Minucher v.
Scalzo Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral
Facts: Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
was filed against Minucher following a buy-bust
operation conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents
accompanied by Scalzo in the house of Minucher, an
Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been
seized. Minucher was later acquitted by the court.
Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up
charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.Scalzo
on his counterclaims that he had acted in the discharge of
his official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the United States
Department of Justice.Scalzo subsequently filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special
agent of the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. He
attached to his motion Diplomatic Note of the United States
Embassy addressed to DOJ of the Philippines and a
Certification of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying
that the note is a true and faithful copy of its original. Trial
court denied the motion to dismiss.
Issue: Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to
diplomatic immunity.
Ruling: YES. A foreign agent, operating within a territory,
can be cloaked with immunity from suit as long as it can be
established that he is acting within the directives of the
sending state.The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine
government to the activities of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the
undisputed facts in the case. The official exchanges of
communication between agencies of the government of the
two countries. Certifications from officials of both the
Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United
States Embassy. Participation of members of the Philippine
Narcotics Command in the buy-bust operation conducted
at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo. These
may be inadequate to support the diplomatic status of the
latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine
government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the
activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the
United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job
description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct
surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having
ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who
would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting
surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the
poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then
becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against
Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond
the scope of his official function or duties.
Liang v. People
Facts: Jeffrey Liang is an economist working in the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, he was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of
defamation for allegedly uttering defamatory words against
fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal. Because of this, he was
arrested, but then, he was able to post bail, and so he was
released from custody.
The next day, the MTC judge received an office of
protocol from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
stating that Liang is covered by immunity from legal
process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the
ADB and the Philippine Government. Because of this, the
MTC judge dismissed the two criminal cases without notice
to the prosecution.
The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it
was denied. It then filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City. The latter set aside the MTC ruling and ordered for an
enforcement of a warrant of arrest. Liang filed a MR but it
was denied. Hence, this Petition for Review.
Iaaue: Whether or not Liang is covered by immunity under
the Agreement??? NO.
Ruling: The immunity mentioned in Section 45 of the
Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the exception that
the act was done in an official capacity. Slandering a
person could not possibly be covered by the immunity
agreement because our laws do not allow the commission
of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.
It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may
be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever
damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or
in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction.
Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a
diplomatic agent enjoys immunity from criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an
action relating to any professional or commercial activity
exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state
outside his official functions. The commission of a crime is
not part of an official duty.
People v. Tulin
Facts: MT Tabangao is a cargo vessel owned by PNOC. It
was sailing near the coast of Mindoro loaded with barrels
of kerosene, gasoline, and diesel oil with a total value of
40.4M. The vessel was suddenly boarded by 7 fully armed
pirates (accused in the case Emilio Changco, Cecilio
Changco, Tulin, Loyola, Infante, etc.). they detained and
took control of the vessel. The name MT Tabangao and the
PNOC logo were painted over with black. Then it was
painted with the name Galilee. The ship crew was forced to
sail to Singapore.
In Singapore, the ship was awaiting another vessel that did
not arrive. Instead, the ship went back to Batangas
Philippines and remained at sea. Days later, it went back to
Singapore. This time, another vessel called the Navi Pride
anchored beside it. Another accused, Cheong San Hiong,
supervised the Navis crew and received the cargo on board
MT Tabangao/Galilee.
After the transfer of goods were completed, MT
Tabangao/Galilee went back to the Philippines and the
original crew members were released by the pirates in
batches. The crew was ordered not to tell authorities of
what happened.
The chief engineer of the crew, however, reported the
incident to the coast guard. Afterwards, a series of arrests
were effected in different places. An information charging
the accused with qualified piracy or violation of the PD 532
Piracy in the Philippine Waters was filed against the
accused.
As it turns out, Navi Pride captain, Hiong, was employed
with Navi Marine Services ( a Singaporean firm, I think).
