COBB-PEREZ v LANTIN

May 22, 1968

FACTS:
Ricardo Hermoso commenced a civil case against Damaso Perez and Gregorio Sumbong, for recovery of
sum ofP17,309.44 representing unpaid purchases of leather materials used in the shoe manufacturing
business ofHermoso. Judgment was rendered in favor of Hermoso, ordering the defendants to be held
jointy and severally liable.

The Sheriff of Manila levied upon the shares of common stock registered in Damaso Perezname with
the Republic Bank.

Petitioners used the rules of procedure to suspend the execution of judgment. (and they managed to
have the sale suspended 6x)
They alleged that levy was highly excessive and unjust
Even the wife of Damaso Perez, filed to lift the writ of execution alleging that the shares of stock
were conjugal assets and that the debt was a personal obligation.
ISSUE: Won petitioners restored to tricky, sneaky and maneuvering tactics to thwart the ends of justice?

HELD: YES

RATIO:
During the protracted litigation, the petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages
alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money
judgment which has long become final and executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or
withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice,
have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006
PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent") for serious misconduct and
deliberate violation of Canon 1,1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code").
The Facts
In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal complaint for estafa
thru falsification of a public document 4 against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as
the notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement.

The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury 5 against complainant. Respondent, in
his affidavit-complaint, stated that:
5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized by me under the following
circumstances:

A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at No. 33 Don
Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.

B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to own real
property in his name agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a
Filipino.

C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents that would
guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner of the property despite the transfer of title in
the name of Mr. Donton.

D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stiers
free and undisturbed use of the property for his residence and business operations. The
OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr. Donton. 6

Complainant averred that respondents act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier, being a
foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate
violation of the Code. Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something in violation of
law and assisting Stier in carrying out a dishonest scheme.
In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the disbarment case against him upon
the instigation of complainants counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan, 7 because respondent refused to act as complainants
witness in the criminal case against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the
Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness and due execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
 The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional
prohibition against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner San Juan recommended respondents
suspension from the practice of law for two years and the cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted, with modification, the Report
and recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for six months.
On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule
139-B8 of the Rules of Court.
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent stated that he was already 76
years old and would already retire by 2005 after the termination of his pending cases. He also said that his practice of law
is his only means of support for his family and his six minor children.
In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration because the IBP had no more
jurisdiction on the case as the matter had already been referred to the Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws which he is
bound to uphold and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law
commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer. 10

By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real property. 11Yet, in
his motion for reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to
Stier. Respondent, however, aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in complainants
name. But respondent provided "some safeguards" by preparing several documents, 13including the Occupancy
Agreement, that would guarantee Stiers recognition as the actual owner of the property despite its transfer in
complainants name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional prohibition against
foreign ownership of lands14 by preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he prepared and
notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge
of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended. 15

In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law for three years for preparing an
affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re: Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was
suspended from the practice of law for one year for preparing a contract which declared the spouses to be single again
after nine years of separation and allowed them to contract separately subsequent marriages.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law
for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents personal record as
an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. L-363 July 31, 1962
IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ, respondent.
Victoriano A. Savellano for complaint.
Nestor M. Andrada for respondent.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on October 5, 1945. In
criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro he was convicted of the murder
of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators was
sentenced to the penalty of death. Upon review by this Court the judgment of conviction was affirmed on
June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-17101), but the penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua. After serving a
portion of the sentence respondent was granted a conditional pardon by the President on August 19, 1958.
The unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted "on condition that he shall not again violate any of
the penal laws of the Philippines."
On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case, filed a verified
complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule
127, section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time, admitting the facts alleged by complainant
regarding pardon in defense, on the authority of the decision of this Court in the case of In re Lontok, 43
Phil. 293.
Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime insolving moral turpitude. Murder is, without
doubt, such a crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty or good morals. In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in disbarment statutes, it
means an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his
fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between man and man.
State ex rel. Conklin v. Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279. pp. 428-429.
The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent places
him beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited. Reliance is placed by him squarely on the
Lontok case. The respondent therein was convicted of bigamy and thereafter pardoned by the Governor-
General. In a subsequent viction, this Court decided in his favor and held: "When proceedings to strike an
attorney's name from the rolls the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held
that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the
attorney after the pardon has been granted."
It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In making it the Court proceeded
on the assumption that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok was absolute. This is implicit in the ratio
decidendi of the case, particularly in the citations to support it, namely. In Re Emmons, 29 Cal. App.
121; Scott vs. State, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 343; and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 380. Thus in Scott vs. State the
court said:
We are of opinion that after received an unconditional pardon the record of the felony conviction
could no longer be used as a basis for the proceeding provided for in article 226. The record, when
offered in evidence, was met with an unconditional pardon, and could not, therefore, properly be
said to afford "proof of a conviction of any felony." Having been thus cancelled, all its force as a
felony conviction was taken away. A pardon falling short of this would not be a pardon, according to
the judicial construction which that act of executive grace was received. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall,
344; Knote v. U.S., 95 U.S. 149, and cases there cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191.
And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with approval in the Lontok case is as follows:
 A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and
when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out the existence of guilt, so that in the
eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It granted
before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from
attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to
all his civil rights it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.
The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely remitted the unexecuted
portion of his term. It does not reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte Garland, which was "a full
pardon and amnesty for all offense by him committed in connection with rebellion (civil war) against
government of the United States."
The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here. Respondent Gutierrez must be
judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon he invokes in defense. The
crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking
advantage of his official position (respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor
vehicle. People vs. Diosdado Gutierrez, supra. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify
his being purged from the profession.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of
mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe
a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These
standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to
them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal. As stated in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed.,
552, 556: "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their
sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them
under foot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a
pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for which
respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name stricken from
the roll of lawyers.
Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part

