1. GR No.

194709 July 31, 2013

Minette Baptista, et al. v. Rosario Villanueva, et al.

FACTS: Petitioners were former union members of Radio Philippines Network

Employees Union (RPNEU), a legitimate labor organization and the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of Radio Philippines Network (RPN).
Respondents were the unions elected officers and members.
On April 26, 2005, on suspicion of union mismanagement, petitioners and some other
union members, filed a complaint before the executive board of the company for the
impeachment of the union president, but the action was eventually abandoned.
The impeachment complaint was re-lodged against all the union officers of RPNEU
before the DOLE. A petition for audit covering the years 2000-2004 was also filed.
Thereafter, two written complaints were filed against the petitioners for alleged violation
of the unions CBL which requires exhaustion of remedies with the union before resorting
to the courts. Months later, a different group of union members filed a complaint against
the petitioners and 12 others for alleged commission of an act which violates a CBL
provision that prohibits joining or forming a union outside the 60-day period. The
complaints were consolidated.
The petitioners were requested to answer the complaint and to attend a scheduled
hearing. They denied the charges through an exchange of communications. They
questioned the procedure adopted by the Committee in its investigation. Later, the
Committee submitted a recommendation for the expulsion of the petitioners. The BOD
affirmed the recommendation and the petitioners were served an expulsion notice.
RPNEUs officers requested that the petitioners be served notices of termination of
employment in compliance with their union security clause.
The petitioners filed separate complaints for ULP questioning the legality of the expulsion
and subsequent termination.
ISSUES: 1. Whether there is unfair labor practice
2. Whether the petitioners were afforded due process in the investigation
HELD:
1. No.
ULP relates to the commission of acts that transgress the workers right to organize.
Under the Labor Code, the prohibited act must necessarily pertain to the workers right to
self-organization and to the observance of the CBA. Absent the said vital elements, the
acts complained, although unseemingly unjust, would not constitute ULP.
The petitioners were not able to establish how they were coerced or restrained
by the union in a way that curtailed their right to self-organization. Onus probandi rests
upon the party alleging ULP to prove such.

2. Yes.
Due process is satisfied when a person was notified of the charge against him and he
was given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the
filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer
the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. It
cannot be denied that petitioners were properly notified and were equally afforded the
opportunity to present their side.

2. GR No. 165381 February 9, 2011

Nelson A. Culili v. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) and Hizon,
et al.

FACTS: ETPI is engaged mainly in the business of establishing commercial

telecommunications systems and leasing of international datalines or circuits that pass
through the international gateway facility (IGF). The other respondents are ETPIs
officers. Culili was employed as a Technician in the Field Operations Department. He was
promoted to Senior Technician in the Customer Premises Equipment Management Unit
of the Service Quality Department.
As a telecom company, ETPI was required under RA No. 7925 and EO No. 109 to
establish landlines in Metro Manila and certain provinces. However, due to
interconnection problems with PLDT, poor subscription and other business difficulties,
ETPI was forced to halt its roll out of 129,000 landlines already allocated to a number of
its employees.
Soon thereafter, ETPI implemented a Right-Sizing Program due to business troubles
and losses. The first phase involved the reduction of workforce to only those employees
that were necessary and that ETPI could sustain. The second phase entailed a company-
wide reorganization which would result in the transfer, merger, absorption or abolition of
certain departments.
As part of the first phase, employees who rendered at least 15 years of service were
offered the Special Retirement Program, with the option to voluntarily retire at an earlier
age and a retirement package equivalent of two and a half months salary for every year
of service. The offer was initially rejected by Eastern Telecommunications Employees
Union (ETEU), the SEBA, but it later agreed to both programs. The retirement program
was available to 102 qualified employees. Culili was the only one who rejected the offer.
The second phase necessitated the abolition, transfer and merger of some departments.
Among the departments was the Service Quality Department. The functions of Culilis
unit was absorbed by the Business and Consumer Accounts Department. The function of
Culili as Senior Technician became unnecessary. His position was then abolished due to
redundancy and was absorbed by another employee already with the Business and
Consumer Accounts Department.
When Culili and three others discovered that their names were omitted in ETPis New
Table of Organization, they wrote the union president to protest such omission.
Thereafter, Culili was informed that he was terminated from employment. Culili protested
alleging that neither he nor the DOLE were formally notified of his termination. He
claimed that he only came to know about it when he was handed a copy of the
termination letter and when he was barred from entering the premises when he reported
for work. He believed that ETPI already decided to dismiss him even before the letter
was served upon him evidenced by an earlier version of the letter. He also asserted that
ETPI contracted out the services he performed to a labor-only contractor which prove
that his functions did not really become unnecessary, and this violated their CBA. He also
claimed that he was discriminated against when he was not offered the additional benefit
in the form of motorcycles offered to other employees who availed the Special
Retirement Program.
ETPI denied Culilis claims. It averred that since Culili did not avail of the Special
Retirement Program and his position was subsequently declared redundant, it had no
choice but to terminate Culili. Also, Culili still reported for work despite the notice of
termination which he ignored. ETPI also alleged that Culili informed his superiors that he
would agree to his termination if he would be given special work tools which were worth
almost a million pesos.
Culili filed a complaint against ETPI and its officers for illegal dismissal, ULP and money
claims before the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUES: 1. Whether ETPI and its officers committed ULP against Culili
2. Whether Culili was illegally dismissed
3. Whether Culili is entitled to recover damages
HELD: 1. No.
There should be no dispute that all prohibited acts constituting ULP in essence relate to
the workers right to self-organization. An employer may only be held liable for ULP if it
can be shown that his acts affect in whatever manner the right of his employees to self-
organize.
There is no showing that ETPI was motivated by ill will, bad faith or malice, or that it was
aimed at interfering with its employees right to self-organize. It even negotiated with
ETEU before implementing its Right-Sizing Program.
2. No.
Under our laws, an employee may be terminated for reasons involving measures
taken by the employer due to business necessities. There is redundancy when the
service capability of the workforce is greater than what is seasonably required to meet
the demands of the business enterprise. The determination of whether or not an
employees services are still needed or sustainable properly belongs to the employer
provided that there is no violation of law or commission of an arbitrary of malicious act.
Among the requisites of a valid redundancy program are: (1) the good faith of the
employer in abolishing the redundant position; and (2) fair and reasonable criteria in
ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant (e.g. status, efficiency and
seniority)
ETPI was upfront in its plan to implement a Right-Sizing Program. It even
negotiated with ETEU for the latter to understand the business dilemma. This rules out
bad faith. If Culilis position were indeed indispensable to ETPI, it would have been
absurd for the latter to abolish the same. But, the position was abolished for being too
specialized and limited.
Culili failed to prove that his dismissal was orchestrated by the respondents for
the mere purpose of getting rid of him was never transmitted. The letter which he used to
establish that ETPI had already decided to dismiss him prior to the actual dismissal. In
fact, most of the officers have not even dealt with Culili personally. Moreover, it cannot be
immediately concluded that the employer employed bad faith in contracting out the
function of Culili. Also, it has been established that his termination was for an authorized
cause and there was no bad faith in doing so.
3. Yes.
In view of ETPIs failure to comply with the notice requirements under the Labor
Code, Culili is entitled to nominal damages in addition to his separation pay. Aside from
the manner the written notice was served that is, ETPI simply asked one of its guards to
serve the required written notice on Culili, a reading of the notice shows that ETPI failed
to properly inform Culili of the grounds for his termination.

3. San Miguel Employees Union vs. Bersamira

G.R. No. 87700 June 13, 1990
Melencio-Herrera, J.:

Facts: SanMig entered into contracts for merchandising services with

Lipercon and D'Rite. It was expressly understood in the contract that the
workers employed by the contractors were to be paid by the latter and that
none of them were to be deemed employees or agents of SanMig.
Section 1 of their CBA specifically provides that "temporary,
probationary, or contract employees and workers are excluded from the
bargaining unit and, therefore, outside the scope of this Agreement." The
Union advised SanMig that some Lipercon and D'Rite workers had signed up
for union membership and sought the regularization of their employment with
SMC.
On the ground that it had failed to receive any favorable response from
SanMig, the Union filed a notice of strike for unfair labor practice, CBA
violations, and union busting. The Union again filed a second notice of strike
for unfair labor practice. Series of pickets were staged by Lipercon and D'Rite
workers in various SMC plants and offices. SMC filed a verified Complaint for
Injunction and Damages before respondent Court. Respondent Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order for the purpose of maintaining the status quo.
Union filed a Motion to Dismiss SanMig's Complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the case/nature of the action, which motion was opposed by
SanMig. Anchored on grave abuse of discretion, petitioners are now before us
seeking nullification of the challenged Writ.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Court correctly assumed jurisdiction over
the present controversy and properly issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
to the resolution of that question, is the matter of whether, or not the case at
bar involves, or is in connection with, or relates to a labor dispute.
Held: The Supreme Court held, that a "labor dispute" as defined in Article 212
(1) of the Labor Code includes "any controversy or matter concerning terms
and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and
conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee." That a labor dispute, as
defined by the law, does exist herein is evident. At bottom, what the Union
seeks is to regularize the status of the employees contracted by Lipercon and
D'Rite in effect, that they be absorbed into the working unit of SanMig. This
matter definitely dwells on the working relationship between said employees
vis-a-vis SanMig. Terms, tenure and conditions of their employment and the
arrangement of those terms are thus involved bringing the matter within the
purview of a labor dispute. Further, the Union also seeks to represent those
workers, who have signed up for Union membership, for the purpose of
collective bargaining. San Mig, for its part, resists that Union demand on the
ground that there is no employer-employee relationship between it and those
workers and because the demand violates the terms of their CBA. Obvious
then is that representation and association, for the purpose of negotiating the
conditions of employment are also involved. In fact, the injunction sought by
SanMig was precisely also to prevent such representation. Again, the matter
of representation falls within the scope of a labor dispute. Neither can it be
denied that the controversy below is directly connected with the labor dispute
already taken cognizance of by the NCMB-DOLE.

4. G.R. No. L-19187 February 28, 1963

STERLING PRODUCTS INTERNATIONAL, INC. and V. SAN PEDRO, petitioners,
vs.LORETA C. SOL and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
FACTS:
Loreta C. Sol charged Sterling Products International for unfair labor
practice. She filed a complaint against the said firm for underpayment, money
equivalent of her vacation leave from 1952 to 1959, and Christmas bonus for
1959, equivalent to one month salary. The complaint resulted in her dismissal,
without just cause. The company answered that SOL is an independent
contractor whose services were retained by petitioners to submit reports of
radio monitoring work performed outside of their (petitioners') office; that
petitioners no longer required complainant's services and therefore, it gave
her notice of termination, as it did in fact terminate her services, as an
independent contractor.
The Court of Industrial Relations held that the complainant is not an
employee of the respondent firm but only an independent contractor and that
respondent firm was justified in dismissing the complainant due to economic
reasons. The lower court reversed the decision ruling that complainant was an
employee and not an independent contractor and that the company
possessed and exercised its right to control the work of said employee, that
being the court ordered her reinstatement with back wage and charged the
firm of ULP. Aggrieved by the decision, the company filed a petition for
certiorari.
Issue: Whether Loreta Sol is an employee of the said company and whether
there is ULP
Held: YES. Respondent Sol was directed to listen to certain broadcasts,
directing her, in the instructions given her, when to listen and what to listen,
petitioners naming the stations to be listened to, the hours of broadcasts, and
the days when listening was to be done. Respondent Sol had to follow these
directions. The mere fact that while performing the duties assigned to her she
was not under the supervision of the petitioners does not render her a
contractor, because what she has to do, the hours that she has to work and
the report that she has to submit all these are according to instructions
given by the employer. It is not correct to say, therefore, that she was an
independent contractor, for an independent contractor is one who does not
receive instructions as to what to do, how to do, without specific instructions.
Petitioners claim that respondent Sol was merely an employee and was not
connected with any labor union, the company cannot be considered guilty of
unfair labor practice, and we find this contention to be well-founded. The term
unfair labor practice has been defined as any of those acts listed in the labor
code Respondent Sol was not connected with any labor organization, nor has
she ever attempted to join a labor organization, or to assist, or contribute to a
labor organization. The company cannot, therefore, be considered as having
committed an unfair labor practice.

5. AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES INC. v. CLAVE, G.R. No. L-51641

Facts:
On January 4, 1960, the petitioner entered into a contract with the Maritime Security Agency
(agency) for the latter to guard and protect the petitioners vessels while they were moored at the
port of Manila. It was stipulated in the contract that its term was for one year commencing from
the date of its execution and it may be terminated by either party upon 30 days notice to the other.
The guards were not known to petitioner who dealt only with the agency on matter pertaining to
the service of the guards. A lump sum would be paid by the petitioner to agency who in turn
determined and paid the individual watchmen.
Upon prior notice given by petitioner to the agency, the contract was terminated on January 4,
1961 after it had run its term. On December 24, 1960, the agency (private respondents) cabled the
petitioners office protesting against the termination of their contract. On February 6, 1961, the
respondent union passed a resolution abolishing itself.
Later, on November 17, 1961, private respondents counsel wrote the petitioner a letter
where they pointed out that the termination of the contract was primarily because of a
misunderstanding between the petitioner (represented by Capt. Morris) and Mr. A. Tinsay
(operator of the agency). On December 10, 1962, the respondent union passed another resolution
reviving itself.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner refused to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with the said
individual watchmen and discriminated against them in respect to their tenure of employment by
terminating their contract on January 1, 1961 because of their union activities.
Held:
It is the agency that recruits, hires, and assigns the work of its watchmen. Hence, a watchman
cannot perform any security service for the petitioners vessels unless the agency first accepts him
as its watchman. With respect to his wages, it is the agency that quantifies and pays the wages to
which a watchman is entitled. Neither does the petitioner have any power to dismiss the security
guards. In the light of the foregoing facts, it is evident that the complaining watchmen cannot be
considered as employees of the petitioner.
In view of the findings that there is no employer-employee relationship, it should necessarily
follow that the petitioner cannot be guilty of unfair labor practice. Under Republic Act 875, an
unfair labor practice may be committed only within the context of an employer-employee
relationship.

6. SCHERING EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION v. SCHERING PLOUGH CORP., G.R. No.

142506
Facts:
Sometime in January 1977, Lucia P. Sereneo (petitioner) was employed as a professional medical
representative by respondent company. Eventually, she became a field sales training manager. On
January 22, 1996, when she was elected president of Schering Employees Labor Union (SELU)
and started the re-negotiation with respondent company on the CBA, respondents suddenly
became dissatisfied with her sales performance. The respondent company sent her a notice asking
her to submit an explanation why she failed to implement marketing projects. Later she was again
required to comment on the complaint charging her with misappropriation of company funds,
falsification and tampering of company records, and submission of false reports. This prompted
petitioner SELU to file with the NCMB a notice of strike on the grounds of ULP and union
busting. The notice of strike was dismissed by the NCMB in its resolution. Subsequently,
respondents sent petitioner Sereneo a Memorandum terminating his services for loss of trust and
confidence.
In their answer, respondents claimed that Sereneo failed to perform her duties as professional
medical representative prompting the company to send her 2 letters charging her with wilful
violation of company rules and regulations. When she refused to submit her explanation, they
found her guilty of dishonesty, wilful breach of trust and wilful disobedience which eventually led
to her termination. The Labor Arbiter found respondents guilty of ULP. Upon appeal, the NLRC
reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the petitioners complaint. The CA
affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Sereneo was illegally dismissed from employment.
Held:
After a close view of the records, the NLRC found that petitioner falsified company call cards by
altering the dates of her actual visits to physicians, misappropriation of company funds by
falsifying food receipts, and that she is dishonest. Hence, her dismissal from the service is on
order.
Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended, fraud or wilful breach by the employee of trust
reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative is a ground for terminating an
employment. Upon scanning the records, petitioners accusation of union busting is bereft of any
proof.

7. CALTEX FILIPINO MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION v. COURT OF

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., et al.
G.R. Nos. L-30632-33 April 11, 1972
FACTS:
The Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors' Association is a labor organization of Filipino
managers supervisors in Caltex (Philippines). The Association requested the Company that it shall
be recognized as the duly authorized bargaining agency for managers and supervisors in the
Company. For several attempts, the company ignored the request.
The Association filed notice to strike as the Company committed ULP for refusing to bargain in
good faith on the part of the Company. The Company also allegedly resorted to union-busting
tactics in order to discourage the activities of the association and its members, including
discrimination and intimidation of officers and members of the association. In due time, the strike
was held.
ISSUE: Whether or not the company committed ULP
HELD: YES
The Company never entertained issues as to the majority representation of the Association. The
Company employed dilatory tactics doubtless to discredit the union before the eyes of its own
members and prospective members as an effective bargaining agent, postpone eventual
recognition of the Association, and frustrate its efforts towards securing favorable action on its
economic demands.
It is likewise not disputed that on March 4, 1965, the Company issued its statement of policy. At
that time the Association was seeking recognition as bargaining agent and has presented economic
demands for the improvement of the terms and conditions of employment of supervisors. The
statement of policy conveyed in unequivocal terms to all employees the following message:
We sincerely believe that good employee relations can be maintained and essential
employee needs fulfilled through sound management administration without the necessity
of employee organization and representations. We respect an employee's right to present his
grievances, regardless of whether or not he is represented by a labor organization.
(Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the company again committed ULP after the strike by cutting off of telephone
facilities extended Association members in the refinery; and using of a member of the Association
to spy for the company. The discriminatory acts practiced by the Company against active
unionists after the strike furnish further evidence that Company committed unfair labor practices
as charged. Also, the discrimination consisted in the Company's preferring non-members of the
Association in promotions to higher positions and humiliating active unionists by either promoting
junior supervisors over them or by reduction of their authority compared to that assigned to them
before the strike, or otherwise downgrading their positions.

8. REPUBLIC SAVINGS BANK vs. CIR and ROSENDO T. RESUELLO et al.

G.R. No. L-20303 September 27, 1967

FACTS:

The respondent employees were discharged for having written and published a patently
libelous letter tending to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt of officers, employees of
the bank, employer, and the bank itself. The letter referred to was a letter-charge which
the respondents had written to the bank president, demanding his resignation on the
grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as
discrimination in the promotion of bank employees.

The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the
respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. In view of the foregoing,
the prosecutor filed a complaint in the CIR alleging that the Bank's conduct violated
section 4(a) (5) of the Industrial Peace Act which makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an
employee for having filed charges or for having given or being about to give testimony
under this Act."

ISSUE: Did the Company commit ULP?

HELD: YES.

Since the respondents acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-
charge, they were protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise
of their right of self-organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and
protection, interference with which constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 4(a).
Indeed, when the respondents complained against nepotism, favoritism and other
management practices, they were acting within an area marked out by the Act as a
proper sphere of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining does not end with the
execution of an agreement; It is a continuous process. The joining in protests or
demands, even by a small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such,
is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act.

Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their
grievances. Good faith bargaining required of the Bank an open mind and a sincere
desire to negotiate over grievances. The grievance committee, created in the collective
bargaining agreements, would have been an appropriate forum for such negotiation.
Indeed, the grievance procedure is a part of the continuous process of collective
bargaining.It is intended to promote, as it were, a friendly dialogue between labor and
management as a means of maintaining industrial peace.

9. T & H SHOPFITTERS CORPORATION/GIN QUEEN CORPORATIONvs.T & H

SHOPFITTERS CORPORATION/GIN QUEEN WORKERS UNION
Facts:
T&H Shopfitters Corporation/ Gin Queen Corporation workers union (THS-GQ Union) et
al filed a complaint for ULP by way of union busting, and illegal lockout, with moral and
exemplary damages and atty.s fees, against T&H Shopfitters and Gin Queen before
labor arbiter.
The corporations were treated by the union as single entity and their sole employer. To
improve their working conditions, the respondents and the petitioners held a formal
meeting to discuss a formation of a union. However, on the next day 17 EE were barred
from entering from factory in Zambales and were ordered to transfer to warehouse in
Subic because of expansion. They were even ordered to go on forced leave due to
unavailability of work.
Dole issued a certificate of registration in favour of THS-GQ Union.
Union stated that affected EE were not given regular work assignments, and the
corporations employed subcontractor to perform the job which prompted the Union to
seek assistance from NCMB. An agreement was reach by giving the regular EE the
priority to the distribution of work. But the company did not complied with the agreement
and even hired more contractual workers.
The union filed PCE but put on hold. The CE election was scheduled on Oct. 11, 2004.
The director of Gin queen informed the EE that the lease contract was expired and the
possible relocation. Some of EE checked the place and found out that it was grassland.
The Union members work as grass cutter because of that union officers and some of its
members refused to report to work. The corporations summoned the union president to
explain why he should not be terminated.
A day before certification election the corporations sponsored a field trip to the EE. The
Union officers and its member were excluded. During the night of the field trip a sale
agent appeared convincing the EE not to vote for union. When the election day came the
EE were escorted at the polling center.
Because of heavy work pressure exerted by petitioners the no union prevailed. The union
protested.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner corporations committed unfair labor practice
Ruling: Yes.
The questioned acts of petitioners, namely: 1) sponsoring a field trip to Zambales for its
employees, to the exclusion of union members, before the scheduled certification
election; 2) the active campaign by the sales officer of petitioners against the union
prevailing as a bargaining agent during the field trip; 3) escorting its employees after the
field trip to the polling center; 4) the continuous hiring of subcontractors performing
respondents functions; 5) assigning union members to the Cabangan site to work as
grass cutters; and 6) the enforcement of work on a rotational basis for union members, all
reek of interference on the part of petitioners.
Indubitably, the various acts of petitioners, taken together, reasonably support an
inference that, indeed, such were all orchestrated to restrict respondents free
exercise of their right to self-organization. The Court is of the considered view that
petitioners undisputed actions prior and immediately before the scheduled
certification election, while seemingly innocuous, unduly meddled in the affairs of its
employees in selecting their exclusive bargaining representative.
Petitioners had no business persuading and/or assisting its employees in their legally
protected independent process of selecting their exclusive bargaining representative.
The fact and peculiar timing of the field trip sponsored by petitioners for its
employees not affiliated with THS-GQ Union, although a positive enticement was
undoubtedly extraneous influence designed to impede respondents in their quest to
be certified. This cannot be countenanced.
Not content with achieving a "no union" vote in the certification election, petitioners
launched a vindictive campaign against union members by assigning work on a
rotational basis while subcontractors performed the latters functions regularly.
Worse, some of the respondents were made to work as grass cutters in an effort to
dissuade them from further collective action.

