Republic v.

Sandiganbayan
Facts:
President Corazon C. Aquino issued EO No. 1 creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). EO No.
1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates.
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major
General Ramas. On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported
unexplained wealth of Ramas.

Evidence showing that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at Quezon City worth 700k
He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of 3,327 square meters.
Communication equipment and facilities are found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano, a Confidential Agent of the
Military Security Unit, and are confiscated by elements of the PC Command of Batangas.
These items could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent
Commanding General of the Philippine Army.
Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was also able to
confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano.
Elizabeth Dimaano is allegedly Major General Q. Josephus Ramas mistress. She does not have any means to acquire the
communications equipment as well as the aforementioned money.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos residence a search warrant captioned Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. Dimaano was not present during the raid but Dimaanos cousins witnessed
the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt together with other items not included in
the search warrant.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and seizure five days
after the successful EDSA revolution. Petitioner argues that a revolutionary government was operative at that
time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were taking power
in the name and by the will of the Filipino people. Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government
effectively withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents exclusionary
right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only beginning 2
February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of
Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the government may
confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her since at the time of
their seizure; private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.
Issue:
WON the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum.
WON the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant) and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration) remained in effect during the interregnum.

RULING:
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained
in effect during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no
constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution
by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights
because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno: A revolution has been defined as the complete
overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it or as a
sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence or at
least some acts of violence.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound by no
constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because there
was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the
sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.
 The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum. Whether the
revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration is another
matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary
international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in
the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same
way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape
responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the
revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration.
In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government
did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched
and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies, communications
equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant did not particularly describe
these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize
these items without showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding
team exceeded its authority when it seized these items. The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these
items are contraband per se, and they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized
them. However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure
warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold that these items should
be returned immediately to Dimaano.

Quiao v. Quiao
FACTS:
RIta filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido. RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation
thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally
between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.

Brigidos share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children
because Brigido is the offending spouse.

Petitioner and respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of the exchange of marital vows, the
operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the
property relations between the petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gains. Under this property relation, the husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and
the income from their work or industry. The husband and wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal
partnership of gains.

At the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the
same applies in the instant case, and the applicable law, in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and
liabilities is concerned, is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter
provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code this Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law.

Issue:
WON Brigidos vested right over half of the common properties of the conjugal partnership was violated when the trial court
forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant to Articles 63(2) and 129 of the Family Code.

Ruling: NO
In Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, we define and explained vested right in the following manner:

A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or to
the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a
contingency. The term vested right expresses the concept of present fixed interest which, in right reason and natural
justice, should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free
society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
October 18, 2005 ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R.
Ermita:
The concept of vested right is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a present
fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only
legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has
become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and
perfect or fixed and irrefutable.

From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his vested right, he may lose the same if there is due
process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.

In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent
prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that
the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant
after the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the Decision dated October
10, 2005 was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court's ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as net
profits, pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due
process.

Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's vested right is one founded, not only in the
provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the old Civil Code. This provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the
Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in the conjugal partnership profits. The said provision says:

Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her share of the conjugal partnership profits, which
shall be awarded to the children of both, and the children of the guilty spouse had by a prior marriage. However, if the
conjugal partnership property came mostly or entirely from the work or industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from the
fruits of the separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not apply.

In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to all the net profits.

From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil
Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal separation case. Thus,
after trial and after the petitioner was given the chance to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim may in fact
be set aside under the Civil Code since the trial court found him the guilty party.

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application.

Facts:

Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is assailing the constitutionality of RA 7080 also known as An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder because the assailed law is said to be vague, it dispenses the reasonable
doubt standards in criminal prosecution and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes punishable under the Revised
Penal Code which he claims to be violative of the due process clause of our Constitution.

Issue:

Whether RA 7080 is unconstitutional for being vague.

