FAMIT v.

Court of Appeals, et al,

G.R. No. 164060 June 15, 2007

FACTS:

MIT hired Arthur Andersen to develop a faculty ranking and compensation system. On January
29, 2001, in the 5th CBA negotiation meeting, MIT presented the new faculty ranking instrument
to petitioner FAMIT. The latter agreed to the adoption and implementation of the instrument,
with the reservation that there should be no diminution in rank and pay of the faculty members.

FAMIT and MIT entered into a new CBA effective June 1, 2001. It incorporated the new ranking
for the college faculty in Section 8 of Article V which states that, The faculty ranking sheet was
annexed to the CBA as Annex "B," while the college faculty rates sheet for permanent faculty
and which included the point ranges and corresponding pay rates per faculty level was added
as Annex "C."

After a month, MIT called FAMITs attention to what it perceived to be flaws or omissions in the
CBA signed by the parties. In a letter7 dated July 5, 2001 to FAMIT, MIT requested for an
amendment of the following CBA annexes Annex "B" (Faculty Ranking Sheet); Annex "C"
(College Faculty Rates for Permanent Faculty Only); and Annex "D" (H.S. Faculty Rates for
Permanent Faculty Only).

FAMIT rejected the proposal.

Meanwhile, MIT instituted some changes in the curriculum during the school year 2000-2001
which resulted in changes in the number of hours for certain subjects.

Upon learning of the changes, FAMIT opposed the formula. It averred that unknown to FAMIT,
MIT has not been implementing the relevant provisions of the 2001 CBA.

FAMIT met with MIT to settle this second issue but to no avail. MIT maintained that it was within
its right to change the pay formula used.

FAMIT brought the matter to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board for mediation.
Proceedings culminated in the submission of the case to the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators for
resolution.

The Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators ruled in favor of the petitioner.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUES:

(1) Is MITs new proposal, regarding faculty ranking and evaluation, lawful and consistent with
the ratified CBA? and

(2) Is MITs development of a new pay formula for the high school department, without the
knowledge of FAMIT, lawful and consistent with the ratified CBA?

HELD:

1.) Considering the submissions of the parties, the new point range system proposed by MIT is
an unauthorized modification of Annex "C" of the 2001 CBA. It is made up of a faculty
classification that is substantially different from the one originally incorporated in the current
CBA between the parties. Thus, the proposed system contravenes the existing provisions of the
CBA, hence, violative of the law between the parties.
The CBA during its lifetime binds all the parties. The provisions of the CBA must be respected
since its terms and conditions "constitute the law between the parties." Those who are entitled
to its benefits can invoke its provisions. In the event that an obligation therein imposed is not
fulfilled, the aggrieved party has the right to go to court and ask redress. The CBA is the norm of
conduct between petitioner and private respondent and compliance therewith is mandated by
the express policy of the law.

2.) We rule that MIT cannot adopt its unilateral interpretation of terms in the CBA. It is clear from
the provisions of the 2001 CBA that the salary of a high school faculty member is based on a
rate per load and not on a rate per hour basis.

There is no room for unilateral change of the formula by MIT. Needless to stress, the Labor
Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision
affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor.

Capitol Medical Center Inc. v. Trajano,

G.R. No. 155690 June 30, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioner is a hospital with address at Panay Avenue corner Scout Magbanua Street, Quezon
City. Upon the other hand, Respondent is a duly registered labor union acting as the certified
collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of petitioner hospital. Respondent
sent petitioner a letter requesting a negotiation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
Petitioner, however, challenged the unions legitimacy and refused to bargain with respondent.
Subsequently petitioner filed with the (BLR), Department of Labor and Employment, a petition
for cancellation of respondents certificate of registration.

