Lambino Vs.

Comelec Case Digest

Lambino Vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 174153
Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative

petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold
a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged
that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17
of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-
7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift
the present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary.
COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions
and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement
the initiative petitions.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the
initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due
course to the Lambino Groups petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic
requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did
not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on Direct Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the
time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and
misleading which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision
through Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and
revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution
may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the
executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present
petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the
constitution before complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.
Lambino vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

FACTS:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under
Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and
Referendum Act.

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each
legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters.
The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the
signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Groups initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying
Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII
(Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled Transitory Provisions.
These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC
indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their
initiative.

The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735
inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the
initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and

HELD:
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that
allows a peoples initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section
states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment should be ready and shown to the people before they sign such
proposal. The framers plainly stated that before they sign there is already a draft shown
to them. The framers also envisioned that the people should sign on the proposal
itself because the proponents must prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature.

The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means
two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus
sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a
petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is
first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in
a petition. Thus, an amendment is directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments.

There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements

in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they
complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures that
the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the
proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the
paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to
this Court a copy of a signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006
when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006.

2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements
of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a peoples
initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Courts ruling in
Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or
reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this
Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not
comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on
amendments to the Constitution.
Miriam Defensor- Santiago vs. COMELEC
G.R No. 127325
March 19, 1997

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL

ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN
PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the Peoples Initiative for
Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON
(DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR.
FACTS:
Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a
Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples
Initiative (Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order (1) Fixing
the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country; (2) Causing the
necessary publications of said Order and the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation; and (3) Instructing
Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and
volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for
the purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs the conduct of initiative to
amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is a valid exercise of
delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A. No. 6375 failed to be an enabling law
because of its deficiency and inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, (2) R.A. No.
6735 is adequate to cover the system of initiative on amendment to the Constitution,
and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid. .
HELD:
NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence in subtitles simply
means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local
laws. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation.
Provisions COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution are declared void.
RATIO:
Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A. No. 6735 failed to
provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of
initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate
omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was
left to some future law.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The
petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the
COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel
before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue
through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of
registered voters in each legislative district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars,
in the establishment of signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its election
registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits, and
voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the
COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not
fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or
under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket
number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed.
That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been
dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the
order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so
dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
PUNO, concurring and dissenting
I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide
insofar as it orders the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I
cannot share the view that R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are
legally defective and cannot implement the peoples initiative to amend the Constitution.
I likewise submit that the petition with respect to the Pedrosas has no leg to stand on
and should be dismissed. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)
VITUG, concurring and dissenting
I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the TRO
earlier issued by the Court did not prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right
to campaign for constitutional amendments.
[T]he TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made permanent under
the ponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin petition and must not be so
understood as having intended or contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the
Pedrosas. The grant of such a right is clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on
people initiative.
FRANCISCO, concurring and dissenting
There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has prepared a
scholarly and well-written ponencia. Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view
that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)
PANGANIBAN, concurring and dissenting
Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority,
holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the initiatory Delfin Petition.
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to be directly proposed by the people
through initiative, there is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void.
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the
required number of signatures in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the
Philippines with at least 3% in every legislative district no public funds may be spent
and no government resources may be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution.
Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition absent such
signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the majoritys two other rulings.
Miriam Defensor- Santiago vs. COMELEC
G.R No. 127325
March 19, 1997

FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for
People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift
Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and
directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between
petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to
file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December
18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel
Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following
arguments, among others:

1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an
enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and

2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the
Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.

ISSUE:

WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by peoples
initiative.

WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution,

and if so WON the Act as worded adequately covers such initiative.

WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to
the constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the
conduct of such initiative?

WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in the
draft petition would constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the constitution.

WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.

WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is
a pending case before the COMELEC.

HELD:
NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.

Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to
AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve,
or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can
only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause
"proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed"
denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for
Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution.
This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and
local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle
therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of
values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far
more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and
referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to
forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made
permanent.

WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.

Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS:

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents.
The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro
Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant
(respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources
(DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further
asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and
asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the
ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber
License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief
prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the
court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent
RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of
contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal
right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The
Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right --
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article
II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the
environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the
DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the governing and
supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's
natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in
Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative
Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation,
and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners
(and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's
duty to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation
to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners
maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of
discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full
protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate
enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded
jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the
wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare
is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the
non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated
by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not
create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit

by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety,
moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police
power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC
decision is SET ASIDE.
CASE DIGEST : OPOSA vs FACTORAN

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993 JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE
ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA vs. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN,
JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the
RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

FACTS: a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine

rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."

The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs
"are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin
tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally
concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that
they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4Consequently, it is
prayed for that judgment be rendered:

1] Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

2] Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be
submitted as a matter of judicial notice.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action?

HELD: YES

petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all Filipinos.
The right to a balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment. The said right implies the judicious management of the
countrys forests. This right is also the mandate of the government through DENR. A
denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to
respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. All licenses may thus be
revoked or rescinded by executive action.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment
Imbong vs. Ochoa, Jr. Digest

April 8, 2014

G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957, 204988, 205003, 205043, 205138, 205478,
205491, 205720, 206355, 207111, 207172 & 207563

JAMES M. IMBONG, ET AL., Petitioners, v. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ET

AL., Respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:

Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population
growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically
opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in
various media. From television debates to sticker campaigns, from rallies by socio-
political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy -the clash
between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and
progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite
calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from
various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to
wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound
and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris
controversy, as presented in fourteen petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: The RH Law violates the right to
life of the unborn, the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products, and to religious freedom, equal protection clause, involuntary servitude,
among others.

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal

prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical
practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to
other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health
programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex
education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.

While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute,
they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the
"compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of
religion and the right to free speech.
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due
process by removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to
decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall
offer." It ignores the management perogative inherent in corporations for employers to
conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners,
pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual
case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.;
2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are
essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed
legislation took effect.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court
issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of
the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July
17, 2013.

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.
Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception
program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the
sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote.

ISSUES: 1) Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy; 2) Whether the RH law is unconstitutional.

HELD:

1) In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists
and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.

REMEDIAL LAW: actual case or controversy

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the
unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation.
Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and ( d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis
mota of the case.

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject petitions do not present any actual
case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented. They claim that
the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since
no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no
showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation.
In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate
or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court
would amount to an advisory opinion. The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate
mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings
must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a
denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from
an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.

Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of

ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner
must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of
the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that
the same is ripe for judicial determination.

Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and
that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident
that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners
or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for
vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at
least, be heard on the matter NOW.

REMEDIAL LAW: facial challenge

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject
petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a
speech regulating measure.

The Court is not persuaded.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First
Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes
concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment.
These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After
all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful
assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they
are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the
application of facial challenges to strictly penal statutes, it has expanded its scope to
cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is
simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction,
is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the
framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to
maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights
mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority
to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed
pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that
there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch
of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the
detriment of the Filipino people.

REMEDIAL LAW: locus standi

The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective
petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot
prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them, and the
government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.

The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine
and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.

Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can
challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights.
The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a
violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the
prohibition against third-party standing.

REMEDIAL LAW: transcendental importance

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter
is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest."

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, the Court held that in cases of
paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing
requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is
no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency
Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the
constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and
general interest shared in common with the public.

With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through
an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus
standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise
directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a
constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is,
after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion,
waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have
been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.

In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but
also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all.
After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life
and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights.
Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health
have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court
entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance
warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right
to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait
for a life to be taken away before taking action.

The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights
enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life
of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.

REMEDIAL LAW: declaratory relief

The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Suffice it to state that
most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive
reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.

POLITICAL LAW: one subject-one title

The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates
Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title rule.
According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the
assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing
its true intent- to act as a population control measure.