10. PRINCE TRANSPORT, INC. V GARCIA 639 SCRA 312

FACTS OF THE CASE:
Respondents are employees of petitioner Prince Transport Inc., a company engaged on the
business of transporting passengers by land. They were hired either as drivers, conductors,
mechanics or inspectors. As alleged by respondents, sometimes in 1997, PTI caused the transfer of
all union members and sympathizers to one of its sub companies, Lubas Transport allegedly to
block the continued formation of the union.
Despite such transfer, the schedule of drivers and conductors, as well as their company IDs were
issued by PTI; the daily time records, tickets and reports of the respondents were also filed at the
PTI office, and all claims for salaries were transacted at the same office; later, the business of
Lubas deteriorated because of the refusal of PTI to maintain and repair the units being used
therein, which resulted in the virtual stoppage of its operations and respondents loss of
employment.
Petitioners on the other hand, denied the material allegations of the complaint contending that
herein respondents were no longer their employees, since; they all transferred to Lubas at their
own request.
 Respondents then filed a complaint charging PTI with illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice.
The Labor arbiter dismissed the complaint for unfair labor practice in the absence of evidence to
show that they violated respondents right to self organization. Respondents then filed a special
civil action for certiorari with the CA and the CA ruled that the petitioner company is guilty of
ULP. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner PTI is guilty of ULP.
RULING:
Yes. It is. As to whether petitioner is guilty of ULP, the court finds no cogent reason to depart from
the findings of the CA that respondents transfer of work assignments to Lubas was designed by
petitioners as a subterfuge to foil the formers right to organize themselves into a union. Under
Article 248 (a) and (e) of the labor code, an employer is guilty of ULP if it interferes with,
restrains or coerces its employees in the exercise of their right to self organization or if it
discriminates in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment in
order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
Indeed, evidence of petitioners unfair labor practice is shown by the established fact that, after
respondents transfer to Lubas, petitioners left them high and dry insofar as the operations of
Lubas was concerned. The Court finds no error in the findings and conclusion of the CA that
petitioners "withheld the necessary financial and logistic support such as spare parts, and repair
and maintenance of the transferred buses until only two units remained in running condition." This
left respondents virtually jobless.

11: PARK HOTEL V. MANOLO SORIANO G.R. NO. 171118, 10 SEPTEMBER 2012
FACTS:
The petitioners were Park Hotel, the company, Gregg Harbutt, the
manager of the hotel and Bill Percy, the owner of the company. Harbutt is an
officer and stockholder of Burgos Corporation, a sister company of Park Hotel.
Manolo Soriano was hired by the petitioner Park Hotel as a Maintenance
Electrician. His co-respondent Lester Gonzales was a Doorman and then
Supervisor. Co-respondent Yolanda Badilla was a bartender of Js Playhouse. They
were dismissed by the company for allegedly stealing company property. At the
time of the case they were all employees of Burgos Corporation.
The respondents filed complaints against the petitioners before the Labor Arbiter
for illegal dismissal, ULP, and damages. They alleged that they were dismissed
because they were allegedly organizing a union. They also alleged that the
petitioners forced them to sign resignation letters in the presence of goons and
that they were not actually given the allegedly issued Memoranda for their
alleged violations.
The LA ruled in the respondents favor finding the employees were illegally
dismissed and that the employers committed the ULP of union busting by
terminating the employees. It ordered the petitioner employer to reinstate the
employees and to pay them damages. The LA rendered a new decision similarly
favoring the employees when the case was remanded to the LA upon appeal by
the petitioners to the NLRC. An appeal to the NLRC was dismissed. The CA
likewise dismissed the certiorari field against the NLRC and affirmed the
judgment.
ISSUE
1. Whether the actions of the employer constitute an unfair labor practice
2. Who among the petitioners are liable for ULP if they are liable
HELD
1. Yes, the petitioners committed ULP.
The Court ruled that an unfair labor practice is committed when an employer
interferes, restrains, or coerces employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization. This includes dismissing an employee from work because of he is
exercising his right to self-organization.
In the case, the immediate impulse of the respondent employers was to
terminate the employees who were organizing a union. The unceremonious
dismissal of the employees was to restrain their attempt to exercise their right to
self-organization.
2. Percy and Harbutt are liable.
The Court ruled that an officer of a corporation may be deemed solidarily liable
for unlawful acts of the corporation. This rule also applies in cases wherein an
employee is terminated and an officer has acted with malice or bad faith.
In the case, both Percy and Harbutt, as officers of Burgos, are liable because they
have acted maliciously in terminating the employees by dismissing them without
any valid ground and doing so to suppress their right to self-organization.

12. G.R. No. L-8116 August 25, 1956

SCOTY'S DEPARTMENT STORE, ET AL., petitioner, vs.NENA MICALLER, respondent.

Facts:
Nina Micaller , an employee of petitioner, was found by the trial court to have been illegally
dismissed from her position as a salesgirl. Moreover, it ruled that the owners of Scottys
Department Store are guilty of unfair labor practice.
The controversy stemmed from the employers allegations of her misconduct and serious
disrespect to the management. As a rebuttal, the respondent claimed that her dismissal was
prompted by her organization of a union which was later on affiliated with the National Labor
Union. Micaller buttressed her allegation with the fact that the owners went to her house and
questioned her further as regards her union activities, in addition to tendering a paper for her to
sign in order to withdraw from the union. Thereafter, the manager of the store asked each
employee about their affiliation with the union. This impelled the Union to file a notice of strike;
an act which likewise pressed the petitioners to employ temporary employees equal in number to
the old.
Issue:
 Whether or not the petitioners are guilty of unfair labor practices.
Held:
Yes, petitioners are guilty of unfair labor practice under the Industrial Peace Act.
Since, in 1956, the law on this point is of recent enactment, the Court found it difficult to
determine what acts or circumstances may constitute unfair labor practice within its purview for
lack of appropriate precedents. However, there are many American cases that may be resorted to
where been found guilty of unfair labor practice under similar circumstances and was given the
corresponding sanction. One of such cases, which in its opinion is on all fours with the present, is
NLRB vs. Harris-Woodson Co. (CCA-4, 1947, 179 F 2d 720) where the following was held: .

As to the Board's finding of interference, there is abundant evidence of the questioning of

employees as to membership in the union and of anti-union expressions by the company's
superintendent made in such a way as to discourage union membership. The rule with respect
thereto is well settled and was stated by us recently in the case of NLRB vs. Norfolf-Southern Bus
Corpn. 159 Fed 2d 518, where he Court said:
"Questioning of employees concerning union membership and activities and disparaging remarks
by supervisory employees made in such away as to hamper the exercise of free choice on the part
of the employees, have been uniformly condemned as a violation of the Act.
As to the discharge of Edna B. Edler, the president of the union, it appears that she was discharged
in the Spring of 1945 at the time when question of union representation was becoming acute. The
Company contends that the ground of the discharge was insubordinate language and conduct, and
evidence of a controversy between the employer and the superintendent of the this was not the true
reason for the discharge, but only a pretext. It was shown that Mrs. Edler was a competent and
efficient employee with a long record of faithful service, and by the controversies and even
quarrels between the employees and the superintendent had not therefore led to discharge.
According to Mrs. Edler's testimony, which was accepted by the Board, the controversy was a
very minor character and furnished to sufficient justification for the peremptory discharge of an
efficient employee with a long record of service. Under such circumstances, the Board may very
well have concluded that the true reason for the discharge was other than the union and her
activity in its behalf. This is all the more reasonable in view of the manifest anti-union bias of the
company's officers and superintendent and for the controversy with regard to the recognition of
the union which had just been revived .

13. Philippine Steam Navigation Co. vs. Philippine Marine Officers Guild, et al. G.R. Nos. L-
20667 and 20669

Facts:
PMOG (herein private respondent) and Cebu Seamen Association (CSA) are rival unions
representing PHILSTEAM officers. On 15 and 18 June 1954, PMOG sent petitioner co. set of
demands and request for CB. Petitioner, in its answer on 29 June 1954, required PMOG to prove
its majority representation. On the same date, petitioner started interrogating and investigating its
captains, deck officers, and engineers, to find out if they had joined PMOG or authorized PMOG
to represent them. PMOG replied insisting its former demands. PMOG filed a notice of strike.
Two conferences were held at DOLE but to no avail.
Meanwhile CSA sent petitioner its own set of demands. The latter recognized the latter as having
majority representation. On August 24, 1954, PHILSTEAM and CSA signed a CBA. On the same
date, PMOG declared a strike. The RP President certified the dispute to CIR.

Issue: Did petitioner commit ULP? Is reinstatement of strikers proper?

Held:
Yes, petitioner committed ULP when it conducted investigations to check majority status of
PMOG. The rule in this jurisdiction is that subjection by the company of its employees to a series
of questionings regarding their membership in the union or their union activities, in such a way as
to hamper the exercise of free choice on their part, constitutes unfair labor practice.
Yes, striking employees are entitled to reinstatement, whether or not the strike was the
consequence of the employer's unfair labor practice, unless, where the strike was not the
consequence of any unfair labor practice, the employer has hired others to take the place of the
strikers and has promised them continued employment.

14. Guys refer to case 27, yung digest ni Greg. Parehas lang yung case, same dates and same
citations.

15. G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR
TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON,
ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and
RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs.PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC.
and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration
at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be
participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the
regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M.,
respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed
demonstration.
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not
be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts
should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent
Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a
charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, charging them with a
"violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic
Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20,
rec.).
Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner
PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino
Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor
Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor
practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees of the
respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
ISSUE: WHO IS GUILTY OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE?
HELD: The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal
on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass
demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8)
petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of
expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the
respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities
for ... mutual aid or protection" while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an
employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in
Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the
respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged
police abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees
to engage in such common action to better shield themselves against such alleged police
indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning
and regular shift should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal,
was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting speech."

16. G.R. No. L-21696 February 25, 1967

VISAYAN STEVEDORE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY (VISTRANCO) and
RAFAEL XAUDARO, petitioners, vs.COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
UNITED WORKERS' & FARMERS' ASSOCIATION (UWFA) VENANCIO DANO-
OG, BUENAVENTURA AGARCIO and 137 others, respondents.
FACTS: The Company is engaged in the loading and unloading of vessels, with a branch
office in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, under the management of said Rafael Xaudaro. Its
workers are supplied by the United Workers and Farmers Association, a labor organization
hereinafter referred to as UWFA whose men (affiliated to various labor unions) have
regularly worked as laborers of the Company during every milling season since immediately
after World War II up to the milling season immediately preceding November 11, 1955, when
the Company refused to engage the services of Venancio Dano-og, Buenaventura, Agarcio
and 137 other persons named in the complaint filed in case No. 62-ULP-Cebu of the Court of
Industrial Relations and hereinafter referred to as the Complainants owing, they claim,
to their union activities. At the behest of the UWFA and the Complainants, a complaint for
unfair labor practice was, accordingly, filed against the Company and Xaudaro with the Court
of Industrial Relations hereinafter referred to as the CIR in which it was docketed as
Case No. 62-ULP-Cebu. In due course, its Presiding Judge issued the order appealed from,
which was affirmed by the CIR sitting en banc. Hence this petition for review by certiorari.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE COMPANY IS GUILTY OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
HELD: Referring to the unfair labor practice charge against the Company, we find, with the
CIR, that said charge is substantially borne out by the evidence of record, it appearing that the
workers not admitted to work beginning from November, 1955, were precisely those
belonging to the UWFA and the Xaudaro, the Company Branch Manager, had told them
point-blank that severance of their connection with the UWFA was the remedy, if they wanted
to continue working with the Company.