For its part, respondent filed with the (NCMB), National Capital Region, a notice of strike.
Respondent alleged that petitioners refusal to bargain constitutes unfair labor practice.
Despite several conferences and efforts of the designated conciliator-mediator, the parties failed
to reach an amicable settlement. Respondent staged a strike.
Former Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing, now Associate Justice of this Court,
issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute and ordering all striking
workers to return to work and the management to resume normal operations, thus:
xxx all striking workers are directed to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from
the receipt of this Order and the management to resume normal operations and accept
back all striking workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the
strike. Further, parties are directed to cease and desist from committing any act that may
exacerbate the situation.
Moreover, parties are hereby directed to submit within 10 days from receipt of this Order
proposals and counter-proposals leading to the conclusion of the collective bargaining
agreement in compliance with aforementioned Resolution of the Office as affirmed by the
Supreme Court. xxx

ISSUE:
Whether or not Secretary of Labor cannot exercise his powers under Article 263 (g) of the Labor
Code without observing the requirements of due process.

RULING:
The discretion to assume jurisdiction may be exercised by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment without the necessity of prior notice or hearing given to any of the
parties. The rationale for his primary assumption of jurisdiction can justifiably rest
on his own consideration of the exigency of the situation in relation to the national
interests.
xxx In labor disputes adversely affecting the continued operation of such hospitals, clinics
or medical institutions, it shall be the duty of the striking union or locking-out employer
to provide and maintain an effective skeletal workforce of medical and other health
personnel, whose movement and services shall be unhampered and unrestricted, as are
necessary to insure the proper and adequate protection of the life and health of its patients,
most especially emergency cases, for the duration of the strike or lockout. In such cases,
therefore, the Secretary of Labor and Employment is mandated to immediately assume, within
twenty-four (24) hours from knowledge of the occurrence of such a strike or lockout, jurisdiction
over the same or certify it to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration. For this purpose, the contending parties are strictly enjoined to
comply with such orders, prohibitions and/or injunctions as are issued by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment or the Commission, under pain of immediate disciplinary action,
including dismissal or loss of employment stats or payment by the locking-out employer
of backwages, damages and other affirmative relief, even criminal prosecution against
either or both of them.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the President of the Philippines shall not be precluded
from determining the industries that, in his opinion, are indispensable to the national
interest, and from intervening at any time and assuming jurisdiction over any such labor
dispute in order to settle or terminate the same.

Santa Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc.,
January 24, 2007

FACTS:

The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union (Union) is the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the regular daily paid workers and the monthly paid non-commission-earning
employees of the Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Company) in its Sta. Rosa, Laguna
plant. The individual petitioners are Union officers, directors, and shop stewards.

The Union, its officers, directors and six shop stewards filed a Notice of Strike with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) Regional Office in Southern Tagalog, Imus, Cavite.
The petitioners relied on two grounds: (a) deadlock on CBA ground rules; and (b) unfair labor
practice arising from the companys refusal to bargain.

The Company filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the reasons cited by the Union were not
valid grounds for a strike. The Union then filed an Amended Notice of Strike.

Meanwhile, the Union decided to participate in a mass action organized by the Alyansa ng mga
Unyon sa Coca-Cola in front of the Companys premises set for September 21, 1999. The Office
of the Mayor issued a permit to the Union, allowing it to conduct a mass protest action within the
perimeter of the Coca-Cola plant on September 21, 1999 from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon.

The Company filed a Petition to Declare Strike Illegal.

The Union filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss and/or to Suspend Proceedings alleging
therein that the mass action conducted by its officers and members on September 21, 1999 was
not a strike but just a valid exercise of their right to picket, which is part of the right of free
expression as guaranteed by the Constitution The Union averred that the petition filed by the
Company was designed to harass and its officers and members in order to weaken the Unions
position in the on-going collective bargaining negotiations.

The NCMB recommended that the Notice of Strike of the Union be converted into a preventive
mediation case. After conciliation proceedings failed, the parties were required to submit their
respective position papers. In the meantime, the officers and directors of the Union remained
absent without the requisite approved leaves. On October 11, 1999, they were required to
submit their explanations why they should not be declared AWOL.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision granting the petition of the Company. He declared that
the September 21, 1999 mass leave was actually a strike under Article 212 of the Labor Code.

The Union appealed the decision to the NLRC. NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter
with the modification.

The Union and its officers, directors and the shop stewards, filed a petition for certiorari in the
CA. Another petition was filed by Ricky G. Ganarial and Almira Romo. The two cases were
consolidated in the 6th Division of the CA.

CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition for lack of merit.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which the appellate court denied; hence, the
instant petition was filed.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether the September 21, 1999 mass action staged by the Union was a strike;
(2) If, in the affirmative, whether it was legal; and
(3)Whether the individual officers and shop stewards of petitioner Union should be dismissed
from their employment.

HELD:

(1) The ruling of the CA that petitioners staged a strike on September 21, 1999, and not merely
a picket is correct.

It bears stressing that this is a finding made by the Labor Arbiter which was affirmed by the
NLRC and the CA. The settled rule is that the factual findings and conclusions of tribunals, as
long as they are based on substantial evidence, are conclusive on this Court.

Petitioners failed to establish that the NLRC committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction in affirming the findings of the Labor Arbiter that petitioners had
indeed staged a strike.

Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the
concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.

That there was a labor dispute between the parties, in this case, is not an issue. Petitioners
notified the respondent of their intention to stage a strike, and not merely to picket. Petitioners
insistence to stage a strike is evident in the fact that an amended notice to strike was filed even
as respondent moved to dismiss the first notice. The basic elements of a strike are present in
this case. The mass concerted activity constituted a strike.

What is definitive of whether the action staged by petitioners is a strike and not merely a picket
is the totality of the circumstances surrounding the situation.

(2) Records reveal that the said strike did not comply with the requirements of Article 263 (F) in
relation to Article 264 of the Labor Code. Strict adherence to the mandate of the law is required.

Aside from the above infirmity, the strike staged by respondents was, further, in violation of the
CBA which stipulated under Section 1, Article VI.

On the second and third issues, the ruling of the CA affirming the decisions of the NLRC and the
Labor Arbiter ordering the dismissal of the petitioners-officers, directors and shop stewards of
petitioner Union is correct.
(3) It bears stressing, however, that the law makes a distinction between union members and
union officers. A worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from
employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to
have lost employment status. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike, the law provides that a union officer may be
terminated from employment. The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union
officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. It possesses the right
and prerogative to terminate the union officers from service.

In this case, instead of playing the role of peacemakers and grievance solvers, the petitioners-
shop stewards participated in the strike. Thus, like the officers and directors of
petitioner Union who joined the strike, petitioners-shop stewards also deserve the penalty of
dismissal from their employment.

Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort, Inc. v. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union,
G.R. No. 158075 June 30, 2006

FACTS:

The union, which was registered before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), filed
a Petition for Certification Election before the DOLE-National Capital Region (NCR) seeking
certification as the exclusive bargaining representative of its members.

The DOLE-NCR denied the unions petition as it failed to comply with legal requirements,
specifically Section 2, Rule V, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code, and was seen to fragment the employees of petitioner.

Through its president Kimpo, the union later notified petitioner of its intention to negotiate, by
Notice to Bargain, a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) for its members.

Acting on the notice, the Hotel, advised the union that since it was not certified by the DOLE as
the exclusive bargaining agent, it could not be recognized as such.

The union clarified that it sought to bargain "for its members only," and declared that "[the
Hotels] refusal tobargain [would prompt] the union to engage in concerted activities to protect
and assert its rights under the Labor Code."

By Notice, the union announced that its executive officers as well as its directors decided to go
on strike in view of the managements refusal to bargain collectively, and thus called for the
taking of strike vote.

Petitioner thereupon issued a Final Reminder and Warning.

The union went on to file a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) due to unfair labor practice (ULP) in that the Hotel refused to bargain with it and the
rank-and-file employees were being harassed and prevented from joining it.

Conciliation conferences were immediately conducted by the NCMB during which the union
insisted on the adoption of a CBA for its members.

However, the union suddenly went on strike. The following day, the National Union of Workers
in the Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN) joined the strike and openly
extended its support to the union.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for injunction before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).
The NLRC thus issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) directing the strikers to
immediately "cease and desist from obstructing the free ingress and egress from the Hotel
premises."

Despite the efforts of the NCMB, which was joined by the Department of Tourism, to conciliate
the parties, the same proved futile.

On January 14, 1998, Rowena, whose services were terminated, also filed a complaint against
petitioner for illegal dismissal.

Petition to declare the strike illegal.

