FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 173329 December 21, 2009

SUSAN G. PO and LILIA G. MUTIA, Petitioners,

vs.
OMERO DAMPAL,* Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On December 19, 1984, two farm lots located in Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon which were covered by OCT No. P-
4146 and OCT No. 4147, with an approximate area of 2.5773 and 2.0651 hectares, respectively, were mortgaged
for P33,000.00 by the spouses Florencio and Ester Causin, through their attorney-in-fact Manuel Causin, to the
now-defunct Rural Bank of Tagoloan, Inc.

For failure to pay the obligation, the bank foreclosed the mortgage and sold the lots at public auction on July 8,
1992 to petitioner Susan G. Po (Susan) who was the highest bidder. OCT No. P-4146 and OCT No. 4147 were
subsequently cancelled and TCT No. T-39280 and TCT No. 39281 were, in their stead, issued in Susans favor,
following the spouses Causins failure to redeem the property.

On September 13, 1993, Susan sold the lot covered by TCT No. 39281 to her herein co-petitioner Lilia G. Mutia
(Lilia) who was issued TCT No. T-40193.

On September 29, 1994, the spouses Causin and their tenant-herein respondent Omero Dampal (Dampal) filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Manolo Fortich a complaint against the bank for Annulment of the Real Estate
Mortgage and Sale, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-280 (the civil case).

While the civil case was pending or on June 16, 1997, Dampal filed a complaint against Susan and Lilia before
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Region X, for Legal Redemption with
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, docketed as DARAB Case No. X-05-361.

By Decision1 of September 16, 1997, the Regional Adjudicator of DARAB Region X disallowed the redemption
prayed for on the ground of prescription, albeit he declared that Dampal is entitled to security of tenure as a
tenant; and that although Dampal was not given notice in writing of the public auction sale, he was deemed to
have knowledge thereof because of the civil case for annulment, hence, there was substantial compliance with
the rules.

Dampals motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order2 dated October 28, 1997, he appealed to the
DARAB Central Office where it was docketed as DARAB Case No. 7315.

By Decision3 of October 19, 2004, the DARAB Central Office reversed the Adjudicators ruling. It held that
Dampal, as a tenant, had the right to redeem the mortgage in the amount of P40,000.00 plus interest; and that the
right had not prescribed, owing to the lack of written notice to him and to the DAR of the sale. It accordingly
ordered the cancellation of the title issued in favor of Susan and that of Lilia and the issuance of new ones in
Dampals favor, upon his payment of the redemption amount. Susan and Lilias motion for reconsideration of the
said Decision was denied by Resolution4 of July 7, 2005, hence, they appealed via certiorari to the Court of
Appeals.

By Resolution5 of October 19, 2005, the appellate court, holding that petitioners should have appealed the DARAB
Decision via Rule 43, instead of Rule 65, dismissed petitioners petition for certiorari.

Petitioners thereupon filed before the appellate court a Motion for Leave to Amend Petition and for Admission of
Amended Petition, which motion was denied by Resolution 6 of March 28, 2006. In denying the motion, the
appellate court held that dismissal due to error in the mode of appeal cannot be reconsidered by the mere
expediency of filing an amended petition. Moreover, it noted that it was filed out of time.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts March 28, 2006 Resolution, alleging that their error
in the choice of remedy was excusable as they relied on Sec. 1, Rule XIV of the DARAB Revised Rules of
Procedure, reading:

Sec. 1. Appeal to the Board. An appeal may be taken to the Board from a resolution, decision or final order of
the Adjudicator that completely disposes of the case by either or both of the parties within a period of fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the resolution/decision/final order appealed from or of the denial of the movants motion for
reconsideration in accordance with section 12, Rule X by:

1.1 filing a Notice of Appeal with the Adjudicator who rendered the decision or final order appealed from;

1.2 furnishing copies of said Notice of Appeal to all parties and the Board; and

1.3 paying an appeal fee of Seven Hundred Pesos (Php700.00) to the DAR Cashier where the Office of
the Adjudicator is situated or through postal money order, payable to the DAR Cashier where the Office of
the Adjudicator is situated, at the option of the appellant.

A pauper litigant shall be exempt from the payment of the appeal fee.

Proof of service of Notice of Appeal to the affected parties and to the Board and payment of appeal fee shall be
filed, within the reglementary period, with the Adjudicator a quo and shall form part of the records of the case.

Non-compliance with the foregoing shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal. (underscoring supplied)

By Resolution7 of May 22, 2006, the appellate court denied the motion for reconsideration, holding that nothing in
the above-quoted Sec. 1 of Rule XIV states that the remedy of an aggrieved party from an adverse decision of the
DARAB is by certiorari, and that the applicable rule is Sec. 1, Rule XV of the 2003 DARAB Revised Rules of
Procedure.

On petitioners attribution of the faux pas to their counsel, the appellate court held that they are bound thereby.
Hence, this petition.

Petitioners assert that the appellate court, in dismissing their petition due to technicality, denied them the
opportunity to establish the merits of their case. They maintain that Dampals right of redemption has prescribed,
he having admitted Susans acquisition of title to the property as early as 1993 but that it was only in 1997 that he
filed the action for redemption before the DARAB. They thus conclude that the need for sending him notice in
writing could be dispensed with; and that Dampals inaction estopped him from asserting his right as a tenant.

The petition is bereft of merit.

The earlier-quoted Sec. 1 of Rule XIV of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure dwells on how appeals to
the DARAB Board from the decisions, resolutions or final orders of the Adjudicator are to be taken. How
petitioners could have been misled to file their appeal from the DARABs Decision to the Court of Appeals via
certiorari escapes comprehension.

Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, appeals from the decisions of the DARAB should be filed with the Court of
Appeals by verified petition for review. Thus, Sec. 1 of Rule 43 provides:

SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals
and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority,
Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer,
National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications
Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance
System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine
Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary
arbitrators authorized by law.1avvphi1

SECTION 2. Where to appeal. An appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the
period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law.

SECTION 3. How appeal taken. Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review x x x (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Sec. 1, Rule XV of the 2003 DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure provides:

Section 1. Appeal to the Court of Appeals. - Any decision, order, resolution, award or ruling of the Board on any
agrarian dispute or any matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement, interpretation of
agrarian reform laws or rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, may be brought on appeal within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of a copy thereof, to the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Rules of Court.
(underscoring supplied)

While a petition for certiorari, when availed of as a wrong remedy, is dismissible, there are exceptions thereto, viz:
(a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so
requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive
exercise of judicial authority.8 None of these circumstances is present in the case at bar, however. lavvphil

The denial9 by the appellate court of petitioners "MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION AND FOR
ADMISSION OF AMENDED PETITION" filed on October 28, 2005 is thus in order. For the records show that
petitioners filed the petition for certiorari on the last day of the 15-day period to appeal or on October 5, 2005.

The belated filing of the Amended Petition is inexcusable.

Time and again, we held that rules of procedure exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules, in the
guise of liberal construction, would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules are not to be disdained as
mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures the
effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. Rules are
not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation; they help provide a vital system of justice where
suitors may be heard following judicial procedure and in the correct forum. Public order and our system
of justice are well served by a conscientious observance by the parties of the procedural rules. 10(emphasis
supplied)

Technicality aside, on the merits, petitioners failed to establish that in deciding the case, the DARAB committed
grave abuse of discretion.

In its disquisition, the DARAB held that absence of written notice to the tenant of the sale, as well as to the DAR,
is indispensable, particularly in view of Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389,
which mandates that the 180-day period must be reckoned from the notice in writing upon registration of the sale.

Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 3844 or the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963, as amended by Republic Act No.
6389, otherwise known as the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines, provides:

Sec. 12. Lessees right of redemption. In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the
knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable
price and consideration: Provided, That where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to
said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under
this Section may be exercised within one hundred eighty days from notice in writing which shall be
served by the vendee on all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform upon the registration
of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption. The redemption price shall be
the reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale. (emphasis supplied)

The admitted lack of written notice on Dampal and the DAR thus tolled the running of the prescriptive period.
Petitioners contention that Dampal must be considered to have had constructive knowledge thereof fails in light of
the express requirement for notice to be in writing.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

OTILIA STA. ANA, G.R. No. 164340

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
SPOUSES LEON G. CARPO and AURORA
CARPO, Promulgated:
Respondents.
November 28, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision [2] dated March 5, 2004 which reversed and
set aside the Decision[3] of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) dated
June 24, 1998 and reinstated the Decision[4] of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of
Laguna dated October 12, 1993.