Ruling:
 NO. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the
employment of terms without defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive
constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution
in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in
imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently
ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no
challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities. With more reason, the doctrine
cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be
stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld -
not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous
specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid
merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the
nature of the act it will be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank

Facts. Appellee, Central Hanover Bank & Trust, set up common fund pursuant to a New York statute allowing the creation of
common funds for distribution of judicial settlement trusts. There were 113 participating trusts. Appellee petitioned for
settlement of its first account as common trustee. Some of the beneficiaries were not residents of New York. Notice was by
publication for four weeks in a local newspaper. Appellee had notified those people by mail that were of full age and sound
mind who would be entitled to share in the principal if the interest they held became distributable. Appellant was appointed as
special guardian and attorney for all persons known or unknown not otherwise appearing who had or might thereafter have
any interest in the income of the common trust fund. Appellee was appointed to represent those interested in the principal.
Appellant appeared specially, objecting that notice by publication, permitted under the applicable statute was inadequate to
afford the beneficiaries due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and that therefore jurisdiction was lacking.

Issue

Whether or not publication is sufficient notice under due process.

Held

No. Notice by publication is not adequate notice in the present case. The means used in the service of notice must be
reasonably certain to actually inform the affected parties. The means used in the service of notice must be reasonably
certain to inform those who are affected. If such means are not possible, then the alternate means adopted must not be
substantially less likely to inform the concerned parties. A large number of cases brought before the court on the issue of
notice involves those served by publication. In any, case, the bank has a record of the names and addresses of the income
beneficiaries. It has not been shown that the bank has made any serious effort to inform the said beneficiaries personally of
the settlement proceedings through the said addresses.

Whether or not the action is in personam or in rem, the court can determine the interests of all claimants as long as there is a
procedure allowing for notice and an opportunity to be heard.

There has to be notice and opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. The claimants at issue could
potentially be deprived of property here, as the proposed disposition cuts off their rights to sue for negligent or illegal
impairments of their interests. In addition, the courts decision appoints someone who, without their knowledge, could use the
trust to obtain the fees and expenses necessary for a sham proceeding.

There need not be personal service because the state has an interest in settling trusts. Notice has to be reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pending action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections. You do not have to notify all the beneficiaries when the trust concerns many small interests. Sending notice to
most of them will protect their interests sufficiently.

Anonymous v. Radam

FACTS

In an anonymous letter-complaint, Ma. Victoria Radam, utility worker in the Office of the Clerk of Court of RTC of
Alaminos, was charged with immorality.

The unnamed complainant alleged that respondent was unmarried but got pregnant and gave birth sometime in
October 2005 and that her behavior tainted the image of the judiciary.

Judge Abella conducted a discreet investigation to verify the allegations. In his report 6 months after, Judge Abella
made the following findings:

o She was unmarried and gave birth

o She refused to marry the father because they planned to migrate to Canada

o She expressed remorse and promised not to commit the same mistake

o The father of the child is unknown as seen in the birth cert

o She gave birth to 2 other babies while she worked abroad and before she was employed by the RTC

o Recommendation: Such conduct fell short of the strict standards of Court personnel and contrary to the Code
of Judicial Ethics and the Civil Service Rules. A place in the judiciary demands upright men and women. She
is guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct which cannot be countenanced by the Court. GUILTY of
IMMORAL CONDUCT or ACT UNBECOMING A COURT EMPLOYEE. 1 month suspension or 5k fine

After reviewing the findings of Judge Abella, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that:

o She be absolved of the charge of immorality because her alleged misconduct (that is, giving birth out of
wedlock) did not affect the character and nature of her position as a utility worker.

o She be held liable for conduct unbecoming a court employee and imposed a fine of P5,000 for stating in the
birth certificate that the father was "unknown" to her

SC: The OCA correctly exonerated respondent from the charge of immorality. However, it is wrong to hold her liable for a
charge of which she was not previously informed.

