance of
them P30,000.00. Adjeril and Helen Taha subsequently
an afterthought, rather than a truthful plaint for redress
executed an affidavit of desistance in Criminal Case No.
of an actual wrong.
7687 for kidnapping pending in the prosecutor's office,
which was sworn to before Prosecutor II Chito S. The challenged decision definitely leaves much to be
Meregillano. Helen Taha testified that she agreed to the desired. The court below made no serious effort to
settlement because that was what her husband wanted. dispassionately or impartially consider the totality of the
Mia Taha was dropped from the school and was not evidence for the prosecution in spite of the teaching in
various rulings that in rape cases, the testimony of the
offended party must not be accepted with precipitate
credulity. In finding that the crime of rape was
committed, the lower court took into account only that
portion of the testimony of complainant regarding the
incident and conveniently deleted the rest. Taken singly,
there would be reason to believe that she was indeed
raped. But if we are to consider the other portions of her
testimony concerning the events which transpired
thereafter, which unfortunately the court a quo wittingly
or unwittingly failed or declined to appreciate, the actual
truth could have been readily exposed.
It is basic that for kidnapping to exist, there must be
indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactor
was to deprive the offended party of her liberty. In the
present charge for that crime, such intent has not at all
been established by the prosecution. Prescinding from
the fact that the Taha spouses desisted from pursuing this
charge which they themselves instituted, several grave
and irreconcilable inconsistencies bedevil the
prosecution's evidence thereon and cast serious doubts
on the guilt of appellant.
The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in
rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies are strictly
required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great
caution is observed so that their reputations shall remain
untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor
to their character humiliates their entire families.80 It
could precisely be that complainant's mother wanted to
save face in the community where everybody knows
everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter's
indiscretion and escape the wagging tongues of their
small rural community, she had to weave the scenario of
this rape drama.
12. RE: CONVICTION OF JUDGE ADORACION
G. ANGELES [FOR CHILD ABUSE]- A.M. NO. 06-
9-545-RTC, JANUARY 31, 2008
Facts:
Respondent was convicted for violation of RA 7610.
Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (SSP
Velasco) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) wrote a
letter to then CJ Panganiban inquiring whether it is
possible to order the immediate suspension of the
respondent. The matter was referred to the OCA for
comment and recommendation where they
recommended that respondent be indefinitely suspended.
The Court's Second Division approved all of these
recommendations, thus, suspending respondent from
performing her judicial functions while awaiting the
final resolution of her criminal cases. Respondent filed
an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration; he claimed that
the suspension order was wielded against her without
affording her the opportunity to be heard since she was
not furnished copies of SSP Velasco's letter and OCA's
Administrative Complaint. Thus, respondent submitted
that her suspension is essentially unjust. Moreover,
respondent manifested that the two criminal cases
against her are on appeal before the CA and have,
therefore, not yet attained finality. As such, respondent
still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence
and her suspension clashes with this presumption and is
tantamount to a prejudgment of her guilt. SSP Velasco
filed an Urgent Appeal/Manifestation manifesting that
respondent continuously defied the courts Resolution.
Velasco reiterated that due to her conviction on two
counts of child abuse, respondent no longer enjoys the
constitutional presumption of innocence and should
remain suspended in order to erase any suspicion that
she is using her influence to obtain a favorable decision
and in order to maintain and reaffirm the people's faith in
the integrity of the judiciary.
Issue:
Whether or not grounds exist to preventively suspend the
respondent pending the resolution of this administrative
case.
Held:
We resolve the issue in the negative. The Court cannot
fully agree with the recommendation of the OCA. By
parity of reasoning, the fact of respondent's conviction
by the RTC does not necessarily warrant her suspension.