The Facts

Respondent Leon Carpo[5] (Leon) and his brother Francisco G. Carpo are the registered co-owners of a
parcel of land designated as Lot No. 2175 of the Santa Rosa Estate Subdivision, situated at Sta. Rosa,
Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-17272 [6] of the Register of Deeds of
Laguna, with an area of 91,337 square meters, more or less. A portion thereof, consisting of 3.5 hectares,
pertained to Leon and his wife, respondent Aurora Carpo. It was devoted to rice and corn production
(subject land) and was tenanted by one Domingo Pastolero (Domingo), husband of Adoracion Pastolero
(Adoracion).[7] When Domingo passed away, Adoracion together with her son Elpidio Pastolero,
assumed the tenancy rights of Domingo over the subject land.

However, on December 29, 1983, Adoracion, by executing a notarized Pinanumpaang Salaysay[8] with
the conformity of Leon, and for a consideration of P72,500.00, transferred her rights in favor of
petitioner Otilia Sta. Ana[9] (petitioner) who, together with her husband, Marciano de la Cruz (Marciano),
became the new tenants of the subject land.

At the outset, the parties had a harmonious tenancy relationship. [10] Unfortunately, circumstances
transpired which abraded the relationship. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) mediated in
order to amicably settle the controversy, but no settlement was reached by the parties. Thus, the instant
case.

In their Complaint for Ejectment due to Non-Payment of Lease Rentals [11] dated December 1,
1989, respondents alleged that it was their agreement with petitioner and Marciano to increase the
existing rentals from 36 cavans to 45 cavans, and that, if respondents wanted to repossess the property,
they only had to pay the petitioner the amount of P72,500.00, the same amount paid by the latter to
Adoracion. Respondents further averred that despite repeated demands, petitioner refused to pay the
actual rentals from July 1985 to September 1989, in violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 817; and
that the subject land had been declared, upon the recommendation of the Human Settlements
Committee, suitable for commercial and industrial purposes, per Zoning Ordinance of 1981 of the
Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Respondents prayed that petitioner be ejected from the subject land
and be directed to pay P75,016.00 as unpaid rentals.

In their Answer[12] dated January 26, 1990, petitioner and Marciano denied that there was an
agreement to increase the existing rental which was already fixed at 36 cavans of palay, once or twice a
year depending on the availability of irrigation water; that neither was there an agreement as to the
future surrender of the land in favor of the respondents; that they did not refuse to pay the rentals
because they even sent verbal and written notices to the respondents, advising them to accept the same;
and that in view of the latters failure to respond, petitioner and Marciano were compelled to sell the
harvest and to deposit the proceeds thereof in Savings Account No. 9166 with the Universal Savings
Bank at Sta. Rosa, Laguna under the names of Leon and Marciano. As their special affirmative defense,
petitioner and Marciano claimed that Marciano is a farmer-beneficiary of the subject land pursuant to
P.D. 27. Petitioner and Marciano prayed for the outright dismissal of the complaint and for the
declaration of Marciano as full owner of the subject land.

Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The PARADs Ruling

On October 12, 1993, the PARAD ruled that petitioner and Marciano deliberately defaulted in the
payment of the rentals due the respondents. The PARAD found that the deposit made with Republic
Planters Bank was actually in the names of petitioner and Marciano, hence, personal to them. The
PARAD also found that it was only during the hearing that petitioner and Marciano deposited the
amount of P40,000.00 with the Universal Savings Bank for the unpaid rentals. As such the PARAD
considered the deposits as late payments and as implied admission that indeed petitioner and Marciano
did not pay the past rentals when they fell due. The PARAD further held and disposed thus:

The intent of the defendant to subject the said area under PD 27 should pass the criteria
set. Foremost is the determination of the aggregate riceland of plaintiff. He must have
more than seven (7) hectares of land principally devoted to the planting of palay. Area
over seven (7) hectares shall be the one to be covered by PD 27 on Operation Land
Transfer (OLT). In the case at bar, defendants failed to prove that plaintiff has more than
the required riceland. In fact the subject 3.5 hectares are jointly owned by two. Hence,
coverage for OLT is remote.

Defendant claimed that plaintiff is covered by LOI 474, and therefore, he is zero
retention of area. In reference to said law, wherein it provides landowner with other
agricultural land of more than 7 hectares, or have other industrial lands from where he
and his family derived resources, then, the owner cannot retain any riceland. However,
this is not applicable in the instant case, as the defendant failed to prove that plaintiff has
other source of income from where they will derive their sustenance.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Judgment is hereby rendered:

a) Ordering the ejectment of defendant from the subject landholding for non-
payment of lease rentals;

b) Ordering the defendant Marciano de la Cruz to surrender the possession and

cultivation of the subject land to herein plaintiffs;

c) Ordering the defendant to pay as actual damage the amount of P75,016.00

corresponding to the unpaid rentals from July 18, 1985 up to September 16,
1989[; and]
d) [D]eclaring the subject land not covered by Presidential Decree No. 27,
Republic Act [No.] 6657, and Executive Order No. 228.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner and Marciano sought relief from the DARAB.[13]

The DARABs Ruling

On June 24, 1998, the DARAB held:

It is a fundamental rule in this jurisdiction that for non-payment of lease rentals to

warrant the dispossession and ejectment of a tenant, the same must be made in a willful
and deliberate manner (Cabero v. Caturna, et al., CA-G.R. 05886-R, March 10, 1977).
For a valid ouster or ejectment of a farmer-tenant, the willful and deliberate intent not to
 pay lease rentals and/or share can be ascertained when there is a determination of will
not to do a certain act.

Considering the circumstances obtaining in this case, it cannot be concluded that

the defendants-appellants deliberately failed or refused to pay their lease rentals. It was
not the fault of defendants-appellants herein that the rentals did not reach the plaintiffs-
appellees because the latter choose to lend a deaf ear to the notices sent to them. Clearly,
therefore plaintiffs-appellees failed to show by substantial evidence that the defendants-
appellants deliberately failed or refused to pay their lease rentals. It has been held that
the mere failure of a tenant to pay the landowners share does not necessarily give the
latter the right to eject the former when there is lack of deliberate intent on the part of the
tenant to pay (Roxas y Cia v. Cabatuando, 1 SCRA 1106).

Thus:

WHEREFORE, finding the appeal interposed by the defendants-appellants to be

meritorious, the Decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and another judgment
issued as follows:

1. Enjoining plaintiffs-appellees to respect the peaceful possession and

cultivation of the land in suit by the defendants-appellants; and

2. Directing the MARO of Sta. Rosa, Laguna to assist the parties in the proper
accounting of lease rentals to be paid by the defendants-appellants to the
plaintiffs-appellees.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA. On April 16, 2003, Marciano passed away.[14]

The CAs Ruling

On March 5, 2004, the CA affirmed the factual findings of the PARAD that petitioner and Marciano
failed to pay the rentals and that there was no valid tender of payment. The CA added that this failure to
pay was tainted with bad faith and deliberate intent. Thus, petitioner and Marciano did not legally
comply with their duties as tenants. Moreover, the CA held that the subject land was not covered by P.D.
27, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 and Executive Order (E.O.) No. 228, since the same had become a
residential, commercial and industrial land, to wit:

In the case at bar, We opted to give more weight to the petitioners contention that the
subject landholding is for residential, commercial, and industrial purposes as declared by
zoning ordinance of 1981 of the town of Sta. Rosa, Laguna upon recommendation of the
Human Settlement Committee xxx. The vicinity map of the subject landholding shows
that it is almost beside Nissan Motors Technopa[r]k and surrounded by the South
Expressway and several companies such as the Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. and
 Toyota Motors Philippines along the Pulong Santa Cruz, National Road. The vicinity
map shows therefore that the subject landholding is a residential, commercial, and
industrial area exempted from the coverage of P.D. No. 27, Republic Act. No. 6657 and
Executive Order No. 228.

The CA ruled in favor of the respondents in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence

on the matter, the present Petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board-Central Office, Elliptical Road,
Diliman, Quezon City (promulgated on June 24, 1998) is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one entered-REINSTATING the decision of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board-Region IV, Office of the Provincial Adjudicator,
Sta. Cruz, Laguna (dated October 12, 1993). No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration [15] assailing the aforementioned Decision which the CA,
however, denied in its Resolution[16] dated June 28, 2004.

Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ARROGATING

UPON ITSELF WHAT IS OTHERWISE DARS POWER TO DETERMINE WHETHE
R THE SUBJECT AGRICULTURAL LAND HAS
BECOME RESIDENTIAL/INDUSTRIAL/COMMERCIAL.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT

EQUATED LAND RECLASSIFICATION WITH LAND CONVERSION FOR
PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE PROPRIETY OF EJECTMENT OF AN
AGRICULTURAL LESSEE.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED

TO NOTE THAT AN EJECTMENT SUIT BASED ON A CLAIM OF NON-PAYMENT
OF LEASE RENTAL IS DIAMETRICALLY ANTITHETICAL TO THE CLAIM THAT
THE SUBJECT LAND IS NO LONGER AGRICULTURAL BUT A RESIDENTIAL,
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL AREA EXEMPTED FROM THE COVERAGE
OF P.D. NO. 27, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 228.

THE DECISION DATED MARCH 5, 2004--INSOFAR AS IT ADOPTED THE

FINDING OF DARAB-REGION IV, OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL
ADJUDICATOR, STA. CRUZ, LAGUNA INSTEAD OF THAT OF THE DARAB-
CENTRAL--IS VIOLATIVE OF SEC. 14, ART. VIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
FOR HAVING DECIDED WITHOUT EXPRESSING THEREIN CLEARLY AND
DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH SAID DECISION IS
BASED.
 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RESORTING TO
SURMISES AND CONJECTURES WHEN IT RULED THAT THE FAILURE OF THE
HEREIN PETITIONER AND HER DECEASED HUSBAND TO DELIVER THE
LEASE RENTALS TO HEREIN RESPONDENTS, WAS DONE SO IN BAD FAITH
AND WITH DELIBERATE INTENT TO DEPRIVE THE LAND OWNERS THEREOF.

Petitioner asseverates that there is no evidence to support respondents' claim that the failure to pay the
lease rentals was tainted with malevolence, as the records are replete with acts indicative of good faith
on the part of the petitioner and Marciano and bad faith on the part of respondents.

Moreover, petitioner claimed that the power to determine whether or not the subject land is non-
agricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL),
lies with the DAR, and not with the courts; that mere reclassification by way of a zoning ordinance does
not warrant the dispossession of a tenant but conversion does, and entitles the tenant to payment of
disturbance compensation; the legal concepts of reclassification and conversion are separate and distinct
from each other; that respondents' complaint before the PARAD alleged and established the fact that the
subject land is a riceland, therefore, agricultural; that the CA failed to explain why it upheld the findings
of the PARAD on the issue of non-payment of lease rentals; and that though the issue of non-payment of
lease rentals is a question of fact, due to the conflict of the factual findings of the PARAD and CA with
those of the DARAB, petitioner asks that this Court review the evidence on record, and pursuant to the
CA decision in Cabero v. Caturna, et al.,[17] rule on whether petitioner willfully and deliberately refused
to pay lease rentals as to warrant her dispossession from the subject land.[18]

On the other hand, respondents aver that petitioner and her family are wealthy, as they own
numerous properties in Sta. Rosa, Laguna including a luxurious house;[19] that, as such, petitioner cannot
be considered as a landless tenant deserving the protection of agrarian reform laws; that the DARAB
negated the highest degree of respect the factual findings of the
PARAD deserved; that petitioner's claims that Marciano repeatedly made

verbal and written notices[20] for Leon to accept their lease rentals were fraudulent designs to disguise the
deliberate intent of petitioner not to pay the lease rentals; that when Leon went to petitioner's residence,
petitioner did not pay the P10,000.00 due as lease rentals; that during the hearing before the PARAD,
when respondents' counsel requested that they be furnished a bank certificate as to the existence of said
bank deposits in Republic Planters Bank as of April 20, 1987 and October 1, 1987, petitioner herself
commented, Nagdeposito ho talaga kami sa pangalan namin;[21] that the statement of petitioner is an
admission that bank deposits, if any, were made, not in the name of Leon as contained in the written
notices, but rather in the names of petitioner and Marciano; that such certificate was not introduced in
evidence and that upon inquiry, said deposits do not actually exist; that per recent inquiry, the bank
deposit in Universal Savings Bank only contains P1,020.19 due to previous withdrawals made by
Marciano; that the foregoing circumstances indicate a pattern of fraudulent misrepresentations by the
petitioner to mislead the DARAB into believing that petitioner and Marciano did not deliberately refuse
to pay the lease rentals; that from July 18, 1985 up to the present, petitioner failed to pay the lease
rentals showing again, the deliberate refusal to pay; that this default on the part of the petitioner has been
recurring for several years already, thus depriving the respondents as landowners of their share of the
subject land in violation of the principle of social justice; that as raised in respondents Omnibus
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration[22] before the DARAB and as found by the CA based on its
vicinity map,[23] the subject land is of a residential, commercial and industrial character, exempted from
agrarian reform coverage; and that the DARAB erred in not finding the sale of the tenancy rights of
Adoracion to petitioner and Marciano for P72,500.00 violative of P.D. 27 even if the same was with
Leon's consent. The sale, respondents contend was therefore, null and void ab initio, not susceptible of
any ratification.[24]

Our Ruling

Before we resolve this case on the merits, a procedural issue must be disposed of.

Respondents strongly argue that the instant Petition was filed out of time because, while
petitioner originally claimed to have received her copy of the CA Resolution [25]dated June 28, 2004,
denying her Motion for Reconsideration,[26] on July 12, 2004, petitioner eventually admitted, after
respondents showed proof to the contrary, that she actually received the said Resolution on July 7, 2004.
[27]
Thus, petitioner had only up to July 22, 2004 to appeal the CA's ruling to this Court. In this case,
petitioner filed her Motion[28] for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari (Motion)
on July 23, 2004. As such, there was no more period to extend. Further, the instant Petition was filed
on August 27, 2004, or three (3) days beyond the thirty-day extended period. Hence, respondents submit
that the CA decision had already become final and executory.[29]

Petitioner alleges that on July 15, 2004, she met with her counsel to engage the latter's legal
services. During said meeting, counsel asked petitioner about the date of receipt of the assailed CA
Resolution. Petitioner replied that she received her copy on July 12, 2004. On July 20, 2004, counsel
filed an Entry of Appearance with the CA.[30] On July 23, 2004, petitioner through counsel filed the
Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review. On August 11, 2004, petitioner received a
copy of respondents' Opposition to the Motion. Thereafter, upon verification, petitioner admitted that she
received the copy of the CA Resolution on July 7, 2004. Thus, her Motion was admittedly filed one day
late. Petitioner begs the indulgence of this Court for her oversight and mistake, attributing the same to
her lack of education and old age.
 Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. If the
application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it is always within our
power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from their operation. Law and jurisprudence grant
to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with the procedural rules, even the most mandatory in
character, mindful of the duty to reconcile the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties'
right to an opportunity to be heard.[31]

Our recent ruling in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo[32] is instructive:

We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit
liberal application of the Rules, allowing us, depending on the circumstances, to set aside
technical infirmities and give due course to the appeal. In cases where we dispense with
the technicalities, we do not mean to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods
set by law. In those rare cases where we did not stringently apply the procedural rules,
there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our
judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between
the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given
the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.

In this case, petitioner was one day late in filing her Motion for Extension. To deny the Petition
on this ground alone is too harsh a penalty for a days delay, taking into consideration the time, resources
and effort spent by petitioner and even by the respondents, in order to pursue this case all the way to this
Court. Thus, we dispense with the apparent procedural defect and resolve this case on the merits. The
ends of justice are better served when cases are determined on the merits with all parties given full
opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections.[33]

The Petition is impressed with merit.

In sum, there are two (2) ultimate issues that require resolution in this case:
1) Whether the CA erred in ruling that the subject land had already become residential,
commercial and/or industrial, thus, excluded from the coverage of our laws on agrarian reform;
and

2) Whether the petitioner, as an agricultural tenant, failed to pay her lease rentals when the same fell
due as to warrant her dispossession of the subject land.

On the first issue, we rule in the affirmative.

To recapitulate, the instant case sprang from a Complaint for Ejectment based on Non-Payment
of lease rentals. Though an allegation was made by the respondents that the land had been declared,
upon the recommendation of the Human Settlements Committee, suitable for commercial and industrial
purposes, per Zoning Ordinance of 1981 of the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, no argument was advanced by
respondents to support such allegation, in the same way that no prayer for the ejectment of the tenants
was raised based on that allegation. The PARAD held that petitioner should be ejected for non-payment
of lease rentals. It also ruled that the subject land is not covered by P.D. No. 27, R.A. No. 6657, and E.O.
No. 228, not on the basis of the allegation in the complaint, but on the respondents' right of retention.

On appeal, the DARAB concentrated on the issue of petitioners failure to pay lease rentals.
When the DARAB ruled that petitioner and Marciano did not deliberately fail to pay said rentals,
respondents raised a new issue in their Omnibus Motion that the transaction between Adoracion and
petitioner was void in violation of P.D. No. 27, despite the conformity of Leon. This issue was not
resolved by the DARAB.