Before the seizure of the MT Tabangon, Navi Marine was
dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean
broker who offered to sell bunker oil to the former. When
the transaction pushed through, Hiong was assigned to
supervise a ship to ship transfer. He was told that the
Galilee would be making the transfer, so Navi Pride ship-
sided with Galilee and the transfer was effected. Paul Gan
received the payment. Upon arrival in Singapore, Hiong
was asked again to transact another transfer of oil. The
same procedure was followed. Hiong then went to the
Philippines to arrange another transfer with Changco the
pirates head. This was how Hiong was arrested by the NBI
agents.
Issue: Whether or not the accused are guilty of qualified
piracy YES!
Ruling: Hiong argues that he can not be convicted under
PD 534 or Art 122 of the RPC as amended, since both laws
punish piracy committed in Philippine waters. Hiong also
contends that the court never acquired jurisdiction over him
since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters.
Art. 122 of the RPC (piracy in general and mutiny in the
high seas) provided that piracy must be committed in the
high seas by any person not a member of its complement
nor a passenger thereof. It was amended by RA 7659,
which broadened the law to include offenses committed in
Philippine waters. PD 532 on the other hand, embraces any
person, including a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel in the Philippine waters.
Passenger or not, member of the complement or not, any
person is covered by the law. No conflict exists among the
mentioned laws, they exist harmoniously as separate laws.
The attack on and the seizure of MT Tabangao and its
cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the
captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore,
where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred and sold. Such
transfer was done under Hiongs supervision. Although the
disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo was not
done in Philippine waters, it is still deemed part of the same
act. Piracy falls under Title 1 of Book 2 of the RPC. It is an
exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The
same principle applies to the case, even if Hiong is charged
with violation of a special penal law, instead of the RPC.
Regardless of the law penalizing piracy, it remains to be a
reprehensible crime against the whole world.
People v. Silvestre & Atienza
Facts: Romana Silvestre, wife of Domingo Joaquin by her
second marriage, cohabited with her co-defendant Martin
Atienza. The complaining husband, Joaquin, filed a case
for adultery and concubinage against Silvestre and Atienza,
respectively. A barangay conciliation happened, in which
Martin Atienza signed a promise to discontinue
cohabitation with Silvestre, in exchange of Joaquins
withdrawal of complaint. Sometime in November 1930,
accused Romana went to the house of her son and his wife
by her former marriage, where she was followed by Martin
Atienza. While they were gathered during supper, Atienza
told the couple to take the furniture out of the house
because he is going to set fire on it as his way of revenge to
the residents who instigated Domingo Joaquin to file a case
against him. No one, not even Romana Silvestre, dared say
anything to him as he was armed with a pistol. Eventually,
the house was set on fire. Both were charged of the crime
of arson. But as with Romana Silvestre, the only evidence
on record against her are that (1) first, she lived
adulterously with her co-defendant Atienza, and (2) second,
that Silvestre listened to Atienzas intentions without
raising a protest, and did not give the alarm when the latter
set fire to the house. Thus based on these facts, the court
also found Silvestre guilty of arson as accomplice.
Issue: Is Romana Silvestre guilty of the crime of arson as
accomplice?
Ruling: No. Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code,
considered in connection with Article 13, defines an
accomplice to be the one who does not take direct part in
the commission of the act who does not force or induce
other to commit it, nor cooperates in the commission of the
act by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by
previous or simultaneous actions. In this case, no
cooperation was made by Silvestre, since the complicity or
involvement requires a certain degree of cooperation
whether moral through advice, encouragement or
agreement or material, through external acts. In Silvestres
case, her mere presence and simultaneous acts do not
constitute cooperation for it does not appear that they
encouraged or nerved Atienza to commit the crime of
arson. As for her failure to give the alarm, that however
does not make her an accomplice.
