FIRST DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154380

Petitioner,

Present:
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
- versus - (Chairman),
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
Respondent. Promulgated:
October 5, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him
or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a

definite ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] dated
May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch
23 and its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is

capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the
Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his
American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine
Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the

United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage
was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son
Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized
as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her
child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel,
California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration

but it was denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26
OF THE FAMILY CODE[4]

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not

applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that
is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy,
according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal

separation.[5] Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondents
situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.[6]

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case
but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant

to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.[7]

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial
court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section

1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:

RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
 Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive
order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach
or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of
his rights or duties, thereunder.
...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are

adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy;
and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.[8]

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage

between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a
divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are
also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the
institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of
his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as
when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family

Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this
provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators
in its enactment?
 Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive

Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on August
3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36,
and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation
presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The

instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were
two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen
and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed
she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
 Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings [9] on the Family Code, the
Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following

objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:

1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses
are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced
will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly
divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for
Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them
abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry.
We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more
widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)

Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the
intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member
of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,

is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case

of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
 Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains

a foreign citizenship by naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got

married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a
divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a
Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases

involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry

as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the
interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to

mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be

construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter
of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal

meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. [12]
 If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining

a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be
deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or

her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained

abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen,

there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano.

As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid
divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced

Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the
Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal
separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular
case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have
all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a

sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated
Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted

by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents

wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and
mere allegation is not evidence.[13]

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that
his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the

divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.[14] Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice
of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and

proved.[15] Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows
his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there
would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another

marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the

Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to
allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired
foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the
present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are

unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was
naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried
an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could

only be made properly upon respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in

his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED.

The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET
ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice
Chairman
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 20-22.
[2]
Id. at 27-29.
[3]
Id. at 21-22.
[4]
Id. at 105.
[5]
Id. at 106-110.
[6]
Id. at 110.
[7]
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
[8]
Office of the Ombudsman v. Ibay, G.R. No. 137538, 3 September 2001, 364 SCRA 281, 286, citing Galarosa v.
Valencia, G.R. No. 109455, 11 November 1993, 227 SCRA 729, 737.
[9]
Held on January 27 and 28, 1988 and February 3, 1988.
[10]
No. L-68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
[11]
G.R. No. 124862, 22 December 1998, 300 SCRA 406.
[12]
Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, No. L-9274, 1 February 1957, 100 Phil. 850, 855.
[13]
Cortes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121772, 13 January 2003, 395 SCRA 33, 38.
[14]
Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 447.
[15]
Id. at 451.
 E N B A NC

BASES CONVERSION AND G.R. No. 178160

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,*
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - TINGA,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION, and
PERALTA, JJ.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Promulgated:
Respondent. February 26, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari[1] with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. The petition seeks to nullify
Decision No. 2007-020[2] dated 12 April 2007 of the Commission on Audit (COA).

The Facts

On 13 March 1992, Congress approved Republic Act (RA) No. 7227[3] creating the
Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA). Section 9 of RA No. 7227
states that the BCDA Board of Directors (Board) shall exercise the powers and
functions of the BCDA. Under Section 10, the functions of the Board include the
determination of the organizational structure and the adoption of a compensation
and benefit scheme at least equivalent to that of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP). Accordingly, the Board determined the organizational structure of the BCDA
and adopted a compensation and benefit scheme for its officials and employees.

On 20 December 1996, the Board adopted a new compensation and benefit

scheme which included a P10,000 year-end benefit granted to each contractual
employee, regular permanent employee, and Board member. In a
memorandum[4] dated 25 August 1997, Board Chairman Victoriano A. Basco
(Chairman Basco) recommended to President Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos) the
approval of the new compensation and benefit scheme. In a memorandum[5] dated
9 October 1997, President Ramos approved the new compensation and benefit
scheme.

In 1999, the BSP gave a P30,000 year-end benefit to its officials and employees. In
2000, the BSP increased the year-end benefit from P30,000 to P35,000. Pursuant
to Section 10 of RA No. 7227 which states that the compensation and benefit
scheme of the BCDA shall be at least equivalent to that of the BSP, the Board
increased the year-end benefit of BCDA officials and employees from P10,000
to P30,000. Thus in 2000 and 2001, BCDA officials and employees received
a P30,000 year-end benefit, and, on 1 October 2002, the Board passed Resolution
No. 2002-10-193[6] approving the release of a P30,000 year-end benefit for 2002.