Finally, when the case reached the CA, the appellate court affirmed the findings of the PARAD
that petitioner and Marciano deliberately and in bad faith did not pay the lease rentals. The CA,
however, also held that the subject land had already become a residential, commercial and industrial area
based on the vicinity map showing that the land was surrounded by commercial and industrial
establishments.
Without doubt, the PARAD acted without jurisdiction when it held that the subject land was no
longer covered by our agrarian laws because of the retention rights of the respondents. The CA likewise
acted without jurisdiction when it ruled that the land had become non-agricultural based on a zoning
ordinance of 1981 on the strength of a mere vicinity map. These rulings violated the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which
jurisdiction has initially been lodged in an administrative body of special competence. For agrarian
reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Executive Order 229 vested the
DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters; and (2)
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources.[34]

In Department of Agrarian Reform v. Abdulwahid,[35] we held:

As held by this Court in Centeno v. Centeno [343 SCRA 153], "the DAR is vested with
the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall
have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the
 agrarian reform program." The DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction
"to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or
incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
under R.A. No. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. No. 3844 as amended by R.A.
No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations."

Under Section 3 (d) of R.A. No. 6657 (CARP Law), "agrarian dispute" is defined to
include "(d) . . . any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired
under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners
to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or
lessor and lessee."

Simply put, agrarian disputes, as defined by law and settled in jurisprudence, are within the
primary and exclusive original jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB, while issues of retention
and non-coverage of a land under agrarian reform, among others, are within the domain of the DAR
Secretary.

Thus, Section 3, Rule II of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides:

SECTION 3. Agrarian Law Implementation Cases. The Adjudicator or the Board

shall have no jurisdiction over matters involving the administrative implementation of
RA No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of
1988 and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules and administrative orders,
which shall be under the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Office of the
Secretary of the DAR in accordance with his issuances, to wit:

3.1 Classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under the

agrarian reform program and the initial issuance of CLOAs and EPs,
including protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of such
coverage;
3.2 Classification, identification, inclusion, exclusion, qualification, or
disqualification of potential/actual farmer-beneficiaries;
3.3 Subdivision surveys of land under CARP;
3.4 Recall, or cancellation of provisional lease rentals, Certificates of Land
Transfers (CLTs) and CARP Beneficiary Certificates (CBCs) in cases
outside the purview of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 816, including the
issuance, recall, or cancellation of EPs or CLOAs not yet registered with
the Register of Deeds;
3.5 Exercise of the right of retention by the landowner;
3.6 Application for exemption from coverage under Section 10 of RA 6657;
 3.7 Application for exemption pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion
No. 44 (1990);
3.8 Exclusion from CARP coverage of agricultural land used for livestock, swine,
and poultry raising;
3.9 Cases of exemption/exclusion of fish pond and prawn farms from the
coverage of CARP pursuant to RA 7881;
3.10 Issuance of Certificate of Exemption for land subject of Voluntary Offer to
Sell (VOS) and Compulsory Acquisition (CA) found unsuitable for
agricultural purposes;
3.11 Application for conversion of agricultural land to residential, commercial,
industrial, or other non-agricultural uses and purposes including protests
or oppositions thereto;
3.12 Determination of the rights of agrarian reform beneficiaries to homelots;
3.13 Disposition of excess area of the tenants/farmer-beneficiary's landholdings;
3.14 Increase in area of tillage of a tenant/farmer-beneficiary;
3.15 Conflict of claims in landed estates administered by DAR and its
predecessors; or
3.16 Such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred to it by the
Secretary of the DAR.

Verily, there is an established tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondents in this
case. An action for Ejectment for Non-Payment of lease rentals is clearly an agrarian dispute,
cognizable at the initial stage by
the PARAD and thereafter by the DARAB.[36] But issues with respect to the retention rights of the
respondents as landowners and the exclusion/exemption of the subject land from the coverage of
agrarian reform are issues not cognizable by the PARAD and the DARAB, but by the DAR Secretary
because, as aforementioned, the same are Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases.

It has not escaped our notice that, as this case progressed and reached a higher level in the
hierarchy of tribunals, the respondents would, invariably, proffer an additional theory or defense, in
order to effect petitioners eviction from the land. As a consequence, the simple issue of ejectment based
on non-payment of rentals has been muddled.

Proof necessary for the resolution of the issue of the land being covered by, or
excluded/exempted from, P.D. No. 27, R.A. No. 6657, and other pertinent agrarian laws, as well as of
the issue of the right of retention of the respondents, was not offered in evidence. Worse, the PARAD
resolved the issue of retention even if it was not raised by the respondents at that level, and even if the
PARAD had no jurisdiction over the same.
 Likewise, the CA ruled that the land had ceased being agricultural on the basis of a mere vicinity
map, in open disregard of the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, since the issue was within the province
of the Secretary of DAR.

We take this opportunity to remind the PARAD and the CA that courts of justice have no power
to decide a question not in issue. A judgment that goes beyond the issues, and purports to adjudicate
something on which the parties were not heard, is extra-judicial, irregular and
invalid. This norm applies not only to courts of justice, but also to quasi-judicial

bodies such as the PARAD. Accordingly, premature and irregular were the PARAD ruling on the
retention rights of the respondents, and the CA decision on the non-agricultural character of the land
subject of this controversy -- these issues not having passed the scrutiny of the DAR Secretary -- are
premature and irregular.[37]

Thus, we cannot allow ourselves to fall into the same error as that committed by the PARAD and
the CA, and resolve the issue of the non-agricultural nature of the subject land by receiving, at this stage,
pieces of evidence and evaluating the same, without the respondents having first introduced them in the
proper forum. The Office of the DAR Secretary is in a better position to resolve the issues on retention
and exclusion/exemption from agrarian reform coverage, being the agency lodged with such authority
inasmuch it possesses the necessary expertise on the matter.[38]

Likewise, we refrain from entertaining the issue raised by respondents that petitioner and her
family are not landless tenants and are therefore not deserving of any protection under our laws on
agrarian reform, because fairness and due process dictate that issues not raised in the proceedings below
should not be raised for the first time on appeal.[39]

On the second issue, we rule in the negative.

Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 3844,[40] as amended, coupled with the fact that the respondents
are the complainants themselves, the burden of proof to show the existence of a lawful cause for the
ejectment of the petitioner as an agricultural lessee rests upon the respondents as

agricultural lessors.[41] This proceeds from the principle that a tenancy relationship, once established,
entitles the tenant to security of tenure. Petitioner can only be ejected from the agricultural landholding
on grounds provided by law.[42] Section 36 of the same law pertinently provides:
 Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. Notwithstanding any agreement as to
the period or future surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the
enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is
shown that:

xxxx

(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That
if the non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five
per centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for
dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not
thereby extinguished;

xxxx

Respondents failed to discharge such burden. The agricultural tenant's failure to pay the lease
rentals must be willful and deliberate in order to warrant his dispossession of the land that he tills.

Petitioner's counsel opines that there appears to be no decision by this Court on the matter; he
thus submits that we should use the CA decision in Cabero v. Caturna. This is not correct. In an En
Banc Decision by this Court in Roxas y Cia v. Cabatuando, et al.,[43] we held that under our law and
jurisprudence, mere failure of a tenant to pay the landholder's share does not necessarily give the latter
the right to eject the former when there is lack of deliberate intent on the part of the tenant to pay. This
ruling has not been overturned.

The term deliberate is characterized by or results from slow, careful, thorough calculation and
consideration of effects and consequences.[44] The term willful, on the other hand, is defined as one
governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason.[45]

We agree with the findings of the DARAB that it was not the fault of petitioner that the lease
rentals did not reach the respondents because the latter chose to ignore the notices sent to them. To note,
as early as November 10, 1986, Marciano executed an Affidavit[46] stating that Leon refused to receive
the respective lease rentals consisting of 37 cavans for November 1985 and July 1986. For 1987,
Marciano wrote Leon two letters[47] informing him of the availability of the lease rentals for April and
October of the same year. On April 27, 1988, Marciano sought DAR intervention and mediation with
respect to the execution of a leasehold contract and the fixing of the leasehold rentals. [48]Meetings were
set but respondents failed to attend.[49] The dispute was referred to the barangay but the parties failed to
amicably settle.[50]
 These factual circumstances negate the PARAD findings of Marcianos and petitioner's deliberate
and willful intent not to pay lease rentals. Good faith was clearly demonstrated by Marciano and
petitioner when, because respondents refused to accept the proffered payment, they even went to the
point of seeking government intervention in order to address their problems with respondents. Absent
such deliberate and willful refusal to pay lease rentals, petitioner's ejectment from the subject land is not
justified.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60640 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) dated June 24, 1998 in DARAB Case
No. 2203 is REINSTATED without prejudice to the rights of respondent-spouses Leon and Aurora
Carpo to seek recourse from the Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary on the
other issues they raised. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 175098, August 26, 2015

ISMAEL V. CRISOSTOMO, Petitioner, v. MARTIN P. VICTORIA, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure praying that the July 31,
2006 Decision1 and the October 20, 2006 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals Eighth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 94107 be
reversed and set aside, and that the April 4, 2005 Decision 3 and March 17, 2006 Resolution4 of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board be reinstated.

