CELEDONIO QUILBAN, ROMUALDO
DALAGAN, FORTUNATO RAMIREZ
AMADOR ALARCON and LUIS
AGAWAN, complainant,
vs. ATTY. SANTIAGO R.
ROBINOL, respondent.
A.M. No. 2180 April 10, 1989
ATTY. SANTIAGO R.
ROBINOL, complainant,
vs. ATTY. A. R. MONTEMAYOR, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Subjected to frustrations were the dreams of
thirty-two (32) squatter families to own the land
of approximately 50 square meters each on
which their respective homes were built. To
vindicate their rights they have aired their plight
before this Court. Thwarted, too, was the
benevolence shown by the original owner of the
land which parted with its property at a
giveaway price thinking that it was
accommodating the landless squatters.
The antecedent facts follow:
The Colegio de San Jose, a Jesuit corporation,
(Colegio, for short) used to own a parcel of land
at the Seminary Road, Barrio Bathala, Quezon
City. Through its administrator, Father Federico
Escaler, it sold said land to the Quezon City
Government as the site for the Quezon City
General Hospital but reserved an area of 2,743
square meters as a possible development site.
Squatters, however, settled in the area since 1965
or 1966.
Sometime in 1970, the Colegio, through Father
Escaler gave permission to Congressman Luis R.
Taruc to build on the reserved site a house for his
residence and a training center for the Christian
Social Movement. Seeing the crowded shanties of
squatters, Congressman Taruc broached to
Father Escaler the Idea of donating or selling the
land cheap to the squatters. Congressman Taruc
then advised the squatters to form an
organization and choose a leader authorized to
negotiate with Father Escaler. Following that
advice, the squatters formed the "Samahang
Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala" (Samahan, for
brevity), with Bernabe Martin as President
(Exhibit "24", Robinol), who was entrusted with
the task of negotiating on their behalf for the sale
of the land to them.
But instead of working for the welfare of the
Samahan, Martin went to one Maximo Rivera, a
realtor, with whom he connived to obtain the
sale to the exclusion of the other Samahan
members. On 28 March 1971, the land was
ultimately sold to Rivera at P 15 per square
meter or a total consideration of P 41,961.65. The
prevailing price of the land in the vicinity then
was P 100 to P 120 per square meter. It was
evident that Father Escaler had been made to
believe that Rivera represented the squatters on
the property. On the same date, 28 March 1971,
Rivera obtained TCT No. 175662 to the property
in his name alone.
In 1972, thirty-two heads of families of the
Samahan filed Civil Case No. Q-16433, Branch
IV, Quezon City, entitled "Celedonio Quilban, et
al., Plaintiffs, vs. Maximo Rivera, et al.,
Defendants." with the principal prayer that said
defendants be ordered to execute a deed of
conveyance in favor of said plaintiffs after
reimbursement by the latter of the corresponding
amount paid by Rivera to the Colegio. The Court
of First Instance of Quezon City, however,
dismissed the case.
To prosecute the appeal before the Court of
Appeals, the Samahan members hired as their
counsel Atty. Santiago R. Robinol for which the
latter was paid P 2,000.00 as attorney's fees on 8
October 1975 (Exhibit "I"). Atty. Robinol was also
to be given by the members a part of the land,
subject matter of the case, equal to the portion
that would pertain to each of them. What was
initially a verbal commitment on the land
sharing was confirmed in writing on 10 March
1979 (Exhibit "2").
On 14 November 1978, the Court of Appeals
reversed the CFI Decision by:
(1) ordering defendant Maximo Rivera and all
his co-defendants to execute a deed of
conveyance of the land in question in favor of
herein plaintiffs after the payment of the
corresponding amount paid by the defendants to
the Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and in case of
refusal or failure on their part to do so, ordering
the Clerk of Court to execute the same in favor of
plaintiffs and declaring TCT No. 175662 (Annex
E) null and void and ordering the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City to cancel said certificate
and issue a new one in lieu thereof in the name
of plaintiffs-appellants, upon presentation of the
deed of conveyance to be executed in favor of
appellants and (2) ordering appellees jointly and
severally to pay appellants the sum of P 2,000.00
as attomey's fees, plus costs." (p. 30, Report and
Recommendation)
To raise the amount of P 41,961.65 ordered paid
by the Court of Appeals, plus expenses for
ejectment of the non-plaintiffs occupying the
property, conveyance, documentation, transfer of
title etc., the five officers of the Samahan
collected, little by little, P 2,500.00 from each
head of family. The Treasurer, Luis Agawan,
issued the proper receipts prepared by Atty.
Robinol. On 18 May 1979, the sum of P 68,970.00
was turned over to Atty. Robinol by the officers;
on 31 May 1979 the amounts of P l,030.00 and P
2,500.00 respectively; and on 2 June 1979, the
sum of P 2,500.00, or a total of P 75,000.00.
After almost a year, the five officers discovered
that no payment had been made to Rivera. When
queried, Atty. Robinol replied that there was an
intervention filed in the civil case and that a Writ
of Execution had not yet been issued by the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City. However,
it turned out that the motion for intervention had
already been dismissed. After confronting Atty.
Robinol with that fact, the latter gave other
excuses, which the officers discovered to have no
basis at all.
On 6 March 1980, 21 out of 32 plaintiffs arrived
at a "first consensus" to change their counsel,
Atty. Robinol (Exhibit "3"). The officers of the
Samahan thereafter approached Atty. Anacleto
R. Montemayor, who agreed to be their counsel,
after he was shown the document of 6 March
1980 containing the consensus of the Samahan
members to change Atty. Robinol as their
lawyer. Upon Atty. Montemayor's advice, the
officers sent Atty. Robinol a letter dated 17
March 1980 informing the latter of their decision
to terminate his services and demanding the
return of the P 75,000.00 deposited with him
(Exhibit "5"). Atty. Robinol turned deaf ears to
the demand. A subsequent letter of the same
tenor, dated 31 March 1980 (Exhibit "6"), was
similarly disregarded by Atty. Robinol.
On 20 March 1980, Atty. Montemayor formally
entered his appearance in Civil Case No. Q-16433
as counsel for the plaintiffs (Exhibit "8"), vice
Atty. Robinol, on the strength of the authority
dated 18 March 1980 given him by plaintiffs in
said civil case through the five officers (Exhibit
"9"). Atty. Montemayor then filed on 20 March
1980 a Motion for Execution praying that the
defendants and/or the Clerk of Court be directed
to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the
plaintiffs (Exhibit "10"). At the hearing of the
Motion for Execution on 5 June 1980, Atty.
Robinol manifested that he had no objection to
the appearance of and his substitution by Atty.
Montemayor (Exhibits "11" & "11-A").
Because Atty. Robinol, however, still questioned
the first consensus dated 6 March 1980, another
document labelled the "second consensus"
(Exhibit "E") was signed by 21 plaintiffs during a
meeting held for the purpose on 24 November
1980 to the effect that they had decided to change
Atty. Robinol as their counsel because he had
delayed paying for their land notwithstanding
the Decision of the Court of Appeals in their
favor.
Administrative Case No. 2144
On 15 April 1980 the Samahan officers filed this
Administrative Complaint before this Court
requesting the invention of Atty. Robinol for
refusal to return the P 75,000.00 and praying that
the Court exercise its power of discipline over
members of the Bar unworthy to practice law.
The details of their Complaint were embodied in
their Joint Affidavit executed on 14 April 1980
describing what had transpired between them
and Atty. Robinol.
In his defense, Atty. Robinol maintains that he
was hired by Complainants to appeal their case
to the Court of appeals after they had lost in the
lower Court; that their agreement as to attomey's
fees was on a contingent basis if he obtains a
reversal of the lower Court Decision, they wig
give him a portion of the property subject matter
of the litigation equal to the portion that will
pertain to each of the 32 plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. Q-16433; that he did not receive P 70,000.00
from Complainants on 18 May 1979 but only P
56,470.00; that he prepared and signed the
receipt dated 18 May 1979 showing that he
received P 70,000.00 only to save complainants
from embarrassment and shame should their co-
plaintiff ask for proof that they (Complainants)
have paid their shares, which they have not; that
the correct amount in his possession is only P
62,470.00-it would really be P 75,000.00 had the
five Complainants paid their shares in the
amount of P 12,500.00 at P 2,500.00 each and one
Fortunate Ramirez paid his balance of P 30.00;
that he had the right to hold the money in his
possession as guarantee for the payment of his
attomey's fees of get a portion of the property
that win pertain to each of the plaintiffs, he
wants his portion converted to cash, and the cash
equivalent of his portion is P 50,000.00 (2,743
square meters divided by 32 plaintiffs equals 85
square meters for each plaintiff, multiplied by P
500.00 up per square meter); that considering
that P 50,000.00 is even less than one-half (1/ 2)
per cent of the total value of the property, which
is more than a million pesos, such amount is not
unreasonable; that he is ready to give back the
amount of P 12,470.00, representing the
difference between P 50,000.00 and the amount
of P 62,470.00 in his possession; that
complainants cannot make this Court a collection
agency and that while this Court has the
exclusive disciplinary power over members of
the Bar, it is equally true that the Court cannot
pass judgment on Complainants' plea that the
amount deposited by respondent be returned to
them as this prayer should be ventilated in an
ordinary action; that he does not have the
slightest intention to appropriate the money in
his possession (P 62,470.00) for himself, but he is
holding it until his attomey's fees are satisfied
there being no guarantee for its satisfaction
because of Complainants' adamant refusal to pay
him; that there was no previous notice to him of
his discharge; and that Atty. Montemayor
accepted the case without his Robinols formal
withdrawal and conformity.
Administrative Case No. 2180
Pursuing that tack on 29 July 1980, Atty. Robinol
filed a complaint for Disbarment against Atty.
Anacleto R. Montemayor for alleged gross
unethical conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in
that Atty. Montemayor readily accepted the case
without his Robinols formal withdrawal and
conformity and knowing fully well that there
was no consensus of all the plaintiffs to
discharge him as their counsel.
For his part, Atty. Montemayor denied that the
attomey's fees agreed upon by plaintiffs and
Atty. obinol were purely on a contingent basis,
the truth being that the attomey's fees were
payable on a cash basis of P 2,000.00 retainer fee,
as evidenced by the receipt signed by Atty.
Robinol (Annex "I"), plus whatever amount is
adjudicated as attomey's fees by the Court of
Appeals; that the contingent fee referred to by
Atty. Robinol was the result of his insistent
demand after the Court of Appeals Decision in
Civil Case No. Q-16433 was already final, as
shown by the date of the agreement (Annex "2");
that twenty [20] out of thirty-two [32] members
of the Samahan signed the agreement to
discharge Atty. Robinol and hire a substitute
counsel as shown by Annex "3", which is a
majority of the membership and, therefore, a
valid consensus; that he agreed to act as counsel
if only to arrest the growing belief of the
Samahan that most members of the Philippine
Bar are unprincipled; that although there was no
formal Motion for substitution, there was
substantial compliance with Sec. 26, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, as shown by the formal entry
of appearance in Civil Case No. Q-1 6433 (Annex
"8"), the written consent of the clients (Annex
"9"), notice to Atty. Robinol of his discharge and
substitution (Annexes "10' and "11"), non-
objection by Robinol of his appearance as
counsel (Annex "l 2"), and implied consent of the
Court to the substitution as shown by its Order
of 29 May 1980 (Annex "l 3"); that his
professional and personal actuations as counsel
for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433, CFI-
Quezon City, do not cause dishonor either to
himself or to the Philippine Bar; and that the
Complaint against him should be dismissed.
On 1 September 1980 and on 17 December 1980,
the Court referred Adm. Case No. 2144 and
Adm. Case No. 2180, respectively, to the Office
of the Solicitor General for investigation, report
and recommendation. On 15 December 1988, the
Solicitor General submitted his compliance and
recommended:
1. That Atty. Santiago R. Robinol be suspended
for three months for refusing to deliver the funds
of the plaintiffs in his possession, with the
warning that a more severe penalty will be
imposed for a repetition of the same or similar
act, and that he be ordered to return to the
plaintiffs, through the complainants in Adm.
Case No. 2134, the sum of P 75,000.00.
2. That the case against Atty. Anacleto R.
Montemayor, Adm. Case No. 2180, be dismissed,
since he has not committed any misconduct
imputed to him by Atty. Robinol. (pp. 59-60,
Rollo)
Except for the disciplinary sanction suggested for
Atty. Robinol, we concur with the
recommendations.
Re: Atty. Santiago R. Robinol
Atty. Robinol has, in fact, been guilty of ethical
infractions and grave misconduct that make him
unworthy to continue in the practice of the
profession. After the Court of Appeals had
rendered a Decision favorable to his clients and
he had received the latter's funds, suddenly, he
had a change of mind and decided to convert the
payment of his fees from a portion of land
equivalent to that of each of the plaintiffs to P
50,000.00, which he alleges to be the monetary
value of that area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had
no right to unilaterally appropriate his clients'
money not only because he is bound by a written
agreement but also because, under the
circumstances, it was highly unjust for him to
have done so. His clients were mere squatters
who could barely eke out an existence They had
painstakingly raised their respective quotas of P
2,500.00 per family with which to pay for the
land only to be deprived of the same by one
who, after having seen the color of money, heart
lessly took advantage of them.
Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since he
was unjustly dismissed by his clients he had the
legal right to retain the money in his possession.
Firstly, there was justifiable ground for his
discharge as counsel. His clients had lost
confidence in him for he had obviously engaged
in dilatory tactics to the detriment of their
interests, which he was duty-bound to protect.
Secondly, even if there were no valid ground, he
is bereft of any legal right to retain his clients'
funds intended for a specific purpose the
purchase of land. He stands obliged to return the
money immediately to their rightful owners.
The principle of quantum meruit applies if a
lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon
for his services in which case he would be
entitled to receive what he merits for his services,
as much as he has earned. In this case, however,
there was an express contract and a stipulated
mode of compensation. The implied assumpsit
on quantum meruit therefore, is inapplicable.
But Atty. Robinol seeks to impress upon the
Court that he had received only the sum of P
62,470.00 and not P 75,000.00 claiming that five
(5) officers of the Samahan had not yet paid their
shares to P 12,500.00.
We agree with the Solicitor General that
complainants' evidence on this score is the more
credible and that he had, in fact, received the
total sum of P 75,000.00 inclusive of the share of
P 12,500.00 of the five (5) officers of the Somalian
For, in the pleadings filed by Atty. Robinol
himself in the civil case below, namely, the
Motion for Execution on 5 June 1979; the Motion
for Postponement on 31 August 1979; and the
Motion to Set Hearing of Motion for Execution
on 10 March 1980, he made mention of seven (7)
persons, who, as of that time, had not yet
submitted their corresponding shares which list,
however, did not include any of the five (5)
officers of the Samahan.
Inevitable, therefore, is the conclusion that Atty.
Robinol has rendered himself unfit to continue in
the practice of law. He has not only violated his
oath not to delay any man for money and to
conduct himself with all good fidelity to his
clients. He has also brought the profession into
disrepute with people who had reposed in it full
faith and reliance for the fulfillment of a life-time
ambition to acquire a homelot they could call
their own.
Re: Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor
In so far as Atty. Montemayor is concerned, we
agree with the findings of the Solicitor General
that he has not exposed himself to any plausible
charge of unethical conduct in the exercise of his
profession when he agreed to serve as counsel
for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433.
Of the thirty-two (32) plaintiffs in said civil case,
twenty-one (21) had signed the first consensus of
6 March 1980 expressing their resolve to change
their lawyer. In as much as Atty. Robinol sought
to exclude seven (7) of the plaintiffs (out of 32)
for non-payment of their shares, only twenty five
(25) of them should be considered in
determining the majority. Consequently, twenty-
one (21) out of twenty-five (25) is sufficient to
make the said consensus binding. It is more than
a simple majority.
Moreover, the following developments estop
Atty. Robinol from questioning his discharge as
counsel: On 17 March 1980 he was informed in
writing by plaintiffs of the termination of his
services (Exhibit "5"). That was followed by
another letter of 31 March 1980 of the same tenor
(Exhibit "6"). In his Memorandum of 12
December 1985 and during the proceedings
before the lower Court on 5 June 1980 he had
stated that he had no objection to Atty.
Montemayor's appearance in Civil Case Q-16433.
When the latter did enter his appearance,
therefore, on 20 March 1980 it was only after
assuring himself that Atty. Robinol's services had
been formally terminated. He had in no way
encroached upon the professional employment
of a colleague.
There is no gainsaying that clients are free to
change their counsel in a pending case at any
time (Section 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and
thereafter employ another lawyer who may then
enter his appearance. In this case, the plaintiffs in
the civil suit below decided to change their
lawyer, Atty. Robinol, for loss of trust and
confidence. That act was well within their
prerogative.
In so far as the complaint for disbarment filed by
Atty. Robinol against Atty. Montemayor is
concerned, therefore, we find the same
absolutely without merit.
ACCORDINGLY, 1) In Administrative Case No.
2144, Atty. Santiago R. Robinol is hereby
DISBARRED for having violated his lawyer's
oath to delay no man for money, broken the
fiduciary relation between lawyer and client, and
proven himself unworthy to continue in the
practice of law. By reason of his unethical
actuations, he is hereby declared to have
forfeited his rights to attomey's fees and is
ordered to return the amount of P 75,000.00 to
the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433 through
the complainant in the aforementioned
Administrative Case.
2) Administrative Case No. 2180 against Atty.
Anacleto R. Montemayor for disbarment is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the
respective personal records of Attys. Santiago R.
Robinol and Anacleto R. Montemayor.
This Resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
RUBY MAE BARNACHEA, complainant,
vs. ATTY. EDWIN T.
QUIOCHO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On January 3, 2002, Ruby Mae Barnachea
filed a verified complaint for breach of lawyer-
client relations against respondent Atty. Edwin T.
Quiocho.
It appears that respondent had not been in
the private practice of the law for quite some
time. However, in September 2001, he decided to
revive his legal practice with some
associates. Complainant engaged the legal
services of respondent for the latter to cause the
transfer under her name of the title over a
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 334411 previously owned by her sister,
Lutgarda Amor D. Barnachea. The latter sold said
property to complainant under an unnotarized
deed of absolute sale. Complainant drew and
issued BPI Family Bank Check No. 0052304 in the
amount of P11,280.00 and BPI Family Bank Check
No. 0052305 in the amount of P30,000.00, both
dated September 5, 2001, or the total amount
of P41,280.00 for the expenses for said transfer
and in payment for respondents legal
services. Respondent enchased the checks.
However, despite the lapse of almost two
months, respondent failed to secure title over the
property in favor of complainant. The latter
demanded that respondent refund to her the
amount of P41,280.00 and return the documents
which she earlier entrusted to him. However,
respondent failed to comply with said
demands. On November 1, 2001, complainant
received a letter from respondent informing her
that he had failed to cause the transfer of the
property under her name and that he was
returning the documents and title she had
entrusted to him and refunding to her the amount
of P41,280.00 through his personal check No. DIL
0317787. Said check was drawn against his
account with the Bank of Commerce (Diliman
Branch) in the amount of P41,280.00 and was
postdated December 1, 2001. Respondent told
complainant that he needed more time to fund the
check. However, respondent failed to fund the
check despite the demands of complainant.
In his Answer to the complaint, respondent
denied that complainant contracted his legal
services. Although respondent admitted having
received the two checks from complainant, he
claimed that said checks were intended to cover
actual and incidental expenses for transportation,
communication, representation, necessary
services, taxes and fees for the cancellation and
transfer of TCT No. 334411 under the name of
complainant and not for legal services. He
asserted that he acted in good faith as shown by
the fact of his return of complainants documents
with an explanatory letter and his issuance of a
personal check for P41,280.00 dated December 1,
2001. He insisted that he would not compromise
for such meager amount his personal standing as
well as his membership in the legal
profession. His failure to transfer the title of the
property under the name of the complainant was
caused by his difficulty in making good the
claimed amount, compounded by his affliction
with diabetes and the consequent loss of sight of
his right eye.
Respondent further alleged that he was a
licensed real estate and insurance broker and had
been a freelance business management
consultant. At the same time he engaged in real
estate brokering, pre-need products marketing for
Prudential Life, and life insurance underwriting
for Insular Life. In 1999, he gave up the practice of
his profession as a lawyer and subsequently
managed to put up a business center with fellow
insurance underwriters for their common
insurance underwriting practice.He further
claimed that sometime in August, 2001, an
insurance client introduced complainant as an
insurance prospect to him. In the course of their
dealing, complainant intimated to respondent her
willingness to consider respondents insurance
proposal provided the latter would help her
facilitate the cancellation and eventual transfer to
her name the property covered by TCT No.
334411 in the name of complainants sister,
Lutgarda Amor D. Barnachea. Respondent
agreed to help complainant in the transfer of the
title to her name, with the condition that no
diligent study or verification of complainants
documents, nor preparation of any additional
document or any application or petition
whatsoever, will be made by respondent. He
explained to complainant that his task was merely
to go through the regular process of presenting
the available documents, paying the taxes and
fees, and following up the processing for the
cancellation and issuance of the certificate of
title. In other words, respondent offered to
complainant services which a non-lawyer familiar
with the procedure and the related offices can
perform and provide to the complainant with
respect to the transfer of the title of the property
in her name.
Respondent asserted that in the latter part of
September 2001, he discovered and became aware
for the first time that the original copy of TCT No.
334411 with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
was destroyed in a fire in Quezon City Hall
several years earlier and that complainants copy
of the title needed to be reconstituted before it can
be cancelled and transferred. At about the same
time, the working relations of respondent in the
business center with his non-lawyer associates
had become difficult and strained, impelling him
to sever his business relations with them and
cease from to going to the business center.
Consequently, telephone communications
between respondent and complainant at the
business center was cut. Communications became
much more limited when, apart from the fact that
respondent did not have a landline at his
residence, respondents mobile phone was stolen
sometime in October 2001.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
designated Atty. Dennis B. Funa as Commissioner
to conduct a formal investigation of the
complaint.Despite several settings, respondent
failed to appear and adduce evidence.
On April 26, 2002, Investigating
Commissioner Dennis B. Funa submitted his
report and recommendation stating in part that:
1. Respondent is not able to meet his financial
obligations due to financial difficulties, and that
respondent is in good faith in his failure to meet
this obligation.
2. It is recommended that respondent be
ORDERED TO REPAY HIS CLIENT within
ninety (90) days from receipt of this
Decision. The principal amount being
P41,280.00. Failure to comply with the Order
shall be considered as proof of evident bad faith,
and shall be considered in the continuing
evaluation of the case in view of the continued
failure to repay his client.
3. Respondent should also be given a WARNING
that a repetition shall be dealt with more
severely.[1]
The Investigating Commissioner gave
credence to the claim of complainant that she
engaged the legal services of respondent and paid
him for his services and that respondent failed in
his undertaking and refund the amount
of P41,280.00 to complainant despite her demands
and that respondent appeared to be evading the
complainant.
On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of
Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-550
adopting and approving the Investigating
Commissioners recommendation with the
additional sanction of reprimand for respondent:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules,
with modification. Respondent is hereby
reprimanded and ordered to return the Forty One
Thousand Two Hundred Eighty (P41,280.00) Pesos
to complainant within ninety (90) days from receipt
of notice.[2]
While the Court agrees with the Board of
Governors that respondent should be meted a
disciplinary sanction, it finds that the penalty of
reprimand recommended by the Board of
Governors is not commensurate to the gravity of
the wrong committed by respondent. As found by
the Investigating Commissioner, the complainant
engaged the legal services of the respondent. As
admitted in his letter to the complainant,
respondent had just resumed his private practice
of law two months before complainant contracted
his services for the notarization of the Deed of
Absolute Sale, the registration thereof with the
Register of Deeds and the transfer of the title over
the property to the complainant:
NOVEMBER 1, 2002
DEAR RUBY,
I AM SORRY I AM RETURNING YOUR
DOCUMENTS WITHOUT CHANGES.
I HAD A SERIES OF MONEY PROBLEMS
RIGHT AFTER YOU GAVE ME THE TWO
CHECKS AND COMING WITH THE
AMOUNTS WITH PERSONAL FUNDS.
I WAS REVIVING MY LEGAL PRACTICE
ONLY FOR TWO MONTHS WHICH WE MET
AND HAD JUST SET UP THE OFFICE WITH
TWO ASSOCIATES WHICH A FEW WEEKS
LATER WE HAD DISAGREEMENTS AND
DECIDED TO DISBAND. I WILL HAVE TO
REFURBISH MY OFFICE. I AM ISSUING MY
PERSONAL CHECK TO GUARANTEE THE
AMOUNT I TOOK. I NEED A LITTLE TIME TO
COVER THE AMOUNT. THANKS FOR YOUR
UNDERSTANDING.
(
Sgd.) EDWIN.[3]
Respondents claim that complainant did not
retain his legal services flies in the face of his letter
to complainant. Even if it were true that no
attorney-client relationship existed between
them, case law has it that an attorney may be
removed or otherwise disciplined not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in the profession but
also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, making him unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer upon him.[4]
In this case, respondent failed to comply
with his undertaking for almost two months.
Worse, despite demands of complainant, he failed
to refund the amount of P41,280.00 and to return
to complainant the deed of absolute sale and title
over the property. Respondents claim that
complainant could not contact him because he did
not have any landline at his residence and that his
mobile phone was stolen in October 2001, is hard
to believe. He failed to adduce a morsel of
evidence to prove that his telephone at the
business center was cut or that his mobile phone
had been stolen. Even then, respondent could
have easily contacted the complainant at her
residence or could have written her a letter
informing her that the original copy of TCT No.
