1 brothers by using force or intimidation but merely boarded the boat, and it was
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118075. September 5, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMILIANO CATANTAN
y TAYONG, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL alias "Bimbo" were
charged with violation of PD No. 532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and
Highway Robbery Law of 1974 for having on 27 June 1993, while armed with
a firearm and a bladed weapon, acting in conspiracy with one another, by
means of violence and intimidation, wilfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted
and inflicted physical injuries on Eugene Pilapil and Juan Pilapil Jr. who were
then fishing in the seawaters of Tabogon, Cebu, and seized their fishing boat,
to their damage and prejudice. [1]
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both accused Emiliano
Catantan y Tayong and Jose Macven Ursal alias "Bimbo" guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. [2] Of the duo only
Emiliano Catantan appealed.
In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial court erred in
convicting him of piracy as the facts proved only constitute grave coercion
defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code and not piracy under PD No.
532.
The evidence for the prosecution is that at 3:00 o'clock in the morning of 27
June 1993, the Pilapil brothers Eugene, 21, and Juan Jr., 18, were fishing in
the sea some 3 kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon, Cebu. Suddenly,
another boat caught up with them. One of them, later identified as the accused
Emiliano Catantan, boarded the pumpboat of the Pilapils and leveled his gun
at Eugene. With his gun, Catantan struck Eugene on the left cheekbone and
ordered him and Juan Jr. to "dapa." [3] Then Catantan told Ursal to follow him
to the pumpboat of the Pilapils. There they hogtied Eugene, forced him to lie
down at the bottom of the boat, covered him with a tarpaulin up to his neck,
stepped on him and ordered Juan Jr. to ferry them to Daan Tabogon. They left
behind the other pumpboat which the accused had earlier used together with
its passengers one of whom was visibly tied.
Noting that they were already far out into the sea, Eugene reminded Catantan
that they were now off-course but Catantan told Eugene to keep quiet or he
would be killed. Later, the engine conked out and Juan Jr. was directed to row
the boat. Eugene asked to be set free so he could help but was not allowed;
he was threatened with bodily harm instead.
Meanwhile Juan Jr. managed to fix the engine, but as they went farther out
into the open sea the engine stalled again. This time Eugene was allowed to
assist his brother. Eugene's hands were set free but his legs were tied to the
outrigger. At the point of a tres cantos [4] held by Ursal, Eugene helped row
the boat.
As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another boat. Catantan asked
whose boat that was and the Pilapils told him that it was operated by a certain
Juanito and that its engine was new. Upon learning this, Catantan ordered the
Pilapil brothers to approach the boat cautioning them however not to move or
say anything.
On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded the "new"
pumpboat. Once aboard he ordered the operator Juanito to take them to
Mungaz, another town of Cebu. When Juanito tried to beg-off by saying that
he would still pull up his net and harvest his catch, Catantan drew his revolver
and said, "You choose between the two, or I will kill you." [5] Juanito, obviously
terrified, immediately obeyed and Ursal hopped in from the other pumpboat
and joined Catantan.
But, as Ursal was transferring to the "new" pumpboat, its outrigger caught the
front part of the pumpboat of the Pilapils so he kicked hard its prow; it
broke. The jolt threw Eugene into the sea and he landed on the water
headlong. Juan Jr. then untied his brother's legs and the two swam together
clinging to their boat. Fortunately another pumpboat passed by and towed
them safely ashore.
Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack upon or
seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its
cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of the complement or
passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person,
including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in
Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be
considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided." And a vessel is
construed in Sec. 2, par. (b), of the same decree as "any vessel or watercraft
used for transport of passengers and cargo from one place to another through
Philippine waters. It shall include all kinds and types of vessels or boats used
in fishing (underscoring supplied).
On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal
Code is committed by "any person who, without authority of law, shall, by
means of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by
law, or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or
wrong."
Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is
essential that there be an attack on or seizure of a vessel. He claims that he
and his companion did not attack or seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil
only when they were already on board that they used force to compel the
Pilapils to take them to some other place. Appellant also insists that he and
Ursal had no intention of permanently taking possession or depriving
complainants of their boat. As a matter of fact, when they saw another
pumpboat they ordered the brothers right away to approach that boat so they
could leave the Pilapils behind in their boat. Accordingly, appellant claims, he
simply committed grave coercion and not piracy.
We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave
coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls
squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and
Juan Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination,
such compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat. The
testimony of Eugene, one of the victims, shows that the appellant actually
seized the vessel through force and intimidation. The direct testimony of
Eugene is significant and enlightening -
Q: Now, while you and your younger brother were fishing at the seawaters of
Tabogon at that time, was there anything unusual that happened?
A: Yes.
Q: Will you please tell the Court what that was?
A: While we were fishing at Tabogon another pumpboat arrived and the
passengers of that pumpboat boarded our pumpboat.
Q: Now, that pumpboat which you said approached you, how many were
riding in that pumpboat?
A: Four.
Q: When you said the passengers of that pumpboat boarded your pumpboat,
how did they do that?
A: They approached somewhat suddenly and came aboard
the pumpboat (underscoring supplied).
Q: How many suddenly came aboard your pumpboat?
A: Only one.
Q: What did that person do when he came aboard your pumpboat?
A: When he boarded our pumpboat he aimed his revolver at us (underscoring
supplied).
Q: By the way, when he aimed his revolver to you, did he say anything to you?
xxxx
A: He said, "dapa," which means lie down (underscoring supplied).
COURT:
Q: To whom did he aim that revolver?
A: He aimed the revolver on me.
TRIAL PROS. ECHAVEZ:
Q: What else did he do?
