H.8 Tolentino Vs Sec of Finance GR No. 115455 PDF

8/31/2016 G.R.No.
115455
TodayisWednesday,August31,2016
RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.115455August25,1994
ARTUROM.TOLENTINO,petitioner,
vs.
THESECRETARYOFFINANCEandTHECOMMISSIONEROFINTERNALREVENUE,respondents.
G.R.No.115525August25,1994
JUANT.DAVID,petitioner,
vs.
TEOFISTOT.GUINGONA,JR.,asExecutiveSecretaryROBERTODEOCAMPO,asSecretaryofFinance
LIWAYWAYVINZONSCHATO,asCommissionerofInternalRevenueandtheirAUTHORIZEDAGENTSOR
REPRESENTATIVES,respondents.
G.R.No.115543August25,1994
RAULS.ROCOandtheINTEGRATEDBAROFTHEPHILIPPINES,petitioners,
vs.
THESECRETARYOFTHEDEPARTMENTOFFINANCETHECOMMISSIONERSOFTHEBUREAUOF
INTERNALREVENUEANDBUREAUOFCUSTOMS,respondents.
G.R.No.115544August25,1994
PHILIPPINEPRESSINSTITUTE,INC.EGPPUBLISHINGCO.,INC.PUBLISHINGCORPORATION
PHILIPPINEJOURNALISTS,INC.JOSEL.PAVIAandOFELIAL.DIMALANTA,petitioners,
vs.
HON.LIWAYWAYV.CHATO,inhercapacityasCommissionerofInternalRevenueHON.TEOFISTOT.
GUINGONA,JR.,inhiscapacityasExecutiveSecretaryandHON.ROBERTOB.DEOCAMPO,inhis
capacityasSecretaryofFinance,respondents.
G.R.No.115754August25,1994
CHAMBEROFREALESTATEANDBUILDERSASSOCIATIONS,INC.,(CREBA),petitioner,
vs.
THECOMMISSIONEROFINTERNALREVENUE,respondent.
G.R.No.115781August25,1994
KILOSBAYAN,INC.,JOVITOR.SALONGA,CIRILOA.RIGOS,ERMECAMBA,EMILIOC.CAPULONG,JR.,
JOSET.APOLO,EPHRAIMTENDERO,FERNANDOSANTIAGO,JOSEABCEDE,CHRISTINETAN,FELIPEL.
GOZON,RAFAELG.FERNANDO,RAOULV.VICTORINO,JOSECUNANAN,QUINTINS.DOROMAL,
MOVEMENTOFATTORNEYSFORBROTHERHOOD,INTEGRITYANDNATIONALISM,INC.("MABINI"),
FREEDOMFROMDEBTCOALITION,INC.,PHILIPPINEBIBLESOCIETY,INC.,andWIGBERTOTAADA,
petitioners,
vs.
THEEXECUTIVESECRETARY,THESECRETARYOFFINANCE,THECOMMISSIONEROFINTERNAL
REVENUEandTHECOMMISSIONEROFCUSTOMS,respondents.
G.R.No.115852August25,1994
PHILIPPINEAIRLINES,INC.,petitioner,
vs.
THESECRETARYOFFINANCE,andCOMMISSIONEROFINTERNALREVENUE,respondents.
G.R.No.115873August25,1994
COOPERATIVEUNIONOFTHEPHILIPPINES,petitioners,
vs.
HON.LIWAYWAYV.CHATO,inhercapacityastheCommissionerofInternalRevenue,HON.TEOFISTOT.
GUINGONA,JR.,inhiscapacityasExecutiveSecretary,andHON.ROBERTOB.DEOCAMPO,inhis
capacityasSecretaryofFinance,respondents.
G.R.No.115931August25,1994
PHILIPPINEEDUCATIONALPUBLISHERSASSOCIATION,INC.,andASSOCIATIONOFPHILIPPINEBOOK
SELLERS,petitioners,
vs.
HON.ROBERTOB.DEOCAMPO,astheSecretaryofFinanceHON.LIWAYWAYV.CHATO,asthe
CommissionerofInternalRevenueandHON.GUILLERMOPARAYNO,JR.,inhiscapacityasthe
CommissionerofCustoms,respondents.
ArturoM.Tolentinoforandinhisbehalf.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/aug1994/gr_115455_1994.html 1/116
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
DonnaCelesteD.FelicianoandJuanT.DavidforpetitionersinG.R.No.115525.
Roco,Bunag,Kapunan,MigallosandJardelezaforpetitionerR.S.Roco.
VillaranzaandCruzforpetitionersinG.R.No.115544.
CarlosA.RanesesandManuelM.SerranoforpetitionerinG.R.No.115754.
Salonga,Hernandez&AlladoforFreedonFromDebtsCoalition,Inc.&Phil.BibleSociety.
EstelitoP.MendozaforpetitionerinG.R.No.115852.
Panganiban,Benitez,Parlade,Africa&BarinagaLawOfficesforpetitionersinG.R.No.115873.
R.B.Rodriguez&AssociatesforpetitionersinG.R.No.115931.
ReveA.V.SaguisagforMABINI.
MENDOZA,J.:
The valueadded tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the
saleorexchangeofservices.Itisequivalentto10%ofthegrosssellingpriceorgrossvalueinmoneyofgoodsor
propertiessold,barteredorexchangedorofthegrossreceiptsfromthesaleorexchangeofservices.Republic
ActNo.7716seekstowidenthetaxbaseoftheexistingVATsystemandenhanceitsadministrationbyamending
theNationalInternalRevenueCode.
Thesearevarioussuitsforcertiorariandprohibition,challengingtheconstitutionalityofRepublicActNo.7716on
variousgroundssummarizedintheresolutionofJuly6,1994ofthisCourt,asfollows:
I.ProceduralIssues:
A.DoesRepublicActNo.7716violateArt.VI,24oftheConstitution?
B.DoesitviolateArt.VI,26(2)oftheConstitution?
C.WhatistheextentofthepoweroftheBicameralConferenceCommittee?
II.SubstantiveIssues:
A.DoesthelawviolatethefollowingprovisionsintheBillofRights(Art.III)?
1.1
2.4
3.5
4.10
B.DoesthelawviolatethefollowingotherprovisionsoftheConstitution?
1.Art.VI,28(1)
2.Art.VI,28(3)
These questions will be dealt in the order they are stated above. As will presently be explained not all of these
questionsarejudiciallycognizable,becausenotallprovisionsoftheConstitutionareselfexecutingand,therefore,
judiciallyenforceable.Theotherdepartmentsofthegovernmentareequallychargedwiththeenforcementofthe
Constitution,especiallytheprovisionsrelatingtothem.
I.PROCEDURALISSUES
ThecontentionofpetitionersisthatinenactingRepublicActNo.7716,ortheExpandedValueAddedTaxLaw,
Congress violated the Constitution because, although H. No. 11197 had originated in the House of
Representatives, it was not passed by the Senate but was simply consolidated with the Senate version (S. No.
1630) in the Conference Committee to produce the bill which the President signed into law. The following
provisions of the Constitution are cited in support of the proposition that because Republic Act No. 7716 was
passedinthismanner,itdidnotoriginateintheHouseofRepresentativesandithasnottherebybecomealaw:
Art.VI,24:Allappropriation,revenueortariffbills,billsauthorizingincreaseofthepublicdebt,bills
oflocalapplication,andprivatebillsshalloriginateexclusivelyintheHouseofRepresentatives,but
theSenatemayproposeorconcurwithamendments.
Id.,26(2):NobillpassedbyeitherHouseshallbecomealawunlessithaspassedthreereadings
on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members
threedaysbeforeitspassage,exceptwhenthePresidentcertifiestothenecessityofitsimmediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and theyeas
andnaysenteredintheJournal.
ItappearsthatonvariousdatesbetweenJuly22,1992andAugust31,1993,severalbills 1were introduced in the

HouseofRepresentativesseekingtoamendcertainprovisionsoftheNationalInternalRevenueCoderelativetothevalue
addedtaxorVAT.ThesebillswerereferredtotheHouseWaysandMeansCommitteewhichrecommendedforapprovala
substitutemeasure,H.No.11197,entitled
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUEADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX BASE
AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100,
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102,103,104,105,106,107,108AND110OFTITLEIV,112,115AND116OFTITLEV,AND236,
237AND238OFTITLEIX,ANDREPEALINGSECTIONS113AND114OFTITLEV,ALLOFTHE
NATIONALINTERNALREVENUECODE,ASAMENDED
The bill (H. No. 11197) was considered on second reading starting November 6, 1993 and, on November 17,
1993,itwasapprovedbytheHouseofRepresentativesafterthirdandfinalreading.
ItwassenttotheSenateonNovember23,1993andlaterreferredbythatbodytoitsCommitteeonWaysand
Means.
OnFebruary7,1994,theSenateCommitteesubmitteditsreportrecommendingapprovalofS.No.1630,entitled
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUEADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX BASE
102,103,104,105,107,108,AND110OFTITLEIV,112OFTITLEV,AND236,237,AND238OF
TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113, 114 and 116 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNALREVENUECODE,ASAMENDED,ANDFOROTHERPURPOSES
It was stated that the bill was being submitted "in substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129, taking into consideration
P.S.Res.No.734andH.B.No.11197."
OnFebruary8,1994,theSenatebeganconsiderationofthebill(S.No.1630).Itfinisheddebatesonthebilland
approveditonsecondreadingonMarch24,1994.Onthesameday,itapprovedthebillonthirdreadingbythe
affirmativevotesof13ofitsmembers,withoneabstention.
H. No. 11197 and its Senate version (S. No. 1630) were then referred to a conference committee which, after
meetingfourtimes(April13,19,21and25,1994),recommendedthat"HouseBillNo.11197,inconsolidationwith
SenateBillNo.1630,beapprovedinaccordancewiththeattachedcopyofthebillasreconciledandapprovedby
theconferees."
The Conference Committee bill, entitled "AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUEADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM,
WIDENINGITSTAXBASEANDENHANCINGITSADMINISTRATIONANDFORTHESEPURPOSESAMENDING
AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS
AMENDED,ANDFOROTHERPURPOSES,"wasthereafterapprovedbytheHouseofRepresentativesonApril
27, 1994 and by the Senate on May 2, 1994. The enrolled bill was then presented to the President of the
Philippineswho,onMay5,1994,signedit.ItbecameRepublicActNo.7716.OnMay12,1994,RepublicActNo.
7716 was published in two newspapers of general circulation and, on May 28, 1994, it took effect, although its
implementationwassuspendeduntilJune30,1994toallowtimefortheregistrationofbusinessentities.Itwould
havebeenenforcedonJuly1,1994butitsenforcementwasstoppedbecausetheCourt,bythevoteof11to4of
itsmembers,grantedatemporaryrestrainingorderonJune30,1994.
First. Petitioners' contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of
RepresentativesasrequiredbyArt.VI,24oftheConstitution,becauseitisinfacttheresultoftheconsolidation
oftwodistinctbills,H.No.11197andS.No.1630.Inthisconnection,petitionerspointoutthatalthoughArt.VI,SS
24wasadoptedfromtheAmericanFederalConstitution, 2 it is notable in two respects: the verb "shall originate" is
qualifiedinthePhilippineConstitutionbytheword"exclusively"andthephrase"asonotherbills"intheAmericanversionis
omitted. This means, according to them, that to be considered as having originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716
mustretaintheessenceofH.No.11197.
Thisargumentwillnotbearanalysis.Tobeginwith,itisnotthelawbuttherevenuebillwhichisrequiredby
the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this,
becauseabilloriginatingintheHousemayundergosuchextensivechangesintheSenatethattheresultmaybe
arewritingofthewhole.Thepossibilityofathirdversionbytheconferencecommitteewillbediscussedlater.At
thispoint,whatisimportanttonoteisthat,asaresultoftheSenateaction,adistinctbillmaybeproduced.To
insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the
enactmentofthelawmustsubstantiallybethesameastheHousebillwouldbetodenytheSenate'spower
notonlyto"concurwithamendments"butalsoto"proposeamendments."Itwouldbetoviolatethecoequalityof
legislativepowerofthetwohousesofCongressandinfactmaketheHousesuperiortotheSenate.
ThecontentionthattheconstitutionaldesignistolimittheSenate'spowerinrespectofrevenuebillsinorderto
compensateforthegranttotheSenateofthetreatyratifyingpower 3 and thereby equalize its powers and those of
the House overlooks the fact that the powers being compared are different. We are dealing here with the legislative power
whichundertheConstitutionisvestednotinanyparticularchamberbutintheCongressofthePhilippines,consistingof"a
Senate and a House of Representatives." 4 The exercise of the treatyratifying power is not the exercise of legislative
power.Itistheexerciseofacheckontheexecutivepower.Thereis,therefore,nojustificationforcomparingthelegislative
powers of the House and of the Senate on the basis of the possession of such nonlegislative power by the Senate. The
possessionofasimilarpowerbytheU.S.Senate 5hasneverbeenthoughtofasgivingitmorelegislativepowersthanthe
HouseofRepresentatives.
IntheUnitedStates,thevalidityofaprovision(37)imposinganadvaloremtaxbasedontheweightofvessels,
whichtheU.S.SenatehadinsertedintheTariffActof1909,wasupheldagainsttheclaimthattheprovisionwasa
revenuebillwhichoriginatedintheSenateincontraventionofArt.I,7oftheU.S.Constitution.6Noristhepower
toamendlimitedtoaddingaprovisionortwoinarevenuebillemanatingfromtheHouse.TheU.S.Senatehasgonesofar
aschangingthewholeofbillsfollowingtheenactingclauseandsubstitutingitsownversions.In1883,forexample,itstruck
outeverythingaftertheenactingclauseofatariffbillandwroteinitsplaceitsownmeasure,andtheHousesubsequently
acceptedtheamendment.TheU.S.Senatelikewiseadded847amendmentstowhatlaterbecamethePayneAldrichTariff
Actof1909itdictatedtheschedulesoftheTariffActof1921itrewroteanextensivetaxrevisionbillinthesameyearand
recast most of the tariff bill of 1922. 7 Given, then, the power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can
proposeitsownversionevenwithrespecttobillswhicharerequiredbytheConstitutiontooriginateintheHouse.