As then DOLE Secretary Cresenciano Trajanos attempts to conciliate the parties failed, he
issued an order certifying the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, and directing the
striking officers and members to return to work within 24 hours and the Hotel to accept them
back under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike.

On petitioners motion for reconsideration, then DOLE Acting Secretary Jose Espaol, Jr., by
Order modified the Order of Secretary Trajano.

The NLRC declared that the strike was illegal and it dismissed the all other complaints.

On appeal by the union, the Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC Resolution dismissing the
complaints of Mary Grace, Agustin and Rowena and of the union. It modified the NLRC
Resolution.

Hence, the present appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the strike is illegal.

HELD:

Court finds the strike illegal.

As Article 255 of the Labor Code provides, only the labor organization designated or selected by
the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit is
the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining.

The union (hereafter referred to as respondent) is admittedly not the exclusive representative of
the majority of the employees of petitioner, hence, it could not demand from petitioner the right
to bargain collectively in their behalf.

It bears noting that the goal of the DOLE is geered towards "a single employer wide unit which
is more to the broader and greater benefit of the employees working force." The philosophy is to
avoid fragmentation of the bargaining unit so as to strengthen the employees bargaining power
with the management. To veer away from such goal would be contrary, inimical and repugnant
to the objectives of a strong and dynamic unionism.

It is doctrinal that the exercise of the right of private sector employees to strike is not absolute.
 National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries-Manila Pavillion
Hotel Chapter v. Secretary of Labor and Employment

FACTS:
A certification election was conducted on June 16, 2006 among the rank-and-file employees of
respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel (the Hotel).
In view of the significant number of segregated votes, contending unions, petitioner,
NUHWHRAIN-MPHC, and respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavillion Hotel Labor Union
(HIMPHLU), referred the case back to Med-Arbiter, to decide which among those votes would
be opened and tallied.

Med-Arbiter Calabocal ruled for the opening of 17 out of the 22 segregated votes, specially
those cast by the 11 dismissed employees and those cast by the six supposedly supervisory
employees of the Hotel.

Petitioner, which garnered 151 votes, appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment
(SOLE).

SOLE, through then Acting Secretary Luzviminda Padilla, affirmed the Med-Arbiters Order. In
fine, the SOLE concluded that the certification of HIMPHLU as the exclusive bargaining agent
was proper.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by the SOLE, it appealed to the Court
of Appeals.

Appellate court affirmed the ruling of the SOLE.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether employees on probationary status at the time of the certification elections
should be allowed to vote, and
(2) Whether HIMPHLU was able to obtain the required majority for it to be certified as the
exclusive bargaining agent.

(1) The provision in the CBA disqualifying probationary employees from voting cannot override
the Constitutionally-protected right of workers to self-organization, as well as the provisions of
the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules on certification elections and jurisprudence thereon.

A law is read into, and forms part of, a contract. Provisions in a contract are valid only if they are
not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. It is evident that
the period of reckoning in determining who shall be included in the list of eligible voters is, in
cases where a timely appeal has been filed from the Order of the Med
Arbiter,the date when the Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
whether affirming or denying the appeal, becomesfinal and executory.

In the present case, records show that the probationary employees, including Gatbonton, were
included in the list ofemployees in the bargaining unit submitted by the Hotel on May 25,
2006 in compliance with the directive of the Med-Arbiter afterthe appeal and subsequent motion
for reconsideration have been denied by the SOLE, rendering the Med-Arbiters August 22, 2005
Order final and executory 10 days after the March 22, 2007 Resolution (denying the motion for
reconsideration of the January 22 Order denying the appeal), and rightly so. Because, for
purposes of self-organization, those employees are, in light of the discussion above, deemed
eligible to vote.

(2) As to whether HIMPHLU should be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent, the Court
rules in the negative. It is well-settled that under the so-called double majority rule, for there to
be a valid certification election, majority of the bargaining unit must have voted AND the
winning union must have garnered majority of the valid votes cast.

HIMPHLU obtained 169 while petitioner received 151 votes. Clearly, HIMPHLU was not able to
obtain a majority vote. The position of both the SOLE and the appellate court that the opening of
the 17 segregated ballots will not materially affect the outcome of the certification election as for,
so they contend, even if such member were all in favor of petitioner, still, HIMPHLU would win,
is thus untenable.