A: Then he ordered his companion to come aboard the pumpboat.
Q: What did he do with his revolver?
A: He struck my face with the revolver, hitting the lower portion of my left eye.
Q: Now, after you were struck with the revolver, what did these persons do?
A: We were ordered to take them to a certain place.
Q: To what place did he order you to go?
A: To Daan Tabogon. [6]
To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave
coercion would be to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine
waters was seized by the accused by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons. As Eugene Pilapil testified, the accused suddenly
approached them and boarded their pumpboat and Catantan aimed his
revolver at them as he ordered complaining witness Eugene Pilapil
to "dapa" or lie down with face downwards, and then struck his face with a
revolver, hitting the lower portion of his left eye, after which, Catantan told his
victims at gun point to take them to Daan Tabogon.
The incident happened at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. The sudden appearance
of another pumpboat with four passengers, all strangers to them, easily
intimidated the Pilapil brothers that they were impelled to submit in complete
surrender to the marauders. The moment Catantan jumped into the other
pumpboat he had full control of his victims. The sight of a drawn revolver in his
hand drove them to submission. Hence the issuance of PD No. 532 designed
to avert situations like the case at bar and discourage and prevent piracy in
Philippine waters.Thus we cite the succeeding "whereas" clauses of the
decree -
Whereas, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements
are still committing acts of depredations upon the persons and properties of
innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another,
thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting
the economic and social progress of the people;
Whereas, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries; and,
Whereas, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from
perpetrating such acts of depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the
offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles tothe economic,
social, educational and community progress of the people.
The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only means of livelihood is
fishing in sea waters. They brave the natural elements and contend with the
unknown forces of the sea to bring home a bountiful harvest. It is on these
small fishermen that the townspeople depend for the daily bread. To impede
their livelihood would be to deprive them of their very subsistence, and the
likes of the accused within the purview of PD No. 532 are the obstacle to
the "economic, social, educational and community progress of the
people." Had it not been for the chance passing of another pumpboat, the fate
of the Pilapil brothers, left alone helpless in a floundering, meandering
outrigger with a broken prow and a conked-out engine in open sea, could not
be ascertained.
While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention of depriving the
Pilapils permanently of their boat, proof of which they left behind the brothers
with their boat, the truth is, Catantan and Ursal abandoned the Pilapils only
because their pumpboat broke down and it was necessary to transfer to
another pumpboat that would take them back to their lair.Unfortunately for the
pirates their "new" pumpboat ran out of gas so they were apprehended by the
police soon after the Pilapils reported the matter to the local authorities.
The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not
produced in evidence cannot exculpate him from the crime. The fact remains,
and we state it again, that Catantan and his co-accused Ursal seized through
force and intimidation the pumpboat of the Pilapils while the latter were fishing
in Philippine waters.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the
conviction of accused-appellant EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG for the
crime of piracy penalized under PD No. 532 and sentencing him accordingly
to reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
2 Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 153524-25. January 31, 2005]
RODOLFO SORIA and EDIMAR BISTA, petitioners, vs. HON. ANIANO
DESIERTO in his capacity as Head of the Office of the Ombudsman, HON.
ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Military,
P/INS. JEFFREY T. GOROSPE, SPO2 ROLANDO G. REGACHO, SPO1
ALFREDO B. ALVIAR, JR., PO3 JAIME D. LAZARO, PO2 FLORANTE B.
CARDENAS, PO1 JOSEPH A. BENAZA, SPO1 FRANKLIN D. CABAYA and
SPO4 PEDRO PAREL, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Yet again, we are tasked to substitute our judgment for that of the Office of the
Ombudsman in its finding of lack of probable cause made during preliminary
investigation. And, yet again, we reaffirm the time-honored practice of non-
interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations by our prosecutory
bodies absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion on their part.
Petitioners, thru a special civil action for certiorari,[1] contend precisely that the
public respondents herein officers of the Office of the Ombudsman gravely
abused their discretion in dismissing the complaint for violation of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code (Delay in the delivery of detained persons) against
private respondents herein, members of the Philippine National Police
stationed at the Municipality of Santa, Ilocos Sur.
From the respective pleadings[2] of the parties, the following facts appear to
be indubitable:
1. On or about 8:30 in the evening of 13 May 2001 (a Sunday and the day
before the 14 May 2001 Elections[3]), petitioners were arrested without a
warrant by respondents police officers for alleged illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition;
2. Petitioner Soria was arrested for alleged illegal possession of .38 cal.
revolver (a crime which carries with it the penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period) and for violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus
Election Code in relation to the Commission on Election Resolution No. 3328
(which carries the penalty of imprisonment of not less than one [1] year but not
more than six [6] years);
3. Petitioner Bista was arrested for alleged illegal possession of sub-machine
pistol UZI, cal. 9mm and a .22 cal. revolver with ammunition;
4. Immediately after their arrest, petitioners were detained at the Santa, Ilocos
Sur, Police Station. It was at the Santa Police Station that petitioner Bista was
identified by one of the police officers to have a standing warrant of arrest for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Criminal Case No. 12272;
5. The next day, at about 4:30 p.m. of 14 May 2001 (Monday and election
day), petitioners were brought to the residence of Provincial Prosecutor
Jessica Viloria in San Juan, Ilocos Sur, before whom a Joint-Affidavit against
them was subscribed and sworn to by the arresting officers. From there, the
arresting officers brought the petitioners to the Provincial Prosecutors Office in
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, and there at about 6:00 p.m. the Joint-Affidavit was filed and
docketed;
6. At about 6:30 in the evening of the same day, 14 May 2001, petitioner Soria
was released upon the order of Prosecutor Viloria to undergo the requisite
preliminary investigation, while petitioner Bista was brought back and
continued to be detained at the Santa Police Station. From the time of
petitioner Sorias detention up to the time of his release, twenty-two (22) hours
had already elapsed;
7. On 15 May 2001, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, petitioner Bista was
brought before the MTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where the case for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 was pending. Petitioner Bista posted bail and an
Order of Temporary Release was issued thereafter;
8. At this point in time, no order of release was issued in connection with
petitioner Bistas arrest for alleged illegal possession of firearms. At 4:30 in the
afternoon of the same day (15 May 2001), an information for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No.