ISSUES

1. W/N giving birth out of wedlock is an immoral and disgraceful conduct that would make Radam administratively
liable - NO
 For purposes of determining administrative responsibility, giving birth out of wedlock is not per se immoral. To
warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

(Estrada v. Escritor): theres a distinction between public and secular morality on the one hand, and religious
morality. This is important because the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

For a particular conduct to constitute "disgraceful and immoral" behavior under civil service laws, it must be
regulated on account of the concerns of public and secular morality. It cannot be judged based on personal bias,
specifically those colored by particular mores. Nor should it be grounded on "cultural" values not convincingly
demonstrated to have been recognized in the realm of public policy expressed in the Constitution and the laws. At the
same time, the constitutionally guaranteed rights (such as the right to privacy) should be observed to the extent that
they protect behavior that may be frowned upon by the majority.

Under these tests, two things may be concluded:

o (1) If the father of the child is himself unmarried: the woman is not ordinarily administratively liable for
disgraceful and immoral conduct.

There is no law which penalizes an unmarried mother under those circumstances by reason of her
sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity between two unmarried persons.

The situation contravene any fundamental state policy as expressed in the Constitution

o (2) If the father of the child is himself married to another woman: there is a cause for administrative sanction
against either the father or the mother.

The "disgraceful and immoral conduct" consists of having extramarital relations with a married
person. The sanctity of marriage is constitutionally recognized

In this case, she and the father of her child were unmarried. Therefore, respondent cannot be held liable for
disgraceful and immoral conduct simply because she gave birth to the child out of wedlock.

2. W/N Radam should be administratively liable for the incorrect entry in the birth certificate that the father of the child
is unknown - NO

Radam was charged only for giving birth out of wedlock. It was the only charge of which she was informed.

The recommendation of the OCA that she be held administratively liable in connection with an entry in the birth
certificate came like a thief in the night. It was unwarranted. She was neither confronted with it nor given the chance
to explain it. To hold her liable for a totally different charge of which she was totally unaware will violate her right to
due process.

The essence of due process in an administrative proceeding is the opportunity to explain ones side, whether written
or verbal

Radam was deprived of due process with regard to her alleged unbecoming conduct in relation to a certain statement
in the birth certificate of her child.

An employee must be informed of the charges against him, and the normal to do so is by furnishing him with a copy
of the charges against him. This is a basic procedural requirement that cannot be dispensed with. The second
minimum requirement is that the employee must have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the matter
 Ones employment is not merely a species of property rights. It is also the means by which he and those who depend
on him live. It is therefore protected by the guarantee of security of tenure. And in the civil service, this means that no
government employee may be removed, suspended or disciplined unless for cause provided by law and after due
process.

OCA v. Indar

Facts:

This is an administrative complaint for gross misconduct and dishonesty against respondent Judge Cader P. Indar. Upon
investigation it was found that judge Indar who have sworn to faithfully uphold the law had issued decisions in the questioned
annulment of marriage cases without showing that such cases underwent trial and complied with the statutory and
jurisprudential requirements for voiding marriages. In his Report dated 2 September 2011, Justice Borreta first determined
whether the requirements of due process had been complied with since there was no proof that Judge Indar personally and
actually received any of the notices sent to him in the course of the investigation.

Justice Borreta differentiated administrative due process with judicial due process. He stated that while a day in court is a
matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles.

Justice Borreta noted that all possible means to locate Judge Indar and to personally serve the court notices to him were
resorted to. The notices of hearing were sent to Judge Indars known addresses, namely, his sala in RTC-Cotabato Branch 14
and RTC-Shariff Aguak Branch 15, and at his residence address. However, none of the notices appeared to have been
personally received by Judge Indar.

ISSUDE: WON due process was afforde to Justice Indar

Ruling:

The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which govern the conduct of disciplinary and non-
disciplinary proceedings in administrative cases, clearly provide that technical rules of procedure and evidence do not strictly
apply to administrative proceedings. Section 3, Rule I of the Uniform Rules states: Section 3. Technical Rules in
Administrative Investigations. Administrative investigations shall be conducted without necessarily adhering strictly to the
technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings.