Itisinsisted,however,thatS.No.1630waspassednotinsubstitutionofH.No.11197butofanotherSenatebill
(S.No.1129)earlierfiledandthatwhattheSenatedidwasmerelyto"take[H.No.11197]intoconsideration"in
enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between the Senate preserving H. No. 11197 up to the
enactingclauseandthenwritingitsownversionfollowingtheenactingclause(which,itwouldseem,petitioners
admit is an amendment by substitution), and, on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the
samesubjectmatter.Ineithercasetheresultaretwobillsonthesamesubject.
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Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills
authorizinganincreaseofthepublicdebt,privatebillsandbillsoflocalapplicationmustcomefromtheHouseof
Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be
expectedtobemoresensitivetothelocalneedsandproblems.Ontheotherhand,thesenators,whoareelected
at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby
madetobearontheenactmentofsuchlaws.
NordoestheConstitutionprohibitthefilingintheSenateofasubstitutebillinanticipationofitsreceiptofthebill
from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The
Court cannot, therefore, understand the alarm expressed over the fact that on March 1, 1993, eight months
beforetheHousepassedH.No.11197,S.No.1129hadbeenfiledintheSenate.Afterallitdoesnotappearthat
theSenateeverconsideredit.ItwasonlyaftertheSenatehadreceivedH.No.11197onNovember23,1993that
theprocessoflegislationinrespectofitbeganwiththereferraltotheSenateCommitteeonWaysandMeansof
H.No.11197andthesubmissionbytheCommitteeonFebruary7,1994ofS.No.1630.Forthatmatter,ifthe
questionweresimplythepriorityinthetimeoffilingofbills,thefactisthatitwasintheHousethatabill(H.No.
253)toamendtheVATlawwasfirstfiledonJuly22,1992.SeveralotherbillshadbeenfiledintheHousebefore
S.No.1129wasfiledintheSenate,andH.No.11197wasonlyasubstituteofthoseearlierbills.
Second.EnoughhasbeensaidtoshowthatitwaswithinthepoweroftheSenatetoproposeS.No.1630.We
nowpasstothenextargumentofpetitionersthatS.No.1630didnotpassthreereadingsonseparatedaysas
requiredbytheConstitution 8becausethesecondandthirdreadingsweredoneonthesameday,March24,1994.But
this was because on February 24, 1994 9 and again on March 22, 1994, 10 the President had certified S. No. 1630 as
urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on
separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art.
VI, 26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on
separatedaysand(ii)ithasbeenprintedinitsfinalformanddistributedthreedaysbeforeitisfinallyapproved.
In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause, because the two are really
coordinateclausesofthesamesentence.Toconstruethe"except"clauseassimplydispensingwiththesecond
requirementinthe"unless"clause(i.e.,printinganddistributionthreedaysbeforefinalapproval)wouldnotonly
violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of
securingtheimmediateenactmentofabillwhichiscertifiedinordertomeetapubliccalamityoremergency.For
ifitisonlytheprintingthatisdispensedwithbypresidentialcertification,thetimesavedwouldbesonegligibleas
tobeofanyuseininsuringimmediateenactment.Itmaywellbedoubtedwhetherdoingawaywiththenecessity
ofprintinganddistributingcopiesofthebillthreedaysbeforethethirdreadingwouldinsurespeedyenactmentof
a law in the face of an emergency requiring the calling of a special election for President and VicePresident.
Under the Constitution such a law is required to be made within seven days of the convening of Congress in
emergencysession.11
ThatuponthecertificationofabillbythePresidenttherequirementofthreereadingsonseparatedaysandof
printinganddistributioncanbedispensedwithissupportedbytheweightoflegislativepractice.Forexample,the
bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate version, became
RepublicActNo.5440,waspassedonsecondandthirdreadingsintheHouseofRepresentativesonthesame
day(May14,1968)afterthebillhadbeencertifiedbythePresidentasurgent.12
There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the requirement
fortheprintingofthebillanditsdistributionthreedaysbeforeitspassagebutnotwiththerequirementofthree
readingsonseparatedays,also.
Itisnonethelessurgedthatthecertificationofthebillinthiscasewasinvalidbecausetherewasnoemergency,
theconditionstatedinthecertificationofa"growingbudgetdeficit"notbeinganunusualconditioninthiscountry.
It is noteworthy that no member of the Senate saw fit to controvert the reality of the factual basis of the
certification.Tothecontrary,bypassingS.No.1630onsecondandthirdreadingsonMarch24,1994,theSenate
acceptedthePresident'scertification.ShouldsuchcertificationbenowreviewedbythisCourt,especiallywhenno
evidence has been shown that, because S. No. 1630 was taken up on second and third readings on the same
day,themembersoftheSenateweredeprivedofthetimeneededforthestudyofavitalpieceoflegislation?
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeascorpus or declaration of martial law
underArt.VII,18,ortheexistenceofanationalemergencyjustifyingthedelegationofextraordinarypowersto
the President under Art. VI, 23(2), is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be at
hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural
requirementsdesignedtoinsurethatbillsaredulyconsideredbymembersofCongress,certainlyshouldelicita
differentstandardofreview.
PetitionersalsoinviteattentiontothefactthatthePresidentcertifiedS.No.1630andnotH.No.11197.Thatis
because S. No. 1630 was what the Senate was considering. When the matter was before the House, the
PresidentlikewisecertifiedH.No.9210thependingintheHouse.
Third. Finally it is contended that the bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 is the bill which the Conference
CommitteepreparedbyconsolidatingH.No.11197andS.No.1630.ItisclaimedthattheConferenceCommittee
report included provisions not found in either the House bill or the Senate bill and that these provisions were
"surreptitiously"insertedbytheConferenceCommittee.Muchismadeofthefactthatinthelasttwodaysofits
sessiononApril21and25,1994theCommitteemetbehindcloseddoors.Wearenottold,however,whetherthe
provisionswerenottheresultofthegiveandtakethatoftenmarktheproceedingsofconferencecommittees.
Nor is there anything unusual or extraordinary about the fact that the Conference Committee met in executive
sessions. Often the only way to reach agreement on conflicting provisions is to meet behind closed doors, with
only the conferees present. Otherwise, no compromise is likely to be made. The Court is not about to take the
suggestionofacabalorsinistermotiveattributedtotheconfereesonthebasissolelyoftheir"secretmeetings"
onApril21and25,1994,norreadanythingintotheincompleteremarksofthemembers,markedinthetranscript
of stenographic notes by ellipses. The incomplete sentences are probably due to the stenographer's own
limitations or to the incoherence that sometimes characterize conversations. William Safire noted some such
lapsesinrecordedtalksevenbyrecentpastPresidentsoftheUnitedStates.
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Inanyevent,intheUnitedStatesconferencecommitteeshadbeencustomarilyheldinexecutivesessionswith
only the conferees and their staffs in attendance. 13 Only in November 1975 was a new rule adopted requiring open
sessions.Eventhenamajorityofeitherchamber'sconfereesmayvoteinpublictoclosethemeetings.14
AstothepossibilityofanentirelynewbillemergingoutofaConferenceCommittee,ithasbeenexplained:
Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees are not expected to make any
material change in the measure at issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses have
already agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult provision to enforce. Note the
problem when one house amends a proposal originating in either house by striking out everything
following the enacting clause and substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The
versions are now altogether different, permitting a conference committee to draft essentially a new
bill....15
The result is a third version, which is considered an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," the only
requirementforwhichbeingthatthethirdversionbegermanetothesubjectoftheHouseandSenatebills.16
Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an
entirelynewprovisionthatisnotfoundeitherintheHousebillorintheSenatebill. 17Ifthecommitteecanpropose
anamendmentconsistingofoneortwoprovisions,thereisnoreasonwhyitcannotproposeseveralprovisions,collectively
consideredasan"amendmentinthenatureofasubstitute,"solongassuchamendmentisgermanetothesubjectofthe
billsbeforethecommittee.Afterall,itsreportwasnotfinalbutneededtheapprovalofbothhousesofCongresstobecome
valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third
legislativechamberisthuswithoutanybasis.18
Nonetheless, it is argued that under the respective Rules of the Senate and the House of Representatives a
conferencecommitteecanonlyactonthedifferingprovisionsofaSenatebillandaHousebill,andthatcontrary
totheseRulestheConferenceCommitteeinsertedprovisionsnotfoundinthebillssubmittedtoit.Thefollowing
provisionsarecitedinsupportofthiscontention:
RulesoftheSenate
RuleXII:
26.IntheeventthattheSenatedoesnotagreewiththeHouseofRepresentativesontheprovision
of any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both
Houseswhichshallmeetwithintendaysaftertheircomposition.
The President shall designate the members of the conference committee in accordance with
subparagraph(c),Section3ofRuleIII.
EachConferenceCommitteeReportshallcontainadetailedandsufficientlyexplicitstatementofthe
changesinoramendmentstothesubjectmeasure,andshallbesignedbytheconferees.
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless the report has been filed with the
SecretaryoftheSenateandcopiesthereofhavebeendistributedtotheMembers.
(Emphasisadded)
RulesoftheHouseofRepresentatives
RuleXIV:
85.ConferenceCommitteeReports.IntheeventthattheHousedoesnotagreewiththeSenate
on the amendments to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled by conference
committeesofbothChambers.
Theconsiderationofconferencecommitteereportsshallalwaysbeinorder,exceptwhenthejournal
is being read, while the roll is being called or the House is dividing on any question. Each of the
pages of such reports shall be signed by the conferees. Each report shall contain a detailed,
sufficientlyexplicitstatementofthechangesinoramendmentstothesubjectmeasure.
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless copies thereof are distributed to the
Members:Provided,Thatinthelastfifteendaysofeachsessionperioditshallbedeemedsufficient
thatthreecopiesofthereport,signedasaboveprovided,aredepositedintheofficeoftheSecretary
General.
(Emphasisadded)
To be sure, nothing in the Rules limits a conference committee to a consideration of conflicting provisions. But
RuleXLIV,112oftheRulesoftheSenateiscitedtotheeffectthat"IfthereisnoRuleapplicabletoaspecific
casetheprecedentsoftheLegislativeDepartmentofthePhilippinesshallberesortedto,andasasupplementof
these,theRulescontainedinJefferson'sManual."ThefollowingisthenquotedfromtheJefferson'sManual:
The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences committed to them. . .
andmaynotincludesubjectsnotwithindisagreements,eventhoughgermanetoaquestioninissue.
Note that, according to Rule XLIX, 112, in case there is no specific rule applicable, resort must be to the
legislative practice. The Jefferson's Manual is resorted to only as supplement. It is common place in Congress
thatconferencecommitteereportsincludenewmatterswhich,thoughgermane,havenotbeencommittedtothe
committee. This practice was admitted by Senator Raul S. Roco, petitioner in G.R. No. 115543, during the oral
argumentinthesecases.Whatever,then,maybeprovidedintheJefferson'sManualmustbeconsideredtohave
beenmodifiedbythelegislativepractice.IfachangeisdesiredinthepracticeitmustbesoughtinCongresssince
thisquestionisnotcoveredbyanyconstitutionalprovisionbutisonlyaninternalruleofeachhouse.Thus,Art.VI,
16(3)oftheConstitutionprovidesthat"EachHousemaydeterminetherulesofitsproceedings...."
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ThisobservationappliestotheothercontentionthattheRulesofthetwochamberswerelikewisedisregardedin
the preparation of the Conference Committee Report because the Report did not contain a "detailed and
sufficientlyexplicitstatementofchangesin,oramendmentsto,thesubjectmeasure."TheReportusedbrackets
andcapitalletterstoindicatethechanges.Thisisastandardpracticeinbilldrafting.Wecannotsaythatinusing
thesemarksandsymbolstheCommitteeviolatedtheRulesoftheSenateandtheHouse.Moreover,thisCourtis
not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have already ruled,
"parliamentaryrulesaremerelyproceduralandwiththeirobservancethecourtshavenoconcern."19Our concern
is with the procedural requirements of the Constitution for the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements are
concerned,wearesatisfiedthattheyhavebeenfaithfullyobservedinthesecases.
Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee's Report in these cases must have undergone three
readingsineachofthetwohouses.Ifthatbethecase,therewouldbenoendtonegotiationsinceeachhouse
mayseekmodificationsofthecompromisebill.Thenatureofthebill,therefore,requiresthatitbeacteduponby
each house on a "take it or leave it" basis, with the only alternative that if it is not approved by both houses,
anotherconferencecommitteemustbeappointed.Butthenagaintheresultwouldstillbeacompromisemeasure
thatmaynotbewhollysatisfyingtobothhouses.
Art.VI,26(2)must,therefore,beconstruedasreferringonlytobillsintroducedforthefirsttimeineitherhouse
of Congress, not to the conference committee report. For if the purpose of requiring three readings is to give
membersofCongresstimetostudybills,itcannotbegainsaidthatH.No.11197waspassedintheHouseafter
three readings that in the Senate it was considered on first reading and then referred to a committee of that
bodythatalthoughtheSenatecommitteedidnotreportouttheHousebill,itsubmittedaversion(S.No.1630)
which it had prepared by "taking into consideration" the House bill that for its part the Conference Committee
consolidated the two bills and prepared a compromise version that the Conference Committee Report was
thereafter approved by the House and the Senate, presumably after appropriate study by their members. We
cannotsaythat,asamatteroffact,themembersofCongresswerenotfullyinformedoftheprovisionsofthebill.