17. DIGITEL TELECOMMUNICAITONS PHIL. INC. vs DIGITEL EMPLOYEES UNION

GR No. 184903

FACTS: Digitel Employees Union became the exclusive bargaining agent of all rank and file
employees in Digitel in 1994. The Union and Digitel then commenced collective bargaining
negotiations which resulted in a bargaining deadlock. No CBA was forged between Digitel and the
Union. Some Union members abandoned their employment with Digitel. The Union later became
dormant.
10 years thereafter, Digitel received a letter from the president of the Union containing
the list of officers, CBA proposals and ground rules. Digitel was reluctant to negotiate with the
union and demanded the latter to show compliance with the provisions of the unions CBL on
union membership and election of officers.
Thereafter, the president and his group filed a case for preventive mediation before the
NCMB based on Digitels violation of duty to bargain.
During the pendency of the controversy, Digitel Service Inc. (Digiserv) filed with DOLE
an Establishment Termination Report stating that it will cease its business operation. The closure
affected at least 100 employees, 42 of whom are members of the respondent. Alleging that the
affected employees are its members and in reaction to Digiservs action, Esplana (president) filed
a notice of strike for union busting, illegal lockout and violation of assumption order. The
Secretary of Labor and Employment ordered the notice subsumed by a previous assumption order.
Meanwhile, Digitel filed a petition with BLR seeking cancellation of the Unions
registration which the Regional Director dismissed for lack of merit. The Secretary of Labor
directed Digitel to commence the CBA negotiation with the union and certified compulsory
arbitration before the NLRC the issue of ULP.
The NLRC dismissed the ULP charge against Digitel but declaring the dismissal of the 13
employees as illegal and ordering their reinstatement. The union maintains that out of 42
employees, only 13 remained as most had already accepted separation pay. Digitel filed before
CA, challenging the NLRCs decision arguing mainly that Digiserv employees are not employees
of Digitel. CA partially granted the case for ULP thus modifying the the assailed NLRC
dispositions. CA likewise sustained the finding that Digiserv is engaged on labor only contracting
and that its employees are actually employees of Digitel. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid dismissal.

HELD: The affected employees were illegally dismissed. In addition to finding that Digiserv is a
labor contractor, records show that its dismissed employees are in fact employees of Digitel. The
remaining affected employees, except 2, were already hired by Digitel even before the existence
of Digiserv. Likewise, the remaining affected employees continuously held the position of
Customer Service Representative, which was earlier known as Traffic Operator from the time they
were appointed until they were terminated.
Although Digitel maintains that the affected employees were already terminated on the ground of
closure of Digiserv, a department within Digitel. The court refers the closure of a department or
division of a company as retrenchment.
In this case, not all elements for a valid retrenchment were satisfied. There was no good faith in
the retrenchment. The closure of the department is not illegal per se. what makes it unlawful is
when the closure is undertaken in bad faith. Bad faith was evidenced by the timing of and reasons
of the closure and the timing of and reasons for all subsequent opening.

18. Progressive Development Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations

G.R. No. L-39546 (November 29, 1977)

Facts: In behalf of its 48 members, Araneta Coliseum Employees Association

(ACEA) filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against Progressive
Development Corporation (PDC) and Progressive Employees Union (PEU).
PDC initiated a move to disauthorize the counsel of ACEA from appearing in a
union conference with PDC and coerced the employees to disaffiliate from
ACEA and to affiliate with PEU instead. PDC discriminated the employees by
not giving them their working schedules, lessening their number of working
days and eventually dismissing them from their employment. The union
prayed that the employees be reinstated to their former positions with back
wages and all the rights and privileges. However, PDC claimed that the
employees were not discriminated and they were only casual or temporary
employees.
Issue: Whether PDC is guilty of unfair labor practice or not.
Held: Yes. From the facts of record, it is clear that the individuals were
dismissed because they refused to resign from ACEA and to affiliate with PEU
which was being aided and abetted by PDC. While PEU was allegedly
organized on June 26, 1962, it was only on July 11, 1962 that its existence was
publicly announced when the management of the corporation refused to meet
with ACEA. PEU never collected dues from its members and all their members
are now regular employees, there is evidence that the PEU became inactive
after the death of its former counsel. This shows that PEU was organized to
camouflage the corporations dislike for the ACEA and to stave off ACEAs
recognition. The corporation was correctly found to have committed acts
constituting unfair labor practice, hence, back wages for five years without
qualification or deduction are granted.

19. ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB, INC., vs NLRC

G.R. No. 170287
FACTS:
On June 21, 1999, the Club and the Alabang Country Club Independent
Employees Union (Union) entered into a CBA, which provided for a Union
shop and maintenance of membership shop.
Subsequently, in July 2001, an election was held and a new set of
officers was elected. The new officers conducted an audit of the Union funds.
They discovered some irregularly recorded entries, unaccounted expenses
and disbursements, and uncollected loans from the Union funds.
Thereafter, on October 6, 2001, in a meeting called by the Union,
respondents Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras explained their side.
Despite their explanations, respondents Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras
were expelled from the Union and were furnished individual letters of
expulsion for malversation of Union funds.
In a letter dated October 18, 2001, the Union, invoking the Security Clause of
the CBA, demanded that the Club dismiss respondents Pizarro, Braza, and
Castueras in view of their expulsion from the Union. Respondents filed for
illegal dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether the three respondents were illegally dismissed and whether
they were afforded due process.

HELD: Under the Labor Code, an employee may be validly terminated on the
following grounds: (1) just causes under Art. 282; (2) authorized causes under
Art. 283; (3) termination due to disease under Art. 284; and (4) termination by
the employee or resignation under Art. 285.
Another cause for termination is dismissal from employment due to the
enforcement of the union security clause in the CBA. Here, Art. II of the CBA
on Union security contains the provisions on the Union shop and maintenance
of membership shop. There is union shop when all new regular employees
are required to join the union within a certain period as a condition for their
continued employment. There is maintenance of membership shop when
employees who are union members as of the effective date of the agreement,
or who thereafter become members, must maintain union membership as a
condition for continued employment until they are promoted or transferred out
of the bargaining unit or the agreement is terminated.
SC ruled that the Club substantially complied with the due process
requirements before it dismissed the three respondents.
In the above case, we pronounced that while the company, under a
maintenance of membership provision of the CBA, is bound to dismiss any
employee expelled by the union for disloyalty upon its written request, this
undertaking should not be done hastily and summarily.

20. GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION VS CASIO

G.R. No. 149552
FACTS:
The labor union Ilaw at Buklod ng Mangagawa (IBM)-Local 31 Chapter
(Local 31) was the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file
employees of GMC in Lapu-Lapu City.On November 30, 1991, IBM-Local 31,
through its officers and board members entered into a CBA with GMC.The
effectivity of the said CBA was retroactive to August 1, 1991.
Casio was elected IBM-Local 31 President for a three-year term in
June 1991, while his co-respondents were union shop stewards.
Rodolfo Gabiana, the IBM Regional Director for Visayas and
Mindanao, furnished Casio,et al. with copies of the Affidavits of GMC
employees Basilio Inoc and Juan Potot, charging Casio,et al. with acts
inimical to the interest of the union.Through the same letter, Gabiana gave
Casio,et al. three days from receipt thereof within which to file their answers
or counter-affidavits.However, Casio,et al. refused to acknowledge receipt of
Gabianas letter.
Subsequently, on February 29, 1992, Pino,et al., as officers and
members of the IBM-Local 31, issued a Resolution expelling Casio,et al. from
the union.
Gabiana then informed the company of the expulsion of Casio,et al.
from the union of IBM-Local 31 officers and board members.Gabiana likewise
requested that Casio,et al. be immediately dismissed from their work for the
interest of industrial peace in the plant.
GMC acceded to Gabianas request to terminate the employment of
Casio,et al.GMC terminated the employment of Casio,et al.
On March 27, 1992, Casio,et al., in the name of IBM-Local 31, filed a
Notice of Strike and alleged as bases for the strike the illegal dismissal of
union officers and members, discrimination, coercion, and union busting.
Casio,et al.filed before NLRC a complaint against GMC and Pino,et al.
for unfair labor practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Casio, et al. was illegally dismissed?
HELD: There are two aspects which characterize the concept of due process
under the Labor Code: one is substantive whether the termination of
employment was based on the provision of the Labor Code or in accordance
with the prevailing jurisprudence; the other is procedural the manner in which
the dismissal was effected.
In the case at bar, the dismissal of Casio, et al. was indeed illegal,
having been done without just cause and the observance of procedural due
process.
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential
elements of procedural due process.The law requires the employer to furnish
the employee sought to be dismissed with two written notices before
termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) a written notice
apprising the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought in order to afford him an opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself with the assistance of counsel, if he desires, and (2) a
subsequent notice informing the employee of the employers decision to
dismiss him. This procedure is mandatory and its absence taints the dismissal
with illegality.
In the case at bar, Casio,et al. did not receive any other communication
from GMC, except the written notice of termination dated March 24,
1992.GMC, by its own admission, did not conduct a separate and
independent investigation to determine the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the expulsion of Casio,et al. by IBP-Local 31.It straight away
acceded to the demand of IBP-Local 31 to dismiss Casio,et al.

21. PICOP RESOURCES, INCORPORATED (PRI) vs. ANACLETO L. TAECA, GEREMIAS S.

TATO, JAIME N. CAMPOS, MARTINIANO A. MAGAYON, JOSEPH B. BALGOA, MANUEL
G. ABUCAY, MOISES M. ALBARAN, MARGARITO G. ALICANTE, JERRY ROMEO T.
AVILA, LORENZO D. CANON, RAUL P. DUERO, DANILO Y. ILAN, MANUEL M.
MATURAN, JR., LUISITO R. POPERA, CLEMENTINO C. QUIMAN, ROBERTO Q. SILOT,
CHARLITO D. SINDAY, REMBERT B. SUZON ALLAN J. TRIMIDAL, and NAMAPRI-SPFL

G.R. No. 160828 August 9, 2010

PERALTA, J.:

Facts:
Respondents were regular rank-and-file employees of PRI and bona fide members of
Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa PRI Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (NAMAPRI-SPFL),
which is the collective bargaining agent for the rank-and-file employees of petitioner PRI.