In re disbarment Atty. Gutierrez A.C. 363

Attorney Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one Filemon Samaco in 1956. He was sentenced to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. In 1958, after serving a portion of the penalty, he was granted a conditional pardon
by the President. He was released on the condition that he shall not commit any crime. Subsequently, the widow
of Samaco filed a disbarment case against Gutierrez by reason of the latters conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude. Murder, is without a doubt, such a crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he was granted pardon.
HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but conditional. It merely remitted his sentence. It
does not reach the offense itself. Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without
regard to the pardon (which he invoked in defense). The crime was actually qualified by treachery and
aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official position (Gutierrez being
municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as
to justify his being purged from the profession.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 407 August 15, 1967
IN RE ATTORNEY JOSE AVANCEA, respondent.
J. Gonzales and Orense for respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General for complainant.
ANGELES, J.:
On January 12, 1951, the Supreme Court entered a resolution as follows:
In Administrative Case No. 407, In re Atty. Jose Avancea, it appearing that respondent was
convicted in criminal case No. 10220 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Jose Avancea, of the crime of falsification of public document under Art. 172 of the
Revised Penal Code, and that in the decision rendered to that effect the Court has found that said
respondent has taken advantage of the law profession in committing said crime to defraud his
clients, the Court ordered that respondent be, as he is hereby, provisionally suspended from the
practice of law, pending final termination of the criminal case No. 10220, now pending appeal in the
Court of Appeals.
Jose Avancea, a member of the Bar, was charged with falsification of public document before the Court of
First Instance of Manila, in criminal case No. 10220. After trial, he was found guilty as charged and was
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two years to six years of prision correccional, to pay a fine
of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The trial court also
found that he took advantage of the law profession in committing the crime of falsification of public
document to defraud his clients. A copy of the decision was sent to the Supreme Court for whatever the
action it may deem appropriate to take in the premises. Conformably thereto, the Supreme Court adopted
the resolution hereinabove quoted.
From the decision of the lower court, Jose Avancea appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 28,
1962, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.
On a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court, the latter Court, on
June 13, 1962, dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
On January 21, 1963, Jose Avancea was committed to prison at the National Penitentiary. 1wph1.t

On September 25, 1963, the President of the Philippines extended conditional pardon to Jose Avancea.
On October 1, 1963, Jose Avancea was discharged from confinement.
In the decision of the trial court, the following is said:
The evidence on record conclusively establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt as
the author of the falsification of the Power of Attorney (Exhibit A), with grave abuse of confidence.
The accused is a lawyer and has taken advantage of the law profession in committing the crime of
falsification of a public document to defraud his clients. A lawyer of the type of the accused is a
disgrace to the law profession and should be disbarred.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals said:
A la vista de los datos expuestos el Juzgado cree y asi concluye que el apelante no ha explicado
satisfactoriamente como Ilego a su posesion el poder especial Exhibito A; la presuncion es
concluyente que aquel es el autor de la falsification de las firmas de los hermanos Joa que
aparecen en el poder especial Exhibito A. (People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338).
La conclusion es, pues, que el apelante fue quien preparo el exhibito A; fue quien falsifico las
firmas de los hermanos Jao que aparecen en dicho document; y, fue quien Ilevo dicho documento
a la oficina del notario Tumblos para su ratificacion.
 EN SU VIRTUD, habiendose probado fuera de toda duda racional la culpabilidad del apelante, y la
decision apelada estando de conformidad con las pruebas y la ley, la misma se confirmation in toto,
con las costas contra el apelante.
There can, therefore, be no doubt, that Jose Avancea has committed the crime of falsification of public
document against his clients with grave abuse of confidence, having been found guilty thereof by final
judgment of competent jurisdiction. His acts amount to deceit, malpractice or misconduct in office as an
attorney, which constitute grounds for removal from office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
not to mention conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The fact that the respondent was extended conditional pardon by the Chief Executive is of no moment.
Such conditional pardon merely partially relieved him of the penal consequences of his act, but did not
operate as a bar to his disbarment, especially so when he is being disbarred on the ground of professional
misconduct for which he had been convicted by final judgment. (Cf. In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.)
Wherefore, judgment is hereby entered declaring Jose Avancea disbarred from the practice of law, and
striking his name from the roll of attorneys.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on leave
Case: Paras vs. Paras
343 SCRA 414