Aside from the contractual employees, regular permanent employees, and Board
members, the full-time consultants of the BCDA also received the year-end benefit.

On 20 February 2003, State Auditor IV Corazon V. Espao of the COA issued Audit
Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2003-004[7] stating that the grant of year-
end benefit to Board members was contrary to Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) Circular Letter No. 2002-2 dated 2 January 2002. In Notice of
Disallowance (ND) No. 03-001-BCDA-(02)[8] dated 8 January 2004, Director IV
Rogelio D. Tablang (Director Tablang), COA, Legal and Adjudication Office-
Corporate, disallowed the grant of year-end benefit to the Board members and full-
time consultants. In Decision No. 2004-013[9] dated 13 January 2004, Director
Tablang concurred with AOM No. 2003-004 and ND No. 03-001-BCDA-(02).

In a letter[10] dated 20 February 2004, BCDA President and Chief Executive Officer
Rufo Colayco requested the reconsideration of Decision No. 2004-013. In a
Resolution[11] dated 22 June 2004, Director Tablang denied the request. The BCDA
filed a notice of appeal[12] dated 8 September 2004 and an appeal
memorandum[13] dated 23 December 2004 with the COA.
The COAs Ruling

In Decision No. 2007-020,[14] the COA affirmed the disallowance of the year-end
benefit granted to the Board members and full-time consultants and held that the
presumption of good faith did not apply to them. The COA stated that:

The granting of YEB x x x is not without x x x limitation. DBM Circular Letter No. 2002-02
dated January 2, 2002 stating, viz:

2.0 To clarify and address issues/requests concerning the same, the following
compensation policies are hereby reiterated:

2.1 PERA, ADCOM, YEB and retirement benefits, are personnel benefits granted in
addition to salaries. As fringe benefits, these shall be paid only when the basic salary is
also paid.

2.2 Members of the Board of Directors of agencies are not salaried officials of the
government. As non-salaried officials they are not entitled to PERA, ADCOM, YEB and
retirement benefits unless expressly provided by law.

2.3 Department Secretaries, Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries who serve as Ex-
officio Members of the Board of Directors are not entitled to any remuneration in line
with the Supreme Court ruling that their services in the Board are already paid for and
covered by the remuneration attached to their office. (underscoring ours)

Clearly, as stated above, the members and ex-officio members of the Board of Directors
are not entitled to YEB, they being not salaried officials of the government. The same
goes with full time consultants wherein no employer-employee relationships exist
between them and the BCDA. Thus, the whole amount paid to them totaling P342,000 is
properly disallowed in audit.
 Moreover, the presumption of good faith may not apply to the members and ex-officio
members of the Board of Directors because despite the earlier clarification on the matter
by the DBM thru the issuance on January 2, 2002 of DBM Circular Letter No. 2002-02, still,
the BCDA Board of Directors enacted Resolution No. 2002-10-93 on October 1, 2002
granting YEB to the BCDA personnel including themselves. Full time consultants, being
non-salaried personnel, are also not entitled to such presumption since they knew from
the very beginning that they are only entitled to the amount stipulated in their contracts
as compensation for their services. Hence, they should be made to refund the disallowed
YEB.[15] (Boldfacing in the original)

Hence, this petition.

The Courts Ruling

The Board members and full-time consultants of the BCDA are not entitled to the
year-end benefit.

First, the BCDA claims that the Board can grant the year-end benefit to its members
and full-time consultants because, under Section 10 of RA No. 7227, the functions
of the Board include the adoption of a compensation and benefit scheme.