The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an administrative proceeding and not with a judicial proceeding.
As Judge Cooley, the leading American writer on constitutional Law, has well said, due process of law is not necessarily
judicial process; much of the process by means of which the Government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is
purely executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law, as is judicial process. While a day in court is a
matter of right in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings it is otherwise since they rest upon different
principles. In certain proceedings, therefore, of an administrative character, it may be stated, without fear of
contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law. It is settled that technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to administrative proceedings. Thus, administrative due process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.12 It is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard
before the case against him is decided.13 Otherwise stated, in the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to
be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.14

Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office as
property. It is, however, well settled in the United States, that a public office is not property within the sense of the
constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is a public trust or agency.17 (Emphasis supplied)
 In this case, Judge Indar was given ample opportunity to controvert the charges against him. While there is no proof that
Judge Indar personally received the notices of hearing issued by the Investigating Justices, the first two notices of hearing
were received by one Mustapha Randang of the Clerk of Court, RTC-Cotabato, while one of the notices was received by a
certain Mrs. Asok, who were presumably authorized and capable to receive notices on behalf of Judge Indar.

Further, Judge Indar cannot feign ignorance of the administrative investigation against him because aside from the fact that
the Courts Resolution suspending him was mailed to him, his preventive suspension was reported in major national
newspapers.18 Moreover, Judge Indar was repeatedly sent notices of hearings to his known addresses. Thus, there was due
notice on Judge Indar of the charges against him. However, Judge Indar still failed to file his explanation and appear at the
scheduled hearings. Consequently, the investigation proceeded ex parte in accordance with Section 4, Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court.19

Public office is a public trust.20 This constitutional principle requires a judge, like any other public servant and more so
because of his exalted position in the Judiciary, to exhibit at all times the highest degree of honesty and integrity. 21 As the
visible representation of the law tasked with dispensing justice, a judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner that
would merit the respect and confidence of the people.22

Tumey vs. Ohio

Facts: Tumey was arrested at White Oak, and was brought before Mayor Pugh, of the village of North College Hill, charged
with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor. He moved for his dismissal because of the disqualification of the mayor to try
him under the 14th Amendment. The mayor denied the motion, proceeded to the trial, convicted Tumey of unlawfully
possessing intoxicating liquor within Hamilton county as charged, fined him $100, and ordered that he be imprisoned until
the fine and costs were paid. Tumey obtained a bill of exceptions and carried the case on error to the court of common pleas
of Hamilton county. That court heard the case and reversed the judgment, on the ground that the mayor was disqualified as
claimed. The state sought review by the Court of Appeals of the First Appellate District of Ohio, which reversed the common
pleas and affirmed the judgment of the mayor. On 4 May 1926, the state Supreme Court refused Tumey's application to
require the Court of Appeals to certify its record in the case. Tumey then filed a petition in error in that court as of right,
asking that the judgment of the mayor's court and of the appellate court be reversed on constitutional grounds. On 11 May
1926, the Supreme Court adjudged that the petition be dismissed for the reason that no debatable constitutional question was
involved in the cause. The judgment was then brought to the US Supreme Court upon a writ of error allowed by the Chief
Justice of the state Supreme Court, to which it was rightly directed.

Issue: Whether the pecuniary interest of the Mayor and his village, and the system of courts in prosecuting violations of the
Prohibition Act, renders the mayor disqualified from hearing the case.