 People v. Talingdan
Fatcs: Teresa Domogma was the supposed wife of the
deceased Bernardo Bagabag. No certificate or any other
proof of their marriage could be presented by the
prosecution. They lived with their children in Sobosob,
Salapadan, Abra. Their relationship had been strained and
beset with troubles for Teresa had deserted her family
home a couple of times and each time Bernardo took time
out to look for her. On 2 different occasions, appellant
Nemesis Talingdan has visited Teresa in their house while
Bernardo was out at work, and during those visits Teresa
had made Corazon, their then 12-year old daughter to go
down the house and leave them. Bernardo had gotten wind
that an illicit relationship was going on between Talingdan
and Teresa. About a month before Bernardo was killed,
Teresa had again left their house and did not come back for
a period of more than 3 weeks, and Bernardo came to know
later that she and Talingdan were seen together in the town
of Tayum Abra during that time. Just two days before
Bernardo was killed (Thursday), Bernardo and Theresa had
a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped Theresa several times,
resulting in Theresa seeking the help of the police. Accused
Talingdan, a policeman, came armed to the vicinity of
Bernardo's house and called him to come down; Bernardo
ignored him; Talingdan instead left and warned Bernardo
that someday he would kill him. On Saturday, June 24,
1967, Bernardo was gunned down in his house. The
defendants' and Corazon's accounts of what happened had
variations
Issue: Whether or not Teresa Domogma is an accessory to
Bernardo's murder
It is contended that there is no evidence proving that she
actually joined in the conspuracy to kill her husband
because there is no showing of actual cooperation on her
part with co-appellants in their culpable acts that led to his
death
It is claimed that what is apparent is "mere cognizance,
acquiescence or approval thereof on her part, which it is
argued is less than what is required for her conviction as a
conspirator
Ruling: It is true that proof of her direct participation in the
conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt; she cannot have
the same liability as her co-appellants. She had no hand in
the actual shooting. It is also not clear if she helped directly
in the planning and preparation thereof. But the court is
convinced that she knew it was going to be done and did
not object.
There is in the record morally convincing proof that she is
at the very least an accessory to the offense committed.
She did not only order her daughter not to reveal what she
knew to anyone, she also claimed to have no suspects in
mind when the peace officers came into their house later to
investigate
Whereas before the actual shooting she was more or less
passive in her attitude regarding the conspiracy, after
Bernardo was killed, she became active in her cooperation
with her co-appellants
These acts constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape
of the principal in the crime"
Manuel v. People
People v. Puno
Facts: Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento was fetched
by Isabelo Puno, her husbands driver, from her bakeshop
because her own driver had an emergency to attend to. As
they were headed home, Enrique Amurao boarded in the
car beside Puno, the latter introducing the former as his
nephew. As Enrique pointed out a gun to Mrs. Sarmiento,
Puno announced that he wants to get money from her. She
then gave them her bag with P7,000, but the two wanted
P100,000 more. The care sped off north towards the North
superhighway. Puno asked Mrs. Sarmiento to issue a check.
She subsequently drafts 3 checks in denominations of two
for P30,000 and one for P40,000. As they were
approaching towards Pampanga, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped
out of the car, injured herself, crossed on the other side, and
flagged down a fish vendors van. Upon reaching
Balintawak, she reported the matter to CAPCOM. The two
accused-appellants were arrested after attempting to encash
the Php 40,000 check issued to them at PCI Bank, Makati.
Issue: WON the appellants committed the offense of simple
robbery rather than the charged felony of kidnap for
ransom
Held: YES. The court agrees that the crime is indeed
robbery. The motive of the accused has been held to be
relevant or essential in determining the specific nature of
the crime. There is no showing whatsoever that the
appellants had any motive, other than the extortion of
money from her under the compulsion of threats and
intimidation.
People v. Delim
Facts: It is due to the automatic review of the decision of
the RTC Branch 46 (Urdaneta City) finding the appellants,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to
death for the murder of Modesto Bantas.
Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants
and victim are related for modesto is an adopted son of
their father. On January 23,1999 Marlon, Robert and
Ronald Delim charged into the house and poked a gun at
modesto and herded him outside the house. Leon and
Manuel Delim both armed stayed put and made sure that
randy and rita stayed put.
Modesto's lifeless body was then found on January 25,
1999. Marlon, Ronald, and Leon used denial and alibi as
their evidence against the charge.