4413-S, was filed against petitioner Bista with the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur. At 5:00 in the afternoon, informations for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition and violation of Article 261 par. (f) of
the Omnibus Election Code in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 3328,
docketed as Criminal Cases No. 2269-N and No. 2268-N, respectively, were
filed in the Regional Trial Court at Narvacan, Ilocos Sur;
9. On 08 June 2001, petitioner Bista was released upon filing of bail bonds in
Criminal Cases No. 2268-N and No. 4413-S. He was detained for 26 days.
10. On 15 August 2001, petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for
Military Affairs a complaint-affidavit for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised
Penal Code against herein private respondents.
11. After considering the parties respective submissions, the Office of the
Ombudsman rendered the first assailed Joint Resolution dated 31 January
2002 dismissing the complaint for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal
Code for lack of merit; and
12. On 04 March 2002, petitioners then filed their motion for reconsideration
which was denied for lack of merit in the second assailed Resolution dated 25
March 2002.
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code states:
authorities. - The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be
imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for
some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for
crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent;
and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or
capital penalties, or their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his
detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer
at any time with his attorney or counsel.
It is not under dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Soria was
arrested without warrant are punishable by correctional penalties or their
equivalent, thus, criminal complaints or information should be filed with the
proper judicial authorities within 18 hours of his arrest. Neither is it in dispute
that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Bista was arrested are punishable
by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent, thus, he could only be
detained for 36 hours without criminal complaints or information having been
filed with the proper judicial authorities.
The sole bone of contention revolves around the proper application of the 12-
18-36 periods. With respect specifically to the detention of petitioner Soria
which lasted for 22 hours, it is alleged that public respondents gravely erred in
construing Article 125[4] as excluding Sundays, holidays and election days in
the computation of the periods prescribed within which public officers should
deliver arrested persons to the proper judicial authorities as the law never
makes such exception. Statutory construction has it that if a statute is clear
and unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any
attempts at interpretation.[5] Public respondents, on the other hand, relied on
the cases of Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,[6] and Sayo v. Chief of Police of
Manila[7] and on commentaries[8] of jurists to bolster their position that
Sundays, holidays and election days are excluded in the computation of the
periods provided in Article 125,[9] hence, the arresting officers delivered
petitioners well within the allowable time.
In addition to the foregoing arguments and with respect specifically to
petitioner Bista, petitioners maintain that the filing of the information in court
against petitioner Bista did not justify his continuous detention. The information
was filed at 4:30 p.m. of 15 May 2001 but the orders for his release were
issued by the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan,
Ilocos Sur, only on 08 June 2001. They argued that based on law and
jurisprudence, if no charge is filed by the prosecutor within the period fixed by
law, the arresting officer must release the detainee lest he be charged with
violation of Article 125.[10] Public respondents countered that the duty of the
arresting officers ended upon the filing of the informations with the proper
judicial authorities following the rulings in Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military,[11] and People v. Acosta.[12]
From a study of the opposing views advanced by the parties, it is evident that
public respondents did not abuse their discretion in dismissing for lack of
probable cause the complaint against private respondents.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment on the part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an
excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.[13]
No grave abuse of discretion, as defined, can be attributed to herein public
respondents. Their disposition of petitioners complaint for violation of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be said to have been conjured out of
thin air as it was properly backed up by law and jurisprudence. Public
respondents ratiocinated thus:
As aptly pointed out by the respondents insofar as the complaint of Rodolfo
Soria is concerned, based on applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election
day or a special holiday, should not be included in the computation of the
period prescribed by law for the filing of complaint/information in courts in
cases of warrantless arrests, it being a no-office day. (Medina vs. Orosco, 125
Phil. 313.) In the instant case, while it appears that the complaints against
Soria for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Violation of COMELEC Resolution
No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of
Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on May 15, 200[1] at 4:30 p.m., he had already
been released the day before or on May 14, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m. by the
respondents, as directed by Prov. Prosecutor Jessica [Viloria]. Hence, there
could be no arbitrary detention or violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code to speak of.[14]
Indeed, we did hold in Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,[15] that
. . . The arresting officers duty under the law was either to deliver him to the
proper judicial authorities within 18 hours, or thereafter release him. The fact
however is that he was not released. From the time of petitioners arrest at
12:00 oclock p.m. on November 7 to 3:40 p.m. on November 10 when the
information against him for murder actually was in court, over 75 hours have
elapsed.
But, stock should be taken of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday;
November 8 was declared an official holiday; and November 9 (election day)
was also an official holiday. In these three no-office days, it was not an easy
matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and stenographer, draft the information
and search for the Judge to have him act thereon, and get the clerk of court to
open the courthouse, docket the case and have the order of commitment
prepared. And then, where to locate and the uncertainty of locating those
officers and employees could very well compound the fiscals difficulties. These
are considerations sufficient enough to deter us from declaring that Arthur
Medina was arbitrarily detained. For, he was brought to court on the very first
office day following arrest.
And, in Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila[16] --
. . . Of course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer
detaining a person for more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code, the means of communication as well as the hour of arrest and other
circumstances, such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for
the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the necessary information,
must be taken into consideration.