324411 in the custody of the Register of Deeds was
burned when the Quezon City Hall was gutted by
fire and that there was a need for the
reconstitution of said title. Neither did
respondent adduce evidence that he was a life
insurance underwriter for Insular Life or that he
had been sick with diabetes and had lost his sight
in his right eye.Respondent simply refused to
adduce evidence to prove his allegations in his
Answer to the complaint.
The Court is led to believe that respondents
failure to cause the transfer of the title of the
property under the name of complainant was due
to a financial problem that beset him shortly after
he received the checks from complainant. It can
easily be inferred from respondents letter that he
used complainants money to alleviate if not solve
his financial woes. What compounded
respondents unethical conduct was his drawing
of a personal check and delivering the same to
complainant without sufficient funds in his bank
account to cover the check. Even as he promised
to fund his account with the drawee bank,
respondent failed to do so when the check became
due.
A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or
property of his client that may come to his
possession. He is a trustee to said funds and
property.[5]He is to keep the funds of his client
separate and apart from his own and those of
others kept by him. Money entrusted to a lawyer
for a specific purpose such as for the registration
of a deed with the Register of Deeds and for
expenses and fees for the transfer of title over real
property under the name of his client if not
utilized, must be returned immediately to his
client upon demand therefor. The lawyers failure
to return the money of his client upon demand
gave rise to a presumption that he has
misappropriated said money in violation of the
trust reposed on him.[6] The conversion by a
lawyer funds entrusted to him by his client is a
gross violation of professional ethics and a
betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession.[7]
In this case, respondent intransigeantly
refused to return to the complainant the amount
of P41,280.00 which he received for the expenses
for the transfer to her of the title of the property
and for his professional fees. His dishonest
conduct was compounded by his interjection of
flimsy excuses for his obstinate refusal to refund
the amount to complainant.
The relation of attorney and client is highly
fiduciary in nature and is of a very delicate,
exacting and confidential character.[8] A lawyer is
duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with
his clients.[9] The profession, therefore, demands
of an attorney an absolute abdication of every
personal advantage conflicting in any way,
directly or indirectly, with the interest of his
client. In this case, respondent miserably failed to
measure up to the exacting standard expected of
him.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, Respondent Atty. Edwin T.
Quiocho is found guilty of violation of Canons 15
and 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for One (1) Year with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is
DIRECTED to restitute to the complainant the full
amount of P41,280.00 within ten (10) days from
notice hereof. Respondent is further DIRECTED
to submit to the Court proof of payment of said
amount within ten (10) days from said
payment. If Respondent fails to restitute the said
amount within the aforesaid period, he shall be
meted an additional suspension of three (3)
months for every month or fraction thereof of
delay until he shall have paid the said amount in
full. In case a subsidiary penalty of suspension for
his failure to restitute the said amount shall be
necessary, respondent shall serve successively the
penalty of his one year suspension and the
subsidiary penalty. This is without prejudice to
the right of the complainant to institute the
appropriate action for the collection of said
amount.
SO ORDERED.
IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE
OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF
GUAM OF ATTY. LEON G. MAQUERA
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
May a member of the Philippine Bar who
was disbarred or suspended from the practice of
law in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also
been admitted as an attorney be meted the same
sanction as a member of the Philippine Bar for the
same infraction committed in the foreign
jurisdiction? There is a Rule of Court provision
covering this cases central issue. Up to this
juncture, its reach and breadth have not
undergone the test of an unsettled case.
 In a Letter dated August 20, 1996,[1] the
District Court of Guam informed this Court of the
suspension of Atty. Leon G. Maquera (Maquera)
from the practice of law in Guam for two (2) years
pursuant to the Decision rendered by the Superior
Court of Guam on May 7, 1996 in Special
Proceedings Case No. SP0075-94,[2] a disciplinary
case filed by the Guam Bar Ethics Committee
against Maquera.
The Court referred the matter of Maqueras
suspension in Guam to the Bar Confidant for
comment in its Resolution dated November 19,
1996.[3]Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Philippine Bar in a foreign
jurisdiction, where he has also been admitted as
an attorney, is also a ground for his disbarment or
suspension in this realm, provided the foreign
courts action is by reason of an act or omission
constituting deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or a
violation of the lawyers oath.
In a Memorandum dated February 20, 1997,
then Bar Confidant Atty. Erlinda C. Verzosa
recommended that the Court obtain copies of the
record of Maqueras case since the documents
transmitted by the Guam District Court do not
contain the factual and legal bases for Maqueras
suspension and are thus insufficient to enable her
to determine whether Maqueras acts or omissions
which resulted in his suspension in Guam are
likewise violative of his oath as a member of the
Philippine Bar.[4]
Pursuant to this Courts directive in
its Resolution dated March 18, 1997,[5] the Bar
Confidant sent a letter dated November 13, 1997
to the District Court of Guam requesting for
certified copies of the record of the disciplinary
case against Maquera and of the rules violated by
him.[6]
The Court received certified copies of the
record of Maqueras case from the District Court
of Guam on December 8, 1997.[7]
Thereafter, Maqueras case was referred by
the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation report and
recommendation within sixty (60) days from the
IBPs receipt of the case records.[8]
The IBP sent Maquera a Notice of
Hearing requiring him to appear before the IBPs
Commission on Bar Discipline on July 28,
1998.[9] However, the notice was returned
unserved because Maquera had already moved
from his last known address in Agana, Guam and
did not leave any forwarding address.[10]
On October 9, 2003, the IBP submitted to the
Court its Report and Recommendation and
its Resolution No. XVI-2003-110, indefinitely
suspending Maquera from the practice of law
within the Philippines until and unless he updates
and pays his IBP membership dues in full.[11]
The IBP found that Maquera was admitted to
the Philippine Bar on February 28, 1958. On
October 18, 1974, he was admitted to the practice
of law in the territory of Guam. He was
suspended from the practice of law in Guam for
misconduct, as he acquired his clients property as
payment for his legal services, then sold it and as
a consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee
for handling his clients case.[12]
In its Decision, the Superior Court of Guam
stated that on August 6, 1987, Edward Benavente,
the creditor of a certain Castro, obtained a
judgment against Castro in a civil case. Maquera
served as Castros counsel in said case. Castros
property subject of the case, a parcel of land, was
to be sold at a public auction in satisfaction of his
obligation to Benavente. Castro, however,
retained the right of redemption over the property
for one year. The right of redemption could be
exercised by paying the amount of the judgment
debt within the aforesaid period.[13]
At the auction sale, Benavente purchased
Castros property for Five Hundred U.S. Dollars
(US$500.00), the amount which Castro was
adjudged to pay him.[14]
On December 21, 1987, Castro, in
consideration of Maqueras legal services in the
civil case involving Benavente, entered into an
oral agreement with Maquera and assigned his
right of redemption in favor of the latter.[15]
On January 8, 1988, Maquera exercised
Castros right of redemption by paying Benavente
US$525.00 in satisfaction of the judgment
debt.Thereafter, Maquera had the title to the
property transferred in his name.[16]
On December 31, 1988, Maquera sold the
property to C.S. Chang and C.C. Chang for Three
Hundred Twenty Thousand U.S. Dollars
(US$320,000.00).[17]
On January 15, 1994, the Guam Bar Ethics
Committee (Committee) conducted hearings
regarding Maqueras alleged misconduct.[18]
 Subsequently, the Committee filed a Petition
in the Superior Court of Guam praying that
Maquera be sanctioned for violations of Rules
1.5[19] and 1.8(a)[20] of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules) in force in
Guam. In its Petition, the Committee claimed that
Maquera obtained an unreasonably high fee for
his services. The Committee further alleged that
Maquera himself admitted his failure to comply
with the requirement in Rule 1.8 (a) of the Model
Rules that a lawyer shall not enter into a business
transaction with a client or knowingly acquire a
pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless the
transaction and the terms governing the lawyers
acquisition of such interest are fair and reasonable
to the client, and are fully disclosed to, and
understood by the client and reduced in
writing.[21]
The Committee recommended that Maquera
be: (1) suspended from the practice of law in
Guam for a period of two [2] years, however, with
all but thirty (30) days of the period of suspension
deferred; (2) ordered to return to Castro the
difference between the sale price of the property
to the Changs and the amount due him for legal
services rendered to Castro; (3) required to pay
the costs of the disciplinary proceedings; and (4)
publicly reprimanded. It also recommended that
other jurisdictions be informed that Maquera has
been subject to disciplinary action by the Superior
Court of Guam.[22]
Maquera did not deny that Castro executed
a quitclaim deed to the property in his favor as
compensation for past legal services and that the
transaction, except for the deed itself, was oral
and was not made pursuant to a prior written
agreement. However, he contended that the
transaction was made three days following the
alleged termination of the attorney-client
relationship between them, and that the property
did not constitute an exorbitant fee for his legal
services to Castro.[23]
On May 7, 1996, the Superior Court of Guam
rendered its Decision[24]suspending Maquera from
the practice of law in Guam for a period of two (2)
years and ordering him to take the Multi-State
Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE)
within that period. The court found that the
attorney-client relationship between Maquera
and Castro was not yet completely terminated
when they entered into the oral agreement to
transfer Castros right of redemption to Maquera
on December 21, 1987. It also held that Maquera
profited too much from the eventual transfer of
Castros property to him since he was able to sell
the same to the Changs with more than
US$200,000.00 in profit, whereas his legal fees for
services rendered to Castro amounted only to
US$45,000.00. The court also ordered him to take
the MPRE upon his admission during the
hearings of his case that he was aware of the
requirements of the Model Rules regarding
business transactions between an attorney and his
client in a very general sort of way.[25]
On the basis of the Decision of the Superior
Court of Guam, the IBP concluded that although
the said court found Maquera liable for
misconduct, there is no evidence to establish that
[Maquera] committed a breach of ethics in the
Philippines.[26] However, the IBP still resolved to
suspend him indefinitely for his failure to pay his
annual dues as a member of the IBP since 1977,
which failure is, in turn, a ground for removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll
of Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the
Revised Rules of Court.[27]
The power of the Court to disbar or suspend
a lawyer for acts or omissions committed in a
foreign jurisdiction is found in Section 27, Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by
Supreme Court Resolution dated February 13,
1992, which states:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor.A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so.The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of
the Philippine Bar by a competent court or
other disciplinatory agency in a foreign
jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as
an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or
suspension if the basis of such action includes
any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the
foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be
prima facie evidence of the ground for
disbarment or suspension (Emphasis supplied).
The Court must therefore determine whether
Maqueras acts, namely: acquiring by assignment
Castros right of redemption over the property
subject of the civil case where Maquera appeared
as counsel for him; exercising the right of
redemption; and, subsequently selling the
property for a huge profit, violate Philippine law
or the standards of ethical behavior for members
of the Philippine Bar and thus constitute grounds
for his suspension or disbarment in this
jurisdiction.
The Superior Court of Guam found that
Maquera acquired his clients property by
exercising the right of redemption previously
assigned to him by the client in payment of his
legal services. Such transaction falls squarely
under Article 1492 in relation to Article 1491,
paragraph 5 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Paragraph 5 of Article 1491[28] prohibits the
lawyers acquisition by assignment of the clients
property which is the subject of the litigation
handled by the lawyer. Under Article 1492, [29] the
prohibition extends to sales in legal redemption.
The prohibition ordained in paragraph 5 of
Article 1491 and Article 1492 is founded on public
policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney
may easily take advantage of the credulity and
ignorance of his client[30] and unduly enrich
himself at the expense of his client.
The case of In re: Ruste[31] illustrates the
significance of the aforementioned prohibition. In
that case, the attorney acquired his clients
property subject of a case where he was acting as
counsel pursuant to a deed of sale executed by his
clients in his favor. He contended that the sale
was made at the instance of his clients because
they had no money to pay him for his
services. The Court ruled that the lawyers
acquisition of the property of his clients under the
circumstances obtaining therein rendered him
liable for malpractice. The Court held:
Whether the deed of sale in question was
executed at the instance of the spouses driven by
financial necessity, as contended by the
respondent, or at the latters behest, as contended
by the complainant, is of no moment. In either
case an attorney occupies a vantage position to
press upon or dictate his terms to a harassed
client, in breach of the rule so amply protective
of the confidential relations, which must
necessarily exist between attorney and client,
and of the rights of both.[32]
The Superior Court of Guam also hinted
that Maqueras acquisition of Castros right of
redemption, his subsequent exercise of said right,
and his act of selling the redeemed property for
huge profits were tainted with deceit and bad
faith when it concluded that Maquera charged
Castro an exorbitant fee for his legal services. The
court held that since the assignment of the right of
redemption to Maquera was in payment for his
legal services, and since the property redeemed
by him had a market value of US$248,220.00 as of
December 21, 1987 (the date when the right of
redemption was assigned to him), he is liable for
misconduct for accepting payment for his legal
services way beyond his actual fees which
amounted only to US$45,000.00.