Issue: Whether or not there is conspiracy?
Held: Yes there is:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons
agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of
evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be
proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit
a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the
crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in
its executed.
Appellants acted in unison when they abducted Modesto.
So their acts were synchronized and executed with
precision evincing a preconceived plan to kill Modesto
US v. Ah Chong
Facts: The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook
in one of the Officers quarters at Fort McKinley, Rizal
Province. Together living with him in the said quarters was
thedeceased, Pascual Gualberto, who was employed as a
houseboy. There had been severalrobberies in Fort
McKinley prior to the incident thus prompting the
defendant and his roommateto reinforce the flimsy hook
used to lock the door of their room by placing a chair
against it. Thedefendant and the deceased had an
understanding that when either returned at night, he
shouldknock on the door and say his name. On the night of
Aug. 14, 1908, Ah Chong, who was alonein his room, was
awakened by someone trying to force open the door of the
room. Thedefendant called out twice, asking the identity of
the person but heard no answer. Fearing thatthe intruder
was a robber or a thief, the defendant called out that he
would kill the intruder if hetried to enter. At that moment,
the door was forced open and the defendant was struck
firstabove the knee by the edge of the chair. Because of the
darkness of the room, the defendantthought he was being
hit by the intruder and tried to defend himself by striking
wildly at theintruder using a common kitchen knife which
he kept under his pillow. It turned out that the said intruder
was actually the defendants roommate, Pascual Gualberto.
The roommate was brought to the military hospital where
he died from the effects of the wound the following day.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant was criminally liable
for committing a felony.
Held: Defendant was not criminally liable and
exonerated.In order for mistake of fact to be held as a valid
defense, there has to be several requisites.One, that the act
done would have been lawful had the facts been as the
accused believedthem to be. Two, that the intention of the
accused in performing the act should be lawful, andlastly,
that the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on
the part of the accused.In the case at bar, had the intruder
been a robber as the defendant believed him to be, then
AhChong acted in good faith, without malice or criminal
intent, and would have been whollyexempt from criminal
liability and that he cannot be said to have been guilty of
negligence orrecklessness.
People v. Oanis
Facts: Chief of Police Antonio Oanis and Corporal Alberto
Galanta were instructed by the Constabulary Provincial
Inspector to arrest the escaped convict, Anselmo Balagtas,
with bailarina named Irene, and if overpowered, to get him
dead or alive. Upon arrival at the place where Irene could
be found, Oanis approached and asked Brigada Mallare
where Irene's room was. Brigada indicated the room and
said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Oanis and
Galanta then went to the room and upon seeing a man
sleeping with his back towards the door, they
simultaneously fired at him. Shocked by the entire scene,
Irene fainted. It turned out later that the man shot and killed
was not Balagtas but an innocent man named Serapio
Tecson, Irene's paramour.
Issue: Whether or not Oanis and Galanta can be held
responsible for Tecson's death.
Held: Yes. No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be
used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not
be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his
detention. A peace officer cannot claim exemption from
criminal liability if he uses unnecessary or unreasonable
force in making an arrest.
Through impatience of desire to take chances, Oanis and
Galanta have exceeded in the fulfillment of their duty by
killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas
without any resistance from him and without making any
previous inquiry as to his identity.
Padilla v. Dizon
Facts: A tourist, Lo Chi Fai, was caught by Customs guard
at the Manila internationalAirport while attempting to
smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchangeinstruments
out of the country, at time of apprehension, he was found
carrying withhim foreign currency and foreign exchange
instruments (360) amounting to US$355,349.57 where he
failed to declare in the form prescribed by Central bank
uponhis arrival in the Philippines.Information was filed
against the accused Lo Chi Fai with the RTC of Pasay city
forviolation of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular no. 960 where
Respondent judge presided.