We agree with respondent's argument that since her
conviction of the crime of child abuse is currently on
appeal before the CA, the same has not yet attained
finality. As such, she still enjoys the constitutional
presumption of innocence. It must be remembered that
the existence of a presumption indicating the guilt of the
accused does not in itself destroy the constitutional
presumption of innocence unless the inculpating
presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack
of any evidence or explanation, proves the accused's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the accused's guilt
is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence
continues. Moreover, it is established that any
administrative complaint leveled against a judge must
always be examined with a discriminating eye, for its
consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal,
such that the respondent judge stands to face the sanction
of dismissal or disbarment. As aforementioned, the filing
of criminal cases against judges may be used as tools to
harass them and may in the long run create adverse
consequences. The OCA, as well as SSP Velasco, failed
to prove that other than the fact that a judgment of
conviction for child abuse was rendered against the
respondent, which is still on appeal, there are other
lawful grounds to support the imposition of preventive
suspension. Based on the foregoing disquisition, the
Court is of the resolve that, while it is true that
preventive suspension pendente lite does not violate the
right of the accused to be presumed innocent as the same
is not a penalty, the rules on preventive suspension of
judges, not having been expressly included in the Rules
of Court, are amorphous at best. Likewise, we consider
respondent's argument that there is no urgency in
imposing preventive suspension as the criminal cases are
now before the CA, and that she cannot, by using her
present position as an RTC Judge, do anything to
influence the CA to render a decision in her favor. The
issue of preventive suspension has also been rendered
moot as the Court opted to resolve this administrative
case.
However, even as we find that the OCA and SSP Velasco
have not clearly and convincingly shown ample grounds
to warrant the imposition of preventive suspension, we
do note the use of offensive language in respondent's
pleadings, not only against SSP Velasco but also against
former CA Lock. To reiterate our previous ruling
involving the respondent, her use of disrespectful
language in her Comment is certainly below the standard
expected of an officer of the court. The esteemed
position of a magistrate of the law demands temperance,
patience and courtesy both in conduct and in
language. Illustrative are the following statements: "CA
Lock's hostile mindset and his superstar complex"; "In a
frenzied display of arrogance and power"; "(CA Lock's)
complaint is merely a pathetic echo of the findings of the
trial court"; and "when (CA Lock) himself loses his
objectivity and misuses the full powers of his Office
to persecute the object of his fancy, then it is time for
him to step down." In the attempt to discredit CA Lock,
respondent even dragged CA Lock's son into the
controversy, to wit:
It is noteworthy to mention that CA
Lock's hostile attitude was aggravated
by his embarrassment when the
undersigned mentioned to him that she
knew how he used his influence to
secure a position for his son at the
RTC Library of Pasay City which was
then managed by Judge Priscilla
Mijares. CA Lock had made sure that
his son be assigned to the library to
enable the latter to conveniently adjust
his schedule in reviewing for the bar
examination.
Neither was SSP Velasco spared. Of him, the respondent
said: "A reading of the motion for reconsideration
readily discloses that it is mainly anchored on SSP
Velasco's malicious speculations about the guilt of the
undersigned. Speculations, especially those that emanate
from the poisonous intentions of attention-seeking
individuals, are no different from garbage that should be
rejected outright"; and "His malicious insinuation is no
less than a revelation of his warped mindset that a
person's position could cause pressure to bear among
government officials. This brings forth a nagging
question. Did SSP Velasco use his position at the DOJ to
'cause pressure to bear' and obtain a favorable
disposition of the administrative cases lodged against
him by the undersigned? Is he afraid of his own
ghost?" It must be stressed again that, as a dispenser of
justice, respondent should exercise judicial temperament
at all times, avoiding vulgar and insulting language. She
must maintain composure and equanimity. The judicial
office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and
imposes a number of restrictions. This is the price that
judges have to pay for accepting and occupying their
exalted positions in the administration of justice. One
final word. The parties herein have admitted in their
various pleadings that they have filed numerous cases
against each other. We do not begrudge them the
prerogative to initiate charges against those who, in their
opinion, may have wronged them. But it is well to
remind them that this privilege must be exercised with
prudence, when there are clearly lawful grounds, and
only in the pursuit of truth and justice. This prerogative
does not give them the right to institute shotgun charges
with reckless abandon, or allow their disagreement to
deteriorate into a puerile quarrel, not unlike that of two
irresponsible children.
D. RIGHT TO BE HEARD AND TO COUNSEL

13) UNITED STATES V. ASH

Citation. 413 U.S. 300, 93 S. Ct. 2568, 37 L. Ed. 2d

619 (1973)
Brief Fact Summary. A number of informants were
asked to identify a number of suspects in connection
with a bank robbery. The respondent, Ash (the
respondent), challenged the identification because
counsel was not present at what was arguably a critical
stage of the prosecution.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. An accused does not have the

right to counsel at a post indictment photographic lineup
Facts. The Supreme Court of the United States
(Supreme Court) granted certiorari to resolve the split
in the circuits as to the issue of whether an accused has
the right to counsel at a post indictment photographic
lineup. The Supreme Court held that the right to counsel
at a display at which the defendant himself was not
entitled to be present was not embodied in the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution
(Constitution). The Court of Appeals reversed.