Maqueras acts in Guam which resulted in his
two (2)-year suspension from the practice of law
in that jurisdiction are also valid grounds for his
suspension from the practice of law in the
Philippines. Such acts are violative of a lawyers
sworn duty to act with fidelity toward his
clients. They are also violative of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17
which states that [a] lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and shall be mindful the trust
and confidence reposed in him; and Rule 1.01
which prohibits lawyers from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. The requirement of good moral
character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a
continuing requirement to maintain ones goods
standing in the legal profession.[33]
It bears stressing that the Guam Superior
Courts judgment ordering Maqueras suspension
from the practice of law in Guam does not
automatically result in his suspension or
disbarment in the Philippines.Under Section
27,[34] Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
acts which led to his suspension in Guam are mere
grounds for disbarment or suspension in this
jurisdiction, at that only if the basis of the foreign
courts action includes any of the grounds for
disbarment or suspension in this
jurisdiction.[35] Likewise, the judgment of the
Superior Court of Guam only constitutes prima
facie evidence of Maqueras unethical acts as a
lawyer.[36]More fundamentally, due process
demands that he be given the opportunity to
defend himself and to present testimonial and
documentary evidence on the matter in an
investigation to be conducted in accordance with
Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Said
rule mandates that a respondent lawyer must in
all cases be notified of the charges against him. It
is only after reasonable notice and failure on the
part of the respondent lawyer to appear during
the scheduled investigation that an investigation
may be conducted ex parte.[37]
The Court notes that Maquera has not yet
been able to adduce evidence on his behalf
regarding the charges of unethical behavior in
Guam against him, as it is not certain that he did
receive the Notice of Hearing earlier sent by the
IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline. Thus, there is
a need to ascertain Maqueras current and correct
address in Guam in order that another notice, this
time specifically informing him of the charges
against him and requiring him to explain why he
should not be suspended or disbarred on those
grounds (through this Resolution), may be sent to
him.
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the IBP
that Maquera should be suspended from the
practice of law for non-payment of his IBP
membership dues from 1977 up to the
present.[38] Under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the
Revised Rules of Court, non-payment of
membership dues for six (6) months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the IBP, and default
in such payment for one year shall be ground for
removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys.[39]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Leon G. Maquera is
required to SHOW CAUSE, within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of this Resolution, why he
should not be suspended or disbarred for his acts
which gave rise to the disciplinary proceedings
against him in the Superior Court of Guam and
his subsequent suspension in said jurisdiction.
The Bar Confidant is directed to locate the
current and correct address of Atty. Maquera in
Guam and to serve upon him a copy of
this Resolution.
In the meantime, Atty. Maquera is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1)
YEAR or until he shall have paid his membership
dues, whichever comes later.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to
Atty. Maqueras personal record in the Office of
the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all
chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
GEORGE C. SOLATAN, A.C. No. 6504
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, J.,
Chairman,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-
NAZARIO, JJ.
ATTYS. OSCAR A. INOCENTES Promulgated:
and JOSE C. CAMANO,
Respondents. August 9, 2005
x-------------------------------------------------------------------
DECISION
The present case focuses on a critical
aspect of the lawyer-client relationshipthe duty of
loyalty. The fidelity lawyers owe their clients is
traditionally characterized as undivided. This
means that lawyers must represent their clients
and serve their needs without interference or
impairment from any conflicting interest.
This administrative case traces its roots
from the manner by which Attys. Jose C. Camano
and Oscar A. Inocentes responded to the efforts of
complainant, George C. Solatan, to lease a certain
Quezon City apartment belonging to the
attorneys clients. On the basis of acts branded by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) as
bordering on technical extortion, accepting funds
and giving unsolicited advice to an adverse party,
and casting doubts as to the procedure of levy, the
IBP resolved[1] to recommend the suspension of
Atty. Camano from the practice of law for one (1)
year. It likewise recommended the reprimand of
Atty. Inocentes, whom it held liable for the
aforementioned acts of his associate, under the
principle of command responsibility.
Only Atty. Inocentes has elected to
contest the resolution of the IBP, as he questions
the propriety of his being held administratively
liable for acts done by Atty. Camano.[2] However,
the recommendation to suspend Atty. Camano
shall also be passed upon by virtue of Section 12,
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.[3]
 Attys. Inocentes and Camano were both
engaged in the practice of law under the firm
name of Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office.
Atty. Inocentes held office in his home located at
No. 19 Marunong St., Central District, Quezon
City, while Atty. Camano was stationed at an
extension office of the firm located in 3 rd/F, 956
Aurora Blvd., Quirino Dist., Quezon City.
The Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law
Office was retained by spouses Andres and
Ludivina Genito (spouses Genito), owners of an
apartment complex (the Genito Apartments)
located at 259 Tandang Sora cor. Visayas Avenue,
Quezon City, when the Genito Apartments were
placed under sequestration by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) on 9
July 1986.[4] The law office represented the
spouses Genito before the PCGG and the
Sandiganbayan, and subsequently, with authority
from the PCGG.[5] in ejectment cases against non-
paying tenants occupying the Genito
Apartments.[6]
Complainants sister, Gliceria Solatan,
was a tenant in Door 10, Phase B of the Genito
Apartments. It appears from the records that
Gliceria Solatan left for the United States in 1986,
and since then, the apartment was either
intermittently used by members of her family or
placed under the charge of caretakers.[7] In
August 1987, a complaint for ejectment for non-
payment of rentals was filed against Gliceria
Solatan.[8] On 3 March 1988, in a judgment by
default, a Decision[9] was rendered ordering
Gliceria Solatan to vacate the premises of the
apartment, pay the spouses Genito the amount of
Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P30,600.00)
as unpaid rentals from February 1986 to July 1987
with interest at 24% per annum from 20 August
1987 until the premises are vacated, Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorneys fees,
and costs of the suit.[10]
Complainant was occupying the subject
apartment when he learned of the judgment
rendered against his sister. On 10 May 1988, prior
to the implementation of a writ to execute the
judgment, complainant and his mother, Elvira
Solatan, approached Atty. Inocentes at his home
office. Complainant informed Atty. Inocentes of
his desire to arrange the execution of a lease
contract by virtue of which complainant would be
the new lessee of the apartment and thus make
possible his continued stay therein. Atty.
Inocentes referred complainant and his mother to
his associate, Atty. Camano, the attorney in
charge of the ejectment cases against tenants of
the Genito apartments. After the exchange,
complainant went to Atty. Camano at the satellite
office of Atty. Inocentess firm. From here on out,
events quickly turned sour. Different versions of
subsequent events were presented. The facts
reproduced hereunder are by and large culled
from the findings of the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, Siegfred B. Mison.
During the meeting with Atty. Camano, a
verbal agreement was made in which
complainant and his mother agreed to pay the
entire judgment debt of Gliceria Solatan,
including fifty percent of the awarded attorneys
fees and One Thousand Six Hundred Pesos
(P1,600.00) as costs of suit provided that Atty.
Camano would allow complainants continued
stay at Door 10, Phase B of the Genito Apartments.
As partial compliance with the agreement,
complainant issued in the name Atty. Camano a
check for Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
representing half of the P10,000.00 attorneys fees
adjudged against complainants sister.
Complainant and his mother failed to
make any other payment. Thus, the sheriff in
coordination with Atty. Camano and some
policemen, enforced the writ of execution on
22 June 1988 and levied the properties found in
the subject apartment. An attempt at
renegotiation took place at the insistence of
complainant, resulting in Atty. Camanos
acquiescence to release the levied properties and
allowing complainant to remain at the apartment,
subject to the latters payment of costs incurred in
enforcing the writ of execution and issuance of
postdated checks representing installment rental
payments. Complainant, thus, issued four (4)
checks drawn on Far East Bank and Trust
Company dated the fifteenth (15th) of July,
August, September, and October 1988 each in the
amount of Three Thousand Four Hundred Pesos
(P3,400.00).[11] Half of the amount represented
complainants monthly rental, while the other half,
a monthly installment for the payment of Gliceria
Solatans judgment debt.
On 28 June 1988, acting on the advice of
Atty. Camano, complainant presented an
Affidavit of Ownership to the sheriff who then
released the levied items to complainant.
However, a Northern Hill 3-burner gas stove was
not retuned to complainant. The stove was in fact
kept by Atty. Camano in the unit of the Genito
Apartments wherein he temporarily
stayed[12] and, thereafter, turned over the same to
a certain Recto Esberto, caretaker of the Genito
Apartments.[13]
On 1 August 1988, complainant filed the
instant administrative case for disbarment against
Atty. Inocentes and Atty. Camano.[14] After
formal investigation, and despite conflicting
testimonies on the tenor and content of
agreements and conversations, several disturbing
facts were revealed to have been
uncontrovertedAtty. Camanos acceptance from
complainant of attorneys fees and the costs of
implementing the writ of execution, possession of
complainants levied Northern Hill oven, and
advice to complainant on how to recover the
latters levied items. Thus, IBP Investigating
Commissioner Siegfred B. Mison, made the
following recommendations, viz:
Based on the facts
revealed in their respective
Memoranda, the penalty of six (6)
months suspension is therefore
recommended to be imposed on
Respondent Camano for
committing the following acts
that adversely reflects (sic) on his
moral fitness to continue to
practice law[:]
1. He received money (P5,000
then P1,000) from the adverse
party purportedly for attorneys
fees and for reimbursement of
sheriffs expenses. Such act
of accepting funds from the
adverse party in the process of
implementing a writ, borders on
technical extortion particularly
in light of the factual
circumstances as discussed.
2. He gave unsolicited advice to
the adverse party in suggesting
the filing of an Affidavit of
Ownership over the levied
properties, a suggestion
evidently in conflict with [the
interest of] his own client,
supposedly, the Genitos.
3. He failed to turn over the gas
stove to either party thereby
casting doubt as to the
procedure of the levy.
Based on the facts revealed, the penalty of
Reprimand is therefore recommended to
be imposed on Respondent Inocentes for
committing the following acts that
adversely reflects (sic) in his fitness to
continue to practice law[:]
1. He allowed Camano to
perform all the aforementioned
acts, either by negligence or
inadvertence which are inimical
to the legal profession. He cannot
claim ignorance or feign
innocence in this particular
transaction considering that the
Complainants themselves went
to his office on different
occasions regarding this
transaction. Ultimately, he
exercised command
responsibility over the case and
had supervisory control over
Respondent Camano inasmuch
as he received periodic reports
either by phone or in person
from the latter.
2. The letter disclaimer executed
by Mr. Genito filed by
Respondent Inocentes does not
mitigate any liability whatsoever
since the wrongdoing done
against the profession cannot be
undone by a mere letter from a
third party.[15] (Emphasis
supplied.)
The IBP Board of Governors approved
the aforequoted recommendation, with the
modification of an increase in Atty. Camanos
period of suspension from six (6) months to one
(1) year, in a resolution stating, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE,
as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the of the
Investigating Commissionerfinding the
recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, with modification, and for
accepting funds from adverse party in the
process of implementing a writ borders
on technical extortion, for giving
unsolicited advice to the adverse party a
suggestion evidently in conflict with [the
interest of] his own client and for casting
doubts to the procedure of the levy, Atty.
Jose C. Camano is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) year,
likewise, Atty. Oscar Inocentes is hereby
REPRIMANDED for he exercised
command responsibility over the case
inasmuch as he received periodic reports
either by phone or in person.[16]
The IBP held that Atty. Camanos act of
giving unsolicited advice to complainant is a
culpable act because the advice conflicted with
the interest of his clients, the spouses Genito. The
rule on conflicting interests, established in Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
deals with conflicts in the interests of an attorneys
actual clients among themselves, of existing and
prospective clients, and of the attorney and his
clients. It states that a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.
The relation of attorney and client begins
from the time an attorney is retained.[17] An
attorney has no power to act as counsel or legal
representative for a person without being
retained.[18] To establish the professional relation,
it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an
attorney are sought and received in any manner
pertinent to his profession.[19] At the time the
questioned statement was made, Atty. Camano
had called the police to restrain complainant from
surreptitiously pulling out the levied properties
from the apartment complex by virtue of which
the latter was brought to the police station for
questioning. The statement was made in response
to complainants insistence at the police station
that the levied properties were owned by him and
not by the judgment debtor.[20] No employment
relation was offered or accepted in the instant
case.
More fitting, albeit, to the mind of this
Court, inapplicable to the case, is Canon 15 of the
same Code which encompasses the
aforementioned rule. In general terms, Canon 15
requires lawyers to observe loyalty in all
dealings and transactions with their
clients. Unquestionably, an attorney giving
[21]
legal advice to a party with an interest conflicting
with that of his client resulting in detriment to the
latter may be held guilty of disloyalty. However,
far be it that every utterance of an attorney which
may have afforded an individual some relief
adverse to the formers client may be labeled as a
culpable act of disloyalty. As in every case, the
acts alleged to be culpable must be assessed in
light of the surrounding circumstances.
While the levy was made on chattel found
in the apartment of the judgment debtor, Gliceria
Solatan, the complainant was the true owner of
the properties. Consequently, the latter had a
right to recover the same. In fact, considering the
circumstances, the questioned statement is in
consonance with complainants foremost duty to
uphold the law as an officer of the court. The
statement of Atty. Camano in such a context
should not be construed by this Court as giving
advice in conflict against the interest of the
spouses Genito as in fact the latter have no interest
over the incorrectly levied properties.