PRI has a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with NAMAPRI-SPFL for a period of five (5)
years from May 22, 1995 until May 22, 2000. The CBA contained union security provisions.
On May 16, 2000, Atty. Proculo P. Fuentes (Atty. Fuentes) sent a letter to the management of PRI
demanding the termination of employees who allegedly campaigned for, supported and signed the
Petition for Certification Election of the Federation of Free Workers Union (FFW) during the
effectivity of the CBA. NAMAPRI-SPFL considered said act of campaigning for and signing the
petition for certification election of FFW as an act of disloyalty and a valid basis for termination
for a cause in accordance with its Constitution and By-Laws, and the terms and conditions of the
CBA, specifically Article II, Sections 6.1 and 6.2 on Union Security Clause.

Respondents asserted that the act of PRI, Wilfredo Fuentes and Atty. Boniel in giving in to the
wishes of the Union in discharging them on the ground of disloyalty to the Union amounted to
interference with, restraint or coercion of respondents exercise of their right to self-organization.
The act indirectly required petitioners to support and maintain their membership with NAMAPRI-
SPFL as a condition for their continued employment. The acts of NAMAPRI-SPFL, Atty. Fuentes
and Trujillo amounted to actual restraint and coercion of the petitioners in the exercise of their
rights to self-organization and constituted acts of unfair labor practice.

Issue:
Whether the respondents committed acts of disloyalty.

Held:
No.

We are in consonance with the Court of Appeals when it held that the mere signing of the
authorization in support of the Petition for Certification Election of FFW on March 19, 20 and 21,
or before the freedom period, is not sufficient ground to terminate the employment of respondents
inasmuch as the petition itself was actually filed during the freedom period. Nothing in the records
would show that respondents failed to maintain their membership in good standing in the Union.
Respondents did not resign or withdraw their membership from the Union to which they belong.
Respondents continued to pay their union dues and never joined the FFW.

Moreover, the last sentence of Article 253 which provides for automatic renewal pertains only to
the economic provisions of the CBA, and does not include representational aspect of the CBA. An
existing CBA cannot constitute a bar to a filing of a petition for certification election. When there
is a representational issue, the status quo provision in so far as the need to await the creation of a
new agreement will not apply. Otherwise, it will create an absurd situation where the union
members will be forced to maintain membership by virtue of the union security clause existing
under the CBA and, thereafter, support another union when filing a petition for certification
election. If we apply it, there will always be an issue of disloyalty whenever the employees
exercise their right to self-organization. The holding of a certification election is a statutory policy
that should not be circumvented,[23] or compromised
22. DEL PILAR ACADEMY, EDUARDO ESPEJO and ELISEO OCAMPO, JR., vs. DEL PILAR
ACADEMY EMPLOYEES UNION,
G.R. No. 170112. April 30, 2008
NACHURA, J.:

Facts:
In September 1997, the UNION negotiated for the renewal of the CBA. DEL PILAR, however,
refused to renew the same unless the provision regarding entitlement to two (2) months summer
vacation leave with pay will be amended by limiting the same to teachers, who have rendered at
least three (3) consecutive academic years of satisfactory service. The UNION objected to the
proposal claiming diminution of benefits. DEL PILAR refused to sign the CBA, resulting in a
deadlock. The UNION requested DEL PILAR to submit the case for voluntary arbitration, but the
latter allegedly refused, prompting the UNION to file a case for unfair labor practice with the
Labor Arbiter against DEL PILAR; Eduardo Espejo, its president; and Eliseo Ocampo, Jr.,
chairman of the Board of Trustees.

Traversing the complaint, DEL PILAR denied committing unfair labor practices against the
UNION. It justified the non-deduction of the agency fees by the absence of individual check off
authorization from the non-union employees. As regards the proposal to amend the provision on
summer vacation leave with pay, DEL PILAR alleged that the proposal cannot be considered
unfair for it was done to make the provision of the CBA conformable to the DECS Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools.

Issue:
Whether the school committed unfair labor practice.

Held:
No. Anent the proposal to decrease the coverage of the 11th and 12th month vacation with pay, we
do not believe that such was done in bad faith but rather in an honest attempt to make perfect
procession following the DECS Manuals. Moreso, it is of judicial notice that in the course of
negotiation, almost all provisions are up for grabs, amendments or change. This is something
normal in the course of a negotiation and does not necessarily connote bad faith as each every one
(sic) has the right to negotiate reward or totally amend the provisions of the contract/agreement.

All told while there was error on [the] part of [DEL PILAR] for the first issue, [it] came through in
the second. But as it is, we do not believe that a finding of unfair labor practice can be had
considering the lack of evidence on record that said acts were done to undermine the union or
stifle the members right to self organization or that the [petitioners] were in bad faith. If at all, its
(sic) error may have been the result of a mistaken notion that individual check-off authorization is
needed for it to be able to validly and legally deduct assessment especially after individual[s]
concerned registered their objection. On the other hand, it is not error to negotiate for a better term
in the CBA. So long as [the] parties will agree. It must be noted that a CBA is a contract between
labor and management and is not simply a litany of benefits for labor. Moreso, for unfair labor
practice to prosper, there must be a clear showing of acts aimed at stifling the workers right to
self-organization. Mere allegations and mistake notions would not suffice.

23. ITOGON-SUYOC MINES, INCvs.JOSE BALDO, SANGILO-ITOGON WORKERS UNION

and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (Case No. 23)
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations in Case No.
50-ULP-PANG. finding the petitioner guilty of unfair labor practices and ordering it to reinstate
respondent Jose Baldo to his former work with back wage.
In a complaint dated November 18, 1958, an Acting Prosecutor of the Court of Industrial Relations
charged the herein petitioner-employer, Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc., and Claude Fertig its General
Superintendent, with having committed unfair labor practices. The complaint prayed that an order be
issued against the herein petitioner to cease and desist from the labor practices complained of and that
the complaining employees, A. Manaois and Jose Baldo be reinstated to their former positions in the
mining company without loss of employee benefits and with back wages from the date of their
respective dismissal until the date of their actual reinstatement.
The petitioner admitted the fact of the dismissal of the two complaining employees, but
alleged that the complaining employees were dismissed for just and lawful causes, namely,
"inefficiency, utter disregard and violation of safety rules and regulations established and enforced by
the respondent for the protection of the lives of the employees and properties of the respondent
company, utter disregard of the company property and poor attendance records."
Baldo started working as miner in the respondent company sometime in 1954. He worked
continuously therein until February 4, 1958 when he was given a "30-day notice of termination of
employment" to the effect that his services will not be needed by the respondent company after
March 5, 1958. Baldo refused to acknowledge receipt of said notice when Mowry, mine's
superintendent of the company, asked him to sign the same. It appears that Baldo was on 15 days
vacation leave with pay immediately prior to his being served his separation notice. The complainant's
evidence tended to prove that Baldo was dismissed by the company because of his membership in the
complainant Sangilo-Itogon Workers Union, a legitimate labor organization; and, for having testified
for the said union in Case No. 3-MC-PANG a certification proceeding involving the employees of the
respondent company. Baldo failed to obtain a reinstatement therein.
The petitioner, in this appeal, also contends that the Court of Industrial Relations had gravely abused
its discretion when it ordered the reinstatement of Jose Baldo with back wages. The petitioner points
out that it should not be made to pay back wages during the time that this case had been pending.
Issue:
Whether the CIR acted with GAD when it ordered the reinstatement of Jose Baldo with back wages
and the Er had committed ULP.
Held:
In Negative. Er`s contention is without merit. When an employer commits unfair labor practices he
should be made to shoulder all the consequences of his unfair acts. The matter of granting back wages
or backpay to an employee that is reinstated is discretionary with the Court of Industrial Relations.
This question had already been settled in a line of decisions rendered by this Court (United Employees
Welfare Ass'n. vs. Isaac Peral Bowling Alleys, G. R. No. 10327, Sept. 30, 1958; Union of Philippine
Education Co. Employees vs. Philippine Education Co., 91 Phil. 93, 95). We are satisfied that under the
circumstances as shown by the records of the present case the Court of Industrial Relations had not
abused the exercise of its discretion when it ordered the grant of back wages to respondent Baldo
from the date he was promised reinstatement to the day of his actual reinstatement.

24. G.R. No. L-30658-59 March 31, 1976

SHELL OIL WORKERS UNION and SHELL & AFFILIATES SUPERVISORS UNION,
Petitioners, vs. SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, Respondents.
Facts:
The claims interposed that the members of the unions were not being paid their overtime
pay due them in accordance with the ruling in NAWASA Consolidated case to wit: It has been
held that for purposes of computing overtime compensation a regular wage includes all payments
which the parties have agreed shall be received during the work week, including piece work
wages, differential payments for working at undesirable times, such as at night or on Sundays and
holidays, and the cost of board and lodging customarily furnished the employee.
The company filed an answer claiming that the employees who rendered overtime work
have been paid in accordance with law and their CBA and that the NAWASA decision insofar as
the computation of overtime pay is concerned is not applicable to the factual situation and that
claims for overtime pay filed beyond the three-year period allowed by law have already
prescribed.
The trial court rendered its decision denying both the petitions for lack of basis. The
petitioners elevated their cases to the Court of Industrial Relations and reiterated their claim for
the re-computation of their overtime pay by taking into account the fringe benefits enjoyed and
adding the same to the basic rate before computing the overtime pay but the same were denied.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the pertinent ruling in the NAWASA is applicable to the case at bar so as to follow the
payment of additional overtime pay to the petitioners notwithstanding their collective bargaining
agreement.
Ruling:
We rule that the NAWASA case is inapplicable to the case at bar. Having been stipulated
by the parties that ".. the Tin Factory Incentive Pay has ceased in view of the closure of the factory
the fringe benefits as described show that they are occasionally not regularly enjoyed and that not
all employees are entitled to them", petitioners failed to meet the test laid down by this Court in
the NAWASA case.
The collective bargaining agreement resorted to by the parties being in accordance with
R.A. 875, with its provision on overtime pay far away beyond the premium rate provided for in
Commonwealth Act 444, the same should govern their relationship. It should be noted in passing
that Commonwealth Act 444 prescribes only a minimum of at least 25% in addition to the regular
of pay, whereas, under the Collective Bargaining Agreement of the parties, the premium rate of
overtime pay is as high as 150% on regular working days up to 250% on Sundays and recognized
national holidays.
Since this is their contract entered into by them pursuant to bargaining negotiations under
existing laws, they are bound to respect it. It is the duty of this Court to see to it that contracts
between parties, not tainted with infirmity or irregularity or illegality, be strictly complied with by
the parties themselves. This is the only way by which unity and order can be properly attained in
our society.

25. De La Salle University v. De La Salle University

Employees Association, GR No. 169254

Facts:

On May 30, 2000, some of De La Salle University Employees

Association (DLSUEA-NAFTEU) members headed by Belen Aliazas
(Aliazas faction) filed a petition for the election of union officers in
the BLR. They alleged that there has been no election for DLSUEA-
NAFTEUs officers since 1992 in violation of the unions CBL. It would
appear that DLSUEA-NAFTEU repeatedly voted to approve the hold-
over of the previously elected officers led by Baylon Baz (Baz
faction).When the matter was eventually elevated to the BLR
Director, the latter ruled that the Baz factions tenure in office is
valid and subsisting until their successors have been duly elected
and qualified.Thereafter, DLSUEA-NAFTEU entered into a five-year
CBA with De La Salle University (DLSU). DLSUEA-NAFTEU sent a
letter to DLSU requesting for the renegotiation of the economic
terms for the fourth and fifth years of the then current CBA. DLSU
denied the request and contended that there is a conclusion of fact
that there is an absolute void in the leadership of respondent and no
renegotiation can occur given the void in the leadership of
respondent.