Facts:
Atty. Justo De Jesus was charged by her wife Rosa Paras and initiated a case for disbarmentfalsification
of public documents and fraud for counterfeiting using his wifes name and signatureto obtain loans from certain
banks.

Respondent was also charged with grosslyimmoral conduct and concubinage for siring a childwith another
woman; obstruction of justice by usinghis legal skills to derail all the proceedings in thecriminal actions initiated
against him; and unethicaland unprofessional conduct by using his legal skillsto frighten, harass and intimidate.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent can be disbarred on the grounds of falsification of public documents,grossly
immoral conduct and concubinage?

Held:
Good moral character is not only a conditionprecedent to admission to the practice of law;continued
possession is also essential for remainingin the practice of law; Power to disbar must beexercised with great
caution and only in clear caseof misconduct that seriously affects the standingand character of the lawyer as an
officer of the courtand as a member of the bar; It should never bedecreed where any lesser penalty such as
temporarysuspension could accomplish the end desired - It isa time-honored rule that good moral character is
notonly a condition precedent to admission to thepractice of law. Its continued possession is alsoessential for
remaining in the practice of law. thecase at bar, respondent has fallen below the moralwhen he forged his wifes
signature in the bank loandocuments, and, sired a daughter with a womanother than his wife. However, the
power tomisconduct that seriously affects the standing andcharacter of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and
as a member of the bar should never be decreedwhere any lesser penalty such as temporarysuspension
could accomplish the end desired.Therefore, respondent is suspended from thepractice of law for six months on
the charge of falsifying his wifes signature in bank documentsand other related loan instruments; and for one
year on the charges of immorality and abandonment of his own family.
Cojuangco vs Palma
A.C. No. 2474 June 30, 2005

Facts: On June 22, 1982, respondent Atty. Leo J. Palma, despite his subsisting marriage, wed Maria Luisa
Cojuangco, the daughter of complainant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. Thus, the latter filed on November 1982, a
complaint disbarment against respondent. Palma moved to dismiss the complaint.
On March 2, 1983, the court referred the case to OSG for investigation and recommendation. The Assistant
Solicitor General heard the testimonies of the complainant and his witness in the presence of respondents
counsel.
On March 19, 1984 respondent filed with the OSG an urgent motion to suspend proceedings on the ground that
the final actions of his civil case for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him and his wife Lisa, poses a
prejudicial question to the disbarment proceeding, but it was denied.
The OSG transferred the disbarment case to the IBP, the latter found respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct
and violation of his oath as a lawyer, hence, was suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years.
In his motion for reconsideration, respondent alleged that he acted under a firm factual and legal conviction in
declaring before the Hong Kong Marriage Registry that he is a bachelor because his first marriage is void even if
there is judicial declaration of nullity.

Issue: Whether or not a subsequent void marriage still needs a judicial declaration of nullity for the purpose of
remarriage.

Held: Respondents arguments that he was of the firm factual and legal conviction when he declared before the
HIC authorities that he was a bachelor since his first marriage is void and does not need judicial declaration of
nullity cannot exonerate him. In Terre vs Terre, the same defense was raised by respondent lawyer whose
disbarment was also sought. We held:
xxx respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to
the prevailing case law of this court which holds that purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to
contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void an initio is essential.
Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same
result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his frist marriage to complainant
Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage must be regarded as bigamous
and criminal.
FACTS: The complainant Eduardo Cojuangco is a client of ACCRA, w h o a s s i g n e d t h e c a s e t o
A t t y. P a l m a , t h e respondent. The former hired the latter as his personal counsel
f o r h i s business. Atty. Palma becomes very close to the family of Cojuangco, and he dines and
goes with them abroad. He even tutored, complainants 22-year old daughter Maria Luisa
Cojuangco (Lisa).
On June 22, 1982, respondent married Lisa in Hongkong without the knowledge of the
complainant and despite the facts that the former is already m a r r i e d a n d w i t h t h r e e ( 3 )
c h i l d r e n . C o m p l a i n a n t s e n d s h i s t w o s o n s t o persuade Lisa to go home with them, which
she did. In the celebration of respondents marriage with Lisa he misrepresented himself as a bachelor. On
August 24, 1982, complainant filed with the Court of First Instance, a petition for declaration of nullity of
the marriage and which was granted. Subsequently complainant filed a disbarment complaint on
the ground of grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Respondent in his answer filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action. As he contends that complaint
fails to allege acts constituting deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or violation of his lawyers oath.