Held: All questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal bias,
state policy, remoteness of interest would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion. But it certainly
violates the 14th Amendment and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law to subject his liberty or
property to the judgment of a court, the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a
conclusion against him in his case. Herein, the mayor has authority, which he exercised in the case, to order that the person
sentenced to pay a fine shall remain in prison until the fine and costs are paid. The mayor thus has a direct personal pecuniary
interest in convicting the defendant who came before him for trial, in the $12 of costs imposed in his behalf, which he would
not have received if the defendant had been acquitted. This was not exceptional, but was the result of the normal operation of
the law and the ordinance. The system by which an inferior judge is paid for his service only when he convicts the defendant
has not become so embedded by custom in the general practice, either at common law or in this country, that it can be
regarded as due process of law, unless the costs usually imposed are so small that they may be properly ignored as within the
maxim "de minimis non curat lex." The Court cannot regard the prospect of receipt or loss of such an emolument in each case
as a minute, remote, trifling, or insignificant interest. It is certainly not fair to each defendant brought before the mayor for the
careful and judicial consideration of his guilt or innocence that the prospect of such a prospective loss by the mayor should
weigh against his acquittal. But the pecuniary interest of the mayor in the result of his judgment is not the only reason for
holding that due process of law is denied to the defendant here. The statutes were drawn to stimulate small municipalities, in
the country part of counties in which there are large cities, to organize and maintain courts to try persons accused of
violations of the Prohibition Act everywhere in the county. The inducement is offered of dividing between the state and the
village the large fines provided by the law for its violations. The trial is to be had before a mayor without a jury, without
opportunity for retrial, and with a review confined to questions of law presented by a bill of exceptions, with no opportunity
by the reviewing court to set aside the judgment on the weighing of evidence, unless it should appear to be so manifestly
against the evidence as to indicate mistake, bias, or willful disregard of duty by the trial court. Thus, no matter what the
evidence was against him, the defendant had the right to have an impartial judge. He seasonably raised the objection, and was
entitled to halt the trial because of the disqualification of the judge, which existed both because of his direct pecuniary interest
in the outcome, and because of his official motive to convict and to graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the village.
There were thus presented at the outset both features of the disqualification. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is
reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the present opinion.

Singson vs. NLRC

Miguel Singson was an employee of the Philippine Air Lines (PAL). In 1991, a Japanese national alleged that Singson
extorted money from her ($200.00) by accusing her of having excess baggage; and that to settle the issue, she needs to pay
said amount to him. Singson was later investigated and the investigating committee found him guilty. PAL then dismissed
Singson from employment. Singson then filed a case before NLRC against PAL for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter Raul
Aquino ruled in favor of Singson as he found PALs side insufficient to dismiss Singson. PAL appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) and his case was raffled to the 2nd Division thereof.
The 2nd Division, however, was composed of Commissioners Victoriano Calaycay, Rogelio Rayala, and former Labor
Arbiter Raul Aquino same arbiter which decided Singsons case. The commissioners deliberated on the case and
thereafter reversed the decision of Aquino.
Singson moved for reconsideration. This time, only Commissioners Calaycay and Rayala deliberated on the motion. The
motion was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Singson was denied of due process.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Singson was denied due process. The SC held that Singson was denied due
process when Aquino participated, as presiding commissioner of the 2nd Division of the NLRC, in reviewing PALs appeal.
He was reviewing his own decision as a former labor arbiter.
Under Rule VII, Section 2 (b) of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, each Division shall consist of one member from
the public sector who shall act as the Presiding Commissioner and one member each from the workers and employers sectors,
respectively. The composition of the Division guarantees equal representation and impartiality among its members. Thus,
litigants are entitled to a review of three (3) commissioners who are impartial right from the start of the process of review.
Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered impartial since he was the arbiter who decided the case under review. He
should have inhibited himself from any participation in this case. The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that
the motion for reconsideration of Singson was denied by two commissioners and without the participation of Aquino. The
right of petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. He is not only entitled to an
impartial tribunal in the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an impartial review of three
commissioners. The denial of Singsons right to an impartial review of his appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his
right to due process. Miguel Singson was an employee of the Philippine Air Lines (PAL). In 1991, a Japanese national
alleged that Singson extorted money from her ($200.00) by accusing her of having excess baggage; and that to settle the
issue, she needs to pay said amount to him. Singson was later investigated and the investigating committee found him guilty.
PAL then dismissed Singson from employment. Singson then filed a case before NLRC against PAL for illegal dismissal.
Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino ruled in favor of Singson as he found PALs side insufficient to dismiss Singson. PAL appealed
to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and his case was raffled to the 2nd Division thereof.

