Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
WITOLD J. HENISZ*{
1. INTRODUCTION
DESPITE A urry of recent activity, the link between theoretical arguments for a
government's ability to provide a credible commitment to the returns to private
property and the empirical literature on the economic impacts of such political
institutions remains incomplete. Papers aiming to test for the existence of this
relationship in areas as disparate as macroeconomic growth, international
business and industrial organization have recently converged upon the use of
institutional variables constructed by the International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG). These indexes measure the rule of law, the likelihood of government
expropriation, the likelihood of government contract repudiation, the extent of
government corruption and the bureaucratic competence of a given country.
The fact that private sector investment decisions are inuenced by private sector
perceptions of such economic outcomes does not, by itself, establish the inferred
link between investment and political institutions. This article aims to forge that
link by demonstrating that the feasibility of change in policy as derived from a
structural model of political interaction is a robust determinant of cross-national
variation in economic growth.
& Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road,
Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden MA 02148, USA. 1
2 HENISZ
1
A third indirect channel not addressed in this paper links institutional development to the
transaction costs of exchange between private counterparties and the relative ecacy of various
modes of economic organization or governance.
2
Competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraints on the
executive, competitiveness of participation, regulation of participation, legislative eectiveness,
legislative selection, and limitations on the scope of government action.
4
Without loss of generality, the remainder of the paper refers to changes in executive preferences.
Note that since the preferences of all actors and the status quo policy are drawn identically from the
same distribution, each actor, including the executive, faces the same constraints in changing policy.
Allowance for the likelihood of multiple actors changing preferences simultaneously is made by
incorporating information on alignment of preferences across the various branches of government
later in the analysis.
1 1 3 1 1 3
0 4 2 4 1 0 4 2 4 1
(2) (5)
XL1 X0 XE XE XL1 X0
EEEEEEEEE EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
LLLLLLLLLL LLLLLLLLLLL
1 1 3 1 1 3
0 4 2 4 1 0 4 2 4 1
(3) (6)
X0 XE XL1 XL1 XE X0
EEEEEEEEEE EEEEEEEEEEE
LLLLLLLLLLLLLLL LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLL
Note: E indicates the range of outcomes preferred by the executive to the status quo X0.
L indicates the range of outcomes preferred by the legislature to the status quo X0.
Figure 1. The six possible preference ordering of the game fXE , XL1 g.
E 0
E, L1 2/3 0
E, F 2/3
E, J 2/3 0
E, L1, F 4/5 2/3
E, L1, L2 4/5 2/3 0
E, L1, J 4/5 2/3 2/3 0
E, L1, L2, F 13/15 4/5 2/3
E, L1, F, J 13/15 4/5 4/5 2/3
E, L1, L2, J 13/15 4/5 4/5 2/3 2/3 0
E, L1, L2, F, J 19/21 13/15 13/15 4/5 4/5 2/3
where n the number of parties, ni the number of seats held by ith party and
N the total number of seats. The nal value of political constraints for cases in
which the executive is aligned with the legislature(s) and/or court is thus equal to
the value derived under complete alignment plus the fractionalization index
multiplied by the dierence between the independent and completely aligned
values calculated above. For cases in which the executive's party is in the
minority in the legislature(s) and/or courts, the modied constraint measure
equals the value derived under complete alignment plus (one minus the
fractionalization index) multiplied by the dierence between the completely
independent and aligned values calculated above. In cases of mixed alignment, a
weighted (equally) sum of the relevant adjustments is used.
For example, in the case described above the constraint measure equalled 0 if
the legislature was completely aligned and 2/3 if it was completely independent.
However, if the same party controls the executive and the legislative chamber and
the fractionalization index equals 1/4 (the executive has a large and/or
homogeneous majority in Parliament) then the modied constraint measure
equals 0 1=4*2=3 0 1=6. By contrast, if the fractionalization index equals
3/4 (the executive's majority is very precarious and/or heterogeneous), the
7
I assume that as the majority diminishes from this absolute level the diculty in satisfying the
preferences of all coalition or faction members increases thus increasing the level of political
constraints.