The Court is not impressed. The Boards power to adopt a compensation and benefit
scheme is not unlimited. Section 9 of RA No. 7227 states that Board members are
entitled to a per diem:

Members of the Board shall receive a per diem of not more than Five thousand pesos
(P5,000) for every board meeting: Provided, however, That the per diem collected per
month does not exceed the equivalent of four (4) meetings: Provided, further, That the
amount of per diem for every board meeting may be increased by the President but such
amount shall not be increased within two (2) years after its last increase. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 9 specifies that Board members shall receive a per diem for every board
meeting; limits the amount of per diem to not more than P5,000; and limits the
total amount of per diem for one month to not more than four meetings. In Magno
v. Commission on Audit,[16] Cabili v. Civil Service Commission,[17] De Jesus v. Civil
Service Commission,[18] Molen, Jr. v. Commission on Audit,[19] and Baybay Water
District v. Commission on Audit,[20] the Court held that the specification of
compensation and limitation of the amount of compensation in a statute indicate
that Board members are entitled only to the per diem authorized by law and no
other. In Baybay Water District, the Court held that:

By specifying the compensation which a director is entitled to receive and by limiting the
amount he/she is allowed to receive in a month, x x x the law quite clearly indicates that
directors x x x are authorized to receive only the per diem authorized by law and no other
compensation or allowance in whatever form.[21]

Also, DBM Circular Letter No. 2002-2 states that, Members of the Board of
Directors of agencies are not salaried officials of the government. As non-salaried
officials they are not entitled to PERA, ADCOM, YEBand retirement benefits unless
expressly provided by law. RA No. 7227 does not state that the Board members
are entitled to a year-end benefit.

With regard to the full-time consultants, DBM Circular Letter No. 2002-2 states
that, YEB and retirement benefits, are personnel benefits granted in addition to
salaries. As fringe benefits, these shall be paid only when the basic salary is also
paid. The full-time consultants are not part of the BCDA personnel and are not paid
the basic salary. The full-time consultants consultancy contracts expressly state
that there is no employer-employee relationship between the BCDA and the
consultants, and that the BCDA shall pay the consultants a contract price. For
example, the consultancy contract[22] of a certain Dr. Faith M. Reyes states:
 SECTION 2. Contract Price. For and in consideration of the services to be performed by
the CONSULTANT (16 hours/week), BCDA shall pay her the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS and 00/100 (P20,000.00), Philippine currency, per month.

xxxx

SECTION 4. Employee-Employer Relationship. It is understood that no employee-

employer relationship shall exist between BCDA and the CONSULTANT.

SECTION 5. Period of Effectivity. This CONTRACT shall have an effectivity period of one
(1) year, from January 01, 2002 to December 31, 2002, unless sooner terminated by BCDA
in accordance with Section 6 below.

SECTION 6. Termination of Services. BCDA, in its sole discretion may opt to terminate this
CONTRACT when it sees that there is no more need for the services contracted
for. (Boldfacing in the original)

Since full-time consultants are not salaried employees of BCDA, they are not
entitled to the year-end benefit which is a personnel benefit granted in addition to
salaries and which is paid only when the basic salary is also paid.

Second, the BCDA claims that the Board members and full-time consultants should
be granted the year-end benefit because the granting of year-end benefit is
consistent with Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the Constitution.Sections 5 and 18
state:

Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and
property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all
people of the blessings of democracy.

Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare.
The Court is not impressed. Article II of the Constitution is entitled Declaration of
Principles and State Policies. By its very title, Article II is a statement of general
ideological principles and policies. It is not a source of enforceable
rights.[23] In Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of Appeals,[24] the
Court held that Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the Constitution are not self-
executing provisions. In that case, the Court held that Some of the constitutional
provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the Constitution
specifically, Sections 5 x x x and 18 the provisions of which the Court categorically
ruled to be non self-executing.

Third, the BCDA claims that the denial of year-end benefit to the Board members
and full-time consultants violates Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.[25] More
specifically, the BCDA claims that there is no substantial distinction between
regular officials and employees on one hand, and Board members and full-time
consultants on the other. The BCDA states that there is here only a distinction, but
no difference because both have undeniably one common goal as humans, that is
x x x to keep body and soul together or, [d]ifferently put, both have mouths to feed
and stomachs to fill.