Issue:

Whether DLSU is guilty of unfair labor practice when it refused to

bargain collectively with DLSUEA-NAFTEU in light of the intra-union
dispute between DLSUEA-NAFTEUs two opposing factions?Held:

Yes. Petitioner finds reason to refuse to negotiate with respondents

incumbent officers because of the alleged "void in the union
leadership" declared by the Regional Director in his March 19, 2001
decision, but after the election of the union officers held on August
28, 2003, continued refusal by the University to negotiate amounts
to unfair labor practice. The non-proclamation of the newly elected
union officers cannot be used as an excuse to fulfill the duty to
bargain collectively.

26. Union of Filpro Employees-DFAI Unions KMU v. Nestle

Phil., GR No. 158930-31

Same facts as Case 3, Batch 4

Issue:
Whether Nestle committed Unfair Labor Practice?

Held:

No. Basic is the principle that good faith is presumed and he who
alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. By imputing bad
faith unto the actuations of Nestl, it was UFE-DFA-KM who had the
burden of proof to present substantial evidence to support the
allegation of unfair labor practice.

it must be shown that Nestl was motivated by ill will, bad

faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, and, of course,
that social humiliation, wounded feelings, or grave anxiety resulted
in disclaiming unilateral grants as proper subjects in their collective
bargaining negotiations.

There is no per se test of good faith in bargaining.Good faith

or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts, to be precise,
the crucial question of whether or not a party has met his statutory
duty to bargain in good faith typically turns on the facts of the
individual case. Necessarily, a determination of the validity of the
Nestls proposition involves an appraisal of the exercise of its
management prerogative.

27. G.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU
 INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS and EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR
LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, petitioners,
vs.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES
and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
FACTS:
The Unions entered into separate CBAs with the Companies. Near the expiration of their CBAs on
September 30, 1957, the Unions submitted proposals to the Companies to modify their CBAs on
September 16, 1957. There was mutual agreement that the benefits that will be agreed upon will
retroact to October 1, 1957.
However, negotiations were stalled by a deadlock on the issue of union shop resulting to the filing
of a Notice of Strike for deadlock on collective bargaining on January 27, 1958. During
conciliations under the DOLE, the companies urged the unions to drop their demand for union
security in lieu of their demands in toto. ILACTEA-NATU dropped their demand and the other
unions followed upon threat that the benefits will no longer retroact to October 1957 made by the
companies.
Another stalemate occurred on the issue of salary increases on the April 25 May 6, 1958
negotiations. The Company refused to provide counter-proposals but instead presented facts and
figures and demanded that the Unions present a workable formula to justify their proposals. The
Unions voted to strike in protest against what they considered as ULP on the part of the
companies.
After the notice of strike, 87 unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in salary
or in responsibility while negotiations were on-going in DOLE. They resigned from the Unions.
On May 20, 1958, the unions went on strike and picketed the offices of Insular Life Building at
Plaza Moraga. The following day letters from the company thru their acting manager and
president were sent to each striker, stating that they recognize their right to strike however, they
enumerated benefits which will be given to those who will return to work voluntarily. Some were
convince to desist.
During the strike and picket, the company made several attempts of breaking the Unions picket
lines. One such tactic whereby they organized 3 bus-loads of employees to penetrate the picket
lines resulting to injuries for both parties. The Company then filed criminal charges against the
strikers as evidenced by photographs as well as injunction with damages for the pending criminal
cases. CFI Manila issued an order restraining strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing free
and peaceful use of the company gates, entrance and driveway - although the 120 criminal charges
against the strikers were later on dismissed except for slight physical injuries for one striker and
light coercion for two strikers.
Further, the each striker again received a letter from the company stating that they must report
back to work on or before June 2, 1958 or else they will be replaced by someone else.
Due to the preliminary injunction and the ultimatum given by the company, the strikers returned to
work on June 2, 1958. Before being accepted back to the company, however, they were required to
secure clearance from the City Fiscals Office and also screened by the company management.
Non-strikers with pending criminal charges were immediately accepted back to the company
without such requirement. The company refused to accept the union officers most active during
the strike and picket although they obtained clearance from the CFO. 24 were notified months
later that they were dismissed retroactively as of June 2, 1958 and given separation pays while 10
were not readmitted but not dismissed.
On July 29, 1958, the CIR prosecutor filed a ULP against the company for interference with the
right of unions to concerted action based on the two letters sent as well as discrimination against
union members regarding readmission to work. The company filed for the dismissal of the
complaint. The CIR rendered a decision dismissing the case which was reaffirmed by the CIR en
banc.
The Union appealed the decision by certiorari to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether the company committed ULP with regards interference to the unions right to concerted
action and discrimination against striking members
HELD
Yes, the Company committed ULP.
The letters were directed to the individuals and were not coursed through the unions. The action of
the Company is considered as interference with the exercise of the employees right to collective
bargaining. Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or
his representative urging the employees to cease union activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair
labor practice. These are unfair labor practices because they tend to undermine the concerted
activity of the employees, an activity to which they are entitled free from the employer's
molestation.
Although the CIR ruled that they strikers returned to work mainly due to the preliminary
injunction, it failed to consider the two letters sent by the Company to the strikers because it could
easily be disregarded by the strikers. However, the Court ruled that interference constituting unfair
labor practice will not cease to be such simply because it was susceptible of being thwarted or
resisted, or that it did not proximately cause the result intended. For success of purpose is not, and
should not, be the criterion in determining whether or not a prohibited act constitutes unfair labor
practice.
Moreover, there was discrimination on the readmission of the strikers. The respondents did not
merely discriminate against all the strikers in general. They separated the active from the less
active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines. Unionists
belonging to the first category were refused readmission even after they were able to secure
clearances from the competent authorities with respect to the criminal charges filed against them.
The basis of dismissal for the union officers were also based on alleged acts of misconduct which
were the charges filed under the fiscals office later on dismissed. Thus, there is no sufficient
basis for dismissal. The company insisted that failure to report to work is sufficient basis for
dismissal to which the Court stated that mere failure to report for work after notice to return, does
not constitute abandonment nor bar reinstatement

28. CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE BAIS EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL [CABEU-NFL],

represented by its President, PABLITO SAGURAN, Petitioner,
vs.
CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE BAIS, INC. [CAB], represented by its President, ANTONIO
STEVEN L. CHAN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 186605 November 17, 2010
FACTS
CABEU-NFL, as represented by Mr. Pablito Saguran, is a duly registered labor union and certified
bargaining agent of the CAB union rank and file employees. On January 19, 2004, CABEU-NFL
sent CAB a proposed Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) seeking increases in the daily wage
and vacation and sick leave benefits of the monthly employees and the grant of leave benefits and
13th month pay to seasonal workers. On March 27, CAB gave a counter-proposal stating that
production-based bonuses will be maintained, pro-rated increase on wage every time the
government will direct a minimum wage increase but no grant of additional and separate
Christmas bonus.
A revised proposal was then sent by CABEU-NFL to which CAB maintained their position. Thus,
the negotiations resulted in a deadlock. A notice of strike was then filed by CABEU-NFL and the
NCMB assumed jurisdiction over the parties for conciliation.
On June 2, 2005, a letter from CABEU-NFL requested the financial statements of CAB from
2001-2004 and the resumption of conciliation meetings. However, CAB responded that the
purpose of the conciliation has been rendered moot and academic due to the following reasons: the
union Mr. Saguran represents has already lost majority status by disauthorization and withdrawal
of support of 90% employees and the employees formed a new union, CABELA, which obtained
registration and being a duly organized labor union, concluded a new CBA with the company.
CABEU-NFL then filed a complaint of ULP against the company for refusal to bargain. This was
dismissed by the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC reversed the LAs decision stating that CABELA did
not have majority representation determined by the DOLE through a certification election. This
decision was again reversed by CA basing on lack of substantial evidence to support the allegation
of ULP.
ISSUE
Whether CAB was guilty of acts constituting ULP by refusing to bargain collectively.
HELD
No, CAB did not commit ULP by their refusal to bargain with CABEU-NFL.
CAB is being accused of violating its duty to bargain collectively supposedly because of its act in
concluding a CBA with CABELA, another union in the bargaining unit, and its failure to resume
negotiations with CABEU-NFL.
For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that CAB was motivated by ill
will, bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs, or public policy, and, of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings or grave
anxiety resulted in suspending negotiations with CABEU-NFL. CAB, believing that CABEU-NFL
is no longer representing the majority of the employees, merely followed the will of the employees
by negotiation with CABELA.
CABEU-NLF, with insufficient evidence, also failed to prove bad faith on the part of CAB. Mere
reliance to the letter response made by CAB does not prove that CAB acted in bad faith.
The Court stated that LA correctly determined that the filing of ULP is premature because the
issue of collective bargaining is still pending before the NCMB.
29. BPI Employees Union-Davao City-FUBU vs. BPI, et. al.
G.R. No. 174912, July 24, 2013
Facts:
BOMC, which was created pursuant to Central Bank Circular No. 1388, Series
of 1993, and primarily engaged in providing and/or handling support services
for banks and other financial institutions, is a subsidiary of the BPI operating
and functioning as an entirely separate and distinct entity. A service
agreement between BPI and BOMC was initially implemented in BPIs Metro
Manila branches. In this agreement, BOMC undertook to provide services
such as check clearing, delivery of bank statements, fund transfers, card
production, operations accounting and control, and cash servicing,
conformably with BSP Circular No. 1388. Not a single BPI employee was
displaced and those performing the functions, which were transferred to
BOMC, were given other assignments. The Manila chapter of BPI Employees
Union then filed a complaint for unfair labor practice.
On January 1, 1996, the service agreement was likewise implemented in Davao
City. Later, a merger between BPI and FEBTC took effect on April 10, 2000
with BPI as the surviving corporation. Thereafter, BPIs cashiering function
and FEBTCs cashiering, distribution and bookkeeping functions were
handled by BOMC. Consequently, twelve (12) former FEBTC employees were
transferred to BOMC to complete the latters service complement. BPI Davaos
rank and file collective bargaining agent, BPI Employees Union Davao City-
FUBU (Union), objected to the transfer of the functions and the twelve (12)
personnel to BOMC contending that the functions rightfully belonged to the
BPI employees and that the Union was deprived of membership of former
FEBTC personnel who, by virtue of the merger, would have formed part of the
bargaining unit represented by the Union pursuant to its union shop provision
in the CBA. The Union is of the position that the outsourcing of jobs included
in the existing bargaining unit to BOMC is a breach of the union shop
agreement in the CBA. In transferring the former employees of FEBTC to
BOMC instead of absorbing them in BPI as the surviving corporation in the
merger, the number of positions covered by the bargaining unit was
decreased, resulting in the reduction of the Unions membership. For the
Union, BPIs act of arbitrarily outsourcing functions formerly performed by
the Union members and, in fact, transferring a number of its members beyond
the ambit of the Union, is a violation of the CBA and interfered with the
employees right to self-organization, and claims that it is unfair labor practice
for an employer to outsource the positions in the existing bargaining unit.
Rule on the contentions of the Union.
Issue:
Is it unfair labor practice for employer to outsource the positions in the
existing bargaining unit?
Ruling:
No. The rule now is covered by Article 261 of the Labor Code, which provides
that violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are
gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall
be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For
purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement
shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic
provisions of such agreement. Clearly, only gross violations of the economic
provisions of the CBA are treated as ULP. Otherwise, they are mere
grievances.
In the present case, the alleged violation of the union shop agreement in the
CBA, even assuming it was malicious and flagrant, is not a violation of an
economic provision in the agreement. The provisions relied upon by the
Union were those articles referring to the recognition of the union as the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative of all rank-and-file employees, as well
as the articles on union security, specifically, the maintenance of membership
in good standing as a condition for continued employment and the union shop
clause. It failed to take into consideration its recognition of the banks
exclusive rights and prerogatives, likewise provided in the CBA, which
included the hiring of employees, promotion, transfers, and dismissals for just
cause and the maintenance of order, discipline and efficiency in its operations.
The Union, however, insists that jobs being outsourced to BOMC were
included in the existing bargaining unit, thus, resulting in a reduction of a
number of positions in such unit. The reduction interfered with the
employees right to self-organization because the power of a union primarily
depends on its strength in number. It is incomprehensible how the reduction
of positions in the collective bargaining unit interferes with the employees
right to self-organization because the employees themselves were neither
transferred nor dismissed from the service. The union has not presented even
an iota of evidence that petitioner bank has started to terminate certain
employees, members of the union. In fact, what appears is that the Bank has
exerted utmost diligence, care and effort to see to it that no union member has
been terminated. In the process of the consolidation or merger of the two
banks which resulted in increased diversification of functions, some of these
non-banking functions were merely transferred to the BOMC without
affecting the union membership. BPI stresses that not a single employee or
union member was or would be dislocated or terminated from their
employment as a result of the Service Agreement. Neither had it resulted in
any diminution of salaries and benefits nor led to any reduction of union
membership. As far as the twelve (12) former FEBTC employees are
concerned, the Union failed to substantially prove that their transfer, made to
complete BOMCs service complement, was motivated by ill will, anti-
unionism or bad faith so as to affect or interfere with the employees right to
self-organization.
It is to be emphasized that contracting out of services is not illegal per se. It is
an exercise of business judgment or management prerogative. Absent proof
that the management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will
not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an employer. In this case, bad
faith cannot be attributed to BPI because its actions were authorized by CBP
Circular No. 1388, Series of 1993 issued by the Monetary Board of the then
Central Bank of the Philippines. The circular covered amendments in Book I
of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and Other Financial Intermediaries,
particularly on the matter of bank service contracts. A finding of ULP
necessarily requires the alleging party to prove it with substantial evidence.
Unfortunately, the Union failed to discharge this burden.