Is there some action a government like India could take that would lead the Indian
economy to grow like Indonesia or Egypt's? If so, what exactly? If not, what is it
about the `nature of India' that makes it so?
(Lucas, 1988, p. 5)
12
Country name '6064 '6569 '7074 '7579 '8084 '8589 '9094 '6064 '6569 '7074 '7579 '8084 '8589 '9094
POLCON POLCONJ
HENISZ
Bahrain 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bangladesh 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35
Belarus 0.00
Belgium 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.88 0.86 0.78 0.79 0.81 0.82 0.80 0.81 0.77
Benin 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13
Bhutan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bolivia 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.33 0.21
Botswana 0.69 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.36 0.12 0.07 0.11
Brazil 0.77 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.85 0.82 0.62 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.27 0.76 0.74
Bulgaria 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.73
Burkina Faso 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Burma 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Burundi 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cambodia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08
Cameroon 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Canada 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.77
& Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000.
Central African Republic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11
Chad 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Chile 0.70 0.80 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.18 0.44 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30
China, PR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Colombia 0.40 0.41 0.30 0.43 0.40 0.43 0.44 0.40 0.41 0.30 0.43 0.40 0.43 0.44
Comoros 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Congo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20
Costa Rica 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.76 0.75 0.74 0.68
Cote d'Ivoire 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Croatia 0.44
13
TABLE 2 CONTINUED
& Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000.
14
Country name '6064 '6569 '7074 '7579 '8084 '8589 '9094 '6064 '6569 '7074 '7579 '8084 '8589 '9094
POLCON POLCONJ
HENISZ
Iran 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Iraq 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ireland 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.42 0.34 0.28 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.45
Israel 0.54 0.54 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.53
Italy 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.42 0.44 0.53 0.49 0.53 0.49 0.51
Jamaica 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.35 0.25 0.00 0.13 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.35 0.25 0.00 0.13
Japan 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Jordan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Kazakhstan 0.00
Kenya 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Korea, DPR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Korea, Republic of 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.45
Kuwait 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Kyrgyzstan 0.00
Laos 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Latvia 0.14
& Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000.
15
Continued
TABLE 2 CONTINUED
& Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000.
16
Country name '6064 '6569 '7074 '7579 '8084 '8589 '9094 '6064 '6569 '7074 '7579 '8084 '8589 '9094
POLCON POLCONJ
Paraguay 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Peru 0.23 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.12 0.23 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.05
Philippines 0.39 0.41 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.40 0.39 0.41 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.40
Poland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.71
Portugal 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.74
Romania 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31
Russia 0.01
Rwanda 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Saudi Arabia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HENISZ
Senegal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sierra Leone 0.35 0.35 0.27 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Singapore 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02
Slovakia 0.76
Slovenia 0.29
Somalia 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
South Africa 0.26 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.24 0.23 0.42 0.26 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.24 0.23 0.42
Soviet Union 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Spain 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.72 0.79 0.78 0.80
Sri Lanka 0.28 0.51 0.44 0.32 0.20 0.20 0.40 0.28 0.51 0.44 0.32 0.20 0.20 0.40
Sudan 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Swaziland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sweden 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.77
Switzerland 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.87
Syria 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Taiwan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.62
& Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000.
Tajikistan 0.00
Tanzania 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Thailand 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.27 0.33 0.20
Togo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trinidad & Tobago 0.73 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.78 0.82 0.85 0.18 0.26 0.23 0.27 0.32 0.58 0.79
Tunisia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Turkey 0.28 0.43 0.25 0.24 0.08 0.38 0.41
Turkmenistan 0.00
Uganda 0.43 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ukraine 0.00
Note: Annual data for all countries up to and including 1998 is available from http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/
17
18 HENISZ
3.2 Estimation
Results will be computed using OLS, GLS and GMM estimation techniques to
insure maximum comparability with the extant literature and demonstrate
robustness to alternative estimation techniques. It should be noted that while
the GMM results are the most defensible from an econometric perspective
(eliminating both the endogeneity problems addressed by GLS and the omitted
10
The following discussion summarizes the literature overview provided by Barro (1996).