The Court is not impressed. Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the
constitutionality of RA No. 7227 and the burden of proof is on the BCDA to show
that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.[26] In Abakada
Guro Party List v. Purisima,[27] the Court held that:

A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify

its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and unequivocal one. To invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is
an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive
which approved it.
The BCDA failed to show that RA No. 7227 unreasonably singled out Board
members and full-time consultants in the grant of the year-end benefit. It did not
show any clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The claim that there is
no difference between regular officials and employees, and Board members and
full-time consultants because both groups have mouths to feed and stomachs to
fill is fatuous. Surely, persons are not automatically similarly situated thus,
automatically deserving of equal protection of the laws just because they both have
mouths to feed and stomachs to fill. Otherwise, the existence of a substantial
distinction would become forever highly improbable.

Fourth, the BCDA claims that the Board can grant the year-end benefit to its
members and the full-time consultants because RA No. 7227 does not expressly
prohibit it from doing so.

The Court is not impressed. A careful reading of Section 9 of RA No. 7227 reveals
that the Board is prohibited from granting its members other benefits. Section 9
states:

Members of the Board shall receive a per diem of not more than Five thousand pesos
(P5,000) for every board meeting: Provided, however, That the per diem collected per
month does not exceed the equivalent of four (4) meetings: Provided, further, That the
amount of per diem for every board meeting may be increased by the President but such
amount shall not be increased within two (2) years after its last increase. (Emphasis
supplied)

Section 9 specifies that Board members shall receive a per diem for every board
meeting; limits the amount of per diem to not more than P5,000; limits the total
amount of per diem for one month to not more than four meetings; and does not
state that Board members may receive other benefits. In Magno,[28] Cabili,[29] De
Jesus,[30] Molen, Jr.,[31] and Baybay Water District,[32] the Court held that the
specification of compensation and limitation of the amount of compensation in a
statute indicate that Board members are entitled only to the per diem authorized
by law and no other.

The specification that Board members shall receive a per diem of not more
than P5,000 for every meeting and the omission of a provision allowing Board
members to receive other benefits lead the Court to the inference that Congress
intended to limit the compensation of Board members to the per diem authorized
by law and no other. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Had Congress intended
to allow the Board members to receive other benefits, it would have expressly
stated so.[33] For example, Congress intention to allow Board members to receive
other benefits besides the per diem authorized by law is expressly stated in Section
1 of RA No. 9286:[34]

SECTION 1. Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended, is hereby amended to

read as follows:

SEC. 13. Compensation. Each director shall receive per diem to be determined by the
Board, for each meeting of the Board actually attended by him, but no director shall
receive per diems in any given month in excess of the equivalent of the total per diem of
four meetings in any given month.

Any per diem in excess of One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) shall be subject to the
approval of the Administration. In addition thereto, each director shall receive
allowances and benefits as the Board may prescribe subject to the approval of the
Administration. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court cannot, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute or
insert into a statute what Congress omitted, whether intentionally or
unintentionally.[35]
When a statute is susceptible of two interpretations, the Court must adopt the one
in consonance with the presumed intention of the legislature to give its enactments
the most reasonable and beneficial construction, the one that will render them
operative and effective.[36] The Court always presumes that Congress intended to
enact sensible statutes.[37] If the Court were to rule that the Board could grant the
year-end benefit to its members, Section 9 of RA No. 7227 would become
inoperative and ineffective the specification that Board members shall receive
a per diem of not more than P5,000 for every meeting; the specification that
the per diem received per month shall not exceed the equivalent of four meetings;
the vesting of the power to increase the amount of per diem in the President; and
the limitation that the amount of per diem shall not be increased within two years
from its last increase would all become useless because the Board could always
grant its members other benefits.

With regard to the full-time consultants, DBM Circular Letter No. 2002-2 states
that, YEB and retirement benefits, are personnel benefits granted in addition to
salaries. As fringe benefits, these shall be paid only when the basic salary is also
paid. The full-time consultants are not part of the BCDA personnel and are not paid
the basic salary. The full-time consultants consultancy contracts expressly state
that there is no employer-employee relationship between BCDA and the
consultants and that BCDA shall pay the consultants a contract price. Since full-time
consultants are not salaried employees of the BCDA, they are not entitled to the
year-end benefit which is a personnel benefit granted in addition to salaries and
which is paid only when the basic salary is also paid.

Fifth, the BCDA claims that the Board members and full-time consultants are
entitled to the year-end benefit because (1) President Ramos approved the
granting of the benefit to the Board members, and (2) they have been receiving it
since 1997.