We, thus, note that the act of informing
complainant that the levied properties would be
returned to him upon showing proof of his
ownership thereof may hint at infidelity to the
interest of the spouses Genito, but, in this
circumstance, lacks the essence of double dealing
and betrayal of the latters confidence so as to
deserve outright categorization as infidelity or
disloyalty to his clients cause. Nonetheless, after
having noted the foregoing, we remain convinced
with the propriety of meting the one (1) year
suspension from the practice of law on Atty.
Camano, as recommended by the IBP, based on
his other culpable acts which tend to degrade the
profession and foment distrust in the integrity of
court processes.
On the other hand, Atty. Inocentes seeks
to distance himself from the events that
transpired and the reprimand resulting therefrom
by asserting that he was incorrectly punished for
Atty. Camanos acts when his mere participation
in the fiasco was to refer complainant and his
mother to Atty. Camano.
However, it is precisely because of such
participation, consisting as it did of referring the
complainant to his associate lawyer, that Atty.
Inocentes may be held administratively liable by
virtue of his associates unethical acts. His failure
to exercise certain responsibilities over matters
under the charge of his law firm is a blameworthy
shortcoming. The term command responsibility,
as Atty. Inocentes suggests, has special meaning
within the circle of men in uniform in the military;
however, the principle does not abide solely
therein. It controls the very circumstance in which
Atty. Inocentes found himself.
We are not unaware of the custom of
practitioners in a law firm of assigning cases and
even entire client accounts to associates or other
partners with limited supervision, if at all. This is
especially true in the case of Attys. Inocentes and
Camano who, from the records, both appear to be
seasoned enough to be left alone in their work
without requiring close supervision over each
others conduct and work output. However, let it
not be said that law firm practitioners are given a
free hand to assign cases to seasoned attorneys
and thereafter conveniently forget about the case.
To do so would be a disservice to the profession,
the integrity and advancement of which this
Court must jealously protect.
That the firm name under which the two
attorneys labored was that of Oscar Inocentes and
Associates Law Office does not automatically make
Atty. Inocentes the default lawyer acting in a
supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano. It did,
however, behoove Atty. Inocentes to exert
ordinary diligence to find out what was going on
in his law firm. It placed in Atty. Inocentes the
active responsibility to inquire further into the
circumstances affecting the levy of complainants
properties, irrespective of whether the same were
in fact events which could possibly lead to
administrative liability. Moreover, as name
practitioner of the law office, Atty. Inocentes is
tasked with the responsibility to make reasonable
efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm
should act in conformity to the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[22] It is not without
reason or consequence that Atty. Inocentess name
is that which was used as the official designation
of their law office.
With regard to the actual existence of
Atty. Inocentess supervisory capacity over Atty.
Camanos activities, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner based the same on his finding that
Atty. Inocentes received periodic reports from
Atty. Camano on the latters dealings with
complainant. This finding is the linchpin of Atty.
Inocentess supervisory capacity over Atty.
Camano and liability by virtue thereof.
Law practitioners are acutely aware of the
responsibilities that are naturally taken on by
partners and supervisory lawyers over the
lawyers and non-lawyers of the law office. We
have held that lawyers are administratively liable
for the conduct of their employees in failing to
timely file pleadings.[23] In Rheem of the Philippines,
Inc., et al. v. Zoilo R. Ferrer, et al.,[24] partners in a
law office were admonished for the
contemptuous language in a pleading submitted
to court despite, and even due to, the fact that the
pleading was not passed upon by any of the
partners of the office. We held therein that
partners are duty bound to provide for efficacious
control of court pleadings and other court papers
that carry their names or the name of the law
firm.[25]
We now hold further that partners and
practitioners who hold supervisory capacities are
legally responsible to exert ordinary diligence in
apprising themselves of the comings and goings
of the cases handled by the persons over which
they are exercising supervisory authority and in
exerting necessary efforts to foreclose the
occurrence of violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility by persons under
their charge. Nonetheless, the liability of the
supervising lawyer in this regard is by no means
equivalent to that of the recalcitrant lawyer. The
actual degree of control and supervision exercised
by said supervising lawyer varies, inter alia,
according to office practice, or the length of
experience and competence of the lawyer
supervised. Such factors can be taken into account
in ascertaining the proper penalty. Certainly, a
lawyer charged with the supervision of a
fledgling attorney prone to rookie mistakes
should bear greater responsibility for the culpable
acts of the underling than one satisfied enough
with the work and professional ethic of the
associate so as to leave the latter mostly to his/her
own devises.
While Atty. Camanos irregular acts
perhaps evince a need for greater supervision of
his legal practice, there is no question that it has
been Atty. Inocentes practice to allow wide
discretion for Atty. Camano to practice on his
own. It does constitute indifference and neglect
for Atty. Inocentes to fail to accord even a token
attention to Atty. Camanos conduct which could
have brought the then impending problem to
light. But such is not equivalent to the proximate
responsibility for Atty. Camanos acts. Moreover,
it appears from the records that Atty. Inocentes is
a former judge and a lawyer who, as of yet, is in
good standing and it is the first time in which
Atty. Inocentes has been made to answer
vicariously for the misconduct of a person under
his charge. An admonition is appropriate under
the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED,
the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolution
dated 16 April 2004 is AFFIRMED in respect of the
sanction meted out on Atty. Camano. Atty.
Inocentes is hereby ADMONISHED to monitor
more closely the activities of his associates to
make sure that the same are in consonance with
the Code of Professional Responsibility with the
WARNING that repetition of the same or similar
omission will be dealt with more severely.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
FLORENCIA M. SOMOSOT, Complainant,
vs. ATTY. ELIAS A.
PONTEVEDRA, Respondent.
On July 28, 1994, complainant Florencia M.
Somosot (now deceased) filed a verified
complaint1 against respondent Atty. Elias A.
Pontevedra for neglect of duty and for
professional misconduct for unlawfully keeping
money belonging to her.
It appears that complainant was one of the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. X-98, for
reconveyance and recovery of possession,
pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Occidental, Branch 59, San Carlos City.
Respondent was complainants counsel of
record.
On January 15, 1991, the trial court ordered the
parties to submit their respective memoranda
since the case that had been pending for already
twenty-three years.2 Although the trial court
apprised the parties of the importance of their
memoranda to the resolution of the complex
case, both of the parties counsels did not comply
with the order. Thus, on November 12, 1991, the
trial court reiterated the order, giving the parties
a fresh period of 15 days within which to
comply.3
Complainant repeatedly reminded respondent
about the deadline, but respondent still failed to
file a memorandum. Instead, respondent
allegedly entered into an oral agreement with the
opposing counsel that they would both forego
with the filing of the memorandum.4
After almost two years, complainants daughter,
Wilma S. Pones, sent respondent a money order
for P1,000 as payment for the preparation of the
memorandum.5 Since the period for filing had
already lapsed, respondent took no action on
complainants request. Neither did he present
the money order to the post office for
payment.6Complainant later learned that the case
had been submitted for decision without any
memoranda. She asked for a certification to this
effect from the trial court, then sent a letter to
respondent through Wilma Pones asking
respondent to return the money and explain the
certification.7 Respondent ignored her request.
Thus, complainant filed the instant case.
On August 22, 1994, we required respondent to
file his comment. Respondent manifested that he
had earlier filed his comment and submitted
additional copies of said comment.8
On November 28, 1994, we noted respondents
comment and required complainant to submit a
reply. Upon the filing of complainants reply,
respondent filed a rejoinder.9
Respondent, in the main, argued that his failure
to prepare the memorandum was justified. He
explained that complainants family lawyer,
Atty. Raymundo Ponteras, handled the
prosecution of the case and the presentation of
witnesses. Unfortunately, Atty. Ponteras died
after the presentation of the last defense witness
and his notes were lost. Complainant could not
produce copies of the transcripts of stenographic
notes while respondents case folder were also
lost by Atty. Ponteras who borrowed but failed
to return it. Consequently, with nothing to aid
him in the preparation of the memorandum,
respondent was allegedly left with no recourse
but simply to enter into an agreement with the
opposing counsel to submit the case without
memorandum.
On March 1, 1995, the Court referred the case to
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.
Before the case could be heard, however,
complainant died. Thus, the case was submitted
for decision based on the records.
The core issue for our resolution is whether
respondent violated the Canons of Professional
Responsibility in failing to file the required
memorandum in Civil Case No. X-98 and for
keeping the money order despite complainants
request for its return.
In its Report and Recommendation dated
January 5, 2004, the Commission found
respondent liable for breach of his professional
duties and recommended that respondent be
reprimanded and warned. The Commission held
that there was no sufficient justification for
respondents failure to file the memorandum.
Regarding the money order, however, the
Commission held that complainants remedy
was not to proceed administratively against
respondent, who did not present the money
order for payment, but to ask for a refund from
the post office concerned.
On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted the
Report and Recommendation as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering respondents
negligence in the performance of his professional
duties towards his client, Atty. Elias Pontevedra
is hereby REPRIMANDED and Warned that
any similar or other complaint in the future for
breach of his professional duties will be dealt
with more severely.10
We agree with the IBP that respondent should be
appropriately sanctioned.
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that lawyers owe fidelity
to the cause of their clients and must therefore be
always mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in them. Under Canon 18, they are
mandated to serve their clients with competence
and diligence.11 Specifically, they are not to
"neglect a legal matter entrusted to [them], and
[their] negligence in connection therewith shall
render [them] liable."12Additionally, they are
required to keep their client informed of the
status of the latters cases and to respond within
a reasonable time to requests for
information.13 Before admission to the bar,
lawyers subscribe to an oath to conduct
themselves "with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to their clients." Failure to comply with
these abiding precepts of ethical conduct renders
counsel liable for violating the canons of his
profession.
In this case, respondent failed to exercise that
degree of diligence required of him in the
performance of his duties. While it was
impossible for him to prepare a memorandum
without the transcripts of stenographic notes and
his case folder, and while respondent may have
been constrained simply to enter into an
agreement with the opposing counsel to submit
the case for decision without memorandum,
respondent failed to inform the trial court of said
agreement. He should have filed a manifestation
before the trial court informing it of the
agreement instead of leaving the trial court
waiting and wondering whether said
memoranda will be filed at all. His omission not
only gave complainant much anxiety, it also
needlessly compounded the long delay in the
resolution of the 23-year-old case. Worse,
respondent did not inform complainant that the
case had been submitted for decision without
memorandum despite complainants repeated
requests for information regarding the status of
her case.
We remind respondent that by taking a clients
cause, he covenants that he will exert all effort
for its prosecution until its final resolution.14 As
we held in Parias v. Paguinto,15 a lawyer should immediately the postal money order in the
give adequate attention, care and time to his amount of P1,000.00 to complainants heirs.
clients case. Once he agrees to handle a case, he
should undertake the task with dedication and SO ORDERED.
care. It is not enough that a lawyer possesses the
qualification to handle the legal matter. He must MARIA A.C. No. 7181
also give adequate attention to his legal ANGALAN,
work.16 Utmost fidelity is demanded once NENA Present:
counsel agrees to take the cudgels for his clients ANGALAN,
cause.17 DIONICIO
ANGALAN, PUNO, C.J.,
Moreover, respondent should have accounted MAGDALEN
for the money order. Having received the money A ANGALAN, QUISUMBING,
order as payment for professional services that FRANCISCA
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
he was unable to render, respondent should have ANGALAN,
CARPIO,
returned it when complainants daughter INIS
demanded it from him so that complainant could ANGALAN, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
ask for a refund from the issuing post office. As ROSALINO
ANGALAN, CORONA,
expressly stated in Canon 16, a lawyer shall hold
in trust all moneys and properties of his client AND
CARPIO MORALES,
that may come into his possession. He is JOSEFINA
ANGALAN, AZCUNA,
required by Rule 16.03 of said canon to deliver
ALL OF
such funds and property of his client when
WHOM ARE TINGA,
demanded.
HEIRS
OF CHICO-NAZARIO,
However, considering the absence of any ANGALAN VELASCO,
showing that respondent had acted with malice, SAMAL JR., NACHURA,LEONARD
bad faith, or other evil motive in failing to inform married O-DE CASTRO,BRION, and
the trial court of the agreement to submit the to SANAAN
case for decision and in failing to account for the PERALTA, JJ.
SAMAL,
money order, we deem the recommended Complainants,
penalty of reprimand sufficient penalty.18

Complainants prayer for damages is denied. A

proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not
in any sense a civil action where the complainant Promulgated:
is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no - versus - February 6, 2009
private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken solely for the
public welfare. As held in Rayos-Ombac v.
Rayos,19 the attorney is called upon to answer to
the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court. The complainant or the person who called
the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has ATTY.
generally no interest in the outcome except as all LEONIDO C.
good citizens may have in the proper DELANTE,
administration of justice.
Respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Elias x------------------------------------
Pontevedra is hereby REPRIMANDED and - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
WARNED that the commission of the same or
similar offense in the future will be dealt with
more severely. He is ordered to return
 DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint filed by Maria, Nena, Dionicio,
Magdalena, Francisca, Inis, Rosalino, and Josefina
Angalan (complainants) against Atty. Leonido C.
Delante (respondent) for gross violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainants engaged the services of respondent
for the purpose of recovering their property. In a
receipt[4] dated 18 November 1970, respondent
acknowledged receipt of P1,200 from Francisca
Angalan and her husband, Macario Capul
(Capul), representing the full payment of his
professional fees: Received from Mr. MACARIO
CAPUL and FRANCISCA RAFAEL CAPUL the
sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
PESOS (P1,200.00) representing full payment of
professional services in regard to recovery of
Original Certificate of Title No. P-11499 in the
name of Angalan (Samal).

Complainants are the heirs of Angalan Samal Respondent filed a complaint[5] dated 13 April
(Angalan) and Sanaan Samal 1976 with the then Court of First Instance (CFI),
(Sanaan). Complainants allege that they are now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region
illiterate and belong to the Samal Tribe. Angalan, XVI, Tagum, Davao stating that:
Sanaan, and complainants owned a 9.102-hectare
parcel of land in Barrio San Jose, Kaputian, Island
Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte. The 2. x x x
property was covered by Original Certificate of Angalan Samal and his
Title (OCT) No. P-11499.[1] children x x x are the original
patentees of a certain parcel
of land, situated in Ombay,
On 15 April 1971, Angalan and complainants Samal, Davao, covered under
borrowed P15,000 from Navarro R. Eustaquio Original Certificate of Title
and Arabella P. Eustaquio (Spouses No. P-11499, of the Registry
Eustaquio).To secure the loan, Angalan and of Deeds of Davao, having
complainants mortgaged 8.102 hectares of the acquired the same under HP-
9.102-hectare property and surrendered OCT No. No. 65310, pursuant to the
P-11499 to the Spouses Eustaquio. The Spouses provisions of the Homestead
Eustaquio prepared a document[2] and asked Laws of the Public Land Law
Angalan and complainants to sign it. Angalan (C.A. 141);
and complainants affixed their thumb marks on
the document.
3. x x x
[O]n April 15, 1971, the
When complainants tried to pay the loan and herein original patentees x x
recover OCT No. P-11499 from the Spouses x sold and conveyed said
Eustaquio, the Spouses Eustaquio parcel of land covered by the
refused.Complainants learned that the document aforesaid title to the herein
which the Spouses Eustaquio prepared, and defendants for the sum of
which complainants signed, was a deed of FIFTEEN THOUSAND
absolute sale and not a real estate mortgage. They PESOS (P15,000.00) x x x;
also learned that Navarro R. Eustaquio (Navarro)
had transferred the title over the 8.102-property to
his name OCT No. P-11499 was canceled and 4. x x x
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-9926[3] in [U]nder the provisions of the
the name of Navarro was issued. Public Land Law,
particularly Section 119
thereof and even on the face
of the title of said property
now under the name of the
 defendants x x x the herein
plaintiffs have the right to
repurchase said property
within a period of five (5)
years from the date of the
conveyance;
xxxx
7. [A]s a
matter of right under the law,
the herein plaintiffs are
entitled to the produce of the
property at least beginning
April 8, 1976;
xxxx
9. [B]y
reason of unwarranted
refusal on the part of the
defendants to reconvey the
property to plaintiffs, the
latter have been constrained
to engage, and in fact have
engaged, the services of
counsel x x x[6]
Complainants and the Spouses Eustaquio entered
into an amicable settlement. In the amicable
settlement[7] dated 3 September 1977, the parties
stated that:
1. x x x
[T]he plaintiffs have offered
to the defendant[s] the sum
of P30,000.00 as repurchase
price which the defendant[s
accept];
2. x x x
[U]pon the signing hereof,
the plaintiffs shall pay the
defendant[s] the sum
of P15,000.00 and for this
purpose hereby authorize
the defendants to collect the
same from the Clerk of Court
which amount had been
deposited with this
Honorable Court; Likewise,
upon signing hereof the
Deed of Reconveyance shall
be immediately executed
and delivered by the
defendants to plaintiff[s];
3. x x x
[W]hile the balance
of P15,000.00 has not been
paid, the defendant[s] shall
continue to possess, and if
necessary to gather the
produce of the property,
however, upon receipt of the
defendant[s] of the balance
of P15,000.00, said
defendants together with
[their] agent and/or worker,
Alfredo Rabadon shall clear
the area and turnover the
same within fifteen (15) days
from receipt [of] said
balance.[8]
In a Decision[9] dated 30 September 1977, the CFI
approved the amicable settlement.
Complainants did not have the P30,000
repurchase price for the property. Respondent
advanced the P30,000 and, in return,
complainants allowed respondent to possess the
property and gather its produce until he is
paid. In a letter[10] dated 10 January 1979 and
addressed to the barrio captain of Umbay, Samal,
Davao del Norte, respondent stated that:
This will inform you that
the Heirs of Angalan Samal have
already redeemed their property
through me from Mr. Navarro
Eustaquio since September,
1978. In my capacity as counsel
of the Heirs of Angalan Samal
 and owner of the money in
redeeming the property, I have
authorized Mr. Macario Capol to
take over the possession of the
property together with the
harvesting of the matured
coconuts.
When complainants tried to repay the P30,000
repurchase price and recover the property from
respondent, respondent refused.Complainants
learned that respondent transferred the title of the
property to his name TCT No. T-9926 was
canceled and TCT No. T-57932[11] in the name of
respondent was issued.
Complainants filed a complaint[12] dated 30 April
2004 with the RTC, Judicial Region XI, Branch 34,
Davao City praying that (1) the deed of absolute
sale prepared by the Spouses Eustaquio and
signed by the complainants be declared void, (2)
TCT No. T-57932 be declared void, and (3)
respondent be made to pay damages. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 57-2004. In his
answer[13] dated 29 December 2004, respondent
stated that:
[In] 1971, ANGALAN (SAMAL)
[now deceased) [sic] together
with his son-in-law, MACARIO
CAPUL, the latter being the town
mate of herein defendant Delante
in Danao, Cebu and who is
married to the daughter of the
late ANGALAN (SAMAL), came
to herein defendants office and
sought for an advice to borrow
money;
x x x [T]he late ANGALAN
(SAMAL) together with his
children in company with
MACARIO CAPUL, were
directed by herein defendant to
inform him why it was necessary
for them to borrow money and
for whatever [sic] purpose; after
their story, herein defendant
disagreed as to their justification
in borrowing money which was
for no other purpose except to
have money on their own;
xxxx
It is preposterous for plaintiff[s]
to claim that they had [sic]
engaged the professional
services of herein defendant to
file an annulment case since
plaintiffs never came back
apparently ashamed when they
were driven out, but worse they
had [sic] never paid the herein
defendant a single centavo for
purposes of filing an annulment
case against co-defendant
NAVARRO EUSTAQUIO;
x x x [T]he transfer of said
property consisting of 8.102
hectares under the name of
herein defendants was not
tainted with any deceit but
effected legally by virtue of a
valid deed of sale executed by
defendants [sic] spouses
EUSTAQUIO in favor of herein
defendants.
xxxx
[T]he absolute deed of sale, [sic]
dated 15 April 1971, executed by
herein plaintiffs in favor of
defendants EUSTAQUIO, speaks
for itself. It is a sale of real
property and NOT a mortgage.
xxxx
Contrary to the malicious and
untruthful claim of the plaintiffs,
the legal services of defendant
Atty. LEONIDO DELANTE was
never solicited by
them. Plaintiffs only asked
defendant from where they
could borrow money, and after
knowing that they just simply
would [sic] like to borrow money
without any concrete
investments in mind to repay
[sic] back [sic] any loan,
defendant Atty. LEONIDO
DELANTE drove them out of his
office and told them to look for
another person to help them;
Defendant Atty. LEONIDO
DELANTE later learned from
MACARIO CAPUL, who is a
friend and a town mate, and who
is the husband of FRANCISCA
ANGALAN CAPUL, that the
plaintiffs had negotiated a sale
with a certain NAVARRO
EUSTAQUIO x x x;
In September 1977, a former
Filipino client of herein
defendant DELANTE, who, and
his family [sic] are now
permanent residents of New
York, was looking for a real
property to build his retirement
home, [sic] and he approached
herein defendant, in which he
was referred to defendant
EUSTAQUIO [sic]; Upon visiting
the property of defendant
EUSTAQUIO, he was so
impressed of the location of the
property and decided to buy the
same, hence left the money to
herein defendant DELANTE and
to buy [sic] said property under
defendants name, with the
understanding to turn over said
property to him, as soon as he
and his family shall have
returned to the country;
x x x [S]ince herein defendant is
not interested over the said
property as his own, he waited
for his client from New York to
come home and to get his
property but after 11 years, his
client decided not to come back
anymore to the Philippines, and
directed herein defendant to
register the Deed of Sale over the
property to [sic] his name and
directed herein defendant to
refund his client.[14]
Complainants filed a complaint[15] dated 28
December 2005 with the Court charging
respondent with gross violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. In a
Resolution[16] dated 3 July 2006, the Court
required respondent to comment on the
complaint and, in a Resolution[17] dated 4
December 2006, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
In a Notice dated 14 March 2007, Commissioner
Salvador B. Hababag (Commissioner Hababag)
directed complainants and respondent to appear
before the IBP for a mandatory conference. The
parties failed to appear at the mandatory
conference. In an Order dated 16 May 2007,
Commissioner Hababag directed the parties to
submit their position papers.
In a motion dated 4 April 2007 and filed with the
RTC, respondent and complainants prayed that
Civil Case No. 57-2004 be
dismissed.Complainants filed with the Court a
motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment
dated 4 April 2007 and an affidavit of desistance
dated April 2007.
In his position paper dated 2 July 2007,
respondent stated that (1) Angalan and Capul
went to his office in 1971 to seek advice about
borrowing money; (2) his client from New York
bought the property from the Spouses Eustaquio;
and (3) complainants executed a motion to
withdraw the complaint for disbarment and an
affidavit of desistance.
In a Report dated 15 October 2007, Commissioner
Hababag found that respondent violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
 The issue to resolve is whether or
not respondent committed grave
violation of [the] Code of
Professional Responsibility when
he bought the property of his
client[s] without their
knowledge, consent and against
their will?
Weighing evidence presented by
both parties, respondent should
be punished for his
unprofessional and distasteful
acts.
xxxx
His vain attempt to salvage his
malicious acts was too flimsy to
gain belief and acceptance. It is
unbelievable that a buyer would
entrust his money intended for
payment of a property but
allowed that said property be
registered under the name of
another, specifically his lawyer,
simply runs counter to ordinary
human nature. (Emphasis
supplied)
Commissioner Hababag recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for six months.
In a Resolution dated 22 November 2007, the IBP
Board of Governors (Board) adopted and
approved the Report with modification. The
Board increased respondents suspension from six
months to one year.
Pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court,[18] the Board forwarded the case to the
Court for final action.
The Court sustains the findings of the IBP.
Complainants and respondent presented two
different sets of facts.According to complainants,
they engaged the services of respondent for the
purpose of recovering their property from the
Spouses Eustaquio. In violation of the trust and
confidence they reposed in him, respondent
transferred the title over the property to his
name. According to respondent, complainants
did not engage his services. His client from New
York was the one who bought the property from
the Spouses Eustaquio.
After a careful review of the records, the Court
gives credence to complainants version of the
facts.
Respondents credibility is highly questionable. In
his answer dated 29 December 2004 and filed with
the CFI and in his position paper dated 2 July 2007
and filed with the IBP, respondent alleged that
Angalan and Capul went to his office in 1971 to
seek advice about borrowing money. According
to respondent, complainants did not engage his
services. In his answer, respondent stated that:
It is preposterous
for [complainants] to claim that
they had [sic] engaged the
professional services of herein
defendant to file an annulment
case since [complainants] never
came back apparently ashamed
when they were driven out x x x;
xxxx
Contrary to the malicious and
untruthful claim
of [complainants], the legal
services of defendant Atty.