Real Per Capita GDP Growth 126 0.02 0.02 0.10 70.10 0.03
Log(Lagged Per Capita Real GDP) 137 7.61 7.56 9.52 5.65 1.00
Notes: All data from Barro and Lee (1994) except Law & Order Index (International Country Risk Guide), No. Changes in the Identity of the Executive (Gurr, 1996),
Democracy Index (Gurr, 1996, and Bollen, 1990) and Political Constraint Indexes (this paper).
21
22 HENISZ
3.3 Results
Table 4 closely mirrors the presentation of results reported in Barro (1996) but
also presents alternative measures of the institutional environment. Column (1)
uses the control variables proposed by Barro (1996) in an OLS regression.
Columns (2) through (5) replace the rule-of-law index with the alternative
measures of the institutional environment of number of changes in identity of
executive, the democracy index used by Barro (1996), POLCON and
POLCONJ. Columns (6) through (10) pursue the same strategy using 3SLS
on ve-year panels. Columns (11) to (12) repeat the process using the GMM
specication of Caselli et al. (1996). All control variables yielded results similar
to the extant literature.11
Of the political variables, a country increasing its 19851990 ICRG rating by
one standard deviation (from the level of Argentina, Mexico or Egypt to that of
Ireland, Taiwan or Botswana) could expect, ceteris paribus, approximately a 1.3
annual percentage point increase in growth rates (equal to 39% of one standard
deviation). Executive turnover has no signicant impact on growth rates using
OLS or GLS but did have a statistically signicant negative relationship (though
small in economic signicance) using GMM. As Barro (1996) demonstrates,12 a
non-linear relationship between democracy and growth is suggested.
Turning to the variables derived in this paper, the results suggest that, ceteris
paribus, a one standard deviation increase in POLCON (from an average level
such as El Salvador or Sierra Leone to one equal to that of Taiwan, Madagascar
or Singapore) would increase growth by 0.9 (OLS), 0.8 (GMM) or 0.5 (GLS)
percentage points per year (equal to 31%, 25% and 17% of one standard
deviation). A similar increase in POLCONJ (from the level of Botswana or
Pakistan to that of Malaysia or Chile) would increase annual growth rates by 0.5
percentage points (GLS estimation). It should be noted that the gross eect of
political constraints on economic growth is bounded by this estimate from below
as countries with strong political institutions likely also possess good human and
physical capital as well as fewer distortions in the nancial markets.
For the sake of comparison, Table 5 presents the economic signicance of all
of the independent variables included in the analysis. Specically, it lists (by
econometric specication) the expected impact of a one-standard deviation
11
The statistical and economic signicance of these control variables have been the subject of
innumerable articles and dissertations. The results here conform to the extant literature. Interested
readers are referred to Barro (1996) for a recent and thorough description of the complete results.
12
``In the worst dictatorships, an increase in political rights might be growth enhancing because of
the benet from the limitations on government power. But in places that have already achieved a
moderate amount of democracy, a further increase in political rights might impair growth because of
the intensied concern with income redistribution'' (Barro, 1996, p. 4).