The assailed July 31, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the April 4, 2005 Decision and March 17,
2006 Resolution of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. It recognized respondent Martin P. Victoria
(Victoria) as the bona fide tenant of a parcel of riceland owned by petitioner Ismael V. Crisostomo (Crisostomo). The
assailed October 20, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals denied Crisostomo's Motion for Reconsideration.

The April 4, 2005 Decision and March 17, 2006 Resolution of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
sustained the April 7, 2003 Decision5 of the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Bulacan, which ruled in
favor of Crisostomo in his action to eject Victoria from the subject riceland.

In a Complaint for Ejectment filed before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Bulacan, Crisostomo
alleged that he, along with his deceased brother Jose Crisostomo, were the registered owners of a parcel of riceland with an
area of 562,694 square meters. This was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-68421 and located in Sta. Barbara,
Baliuag, Bulacan. On June 21, 1973, he and his brother allegedly entered into a lease contract with David Hipolito (Hipolito)
over a portion of the riceland (disputed portion). The contract was supposedly in effect until Hipolito's death on December 2,
1999. As Hipolito died without any known heirs, Crisostomo was set to reclaim possession and to take over cultivation of the
disputed portion. However, in January 2000, Victoria entered the disputed portion and began cultivating it without the
knowledge and consent of Crisostomo. Crisostomo confronted Victoria, who insisted that he had tenancy rights over the
disputed portion.6

In his Answer, Victoria claimed that Hipolito was his uncle. He alleged that even during the lifetime of Hipolito, it was he
who was doing farmwork on the disputed portion and that he did so with Crisostomo's knowledge. He added that from the
time Hipolito became bedridden, it was he who performed all duties pertaining to tenancy, including the delivery of lease
rentals and corresponding shares in the harvest to Crisostomo. He asserted that Crisostomo's act of receiving lease rentals
from him amounted to implied consent, which gave rise to a tenancy relationship between them. 7

In its April 7, 2003 Decision,8 the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Bulacan ruled in favor of
Crisostomo and ordered Victoria, together with all persons claiming rights under him, to vacate the disputed portion and
surrender its possession to Crisostomo.9

The Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, noting that the essential element of consent was absent, held that
Victoria could not be deemed the tenant of the disputed portion. It further held that implied tenancy could not arise in a
situation where another person is validly instituted as tenant and is enjoying recognition as such by the landowner. 10

In its April 4, 2005 Decision,11 the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board denied Victoria's Appeal. In its March
17, 2006 Resolution,12 it denied Victoria's Motion for Reconsideration.

In its assailed July 31, 2006 Decision,13 the Court of Appeals Eighth Division reversed the rulings of the Office of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Bulacan and of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. It
recognized Victoria as bona fide tenant of the disputed portion.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that "Hipolito, as the legal possessor, could legally allow [Victoria] to work and till the
landholding"14 and that Crisostomo was bound by Hipolito's act. It added that Crisostomo "had been receiving his share of
the harvest from [Victoria], as evidenced by the numerous receipts indicating so." 15 It emphasized that "[t]he receipts
rendered beyond dispute [Victoria's] status as the agricultural tenant on the landholding." 16 It further noted that as an
agricultural tenant, Victoria was entitled to security of tenure who, absent any of the grounds for extinguishing agricultural
leasehold relationships, "should not be deprived of but should continue his tenancy on the landholding." 17

In its assailed October 20, 2006 Resolution,18 the Court of Appeals Eighth Division denied Crisostomo's Motion for
Reconsideration.

Hence, this Petition was filed.

For resolution is the issue of whether respondent Martin P. Victoria is a bona fide tenant of the disputed portion.

Section 6 of Republic Act No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, identifies the recognized parties
in an agricultural leasehold relation: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SECTION 6. Parties to Agricultural Leasehold Relation. The agricultural leasehold relation shall be limited to the person
who furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who
personally cultivates the same. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Proceeding from Section 6 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, the Court of Appeals capitalized on Hipolito's supposed
status as "legal possessor" of the disputed portion, a status that was deemed to emanate from his having been the lessee.
Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that "Hipolito, as the legal possessor, could legally allow [respondent] to work and till
the landholding"19 thereby making respondent a tenant whose security of tenure petitioner must now respect.

The Court of Appeals is in error. Hipolito's status as the acknowledged tenant did not clothe him with the capacity to
designate respondent as a tenant.

This court has settled that tenancy relations cannot be an expedient artifice for vesting in the tenant rights over the
landholding which far exceed those of the landowner. It cannot be a means for vesting a tenant with security of tenure,
such that he or she is effectively the landowner.

Even while agrarian reform laws are pieces of social legislation, landowners are equally entitled to protection. In Calderon v.
Dela Cruz:20
It is true that RA 3844 is a social legislation designed to promote economic and social stability and must be interpreted
liberally to give full force and effect to its clear intent. This liberality in interpretation, however, should not accrue in favor of
actual tillers of the land, the tenant- farmers, but should extend to landowners as well. . . . The landowners deserve as
much consideration as the tenants themselves in order not to create an economic dislocation, where tenants are solely
favored but the landowners become impoverished.21 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted) ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In Valencia v. Court of Appeals, this court grappled with the consequences of a lessee's employment of farmhands who
22

subsequently claimed the status of tenants. Insisting on a tenant's right to security of tenure, these farmhands refused to
vacate and surrender possession of the subject land despite the landowner's demands: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Contrary to the impression of private respondents, Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, does not automatically authorize a
civil law lessee to employ a tenant without the consent of the landowner. The lessee must be so specifically authorized.
For the right to hire a tenant is basically a personal right of a landowner, except as may he provided by law. But certainly
nowhere in Sec. 6 does it say that a civil law lessee of a landholding is automatically authorized to install a tenant
thereon. A different interpretation would create a perverse and absurd situation where a person who wants to be a tenant,
and taking advantage of this perceived ambiguity in the law, asks a third person to become a civil law lessee of the
landowner. Incredibly, this tenant would technically have a better right over the property than the landowner himself. This
tenant would then gain security of tenure, and eventually become owner of the land by operation of law. This is most unfair
to the hapless and unsuspecting landowner who entered into a civil law lease agreement in good faith only to realize later
on that he can no longer regain possession of his property due to the installation of a tenant by the civil law lessee.

On the other hand, under the express provision of Art. 1649 of the Civil Code, the lessee cannot assign the lease without
the consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. In the case before us, not only is there no stipulation
to the contrary; the lessee is expressly prohibited from subleasing or encumbering the land, which includes installing a
leasehold tenant thereon since the right to do so is an attribute of ownership. Plainly stated therefore, a contract of civil law
lease can prohibit a civil law lessee from employing a tenant on the land subject matter of the lease agreement. An
extensive and correct discussion of the statutory interpretation of Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, is provided by the
minority view in Bernas v. Court of Appeals.23 (Emphasis supplied) ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

As explained in Valencia, Section 6 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code was not designed to vest in the enumerated
personsthe owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessora capacity that they did not previously have. Stated
otherwise, Section 6 was not the enabling legislation that, from the moment of its adoption, was to "allow" 24 them, as the
Court of Appeals posits, to furnish landholding to another who shall personally cultivate it, thereby making that other person
a tenant.

