Article 15, NCC

San Luis v. San Luis

G.R. No. 133743; February 6, 2007

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago , J

Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion

Facts: Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), former governor of the Province of Laguna, contracted
three marriages during his lifetime. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of
which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11,
1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce
before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued
a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973.

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the
time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.

On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before
the Regional Trial Court alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo. She then prayed that the conjugal
partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her. On February 4, 1994,
petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the
respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since
the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. Rodolfo San Luis was later joined
by Linda, his sister. The trial Court denied both petitions to dismiss.

Felicidad presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus,
she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held
that the respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because
her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute
divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind
Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen.

The Court of Appeals however reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC rationating that
Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. It found that the marriage between
Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was
capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent.

Issue/s: W/n a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil
Code

Ruling: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos
surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of
the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of
the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign
law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that
proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If
the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine Foreign Service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and
proved.

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on
the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Article 19, NCC

Cebu Country Club v. Elizague

G.R. No. 160273, January 18, 2008

Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion

Facts: Cebu Country Club, Inc. (CCCI), petitioner, is a domestic corporation operating as a non-profit and
non-stock private membership club, having its principal place of business in Banilad, Cebu City. Petitioners
herein are members of its Board of Directors. In 1987, San Miguel Corporation, a special company
proprietary member of CCCI, designated respondent Ricardo F. Elizagaque, its Senior Vice President and
Operations Manager for the Visayas and Mindanao, as a special non-proprietary member. The designation
was thereafter approved by the CCCIs Board of Directors.

In 1996, respondent filed with CCCI an application for proprietary membership. As the price of a
proprietary share was around the P5 million range, Benito Unchuan, then president of CCCI, offered to
sell respondent a share for only P3.5 million. Respondent, however, purchased the share of a certain Dr.
Butalid for only P3 million. Consequently, on September 6, 1996, CCCI issued Proprietary Ownership
Certificate No. 1446 to respondent.

During the other 2 meetings, action on respondents application for proprietary membership was
deferred. In another Board meeting held on July 30, 1997, respondents application was voted upon. On
August 1, 1997, respondent received a letter informing him that the Board disapproved his application for
proprietary membership. Elizague then sent 3 letters to CCCI to inquire regarding the reason of his
applications disapproval. These inquiries remained unheeded.

On December 23, 1998, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners
Issue/s: W/n petitioners are liable for damages to the respondent in disapproving the latters application
for propriety membership with CCCI

Ruling: Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its Articles of Incorporation, has the right to approve
or disapprove an application for proprietary membership. But such right should not be exercised
arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code on the Chapter on Human Relations provide restrictions.

In rejecting respondents application for proprietary membership, the Court found that petitioners
violated the rules governing human relations, the basic principles to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and for the stability of social order. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals aptly held that petitioners committed fraud and evident bad faith in disapproving respondents
applications. This is contrary to morals, good custom or public policy. Hence, petitioners are liable for
damages pursuant to Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the same Code.

It bears stressing that the amendment to Section 3(c) of CCCIs Amended By-Laws requiring the unanimous
vote of the directors present at a special or regular meeting was not printed on the application form
respondent filled and submitted to CCCI. What was printed thereon was the original provision of Section
3(c) which was silent on the required number of votes needed for admission of an applicant as a
proprietary member. It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the dark wondering why his
application was disapproved. He was not even informed that a unanimous vote of the Board members
was required. When he sent a letter for reconsideration and an inquiry whether there was an objection
to his application, petitioners apparently ignored him.

In the exercise of a right, though legal by itself, it must nonetheless be in accordance with the proper
norm. When the right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

Article 29, 30 & 35, NCC

Cheng v. Sy

G.R. No. 174238 July 7, 2009

Ponente: Nachura, J.

Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion

Facts: Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC, Branch 7, Manila against
respondent spouses William and Tessie Sy for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) Check
Nos. 171762 and 71860 for P300,000.00 each, in payment of their loan, both of which were dishonored
upon presentment for having been drawn against a closed account. Meanwhile, based on the same facts,
petitioner, on January 20, 1999, filed against respondents two (2) cases for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang (BP Blg.) 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).

On March 16, 2004, the RTC dismissed the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the elements
of the crime. On the other hand, the Order in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 contained a statement, Hence,
if there is any liability of the accused, the same is purely civil, not criminal in nature. Later, the MeTC,
Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg. 22 cases in its Order dated February 7, 2005 on
account of the failure of petitioner to identify the accused respondents in open court.

On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against respondents before the RTC a complaint] for collection of a
sum of money with damages based on the same loaned amount of P600,000.00 covered by the two PBC
checks previously subject of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases.

In the assailed Order dated January 2, 2006, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
ratiocinating that the civil action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 with damages was already
impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule 111 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

Hence this petition.

Issue/s: W/n dismissal of an action based on culpa aquiliana is a bar to the enforcement of a subsidiary
liability of the employer

Ruling: Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP Blg. 22 includes the
corresponding civil action to recover the amount of the checks. It should be stressed that this policy is
intended to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the
reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal
complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil
action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and
criminal cases. Thus, where petitioners rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the
court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted
on account of res judicata, for failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In view of this
special rule governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code is not applicable.