The 2nd Division, however, was composed of Commissioners Victoriano Calaycay, Rogelio Rayala, and former Labor
Arbiter Raul Aquino same arbiter which decided Singsons case. The commissioners deliberated on the case and
thereafter reversed the decision of Aquino.
Singson moved for reconsideration. This time, only Commissioners Calaycay and Rayala deliberated on the motion. The
motion was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not Singson was denied of due process.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Singson was denied due process. The SC held that Singson was denied due
process when Aquino participated, as presiding commissioner of the 2nd Division of the NLRC, in reviewing PALs appeal.
He was reviewing his own decision as a former labor arbiter.

Under Rule VII, Section 2 (b) of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, each Division shall consist of one member from
the public sector who shall act as the Presiding Commissioner and one member each from the workers and employers sectors,
respectively. The composition of the Division guarantees equal representation and impartiality among its members. Thus,
litigants are entitled to a review of three (3) commissioners who are impartial right from the start of the process of review.

Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered impartial since he was the arbiter who decided the case under review. He
should have inhibited himself from any participation in this case. The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that
the motion for reconsideration of Singson was denied by two commissioners and without the participation of Aquino. The
right of petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. He is not only entitled to an
impartial tribunal in the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an impartial review of three
commissioners. The denial of Singsons right to an impartial review of his appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his
right to due process.

Buck v. Bell

FACTS:

Carrie Buck is a feeble minded white woman who was committed to the State Colony Epileptics and Feeble Minded. She is
the daughter of a feeble minded mother in the same institution, and the mother of an illegitimate feeble-minded child. She
was eighteen years old at the time of the trial of her case in the latter part of 1924. An Act of Virginia, approved March 20,
1924, recites that the health of the patient and the welfare of society may be promoted in certain cases by the sterilization of
mental defectives, under careful safeguard, that the sterilization may be effected in males by vasectomy and in females by
salpingectomy, without serious pain or substantial danger to life; that the Commonwealth is supporting in various institutions
many defective persons who, if now discharged, would become a menace, but, if incapable of procreating, might be
discharged with safety and become self-supporting with benefit to themselves and to society, and that experience has shown
that heredity plays an important part in the transmission of insanity, imbecility, etc. The statute then enacts that, whenever the
superintendent of certain institutions, including the above-named State Colony, shall be of opinion that it is for the best
interests of the patients and of society that an inmate under his care should be sexually sterilized, he may have the operation
performed upon any patient afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity, imbecility, etc., on complying with the very careful
provisions by which the act protects the patients from possible abuse.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said statute authorizing compulsory sterilization of the mentally retarded denies the due process and equal
protection of the laws.

Ruling:

The procedure can be no doubt had the due process of law. Carrie Buck is the probable potential parent of socially inadequate
offspring, likewise afflicted, the she may be sexually sterilized without detriment to her general health, and that her welfare
and that of society will be promoted by her sterilization. We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon
the best citizens for their lives. It is better for all the world if, instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime or
to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.
The Court found that the statute did not violate the Constitution. Justice Holmes made clear that Buck's challenge was not
upon the medical procedure involved but on the process of the substantive law. Since sterilization could not occur until a
proper hearing had occurred (at which the patient and a guardian could be present) and after the Circuit Court of the County
and the Supreme Court of Appeals had reviewed the case, if so requested by the patient. Only after "months of observation"
could the operation take place. That was enough to satisfy the Court that there was no Constitutional violation. Citing the best
interests of the state, Justice Holmes affirmed the value of a law like Virginia's in order to prevent the nation from "being
swamped with incompetence . . . Three generations of imbeciles are enough."