TheallegationthattheConferenceCommitteeusurpedthelegislativepowerofCongressis,inourview,without
warrantinfactandinlaw.
Fourth.WhateverdoubtstheremaybeastotheformalvalidityofRepublicActNo.7716mustberesolvedinits
favor. Our cases 20 manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its
provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed constitutional amendment was invalid because
therequisitevotesforitsapprovalhadnotbeenobtained 21orthatcertainprovisionsofastatutehadbeen"smuggled"in
the printing of the bill 22 have moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the
government.Thereisnoreasonnowtodepartfromthisrule.
Noclaimisheremadethatthe"enrolledbill"ruleisabsolute.Infactinonecase23we"wentbehind"anenrolledbill
andconsultedtheJournaltodeterminewhethercertainprovisionsofastatutehadbeenapprovedbytheSenateinviewof
the fact that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his
signature,sothatineffecttherewasnolongeranenrolledbilltoconsider.
Butwhereallegationsthattheconstitutionalproceduresforthepassageofbillshavenotbeenobservedhaveno
morebasisthananotherallegationthattheConferenceCommittee"surreptitiously"insertedprovisionsintoabill
whichithadprepared,weshoulddeclinetheinvitationtogobehindtheenrolledcopyofthebill.Todisregardthe
"enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our
government.
Fifth.AnadditionalattackontheformalvalidityofRepublicActNo.7716ismadebythePhilippineAirlines,Inc.,
petitioner in G.R. No. 11582, namely, that it violates Art. VI, 26(1) which provides that "Every bill passed by
Congressshallembraceonlyonesubjectwhichshallbeexpressedinthetitlethereof."Itiscontendedthatneither
H.No.11197norS.No.1630providedforremovalofexemptionofPALtransactionsfromthepaymentoftheVAT
and that this was made only in the Conference Committee bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 without
reflectingthisfactinitstitle.
ThetitleofRepublicActNo.7716is:
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE
AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND
REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS
AMENDED,ANDFOROTHERPURPOSES.
AmongtheprovisionsoftheNIRCamendedis103,whichoriginallyread:
103.Exempttransactions.Thefollowingshallbeexemptfromthevalueaddedtax:
....
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws or international agreements to which the
Philippines is a signatory. Among the transactions exempted from the VAT were those of PAL
becauseitwasexemptedunderitsfranchise(P.D.No.1590)fromthepaymentofall"othertaxes...
noworinthenearfuture,"inconsiderationofthepaymentbyiteitherofthecorporateincometaxor
afranchisetaxof2%.
AsaresultofitsamendmentbyRepublicActNo.7716,103oftheNIRCnowprovides:
103.Exempttransactions.Thefollowingshallbeexemptfromthevalueaddedtax:
....
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those granted under Presidential
DecreeNos.66,529,972,1491,1590....
TheeffectoftheamendmentistoremovetheexemptiongrantedtoPAL,asfarastheVATisconcerned.
Thequestioniswhetherthisamendmentof103oftheNIRCisfairlyembracedinthetitleofRepublicActNo.
7716,althoughnomentionismadethereinofP.D.No.1590asamongthosewhichthestatuteamends.Wethink
itis,sincethetitlestatesthatthepurposeofthestatuteistoexpandtheVATsystem,andonewayofdoingthisis
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to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before. To insist that P.D. No. 1590 be
mentionedinthetitleofthelaw,inadditionto103oftheNIRC,inwhichitisspecificallyreferredto,wouldbeto
insistthatthetitleofabillshouldbeacompleteindexofitscontent.
TheconstitutionalrequirementthateverybillpassedbyCongressshallembraceonlyonesubjectwhichshallbe
expressedinitstitleisintendedtopreventsurpriseuponthemembersofCongressandtoinformthepeopleof
pendinglegislationsothat,iftheywishto,theycanbeheardregardingit.If,inthecaseatbar,petitionerdidnot
knowbeforethatitsexemptionhadbeenwithdrawn,itisnotbecauseofanydefectinthetitlebutperhapsforthe
samereasonotherstatutes,althoughpublished,passunnoticeduntilsomeeventsomehowcallsattentiontotheir
existence.Indeed,thetitleofRepublicActNo.7716isnotanymoregeneralthanthetitleofPAL'sownfranchise
underP.D.No.1590,andyetnomentionismadeofitstaxexemption.ThetitleofP.D.No.1590is:
AN ACT GRANTING A NEW FRANCHISE TO PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. TO ESTABLISH,

OPERATE,ANDMAINTAINAIRTRANSPORTSERVICESINTHEPHILIPPINESANDBETWEENTHE
PHILIPPINESANDOTHERCOUNTRIES.
Thetrendinourcasesistoconstruetheconstitutionalrequirementinsuchamannerthatcourtsdonotunduly
interferewiththeenactmentofnecessarylegislationandtoconsideritsufficientifthetitleexpressesthegeneral
subjectofthestatuteandallitsprovisionsaregermanetothegeneralsubjectthusexpressed.24
Itisfurthercontendedthatamendmentofpetitioner'sfranchisemayonlybemadebyspeciallaw,inviewof24
ofP.D.No.1590whichprovides:
Thisfranchise,asamended,oranysectionorprovisionhereofmayonlybemodified,amended,or
repealed expressly by a special law or decree that shall specifically modify, amend, or repeal this
franchiseoranysectionorprovisionthereof.
Thisprovisionisevidentlyintendedtopreventtheamendmentofthefranchisebymereimplicationresultingfrom
theenactmentofalaterinconsistentstatute,inconsiderationofthefactthatafranchiseisacontractwhichcan
bealteredonlybyconsentoftheparties.ThusinManilaRailroadCo.v.
Rafferty, 25 it was held that an Act of the U.S. Congress, which provided for the payment of tax on certain goods and
articlesimportedintothePhilippines,didnotamendthefranchiseofplaintiff,whichexempteditfromalltaxesexceptthose
mentionedinitsfranchise.Itwasheldthataspeciallawcannotbeamendedbyagenerallaw.
In contrast, in the case at bar, Republic Act No. 7716 expressly amends PAL's franchise (P.D. No. 1590) by
specifically excepting from the grant of exemptions from the VAT PAL's exemption under P.D. No. 1590. This is
within the power of Congress to do under Art. XII, 11 of the Constitution, which provides that the grant of a
franchisefortheoperationofapublicutilityissubjecttoamendment,alterationorrepealbyCongresswhenthe
commongoodsorequires.
II.SUBSTANTIVEISSUES
A.ClaimsofPressFreedom,FreedomofThoughtandReligiousFreedom
The Philippine Press Institute (PPI), petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, is a nonprofit organization of newspaper
publishersestablishedfortheimprovementofjournalisminthePhilippines.Ontheotherhand,petitionerinG.R.
No.115781,thePhilippineBibleSociety(PBS),isanonprofitorganizationengagedintheprintinganddistribution
ofbiblesandotherreligiousarticles.Bothpetitionersclaimviolationsoftheirrightsunder4and5oftheBillof
RightsasaresultoftheenactmentoftheVATLaw.
ThePPIquestionsthelawinsofarasithaswithdrawntheexemptionpreviouslygrantedtothepressunder103
(f) of the NIRC. Although the exemption was subsequently restored by administrative regulation with respect to
thecirculationincomeofnewspapers,thePPIpressesitsclaimbecauseofthepossibilitythattheexemptionmay
still be removed by mere revocation of the regulation of the Secretary of Finance. On the other hand, the PBS
goes so far as to question the Secretary's power to grant exemption for two reasons: (1) The Secretary of
FinancehasnopowertogranttaxexemptionbecausethisisvestedinCongressandrequiresforitsexercisethe
voteofamajorityofallitsmembers26and(2)theSecretary'sdutyistoexecutethelaw.
103oftheNIRCcontainsalistoftransactionsexemptedfromVAT.Amongthetransactionspreviouslygranted
exemptionwere:
(f) Printing, publication, importation or sale of books and any newspaper, magazine, review, or
bulletin which appears at regular intervals with fixed prices for subscription and sale and which is
devotedprincipallytothepublicationofadvertisements.
RepublicActNo.7716amended103bydeleting(f)withtheresultthatprintmediabecamesubjecttotheVAT
with respect to all aspects of their operations. Later, however, based on a memorandum of the Secretary of
Justice, respondent Secretary of Finance issued Revenue Regulations No. 1194, dated June 27, 1994,
exempting the "circulation income of print media pursuant to 4 Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
guaranteeingagainstabridgmentoffreedomofthepress,amongothers."Theexemptionof"circulationincome"
hasleftincomefromadvertisementsstillsubjecttotheVAT.
ItisunnecessarytopassuponthecontentionthattheexemptiongrantedisbeyondtheauthorityoftheSecretary
of Finance to give, in view of PPI's contention that even with the exemption of the circulation revenue of print
mediathereisstillanunconstitutionalabridgmentofpressfreedombecauseoftheimpositionoftheVATonthe
gross receipts of newspapers from advertisements and on their acquisition of paper, ink and services for
publication.Evenontheassumptionthatnoexemptionhaseffectivelybeengrantedtoprintmediatransactions,
wefindnoviolationofpressfreedominthesecases.
To be sure, we are not dealing here with a statute that on its face operates in the area of press freedom. The
PPI'sclaimissimplythat,asappliedtonewspapers,thelawabridgespressfreedom.Evenwithduerecognitionof
its high estate and its importance in a democratic society, however, the press is not immune from general
regulationbytheState.Ithasbeenheld:
The publisher of a newspaper has no immunity from the application of general laws. He has no
special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others. He must answer for libel. He may be
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punishedforcontemptofcourt....Likeothers,hemustpayequitableandnondiscriminatorytaxes
onhisbusiness....27
ThePPIdoesnotdisputethispoint,either.
What it contends is that by withdrawing the exemption previously granted to print media transactions involving
printing, publication, importation or sale of newspapers, Republic Act No. 7716 has singled out the press for
discriminatory treatment and that within the class of mass media the law discriminates against print media by
givingbroadcastmediafavoredtreatment.Wehavecarefullyexaminedthisargument,butweareunabletofinda
differentialtreatmentofthepressbythelaw,muchlessanycensorialmotivationforitsenactment.Ifthepressis
now required to pay a valueadded tax on its transactions, it is not because it is being singled out, much less
targeted,forspecialtreatmentbutonlybecauseoftheremovaloftheexemptionpreviouslygrantedtoitbylaw.
Thewithdrawalofexemptionisallthatisinvolvedinthesecases.Othertransactions,likewisepreviouslygranted
exemption,havebeendelistedaspartoftheschemetoexpandthebaseandthescopeoftheVATsystem.The
lawwouldperhapsbeopentothechargeofdiscriminatorytreatmentiftheonlyprivilegewithdrawnhadbeenthat
grantedtothepress.Butthatisnotthecase.
ThesituationinthecaseatbarisindeedafarcryfromthosecitedbythePPIinsupportofitsclaimthatRepublic
Act No. 7716 subjects the press to discriminatory taxation. In the cases cited, the discriminatory purpose was
clear either from the background of the law or from its operation. For example, in Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 28 the law imposed a license tax equivalent to 2% of the gross receipts derived from advertisements only on
newspaperswhichhadacirculationofmorethan20,000copiesperweek.Becausethetaxwasnotbasedonthevolumeof
advertisement alone but was measured by the extent of its circulation as well, the law applied only to the thirteen large
newspapers in Louisiana, leaving untaxed four papers with circulation of only slightly less than 20,000 copies a week and
120weeklynewspaperswhichwereinseriouscompetitionwiththethirteennewspapersinquestion.Itwaswellknownthat
thethirteennewspapershadbeencriticalofSenatorHueyLong,andtheLongdominatedlegislatureofLouisianarespondent
bytaxingwhatLongdescribedasthe"lyingnewspapers"byimposingonthem"ataxonlying."Theeffectofthetaxwasto
curtail both their revenue and their circulation. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted, the tax was "a deliberate and calculated
deviceintheguiseofataxtolimitthecirculationofinformationtowhichthepublicisentitledinvirtueoftheconstitutional
guaranties."29Thecaseisaclassicillustrationofthewarningthatthepowertotaxisthepowertodestroy.
In the other case 30 invoked by the PPI, the press was also found to have been singled out because everything was
exemptfromthe"usetax"oninkandpaper,exceptthepress.Minnesotaimposedataxonthesalesofgoodsinthatstate.
To protect the sales tax, it enacted a complementary tax on the privilege of "using, storing or consuming in that state
tangiblepersonalproperty"byeliminatingtheresidents'incentivetogetgoodsfromoutsidestateswherethesalestaxmight
be lower. The Minnesota Star Tribune was exempted from both taxes from 1967 to 1971. In 1971, however, the state
legislature amended the tax scheme by imposing the "use tax" on the cost of paper and ink used for publication. The law
was held to have singled out the press because (1) there was no reason for imposing the "use tax" since the press was
exemptfromthesalestaxand(2)the"usetax"waslaidonan"intermediatetransactionratherthantheultimateretailsale."
Minnesota had a heavy burden of justifying the differential treatment and it failed to do so. In addition, the U.S. Supreme
Court found the law to be discriminatory because the legislature, by again amending the law so as to exempt the first
$100,000ofpaperandinkused,furthernarrowedthecoverageofthetaxsothat"onlyahandfulofpublisherspayanytaxat
allandevenfewerpayanysignificantamountoftax."31Thediscriminatorypurposewasthusveryclear.