Valencia explained that Section 6 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code is a subsequent restatement of a
"precursor"25 provision: Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1199. This precursor reads: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SECTION 8. Limitation of Relation. The relation of landholder and tenant shall be limited to the person who furnishes
land, either as owner, lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and to the person who actually works the land himself with
the aid of labor available from within his immediate farm household. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Valencia noted that Section 8 assumed a pre-existing tenancy relation. From its epigraph "Limitation of Relation," the import
and effect of Section 8 is not to enable or (to use the word of the Court of Appeals) to "allow" the persons enumerated to
make a tenant of another person. Rather, it is simply to settle that whatever relation exists, it shall be limited to two
persons only: first, the person who furnished the land; and second, the person who actually works the land. "Once the
tenancy relation is established, the parties to that relation are limited to the persons therein stated." 26
As it was with the precursor, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1199, so it is with Section 6 of the Agricultural Land Reform
Code: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 6 as already stated simply enumerates who are the parties to an existing contract of agricultural tenancy, which
presupposes that a tenancy already exists. It does not state that those who furnish the landholding, i.e., either as owner,
civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, are automatically authorized to employ a tenant on the landholding. The
reason is obvious. The civil lease agreement may be restrictive. Even the owner himself may not be free to install a tenant,
as when his ownership or possession is encumbered or is subject to a lien or condition that he should not employ a tenant
thereon. This contemplates a situation where the property may be intended for some other specific purpose allowed by law,
such as, its conversion into an industrial estate or a residential subdivision. 27 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Limiting the relation to these two persons, as well as preventing others from intruding into this relation, is in keeping with
the rationale for adopting Section 6 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

According to Mr. Justice Guillermo S. Santos and CAR Executive Judge Artemio C. Macalino, respected authorities on
agrarian reform, the reason for Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 3844 and Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 1199 in limiting the relationship to the lessee
and the lessor is to "discourage absenteeism on the part of the lessor and the custom of co-tenancy" under which "the
tenant (lessee) employs another to do the farm work for him, although it is he with whom the landholder (lessor) deals
directly. Thus, under this practice, the one who actually works the land gets the short end of the bargain, for the nominal or
'capitalist' lessee hugs for himself a major portion of the harvest." This breeds exploitation, discontent and confusion. . . .
The kasugpong, kasapi, or katulong also works at the pleasure of the nominal tenant. When the new law, therefore, limited
tenancy relation to the landholder and the person who actually works the land himself with the aid of labor available from
within his immediate farm household, it eliminated the nominal tenant or middleman from the picture.

Another noted authority on land reform, Dean Jeremias U. Montemayor, explains the rationale for Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 1199,
the precursor of Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 3844: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Since the law establishes a special relationship in tenancy with important consequences, it properly pinpoints the persons to
whom said relationship shall apply. The spirit of the law is to prevent both landholder absenteeism and tenant absenteeism.
Thus, it would seem that the discretionary powers and important duties of the landholder, like the choice of crop or seed,
cannot be left to the will or capacity of an agent or overseer, just as the cultivation of the land cannot be entrusted by the
tenant to some other people. Tenancy relationship has been held to be of a personal character. 28 (Citations omitted) ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Court of Appeals banks on the following statement made by this court in its 1988 Decision in Co v. Intermediate
Appellate Court:29
As long as the legal possessor of the land constitutes a person as a tenant-farmer by virtue of an express or implied lease,
such an act is binding on the owner of the property even if he himself may not have given his consent to such an
arrangement. This is settled jurisprudence. The purpose of the law is to protect the tenant-farmer's security of tenure,
which could otherwise be arbitrarily terminated by an owner simply manifesting his non-conformity to the
relationship.30 (Citation omitted) ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

However, the factual context in Co, which engendered the quoted pronouncement, is not entirely identical with that of this
case. This statement should, thus, not be taken as binding in this case.

Co involved a parcel which was originally owned by Toribio Alarcon. Sometime before the Second World War, Alarcon
entered into a tenancy relation with Miguel Alfonso. In 1955, Alarcon leased out the same parcel to Republic Broadcasting
System (DZBB). During this time, Alfonso maintained his tenancy. In 1968, Joveno Roaring started helping Alarcon cultivate
the land. Subsequently, Roaring took over the cultivation "in his own right." 31 Roaring's status as such was consolidated
when, with Alfonso's death in 1976, he took over the tenancy. Much later, the parcel was acquired by Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank in a foreclosure sale. The parcel was then acquired by Anderson Co and, still much later, by Jose Chua.
As Co and Chua asked Roaring to vacate the parcel, Roaring filed a Complaint for maintenance of possession and
damages.32

The statement from Co that the Court of Appeals quoted was made in the course of this court's consideration of Roaring's
relation with DZBB. As this court recounted, DZBB was the party receiving shares from the harvest. Thus, DZBB exercised
and benefitted from the rights and prerogatives that normally accrue to the landowner. Stated otherwise, in Co, there was a
clear finding that DZBB stood in the shoes of the landowner: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

We also find that Roaring, besides paying rentals, regularly shared the harvest from the lot with the DZBB, which accepted
the same and included it in the raffle of prizes held during the regular Christmas program for its employees. That the DZBB
was not much interested in such share and that its board of directors had not adopted a resolution recognizing the
agricultural lease in favor of Roaring should not signify that the lease does not exist. The acts of the DZBB clearly show that
it had impliedly allowed Roaring, in his own right, to continue with the original lease arrangement it had with his father-in-
law. Notably, the latter's possession and cultivation of the land from the time it was leased to the DZBB in 1955 and until
his death in 1976 were never questioned by the company.

As long as the legal possessor of the land constitutes a person as a tenant-farmer by virtue of an express or implied lease,
such an act is binding on the owner of the property even if he himself may not have given his consent to such an
arrangement. This is settled jurisprudence. The purpose of the law is to protect the tenant-farmer's security of tenure,
which could otherwise be arbitrarily terminated by an owner simply manifesting his non-conformity to the
relationship.33 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

There is nothing in this case to indicate that Hipolito exercised rights and prerogatives that accrue to the landowner and
which could imply that he was in such a situation where he could exercise a landowner's competencies. Hipolito was not
clothed with authority to "allow" respondent to be the tenant himself. Hipolito, as lessee, was entitled to possession of the
disputed portion, and legally so. He was, in this sense, a "legal possessor." However, his capacities ended here. There was
nothing that authorized him to enter into a tenancy relation with another.

II

Even if Section 6 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code were to be interpreted loosely, petitioner as the landowner never
consented to making respondent a tenant.

This court has settled the requisites for tenancy, the core of which is the element of consent. All these requisites must be
demonstrated by substantial evidence; otherwise, the person claiming to be a tenant is not entitled to security of
tenure: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Tenants are defined as persons who in themselves and with the aid available from within their immediate farm
households cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latters consent, for purposes of production,
sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or
ascertainable in produce or money or both under the leasehold tenancy system.

Based on the foregoing definition of a tenant, entrenched in jurisprudence are the following essential elements of tenancy:
1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring
about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the
harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. The presence of all these elements must be proved
by substantial evidence. Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure and is not covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws. Tenancy
relationship cannot be presumed. Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of
tenure.34 (Emphasis supplied) ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

This court has previously recognized implied consent as sufficing to vest security of tenure in a person claiming to be a
tenant. In Ponce v. Guevarra35 and Joya v. Pareja,36 this court considered the landowners' acts of personally negotiating for
extensions and for better terms with the persons purporting to be tenants as having placed them in estoppel or otherwise
demonstrating their ratification of tenancy.

Here, the Court of Appeals relied on petitioner's having supposedly received shares of the harvest from respondent and his
issuance of the corresponding receipts as demonstrating his implied consent to respondent's tenancy.

We disagree.

While the receipts issued by petitioner bore respondent's name, petitioner never failed to similarly indicate the name of
David Hipolito, the person who, petitioner maintains, is the valid lessee. Petitioner annexed copies of several of these
receipts to his Petition. These receipts consistently indicated: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

J.G.N. TRADING
Tarcan, Conception, Baliwag, Bulacan

No. ...

Petsa ...........

Tinanggap kay MARTIN VICTORIA (DAVID HIPOLITO) ng STA. BARBARA, BALIUAG, BULACAN and kabuuang . . . kaban ng
palay na may timbang . . . kilo.37 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Petitioner may have acknowledged actual delivery made by respondent. However, his consistent inclusion of Hipolito's name
indicates that, to his mind, it was still Hipolito, albeit through another person making actual delivery, sharing the produce
with him. Respondent was recognized only as an agent acting for Hipolito.

Concededly, there is some ambiguity to these receipts. For instance, ' one could make a case for saying that respondent
and Hipolito were co-tenants cooperating in delivering the produce to petitioner. Indeed, the receipts could have used more
definite language such as "for the account of," "on behalf of," or "para kay." We reiterate however, the requisites of tenancy
must be established by substantial evidence. Logically, it is for the person averring tenancy to adduce such evidence. Here,
the evidence does not work to respondent's interest. At best, it evinces an ambiguity; at worst, it proves that he was only
an agent.

Just as damaging to respondent's cause is petitioner's act of demanding that respondent vacate and surrender possession of
the disputed portion as soon as Hipolito died. Stated otherwise, as soon as the lease period that petitioner and Hipolito
agreed upon expired, petitioner expected that the disputed portion was to be restored to his possession.