Issue. Whether the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution
grants an accused the right to have counsel present at a
post indictment photographic identification procedure?
Held. The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution does
not grant an accused the right to counsel during a post
indictment photographic identification procedure
because the accused himself is not entitled to be present,
rendering it impossible that the accused will be confused
or overpowered by the proceedings.
Dissent. The dissent writes to emphasize that the
photographic lineup is indeed a critical stage of the
proceedings.
Concurrence. Justice Potter Stewart (J. Stewart)
concurs to emphasize the point that any issues involved
could be resolved through traditional methods such as
cross examination.
Discussion. The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution
guarantees the assistance of counsel during stages of the
proceeding at which a defendant is faced with either the
intricacies of the law, or a zealous prosecutor. Neither of
these situations exist at a photographic display. The
historical test to be applied to the Sixth Amendment
issues indicates that the right has only been expanded
when new facts have demanded it for the protection of
the defendant.
14) ROCK V. ARKANSAS
Citation. 549 U.S. 877 127 S. Ct. 360 166 L. Ed. 2d 134
2006 U.S.
Brief Fact Summary. The petitioner, Rock (the
petitioner), was charged with manslaughter for
shooting her husband, and sought to introduce her own
testimony that had been refreshed by hypnosis. An
expert witness corroborated the petitioners refreshed
testimony that the gun was defective. The trial court
ruled that hypnotically refreshed testimony was
inadmissible per se and the Arkansas Supreme Court
affirmed.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The states legitimate interest
in barring unreliable evidence does not justify a per se
exclusion because the evidence may be reliable in an
individual case.
Facts. During a domestic dispute, the petitioner shot her
husband. Because she could not remember the precise
details of the incident she submitted to hypnosis by a
licensed hypnotherapist. After the hypnosis, the
petitioner recalled that she did not have her finger on the
trigger when the gun fired during a scuffle. An
inspection by an expert revealed that the gun was
defective. The trial court ruled that no hypnotically
refreshed testimony would be admitted. The Supreme
Court of Arkansas upheld the conviction, ruling that
hypnotically refreshed testimony was inadmissible per
se.
Issue. Does an evidentiary rule prohibiting the
admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony per se
violate a defendants right to testify on her own behalf?
Held. Criminal defendants have a right to testify in their
own behalf under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
(Constitution), the Compulsory Clause of the Sixth
Amendment of the Constitution, and the Fifth
Amendment constitutional privilege against self
incrimination.
Restrictions placed on a criminal defendants right to
testify by a states evidentiary rules, may not be arbitrary
or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to
serve.
The states legitimate interest in barring unreliable
evidence does not justify a per se exclusion because the
evidence may be unreliable in an individual case.
Dissent. An individuals right to present evidence is
always subject to reasonable restrictions. Traditionally
the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme
Court) accords the respect to the states in the
establishment of their own evidentiary rules and
procedures. The Arkansas Supreme Courts decision was
a permissible response to a novel and difficult question.
A defendant in a criminal case has the right to take the
witness stand and testify in his own defense. This right
can be found in several places in the Constitution. A state
may not apply a rule of evidence that permits a witness
to take the stand, but arbitrarily excludes material
portions of his testimony. The right to present relevant
testimony is not without limitation, but a state must
evaluate whether the interests served justify the
limitation imposed on the defendants constitutional
right to testify. The Arkansas Supreme Court failed to
perform the constitutional analysis necessary when a
defendants right to testify is at stake. More traditional
means of assessing information such as cross-
examination are effective tools for revealing
inconsistencies. A states legitimate interest in barring
unreliable evidence does not extend to per se exclusions
that may be unreliable in the individual case.
15) PEOPLE VS LIWANANG
363 SCRA 62
Facts:
Complainant Corazon Hernandez was on her way home
to Paraaque at around 1:00 oclock Upon reaching the
tricycle terminal at Dona Soledad St., Better Living
Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila, she was offered
by tricycle driver Ramil Vendibil While they were about
to leave, Randy Simbulan and Lope Liwanag also rode
the tricycle behind the driver. When they reached India
Street, Lope Liwanag entered the sidecar and sat beside
complainant, grabbed her shoulder, pointed an
instrument at the side of her neck, and declared a hold-
up. Because of fear complainant told accused-appellant
that she only had sixty pesos (P60.00) in her bag.