More recently, in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 32 it was held that a law which taxed general interest
magazines but not newspapers and religious, professional, trade and sports journals was discriminatory because while the
taxdidnotsingleoutthepressasawhole,ittargetedasmallgroupwithinthepress.Whatismore,bydifferentiatingonthe
basis of contents (i.e., between general interest and special interests such as religion or sports) the law became "entirely
incompatiblewiththeFirstAmendment'sguaranteeoffreedomofthepress."
These cases come down to this: that unless justified, the differential treatment of the press creates risks of
suppression of expression. In contrast, in the cases at bar, the statute applies to a wide range of goods and
services.Theargumentthat,byimposingtheVATonlyonprintmediawhosegrosssalesexceedsP480,000but
notmorethanP750,000,thelawdiscriminates33iswithoutmeritsinceithasnotbeenshownthatasaresulttheclass
subjecttotaxhasbeenunreasonablynarrowed.Thefactisthatthislimitationdoesnotapplytothepressalongbuttoall
sales.Norisimpermissiblemotiveshownbythefactthatprintmediaandbroadcastmediaaretreateddifferently.Thepress
istaxedonitstransactionsinvolvingprintingandpublication,whicharedifferentfromthetransactionsofbroadcastmedia.
Thereisthusareasonablebasisfortheclassification.
Thecasescanvassed,itmustbestressed,eschewanysuggestionthat"ownersofnewspapersareimmunefrom
any forms of ordinary taxation." The license tax in the Grosjeancase was declared invalid because it was "one
singleinkind,withalonghistoryofhostilemisuseagainstthefreedomofthe
press."34Ontheotherhand,MinneapolisStaracknowledgedthat"TheFirstAmendmentdoesnotprohibitallregulationof
the press [and that] the States and the Federal Government can subject newspapers to generally applicable economic
regulationswithoutcreatingconstitutionalproblems."35
What has been said above also disposes of the allegations of the PBS that the removal of the exemption of
printing,publicationorimportationofbooksandreligiousarticles,aswellastheirprintingandpublication,likewise
violates freedom of thought and of conscience. For as the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held in Jimmy
Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 36 the Free Exercise of Religion Clause does not prohibit imposing a
generallyapplicablesalesandusetaxonthesaleofreligiousmaterialsbyareligiousorganization.
This brings us to the question whether the registration provision of the law, 37 although of general applicability,
nonetheless is invalid when applied to the press because it lays a prior restraint on its essential freedom. The case of
AmericanBibleSocietyv.CityofManila 38iscitedbyboththePBSandthePPIinsupportoftheircontentionthatthelaw
imposes censorship. There, this Court held that an ordinance of the City of Manila, which imposed a license fee on those
engaged in the business of general merchandise, could not be applied to the appellant's sale of bibles and other religious
literature.ThisCourtreliedonMurdockv.Pennsylvania,39inwhichitwasheldthat,asalicensefeeisfixedinamountand
unrelatedtothereceiptsofthetaxpayer,thelicensefee,whenappliedtoareligioussect,wasactuallybeingimposedasa
conditionfortheexerciseofthesect'srightundertheConstitution.Forthatreason,itwasheld,thelicensefee"restrainsin
advancethoseconstitutionallibertiesofpressandreligionandinevitablytendstosuppresstheirexercise."40
But,inthiscase,thefeein107,althoughafixedamount(P1,000),isnotimposedfortheexerciseofaprivilege
but only for the purpose of defraying part of the cost of registration. The registration requirement is a central
featureoftheVATsystem.Itisdesignedtoprovidearecordoftaxcreditsbecauseanypersonwhoissubjectto
thepaymentoftheVATpaysaninputtax,evenashecollectsanoutputtaxonsalesmadeorservicesrendered.
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Theregistrationfeeisthusamereadministrativefee,onenotimposedontheexerciseofaprivilege,muchlessa
constitutionalright.
For the foregoing reasons, we find the attack on Republic Act No. 7716 on the ground that it offends the free
speech,pressandfreedomofreligionguaranteesoftheConstitutiontobewithoutmerit.Forthesamereasons,
wefindtheclaimofthePhilippineEducationalPublishersAssociation(PEPA)inG.R.No.115931thattheincrease
in the price of books and other educational materials as a result of the VAT would violate the constitutional
mandatetothegovernmenttogiveprioritytoeducation,scienceandtechnology(Art.II,17)tobeuntenable.
B.ClaimsofRegressivity,DenialofDueProcess,EqualProtection,and
Impairment
ofContracts
Thereisbasisforpassinguponclaimsthatonitsfacethestatuteviolatestheguaranteesoffreedomofspeech,
press and religion. The possible "chilling effect" which it may have on the essential freedom of the mind and
conscience and the need to assure that the channels of communication are open and operating importunately
demandtheexerciseofthisCourt'spowerofreview.
Thereis,however,nojustificationforpassingupontheclaimsthatthelawalsoviolatestherulethattaxationmust
be progressive and that it denies petitioners' right to due process and that equal protection of the laws. The
reasonforthisdifferenttreatmenthasbeencogentlystatedbyaneminentauthorityonconstitutionallawthus:"
[W]hen freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands a momentum of respect when
propertyisimperileditisthelawmakers'judgmentthatcommandsrespect.Thisdualstandardmaynotprecisely
reverse the presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of
valueswithinthedueprocessclause."41
Indeed, the absence of threat of immediate harm makes the need for judicial intervention less evident and
underscores the essential nature of petitioners' attack on the law on the grounds of regressivity, denial of due
processandequalprotectionandimpairmentofcontractsasamereacademicdiscussionofthemeritsofthelaw.
Forthefactisthattherehaveevenbeennonoticesofassessmentsissuedtopetitionersandnodeterminations
at the administrative levels of their claims so as to illuminate the actual operation of the law and enable us to
reachsoundjudgmentregardingsofundamentalquestionsasthoseraisedinthesesuits.
Thus,thebroadargumentagainsttheVATisthatitisregressiveandthatitviolatestherequirementthat"Therule
of taxation shall be uniform and equitable [and] Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation." 42
Petitioners in G.R. No. 115781 quote from a paper, entitled "VAT Policy Issues: Structure, Regressivity, Inflation and
Exports"byAlanA.TaitoftheInternationalMonetaryFund,that"VATpaymentbylowincomehouseholdswillbeahigher
proportion of their incomes (and expenditures) than payments by higherincome households. That is, the VAT will be
regressive."Petitionerscontendthatasaresultoftheuniform10%VAT,thetaxonconsumptiongoodsofthosewhoarein
thehigherincomebracket,whichbeforeweretaxedataratehigherthan10%,hasbeenreduced,whilebasiccommodities,
whichbeforeweretaxedatratesrangingfrom3%to5%,arenowtaxedatahigherrate.
Justasvigorouslyasitisassertedthatthelawisregressive,theoppositeclaimispressedbyrespondentsthatin
factitdistributesthetaxburdentoasmanygoodsandservicesaspossibleparticularlytothosewhicharewithin
thereachofhigherincomegroups,evenasthelawexemptsbasicgoodsandservices.Itisthusequitable.The
goods and properties subject to the VAT are those used or consumed by higherincome groups. These include
realpropertiesheldprimarilyforsaletocustomersorheldforleaseintheordinarycourseofbusiness,therightor
privilege to use industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, hotels, restaurants and similar places, tourist
buses, and the like. On the other hand, small business establishments, with annual gross sales of less than
P500,000, are exempted. This, according to respondents, removes from the coverage of the law some 30,000
businessestablishments.Ontheotherhand,anoccasionalpaper 43oftheCenterforResearchandCommunication
cities a NEDA study that the VAT has minimal impact on inflation and income distribution and that while additional
expenditureforthelowestincomeclassisonlyP301or1.49%ayear,thatforafamilyearningP500,000ayearormoreis
P8,340or2.2%.
Lackingempiricaldataonwhichtobaseanyconclusionregardingthesearguments,anydiscussionwhetherthe
VATisregressiveinthesensethatitwillhitthe"poor"andmiddleincomegroupinsocietyharderthanitwillthe
"rich," as the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP) claims in G.R. No. 115873, is largely an academic
exercise. On the other hand, the CUP's contention that Congress' withdrawal of exemption of producers
cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, and service cooperatives, while maintaining that granted to electric
cooperatives, not only goes against the constitutional policy to promote cooperatives as instruments of social
justice (Art. XII, 15) but also denies such cooperatives the equal protection of the law is actually a policy
argument.Thelegislatureisnotrequiredtoadheretoapolicyof"allornone"inchoosingthesubjectoftaxation.
44
NoristhecontentionoftheChamberofRealEstateandBuildersAssociation(CREBA),petitionerinG.R.115754,
thattheVATwillreducethemarkupofitsmembersbyasmuchas85%to90%anymoreconcrete.Itisamere
allegation.Ontheotherhand,theclaimofthePhilippinePressInstitute,petitionerinG.R.No.115544,thatthe
VATwilldrivesomeofitsmembersoutofcirculationbecausetheirprofitsfromadvertisementswillnotbeenough
topayfortheirtaxliability,whilepurportingtobebasedonthefinancialstatementsofthenewspapersinquestion,
stillfallsshortoftheestablishmentoffactsbyevidencesonecessaryforadjudicatingthequestionwhetherthetax
isoppressiveandconfiscatory.
Indeed, regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce. What Congress is required by the
Constitution to do is to "evolve a progressive system of taxation." This is a directive to Congress, just like the
directivetoittogiveprioritytotheenactmentoflawsfortheenhancementofhumandignityandthereductionof
social, economic and political inequalities (Art. XIII, 1), or for the promotion of the right to "quality education"
(Art. XIV, 1). These provisions are put in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially
enforceablerights.
Atallevents,our1988decisioninKapatiran45shouldhavelaidtorestthequestionsnowraisedagainsttheVAT.There
similarargumentsmadeagainsttheoriginalVATLaw(ExecutiveOrderNo.273)wereheldtobehypothetical,withnomore
basisthannewspaperarticleswhichthisCourtfoundtobe"hearsayand[without]evidentiaryvalue."AsRepublicActNo.
7716merelyexpandsthebaseoftheVATsystemanditscoverageasprovidedintheoriginalVATLaw,furtherdebateon
thedesirabilityandwisdomofthelawshouldhaveshiftedtoCongress.
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OnlyslightlylessabstractbutnonethelesshypotheticalisthecontentionofCREBAthattheimpositionoftheVAT
onthesalesandleasesofrealestatebyvirtueofcontractsenteredintopriortotheeffectivityofthelawwould
violatetheconstitutionalprovisionthat"Nolawimpairingtheobligationofcontractsshallbepassed."Itisenough
tosaythatthepartiestoacontractcannot,throughtheexerciseofpropheticdiscernment,fettertheexerciseof
the taxing power of the State. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as
between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a
basic postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the
maintenanceofagovernmentwhichretainsadequateauthoritytosecurethepeaceandgoodorderofsociety.46
In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the exercise of the State's power of
taxationsaveonlywhereataxexemptionhasbeengrantedforavalidconsideration. 47 Such is not the case of
PALinG.R.No.115852,andwedonotunderstandittomakethisclaim.Rather,itsposition,asdiscussedabove,isthat
theremovalofitstaxexemptioncannotbemadebyageneral,butonlybyaspecific,law.
Thesubstantiveissuesraisedinsomeofthecasesarepresentedinabstract,hypotheticalformbecauseofthe
lackofaconcreterecord.WeacceptthatthisCourtdoesnotonlyadjudicateprivatecasesthatpublicactionsby
"nonHohfeldian" 48 or ideological plaintiffs are now cognizable provided they meet the standing requirement of the
ConstitutionthatunderArt.VIII,1,2theCourthasa"specialfunction"ofvindicatingconstitutionalrights.Nonetheless
thefeelingcannotbeescapedthatwedonothavebeforeusinthesecasesafullydevelopedfactualrecordthatalonecan
imparttoouradjudicationtheimpactofactuality 49toinsurethatdecisionmakingisinformedandwellgrounded.Needless
to say, we do not have power to render advisory opinions or even jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory judgment. In
effectwearebeingaskedtodowhattheConferenceCommitteeispreciselyaccusedofhavingdoneinthesecasesto
sitasathirdlegislativechambertoreviewlegislation.
Wearetold,however,thatthepowerofjudicialreviewisnotsomuchpowerasitisdutyimposedonthisCourtby
the Constitution and that we would be remiss in the performance of that duty if we decline to look behind the
barrierssetbytheprincipleofseparationofpowers.Art.VIII,1,2iscitedinsupportofthisview:
Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactualcontroversiesinvolvingrights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentalityoftheGovernment.
Toviewthejudicialpowerofreviewasadutyisnothingnew.ChiefJusticeMarshallsaidsoin1803,tojustifythe
assertionofthispowerinMarburyv.Madison:
Itisemphaticallytheprovinceanddutyofthejudicialdepartmenttosaywhatthelawis.Thosewho
apply the rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws
conflictwitheachother,thecourtsmustdecideontheoperationofeach.50
JusticeLaurelechoedthisjustificationin1936inAngarav.ElectoralCommission:
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determineconflictingclaimsofauthorityundertheConstitutionandtoestablishforthepartiesinan
actualcontroversytherightswhichthatinstrumentsecuresandguaranteestothem.51
Thisconceptionofthejudicialpowerhasbeenaffirmedinseveral
cases52ofthisCourtfollowingAngara.