30. SAN MIGUEL FOODS INC. VS SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES

UNION-PTWGO535 SCRA 133 (2007)
Facts:
Gross or flagrant violation of the seniority rule under the CBA is an unfair labor practice
which the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction.
Some employees of San Miguel Foods Inc. (SMFI) brought grievance against Finance
Manager Gideo Montesa for discrimination, favouritism, unfair labor practice and
harassment. SMFI failed to act on the complaint which prompted San Miguel
Corporation Employees Union PTWGO (the Union) to filea case with the National Labor
Relations Commission against SMFI, its President Amadeo Veloso and Montesa. It
prayed that SMFI et al. be ordered to promote the therein named employees with the
corresponding pay increases or adjustment including payment of salary differentialsplus
attorney s fees[,] and to cease and desist from committing the same unjust
discrimination in matters of promotion.
SMFI filed a motion to dismiss on the alleged ground that the grievance issue should be
resolved in the grievance machinery provided in the collective bargaining. The Union
opposed the motion to dismiss. The NLRC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the NLRCs decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:Whether or not complaints for violation of seniority rule under the CBA falls
within the Labor Arbiters jurisdiction
HELD:As for the alleged ULP committed under Article 248 (i), for violation of a CBA, this
Article is qualified by Article 261 of the Labor Code, provides that violations of a
Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no
longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.
As reflected in the above-quoted allegations of the Union in its Position Paper, the Union
charges SMFI to have violated the grievance machinery provision in the CBA. The
grievance machinery provision in the CBA is not an economic provision, however, hence,
the second requirement for a Labor Arbiter to exercise jurisdiction of a ULP is not
present.
The Union likewise charges SMFI, however, to have violated the Job Security provision in
the CBA, specifically the seniority rule, in that SMFI appointed less senior employees to
positions at its Finance Department, consequently intentionally by-passing more senior
employees who are deserving of said appointment.
As above-stated, the Union charges SMFI to have promoted less senior employees, thus
bypassing others who were more senior and equally or more qualified. It may not be
seriously disputed that this charge is a gross or flagrant violation of the seniority rule
under the CBA, a ULP over which the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction.
SMFI, at all events, questions why the Court of Appeals came out with a finding that it
(SMFI) disregarded the seniority rule under the CBA when its petition before said court
merely raised a question of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals having affirmed the NLRC
decision finding that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the Union complaint and
thus remanding it to the Labor Arbiter for continuation of proceedings thereon, the
appellate court said finding may be taken to have been made only for the purpose of
determining jurisdiction.

31. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNION, et al. v.

COURT OF APPEALS, et al. 502 SCRA 219 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio
Morales, J.)

An ordinary striking worker may not be declared to have lost his employment status
by mere participation in an illegal strike.

The Arellano University Employees and Workers Union (the Union), the exclusive
bargaining representative of about 380 rank-and-file employees of Arellano
University, Inc. (the University), filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB) a Notice of Strike charging the University with Unfair Labor Practice
(ULP). After several controversies and petitions, a strike was staged.

Upon the lifting of the strike, the University filed a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal
before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC issued a
Resolution holding that the University was not guilty of ULP. Consequently, the strike
was declared illegal. All the employees who participated in the illegal strike were
thereafter declared to have lost their employment status.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an employee is deemed to have lost his employment by mere
participation in an illegal strike
HELD:
Under Article 264 of the Labor Code, an ordinary striking worker may not be declared
to have lost his employment status by mere participation in an illegal strike. There
must be proof that he knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts during
the strike. While the University adduced photographs showing strikers picketing
outside the university premises, it failed to identify who they were. It thus failed to
meet the substantiality of evidence test applicable in dismissal cases.
With respect to the union officers, as already discussed, their mere participation in
the illegal strike warrants their dismissal.

32. G.R. No. L-34948-49 May 15, 1979

PHILIPPINE METAL FOUNDRIES INC., petitioner, vs.COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, REGAL MANUFACTURING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
REGEMAS and CELESTINO BAYLON
Facts:
The petitioner filed a complaint against the union of ULP for violating the CBA on
no strike, no lockout clause. Sometime on 1963, the the union stage a strike without
notice of strike against the petitioner because of the alleged illegal dismissal of their
union president Baylon. The dismissal was on the ground that BAylon continuously
absented himself without permission for more than 7 consecutive days from January to
September 1963, due to grounds not covered by the allowed leaves. Thus, the absences
were in violation to the CBA between the parties.
On October 3, 1963, the union president, before his termination, sent a letter to the
company written explanation of his absences. Two days later, he invited the general
manager of the company for a grievance conference to thresh union problems. On the
same day, the company handed him his termination letter on the ground of his absences
and union activities.
Issue:
Whether Baylon was dismissed due to his absences or to his union activities.
Whether the strike was illegal.
Held:
In determining whether a discharge is discriminatory, the true reason for the discharge
must be established. It has been said that while union activity is no bar to a discharge,
the existence of a lawful cause for discharge is no defense if the employee was actually
discharged for union activity. There is no question that Celestino Baylon incurred
numerous absences from January to September 1963. Had the company wanted to
terminate his services on the ground of absences, it could have done so, pursuant to
Article V of the Collective Bargaining Agreement as early as March 1963 when he
incurred twelve (12) consecutive absences without permission. Its failure to do so shows
that the infractions commited by Baylon were disregarded.

The question of whether an employee was discharged because of his union activities is
essentially a question of fact as to which the findings of the Court of Industrial Relations
are conclusive and binding if supported by substantial evidence considering the record as
a whole. 1 This is so because the Industrial Court is governed by the rule of substantial
evidence, rather than by the rule of preponderance of evidence as in any ordinary civil
cases. 2Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 3 It means such
evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably
inferred. 4 Examining the evidence on hand on this matter, We find the same to be
substantially supported.
It is admitted by petitioner that it accepted the invitation of Baylon for a grievance
conference on October 5, 1963. Yet, two hours after it accepted the letter of invitation, it
dismissed Baylon without prior notice and/or investigation. Such dismissal is undoubtedly
an unfair labor practice committed by the company.
Under these facts and circumstances, Baylon and the members of the Union had
valid reasons to ignore the schedule grievance conference and declared a strike.
When the Union declared a strike in the belief that the dismissal of Baylon was due to
union activities, said strike was not illegal . 6 It is not even required that there be in
fact an unfair labor practice committed by the employer. It suffices, if such a belief in
good faith is entertained by labor, as the inducing factor for staging a strike. 7 The
strike declared by the Union in this case cannot be considered a violation of the "no
strike" clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement because it was due to the
unfair labor practice of the employer. Moreover, a no strike clause prohibition in a
Collective Bargaining Agreement is applicable only to economic strikes. 8
The strike cannot be declared as illegal for lack of notice. In strikes arising out
of and against a company's unfair labor practice, a strike notice is not
necessary in view of the strike being founded on urgent necessity and
directed against practices condemned by public policy, such notice being
legally re. required only in cases of economic strikes. 9

33. G.R. No. L-39040 June 6, 1990

ROYAL UNDERGARMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ROYAL UNDERGARMENT WORKERS
UNION (PTGWO) and ANTONIO CRUZ, respondents.
Respondent Cruz was employed by petitioner corporation as an electrician and
was elected president of RUWU-PTGWO. He sent proposals to the corporation for the
purpose of collective bargaining. The following day, he and his wife were terminated from
their positions in the corporation. Cruz and his wife were eventually both reinstated thru
the conciliation efforts of the Department of Labor.
A few months later, 3 supervisors accused Cruz of being intoxicated in the
company premises and threatening to have the three of them killed. Cruz denied this and
claimed he was merely asking for the support of the 3 supervisors in a nationwide strike.
Nevertheless, Cruz was again terminated from his position.
Now facing a charge for unfair labor practice, the company claimed that it did not
interfere with or prevent the union activities of its employees. It asserted that the
dismissal of Cruz was not impelled by reason of union participation but solely by his
infraction of company rules and regulations, specifically, serious threats against the lives
of three co-employees and intoxication while on duty.
Issue:
Whether the company is guilty of ULP.
Held:
Yes it is.
The charge by petitioner against respondent Cruz for being under the influence of liquor
on a certain date and for having threatened the lives of his co-employees is too flimsy to
merit serious consideration.
We have on record the undisputed facts that private respondent, as president of
RUWU, was known for his aggressive and militant union activities; that he and his wife
had been previously dismissed on the ground of active participation in union affairs; that
respondent Cruz was dismissed again for the second time in the course of his campaign
among RUWU members to join the nationwide strike of PTGWO in which RUWU is a
member union.
In the light of the initial attitude of the company, the inducing cause directly
contributing to Cruz's dismissal is the company's antipathy to complainant's union activity
and not his misconduct.