It bears reiteration that the true importance of ascertaining the number of valid votes cast is for it
to serve as basis for computing the required majority, and not just to determine which union won
the elections. The opening of the segregated but valid votes has thus become material. To be
sure, the conduct of a certification election has a two-fold objective: to determine the
appropriate bargaining unit and to ascertain the majority representation of the bargaining
representative, if the employees desire to be represented at all by anyone. It is not simply
the determination of who between two or more contending unions won, but whether it effectively
ascertains the will of the members of the bargaining unit as to whether they want to be
represented and which union they want to represent them.

Having declared that no choice in the certification election conducted obtained the required
majority, it follows that a run-off election must be held to determine which between HIMPHLU
and petitioner should represent the rank-and-file employees.

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., v. JOY C. CABILES,

August 5, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement

agency. Responding to an ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her
application for a quality control job in Taiwan.

Joys application was accepted. Joy was later asked to sign a oneyear employment contract for
a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. She alleged that Sameer Overseas Agency required her to
pay a placement fee of P70,000.00 when she signed the employment contract.

Joy was deployed to work for TaiwanWacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) She alleged that in her
employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she was
asked to work as a cutter.
Joy, without prior notice, was terminated. She was asked to "prepare for immediate
repatriation."

Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of
NT$9,000.

On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission
against petitioner and Wacoal.

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged that respondent's termination was due to her
inefficiency, negligence in her duties, and her "failure to comply with the work requirements [of]
her foreign [employer]."

Pacific Manpower moved for the dismissal of petitioners claims against it.26 It alleged that there
was no employer-employee relationship between them.

Labor Arbiter dismissed Joys complaint. Joy appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission.

National Labor Relations Commission declared that Joy was illegally dismissed.

The Commission denied the agencys motion for reconsideration

Aggrieved by the ruling, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency caused the filing of a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission with respect to the finding of illegal dismissal, Joys entitlement to the
equivalent of three months worth of salary, reimbursement of withheld repatriation expense, and
attorneys fees. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the National Labor Relations
Commission to address the validity of petitioner's allegations against Pacific.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations
Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three months worth of
salary, the reimbursement of the cost ofher repatriation, and attorneys fees despite the alleged
existence of just causes of termination.

HELD:

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just cause for causing Joys
dismissal. The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of law.

Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and quality standards at
work. They may also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the employees comply with these
standards. Failure to comply may be a just cause for their dismissal. Certainly, employers
cannot be compelled to retain the services of an employee who is guilty of acts that are inimical
to the interest of the employer. While the law acknowledges the plight and vulnerability of
workers, it does not "authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the employer." Management
prerogative is recognized in law and in our jurisprudence.

This prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is "tempered with the employees right to
security of tenure." Workers are entitled to substantive and procedural due process before
termination. They may not be removed from employment without a validor just cause as
determined by law and without going through the proper procedure.

Security of tenure for labor is guaranteed by our Constitution. Employees are not stripped of
their security of tenure when they move to work in a different jurisdiction. With respect to the
rights of overseas Filipino workers, we follow the principle of lex loci contractus.Thus,
By our laws, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) may only be terminated for a just or authorized
cause and after compliance with procedural due process requirements.

Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the
unexpired portion ofthe employment contract that was violated together with attorneys fees and
reimbursement of amounts withheld from her salary.

The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all
claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provisions [sic] shall be incorporated in
the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The
performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placementagency, as provided by law, shall be
answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the
recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and
partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation
orpartnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.

Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract
and shall not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a
foreign country of the said contract.

In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as

defined by law or contract, or any unauthorized deductions from the migrant workers salary, the
worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement if [sic] his placement fee and the deductions
made with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less.

Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract, in
accordance with Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042. The award of the three-month
equivalence of respondents salary must be modified accordingly. Since she started working on
June 26, 1997 and was terminated on July 14, 1997, respondent is entitled to her salary from
July 15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. "To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other
OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and
recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFWs security of tenure which an employment
contract embodies and actually profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional provision
of law."