Itdoesnotaddanything,therefore,toinvokethis"duty"tojustifythisCourt'sinterventioninwhatisessentiallya
casethatatbestisnotripeforadjudication.Thatdutymuststillbeperformedinthecontextofaconcretecaseor
controversy,asArt.VIII,5(2)clearlydefinesourjurisdictionintermsof"cases,"andnothingbut"cases."That
theotherdepartmentsofthegovernmentmayhavecommittedagraveabuseofdiscretionisnotanindependent
ground for exercising our power. Disregard of the essential limits imposed by the case and controversy
requirementcaninthelongrunonlyresultinunderminingourauthorityasacourtoflaw.For,asjudges,whatwe
arecalledupontorenderisjudgmentaccordingtolaw,notaccordingtowhatmayappeartobetheopinionofthe
day.
_______________________________
Inthepreceedingpageswehaveendeavoredtodiscuss,withinlimits,thevalidityofRepublicActNo.7716inits
formalandsubstantiveaspectsasthishasbeenraisedinthevariouscasesbeforeus.Tosumup,wehold:
(1)ThattheproceduralrequirementsoftheConstitutionhavebeencompliedwithbyCongressintheenactment
ofthestatute
(2)Thatjudicialinquirywhethertheformalrequirementsfortheenactmentofstatutesbeyondthoseprescribed
bytheConstitutionhavebeenobservedisprecludedbytheprincipleofseparationofpowers
(3)Thatthelawdoesnotabridgefreedomofspeech,expressionorthepress,norinterferewiththefreeexercise
ofreligion,nordenytoanyofthepartiestherighttoaneducationand
(4)That,inviewoftheabsenceofafactualfoundationofrecord,claimsthatthelawisregressive,oppressiveand
confiscatoryandthatitviolatesvestedrightsprotectedundertheContractClauseareprematurelyraisedanddo
notjustifythegrantofprospectivereliefbywritofprohibition.
WHEREFORE,thepetitionsinthesecasesareDISMISSED.
Bidin,Quiason,andKapunan,JJ.,concur.

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SeparateOpinions
NARVASA,C.J.:
Ifullyconcurwiththeconclusionssetforthinthescholarlyopinionofmylearnedcolleague,Mr.JusticeVicenteV.
Mendoza. I write this separate opinion to express my own views relative to the procedural issues raised by the
variouspetitionsanddeathwithbysomeotherMembersoftheCourtintheirseparateopinions.
Bytheirverynature,itwouldseem,discussionsofconstitutionalissuesprovefertilegroundforanotuncommon
phenomenon: debate marked by passionate partisanship amounting sometimes to impatience with adverse
views, an eagerness on the part of the proponents on each side to assume the role of, or be perceived as,
staunchdefendersofconstitutionalprinciples,manifestingitselfinflightsofrhetoric,evenhyperbole.Theperilin
this,obviously,isadiminutionofobjectivitythatqualitywhich,onthepartofthosechargedwiththedutyand
authority of interpreting the fundamental law, is of the essence of their great function. For the Court, more
perhaps than for any other person or group, it is necessary to maintain that desirable objectivity. It must make
certainthatonthisasonanyotheroccasion,thejudicialfunctionismeticulouslyperformed,thefactsascertained
ascomprehensivelyandasaccuratelyaspossible,alltheissuesparticularlyidentified,alltheargumentsclearly
understood else, it may itself be accused, by its own members or by others, of a lack of adherence to, or a
careless observance of, its own procedures, the signatures of its individual members on its enrolled verdicts
notwithstanding.
InthematternowbeforetheCourt,andwhateverreservationssomepeoplemayentertainabouttheirintellectual
limitations or moral scruples, I cannot bring myself to accept the thesis which necessarily implies that the
membersofouraugustCongress,inenactingtheexpandedVATlaw,exposedtheirignorance,orindifferenceto
theobservance,oftherulesofproceduresetdownbytheConstitutionorbytheirrespectivechambers,orwhatis
worse,deliberatelyignoredthoserulesforsomeyetundiscoveredpurposenefariousinnature,oratleastsome
purposeotherthanthepublicwealorthatafewoftheirfellows,actingasabicameralconferencecommittee,by
devious schemes and cunning maneuvers, and in conspiracy with officials of the Executive Department and
others, succeeded in "pulling the wool over the eyes" of all their other colleagues and foisting on them a bill
containing provisions that neither chamber of our bicameral legislature conceived or contemplated. This is the
thesisthatthepetitionerswouldhavethisCourtapprove.ItisathesisIconsiderbereftofanyfactualorlogical
foundation.
Other than the bare declarations of some of the petitioners, or arguments from the use and import of the
language employed in the relevant documents and records, there is no evidence before the Court adequate to
supportafindingthatthelegislatorsconcerned,whetheroftheupperorlowerchamber,actedotherwisethanin
good faith, in the honest discharge of their functions, in the sincere belief that the established procedures were
being regularly observed or, at least, that there occurred no serious or fatal deviation therefrom. There is no
evidence on which reasonably to rest a conclusion that any executive or other official took part in or unduly
influenced the proceedings before the bicameral conference committee, or that the members of the latter were
motivated by a desire to surreptitiously introduce improper revisions in the bills which they were required to
reconcile, or that after agreement had been reached on the mode and manner of reconciliation of the
"disagreeingprovisions,"hadresortedtostratragemsoremployedunderhandedploystoensuretheirapproval
andadoptionbyeitherHouse.NeitheristhereanyproofthatinvotingontheBicameralConferenceCommittee
(BCC)versionofthereconciledbills,themembersoftheSenateandtheHousedidsoinignoranceof,orwithout
understanding,thecontentsthereoforthebillsthereinreconciled.
Also unacceptable is the theory that since the Constitution requires appropriation and revenue bills to originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, it is improper if not unconstitutional for the Senate to formulate, or
eventhinkaboutformulating,itsowndraftofthistypeofmeasureinanticipationofreceiptofonetransmittedby
the lower Chamber. This is specially cogent as regards muchpublicized suggestions for legislation (like the
expanded VAT Law) emanating from one or more legislators, or from the Executive Department, or the private
sector,etc.whichunderstandablycouldbeexpectedtoforthwithgeneratemuchCongressionalcogitation.
Exclusiveorigination,Isubmit,shouldhavenoreferencetotimeofconception.Asapracticalmatter,origination
should refer to the affirmative act which effectively puts the bicameral legislative procedure in motion, i.e., the
transmission by one chamber to the other of a bill for its adoption. This is the purposeful act which sets the
legislative machinery in operation to effectively lead to the enactment of a statute. Until this transmission takes
place, the formulation and discussions, or the reading for three or more times of proposed measures in either
chamber, would be meaningless in the context of the activity leading towards concrete legislation. Unless
transmittedtotheotherchamber,abillpreparedbyeitherhousecannotpossiblybecomelaw.Inotherwords,the
first affirmative, efficacious step, the operative act as it were, leading to actual enactment of a statute, is the
transmissionofabillfromonehousetotheotherforactionbythelatter.Thisistheoriginationthatisspokenofin
theConstitutioninitsArticleVI,Section24,inreferencetoappropriation,revenue,ortariffbills,etc.
It may be that in the Senate, revenue or tax measures are discussed, even drafted, and this before a similar
activitytakesplaceintheHouse.Thisisofnomoment,solongasthosemeasuresorbillremainintheSenate
andarenotsentovertheHouse.ThereisnooriginationofrevenueortaxmeasuresbytheSenateinthiscase.
However,oncetheHousecompletesthedrawingupofasimilartaxmeasureinaccordancewiththeprescribed
procedure, ven if this is done subsequent to the Senates own measure indeed, even if this be inspired by
information that measure of the Senate and after third reading transmits its bill to the Senate, there is
originationby(orin)theHousewithinthecontemplationoftheConstitution.
Soitisentirelypossible,asintimated,thatinexpectationofthereceiptofarevenueortaxbillfromtheHouseof
Representatives, the Senate commences deliberations on its own concept of such a legislative measure. This,
possibly to save time, so that when the House bill raches it, its thoughts and views on the matter are already
formedandevenreducedtowritingintheformofadraftstatute.Thisshouldnotbethoughtilegal,asinterdicted
by the Constitution. What the Constitution prohibits is for the Senate to begin the legislative process first, by
sendingitsownrevenuebilltotheHouseofRepresentativesforitsconsiderationandaction.Thisistheinitiation
thatisprohibitedtotheSenate.
Butpetitionersclaimsthatthislastwaswhatinfacthappened,thatthewentthroughthelegislativemillandwas
finallyapprovedasR.A.No.7716,wastheSenateversion,SB1630.Thisisdisputedbytherespondents.They
claim it was House Bill 11197 that, after being transmitted to the Senate, was referred after first reading to its
CommitteeonWaysandMeanswasreportedoutbysaidCommitteeunderwentsecondandthirdreadings,was
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sent to the bicameral conference committee and then, after appropriate proceedings therein culminating in
extensiveamendmentsthereof,wasfinallyapprovedbybothHousesandbecametheExpandedVATLaw.
Onwhosesidedoesthetruthlie?Ifitisnotpossibletomakethatdeterminationfromthepleadingsandrecords
beforethisCourt,shallitrequireevidencetobepresented?No,onbothlawandprinciple.TheCourtwillrejecta
casewherethelegalissuesraised,whatevertheymaybe,dependfortheirresolutiononstillunsettledquestions
offact.Petitionersmaynot,byraisingwhatareCourttoassumetheroleofatrieroffacts.Itisonthecontrary
their obligation, before raising those questions to this Court, to see to it that all issues of fact are settled in
accordance with the procedures laid down by law for proof of facts. Failing this, petitioners would have only
themselvestoblameforaperemptorydismissal.
Now,whatisreallyprovenaboutwhathappenedtoHB11197afteritwastransmittedtotheSenate?Itseemsto
beadmittedonallsidesthataftergoingthroughfirstreading,HB11197wasreferredtotheCommitteeonWays
andMeanschairedbySenatorErnestoHerrera.
Itishoweversurmisedthatafterthisinitialstep,HB11197wasneverafterwardsdeliberatedonintheSenate,that
itwastheregivennothingmorethana"passingglance,"andthatitneverwentthroughapropersecondandthird
reading.Thereisnocompetentprooftosubstantiatethisclaim.WhatiscertainisthatonFebruary7,1994,the
Senate Committee on Ways and Means submitted its Report (No. 349) stating that HB 11197 was considered,
andrecommendingthatSB1630beapproved"insubstitutionofS.B.No.1129,takingintoconsiderationP.S.Res.
No.734 1 and H.B. No. 11197." This Report made known to the Senate, and clearly indicates, that H.B. No. 11197 was
indeeddeliberatedonbytheCommitteeintruth,asSenatorHerrerapointedout,theBCClater"agreedtoadopt(abroader
coverageoftheVAT)whichiscloselyadheringtotheSenateversion****withsomenewprovisionsoramendments."The
plainimplicationisthattheSenateCommitteehadindeeddiscussedHB11197incomparisonwiththeinconsistentpartsof
SB 1129 and afterwards proposed amendments to the former in the form of a new bill (No. 1630) more closely akin to the
Senatebill(No.1129).
Anditisasreasonabletosupposeasnotthatlater,duringthesecondandthirdreadingsonMarch24,1994,the
Senators,assembledasabody,hadbeforethemcopiesofHB11197andSB1129,aswellasoftheCommittee's
new "SB 1630" that had been recommended for their approval, or at the very least were otherwise perfectly
awarethattheywereconsideringtheparticularprovisionsofthesebills.Thattherewassuchadeliberationinthe
Senate on HB 11197 in light of inconsistent portions of SB 1630, may further be necessarily inferred from the
request,madebytheSenateonthesameday,March24,1994,fortheconvocationofabicameralconference
committeetoreconcile"thedisagreeingprovisionsofsaidbill(SB1630)andHouseBillNo.11197,"arequestthat
couldnothavebeenmadehadnottheSenatorsmoreorlesscloselyexaminedtheprovisionsofHB11197and
comparedthemwiththoseofthecounterpartSenatemeasures.
Were the proceedings before the bicameral conference committee fatally flawed? The affirmative is suggested
because the committee allegedly overlooked or ignored the fact that SB 1630 could not validly originate in the
Senate, and that HB 11197 and SB 1630 never properly passed both chambers. The untenability of these
contentions has already been demonstrated. Now, demonstration of the indefensibility of other arguments
purportingtoestablishtheimproprietyoftheBCCproceedingswillbeattempted.
There is the argument, for instance, that the conference committee never used HB 11197 even as "frame of
reference" because it does not appear that the suggestion therefor (made by House Penal Chairman Exequiel
Javier at the bicameral conference committee's meeting on April 19, 1994, with the concurrence of Senator
Maceda)waseverresolved,theminutesbeingregrettablyvagueastowhatoccurredafterthatsuggestionwas
made. It is, however, as reasonable to assume that it was, as it was not, given the vagueness of the minutes
alreadyalludedto.Infact,areadingoftheBCCReportpersuasivelydemonstratesthatHB11197wasnotonly
utilizedasa"frameofreference"butactuallydiscussedanddeliberatedon.
SaidBCCReportpertinentlystates:2
CONFERENCECOMMITTEEREPORT
TheConferenceCommitteeonthedisagreeingprovisionsofHouseBillNo.11197,entitled:
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX BASE
237, AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113SD AND 114 OF TITLE V, ALL OF
THENATIONALINTERNALREVENUECODE,ASAMENDED
andSenateBillNo.1630entitled:
102,103,104,1106,107,108AND110OFTITLEIV,112,115,117AND121OFTITLEV,ACND
236, 237, AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 1113, 114, 116, 119 AND 120 OF
TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
havingmet,afterfullandfreeconference,hasagreedtorecommendanddoherebyrecommendto
their respective Houses that House Bill No. 11197, in consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be
approved in accordance with the attached copy of the bill as reconciled and approved by the
conferees.
Approved.