As to the issue concerning the duty of the arresting officer after the information
has already been filed in Court, public respondents acted well within their
discretion in ruling thus:
In the same vein, the complaint of Edimar Bista against the respondents for
Violation of Article 125, will not prosper because the running of the thirty-six
(36)-hour period prescribed by law for the filing of the complaint against him
from the time of his arrest was tolled by one day (election day). Moreover, he
has a standing warrant of arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and it was only on
May 15, 2001, at about 2:00 p.m. that he was able to post bail and secure an
Order of Release. Obviously, however, he could only be released if he has no
other pending criminal case requiring his continuous detention.
The criminal Informations against Bista for Violations of Article 125, RPC and
COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and
Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, on May 15, 2001 (Annexes G
and I, Complaint-Affidavit of Edimar Bista) but he was released from detention
only on June 8, 2001, on orders of the RTC and MTC of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur
(Annexes J and K, Complaint-Affidavit). Was there a delay in the delivery of
detained person to the proper judicial authorities under the circumstances?
The answer is in the negative. The complaints against him was (sic)
seasonably filed in the court of justice within the thirty-six (36)-hour period
prescribed by law as discussed above. The duty of the detaining officers is
deemed complied with upon the filing of the complaints. Further action, like
issuance of a Release Order, then rests upon the judicial authority (People v.
Acosta [CA] 54 O.G. 4739).[17]
The above disposition is in keeping with Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military,[18] wherein we ordained that
. . . Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court,
the intent behind Art. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act, the
detained person is informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his
application with the court, he may be released on bail. Petitioner himself
acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order his release when he applied
for and was granted his release upon posting bail. Thus, the very purpose
underlying Article 125 has been duly served with the filing of the complaint
with the MCTC. We agree with the position of the Ombudsman that such filing
of the complaint with the MCTC interrupted the period prescribed in said
Article.
All things considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, we have no
choice but to defer to the Office of the Ombudsmans determination that the
facts on hand do not make out a case for violation of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code.
As we have underscored in numerous decisions --
We have consistently refrained from interfering with the investigatory and
prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman absent any compelling reason. This
policy is based on constitutional, statutory and practical considerations. We
are mindful that the Constitution and RA 6770 endowed the Office of the
Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial powers,
virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention, in order to
insulate it from outside pressure and improper influence. Moreover, a
preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of
the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that
when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of law, to
order an acquittal. Hence, if the Ombudsman, using professional judgment,
finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings, unless
clothed with grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the functions of the courts
will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with
regard to complaints filed before it. In much the same way, the courts will be
swamped with cases if they will have to review the exercise of discretion on
the part of fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time the latter decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.[19] (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition dated 27 May 2002 is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Joint Resolution dated 31 January
2002 and the Order dated 25 March 2002 of the Office of the Ombudsman are
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
3
BAGUIO CITY
EN BANC
JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAOL, A.M. No. 03-1462-MTJ
Regional Trial Court, Branch 90,
Dasmarias, Cavite,
Complainant, Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
-versus- QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
JUDGE LORINDA B. TOLEDO- AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
MUPAS, Municipal Trial Court, CORONA,
Dasmarias, Cavite, CARPIO-MORALES,
Respondent. CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR., and
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
April 19, 2007
x ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Bizarre. The word would aptly describe this tale of the accuser turning out to
be the culprit.
This case started with Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas (Judge Mupas) of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Dasmarias, Cavite, filing an administrative
complaint (Administrative Matter No. OCA IPI No. 02-1515-RTJ) against
Judge Dolores L. Espaol (Judge Espaol) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite, for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse
of Authority, Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service. She imputed these offenses against Judge Espaol for allegedly
illegally usurping the functions of the Executive Judge of Dasmarias, Cavite,
and for ordering her (Mupas) on April 18, 2002, in connection with Criminal
Case No. 9292-01 (People v. Belinda Ventura Singello), to desist from
accepting, for preliminary investigation,' criminal cases falling within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, where suspects are
apprehended pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Judge Espaol filed her Comment dated September 16, 2002[1] stating that
since she was appointed to the single sala RTC of Dasmarias, Cavite, under
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 6 of 1975, she ipso facto became the
Executive Judge exercising supervision over the MTC of
Dasmarias, Cavite. She further stated that her Order dated April 18, 2002,
directing the respondent to desist from conducting preliminary investigation,
did not deprive the latter of the authority to conduct preliminary
investigationbut merely stopped her from conducting the same for being
violative of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No. 7438.
In the same Comment, Judge Espaol said that Judge Mupas operated the
MTC of Dasmarias, Cavite as a One-Stop Shop where criminal suspects
apprehended without a warrant are ordered detained in the municipal jail by
virtue of an unsigned Detention Pending Investigation of the Case, in lieu of a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
prescribed by R.A. No. 7438 and by Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Thus, according to Judge Espaol, the apprehended
persons were detained for a long time until Judge Mupas set the case for
preliminary investigation. If the detainee can post bail, Judge Mupas would fix
the amount of bail and require that the premium, usually equivalent to 20% or
30% thereof, be paid in cash. If the surety bond was secured outside of the
MTC, the bond would be rejected. Hence, the applicants for bail bonds would
go to the RTC of Dasmarias, Cavite to complain and apply for the release of
the detention prisoners.