This definitively settles that, in petitioner's mind, only Hipolito was entitled to possession precisely because it was only with
Hipolito that petitioner agreed to cede possession for a definite duration. Conversely, this definitively settles that petitioner
never recognized respondent as having any personal right to possess the disputed portion.

The Court of Appeals merely noted that petitioner issued receipts to respondent and stopped at that. As we have
demonstrated, a more exacting consideration of the totality of petitioner's actions belies any consent or subsequent
ratification of respondent's alleged tenancy.

To hold that respondent is the bona fide tenant of the disputed portion would be to extend petitioner's dispossession for a
period much longer that he had originally contemplated. It puts him at the mercy of a person whom he recognized as a
tenant. This is precisely the "economic dislocation" that this court warned against in Calderon. To hold as such would be to
permit agrarian reform laws to be used as a convenient artifice for investing in a supposed tenant rights that far exceed
those of the owner.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated July 31, 2006 and the
assailed Resolution dated October 20, 2006 of the Court of Appeals Eighth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 94107, which
recognized respondent Martin P. Victoria as the bona fide tenant of the disputed portion, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The July 4, 2005 Decision and March 17, 2006 Resolution of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
are REINSTATED.

Respondent Martin P. Victoria and all those claiming rights under him are ordered to vacate and surrender possession of the
disputed portion to petitioner Ismael V. Crisostomo.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 191479, September 21, 2015

JESUS VELASQUEZ, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES PATERNO C. CRUZ AND ROSARIO CRUZ, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review of the Decision 1 dated 12 August 2009 and Resolution2 dated 24 February 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 105140 which ordered the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Branch 79 to
assume jurisdiction over the complaint in Civil Case No. 264-M-2007 for recovery of possession with damages.

The facts are as follows:

Respondents Spouses Paterno and Rosario Cruz are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Sta.
Monica in Hagonoy, Bulacan with an area of four hectares, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 020-10-022-
11-027. On 7 May 2007, respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession with Accounting and Damages against
petitioner Jesus Velasquez. Respondents alleged in their Complaint that petitioner's father-in-law, Bernabe Navarro
(Navarro) was a tenant in said lot until 6 April 1985 when the latter relinquished his tenancy rights by virtue of
a Sinumpaang Salaysay; that no other person was installed as tenant of the farmland; that they discovered that petitioner
entered the farmland without their knowledge and consent; that from 1985 up to the time of the filing of the complaint,
petitioner never paid a single centavo as rent for the use of the land; and that they leased the farmland to a certain
Godofredo Tosco in 1995 but petitioner refused to vacate the property. Respondents prayed for the surrender of possession
of the property to them and for accounting and damages.3

In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss,, petitioner contended that, jurisdiction pertains to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) because in the instant controversy is an agrarian dispute. Petitioner asserted that he was
assisting Navarro in tilling the land since 1975. He claimed that he continued working on the land after the death of
Navarro. Petitioner defended his non-payment of rentals due to the fact that the subject land has lost its suitability for
agricultural production, thus, his non-payment is not a ground for dispossession. As a further justification to the non-
payment of rentals, petitioner emphasized that since the implementation of the Operation Land Transfer, he is deemed to
be the owner of the subject land and respondents had no more right to demand rentals. Petitioner claimed that he was
identified as a farmer-beneficiary and has since been paying amortizations to Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). 4

On 15 April 2008, the RTC issued an Order 5 dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction. On 27 June 2008, the trial court
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by respondents for violation of the three-day notice rule. 6

Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals arguing that the elements of tenancy, which would
vest jurisdiction on the DARAB, were not sufficiently established. Respondents also assailed the denial of their motion for
reconsideration for violation of the three-day notice rule. Respondents explained that the motion for reconsideration was
served on 5 May 2008 and the hearing was set on 9 May 2008. Respondents averred that they had no intention to violate
the said rule because they were of the belief that the motion for reconsideration would be received by respondents' counsel
on the following day, 6 May 2008.7

During the pendency of the petition before the appellate court, petitioner became the registered owner of the subject land
under Original Certificate of Title No. EP-992-C.8

Before petitioner could inform the appellate court of this significant development, the Court of Appeals, on 12 August 2009,
found merit in respondents' petition. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' Decision reads: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The April 15, 2008 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Malolos City, Branch 79, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is hereby ordered to assume jurisdiction over the case and act
on it with dispatch.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The appellate court ruled that petitioner failed to establish tenancy relationship between the parties. According to the
appellate court, the elements of consent and sharing of harvest are lacking. Moreover, petitioner was held as unqualified to
be a successor-tenant by virtue of hereditary succession because he is not among those listed under Section 9 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3844, he being only a relative by affinity.

In his motion for reconsideration, petitioner claimed absolute ownership over the disputed land by virtue of the issuance of
an emancipation patent in his favor and the corresponding registration of the same With the Register of Deeds of Bulacan
on 19 September 2008. Resultantly, petitioner argued that the issue of tenancy is now immaterial and any and all matters
relating to the identification, qualification or disqualification of petitioner as a farmer-beneficiary, as well as the validity of
his emancipation patent are in the nature of an agrarian dispute, hence, beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court.
On 24 February 2010, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. 10

Aggrieved, petitioner file d the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari contending that the award of an emancipation patent
in the name of petitioner is the best proof that Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has identified him as the bonafide
successor of his deceased father-in-law, Navarro. Petitioner adds that by becoming the farmer-beneficiary and registered
owner of the subject lot, the issue of the existence or non-existence of tenancy relationship between the parties has become
moot and academic. Petitioner maintains that since Original Certificate of Title No. EP-992-C was issued pursuant to
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 and Operation Land Transfer, any and all actions pertaining to the right and obligation of
petitioner in connection thereto is vested in DARAB which has primary and exclusive original and appellate jurisdiction.
Similarly, any and all matters relating to the identification, qualification or disqualification of petitioner as a farmer-
beneficiary over the subject land and the validity of his emancipation patent over the same land are in the nature of an
agrarian dispute beyond the jurisdiction of the RTC. Lastly, petitioner asserts that respondents had clearly recognized the
authority of the DAR to take cognizance of the dispute between the parties when they had previously submitted the matter
involved herein with the various DAR offices.

Respondents counter that not all the elements of agricultural tenancy are present in this case. Petitioner could not have
succeeded Navarro as tenant of respondents because he is not among those listed under Section 9 of R.A. No. 3844.
Respondents cite the Court of Appeals observation that it has not come across any official document from the DAR expressly
identifying petitioner as Navarro's successor. Respondents insist that a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed.

The core of this dispute is the question of whom between the DARAB and the RTC, has jurisdiction over the case.

Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. - The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture
(DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

xxxx

Rule II, Section 1(1.1) of the DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RULE II

Jurisdiction of the Board and its Adjudicators

SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original Jurisdiction. The Adjudicator shall have primary and exclusive original
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate the following cases:

1.1 The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical, engaged in the management, cultivation, and use of
all agricultural lands covered by Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL), and other related agrarian laws; ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Based on the above-cited rules, only DARAB can adjudicate an agrarian dispute.

Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an agrarian dispute in this wise: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

(d) Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship
or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.

It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under R.A. 6657 and other terms and conditions of
transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

For DARAB to have jurisdiction over the case, there must be tenancy relationship between the parties.

Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landowner and a tenant once they agree, expressly or
impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the landowner, as a result of which relationship the
tenant acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating the land. The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be
presumed and allegations that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. 11

In order for a tenancy agreement to arise, it is essential to establish all its indispensable elements, viz.: (1) the parties are
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3)
there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared
between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. All these requisites are necessary to create a tenancy
relationship, and the absence of one or more requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant.12
The Court of Appeals anchored its ruling on the absence of the consent and sharing of harvests as indispensable elements of
a tenancy relationship. We agree with the appellate court's disquisition. The appellate court held in this wise: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It appears that the element of consent and sharing of harvests are clearly lacking. [Petitioner] merely alleged that he was
verbally asked by all the heirs of Guillerma Coronel to continue working on the land. The fact that [petitioner] was allowed
to stay on the property does not mean that [respondents] impliedly recognized the existence of a leasehold relation with
[petitioner]. Occupancy and continued possession of the land will not ipso facto make one a dejure tenant.

xxxx

In this case, [petitioner]could not present any evidence showing that [respondents] had recognized him as tenant. The
other pieces of evidence submitted by the [petitioner] do not prove the alleged tenancy relationship as the certifications he
presented could only show that he is the actual occupant of the land, a fact recognized by the [respondents] and the reason
why they instituted an action for recovery of possession. Being an actual occupant of the land is definitely different from
being a tenant thereof.