TheReport,itwillbenoted,explicitlyadvertstoHouseBillNo.11197,itbeinginfactmentionedaheadofSenate
Bill No. 1630 graphically shows the very close identity of the subjects of both bills (indicated in their respective
titles) and clearly says that the committee met in "full and free conference" on the "disagreeing provisions" of
both bills (obviously in an effort to reconcile them) and that reconciliation of said "disagreeing provisions" had
beeneffected,theBCChavingagreedthat"HouseBillNo.11197,inconsolidationwithSenateBillNo.1630,be
approvedinaccordancewiththeattachedcopyofthebillasreconciledandapprovedbytheconferees."
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Itmaybeconcluded,inotherwords,that,conformablytotheprocedureprovidedintheConstitutionwithwhichall
theMembersofthebicameralconferencecommitteecannotbutbepresumedtobefamiliar,andnoprooftothe
contrary having been adduced on the point, it was the original bill (HB 11197) which said body had considered
and deliberated on in detail, reconciled or harmonized with SB 1630, and used as basis for drawing up the
amendedversioneventuallyreportedoutandsubmittedtobothhousesofCongress.
ItisfurthercontendedthattheBCCwascreatedandconvokedprematurely,thatSB1630shouldfirsthavebeen
sent to the House of Representatives for concurrence It is maintained, in other words, that the latter chamber
should have refused the Senate request for a bicameral conference committee to reconcile the "disagreeing
provisions"ofbothbills,andshouldhaverequiredthatSB1630befirsttransmittedtoit.This,seemingly,isnit
pickinggiventheurgencyoftheproposedlegislationascertifiedbythePresident(tobothhouses,infact).Time
wasoftheessence,accordingtothePresident'sbestjudgmentasregardswhichabsolutelynooneineither
chamberofCongresstookexception,generalacceptancebeingonthecontraryotherwisemanifestedandthat
judgmenttheCourtwillnotnowquestion.Inlightofthaturgency,whatwassovitalorindispensableaboutsucha
transmittalthatitsabsencewouldinvalidateallelsethathadbeendonetowardsenactmentofthelaw,completely
escapes me, specially considering that the House had immediately acceded without demur to the request for
convocationoftheconferencecommittee.
What has just been said should dispose of the argument that the statement in the enrolled bill, that "This Act
which is a consolidationof House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 11630 was finally passed by the House of
RepresentativesandtheSenateonApril27,1994andMay2,1994,"necessarilysignifiesthatthereweretwo(2)
bills separately introduced, retaining their independent existence until they reached the bicameral conference
committeewheretheywereconsolidated, and therefore, the VAT law did not originate exclusively in the House
having originated in part in the Senate as SB 1630, which bill was not embodied in but merely merged with HB
11197,retainingitsseparateidentityuntilitwasjoinedbytheBCCwiththehousemeasure.Themorelogical,and
fairer,courseistoconstruetheexpression,"consolidationofHouseBillNo.11197andSenateBillNo.11630"in
the context of accompanying and contemporaneous statements, i.e.: (a) the declaration in the BCC Report,
supra, that the committee met to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the two bills, "and after full and free
conference"onthematter,agreedandsorecommendedthat"HouseBillNo.11197,inconsolidationwithSenate
Bill No. 1630, be approved in accordance with the attached copy of the bill as reconciled and approved by the
conferees" and (b) the averment of Senator Herrera, in the Report of the Ways and Means Committee,supra,
that the committee had actually "considered" (discussed) HB No. 11197 and taken it "into consideration" in
recommendingthatitsownversionofthemeasure(SB1630)betheoneapproved.
ThattheSenatemighthavedrawnupitsownversionoftheexpandedVATbill,contemporaneouslywithoreven
beforetheHousedid,isofnomoment.ItbearsrepeatinginthisconnectionthatnoVATbilleveroriginatedinthe
Senate neither its SB 1129 or SB 1630 or any of its drafts was ever officially transmitted to the House as an
initiatingbillwhich,asalreadypointedout,iswhattheConstitutionforbidsitwasHB11197thatwasfirstsentto
the Senate, underwent first reading, was referred to Committee on Ways and Means and there discussed in
relation to and in comparison with the counterpart Senate version or versions the mere formulation of which
was, as also already discussed, not prohibited to it and afterwards considered by the Senate itself, also in
connectionwithSB1630,onsecondandthirdreadings.HB11197wasinthetruestsense,theoriginatingbill.
An issue has also arisen respecting the socalled "enrolled bill doctrine" which, it is said, whatever sacrosanct
statusitmightoriginallyhaveenjoyed,isnowinbadodorwithmodernscholarsonaccountofitsimputedrigidity
and unrealism it being also submitted that the ruling in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (78 Phil. 1) and the cases
reaffirming it, is no longer good law, it being based on a provision of the Code of Civil Procedure 3 long since
strickenfromthestatutebooks.
Iwouldmyselfconsiderthe"enrolledbill"theoryaslayingdownapresumptionofsostrongacharacterastobe
well nigh absolute or conclusive, fully in accord with the familiar and fundamental philosophy of separation of
powers.Theresult,asfarasIamconcerned,istomakediscussionoftheenrolledbillprinciplepurelyacademic
for as already pointed out, there is no proof worthy of the name of any facts to justify its reexamination and,
possibly,disregard.
Theotherquestionis,whatisthenatureofthepowergiventoabicameralconferencecommitteeofreconciling
differences between, or "disagreeing provisions" in, a bill originating from the House in relation to amendments
proposedbytheSenatewhetherasregardssomeorallofitsprovisions?Isthemodeofreconciliation,subject
to fixed procedure and guidelines? What exactly can the committee do, or not do? Can it only clarify or revise
provisionsfoundineitherSenateorHousebill?Isitforbiddentoproposeadditionalornewprovisions,evenon
mattersnecessarilyorreasonablyconnectedwithorgermanetoitemsinthebillsbeingreconciled?
In answer, it is postulated that the reconciliation function is quite limited. In these cases, the conference
committee should have confined itself to reconciliation of differences or inconsistencies only by (a) restoring
provisionsofHB11197aliminatedbySB1630,or(b)sustainingwhollyorpartlytheSenateamendments,or(c)as
a compromise, agreeing that neither provisions nor amendments be carried into the final form of HB 11197 for
submissiontobothchambersofthelegislature.
The trouble is, it is theorized, the committee incorporated activities or transactions which were not within the
contemplation of both bills it made additions and deletions which did not enjoy the enlightenment of initial
committee studies it exercised what is known as an "ex post veto power" granted to it by no law, rule or
regulation,apowerthatintruthisdeniedtoitbytherulesofboththeSenateandtheHouse.Insubstantiation,
theSenateruleiscited,similartothatoftheHouse,providingthat"differencesshallbesettledbyaconference
committee" whose report shall contain "detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or
amendments to the subject measure, ** (to be) signed by the conferees" as well as the "Jefferson's Manual,"
adopted by the Senate as supplement to its own rules, directing that the managers of the conference must
confinethemselvestodifferencessubmittedtothemtheymaynotincludesubjectsnotwithinthedisagreements
eventhoughgermanetoaquestioninissue."
It is significant that the limiting proviso in the relevant rules has been construed and applied as directory, not
mandatory.Duringtheoralargument,counselforpetitionersadmittedthatthepracticefordecadeshasbeenfor
bicameralconferencecommitteestoincludesuchprovisionsinthereconciledbillastheybelievedtobegermane
or necessary and acceptable to both chambers, even if not within any of the "disagreeing provisions," and the
reconciled bills, containing such provisions had invariably been approved and adopted by both houses of
Congress. It is a practice, they say, that should be stopped. But it is a practice that establishes in no uncertain
manner the prevailing concept in both houses of Congress of the permissible and acceptable modes of
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reconciliation that their conference committees may adopt, one whose undesirability is not all that patent if not,
indeed, incapable of unquestionable demonstration. The fact is that conference committees only take up bills
whichhavealreadybeenfreelyandfullydiscussedinbothchambersofthelegislature,butastowhichthereis
needofreconciliationinviewof"disagreeingprovisions"betweenthemandbothchambersentrustthefunction
of reconciling the bills to their delegates at a conference committee with full awareness, and tacit consent, that
conformably with established practice unquestioningly observed over many years, new provisions may be
included even if not within the "disagreeing provisions" but of which, together with other changes, they will be
givendetailedandsufficientlyexplicitinformationpriortovotingontheconferencecommitteeversion.
In any event, a fairly recent decision written for the Court by Senior Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz,
promulgatedonNovember11,1993(G.R.No.105371,ThePhilippineJudgesAssociation,etc.,etal.v.Hon.Pete
Prado,etc.,etal.),shouldleavenodoubtofthecontinuingvitalityoftheenrolledbilldoctrineandgiveaninsight
intothenatureofthereconcilingfunctionofbicameralconferencecommittees.Inthatcase,abilateralconference
committee was constituted and met to reconcile Senate Bill No. 720 and House Bill No. 4200. It adopted a
"reconciled"measurethatwassubmittedtoandapprovedbybothchambersofCongressandultimatelysigned
intolawbythePresident,asR.A.No.7354.Aprovisioninthisstatute(removingthefrankingprivilegefromthe
courts, among others) was assailed as being an invalid amendment because it was not included in the original
versionofeitherthesenateorthehousebillandhencehadgeneratednodisagreementbetweenthemwhichhad
tobereconciled.TheCourtheld:
Whileitistruethataconferencecommitteeisthemechanismforcompromisingdifferencesbetween
the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is
describedthus:
Aconferencecommitteemaydealgenerallywiththesubjectmatteroritmaybelimited
to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the
conferencecommitteeisnotbyrulelimitedinitsjurisdiction,legislativecustomseverely
limitsthefreedomwithwhichnewsubjectmattercanbeinsertedintotheconferencebill.
But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond
its mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on
conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of
conferencecommittee(Davies,LegislativeLawandProcess:InANutshell,1987Ed.,p.
81).
ItisamatterofrecordthattheConferenceCommitteeReportonthebillinquestionwasreturnedto
and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was
enrolledwithitscertificationbySenatePresidentNeptaliA.GonzalesandSpeakerRamonV.Mitraof
theHouseofRepresentativesashavingbeendulypassedbybothHousesofCongress.Itwasthen
presentedtoandapprovedbyPresidentCorazonC.AquinoonApril3,1992.
Underthedoctrineofseparationofpowers,theCourtmaynotinquirebeyondthecertificationofthe
approvalofabillfromthepresidingofficersofCongress.CascoPhilippineChemicalCo.v.Gimenez
(7 SCRA 347) laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in
mattersthathavetobeenteredinthejournalsliketheyeasandnaysonthefinalreadingofthebill)
(Mabanagv.LopezVito,78Phil.1).ThejournalsarethemselvesalsobindingontheSupremeCourt,
as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. v. Pons (34 Phil. 729), where we explained the
reasonthus:
ToinquireintotheveracityofthejournalsofthePhilippinelegislaturewhentheyare,as
we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the
organiclawsbywhichthePhilippineGovernmentwasbroughtintoexistence,toinvade
acoordinateandindependentdepartmentoftheGovernment,andtointerferewiththe
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Applying these principles, we shall
declinetolookintothepetitioners'chargesthatanamendmentwasmadeuponthelast
readingofthebillthateventuallyR.A.No.7354andthatcopiesthereofinitsfinalform
werenotdistributedamongthemembersofeachHouse.Boththeenrolledbillandthe
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with
ArticleVI,Sec.26(2)oftheConstitution.Weareboundbysuchofficialassurancesfrom
a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a
becomingcourtesy.
Withal, an analysis of the changes made by the conference committee in HB 11197 and SB 1630 by way of
reconcilingtheir"disagreeingprovisions,"assailedbypetitionersasunauthorizedorincongrouousreveals
that many of the changes related to actual "disagreeing provisions," and that those that might perhaps be
considered as entirely new are nevertheless necessarily or logically connected with or germane to particular
mattersinthebillsbeingreconciled.
For instance, the change made by the bicameral conference committee (BCC) concerning amendments to
Section99oftheNationalInternalRevenueCode(NIRC)theadditionof"lessorsofgoodsorpropertiesand
importersofgoods"isreallyareconciliationofdisagreeingprovisions,forwhileHB11197mentionsasamong
those subject to tax, "one who sells, barters, or exchanges goods or properties and any person who leases
personal properties," SB 1630 does not. The change also merely clarifies the provision by providing that the
contemplated taxpayers includes "importers." The revision as regards the amendment to Section 100, NIRC, is
also simple reconciliation, being nothing more than the adoption by the BCC of the provision in HB 11197
governingthesaleofgoldtoBangkoSentral,incontrasttoSB1630containingnosuchprovision.Similarly,only
simple reconciliation was involved as regards approval by the BCC of a provision declaring as not exempt, the
sale of real properties primarily held for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of trade or
business, which provision is found in HB 11197 but not in SB 1630 as regards the adoption by the BCC of a
provisiononlifeinsurancebusiness,containedinSB1630butnotfoundinHB11197asregardsadoptionbythe
BCCoftheprovisioninSB1630fordefermentoftaxoncertaingoodsandservicesfornolongerthan3years,as
towhichtherewasnocounterpartprovisioninSB11197andasregardsthefixingofaperiodfortheadoptionof
implementingrules,aperiodbeingprescribedinSB1630andnoneinHB11197.
In respect of other revisions, it would seem that questions logically arose in the course of the discussion of
specific"disagreeingprovisions"towhichanswersweregivenwhich,becausebelievedacceptabletobothhouses
ofCongress,wereplacedintheBCCdraft.Forexample,duringconsiderationofradioandtelevisiontime(Sec.