To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or
population control measure, and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and
"reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are separate.

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as
principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards
the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our
women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated
earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and
the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family planning
products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modern, however,
are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.

For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the
number of births in the country.

It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal
care as well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of
information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortificient, effective,
legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and
supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.

The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of
contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law.
Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH
Law loses its very foundation. As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such
as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services,
prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are
already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.

2)

POLITICAL LAW: right to life

It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is
inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom,
or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.

In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article
III of the Constitution provides: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the
Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An
Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which
prevent fertilization, to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation, and the
ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has long recognized the
need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order to
achieve long-term economic development.

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning
methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one
centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.

This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and
health and the overall promotion of the family's wellbeing.

Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women"
were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population
program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-
abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion." As will be discussed later, these principles
are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the
constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee
religious freedom.

POLITICAL LAW: when life begins

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life
begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without
proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that
the individual members of the Court could express their own views on this matter.

In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.

In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular
phrase of Section 12 which reads:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is
undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said
reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to
conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are
quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is
reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation.
Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with
"fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm. On the other side of the spectrum
are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in
the uterus.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: plain and legal meaning

It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be

interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v.
Judicial Bar Council:

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words
of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and
the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum -from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.

The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that
the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to
be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document
but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as
an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.

In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception"
which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life
begins at fertilization.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming

pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity
capable of developing into a being like its parents.

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation
of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of
survival and maturation under normal conditions.

Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: intent of the framers

Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers
regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From
their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization."

From the deliberations, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized
that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child
from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the
male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the
Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow
it determine when life begins.

Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban
all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas,
spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized
that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question
of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence.
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum
should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited.

Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the
female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed
non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance,
and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the
undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new
human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is,
upon fertilization.

For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon.
Lagman that life begins at implantation. According to him, "fertilization and conception
are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not
identical and synonymous." Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical
authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of
conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected."

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific
mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The
fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object -it is a living human being complete
with DNA and chromosomes. Implantation has been conceptualized only for
convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute
textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.

POLITICAL LAW: the right to health

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the
Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health.
Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.

A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the
health of the people, viz:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the
needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State
shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory
system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and research,
responsive to the country's health needs and problems.

Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their
rehabilitation, self-development, and selfreliance, and their integration into the
mainstream of society.

Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from
substandard or hazardous products.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing.

Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these
self-executing provisions.

It bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception
and contraceptives per se. In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo -under R.A. No. 5921
and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when
they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician -be maintained.

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the
provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a
good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees
with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not
lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and
dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a
licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to
ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public.

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must
consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the
contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs
and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The
distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The
public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De
Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying
contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or
loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use.

At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted
to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination
which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to
ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption.
Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this
ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured
up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case
presents itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that
hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The
first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in
the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they
have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has
the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine
device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the
requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the
EDL supports this construction.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal

contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient
and effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in
the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are
in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies.
There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are
"safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.

POLITICAL LAW: freedom of religion and the right to free speech

At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made
up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History
has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various
religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has
embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all -the religious people of different
sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in
a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and
enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present
Constitution.

The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God" manifested their spirituality
innate in our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical
experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes
with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest
principles of morality. Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to society,
the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating
provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of
religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public
schools.

The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would
not encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa.
The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II,
Section 6 ofthe 1987 Constitution, viz:

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.
Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less
question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and
discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs
and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the
nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.

Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over
another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its
generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of
God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church"
means the religious congregations collectively.

Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to
protect the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down
the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987
Constitution.

In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.

The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or
favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs
among religious groups." Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion
and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition ofa religion.

On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience. Under this part of religious freedom guarantee,
the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's
belief and faith.

The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory
purposes. They have a single goal to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and
practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from
inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the
establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards
for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended
to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual
religious beliefs and practices.

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the
guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and
the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute.
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and
can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.