This Court, acting on the Report dated July 4, 2003 of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), issued on August 6, 2003 a Resolution,[2] the dispositive
portion of which reads:
(T)he Court Resolved to ADOPT the following recommendations:
(a) to DISMISS the charges against Judge Dolores L. Espaol for lack of
merit;
(b) to TREAT the comment dated September 16, 2002 of Judge Espaol as a
SEPARATE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT against Judge Lorinda Mupas of
MTC, Dasmarias, Cavite; and
(c) to REQUIRE Judge Toledo-Mupas to COMMENT on the allegations
against her, contained in Judge Espaols comment.
Thus, a complaint against the respondent Judge Mupas was deemed filed,
and docketed as OCA IPI No. 03-1462-MTJ.
On September 8, 2003, Judge Mupas filed a motion seeking reconsideration
of this Courts Resolution. On October 1, 2003, this Court required the OCA to
file its comment thereon within 15 days from notice. The OCA wrote a
Memorandum dated April 15, 2004[3] to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. recommending the denial of the respondents motion being a mere
reiteration of her arguments already passed upon by the Court. This Court
adopted the said recommendation of the OCA in its Resolution dated May 31,
2004.[4]
Accordingly, Judge Mupas faced the following charges: (1) violation of Rule
112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, and Republic Act No. 7438; and (2) violation of the rules
on preliminary investigation (a) for the delay in the resolution of preliminary
investigation cases pending in [Judge Mupas] court; (b) for failure to perform
her ministerial duty of transmitting the records of the case, including the
resolution on the preliminary investigation, within 10 days from the issuance of
the said resolution to the provincial prosecutor of Cavite; and (c) for
conducting preliminary investigation despite the fact that there were many
prosecutors in Cavite not indisposed to do the job.
On September 19, 2005, Judge Mupas filed her Reply[5] (should
be Comment) to Judge Espaols Comment which was treated as a separate
administrative complaint. She claimed that the August 6, 2003 Resolution of
this Court failed to consider relevant laws, rules, and pronouncements of the
Court itself. She further said that under Rule 112, Section 2 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, she is expressly authorized to conduct
preliminary investigation. She questioned the authority of Judge Espaol in
ordering her to desist from conducting preliminary investigations in the guise of
supervising or reviewing her actions, as the said authority was lodged in the
provincial prosecutors. She pointed out that, in the case of People vs. Belinda
Ventura Singello (Criminal Case No. 9292-01), subject of Judge Espaols
Order dated April 18, 2002, the provincial prosecutor affirmed her (Mupas)
finding of probable cause against the accused without any question on the
manner in which the preliminary investigation was conducted.
She likewise claimed that, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 59-99 dated 1
June 1999, while in single-sala stations the presiding judges are ex
officio executive judges, for purposes of supervision in the interest of the
service, their salas may be merged with multi-sala stations. Therefore, the
RTC of Dasmarias, Cavite had long been merged with the multi-sala station of
the RTC of Imus, Cavite. In support of this claim, Judge Mupas noted that then
Executive Judge Lucenito N. Tagle of the RTC of Imus, Cavite issued a
Memorandum to all judges within his supervision, including both Judge Espaol
and Judge Mupas, to submit periodic reports on detention prisoners.
She further argued that none of the detention prisoners had filed an
administrative complaint against her. She said that it was her duty to conduct
preliminary investigation of complaints filed with her sala. In addition, Judge
Mupas posited that Judge Espaol could not entertain applications for bail in
the RTC because the cases were pending before the MTC.
On January 30, 2006, the Court noted this Reply (should be Comment), and
referred the same to the OCA for evaluation, report, and recommendation.
In the Memorandum dated July 26, 2006[6] addressed to then Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban, the OCA found that the Reply of Judge Mupas was
merely a rehash of the arguments she raised in her Motion for
Reconsideration; it did not refute the specific allegations of Judge Espaol. The
OCA said that the explanation given by the respondent was unsatisfactory and
insufficient to absolve her from administrative liability. However, the OCA
recommended that this case be referred to an Associate Justice of the Court
of Appeals for investigation, report, and recommendation. Eventually, this case
was referred to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal.

During the proceedings before Justice Vidal, Judge Espaol filed her Rejoinder
[Re: Reply dated September 19, 2005] dated December 8, 2006[7] reiterating
that: (1) her Order dated April 18, 2002 was lawful and within her authority to
issue as the OCA declared that she was merely performing her function as
Executive Judge of Dasmarias, Cavite; (2) Judge Mupas violated the rights of
the accused whose preliminary investigation is pending in her court, they
being detained by virtue only of a "Detention Pending Investigation of the
Case" in place of a valid waiver signed in the presence of counsel for
considerable lengths of time; (3) there was no basis for Judge Mupas counter-
charge that she could not grant bail while preliminary investigation was
pending before the Mupas court, considering the latter's absence upon the
prisoners' applications for bail; and (4) Judge Mupas failed to adequately
explain her failure to forward the records and the resolution of the preliminary
investigation of accused Belinda Singello in Criminal Case No. 9292-01.
Judge Mupas filed her Comment (Re: Rejoinder Dated December 8, 2006)
dated December 21, 2006[8] and averred that: (1) acts made in her judicial
capacity and in good faith could not be subject to disciplinary action; (2) as
judge, she enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of her
duties; (3) the preliminary investigation she conducted was within the scope of
her authority; and (4) the reason behind the seeming delay in the conduct of
preliminary investigation was the heavy congestion of the dockets of the MTC
of Dasmarias, Cavite.
Preliminary conferences were conducted by Justice Vidal on January
2, 2007 and January 9, 2007.[9] However, both parties opted not to present
any testimonial evidence. In fact, Judge Espaol filed on January 5, 2007 an
Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Resolve,[10] praying that, inasmuch as the
proceedings were summary in nature, the case be decided based on the
available records and pleadings submitted.