4. CONCLUSION
24
TABLE 4 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND GROWTHa,b,c
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GMM GMM
N 79 84 84 82 44 6683 6885 6787 6488 3039 6471 6471
T '6590 '6590 '6590 '6590 '6590 [Five-Year Panels [Five-Year Panels
19601990] 19651990]
Initial GDP 70.022*** 70.018*** 70.020*** 70.022*** 70.013* 70.032*** 70.027*** 70.025*** 70.028*** 70.011* 70.150*** 70.107***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002)
Male Education 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.003 0.013** 0.009 0.008 0.011* 0.010 0.005*** 0.013***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002)
HENISZ
Female Education 70.011 70.011 70.010 70.011 70.003 70.010 70.006 70.004 70.008 70.021** 0.013*** 0.019***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
Life Expectancy 0.032* 0.032* 0.030* 0.032* 0.016 0.048** 0.068*** 0.074*** 0.065*** 0.063***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.029) (0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
Initial GDP* 71.28* 71.26 71.37 71.32* 73.48 70.399* 70.310 70.220 70.406* 70.507***
Human Capital (0.54) (0.653) (0.716) (0.536) (7.12) (0.176) (0.178) (0.150) (0.195) (0.111)
Fertility 70.018* 70.020* 70.019* 70.017* 70.017 70.014* 70.015* 70.009 70.016* 70.007 0.007*** 0.010
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.002) (0.005)
Government 70.041 70.047 70.058 70.062 70.140** 70.071** 70.069* 70.063* 70.074* 70.085* 0.247*** 0.718***
Consumption (0.033) (0.034) (0.030) (0.035) (0.048) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.039) (0.030) (0.012)
Black Market 70.015*** 70.018*** 70.017*** 70.017*** 70.012 70.025*** 70.026*** 70.025*** 70.025*** 70.025*** 70.014*** 70.025***
Premium (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001)
Terms of Trade 0.285** 0.296** 0.307** 0.230* 0.489* 0.088*** 0.087*** 0.117*** 0.086*** 0.152*** 0.074*** 0.057***
(0.095) (0.092) (0.096) (0.105) (0.207) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.035) (0.023) (0.004)
& Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000.
Investment 0.018 0.052 0.044 0.045 0.029 0.050* 0.029 0.030 0.034 0.060* 0.240*** 0.278***
(0.031) (0.041) (0.034) (0.029) (0.028) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.030) (0.006) (0.007)
Law & Order 0.008** 0.008***
(0.003) (0.002)
Changes in 0.001 70.001 70.002***
Executive (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
Democracy 0.035 0.041
a
*, ** and ***, represent signicance at 95%, 99% and 99.9% condence intervals respectively; OLS coecients computed using White heteroscedasticity consistent
standard errors and covariances [see White (1980)]; regional and time dummy coecients omitted (coecients are jointly signicant in each specication).
b
Following Barro (1996), human capital is dened as the sum of the predicted eects of male and female secondary educational attainment, the log of life
expectancy, and the log of fertility expressed as deviations from their mean levels. This interaction term allows the eect of the human capital variables and initial
income to be non-linear. For example, the results obtained suggest that countries with relatively low levels of initial income converge to their long-run positions
more rapidly if they possess relatively high levels of human capital.
c
Values for each ve-year period are reported in columns 612.
25
26 HENISZ
Note: Values in parentheses are the percentage of a one-standard deviation change in the dependent
variable caused by a one-standard deviation change in the independent variable.
14
See, in particular, the work of Ernesto Stein and Jessica Seddon.
Data Sources
Construction of a measure of political constraints based on the methodology
described herein requires three types of data. First, information regarding the
number of institutional players in a given polity; second, data on partisan
alignments (including coalitions) across institutions; and, nally, data on the
party composition of legislatures. All countries were assumed to have an
executive. Data on the existence of other political actors (unicameral or
bicameral legislatures15 and sub-federal units16 ) with substantive veto power was
taken from the Polity database [see Gurr (1996)] and Derbyshire and Derbyshire
(1996).
Unfortunately, no such time-series measure was available to measure judicial
independence over time. Following Barro (1996), the average 19851990 value
of LAW & ORDER17 from the ICRG was used to compute a dummy variable
(equal to 1 if LAW & ORDER 54) regarding the extent of judicial independence
in a given country over the entire sample. Unfortunately, law and order may be
provided through a well-functioning legal system or through repressive policies.