POLITICAL LAW: legislative acts and the free exercise clause

In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the
use of contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem reproductive health
measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong
according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with
"faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a
church...are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the
civil courts." The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood
only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands
without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it
does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of
eligious freedom.

While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of
contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using
contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality,
their beliefs should be respected.

Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free
exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the
prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to
show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally
unacceptable.

Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the
freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated
when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting according
to one's belief.

Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an

individual in the perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who
plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future
event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the
information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she even decides to
become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon those who object to
contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on
reproductive health matters.

Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the
conscientious objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate
"the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a
person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not
presented any government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its
legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means. Other than the assertion that the
act of referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a
conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious
freedom, it behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be
undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the
conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by other
practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open
willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in
utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of
constitutional freedoms.

At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that
the right to health is protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A.
No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women,"
amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health services and programs.

Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare
programs for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a measure that puts an
unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs m exchange for blind conformity.

POLITICAL LAW: exception; life threatening cases

All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the
law. While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render
reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs,
an exception must be made in life threatening cases that require the performance of
emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be
given preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a
denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger.

POLITICAL LAW: academic freedom

The Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.

At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the
1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State
recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive
members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is,
that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.

It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the
moral development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the
importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation building.

Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health

education program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community
associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it
will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it
becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV,
Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.

POLITICAL LAW: due process

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must
not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to
other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed together with the
other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.

The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being
obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods,
includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to
render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and
exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render
reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, necessarily includes
exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough
to include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.

POLITICAL LAW: equal protection

The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under
the Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary
target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. They argue that,
rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces
contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the
various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in
the guiding principles and definition of terms of the law.

"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons
or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is
to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept
of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not
draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the
legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the
political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal
protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

"Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or

embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be
regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to
rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be
made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should
possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and
as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated
equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other
members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not
justify the non-application of the law to him."

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted

as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature
as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions.
It must not leave out or "under include" those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification.

POLITICAL LAW: involuntary servitude

The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can
hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care
service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono
services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the
government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with Phil Health being a privilege
and not a right.

The point ofthe OSG is well-taken.

It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with
public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of
medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves
the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress to
prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the
public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to
regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right
altogether.

Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the
presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and
compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only
encourages private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers to
render pro bona service. Other than non-accreditation with Phil Health, no penalty is
imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive
healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health
service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it
all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro
bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a
prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be
an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the
furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.

Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized
that conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious
beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro
bona or otherwise.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: natural law

With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, suffice it to say that
the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law.
Our only guidepost is the Constitution.

While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the
Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity
to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural
laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists,
philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the
law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present. Unless, a
natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike
down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the very case cited by the petitioners, it was
explained that the Court is not duty bound to examine every law or action and whether it
conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used
sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man
where no law is applicable.

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life.
It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population
control program of the government by providing information and making non-
abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.

POLITICAL LAW: constitutionality of the RH law

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to
provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and
quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier
pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be
trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional
safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an
authority higher than the State.

In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group
cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem
society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be
tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist
alongside each other.

As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court
that what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the
country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large
population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled,
poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.

At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The
European and Asian countries, which embarked on such a program generations ago,
are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers is
dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a
significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel
their economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are
still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.

Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not
use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious
objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the
wisdom of a law.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court

declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the
following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1] Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require
private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a
miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from
their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5
.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or
refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive
health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they
allow a married individual, not in an emergency or lifethreatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent
of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they
limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5] Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or
refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility
or one which is conveniently accessible regardless ofhis or her religious beliefs;

6] Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5
.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support
reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of
a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7] Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of
pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector
in securing PhilHealth accreditation;

and

8] Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier
"primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and,
therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its
Order, dated July 16, 2013, is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No.
10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

DECISION

(En Banc)

BELLOSILLO, J.:
 I. THE FACTS

Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS

sold in public auction its stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the
same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it
to match the bid of Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in 10,
paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that in the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

II. THE ISSUES

1. Whether 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing

provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;

2. Assuming 10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling

shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;

3. Whether GSIS is included in the term State, hence, mandated to implement 10,
paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution; and

4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the petitioner,
a Filipino corporation, over Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]

1. YES, 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-

executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into
effect.

Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it
appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the
legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional
provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor
details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second

par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same
section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is flawed. If the first
and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures
to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in
the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise
authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third
paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-
executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-
executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.

xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When
our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may
be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on
the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance,
and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is
a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part
of our patrimony as a nation.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When
the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources
of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural
resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

xxx xxx xxx

 For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the
triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed
with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the
purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock,
so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management
of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel
and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain
respondents claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is
being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel
building nor the land upon which the building stands.

3. YES, GSIS is included in the term State, hence, it is mandated to

implement 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with
the prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on
Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and
MHC a state action. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from
the government are considered state action covered by the Constitution (1) when the
activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the government is so significantly
involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action;
and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that
the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under
the second and third categories of state action. Without doubt therefore the
transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the
State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but
also to the government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of
three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a
constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3)
branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional
injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent
GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of the
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not
yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall
only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary
contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision
of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the
highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning
bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they
under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee
respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the
provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested
parties.

xxx xxx xxx

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the
Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders
are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. Certainly, the
constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares
immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the
highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional
injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public
bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question
that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the
Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be
so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the
bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore
it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
Espina vs. Zamora

The Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of RA 8762 (Retail Trade
Liberalization Act of 2000), which expressly repealed the law prohibiting foreign
nationals from engaging in retail trade (RA 1180). RA 8762 also allows natural-
born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship and now reside in the
Philippines, to engage in the retail trade business with the same rights as Filipino
citizens.
In a unanimous 11-page decision penned by Justice Roberto A. Abad, the
Court En Banc dismissed for lack of merit the petition filed a decade ago
assailing RA 8762. It found no showing that the law has contravened any
constitutional mandate and that it would eventually lead to alien control of the
retail trade business.
The Court noted that while the Constitution mandates a bias in favor Filipino
goods, services, labor, and local enterprises, it also recognizes the need for
business exchange with the rest of the world on the basis of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are unfair. The Court also pointed out that
Congress has the discretion under Article XIII, sec. 10 of the Constitution to
reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investment upon recommendation of the
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) and when the national
interest requires; and that in this case Congress has decided, without opposition
from NEDA, to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign
investments.

The Court also found that RA 8762 has provided for strict safeguards on foreign
participation in retail trade. (GR No. 143855, Espina v. Zamora, September 21,
2010)
Espina vs. Zamora

The Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of RA 8762 (

Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000
), which expressly repealed the law prohibiting foreignnationals from engaging in retail
trade (RA 1180). RA 8762 also allows natural-bornFilipino citizens, who had lost their
citizenship and now reside in the Philippines, toengage in the retail trade business with
the same rights as Filipino citizens. In a unanimous 11-page decision penned by Justice
Roberto A. Abad, the Court
En Banc
dismissed for lack of merit the petition filed a decade ago assailing RA 8762. It found
noshowing that the law has contravened any constitutional mandate and that it
wouldeventually lead to alien control of the retail trade business.The Court noted that
while the Constitution mandates a bias in favor Filipino goods,services, labor, and local
enterprises, it also recognizes the need for business exchangewith the rest of the world
on the basis of equality and reciprocity and limits protection ofFilipino enterprises only
against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.The Court also pointed
out that Congress has the discretion under Article XIII, sec. 10 ofthe Constitution to
reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investment upon recommendationof the National
Economic Development Authority (NEDA) and when the nationalinterest requires; and
that in this case Congress has decided, without opposition from NEDA, to open certain
areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments.The Court also found that
RA 8762 has provided for strict safeguards on foreign participation in retail trade. (GR
No. 143855,
Espina v. Zamora
, September 21, 2010)
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice
"to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public
trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T.
Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the
House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the
first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to
this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the
filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the
House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint
was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned
House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar
provided in the Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political

crisis.

HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be
filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5)
of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed
by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with
seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the
Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be
abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine.
Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was
not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is
gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions"
and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus
beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to
be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution,
courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.

>FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against

Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this case
was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the
rules of impeachment provided for by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional, and
whether the resolution thereof is a political question h; as resulted in a political crisis.
HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representativesare
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the
Constitution.
REASONING:In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this
Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of
powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no
means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been
carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three
branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There
exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another. Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence
and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers
assigned to it bythe Constitution.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus
when a proposal reached the floor proposing that A vote of at least one-third of all the
Members of the House shall be necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings, this
was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does
not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by
the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the
Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment
complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.

The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the
merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against
the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule.
Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor
indiscriminately turnjusticiable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is
not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great
branches of the government.
TOLENTINO & MOJICA vs. COMELEC, RECTO & HONASAN
G.R. No. 148334
January 21, 2004

This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June
2001 (Resolution No. 01-005) and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001
(Resolution No. 01-006) of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May
2001 elections while Resolution No. 01-006 declared official and final the ranking of
the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005.

Facts:

Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the

Philippines, the Senate on February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on
COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with
the regular elections on May 14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were
due to be elected in that election. The resolution further provides that the Senatorial
candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired
term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June 30, 2004.

On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13
candidates as the elected Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired
term of 6 years and the 13th Senator to serve the full term of 3 years of Senator
Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th.
Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant
petition for prohibition, praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005. They
contend that COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it
failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required
under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in
their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular
elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3) it
failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under
the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4,
paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica add that because of these omissions,
COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May
2001 elections without distinction such that there were no two separate Senate
elections held simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of
term. Tolentino and Mojica sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during
the pendency of their petition. Without issuing any restraining order, the Supreme Court
required COMELEC to Comment on the petition. Honasan questioned Tolentinos and
Mojica's standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because they do
not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds; nor claim that they sustained
personal injury because of the issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and 01-006.

Issue:

WON the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified:
(1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and
(2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645.
Decision:

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

Ratio Decidendi:

(1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but
empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition
precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and
failure to do so will render the election a nullity.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give
notice of the special election is whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a
sufficient number of voters as would change the result of special election. If the lack of
official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there
was no special election to fill vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be
void.
(2) There is no basis in the petitioners claim that the manner by which the COMELEC
conducted the special Senatorial election on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the
COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass separately the
votes cast for the special election. No such requirement exists in our election laws.
What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC fix the date of
election, if necessary, and state among others, the office/s to be voted for.

Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election
on May 14, 2001 merely implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in
Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of said resolution as introduced by Senator
Francisco Tatad made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by former
Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco,
the Senate agreed to amend the resolution by providing as it now appears, that the
senatorial cabdidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the
unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.
Tolentino vs COMELEC
41 SCRA 702

Petitioner: ARTURO M. TOLENTINO

Respondents: Commission on Election, and the Chief Accountant, the Auditor and
the Disbursing Officer of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Raul S. Manglapus,
Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S. Trillana III, Victor dela Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose
Y. Feria, Leonardo Siguin Reyna, Victor F. Ortega and Juan V. Borra

Facts

The case is a petition for prohibition to restrain respondent Commission on Elections

"from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed
constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the
Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by
the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of
1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be
without the force and effect of law for being violative of the Constitution of the
Philippines. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two
resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent
assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to
the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on
March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said Convention
were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation
thereof, Republic Act 6132.

Issue

Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order the holding of a
plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment/s?

Decision

The Court holds that all amendments to be proposed must be submitted to the people in
a single "election" or plebiscite. We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose
of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not
authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the
Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void. lt says
distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called
for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution,". The same provision
also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for
doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or
amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention,
and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.
The petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention,
insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as
the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695)
are hereby declared null and void. The respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief
Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from
taking any action in compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision immediately executory.