34. G.R. No. L-31276 September 9, 1982

NATIONAL LABOR UNION, petitioner, vs.COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
EVERLASTING MANUFACTURING, ANG WO LONG and BENITO S. ESTANISLAO,
respondents.
Facts:
The twenty-one (21) complaining workers were members of the National Labor
Union. And were employees at Everlasting Manufacturing, a business owned by Benito
Estanislao.
Everlasting Manufacturing was then sold to Ang Wo Long. A few days later a CBA
was entered into between the NLU and Benito Estanislao, who signed himself manager
of the business.
After being issued a business permit to operate Everlasting Manufacturing, Ang
Wo Long sent individual letters to the twenty-one 21 complaining workers informing them
that the business was to temporarily close due to change of management. Within a few
days of sending the letter, Ang Wo Long employed 24 new workers in the Everlasting
Manufacturing.
Facing a charge for unfair labor practice, Ang Wo Long claimed that he was
unaware of the existence of a labor union within the company including the signing of a
the collective bargaining contract. He claimed that Benito Estanislao was a transferrer in
bad faith and should be liable to the employees discharged.
Issue:
Whether Ang Wo Long is guilty of ULP.
Held:
Yes, he is guilty of ULP.
Knowledge or awareness of what is going on refers to a mental and inner state of
consciousness, cognizance, and information. Whether or not Mr. Ang Wo Long knew the
labor problems of the firm he purchased can be determined only from an admission of
Mr. Ang himself or from the surrounding facts and circumstances indicative of knowledge
or awareness.
It is irrational to assume that Mr. Ang bought a business lock, stock, and barrel
without inquiring into its labor-management situation. His dismissal of all the union
members without retaining a few experienced workers and their replacement with a
completely new set of employees who were strangers to the company was an attempt to
rid the firm of unwanted union activity.

35. CLLC E.G. GOCHANGCO WORKERS UNION v NLRC 161 SCRA 655
FACTS:
Petitioner union is a local chapter of the Central Luzon Labor Congress (CLLC),
a legitimate labor federation duly registered with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, while the individual petitioners are former employees of private
respondent who were officers and members of the petitioner union. Private
respondent is a corporation engaged in packing and crating, general hauling,
warehousing, sea van and freight forwarding.
Sometime in January 1980, the majority of the rank and file employees of
respondent firm organized the E.G. Gochanco workers Union as an affiliate of
CLLC. On January 23, 1980 the union filed a petition for certification election.
On February 7,1980, the CLLC National President wrote the general manager of
respondent firm informing him the organization of the union and requesting for
a labor management conference to normalize employer-employee relations. On
February 26, 1980, the union sent a written notice to respondent firm
requesting permission for certain members of the union to attend the hearing of
the petition for certification election.
The management refused to acknowledge receipt of the said notice. On February
28, 1980, private respondent preventively suspended the union officers and
members who participated in the hearing. The common ground alleged by
private respondent for its action was abandonment of work. All the gate passes
of the employees to Clark air base were confiscated by a base guard. Claiming
that the private respondent instigated the confiscation of their gate passes to
prevent them from performing their duties and that the respondent firm did not
pay them their overtime pay, 13th month pay and other benefits, petitioner
union and its members filed a complaint for constructive lockout and unfair
labor practice against private respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether there is ULP.
HELD:
Yes.
Respondent company is guilty of ULP. It is no coincidence that at the time of
suspension and termination orders, the petitioners were in the midst of
certification election preliminary to a labor-management conference,
purportedly, to normalize employee-employer relationship It was within the
legal right of the petitioners to do so, the exercise of which was their sole
prerogative, and in which management may not as a rule interfere. It is not only
an act of arrogance, but a brazen interference as well, witht the employees right
to self-organization, contrary to the prohibition of labor code against unfair labor
practice.
As a consequence of such a suspension, the Clark Air Base guards confiscated
the employees gate passes, and banned then from the base premise. We cannot
be befooled by the companys pretenses that the subsequent confiscation by the
Americans of the complainants passes is beyond the powers of management.
Those passes would not have been confiscated had not management ordered the
suspension. Conversely, in the absence of such suspension order, there was no
ground to seize such gate passes. Base guards, by themselves cannot bar
legitimate employees without the proper sanction of such employees, employers.

36. Quadra v. CA, GR NO. 147593, July 31, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioner Geronimo Q. Quadra was the Chief Legal Officer of respondent Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) when he organized and actively participated in
the activities of Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Employees Association (CUGCO),
an organization composed of the rank and file employees of PCSO, and then later,
the Association of Sweepstakes Staff Personnel and Supervisors (CUGCO) (ASSPS
[CUGCO]). In April 1964, he was administratively charged before the Civil Service
Commission with violation of Civil Service Law and Rules for neglect of duty and
misconduct and/or conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service. On July 14, 1965,
the CSC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the charges and
recommending the penalty of dismissal. The following day, the General Manager of
PCSO, Ignacio Santos Diaz, sent petitioner a letter of dismissal, in accordance with
the decision of the CSC. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
of the CSC. At the same time, petitioner, together with ASSPS (CUGCO), filed with
the CIR a complaint for ULP against respondent PCSO and its officers.
On November 19, 1966, the CIR issued its decision finding respondent PCSO guilty
of ULP for having committed discrimination against the union and for having
dismissed petitioner due to his union activities. It ordered the reinstatement of
petitioner to his former position with full backwages and with all the rights and
privileges pertaining to said position.
Respondent PCSO complied with the decision of the CIR. But while it reinstated
petitioner to his former position and paid his backwages, it also filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari.
During the pendency of the case in the Supreme Court, petitioner filed with the CIR a
"Petition for Damages." He prayed for moral and exemplary damages in connection
with the ULP case.
Respondent PCSO moved to dismiss the petition for damages.
Petitioner resigned from PCSO on August 18, 1967.
The petition for damages and the motion to dismiss, however, remained pending with
the CIR until it was abolished and the NLRC was created. On April 25, 1980, the
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision awarding moral and exemplary damages to
petitioner in the amount of P1.6 million.
The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, prompting respondent PCSO to
file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the NLRC. It held that there was no
basis for the grant of moral and exemplary damages to petitioner as his dismissal
was not tainted with bad faith. It was the Civil Service Commission that
recommended petitioner's dismissal after conducting an investigation.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
but the same was denied for lack for merit.7
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners dismissal constituted ULP .

RULING:
It appears from the facts that petitioner was deliberately dismissed from the service
by reason of his active involvement in the activities of the union groups of both the
rank and file and the supervisory employees of PCSO, which unions he himself
organized and headed. Respondent PCSO first charged petitioner before the Civil
Service Commission for alleged neglect of duty and conduct prejudicial to the service
because of his union activities. The Civil Service Commission recommended the
dismissal of petitioner. Respondent PCSO immediately served on petitioner a letter of
dismissal even before the latter could move for a reconsideration of the decision of
the Civil Service Commission. Respondent PCSO may not impute to the Civil Service
Commission the responsibility for petitioner's illegal dismissal as it was respondent
PCSO that first filed the administrative charge against him. As found by the CIR,
petitioner's dismissal constituted unfair labor practice. It was done to interfere with,
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization.

A dismissed employee is entitled to moral damages when the dismissal is attended by

bad faith or fraud or constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or is done in a manner
contrary to good morals, good customs or public policy. Exemplary damages may be
awarded if the dismissal is effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.

37 POLYMER RUBBER CORPORATION and JOSEPH ANG, v. BAYOLO

SALAMUDING

FACTS: Respondent Bayolo Salamuding, Mariano Gulanan and Rodolfo Raif were
of petitioner Polymer Rubber Corporation (Polymer), who were dismissed after
allegedly committing certain irregularities against Polymer.The three employees filed
a complaint against Polymer and Ang for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, non-
payment of overtime services, violation of Presidential Decree No. 851, with prayer
for reinstatement and payment of back wages, attorneys fees, moral and exemplary
damages. The Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complainant unfair labor practice with
conditions such as reinstatement, overtime pay and payment of back wages.
The petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).The
NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA with modifications. The NLRC deleted the
award of moral and exemplary damages, service incentive pay, and modified the
computation of 13th month pay.The case was subsequently elevated to the Supreme
Court (SC) on a petition for certiorari. The Court affirmed the disposition of the
NLRC with the further modification that the award of overtime pay to the
complainants was deleted.

Upon motion, the Labor arbiter a quo issued a writ of execution but the same was
returned unsatisfied and in the latter part of 2004, Polymer was gutted by fire.
Labor arbiter issued a 5th alias writ of execution so that in its implementation, the
shares of stocks of Ang and USA Resources Corp. were levied.

Polymer and Ang moved to quash said 5th alias writ of execution and to lift notice of
garnishment. They alleged that Ang should not be held jointly and severally liable
with Polymer since it was only the latter which was held liable in the decision of the
LA, NLRC and the Supreme Court. LA granted the motion and the same was affirmed
by the NLRC. Salamuding file a petition for certiorari with CA.

CA stated that there has to be a responsible person or persons working in the interest
of Polymer who may also be considered as the employer. Since Ang as the director of
Polymer was considered the highest ranking officer of Polymer, he was therefore
properly impleaded and may be held jointly and severally liable for the obligations of
Polymer to its dismissed employees
ISSUE: Whether or not Ang as Officer of the Corporation cannot be personally held
liable and be made to pay the liability of the corporation
HELD: YES
A corporation, as a juridical entity, may act only through its directors, officers and
employees. Obligations incurred as a result of the directors and officers acts as
corporate agents, are not their personal liability but the direct responsibility of the
corporation they represent. As a rule, they are only solidarily liable with the
corporation for the illegal termination of services of employees if they acted with
malice or bad faith.29To hold a director or officer personally liable for corporate
obligations, two requisites must concur:
(1) it must be alleged in the complaint that the director or officer assented to patently
unlawful acts of the corporation or that the officer was guilty of gross negligence or
bad faith; and
(2) there must be proof that the officer acted in bad faith.In the instant case, the CA
imputed bad faith on the part of the petitioners when Polymer ceased its operations
the day after the promulgation of the SC resolution in 1993 which was allegedly
meant to evade liability. The CA found it necessary to pierce the corporate fiction and
pointed at Ang as the responsible person to pay for Salamudings money claims.
Except for this assertion, there is nothing in the records that show that Ang was
responsible for the acts complained of. At any rate, we find that it will require a great
stretch of imagination to conclude that a corporation would cease its operations if
only to evade the payment of the adjudged monetary awards in favor of three (3) of its
employees.
In labor cases, for instance, the Court has held corporate directors and officers
solidarily liable with the corporation for the termination of employment of employees
done with malice or in bad faith.
To hold Ang personally liable at this stage is quite unfair. The judgment of the LA, as
affirmed by the NLRC and later by the SC had already long become final and
executory.