Liwanag instructed Randy Simbulan to get her bag.
Before municipal building of Paraaque, accused-
appellant informed complainant that since they could not
get anything from her anyway, she might as well submit
herself to them. Then, accused-appellant began kissing
complainant and touching her private parts. Randy
Simbulan, meanwhile, inserted his finger into
complainants vagina.
As they were entering Levitown Subdivision, accused-
appellant ordered complainant to act naturally while they
passed the guardhouse. Afterwards, accused-appellant
asked her to give in to his desire, and then, he again
began touching her private parts. Complainant answered
that she would rather be killed than accede to his desire.
This prompted accused-appellant to hit her with an
icepick on the abdomen.
Upon reaching a vacant lot, accused-appellant ordered
Vendibil to stop the tricycle. He then tried to strangle
complainant, causing her to fall down from her seat and
lose consciousness. When she regained consciousness,
she was forced to board the tricycle. Accused-appellant
tried to strangle her with a bandana and ordered her to
remove her underwear. When she refused, accused-
appellant himself removed her underwear, opened his
pant zipper and forced her to sit on his lap. Complainant
struggled, so accused-appellant ordered the tricycle to
stop and dragged complainant out. Accused-appellant
then brought complainant to a grassy vacant lot and
forced himself on her. After satisfying his lust, they
again boarded the tricycle and accused-appellant
informed complainant that his companions would
follow.Thereafter, they came upon another vacant lot
where accused-appellant and Vendibil dragged
complainant. There, Vendibil forced complainant to put
his penis into her mouth. Unsatisfied, Vendibil forced her
to lie down and succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with her while accused-appellant and Simbulan watched.
Thereafter, Simbulan took his turn. After he satisfied his
lust, they talked of killing complainant.
She pleaded for her life and, in desperation, she offered
them money in exchange for her life. Accused-appellant
asked her if she can produce P10,000.00, but she said
she could not. Accused-appellant lowered his demand to
P5,000.00. They agreed on the sum of P2,000.00.
Accused-appellant instructed complainant to deliver the
money at Guadalupe, Makati. She was to place the
amount inside a bag together with a sandwich she was to
buy at Burger Machine at 11:30 that same morning.
When they finally let go of her, complainant proceeded
to a church. At daybreak, She told here mother the story
and the went to police station to report the incident.
At the appointed hour, complainant went to Guadalupe,
Makati, bringing with her an envelope containing pieces
of plain paper. Accused-appellant arrived after 45
minutes. Complainant handed the envelope to him, then
she ran away. Accused-appellant also ran and boarded a
bus, but he was collared and arrested by the police.
the Court finds accused Lope Liwanag y Buenaventura
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of having violated
Presidential Decree No. 532, known as the Anti-Piracy
and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974.
Accused-appellant submits that he was deprived of his
constitutional right to counsel under Article III, Section
14, (2) of the 1987 Constitution which provides, thus:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel.
Issue: WON, the accused-appelant was deprived of
his constitutional right to counsel.
Held: No, In essence, the right to be heard by counsel
simply refers to the right to be assisted by counsel for the
purpose of ensuring that an accused is not denied the
collateral right to due process, a fundamental right which
cannot be waived by an accused. The underlying basis
for due process is the concept of fairness, without which
there can be no justice. In other words, there can be no
due process accorded an accused if he is not given the
right to be heard through counsel or assisted by counsel.
It follows that in order to be heard, and therefore be
accorded due process, the assistance given by counsel
must be effective as implied in the rationale of Article
III, Section 14 (2). In this sense, this Court subscribes to
American jurisprudence when it held that [t]he right of
an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental
right. Without counsel, the right to a fair trial itself
would be of little consequence, for it is through counsel
that the accused secures his other rights. In other words,
the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of
counsel
In Strickland v. Washington,[12] accused-appellant
contends that the assistance rendered by counsel is
ineffective or is defective if the following elements are
present: (1) that counsels performance was deficient,
which requires a showing that counsel was not
functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment; and (2) that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense, which requires a
showing that counsels errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial which result is
reliable. Accused-appellant claims that the assistance
afforded him by his counsel during the course of the trial
was ineffective since the counsel de officio failed to
safeguard his rights necessary for the reversal of his
conviction.