ISSUE: W O N r e s p o n d e n t s a c t s c o n s t i t u t e d e c e i t , m a l p r a c t i c e , gross misconduct in office,

grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer that would warrant his disbarment. YES!

RULING:
There is no question that respondent as a lawyer, is well versed in the law, fully well that in marrying Maria Luisa
he was entering into a bigamous marriage defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. The respondent betrayed the trust reposed in him by complainant. He was treated as part of
the family and was allowed to tutor Maria Luisa. For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that
respondent committed g r o s s l y i m m o r a l c o n d u c t a n d v i o l a t i o n o f h i s o a t h a s a
l a w y e r , a n d i t i s recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) years and which later lessen to one (1) year. According to IBP:At the outset, it must be
stressed that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its members. There
is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his
private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a
mere citizen at another. Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as
the latter may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may
at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.P r o f e s s i o n a l
c o m p e t e n c y a l o n e d o e s n o t m a k e a l a w y e r a w o r t h y m e m b e r o f t h e B a r.
G o o d m o r a l c h a r a c t e r i s a l w a y s a n i n d i s p e n s a b l e requirement. T h e i n t e r d i c t u p o n
lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the Code of P r o f e s s i o n a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y, i s
t h a t t h e y s h a l l n o t e n g a g e i n u n l a w f u l , dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Guevarra vs. Eala A.c. 7136, August 1, 2007

Facts: Joselano Guevarra filed a Complaint for Disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for
"grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."

The complainant first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene)
introduced respondent Atty. Eala, a lawyer and a sportscaster, to him as her friend who was married to Mary Ann
Tantoco with whom he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene, complainant noticed that Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls,
as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall." He also noticed
that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did
not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents' house
in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work. More so, complainant has seen Irene and respondent
together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the
conjugal house.

Moreover, Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You"
on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his
wedding to Irene. Also, it was revealed that Irene gave birth to a girl in 2002 and Irene named respondent in the
Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father.

In his answer, Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene, the
truth of the matter being that their relationship was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their
respective families. He also said that his special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous
circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment.

Issue: Whether the respondent be disbarred from the practice of Law.

Held: YES. The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not
his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly.

While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults
is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of
the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual
relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the
sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law. Furthermore,
respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer
from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same
Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law."

As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. In carrying on an
extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and
void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the
law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
ABANDONMENT OF LAWFUL WIFE AND MAINTAINING ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP AS GROUND FOR
DISBARMENT
JOVITA BUSTAMANTE-ALEJANDRO VS. ATTY. WARFREDO TOMAS ALEJANDRO and MARICRIS VILLARIN
AC No. 4256. February 13, 2004

Facts: Complainant submitted a photocopy of the marriage contract between her and respondent Atty. Alejandro
in support of her charge of bigamy and concubinage against the latter and Villarin. She also submitted a
photocopy of the birth certificate of a child of the respondent and also stated that they were married in May 1,
1990 in Isabela, Province.
The Supreme Court directed respondents to file their comment on the complaint within 10 days but they failed to
comply. Copies of the resolution, complaint and its annexes were returned to both respondents unserved with
notation moved, same as when served personally. Complainant was required anew to submit the correct,
present address of respondents under pain of dismissal of her administrative complaint. She disclosed
respondents address at 12403 Develop Drive Houston, Texas in a handwritten letter.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that both respondents be disbarred. The Supreme
Court ordered Atty. Alejandro to be disbarred while the complaint against his co-respondent Atty. Villarin was
returned to the IBP for further proceedings or it appears that a copy of the resolution requiring comment was
never deemed served upon her as it was upon Atty. Alejandro.

Issue: Whether or not abandonment of lawful wife and maintaining an illicit relationship with another woman are
grounds for disbarment.

Held: Sufficient evidence showed that respondent Atty. Alejandro, lawfully married to complainant, carried on an
illicit relationship with co-respondent Atty. Villarin. Although the evidence was not sufficient to prove that he
co0ntracted a subsequent bigamous marriage, that fact remains of his deplorable lack of that degree of morality
required of him as member of the bar. A disbarment proceeding is warranted against a lawyer who abandons his
lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who had borne him a child. We can do no
less in this case where Atty. Alejandro even fled to another country to escape the consequences of his
misconduct.
Therefore, Atty. Alejandro disbarred from the practice of law while the complaint against Atty. Villarin was referred
back to the IBP.