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100,NIRC)dealtwithinbothHouseandSenatebills,thequestionapparentlycameup,therelevanceofwhichis
apparentonitsface,relativetosatellitetransmissionandcabletelevisiontime.Hence,aprovisionintheBCCbill
on the matter. Again, while deliberating on the definition of goods or properties in relation to the provision
subjectingsalesthereoftotax,aquestionapparentlyarose,logicallyrelevant,aboutrealpropertiesintendedto
besoldbyapersonineconomicdifficulties,orbecausehewishestobuyacar,i.e.,notaspartofabusiness,the
BCCevidentlyresolvedtoclarifythematterbyexcludingfromthetax,"real properties held primarily for sale to
customersorheldforleaseintheordinarycourseofbusiness."Andinthecourseofconsiderationoftheterm,
sale or exchange of services (Sec 102, NIRC), the inquiry most probably was posed as to whether the term
shouldbeunderstoodasincludingotherservices:e.g.,servicesoflessorsofpropertywhetherrealorpersonal,of
warehousemen, of keepers of resthouses, pension houses, inns, resorts, or of common carriers, etc., and
presumably the BCC resolved to clarify the matter by including the services just mentioned. Surely, changes of
thisnatureareobviouslytobeexpectedinproceedingsbeforebicameralconferencecommitteesandmayeven
beconsideredgristfortheirmill,giventhehistoryofsuchBCCsandtheirgeneralpracticehereandabroad
In any case, all the changes and revisions, and deletions, made by the conference committee were all
subsequentlyconsideredbyandapprovedbyboththeSenateandtheHouse,meetingandvotingseparately.Itis
an unacceptable theorization, to repeat, that when the BCC report and its proposed bill were submitted to the
Senate and the House, the members thereof did not bother to read, or what is worse, having read did not
understand, what was before them, or did not realize that there were new provisions in the reconciled version
unrelatedtoany"disagreeingprovisions,"orthatsaidnewprovisionsorrevisionswereeffectivelyconcealedfrom
them
Moreover,itcertainlywasentirelywithinthepowerandprerogativeofeitherlegislativechambertorejecttheBCC
billandrequiretheorganizationofanewbicameralconferencecommittee.Thatthisoptionwasnotexercisedby
either house only proves that the BCC measure was found to be acceptable as in fact it was approved and
adoptedbybothchambers.
IvotetoDISMISSthepetitionsforlackofmerit.
PADILLA,J.:
TheoriginalVATlawandtheexpandedVATlaw
InKapatiranv.Tan,1 where the ponente was the writer of this Separate Opinion, a unanimous Supreme Court en banc
upheld the validity of the original VAT law (Executive Order No. 273, approved on 25 July 1987). It will, in my view, be
pointlessatthistimetoreopenargumentsadvancedinsaidcaseastowhysaidVATlawwasinvalid,anditwillbeequally
redundant to restate the principles laid down by the Court in the same case affirming the validity of the VAT law as a tax
measure. And yet, the same arguments are, in effect, marshalled against the merits and substance of the expanded VAT
law (Rep. Act. No. 7716, approved on 5 May 1994). The same Supreme Court decision should therefore dispose, in the
main,ofsucharguments,fortheexpandedVATlawispredicatedbasicallyonthesameprinciplesastheoriginalVATlaw,
exceptthatnowthetaxbaseoftheVATimpositionhasbeenexpandedorbroadened.
Itonlyneedstobestatedwhatactuallyshouldbeobviousthatataxmeasure,liketheexpandedVATlaw
(Republic Act. No. 7716), is enacted by Congress and approved by the President in the exercise of the State's
powertotax,whichisanattributeofsovereignty.Andwhilethepowertotax,ifexercisedwithoutlimit,isapower
todestroy,andshould,therefore,notbeallowedinsuchform,ithastobeequallyrecognizedthatthepowerto
taxisanessentialrightofgovernment.Withouttaxes,basicservicestothepeoplecancometoahalteconomic
progresswillbestunted,and,inthelongrun,thepeoplewillsufferthepainsofstagnationandretrogression.
Consequently,uponcarefuldeliberation,IhavenodifficultyinreachingtheconclusionthattheexpandedVATlaw
comeswithinthelegitimatepowerofthestatetotax.AndasIhadoccasiontopreviouslystate:
Constitutional Law, to begin with, is concerned with power not political convenience, wisdom,
exigency,orevennecessity.NeithertheExecutivenorthelegislative(CommissiononAppointments)
cancreatepowerwheretheConstitutionconfersnone.2
Likewise,inthefirstVATcase,Isaid:
In any event, if petitioners seriously believe that the adoption and continued application of the VAT
areprejudicialtothegeneralwelfareortheinterestsofthemajorityofthepeople,theyshouldseek,
recourse and relief from the political branches of the government. The Court, following the time
honored doctrine of separation of powers, cannot substitute its judgment for that of the President
(andCongress)astothewisdom,justiceandadvisabilityoftheadoptionoftheVAT.3
ThisCourtshouldnot,asarule,concernitselfwithquestionsofpolicy,muchless,economicpolicy.Thatisbetter
left to the two (2) political branches of government. That the expanded VAT law is unwise, unpopular and even
antipoor,amongotherthingssaidagainstit,areargumentsandconsiderationswithintherealmofpolicydebate,
whichonlyCongressandtheExecutivehavetheauthoritytodecisivelyconfront,alleviate,remedyandresolve.
II
TheprocedurefollowedintheapprovalofRep.ActNo.7716
Petitioners however posit that the present case raises a farreaching constitutional question which the Court is
dutyboundtodecideunderitsexpandedjurisdictioninthe1987Constitution.4Petitionersmorespecificallyquestion
and impugn the manner by which the expanded VAT law (Rep. Act. No. 7716) was approved by Congress. They contend
that it was approved in violation of the Constitution from which fact it follows, as a consequence, that the law is null and
void.MainrelianceofthepetitionersintheirassaultinSection24,Art.VIoftheConstitutionwhichprovides:
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bill of
localapplication,andprivatebillsshalloriginateexclusivelyintheHouseofRepresentatives,butthe
Senatemayproposeorconcurwithamendments.
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Whileitshouldbeadmittedattheoutsetthattherewasnorigorousandstrictadherencetotheliteralcommandof
theaboveprovision,itmayhoweverbesaid,aftercarefulreflection,thattherewassubstantialcompliance with
theprovision.
There is no question that House Bill No. 11197 expanding the VAT law originated from the House of
Representatives.ItisundeniablyaHousemeasure.Ontheotherhand,SenateBillNo.1129,alsoexpandingthe
VATlaw,originatedfromtheSenate.ItisundeniablyaSenatemeasurewhich,inpointoftime,actuallyantedated
HouseBillNo.11197.
But it is of record that when House Bill No. 11197 was, after approval by the House, sent to the Senate, it was
referred to, and considered by the Senate Committee on Ways and Means (after first reading) together with
Senate Bill No. 1129, and the Committee came out with Senate Bill No. 1630 in substitution of Senate Bill No.
1129butafterexpresslytakingintoconsiderationHouseBillNo.11197.
Since the Senate is, under the abovequoted constitutional provision, empowered to concur with a revenue
measure exclusively originating from the House, or to propose amendments thereto, to the extent of proposing
amendmentsbySUBSTITUTIONtotheHousemeasure,theapprovalbytheSenateofSenateBillNo.1630,after
ithadconsideredHouseBillNo.11197,maybetaken,inmyview,asanAMENDMENTBYSUBSTITUTIONby
theSenatenotonlyofSenateBillNo.1129butofHouseBillNo.11197aswellwhich,itmustberemembered,
originatedexclusivelyfromtheHouse.
But then, in recognition of the fact that House Bill No. 11197 which originated exclusively from the House and
SenateBillNo.1630containedconflictingprovisions,bothbills(HouseBillNo.11197andSenateBillNo.1630)
were referred to the Bicameral Conference Committee for joint consideration with a view to reconciling their
conflictingprovisions.
TheConferenceCommitteecameouteventuallywithaConferenceCommitteeBillwhichwassubmittedtoboth
chambersofCongress(theSenateandtheHouse).TheConferenceCommitteereportedoutabillconsolidating
provisions in House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630. What transpired in both chambers after the
Conference Committee Report was submitted to them is not clear from the records in this case. What is clear
howeveristhatbothchambersvotedseparatelyonthebillreportedoutbytheConferenceCommitteeandboth
chambersapprovedthebilloftheConferenceCommittee.
Tomethen,whatshouldreallybeimportantisthatbothchambersofCongressapprovedthebillreportedoutby
the Conference Committee. In my considered view, the act of both chambers of Congress in approving the
ConferenceCommitteebill,shouldputanendtoanyinquirybythisCourtastohowthebillcameabout.Whatis
more, such separate approvals CURED whatever constitutional infirmities may have arisen in the procedures
leadingtosuchapprovals.For,ifsuchinfirmitieswereseriousenoughtoimpugntheveryvalidityofthemeasure
itself, there would have been an objection or objections from members of both chambers to the approval. The
Courthasbeenshownnosuchobjectiononrecordinbothchambers.
PetitionerscontendthattherewereviolationsofSec.26paragraph2,ArticleVIoftheConstitutionwhichprovides:
Sec.26....
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separatedays,andprintedcopiesthereofinitsfinalformhavebeendistributedtoitsMembersthree
days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas
andnaysenteredintheJournal.
inthat,whenSenateBillNo.1630(theSenatecounterpartofHouseBillNo.11197)wasapprovedbytheSenate,
afterithadbeenreportedoutbytheSenateCommitteeonWaysandMeans,thebillwentthroughsecondand
thirdreadingsonthesameday(notseparatedays)andprintedcopiesthereofinitsfinalformwerenotdistributed
to the members of the Senate at least three (3) days before its passage by the Senate. But we are told by the
respondentsthatthereasonforthis"shortcut"wasthatthePresidenthadcertifiedtothenecessityofthebill's
immediateenactmenttomeetanemergencyacertificationthat,byleaveofthesameconstitutionalprovision,
dispensed with the second and third readings on separate days and the printed form at least three (3) days
beforeitspassage.
WehaveherethenasituationwherethePresidentdidcertifytothenecessityofSenateBillNo.1630'simmediate
enactmenttomeetanemergencyandtheSenaterespondedaccordingly.WhileIwouldbethelasttosaythatthis
CourtcannotreviewtheexerciseofsuchpowerbythePresidentinappropriatecasesripeforjudicialreview,Iam
notpreparedhowevertosaythatthePresidentgravelyabusedhisdiscretionintheexerciseofsuchpowerasto
requirethatthisCourtoverturnhisaction.Wehavebeenshownnofactorcircumstancewhichwouldimpugnthe
judgmentofthePresident,concurredinbytheSenate,thattherewasanemergencythatrequiredtheimmediate
enactment of Senate Bill No. 1630. On the other hand, a becoming respect for a coequal and coordinate
departmentofgovernmentpointsthatweightandcredibilitybegiventosuchPresidentialjudgment.
TheauthorityorpoweroftheConferenceCommitteetomakeinsertionsinanddeletionsfromthebillsreferredto
it,namely,HouseBillNo.11197andSenateBillNo.1630islikewiseassailedbypetitioners.Again,whatappears
importanthereisthatbothchambersapprovedandratifiedthebillasreportedoutbytheConferenceCommittee
(with the reported insertions and deletions). This is perhaps attributable to the known legislative practice of
allowingaConferenceCommitteetomakeinsertionsinanddeletionsfrombillsreferredtoitforconsideration,as
long as they are germane to the subject matter of the bills under consideration. Besides, when the Conference
Committeemadetheinsertionsanddeletionscomplainedofbypetitioners,wasitnotactuallyperformingthetask
assignedtoitofreconcilingconflictingprovisionsinHouseBillNo.11197andSenateBillNo.1630?
This Court impliedly if not expressly recognized the fact of such legislative practice in Philippine Judges
Association,etc.vs.Hon.PeterPrado,etc.,5Insaidcase,westatedthus:
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that
amendmenttoanybillwhentheHouseandtheSenateshallhavedifferencesthereonmaybesettled
byaconferencecommitteeofbothchambers.TheystressthatSec.35wasneverasubjectofany
disagreementbetweenbothHousesandsothesecondparagraphcouldnothavebeenvalidlyadded
asanamendment.
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Theseargumentsareunacceptable.
Whileitistruethataconferencecommitteeisthemechanismforcompromisingdifferencesbetween
the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is
describedthus:
Aconferencecommitteemaydealgenerallywiththesubjectmatteroritmaybelimited
to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the
conferencecommitteeisnotbyrulelimitedinitsjurisdiction,legislativecustomseverely
limitsthefreedomwithwhichnewsubjectmattercanbeinsertedintotheconferencebill.
But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond
itsmandate.Theseexcursionsoccursevenwheretherulesimposestrictlimitationson
conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of
conferencecommittee(Davies,LegislativeLawandProcess:InANutshell,1986Ed.,p.
81).
ItisamatterofrecordthattheConferenceCommitteeReportonthebillinquestionwasreturnedto
and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was
enrolledwithitscertificationbySenatePresidentNeptaliA.GonzalesandSpeakerRamonV.Mitraof
theHouseofRepresentativesashavingbeendulypassedbybothHousesofCongress.Itwasthen
presentedtoandapprovedbyPresidentCorazonC.AquinoonApril3,1992.
It would seem that if corrective measures are in order to clip the powers of the Conference Committee, the
remedy should come from either or both chambers of Congress, not from this Court, under the timehonored
doctrineofseparationofpowers.
Finally,ascertifiedbytheSecretaryoftheSenateandtheSecretaryGeneraloftheHouseofRepresentatives
This Act (Rep. Act No. 7716) is a consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630
(w)asfinallypassedbytheHouseofRepresentativesandtheSenateonApril27,1994andMay2,
1994respectively.