The Court is not impressed. The State is not estopped from correcting a public
officers erroneous application of a statute, and an unlawful practice, no matter how
long, cannot give rise to any vested right.[38]
The Court, however, notes that the Board members and full-time consultants
received the year-end benefit in good faith. The Board members relied on (1)
Section 10 of RA No. 7227 which authorized the Board to adopt a compensation
and benefit scheme; (2) the fact that RA No. 7227 does not expressly prohibit Board
members from receiving benefits other than the per diem authorized by law; and
(3) President Ramos approval of the new compensation and benefit scheme which
included the granting of a year-end benefit to each contractual employee, regular
permanent employee, and Board member. The full-time consultants relied on
Section 10 of RA No. 7227 which authorized the Board to adopt a compensation
and benefit scheme. There is no proof that the Board members and full-time
consultants knew that their receipt of the year-end benefit was unlawful. In
keeping with Magno,[39] De Jesus,[40] Molen, Jr.,[41] and Kapisanan ng mga
Manggagawa sa Government Service Insurance System (KMG) v. Commission on
Audit,[42] the Board members and full-time consultants are not required to refund
the year-end benefits they have already received.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Commission on Audit Decision

No. 2007-020 dated 12 April 2007 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
Board members and full-time consultants of the Bases Conversion and
Development Authority are not required to refund the year-end benefits they have
already received.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

(On official leave)

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 (On official leave)
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

*
On official leave per Special Order No. 563.
*
On official leave per Special Order No. 571.
[1]
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 37-44.
[3]
Otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 45-51.
[5]
Id. at 52.
[6]
Id. at 67.
[7]
Id. at 73.
[8]
Id. at 78-81.
[9]
Id. at 89-91.
[10]
Id. at 92-93.
[11]
Id. at 94-98.
[12]
Id. at 99.
[13]
Id. at 100-110.
[14]
Id. at 37-44.
[15]
Id. at 42-43.
[16]
G.R. No. 149941, 28 August 2007, 531 SCRA 339, 349.
[17]
G.R. No. 156503, 22 June 2006, 492 SCRA 252, 260.
[18]
G.R. No. 156559, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 624, 627.
[19]
G.R. No. 150222, 18 March 2005, 453 SCRA 769, 778.
[20]
425 Phil. 326 (2002).
[21]
Id. at 337.
[22]
Rollo, pp. 158-159.
[23]
Pamatong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161872, 13 April 2004, 427 SCRA 96, 100-101; Taada v. Angara,
338 Phil. 546, 580-583 (1997).
[24]
G.R. No. 167324, 17 July 2007, 527 SCRA 746, 764-765.
[25]
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states that, No person shall be x x x denied the equal protection of the
laws.
[26]
British American Tobacco v. Camacho, G.R. No. 163583, 20 August 2008; Central Bank Employees Association,
Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531, 562 (2004).
[27]
G.R. No. 166715, 14 August 2008.
[28]
Supra note 16.
[29]
Supra note 17.
[30]
Supra note 18.
[31]
Supra note 19.
[32]
Supra note 20.
[33]
Romualdez v. Marcelo, G.R. Nos. 165510-33, 28 July 2006, 497 SCRA 89, 107-109; Republic of the Philippines
v. Honorable Estenzo, 188 Phil. 61, 65-66 (1980).
[34]
An Act Further Amending Presidential Decree No. 198, Otherwise Known As The Provincial Water Utilities Act
of 1973, as amended.
[35]
Canet v. Mayor Decena, 465 Phil. 325, 332-333 (2004).
[36]
Sesbreo v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals, 337 Phil. 89, 103-104 (1997).
[37]
In re Guaria, 24 Phil. 37, 47 (1913).
[38]
Veterans Federation of the Philippines v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155027, 28 February 2006, 483 SCRA 526,
556; Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Government Service Insurance System (KMG) v. Commission on Audit, G.R.
No. 150769, 31 August 2004, 437 SCRA 371, 390-391.
[39]
Supra note 16.
[40]
Supra note 18.
[41]
Supra note 19.
[42]
G.R. No. 150769, 31 August 2004, 437 SCRA 371, 391.