15
Eective legislatures possess ``signicant governmental autonomy . . . including, typically,
substantial authority with regard to taxation and disbursement, and the power to override vetoes of
legislation''. A classication of partially eective is assigned when ``the eective executive's power
substantially outweighs but does not completely dominate that of the legislature'' (Gurr, 1989, p. 51).
16
While such sub-federal units will not have veto power over all relevant economic policies, the
existence of such extensive delegation of economic authority implies that they will play a role in many
key issues.
17
``A country with a sound law and order tradition has sound political institutions, a strong court
system and provisions for an orderly succession of power. This indicator reects the degree to which
the citizens of the country are willing to accept the established institutions to make and implement
laws and adjudicate disputes. A high point total means that there is a strong law and order tradition,
while a low point total means that there is a tradition of depending on physical force or illegal means
to setting claims'' (International Country Risk Guide, 1996).
In order to separate out the latter case, only those country-years in which the
Polity database indicated at least ``slight to moderate limitations to executive
authority'' existed were coded as having an independent judiciary. A sucient
but not necessary condition for this coding is the presence of an independent
judiciary. While this process creates problems of endogeneity and subjectivity,
eorts to develop a more objective measure of judicial independence based on
judicial tenure or hazard rates have to date yielded results for less than half the
sample. While preliminary results examining the correlation of judicial tenure
with economic outcomes has been promising, using this measure would unduly
restrict the sample size.
The above data sources were then supplemented by various issues of The
Political Handbook of the World and The Statesman's Yearbook to note the party
distribution of the legislature(s): specically, whether the executive enjoys a
majority in one (or both) legislature(s) and how many seats in each legislature
were controlled by each party. Based on this information, the values of
institutional hazards were modied to form a preliminary measure of political
constraints (POLCON ) using the methodology described in the previous
section.
Finally, the identity of justices of the Supreme Court or highest court of
appeal for private contractual disputes, during the period 19601996 was
collected for a sample of 44 countries.18 The preliminary measures of political
constraints were then further modied to take into account alignment between
the court and the individual executive or the party of the individual executive19
as well as the polarization or fractionalization of the court. The nal variable
constructed was labelled POLCONJ.
Sample Calculations
In the United States in 1990 the lower and upper houses of the legislature
were controlled by the Democratic Party while the Republican Party
controlled the executive. Were the two legislative chambers completely
controlled by separate opposition parties, the political constraint measure
would equal 0.90 (E, L1, L2, F, J 19=21). Were they completely controlled
by a single opposition party, the political constraint measure would be 0.87
(E, L, F, J 13=15). If the legislatures were completely aligned with the
executive the measure would be 0.80 (E, F, J 4=5). However, as the same
opposition party controlled both legislatures and the fractionalization index
18
Eorts to increase this sample are ongoing.
19
Because of the lifetime (or long-term) tenure of Supreme Court justices, party alignment alone
was not thought sucient to indicate alignment as judicial preferences and the preferences of the
appointing executive may diverge subsequent to appointment with few, if any, consequences. A higher
standard for alignment was used to capture this important dierence between judicial and legislative
preferences over time. Specically, courts were considered aligned when the current executive
appointed the majority of justices of Supreme Court or for cases in which the party of the current
executive appointed 2/3 of justices.
20
Note that POLCON and POLCONJ automatically yield lower scores for Westminster systems
and higher rankings for mixed executive systems in which power is held by dierent parties.
35 for the People's Progress and 27 for the People's National Party, with the
remaining parties' seat totals unchanged. In this case, the fractionalization index
increased to 0.55, signifying that it was relatively more dicult for the new
governing party to steamroll the legislature in comparison to their immediate
predecessor (i.e., their majority was slightly more tenuous). The political
constraint index value thus rose from 0:24 to 0:00 0:55*0:67 0:00 0:37.
WITOLD J. HENISZ
The Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania
REFERENCES