One of the rights which accused-appellant contends his
counsel de officio failed to safeguard was his right to be
secure in his person against unreasonable searches and
seizures as enshrined in the Bill of Rights. He claims that
his right was violated when he was arrested without a
warrant which his counsel should have contested.
16) PEOPLE VS TULIN
363 SCRA 10
FACTS:
In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a
cargo vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation,loaded with barrels of kerosene,
regular gasoline, and diesel oil, was boarded by 7 fully
armed pirates. The pirates includingthe accused Roger P.
Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, and Andres Infante Jr. detained
the crew and completely took over the vessel.The vessel
was directed to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes
were unloaded transferred and sold under the
directsupervision of accused Cheong San Hiong.
Thereafter, the captive vessel returned to the Philippines.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected and all
the accused were charged with qualified piracy or
violation of PresidentialDecree No. 532 (Piracy in
Philippine Waters). They were subsequently convicted of
the crime charged. Hence, this appeal.Meanwhile
accused Cheong argues that
the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as
an accomplice when theacts allegedly committed by him
were done or executed outside of Philippine waters and
territory, stripping the Philippinecourts of jurisdiction to
hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence.
accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio,
Changco uniformly contend that during the custodial
investigation, they were subjected to physical violence;
were forced to sign statements without being given the
opportunity to read the contents of the same; were
denied assistance of counsel, and were not informed of
their rights, in violation of their constitutional rights,
Issue: WON the accused-appellants were deprived of
the right to counsel.
Held: No, It is true that an accused person shall be
entitled to be present and to defend himself in person
and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from
arraignment to promulgation of judgment (Section 1,
Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). This is
hinged on the fact that a layman is not versed on the
technicalities of trial. However, it is also provided by law
that "[r]ights may be waived, unless the waiver is
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or
good customs or prejudicial to a third person with right
recognized by law." (Article 6, Civil Code of the
Philippines). Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds
that "[u]pon motion, the accused may be allowed to
defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to
the court that he can properly protect his rights without
the assistance of counsel." it is amply shown that the
rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently and
properly protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas
Posadas. SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel. Saliently, the absence of counsel during the
execution of the so-called confessions of the accused-
appellants make them invalid. In fact, the very basic
reading of the Miranda rights was not even shown in the
case at bar. Thus, in this case, the uncounselled
extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants, without
a valid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible
and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be
regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence against
them.

E. RIGHT TO BE INFORMED

17. PECHO V. PEOPLE (1996)

Facts:
The decision of the Supreme Court for convicting the
accused for the complex crime of attempted estafa thru
falsification of official and commercial document was
assailed with the contention of the defense that the
accused may not be convicted of the crime for double
jeopardy. The charge against the accused (Odon Pecho)
was on violation of RA 3019 of which he was acquitted
because it only penalizes consummated crime. In the
absence of evidence that shows that the crime was
consummated the accused was acquitted but the court
held judgment of prosecuting his conviction for
attempted estafa thru falsification of official and
commercial document which is necessarily included in
the crime charged. Accused invokes the defense of
double jeopardy since his acquittal from the charge
involving RA 3019 is a bar for prosecution on the crime
of attempted estafa thru falsification of official and
commercial document and that the accused was not
informed of this charge against him in the filing of the
information.
Issue: Whether or not the accused was informed of the
nature and cause of the crime to which he is convicted.
Held: The court presented the objectives of the right of
the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
crime he is charged with as follows:
1. To furnish the accused with such a description of
the charge against him as will enable him to
make his defense;
2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for
protection against a further prosecution for the
same cause;
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it
may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction, if one should be had.
In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts must
be stated: not conclusions of law. The complaint must
contain a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime. What
determines the real nature and cause of accusation
against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in
the information or complaint and not the caption or
preamble of the information or complaint nor the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, they being conclusions of law. It follows then
that an accused may be convicted of a crime which
although not the one charged, is necessarily included in
the latter. It has been shown that the information filed in
court is considered as charging for two offenses which
the counsel of the accused failed to object therefore he
can be convicted for both or either of the charges.
However by reviewing the case at bar the SC finds lack
of sufficient evidence that would establish the guilt of
the accused as conspirator to the crime of estafa beyond
reasonable doubt, the prior decision of the SC was
deemed to be based merely on circumstantial evidence,
thus the accused was acquitted.