LEONIDO DELANTE was
never solicited by
them. Plaintiffs only asked
defendant from where they
could borrow money, and after
knowing that they just simply
 would like to borrow money
without any concrete
investments in mind to repay
back [sic] any loan, defendant
Atty. LEONIDO DELANTE
drove them out of his office and
told them to look for another
person to help them;
Defendant Atty. LEONIDO DELANTE
later learned from MACARIO CAPUL x
x x that the plaintiffs had negotiated a
sale with a certain NAVARRO
EUSTAQUIO.[19] (Emphasis supplied)
The Court is not impressed. Angalan and
complainants went to respondents office not to
seek advice about borrowing money but to
engage his services for the purpose of recovering
their property. This is obvious. First, after
Angalan and complainants went to respondents
office, respondent filed a complaint with the CFI
praying that the Spouses Eustaquio reconvey the
property to Angalan and complainants.Second, in
the complaint, respondent stated that, by reason
of unwarranted refusal on the part of the
defendants to reconvey the property to
plaintiffs, the latter have been constrained to
engage, and in fact have engaged, the services of
counsel. Third, respondent issued a receipt to
complainants stating that he RECEIVED from
Mr. MACARIO CAPUL and FRANCISCA
RAFAEL CAPUL the sum of ONE THOUSAND
TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00)
representing full payment of professional
services in regard to the recovery of Original
Certificate of Title No. P-11499 in the name of
Angalan (Samal). Fourth, in respondents letter
dated 10 January 1979 and addressed to the barrio
captain of Umbay, Samal, Davao del Norte, he
stated that he was the lawyer of complainants:
This will inform you that the
Heirs of Angalan Samal have
already redeemed their property
through me from Mr. Navarro
Eustaquio since September,
1978. In my capacity as counsel
of the Heirs of Angalan
Samal and owner of the money
in redeeming the property, I have
authorized Mr. Macario Capol to
take over the possession of the
property together with the
harvesting of the matured
coconuts.[20]
These clearly show that complainants engaged
the services of respondent.
In his answer, respondent alleged that
complainants did not pay him his professional
fees (which, according to him, they did not
engage). He stated that, [complainants] had never
paid the herein defendant a single centavo for
purposes of filing an annulment case against x x x
NAVARRO EUSTAQUIO.
The Court is not impressed. Complainants fully
paid respondent his professional fees. This is
obvious. In a receipt dated 18 November 1970,
respondent stated that he RECEIVED from Mr.
MACARIO CAPUL and FRANCISCA RAFAEL
CAPUL the sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) representing full
payment of professional services in regard to the
recovery of Original Certificate of Title No. P-
11499 in the name of Angalan (Samal). This
clearly shows that complainants paid respondent
his professional fees.
In his answer and position paper, respondent
alleged that his client from New York bought the
property from the Spouses Eustaquio:
[I]n September 1977, a former
Filipino client of herein
respondent, who, and his family
[sic] are now permanent
residents of New York, was
looking for a real property to
build his retirement home, and
he approached herein
respondent, in which [sic] he was
referred to Navarro Eustaquio;
and upon visiting the property of
Navarro Eustaquio, he was
impressed of [sic] the location of
the property and decided to buy
the same, hence left the money to
herein respondent and to buy
[sic] said property under
respondents name, with the
understanding to turn over said
property to him, as soon as he
and his family shall have
returned to the country;

x x x [S]ince herein respondent
was not interested over the said
property as his own, he waited
for his client from New York to
come home and to get his
property but after 11 years, his
client decided not to come back
anymore to the Philippines, and
directed herein respondent to
register the Deed of Sale over the
property under his name and
directed herein respondent to
refund his client.[21]
The Court is not impressed. Complainants
repurchased the property from the Spouses
Eustaquio. This is obvious. First, complainants
and the Spouses Eustaquio entered into an
amicable settlement stating that complainants
would repurchase the property from the Spouses
Eustaquio:
1. x x x [T]he plaintiffs have
offered to the
defendant[s] the sum
of P30,000.00 as repurchase
price which the defendant[s
accept];
2. x x x [U]pon the signing hereof,
the plaintiffs shall pay the
defendant[s] the sum
of P15,000.00 and for this
purpose hereby authorize
the defendants to collect the
same from the Clerk of Court
which amount had been
deposited with this
Honorable Court; Likewise,
upon signing hereof the
Deed of Reconveyance shall
be immediately executed
and delivered by the
defendants to plaintiff[s];
3. x x x [W]hile the balance
of P15,000.00 has not been
paid, the defendant[s] shall
continue to possess, and if
necessary to gather the
produce of the property,
however, upon receipt of the
defendant[s] of the balance
of P15,000.00, said
defendants together with
[their] agent and/or worker,
Alfredo Rabadon shall clear
the area and turnover the
same within fifteen (15) days
from receipt [of] said
balance.[22] (Emphasis
supplied)
Second, in his letter to the barrio captain,
respondent stated that complainants repurchased
the property from the Spouses Eustaquio:
This will inform you that the
Heirs of Angalan Samal have
already redeemed their property
through me from Mr. Navarro
Eustaquio since September,
1978. In my capacity as counsel of
the Heirs of Angalan Samal and
owner of the money in
redeeming the property, I have
authorized Mr. Macario Capol to
take over the possession of the
property together with the
harvesting of the matured
coconuts.[23] (Emphasis supplied)
These clearly show that complainants
repurchased the property from the Spouses
Eustaquio.
Respondents story about the client from New
York is unbelievable.Respondent did not give any
detail or proof to substantiate his story the name
of the alleged client, an affidavit of the alleged
client, the old passport of the alleged client
showing immigration stamps, or any form of
correspondence between him and the alleged
client. The Court agrees with the observation of
Commissioner Hababag that respondents vain
attempt to salvage his malicious acts [is] too
flimsy to gain belief and acceptance.

In his position paper, respondent alleged that
complainants executed a motion to withdraw the
complaint for disbarment and an affidavit of
desistance. This is immaterial. Section 5, Rule 139-
B of the Rules of Court states that, No
investigation shall be interrupted or terminated
by reason of the desistance, settlement,
compromise, restitution, withdrawal of charges,
or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same.
Respondent violated Canons 16 and 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 16
states that lawyers shall hold in trust all
properties of their clients that may come into
their possession.Respondent should have held in
trust TCT No. T-9926 and returned the property
to complainants upon demand.[24] Instead of
holding in trustthe property of complainants,
respondent (1) transferred the title of the property
to his name, (2) refused to return the property to
complainants, and (3) referred to complainants
charges as malicious and untruthful.
Canon 17 states that lawyers shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in
them. Respondent should have been mindful of
the trust and confidence complainants reposed in
him. Complainants allege that they are illiterate
and that the Spouses Eustaquio took advantage of
them. Complainants engaged the services of
respondent in the hope that he would help them
recover their property. Instead of protecting the
interests of complainants, respondent took
advantage of complainants and transferred the
title of the property to his name.
Considering the depravity of respondents
offense, the Court finds the recommended
penalty too light. Violation of Canons 16 and 17
constitutes gross misconduct.[25] Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Court for gross
misconduct. In Hernandez v. Go,[26] the Court
disbarred a lawyer for transferring the titles over
the properties of his client to his name without the
knowledge of his client. In Hernandez, the Court
held that:
Considering the
depravity of respondents offense,
we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP too
light. It bears reiterating that a
lawyer who takes advantage of
his clients financial plight to
acquire the latters properties for
his own benefit is destructive of
the confidence of the public in the
fidelity, honesty, and integrity of
the legal profession. Thus, for
violation of Canon 16 and Canon
17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which constitutes
gross misconduct, and consistent
with the need to maintain the
high standards of the Bar and
thus preserve the faith of the
public in the legal profession,
respondent deserves the ultimate
penalty, that of expulsion from
the esteemed brotherhood of
lawyers.[27]
A person who takes the 8.102-hectare property of
his illiterate clients and who is incapable of telling
the truth is unfit to be a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Leonido C.
Delante GUILTY of violating Canons 16 and 17 of
the Code of Professional
Responsibility.Accordingly, the
Court DISBARS him from the practice of law
and ORDERS that his name be stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office
of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts all over the
country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be
attached to the personal records of respondent.
ARTEMIO ENDAYA, complainant, vs. ATTY.
WILFREDO OCA, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
 The law is no brooding omnipresence in the
sky, so spoke Justice Holmes. He must have made
the statement because invariably the legal system
is encountered in human form, notably through
the lawyers. For practical purposes, the lawyers
not only represent the law; they are the
law.[1] With their ubiquitous presence in the social
milieu, lawyers have to be responsible. The
problems they create in lawyering become public
difficulties. To keep lawyers responsible
underlies the worth of the ethics of lawyering.
Indeed, legal ethics is simply the aesthetic term
for professional responsibility.
The case before us demonstrates once again
that when a lawyerviolates his duties to his client,
the courts, the legal profession and the public, he
engages in conduct which is both unethical and
unprofessional.
This case unfolded with a
verified Complaint filed on January 12, 1993 by
[2]
complainant Artemio Endaya against respondent
Atty. Wifredo Oca for violation of the lawyers
oath and what complainant termed as
professional delinquency or infidelity.[3] The
antecedents are:
On November 7, 1991, a complaint for
unlawful detainer docketed as Civil Case No. 34-
MCTC-T was filed with the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Taysan-Lobo, Batangas by
Apolonia H. Hornilla, Pedro Hernandez, Santiago
Hernandez and Dominador Hernandez against
complainant and his spouse Patrosenia Endaya.[4]
On December 13, 1991, the complainant and
his wife as defendants in the case filed their
answer which was prepared by a certain Mr.
Isaias Ramirez. A preliminary conference was
conducted on January 17, 1992, which
complainant and his wife attended without
counsel. During the conference, complainant
categorically admitted that plaintiffs were the
declared owners for taxation purposes of the land
involved in the case. Continuation of the
preliminary conference was set on January 31,
1992. Thereafter, complainant sought the services
of the Public Attorneys Office in Batangas City
and respondent was assigned to handle the case
for the complainant and his wife.[5]
At the continuation of the preliminary
conference, respondent appeared as counsel for
complainant and his spouse. He moved for the
amendment of the answer previously filed by
complainant and his wife, but his motion was
denied.[6] Thereafter, the court, presided by
Acting Trial Court Judge Teodoro M. Baral,
ordered the parties to submit their affidavits and
position papers within ten days from receipt of
the order. The court also decreed that thirty days
after receipt of the last affidavit and position
paper, or upon expiration of the period for filing
the same, judgment shall be rendered on the
case.[7]
Respondent failed to submit the required
affidavits and position paper, as may be gleaned
from the Decision dated March 19, 1992 of the
MCTC where it was noted that only the plaintiffs
submitted their affidavits and position papers.[8]
Nonetheless, the court dismissed the
complaint for unlawful detainer principally on
the ground that the plaintiffs are not the real
parties-in-interest. The dispositive portion of
the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby dismissed on
the ground that the plaintiffs have no legal
capacity to sue as they are not the real party
(sic) in interest, in addition to the fact that there
is no privity of contract between the plaintiffs
and the defendants as to the verbal lease
agreement.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Plaintiffs appealed the Decision to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City,
Branch 1, where the case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 3378. On April 10, 1992, the RTC
directed the parties to file their respective
memoranda.[10] Once again, respondent failed the
complainant and his wife. As observed by the
RTC in its Decision[11] dated September 7, 1992,
respondent did not file the memorandum for his
clients, thereby prompting the court to consider
the case as submitted for decision.[12]
In its Decision, the RTC reversed the decision
appealed from as it held that plaintiffs are the co-
owners of the property in dispute and as such are
parties-in-interest.[13] It also found that the verbal
lease agreement was on a month-to-month basis
and perforce terminable by the plaintiffs at the
end of any given month upon proper notice to the
defendants.[14] It also made a finding that
defendants incurred rentals in arrears.[15] The
decretal portion of the Decision reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Taysan-Lobo dated March 19, 1992, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and new one
entered, to wit:
Defendants ARTEMIO ENDAYA and
PATROSENIA ENDAYA and all persons
claiming under them are hereby ordered to
vacate and dismantle their house on the land
subject of the verbal lease agreement at their own
expense. The defendants are likewise ordered to
pay the monthly rental of P25.00 from the month
of January 1991 to November 1991 and ONE
THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS monthly from
December 1991 until the defendants finally
vacate and surrender possession of the subject
property to the plaintiffs and to pay attorneys fee
in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00)
PESOS.
No pronouncement as to cost.[16]
Complainant received a copy of
the Decision on October 7, 1992. Two days later, or
on October 9, 1992, complainant confronted
respondent with the adverse decision but the
latter denied receipt of a copy thereof. Upon
inquiry with the Branch Clerk of Court, however,
complainant found out that respondent received
his copy back on September 14, 1992.[17]
Having lost the unlawful detainer case, on
January 12, 1993 complainant filed the present
administrative complaint against the respondent
for professional delinquency consisting of his
failure to file the required pleadings in behalf of
the complainant and his spouse. Complainant
contends that due to respondents inaction he lost
the opportunity to present his cause and
ultimately the case itself.[18]
In his Comment[19] dated March 17, 1993,
respondent denies that he committed professional
misconduct in violation of his oath, stressing that
he was not the original counsel of complainant
and his spouse.[20] He further avers that when he
agreed to represent complainant at the
continuation of the preliminary conference in the
main case, it was for the sole purpose of asking
leave of court to file an amended answer because
he was made to believe by the complainant that
the answer was prepared by a non-lawyer. Upon
discovering that the answer was in fact the work
of a lawyer, forthwith he asked the court to relieve
him as complainants counsel, but he was denied.