More importantly, [petitioner] was not able to show that he shared his harvests, not even once, with the [respondents]. He
just reasoned out that he was not able to remit his dues because the land became unproductive due to the intrusion of
saline waters. No explanation was offered to show that he exerted efforts to make the land productive for agricultural
production. Instead, he took the opportunity to release bangus fingerlings but without giving any share of this income to the
[respondents].13 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

According to the Court of Appeals, petitioner's claim that he succeeded Navarro as tenant is questionable. Section 9 of RA
3844 provides an exclusive enumeration of those who are qualified to succeed to the leasehold rights of a deceased or
incapacitated tenant, to wit: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Death or Incapacity of the Parties. - In case of death or
permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee to work his landholding, the leasehold shall continue between the
agricultural lessor and the person who can cultivate the landholding personally, chosen by the agricultural lessor within one
month from such death or permanent incapacity, from among the following: (a) the surviving spouse; (b) the eldest direct
descendant by consanguinity; or (c) the next eldest descendant or descendants in the order of their age: Provided, That in
case the death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee occurs during the agricultural year, such choice shall be
exercised at the end of that agricultural year: Provided, further, That in the event the agricultural lessor fails to exercise his
choice within the periods herein provided, the priority shall be in accordance with the order herein established.

In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessor, the leasehold shall bind his legal heirs. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Petitioner, a relative by affinity of Navarro, is, to the Court of Appeals, not qualified to succeed as tenant.

The Court of Appeals cited additional reasons, based on standing rulings and administrative issuances, which support
petitioner's disqualification as successor of the deceased tenant, thus: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Neither can this Court recognize him as the bona fide successor of Navarro's Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) award under
P.D. 27. The ruling in the case of Tumol vs. Esguerra, G.R. No. 150646, July 15, 2005, is instructive: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Pursuant to the provisions of the Presidential Decree No. 27, and the Policy of the Government laid down in the Code of
Agrarian Reforms to establish owner-cultivatorship and the economic family size farm as the basis of agricultural
development of the country, the following rules and regulations shall be observed in the event of death of a tenant-
beneficiary:

Succession to the farmholding covered by Operation Land Transfer, shall be governed by the pertinent provisions of the
New Civil Code of the Philippines subject to the following limitations:

xxxx

2. For the purpose of determining who among the heirs shall be the sole owner-cultivator, the following rules shall apply:

xxxx

b. Where there are several heirs, and in the absence of extra-judicial settlement or waiver of rights in favor of one heir who
shall be the sole owner and cultivator, the heirs shall within one month from death of the tenant-beneficiary be free to
choose from among themselves one who shall have sole ownership and cultivation of the land, subject to Paragraph 1(b)
and (c) hereof: Provided, however, That the surviving spouse shall be given first preference; otherwise, in the absence or
due to the permanent incapacity of the surviving spouse, priority shall be determined among the heirs according to
age.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In fact, Ministry Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1978 also provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Where there are several heirs, and in the absence of extra judicial settlement or waiver of rights in favor of the one heir
who shall be the sole owner and cultivator, the heirs shall[,] within one month from the death of the tenant-beneficiary[,]
be free to choose from among themselves one who shall have sole ownership and cultivation of the land, xxx Provided,
however, That [sic] the surviving spouse shall be given first preference; otherwise, in the absence or due to the permanent
incapacity of the surviving spouse, priority shall be determined among the heirs according to age (emphases and
underlining omitted). ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Moreover, the ministry memorandum circular specifically provides that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. Succession to the farmholding covered by Operation Land Transfer shall be governed by the pertinent provisions of the
New Civil Code of the Philippines subject to the following limitations:

a. The farmholding shall not be partitioned or fragmented.

b. The ownership and cultivation of the farmholding shall ultimately be consolidated in one heir who possesses the following
qualifications:

(1) being a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmer's cooperative; cralawlawlibrary

(2) capable of personally cultivating the farmholding; and

(3) willing to assume the obligations and responsibilities of a tenant-beneficiary.

c. Such owner-cultivator shall compensate the other heirs to the extent of their respective legal interest in the land, subject
to the payment of whatever outstanding obligations of the deceased tenant-beneficiary.

Again, being a relative only by affinity of the deceased Bernabe Navarro, [petitioner]cannot lay claim as his successor. The
(c)ourt cannot accept his assertion that he was already identified by the DAR as the successor on the basis of land
amortization receipts. Said receipts merely show that [petitioner] was the payor but these do not, in any way, recognize
him as the tenant-beneficiary of the land. It could be that it was in the account of Bernabe Navarro. The [c]ourt has not
come across any official document from the DAR that expressly identified him as Bernabe Navarro's successor. 14 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

We also note the appellate court's reference to the well-entrenched principle that the jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter on the existence of the action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. 15 A court
does not lose its jurisdiction over a case by the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged
existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. The court continues to have the authority to hear and evaluate the
evidence, precisely to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, and, if, after hearing, tenancy is shown to exist, it shall
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.16

It was mentioned by the appellate court that the Complaint alleged the following material facts: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

3. Plaintiffs are the registered owners of a parcel of farmland located at Brgy. Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan with an area
of four (4) hectares, more or less, under Tax Declaration Property Index No. 020-10-022-11-027, which they acquired from
Guillerma Coronel Vda. de Cruz, plaintiff Paterno's mother. x x x

4. For a long period of time, the said farmland was tenanted by Bernabe Navarro; cralawlawlibrary

5. On April 6, 1985, tenant Bernabe Navarro voluntarily surrendered his tenancy rights over the aforesaid lot through a
Sinumpaang Salaysay. x x x

6. After Bernabe Navarro relinquished his tenancy rights in favor of [respondents'] predecessor-in-interest, no other person
was installed as tenant of the farmland; cralawlawlibrary

7. Not long thereafter, [respondents] discovered that [petitioner] Jesus Velasquez entered the farmland without their
consent and without the knowledge of their predecessor-in-interest. Thus, they confronted [petitioner] for his actuations.

8. However, from 1985 up to the present, [petitioner] Jesus Velasquez never paid even a single centavo to [respondents] as
rent for the use of the land. Worse, [petitioner] converted the farmland into a fishpond without notice and consent of the
[respondents] or their predecessor-in-interest; cralawlawlibrary

9. Sometime in 1988 and 1989 Fernando Cruz and Jose Cruz, brothers of [Paterno Cruz], attempted to visit the farmland
but they were menacingly denied entry by the [petitioner]; cralawlawlibrary

10. Considering that [respondents] never received any rental payment from [petitioner], they sought means on how tc earn
income therefrom. Hence, on July 6, 1995, [respondent] Paterno Cruz, together with his siblings, entered into a lease
contract over the premises subject matter of this action with Godofredo M. Tosco. x x x

11. Unfortunately, [petitioner] unjustifiably refused the entry of and surrender to Mr. Godofredo Tosco the peaceful
possession of the farmland. This, [petitioner] did, despite receipt from [respondent] Rosario Cruz a letter informing him that
Mr. Tosco would be the lawful possessor of the lot by virtue of his lease contract with [respondents]. x x x

xxxx

14. On account of [petitioner's] illegal occupancy of the lot in controversy, [respondents] were deprived of their income that
could be derived from the rental thereof, the amount of which is submitted to the sound discretion of this Honorable Court,
after [petitioner] is ordered to account for all the benefits he derived from use of the premises. 17 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Reading the material allegations of the Complaint, the decision under review concluded that the case below was for recovery
of possession or an accion publiciana, a plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the
proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the
complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant's possession
had become illegal, the action will be an accion publiciana.18

The averments of respondents' complaint, taken as true, establish the nature of the action which the court has jurisdiction
to determine, precisely, whether or not tenancy exist between the parties. Thus did respondents as plaintiffs aver that they
are the registered owners of the subject property which they acquired from Guillerma Coronel Vda. de Cruz; that their
tenant, Navarro, relinquished his tenancy rights on 6 April 1985, and since then, no one was installed as tenant; that in
1995, respondents were dispossessed of their property when petitioner refused the entry of and surrender the possession of
farmland to Mr. Godofredo Tosco, a lessee of respondents. Jurisdiction pertains to the RTC where an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title takes place.

The issuance of the emancipation patent was brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals through a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied by the appellate court and rightfully so. Our discussion is and should be limited only on
the issue of tenancy, which is determinative of jurisdietion. The validity of the emancipation patent, which may or may not
involve tenancy, cannot be decided by this Court. We can only resolve said issue if brought before us on appeal and only
after the exhaustion of administrative remedies.19

To reiterate, the RTC retains jurisdiction over the instant action for recovery of possession.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution dated 12 August 2009 and 24 February 2010,
respectively of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 105140, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.