On the same day, Judge Espaol filed her Reply [Re: Comment dated
December 21, 2006],[11] arguing that: (1) Judge Mupas is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law even if she acted in good faith; and (2) the presumption of
regularity in the performance of her judicial function could not cure the
incompetence of the respondent.
Both the complainant[12] and the respondent[13] filed their respective
memoranda encompassing all the arguments they raised in their respective
pleadings. Judge Espaol also filed a Counter Memorandum (Re:
Memorandum of the Respondent dated January 18, 2007) dated January 29,
2007.[14]
In an undated Resolution filed with the OCA on February 9, 2007, Justice
Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal found, contrary to Judge Mupas claim, that the
document entitled "Detention Pending Investigation of Cases" cannot validly
be deemed to be an implied waiver of the rights of the accused under Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code. Justice Vidal submits the following findings:
Extant from the records, is Respondents admission of her practice in the
issuance of the document entitled Detention Pending Investigation of Cases
claiming, however, that such document served as an implied waiver of the
rights of the accused under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
The undersigned disagrees.
Sec. 2 e) of RA 7438 is in point, thus:
xxx Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial
investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of
his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no
effect. (Underscoring supplied)
The afore cited law is clear and simple. Thus, construction is
unnecessary. Clearly, what the said provision requires to protect the rights of
the accused is a written waiver signed by the accused with the assistance of a
counsel. However, the procedure adopted by the Respondent runs counter
thereto. She resorted to the issuance of a commitment order dubbed as
Detention Pending Investigation of the Case to legally prolong the detention of
the accused pending the resolution of the preliminary investigation. Obviously,
this is not within the contemplation of the law. Thus, the practice is highly
erroneous a blatant manifestation of ignorance in the legal procedure.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary[15] provides:
Canon 6 Competence and Diligence
xxx
Sec. 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their
knowledge, skills and personal qualities necessary for the proper performance
of judicial duties, taking advantage for this purpose of the training and other
facilities which should be made available, under judicial control, to judges.
xxx
Otherwise put, Respondent is presumed to know the basic measures to
protect the rights of the accused during preliminary investigation. Sadly,
Respondent failed in this regard. Instead, she maintained the practice of
issuing this highly improper order, i.e., Detention Pending Investigation of the
Case, just to put a semblance of legality in the detention of the accused.[16]
With respect to the other charges, Justice Vidal found the evidence insufficient
to support the accusations that Judge Mupas: (1) detained the accused for a
long period of time while the preliminary investigation was pending in her
court; (2) failed to transmit to the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite the records of
the case within 10 days after preliminary investigation; and (3) acted without
authority to conduct preliminary investigation because there were enough
prosecutors in Cavite to conduct the same.
Justice Vidal then concludes:
However, the undersigned finds that Respondent should still be held
administratively liable. Respondents act of issuing orders dubbed as Detention
Pending Investigation of Cases instead of requiring the accused to execute a
written waiver, with the assistance of counsel, pursuant to Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, fall [sic] short of the measure of responsibility expected
from a judge.
Respondent should be reminded that the actions of everyone connected with
an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to
the clerk of lowest rank, should be circumscribed with a high degree of
responsibility. The image of a court, as a true temple of justice, is mirrored in
the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work
thereat. Judicial personnel are expected to be living examples of uprightness
in the performance of official duties [and] preserve at all times the good name
and standing of the courts in the community.[17]
Thus, the dispositive portion of her Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and it appearing that this is the first time
the Respondent has committed the infraction, supra, the undersigned
respectfully recommends that she be REPRIMANDED for her practice of
issuing the "Detention Pending Investigation of the Case" orders with STERN
WARNING that a repetition thereof or any similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
We agree with the findings of Justice Vidal, but We find the recommended
penalty too light, grossly disproportionate to the offense committed, especially
when viewed in the light of Judge Mupas record of incorrigible misconduct.
There is no gainsaying that Judge Mupas practice of issuing "Detention
Pending Investigation of the Case" orders in lieu of a written waiver signed by
the accused with the assistance of counsel is, in the words of Justice Vidal, "a
blatant manifestation of ignorance in the legal procedure." It is gross ignorance
of the law, pure and simple.
Under Rule 140, Section 8, of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-
8-10 SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious
charge, and Section 11 thereof provides the sanctions, as follows:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of
the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the
Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment
to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations: Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case
include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three
(3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
While Justice Vidal considered the respondent's practice of issuing "Detention
Pending Investigation of the Case" orders as a first-time infraction, We note
that this case is not the first time the respondent was charged and found guilty
of gross ignorance of the law.
In Espaol v. Mupas,[18] the respondent judge was fined the amount of
P21,000.00 for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross
ignorance of the law when she ordered the arrest of the accused in six criminal
cases before the expiration of the 10-day period she gave them to file their
counter-affidavits, and without any finding of probable cause.
In Loss of Court Exhibits at MTC-Dasmarias, Cavite,[19] aside from being
found guilty of grave misconduct for refusing to turn over to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for ballistics examination a firearm that a court
employee surreptitiously took from the court's steel cabinet and used to
commit suicide, Judge Mupas was held administratively liable for gross
ignorance of the law for her failure to submit to the provincial prosecutor her
resolution and the records of the case within 10 days after preliminary
investigation. The Court imposed on the respondent the penalty of suspension
for three (3) months without pay, with a stern warning that a similar infraction
will be dealt with more severely.