He adds that he agreed to file the position paper
for the complainant upon the latters undertaking
to provide him with the documents which
support the position that plaintiffs are not the
owners of the property in dispute. As
complainant had reneged on his promise, he
claims that he deemed it more prudent not to file
any position paper as it would be a repetition of
the answer. He offers the same reason for not
filing the memorandum on appeal with the
RTC. Finally, respondent asserts that he fully
explained his stand as regards Civil Case No. 34-
MCTC-T to the complainant.[21]
Pursuant to our Resolution[22] dated May 10,
1993, complainant filed his Reply[23] to
respondents Comment wherein he merely
reiterated his allegations in the Complaint.
On July 28, 1993, this Court directed
respondent to file his rejoinder within ten days
from notice of our Resolution.[24] But he failed to
do so despite the lapse of a considerable period of
time. This prompted the Court to require
respondent to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt and
to file his rejoinder, both within ten (10) days from
notice.[25]
In his Explanation[26] dated February 28, 1997,
respondent admits having received a copy of the
resolution requiring him to file a rejoinder.
However, he asserts that he purposely did not file
a rejoinder for he believed in good faith that a
rejoinder to complainants reply is no longer
necessary.[27] He professes that in electing not to
file a rejoinder he did not intend to cast disrespect
upon the Court.[28]
On June 16, 1997, we referred this case to the
Office of the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report
and recommendation.[29]
In its Report[30] dated February 6, 2001, the
Office of the Bar Confidant found respondent
negligent in handling the case of complainant and
his wife and recommended that he be suspended
from the practice of law for one month. The
pertinent portions of the Report read, thus:
It is to be noted that after appearing at the
preliminary conference before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, respondent was never heard
from again. Respondents seeming indifference to
the cause of his client, specially when the case
was on appeal, caused the defeat of herein
complainant. Respondent practically abandoned
complainant in the midst of a storm. This is even
more made serious of the fact that respondent, at
that time, was assigned at the Public Attorneys
Office- a government entity mandated to provide
free and competent legal assistance.
A lawyers devotion to his clients cause not only
requires but also entitles him to deploy every
honorable means to secure for the client what is
justly due him or to present every defense
provided by law to enable the latters cause to
succeed. (Miraflor vs. Hagad, 244 SCRA 106)
....
The facts, however, do not show that respondent
employed every legal and honorable means to
advance the cause of his client. Had respondent
tried his best, he could have found some other
defenses available to his client; but respondent
was either too lazy or too convinced that his
client had a losing case.
....
For intentionally failing to submit the pleadings
required by the court, respondent practically
closed the door to the possibility of putting up a
fair fight for his client. As the Court once held, A
client is bound by the negligence of his lawyer.
(Diaz-Duarte vs. Ong, 298 SCRA 388)[31]
However, the Bar Confidant did not find
complainant entirely faultless.She observed, viz:
Respondents allegation that complainant failed
in his promise to submit the documents to
support his claim was not denied by
complainant; hence, it is deemed admitted.
Complainant is not without fault; for
misrepresenting that he could prove his claim
through supporting documents, respondent was
made to believe that he had a strong leg to stand
on. A party cannot blame his counsel for
negligence when he himself was guilty of
neglect. (Macapagal vs. Court of Appeals, 271
SCRA 491)[32]
On April 18, 2001, we referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation,
report and recommendation.
Several hearings were set by the IBP but
complainant did not appear even
once. Respondent attended five hearings, but he
failed to present evidence in support of his
defense, as required by Investigating
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez. This
compelled the latter to make his report on the
basis of the pleadings and evidence forwarded by
the Office of the Bar Confidant.
On October 11, 2002, Commissioner
Fernandez issued his Report[33]wherein he
concurred with the findings and recommendation
of the Office of the Bar Confidant.
In a Resolution[34] dated April 26, 2003, the
IBP Board of Governors adopted the Report of
Commissioner Fernandez.
The Court is convinced that respondent
violated the lawyers oath not only once but a
number of times in regard to the handling of his
clients cause. The repeated violations also involve
defilement of several Canons in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Right off, the Court notes that respondent
attributes his failure to file the required pleadings
for the complainant and his wife invariably to his
strong personal belief that it was unnecessary or
futile to file the pleadings. This was true with
respect to the affidavits and position paper at the
MCTC level, the appeal memorandum at the RTC
level and the rejoinder at this Courts level. In the
last instance, it took respondent as long as three
years, under compulsion of a show cause order at
that, only to manifest his predisposition not to file
a rejoinder after all. In other words, at the root of
respondents transgressions is his seeming
stubborn mindset against the acts required of him
by the courts. This intransigent attitude not only
belies lack of diligence and commitment but
evinces absence of respect for the authority of this
Court and the other courts involved.
The lawyers oath embodies the fundamental
principles that guide every member of the legal
fraternity. From it springs the lawyers duties and
responsibilities that any infringement thereof can
cause his disbarment, suspension or other
disciplinary action.[35]
Found in the oath is the duty of a lawyer to
protect and safeguard the interest of his client.
Specifically, it requires a lawyer to conduct
himself to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to his clients.[36] This duty is further
stressed in Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates that (A) lawyer
shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.
In this case, evidence abound that
respondent failed to demonstrate the required
diligence in handling the case of complainant and
his spouse. As found by the Office of the Bar
Confidant,[37] after appearing at the second
preliminary conference before the MCTC,
respondent had not been heard of again until he
commented on the complaint in this case. Without
disputing this fact, respondent reasons out that
his appearance at the conference was for the sole
purpose of obtaining leave of court to file an
amended answer and that when he failed to
obtain it because of complainants fault he asked
the court that he be relieved as counsel.[38] The
explanation has undertones of dishonesty for
complainant had engaged respondent for the
entire case and not for just one incident. The
alternative conclusion is that respondent did not
know his procedure for under the Rules on
Summary Procedure[39] the amended answer is a
prohibited pleading.
Even assuming respondent did in fact ask to
be relieved, this could not mean that less was
expected from him. Once a lawyer takes the
cudgels for a clients case, he owes it to his client
to see the case to the end. This, we pointed out
in Legarda v. Court of Appeals,[40] thus:
It should be remembered that the moment a
lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he
will exert all effort for its prosecution until its
final conclusion. A lawyer who fails to exercise
due diligence or abandons his clients cause make
him unworthy of the trust reposed on him by the
latter.[41]
Also, we held in Santiago v. Fojas,[42] every
case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention,
diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts if for a fee or
for free. In other words, whatever the lawyers
reason is for accepting a case, he is duty bound to
do his utmost in prosecuting or defending it.
Moreover, a lawyer continues to be a counsel
of record until the lawyer-client relationship is
terminated either by the act of his client or his own
act, with permission of the court. Until such time,
the lawyer is expected to do his best for the
interest of his client [43]
Thus, when respondent was directed to file
affidavits and position paper by the MCTC, and
appeal memorandum by the RTC, he had no
choice but to comply. However, respondent did
not bother to do so, in total disregard of the court
orders. This constitutes negligence and
malpractice proscribed by Rule 18.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which mandates that
(A) lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Respondents failure to file the affidavits and
position paper at the MCTC did not actually
prejudice his clients, for the court nevertheless
rendered a decision favorable to them. However,
the failure is per se a violation of Rule 18.03.
It was respondents failure to file appeal
memorandum before the RTC which made
complainant and his wife suffer as it resulted in
their loss of the case. As found by the Office of the
Bar Confidant, to which we fully subscribe, in not
filing the appeal memorandum respondent
denied complainant and his spouse the chance of
putting up a fair fight in the dispute. Canon
19 prescribes that (A) lawyer shall represent his
client with zeal within the bounds of the law. He
should exert all efforts to avail of the remedies
allowed under the law. Respondent did not do so,
thereby even putting to naught the advantage
which his clients apparently gained by prevailing
at the MCTC level. Verily, respondent did not
even bother to put up a fight for his clients.
Clearly, his conduct fell short of what Canon
19requires and breached the trust reposed in him
by his clients.
We cannot sustain respondents excuse in not
filing the affidavits and position paper with the
MCTC and the appeal memorandum with the
RTC.He claims that he did not file the required
pleadings because complainant failed to furnish
him with evidence that would substantiate
complainants allegations in the answer. He
argues that absent the supporting documents, the
pleadings he could have filed would just be a
repetition of the answer.However, respondent
admits in his comment that complainant
furnished him with the affidavit of persons
purporting to be barangay officials attesting to an
alleged admission by Felomino Hernandez, the
brother of the plaintiffs in the unlawful detainer
case, that he had already bought the disputed
property.[44] This did not precipitate respondent
into action despite the evidentiary value of the
affidavit, which was executed by disinterested
persons. Said affidavit could have somehow
bolstered the claim of complainant and his wife
which was upheld by the MCTC that plaintiffs are
not the real parties-in-interest. While respondent
could have thought this affidavit to be without
probative value, he should have left it to the
sound judgment of the court to determine
whether the affidavit supports the assertions of
his clients. That could have happened had he filed
the required position paper and annexed the
affidavit thereto.
Further, notwithstanding his belief that
without the supporting documents filing the
required pleadings would be a futile exercise, still
respondent should have formally and promptly
manifested in court his intent not to file the
pleadings to prevent delay in the disposition of
the case.[45]Specifically, the RTC would not have
waited as it did for the lapse of three months from
June 5,1992, the date when plaintiffs-appellants
submitted their appeal memorandum, before it
rendered judgment. Had it known that
respondent would not file the appeal
memorandum, the court could have decided the
case much earlier.
For his failure to inform the court,
respondent violated Canon 12, to wit:
Canon 12: A lawyer shall exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.
Respondent likewise failed to demonstrate
the candor he owed his client. Canon 17 provides
that (A) lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. When complainant
received the RTC decision, he talked to
respondent about it.[46] However, respondent
denied knowledge of the decision despite his
receipt thereof as early as September 14, 1992.
Obviously, he tried to evade responsibility for his
negligence. In doing so, respondent was
untruthful to complainant and effectively
betrayed the trust placed in him by the latter.
On top of all these is respondents
employment as a lawyer of the Public Attorneys
Office which is tasked to provide free legal
assistance for indigents and low-income persons
so as to promote the rule of law in the protection
of the rights of the citizenry and the efficient and
speedy administration of justice.[47] Against this
backdrop, respondent should have been more
judicious in the performance of his professional
obligations. As we held in Vitriola v.
Dasig[48] lawyers in the government are public
servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public
service. Furthermore, a lawyer from the
government is not exempt from observing the
degree of diligence required in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Canon 6 of the Code
provides that the canons shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their
official tasks.
At this juncture, it bears stressing that much
is demanded from those who engage in the
practice of law because they have a duty not only
to their clients, but also to the court, to the bar, and
to the public. The lawyers diligence and
dedication to his work and profession not only
promote the interest of his client, it likewise help
attain the ends of justice by contributing to the
proper and speedy administration of cases, bring
prestige to the bar and maintain respect to the
legal profession.[49]
The determination of the appropriate
penalty to be imposed on an errant attorney
involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the facts of the case.[50] In cases of similar
nature, the penalty imposed by this Court
consisted of reprimand,[51] fine of five hundred
pesos with warning,[52] suspension of three
months,[53] six months,[54] and even disbarment in
aggravated cases.[55]
The facts and circumstances in this case
indubitably show respondents failure to live up to
his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the
strictures of the lawyers oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, thereby warranting his
suspension from the practice of law. At various
stages of the unlawful detainer case, respondent
was remiss in the performance of his duty as
counsel.
To reiterate, respondent did not submit the
affidavits and position paper when required by
the MCTC. With his resolution not to file the
pleadings already firmed up, he did not bother to
inform the MCTC of his resolution in mockery of
the authority of the court. His stubbornness
continued at the RTC, for despite an order to file
an appeal memorandum, respondent did not file
any. Neither did he manifest before the court that
he would no longer file the pleading, thus further
delaying the proceedings. He had no misgivings
about his deviant behavior, for despite receipt of
a copy of the adverse decision by the RTC he
opted not to inform his clients accordingly.
Worse, he denied knowledge of the decision
when confronted by the complainant about it.
At this Courts level, respondents stubborn
and uncaring demeanor surfaced again when he
did not file a rejoinder to complainants reply.
 Respondents story projects in vivid detail his
appalling indifference to his clients cause,
deplorable lack of respect for the courts and a
brazen disregard of his duties as a lawyer.
However, we are not unmindful of some
facts which extenuate respondents misconduct.
First, when complainant sought the assistance of
respondent as a PAO lawyer, he misrepresented
that his answer was prepared by someone who is
not a lawyer. Second, when complainant showed
respondent a copy of their answer with the
MCTC, he assured him that he had strong
evidence to support the defense in the answer that
plaintiffs were no longer the owners of the
property in dispute. However, all that he could
provide respondent was the affidavit of the
barangay officials. Last but not least, it is of public
knowledge that the Public Attorneys Office is
burdened with a heavy caseload.
All things considered, we conclude that
suspension for two (2) months from the practice
of law is the proper and just penalty.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wilfredo
Oca is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for two (2) months from notice, with the
warning that a similar misconduct will be dealt
with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be
attached to respondents personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be
furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) and to all the courts in the
land.
SO ORDERED.