No person shall take out or transmit or attempt to take out
or transmit foreignexchange in any form, out of the
Philippines directly....... tourist and non-resident temporary
visitors bringing with them more than US$ 3,000.00 shall
declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the
Central Bank at points of entriesupon arrival in the
Philippines
(CB Circular no. 960 sec. 6)
Alexander Padilla, Commissioner of Customs, filed an
Administrative complaintdated August 6, 1987 against
Respondent Judge Baltazar R. Dizon for rendering
amanifestly erroneous decision due at the very least, to
gross incompetence andgross ignorance of the law, in
Criminal case entitled People vs. Lo Chi Fai (no. 86-
10126-P). Acquitting said accused for violation of Central
Bank circular no. 960 sec6. The acquittal according to him
is based on:(1)
No deliberate intent, there must be a clear intention to
violate the law inorder for the accused to be prosecuted.(2)
Money brought by the accused is for the purpose of
investing in some undefinedbusiness ventures and that the
reason why the accused ought to export the moneyis
because of the fear that the Attempted Revolution might
spread.Furthermore, respondent Judge Alleged that he
rendered his decision in goodfaith.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of
gross incompetence orgross ignorance of the law rendering
the decision in question.
Held: Yes, the proof of malice or deliberate intent is not
essential in offenses punishedby special laws, which are
Mala Prohibita.
Thus, in requiring proof of malice, therespondent judge has
by his gross ignorance allowed the accused to go scot
free.A judge cannot be held to account or answer,
criminally, civilly or administratively,for an erroneous
decision rendered by him in good faith. But these
circumstanceswhich make the story invented by the
accused as palpably unbelievable as torender the findings
of the respondent judge obviously contrived to favor
theacquittal of the accused, thereby clearly negating his
claim that he rendered thedecision in good faith. The
court finds the Respondent Judge Baltazar Dizon guilty of
gross incompetence,ignorance of the law. The court thereby
ordered that the Respondent Judge beDismissed from the
Service.
Magno v. CA
Facts: Petitioner was in process of puttingup a car repair
shop sometime inApril 1983, but he did not havecomplete
equipment that couldmake his venture workable. Helacked
funds to purchasenecessary equipment.
He approached Corazon Teng, VPof Mancor Industries, a
distributorof equipment who referred him toLS Finance
A lease/purchase agreementspecifying a warranty
deposit(29,790) of 30% for Magno to putup. Claimino lg he
could not affordit, Magno asked LS Finance to find a 3
thrird party lender to lend him theamount. LENDER =
TENG, specifieda 3% interest on short term loan.
Magno issued postdated checks toLS Finance, who gave it
to Teng.When check matured, Magno saidhe could not
cover it and he wasnot banking with Pacific Bankanymore.
In lieu, he issued 6 check- first 2 checks honored, last 4
inquestion. When business failed,Magno could no longer
pay rent toLS Finance, LS pulled outequipment. Magno
promised to paythe rest of the warranty deposit,but the
remaining checks were nolonger honored due to
closedaccount. He was convicted of fourcounts of
violating BP 22. CAaffirmed this decision becauseissuing a
bouncing check is a crime
Issue:
(1)WON Magno is guilty of violatingB.P. 22 upon review
(2)WON post-dated checks weredrawn or issued "to apply
onaccount or for value", as requiredunder Section 1 of B.P.
Blg, 22.
Held:
(1) NO. There is no violation of BP22by issuance of check
to coverwarranty deposit given bycomplainant to enable
drawer toimport equipment financed onlease-purchase
agreement. Sincetransaction did not becomepurchase when
Magno failed to payrent and LS Finance pulled
outequipment. No need for Magno tocontinue paying
warranty deposit(warranty deposit is for purchase of
equipment).
(2)
NO violation is committed whencomplainant told drawer
that hehas insufficient funds in the bank. The 4 checks were
issued tocollateralize rent/ anaccommodation and not
forpurchase equipment/receipt of anactual account or
credit forvalue.
Ratio:
RTC and CAs decision merelyrelied on the law, without
looking intothe real nature of warranty deposit.Acquittal
based on action notconstituting a wrong sought to
bepunished in offense charged (notbecause of lack of
intent).