In Bitoon, et al. v. Toledo-Mupas,[20] the respondent was also found

administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for changing the
designation of the crime from a non-bailable offense to a bailable one, i.e.,
syndicated estafa to simple estafa, and granted bail without hearing on the
ground that the accused is entitled to it as a matter of right.The Court found
her to have exceeded her authority in the conduct of preliminary investigation
and to have failed to observe the elementary rules on bail. She was meted the
penalties of a fine in the amount of P40,000.00, suspension for three (3)
months without salaries and benefits, and a stern warning that a same or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Upon motion for reconsideration, however, the penalty of fine of P40,000.00

was deleted on the ground that the acts of the respondent in the Espaol v.
Mupas and the Loss of Court Exhibits cases were done after the acts
complained of in Bitoon. While the Court maintained that the respondent's acts
in Bitoon remain inexcusable, the respondent was not found to be an
incorrigible third-time offender deserving the penalty originally imposed. The
Court also noted that the respondent was not motivated by malice, bad faith or
corrupt motives and that there was an absence of any serious damage to the
complainants. However, the stern warning of the Court should have been
ample reminder that the penalty of dismissal would be imposed should the
respondent commit the same or a similar infraction.[21]

In the present case, while the documents denominated "Detention Pending

Investigation of the Case" were issued during the same period of time that the
three (3) above-cited cases were decided, it is noteworthy that Judge Mupas
continued with the practice even after her attention had been called. Worse,
she remained insistent that the document was an implied waiver of the rights
of the accused under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.[22] Judge Mupas
must be reminded that although judges have in their favor the presumption of
regularity and good faith in the performance of their official functions, a blatant
disregard of the clear and unmistakable terms of the law obviates this
presumption and renders them susceptible to administrative
sanctions.[23] Being among the judicial front-liners who have direct contact
with the litigants, a wanton display of utter lack of familiarity with the rules by
the judge inevitably erodes the confidence of the public in the competence of
our courts to render justice. [24] It subjects the judiciary to
embarrassment. Worse, it could raise the specter of corruption.

When the gross inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and
elemental a rule, a law, or a principle in the discharge of his or her duties, a
judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the exalted position and
title he or she holds, or the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad
faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.[25]

All said, this Court finds the respondent, Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas,
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law. Considering that this is
her fourth offense, she deserves to be meted the supreme penalty of dismissal
from the service, with all the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto.

WHEREFORE, Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas of the Municipal Trial Court of

Dasmarias, Cavite is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law. This being her
fourth offense, she is hereby ORDERED DISMISSED FROM THE
SERVICE with forfeiture of all benefits due her, excluding her accrued leave
benefits, and with perpetual disqualification from reinstatement or appointment
to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

This Decision is final and immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
4 Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J.
BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE
CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER,
PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Taada, Wigberto E. Taada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez,
Joker P. Arroyo, Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2]
search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani
Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
[Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6,
Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon
City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum"
newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines,
equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as
numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be
in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of
the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents,
"particularly the Chief Legal Officer, Presidential Security Command, the
Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their
representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or
successors" be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence
against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in Criminal Case No.
Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose
Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer
the petition. The plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was
set for hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the
Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing
petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested
that respondents "will not use the aforementioned articles as evidence in the
aforementioned case until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of the
aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer for
preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that
petitioners had come to this Court without having previously sought the
quashal of the search warrants before respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners,
before impugning the validity of the warrants before this Court, should have
filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this
procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of
the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to mention
the public interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices, which
was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies.
The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its
inherent power to suspend its rules. In the words of the revered Mr. Justice
Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always
in the power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a
particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require
it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches.
Considerable stress is laid on the fact that while said search warrants were
issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition impugning the same was
filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than six [6]
months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in
the filing of the petition thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3,
Manifestation] with the fact that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more
than half a year after the petitioners' premises had been raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had
waited this long to bring their case to court, it was because they tried at first to
exhaust other remedies. The events of the past eleven fill years had taught
them that everything in this country, from release of public funds to release of
detained persons from custody, has become a matter of executive
benevolence or largesse
to the President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos,
through counsel Antonio Coronet asking the return at least of the printing
equipment and vehicles. And after such a letter had been sent, through Col.
Balbino V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential
Security Command, they were further encouraged to hope that the latter would
yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to
Court. [pp. 123-124, Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial
system, We find no ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment.
On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently
negate the presumption that they had abandoned their right to the possession
of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had
used and marked as evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case
No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped from challenging the validity of the search
warrants. We do not follow the logic of respondents. These documents lawfully
belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with
them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does
not and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants
assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the
search warrants in question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an
examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as
mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court .6 This objection, however, may properly be
considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during
the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been
conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two
distinct places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D,
RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, respectively. Objection is
interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter
address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place
where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the
articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. This
assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which
states:
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of
committing the crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and
he is keeping and concealing the same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two
search warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent
were to search two distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for
respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and the same
place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were
specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself
who headed the team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that
might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is more apparent than
real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was
applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon
City, which address appeared in the opening paragraph of the said
warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind
when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be
searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing
officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant.
This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant
on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge
who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it
has also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the
official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be
searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that
although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b
belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J.
Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties
that may be seized under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for
the search and seizure of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense;
and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be
owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or
may not be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-quoted
Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen property.
Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in
whose possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership,
therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against
whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought
to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to
the articles and property seized under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were
seized under the disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments or implements intended
by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on
in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of
the said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao
Sawmill Co. v. Castillo9 where this legal provision was invoked, this Court
ruled that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when
placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when
placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary
right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or
building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the
machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable
property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon
application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C.