18. ANDAYA vs. PEOPLE, 2006
FACTS:
Complainant Armed Forces and Police Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) is a non-stock and non-
profit association authorized to engage in savings and
loan transactions. In 1986, petitioner Noe S. Andaya was
elected as president and general manager of AFPSLAI.
During his term, he sought to increase the capitalization
of AFPSLAI to boost its lending capacity to its
members. Consequently, the Board of Trustees of
AFPSLAI passed and approved a Resolution setting up
a Finders Fee Program whereby any officer, member or
employee, except investment counselors, of AFPSLAI
who could solicit an investment of not less than
P100,000.00 would be entitled to a finders fee
equivalent to one percent of the amount solicited.
An information for estafa through falsification of
commercial document was filed against petitioner.
Noe S. Andaya, being then the President and General
Manager of the AFPSLAI, was accused of having
caused and approved the disbursement of the sum of
P21,000.00, from the funds of the association, by
making it appear in Disbursement Voucher No. 58380
that said amount represented the 1% finders fee of one
DIOSDADO J. GUILLAS [Guilas]; that by virtue of
said falsification, said accused was able to encash and
receive a MBTC Check for the said amount.
The facts alleged in the information are sufficient to
constitute the crime of falsification of private document.
Specifically, the allegations in the information can be
broken down into the three essential elements of this
offense as follows: (1) petitioner caused it to appear in
Disbursement Voucher No. 58380 that Diosdado Guillas
was entitled to a finders fee from AFPSLAI in the
amount of P21,000.00 when in truth and in fact no
finders fee was due to him; (2) the falsification was
committed on Disbursement Voucher No. 58380; and (3)
the falsification caused damage to AFPSLAI in the
amount of P21,000.00.
ISSUE:
Are disbursement vouchers commercial documents
(negotiable instruments)?
HELD:
NO. It appears that the public prosecutor erroneously
characterized the disbursement voucher as a commercial
document so that he designated the offense as estafa
through falsification of commercial document in the
preamble of the information. However, as correctly ruled
by the trial court, the subject voucher is a private
document only; it is not a commercial document
because it is not a document used by merchants or
businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit
transactions nor is it defined and regulated by the Code
of Commerce or other commercial law. Rather, it is
a private document, which has been defined as a deed
or instrument executed by a private person without the
intervention of a public notary or of other person legally
authorized, by which some disposition or agreement is
proved, evidenced or set forth, because it acted as the
authorization for the release of the P21,000.00 finders
fee to Guilas and as the receipt evidencing the payment
of this finders fee.
The information in the case at bar is valid, however,
there is a variance between the allegation in the
information and proof adduced during trial with
respect to the third essential element of falsification
of private document, i.e., the falsification caused
damage or was committed with intent to cause damage
to a third party.
To reiterate, petitioner was charged in the information
with causing damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of
P21,000.00 because he caused it to appear in the
disbursement voucher that Guilas was entitled to a
P21,000.00 finders fee when in truth and in fact
AFPSLAI owed no such amount to Guilas.
However, he was convicted by the trial court of
falsifying the voucher with criminal intent to cause
damage to the government because the trial court found
that petitioners acts were designed to lower the tax base
of Hernandez and aid the latter in evading payment of
taxes on the finders fee.
This variance material and prejudicial to petitioner
which, perforce, is fatal to his conviction in the instant
case. By the clear and unequivocal terms of the
information, the prosecution endeavored to prove that
the falsification of the voucher by petitioner caused
damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00 and
not that the falsification of the voucher was done with
intent to cause damage to the government. The defense
applicable for each is different.
19) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ABULON
FACTS:
In three (3) separate Informations for Criminal Cases
No. SC-7422, SC-7423 and SC-7424 all dated 16 June
1999, appellant was indicted before the RTC for three (3)
counts of qualified rape against his minor daughter
AAA.
AAA is the oldest of five (5) legitimate children born to
appellant and BBB. On 14, 15, and 16 March 1999,
appellant raped AAA. The first rape incident occurred at
around 1:30 in the morning of 14 March 1999. AAA was
home, fast asleep next to her brother and sister when she
suddenly woke up to the noise created by her father who
arrived drunk, but who likewise soon thereafter returned
to the wedding festivities he was attending. Abiding by
their fathers instructions, AAA and her siblings went
back to sleep.