Lawrence and Garner vs. Texas [539 US 558, 26 June 2003]

Facts: Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered John Geddes Lawrences
apartment and saw him and another adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Petitioners were
arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to
engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. The two were arrested, held in custody over night, and charged and convicted
before a Justice of the Peace. The two exercised their right to a trial de novo in Harris County Criminal Court. They
challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment and of a like provision of the
Texas Constitution. Those contentions were rejected. The two, having entered a plea of nolo contendere, were each fined
$200 and assessed court costs of $141.25. The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District considered the two
accuseds federal constitutional arguments under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. After hearing the case en banc the court, in a divided opinion, rejected the constitutional arguments and
affirmed the convictions. The majority opinion indicated that the Court of Appeals considered the US Supreme Court
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick (478 US 186 [1986]), to be controlling on the federal due process aspect of the case. The US
Supreme Court granted certiorari (537 U. S. 1044 [2002], to consider 3 questions: (1) whether the criminal convictions under
the Texas Homosexual Conduct law violate the 14th Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws; (2) Whether the
criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy
protected by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment; and (3) Whether Bowers v. Hardwick (478 US 186 [1986]),
should be overruled.

Issue: Whether the statute and the Bower decision denies homosexual persons the autonomy of decisions involving
relationships available to heterosexual ones.

Ruling: The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular
sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private
human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes do seek to control a personal
relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without
being punished as criminals. This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the
meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects. It
suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their
own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with
another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the
Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice. Our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection
to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the 14th Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define
ones own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters
could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. Persons in a homosexual
relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do. The decision in Bowers would deny
them this right. The case of Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain
binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled. Thus, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Texas Fourteenth District is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the present
opinion.

Republic v. Albios

FACTS
Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen. She later on filed a petition to nullify their
marriage. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they
never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She
said that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration
thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that
Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the
$2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. She described their marriage as one made in jest and,
therefore, null and void ab initio.

The RTC ruled in her favor.

In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution
denying the OSGs motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as
a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA, however, upheld the RTC decision.

Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar
to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in
exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife
or build a family.

The OSG then elevate the case to the Supreme Court

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Albios and Fringer be declared null and void.

RULING:

No, respondents marriage is not void.

The court said:

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood
the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That
their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention
to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was
a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which
was necessary to accomplish their goal.

The court also explained that There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what
the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and
formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be
declared valid.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This
Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as
easily nullified when no longer needed.

ROMUALDEZ v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:

Spouses Romualdez allegedly made false representations in their sworn applications for Voters Registration. They
indicated that they are residents of Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were residents of Quezon City. Garay charged them
with violations of Omnibus Election Code and Voters Registraion Act. The Comelec recommended the filing of information
against the Spouses Romualdez for violation of Voters Registration Act.

Spouses Romualdez argued that they were not accorded due process of law when the elections offenses for which
they are charged by Garay are different from the resolution of the Comelec.

The Spouses argue that Section 45(j) of the Voters Registration Act is vague on the ground that it contravenes the
fair notice requirement of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, Section 14(1) and Section 14(2), Article III of thereof.
Petitioners submit that Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 makes no reference to a definite provision of the law, the
violation of which would constitute an election offense.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 45(j) of the Voters Registration is vague.

Ruling:

NO. The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. However, the Court has imposed certain limitations by which
a criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. The Court has declared that facial invalidation or an
"on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate.

Be that as it may, the test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language
conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.
The Court has similarly stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to
be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. As structured, Section 4541 of Republic Act No. 8189 makes a
recital of election offenses under the same Act. Section 45(j) is, without doubt, crystal in its specification that a violation of
any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189 is an election offense. The language of Section 45(j) is precise. The
challenged provision renders itself to no other interpretation. A reading of the challenged provision involves no guesswork.
The Court does not see herein an uncertainty that makes the same vague.

Notably, herein petitioners do not cite a word in the challenged provision, the import or meaning of which they do
not understand. This is in stark contrast to the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, where therein petitioner sought for statutory
definition of particular words in the challenged statute. Even then, the Court in Estrada rejected the argument.