Metrocom.10 The application was accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of
Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom
Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a
surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the search
warrants on December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents
could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause
upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search
is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought
to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive
materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits
must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive
material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will
not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that
petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other
paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and
are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of
subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is a
mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of
probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a
search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the
statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro
U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows
that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and things above-
described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities
in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such
as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6
Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce; 14 the Constitution requires
no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the
facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez
v. Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer
to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of
the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." As couched, the quoted
averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the
test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration
constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants.
The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment,
typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment, tape
recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the
"WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents communication, letters
and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to
promote the objectives and piurposes of the subversive organization known as
Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement;
and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and
other subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking
"Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the
search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda,
pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist
Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too
general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith
the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and
that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any
"paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut
General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to
be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the articles
sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be
characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter
in English history: the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and
the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving
commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy
the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such
historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our
government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the
voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state
security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing
offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a
consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and
sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said
newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to
the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and
constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in
print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework
where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on
the ground that they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 885, as amended, which authorizes "the sequestration of the
property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged in subversive activities
against the government and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance
with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of
National Defense." It is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be
effected in view of the absence of any implementing rules and regulations
promulgated by the Minister of National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported
that no less than President Marcos himself denied the request of the military
authorities to sequester the property seized from petitioners on December 7,
1982. Thus:
The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for
sequestration of the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing presses,
according to Information Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.
On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices
in Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all
materials in the premises.
Cendaa said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment
remain at the disposal of the owners, subject to the discretion of the court. 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is
further confirmed by the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the
letter dated February 10, 1983 of U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed
to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM " case. 20 In this
reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:
2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of
our authorities to close the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the
equipment and materials it uses. 21
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b]
issued by respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null
and void and are accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory
injunction for the return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all articles
seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera,
Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.
 as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6
Separate Opinions Movement.
The obvious question is: Why were the documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books,
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring etc. subversive? What did they contain to make them subversive? There is
I am glad to give my concurrence to the ponencia of Mr. Justice Escolin At the nothing in the applications nor in the warrants which answers the questions. I
same time I wish to state my own reasons for holding that the search warrants must, therefore, conclude that the warrants are general warrants which are
which are the subject of the petition are utterly void. obnoxious to the Constitution.
The action against "WE FORUM" was a naked suppression of press freedom In point of fact, there was nothing subversive published in the WE FORUM just
for the search warrants were issued in gross violation of the Constitution. as there is nothing subversive which has been published in MALAYA which
The Constitutional requirement which is expressed in Section 3, Article IV, has replaced the former and has the same content but against which no action
stresses two points, namely: "(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable has been taken.
cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; Conformably with existing jurisprudence everything seized pursuant to the
and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized." warrants should be returned to the owners and all of the items are subject to
(Stonehill vs. Diokno, 126 Phil. 738, 747: 20 SCRA 383 [1967].) the exclusionary rule of evidence.
Any search warrant is conducted in disregard of the points mentioned above Teehankee, J., concur.
will result in wiping "out completely one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile
and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the
whims caprice or passion of peace officers." (Ibid, p. 748.)
The two search warrants were issued without probable cause. To satisfy the
requirement of probable cause a specific offense must be alleged in the
application; abstract averments will not suffice. In the case at bar nothing
specifically subversive has been alleged; stated only is the claim that certain
objects were being used as instruments and means of committing the offense
of subversion punishable under P.D. No. 885, as amended. There is no
mention of any specific provision of the decree. I n the words of Chief Justice
C Concepcion, " It would be legal heresy of the highest order, to convict
anybody" of violating the decree without reference to any determinate
provision thereof.
The search warrants are also void for lack of particularity. Both search
warrants authorize Col. Rolando Abadilla to seize and take possession,
among other things, of the following:
Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books and other publication to
promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known
as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6
Movement.
The obvious question is: Why were the documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books,
etc. subversive? What did they contain to make them subversive? There is
nothing in the applications nor in the warrants which answers the questions. I
must, therefore, conclude that the warrants are general warrants which are
obnoxious to the Constitution.
In point of fact, there was nothing subversive published in the WE FORUM just
as there is nothing subversive which has been published in MALAYA which
has replaced the former and has the same content but against which no action
has been taken.
Conformably with existing jurisprudence everything seized pursuant to the
warrants should be returned to the owners and all of the items are subject to
the exclusionary rule of evidence.
Teehankee, J., concur.

Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring
I am glad to give my concurrence to the ponencia of Mr. Justice Escolin At the
same time I wish to state my own reasons for holding that the search warrants
which are the subject of the petition are utterly void.
The action against "WE FORUM" was a naked suppression of press freedom
for the search warrants were issued in gross violation of the Constitution.
The Constitutional requirement which is expressed in Section 3, Article IV,
stresses two points, namely: "(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision;
and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized."
(Stonehill vs. Diokno, 126 Phil. 738, 747: 20 SCRA 383 [1967].)
Any search warrant is conducted in disregard of the points mentioned above
will result in wiping "out completely one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile
and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the
whims caprice or passion of peace officers." (Ibid, p. 748.)
The two search warrants were issued without probable cause. To satisfy the
requirement of probable cause a specific offense must be alleged in the
application; abstract averments will not suffice. In the case at bar nothing
specifically subversive has been alleged; stated only is the claim that certain
objects were being used as instruments and means of committing the offense
of subversion punishable under P.D. No. 885, as amended. There is no
mention of any specific provision of the decree. I n the words of Chief Justice
C Concepcion, " It would be legal heresy of the highest order, to convict
anybody" of violating the decree without reference to any determinate
provision thereof.
The search warrants are also void for lack of particularity. Both search
warrants authorize Col. Rolando Abadilla to seize and take possession,
among other things, of the following:
Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books and other publication to
promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known