AAA was next awakened by the weight of her father
lying naked on top of her. Appellant had removed her
underwear while she slept. He poked a knife on AAAs
waist and threatened to kill her and her siblings if she
reported the incident to anyone. She begged him to stop
but he proceeded to kiss her mouth, vagina, and breast,
and to have carnal knowledge of her. Although they
witnessed the ongoing ordeal, AAAs siblings could do
nothing but cry as appellant likewise poked the knife on
them.The following morning, AAA found a whitish
substance and blood stains on her panty.
On 15 March 1999, at around 10:30 in the evening, AAA
and her siblings were awakened as appellant came home
drunk. As in the previous evening, appellant roused AAA
in mid-sleep. This time, she woke up with her father
holding her hand, covering her mouth and lying on top
of her. He undressed AAA, then mounted her.
Repeatedly, he inserted his penis into her vagina, and
AAA felt pain in her private parts. Appellant also kissed
and fondled AAA on different parts of her body.
Again, AAAs siblings could only cry as they saw
appellant rape their sister. AAAs sister, however, took a
pen and wrote her a note which read: Ate, let us tell what
father was doing to the police officer. After appellant had
raped AAA, the latters sister asked their father why he
had done such to AAA. In response, appellant spanked
AAAs sister and threatened to kill all of them should
they report the incidents to the police.The sisters
nonetheless related to their relatives AAAs misfortune,
but the relatives did not take heed as they regarded
appellant to be a kind man.
The third rape episode happened at around 3:30 in the
morning of 16 March 1999. Although appellant did not
insert his penis into AAAs vagina on this occasion, he
took off her lower undergarments and kissed her vagina.
On cross-examination, AAA asserted that her father
inserted his tongue into the hole of her vagina and she
felt pain because of this.
To corroborate AAAs testimony, the prosecution
presented BBB and AAAs 6-year old brother CCC. BBB
testified that she was a stay-in housemaid working in Las
Pias on the dates that her daughter was raped by
appellant. On 26 March 1999, she went home and stayed
with her family. However, it was only on 4 May 1999
that BBB learned of the rape, when CCC told her that
appellant had raped AAA three (3) times and that he had
seen his father on top of his sister during those
occasions. BBB then verified the matter with AAA
herself, and the latter affirmed the incidents. BBB thus
took AAA with her to the barangay and police authorities
to report the incidents, and later to the provincial
hospital for medical examination.
CCC testified that on three (3) separate occasions, he
saw his father lying naked on top of AAA, who was
likewise naked.
The prosecution also presented SPO1 Bayani G.
Montesur (SPO1 Montesur) and Dr. Gloria Cabael (Dr.
Cabael). SPO1 Montesur identified the Police Blotter of
4 May 1999 which recorded the complaints of rape
against appellant and the report of the latters arrest.[20]
Dr. Cabael, on the other hand, testified that she
examined AAA on 4 May 1999 upon the request of
Police Officer Gallarosa. She identified the Rape Case
Report she prepared thereafter.
Appellant testified as the sole witness on his behalf,
proffering denial and alibi as his defenses. According to
appellant, he was hired by his aunt, Raquel Masangkay,
to deliver hogs and that at 1:30 in the morning of 14
March 1999, he was in Calamba, Laguna pursuant to
such employment. He averred that he went home at 7:00
in the morning of the following day and thus could not
have raped his daughter as alleged. Likewise denying the
second rape charge, appellant testified that on 15 March
1999, he attended a wedding ceremony in Sityo
Kalayaan, San Antonio, Kalayaan, Laguna. He went
home drunk at 6:00 that evening and promptly went to
sleep. Similarly, at 3:00 in the morning of 16 March
1999, appellant claimed to have been asleep with his
children and could not have thus committed the rape as
charged.
RTC found him guilty of 2 counts of qualified rape and 1
count of acts of lasciviousness
ISSUE
Whether or not the Informations against him are
defective as they failed to allege the key element of force
and/or intimidation.
RULING
The matter of the purportedly defective Informations
was properly addressed by the Court of Appeals,
pointing out that a close scrutiny of the Informations
would reveal that the words force and/or intimidation are
specifically alleged therein. Even if these were not so,
well-established is the rule that force or intimidation
need not be proven in incestuous cases. The
overpowering moral influence of a father over his
daughter takes the place of violence and offer of
resistance ordinarily required in rape cases where the
accused is unrelated to the victim
The differences between the two modes of committing
rape are the following:
(1) In the first mode, the offender is always a man,
while in the second, the offender may be a man or a
woman;
(2) In the first mode, the offended party is always a
woman, while in the second, the offended party may be a
man or a woman;
(3) In the first mode, rape is committed through penile
penetration of the vagina, while the second is committed
by inserting the penis into another persons mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or
anal orifice of another person; and
(4) The penalty for rape under the first mode is higher
than that under the second.
In view of the material differences between the two
modes of rape, the first mode is not necessarily included
in the second, and vice-versa. Thus, since the charge in
the Information in Criminal Case No. SC-7424 is rape
through carnal knowledge, appellant cannot be found
guilty of rape by sexual assault although it was proven,
without violating his constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
However, following the variance doctrine embodied in
Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of
Criminal Procedure, appellant can be found guilty of the
lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness. Said provisions
read:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation
and proof. When there is a variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information and that
proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused
shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in
another. An offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitutes the latter. And an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense proved
when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or
form part of those constituting the latter.
Indeed, acts of lasciviousness or abusos dishonestos are
necessarily included in rape.
20) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-
appellee V. FRANCASIO DELFIN accused-
appellant;
GR. No. 190349; December 10, 2014;
Second Division; Del Castillo, J.
TOPIC/PURPOSE:
This is a case regarding two counts of rape.
FACTS:
There are two counts of rape.
The first rape incident happened on May 27, 2001 at
around 10:00pm.
AAA, an 11 year old girl was watching TV at a market
in Naval, when shewent out, the appellant summoned
her, she tried to run away, however, Delfin threatened
her, thus she approached him. When she was near
Delfin, he grabbed her arm and dragged her to the
second floor of a newly constructed building near the
market. Under threat, Delfin was able to rapenAAA.
Delfin then gave her money and told her not to tell
anyone of the incident or her family will be harmed.
The second rape incident happened on June 30, 2001 at
around 11:00 pm. AAA was sleeping at a parked
jeepney outside a billiard hall. She was awakened by
Delfin when he flashed a flashlight towards her. He went
inside the jeepney and raped AAA.
After experiencing pains and swelling, AAA decided
to tell her aunt BBB about the rape incidents. BBB of witnesses are given great weight ad respect most
brought AAA to the hospital and was examined. The
results stated that she has a lacerated hymen at the 6:00
oclock position and a corrugated hymen. AAAs 3. No, CCC did not instigate the allegations against
family subsequently reported the incident to the DSWD.
The Defense presented five witnesses, including the
appellant. The witnesses gave their testimonies. One
stated that Delfin was with him at the time of the crime,
and another testimony is that there was no jeepney
parked near the billiard hall. Delfin also contended that
AAAs allegations were false, and that such allegations
were instigated by CCC, AAAs aunt.
Since he once reported to the police that AAAs aunt
CCC was involved in illegal drug activities. The
defense also pointed out that there were inconsistencies
to AAAs account.
On November 19, 2003, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
declared that the appellant is guilty of two counts of
statutory rape. On appeal, on January 27, 2009 the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the
Decision of the RTC of Naval, Brilian Branch 16,
sentencing Francasio Delfin of the crime of simple rape
instead of statutory rape, sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim civil
indemnity and moral damages at PhP. 75,000 each and
acquitting him of statutory rape, hence the appeal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Delfin raped AAA on two counts
2. Whether or not the inconsistencies have a bearing in
the present case
3. Whether or not the allegations were false and was
instigated by CCC
RULING:
1. Yes, the Supreme Court affirmed the Decision of the
CA with modifications. The Supreme Court pointed
out the elements of rape under Article 266-A of the
RPC and that such elements were present in the case
namely: (1) the offender was a man, in this case
Delfin; (2) the offender had carnal knowledge of a
woman; and lastly, (3) the act was accomplished by
use of force or intimidation. The testimonies
established that Delfin had carnal knowledge of
AAA, which was proven by the medical
examinations, and that he used force and
intimidation in approaching her.
2. No, the inconsistencies in AAAs statements are
trivial matters. The Court reiterated the ruling of CA,
that such inconsistencies are only minor and collateral
matters. It has been stated that such inconsistencies were
not an essential element of the crime, and that it has no
bearing on the essential facts. It is a well-settled rule that
factual findings of trial courts in regard of the credibility
especially since it has been affirmed by the CA.
Delfin. The
Defense was not able to prove the connection of CCC
to the rape cases. There was no showing that CCC
knew about the rape incidents, since they were not able
to meet and talk after the incidents and she was not
informed by AAA about such incidents.