Under the longaccepted doctrine of the "enrolled bill," the Court in deference to a coequal and coordinate
branch of government is held to a recognition of Rep. Act No. 7716 as a law validly enacted by Congress and,
thereafter, approved by the President on 5 May 1994. Again, we quote from out recent decision in Philippine
JudgesAssociation,supra:
Underthedoctrineofseparationofpowers,theCourtmaynotinquirebeyondthecertificationofthe
approvalofabillfromthepresidingofficersofCongress.CascoPhilippineChemicalCo.v.Gimenez
laiddowntherulethattheenrolledbillisconclusiveupontheJudiciary(exceptinmattersthathave
tobeenteredinthejournalsliketheyeasandnaysonthefinallyreadingofthebill).Thejournalsare
themselvesalsobindingontheSupremeCourt,asweheldintheold(butstillvalid)caseofU.S.vs.
Pons,8whereweexplainedthereasonthus:
ToinquireintotheveracityofthejournalsofthePhilippinelegislaturewhentheyare,as
we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the
organiclawsbywhichthePhilippineGovernmentwasbroughtintoexistence,toinvade
acoordinateandindependentdepartmentoftheGovernment,andtointerferewiththe
legitimatepowersandfunctionsoftheLegislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment
was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies
thereofinitsfinalformwerenotdistributedamongthemembersofeachHouse.Boththeenrolledbill
andthelegislativejournalscertifythatthemeasurewasdulyenactedi.e.,inaccordancewithArticle
VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate
departmentofthegovernment,towhichweowe,attheveryleast,abecomingcourtesy.
III
PressFreedomandReligiousFreedomandRep.ActNo.7716
The validity of the passage of Rep. Act No. 7716 notwithstanding, certain provisions of the law have to be
examinedseparatelyandcarefully.
Rep.Act.No.7716inimposingavalueaddedtaxoncirculationincomeofnewspapersandsimilarpublications
andonincomederivedfrompublishingadvertisementsinnewspapers 9,tomymind,violatesSec.4,Art.IIIofthe
Constitution.Indeed,eventheExecutiveDepartmenthastriedtocurethisdefectbytheissuanceoftheBIRRegulationNo.
1194 precluding implementation of the tax in this area. It should be clear, however, that the BIR regulation cannot amend
thelaw(Rep.ActNo.7716).Onlylegislation(asdistinguishedfromadministrationregulation)canamendanexistinglaw.
Freedom of the press was virtually unknown in the Philippines before 1900. In fact, a prime cause of the
revolution against Spain at the turn of the 19th century was the repression of the freedom of speech and
expressionandofthepress.Nolessthanournationalhero,Dr.JoseP.Rizal,in"FilipinasDespuesdeCienAnos"
(ThePhilippinesaCenturyHence)describingthereformssinequibusnonwhichtheFilipinoswereinsistingupon,
stated: "The minister . . . who wants his reforms to be reforms, must begin by declaring the press in the
Philippinesfree...".10
PressfreedominthePhilippineshasmetrepressions,mostnotableofwhichwastheclosureofalmostallforms
ofexistingmassmediaupontheimpositionofmartiallawon21September1972.
Section 4, Art. III of the Constitution maybe traced to the United States Federal Constitution. The guarantee of
freedom of expression was planted in the Philippines by President McKinley in the Magna Carta of Philippine
Liberty,InstructionstotheSecondPhilippineCommissionon7April1900.
Thepresentconstitutionalprovisionwhichreads:
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Sec.4Nolawshallbepassedabridgingthefreedomofspeech,ofexpression,orofthepress,orthe
rightofthepeoplepeaceablytoassembleandpetitionthegovernmentforredressofgrievances.
isessentiallythesameasthatguaranteedintheU.S.FederalConstitution,forwhichreason,Americancaselaw
givingjudicialexpressionastoitsmeaningishighlypersuasiveinthePhilippines.
Theplainwordsoftheprovisionrevealtheclearintentionthatnopriorrestraintcanbeimposedontheexercise
offreespeechandexpressioniftheyaretoremaineffectiveandmeaningful.
TheU.S.SupremeCourtintheleadingcaseofGrosjeanv.AmericanPressCo.Inc.11declaredastatuteimposing
a gross receipts license tax of 2% on circulation and advertising income of newspaper publishers as constituting a prior
restraintwhichiscontrarytotheguaranteeoffreedomofthepress.
InBantamBooks,Inc.v.Sullivan12,theU.S.SupremeCourtstated:"Anysystemofpriorrestraintofexpressioncomes
tothisCourtbearingaheavypresumptionagainstitsconstitutionality."
Inthisjurisdiction,priorrestraintontheexerciseoffreeexpressioncanbejustifiedonlyonthegroundthatthere
isaclearandpresentdangerofasubstantiveevilwhichtheStatehastherighttoprevent13.
In the present case, the tax imposed on circulation and advertising income of newspaper publishers is in the
nature of a prior restraint on circulation and free expression and, absent a clear showing that the requisite for
prior restraint is present, the constitutional flaw in the law is at once apparent and should not be allowed to
proliferate.
Similarly,theimpositionoftheVATonthesaleanddistributionofreligiousarticlesmustbestruckdownforbeing
contrarytoSec.5,Art.IIIoftheConstitutionwhichprovides:
Sec.5.Nolawshallbemaderespectinganestablishmentofreligion,orprohibitingthefreeexercise
thereof.Thefreeexerciseandenjoymentofreligiousprofessionandworship,withoutdiscrimination
orpreference,shallforeverbeallowed.Noreligioustestshallberequiredfortheexerciseofcivilor
politicalrights.
That such a tax on the sale and distribution of religious articles is unconstitutional, has been long settled in
AmericanBibleSociety,supra.
Insofar,therefore,asRep.ActNo.7716imposesavalueaddedtaxontheexerciseoftheabovediscussedtwo
(2) basic constitutional rights, Rep. Act No. 7716 should be declared unconstitutional and of no legal force and
effect.
IV
PetitionsofCREBAandPALandRep.ActNo.7716
TheChamberofRealEstateandBuilder'sAssociation,Inc.(CREBA)fileditsownpetition(GRNo.11574)arguing
thattheprovisionsofRep.ActNo.7716imposinga10%valueaddedtaxonthegrosssellingpriceorgrossvalue
in money of every sale, barter or exchange of goods or properties (Section 2) and a 10% valueadded tax on
grossreceiptsderivedfromthesaleorexchangeofservices,includingtheuseorleaseofproperties(Section3),
violate the equal protection, due process and nonimpairment provisions of the Constitution as well as the rule
thattaxationshouldbeuniform,equitableandprogressive.
The issue of whether or not the valueadded tax is uniform, equitable and progressive has been settled in
Kapatiran.
CREBA which specifically assails the 10% valueadded tax on the gross selling price of real properties, fails to
distinguishbetweenasaleofrealpropertiesprimarilyheldforsaletocustomersorheldforleaseintheordinary
course of trade or business and isolated sales by individual real property owners (Sec. 103[s]). That those
engagedinthebusinessofrealestatedevelopmentrealizegreatprofitsisofcommonknowledgeandneednot
be discussed at length here. The qualification in the law that the 10% VAT covers only sales of real property
primarilyheldforsaletocustomers,i.e.fortradeorbusinessthustakesintoconsiderationataxpayer'scapacity
topay.Thereisnoshowingthattheconsequentdistinctioninrealestatesalesisarbitraryandinviolationofthe
equal protection clause of the Constitution. The inherent power to tax of the State, which is vested in the
legislature,includesthepowertodeterminewhomorwhattotax,aswellashowmuchtotax.Intheabsenceofa
clearshowingthatthetaxviolatesthedueprocessandequalprotectionclausesoftheConstitution,thisCourt,in
keepingwiththedoctrineofseparationofpowers,hastodefertothediscretionandjudgmentofCongressonthis
point.
Philippine Airlines (PAL) in a separate petition (G.R. No. 115852) claims that its franchise under PD No. 1590
whichmakesitliableforafranchisetaxofonly2%ofgrossrevenues"inlieuofalltheotherfeesandchargesof
any kind, nature or description, imposed, levied, established, assessed or collected by any municipal, city,
provincial,ornationalauthorityorgovernmentagency,noworinthefuture,"cannotbeamendedbyRep.ActNo.
7716astomakeit(PAL)liablefora10%valueaddedtaxonrevenues,becauseSec.24ofPDNo.1590provides
thatPAL'sfranchisecanonlybeamended,modifiedorrepealedbyaspeciallawspecificallyforthatpurpose.
The validity of PAL's above argument can be tested by ascertaining the true intention of Congress in enacting
Rep.ActNo.7716.Sec.4thereofdealingwithExemptTransactionsstates:
Sec.103.ExemptTransactions.Thefollowingshallbeexemptfromthevalueaddedtax:
xxxxxxxxx
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those granted under Presidential
DecreesNo.66,529,972,1491,
1590,..."(Emphasissupplied)
TherepealingclauseofRep.ActNo.7716furtherreads:
Sec. 20. Repealing clauses. The provisions of any special law relative to the rate of franchise
taxesareherebyexpresslyrepealed.
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xxxxxxxxx
Allotherlaws,orders,issuances,rulesandregulationsorpartsthereofinconsistentwiththisActare
herebyrepealed,amendedormodifiedaccordingly(Emphasissupplied)
Therecanbenodispute,inmymind,thattheclearintentofCongresswastomodifyPAL'sfranchisewithrespect
tothetaxesithastopay.Tothisextent,Rep.ActNo.7716canbeconsideredasaspeciallawamendingPAL's
franchise and its tax liability thereunder. That Rep. Act. No. 7716 imposes the valueadded taxes on other
subjectsdoesnotmakeitagenerallawwhichcannotamendPDNo.1590.
Tosumup:itismyconsideredviewthatRep.ActNo.7716(theexpandedvalueaddedtax)isavalidlaw,viewed
from both substantive and procedural standards, except only insofar as it violates Secs. 4 and 5, Art. III of the
Constitution(theguaranteesoffreedomofexpressionandthefreeexerciseofreligion).Tothatextent,itis,inits
presentform,unconstitutional.
I,therefore,votetoDISMISSthepetitions,subjecttotheabovequalification.
VITUG,J.:
Lestwebelostbyaquagmireoftrifles,therealthresholdandprejudicialissue,tomymind,iswhetherornotthis
Court is ready to assume and to take upon itself with an overriding authority the awesome responsibility of
overseeingtheentirebureaucracy.Farfromit,oursismerelytoconstrueandtoapplythelawregardlessofits
wisdom and salutariness, and to strike it down only when it clearly disregards constitutional proscriptions. It is
whatthefundamentallawmandates,anditiswhattheCourtmustdo.
I cannot yet concede to the novel theory, so challengingly provocative as it might be, that under the 1987
ConstitutiontheCourtmaynowatgoodlibertyintrude,intheguiseofthepeople'simprimatur,intoeveryaffairof
thegovernment.Whatsignificancecanstillthenremain,Iask,ofthetimehonoredandwidelyacclaimedprinciple
ofseparationofpowers,ifateveryturntheCourtallowsitselftopassupon,atwill,thedispositionofacoequal,
independentandcoordinatebranchinoursystemofgovernment.Idreadtothinkofthesovarieduncertainties
that such an undue interference can lead to. The respect for long standing doctrines in our jurisprudence,
nourishedthroughtime,isoneofmaturitynottimidity,ofstabilityratherthanquiescence.
Ithasneveroccurredtome,andneitherdoIbelieveithasbeenintended,thatjudicialtyrannyisenvisioned,let
aloneinstitutionalized,byourpeopleinthe1987Constitution.Thetestoftyrannyisnotsolelyonhowitiswielded
butonhow,inthefirstplace,itcanbecapableofbeingexercised.Itistimethatanysuchperceptionofjudicial
omnipotenceiscorrected.
Againstallthathasbeensaid,Isee,inactualityinthesecasesatbench,neitheraconstitutionalinfringementof
substance, judging from precedents already laid down by this Court in previous cases, nor a justiciability even
now of the issues raised, more than an attempt to sadly highlight the perceived shortcomings in the procedural
enactmentoflaws,amatterwhichisinternaltoCongressandanareathatisbestlefttoitsownbasicconcern.
Thefactofthematteristhatthelegislativeenactment,initsfinalform,hasreceivedtheultimateapprovalofboth
housesofCongress.Thefinestrhetoric,indeedfashionableintheearlypartofthisclosingcentury,wouldstillbe
apoorsubstitutefortangibility.Ijoin,nonetheless,someofmycolleaguesinrespectfullyinvitingthekindattention
ofthehonorablemembersofourCongressinthesuggestedcircumspectobservanceoftheirownrules.
Afinalremark.Ishouldliketomakeitclearthatthisopiniondoesnotnecessarilyforeclosetheright,peculiarto
anytaxpayeradverselyaffected,topursueatthepropertime,inappropriateproceedings,andinproperfora,the
specificremediesprescribedthereforbytheNationalInternalRevenueCode,RepublicAct1125,andotherlaws,
as well as rules of procedure, such as may be pertinent. Some petitions filed with this Court are, in essence,
althoughstyleddifferently,inthenatureofdeclaratoryreliefoverwhichthisCourtisbereftoforiginaljurisdiction.
Allconsidered,I,therefore,joinmycolleagueswhoarevotingforthedismissalofthepetitions.
CRUZ,J.:
It is a curious and almost incredible fact that at the hearing of these cases on July 7, 1994, the lawyers who
argued for the petitioners two of them former presidents of the Senate and the third also a member of that
bodyallaskedthisCourttolookintotheinternaloperationsoftheirChamberandcorrecttheirregularitiesthey
claimedhadbeencommittedthereaswellasintheHouseofRepresentativesandinthebicameralconference
committee.
Whileamemberofthelegislativewouldnormallyresistsuchinterventionandinvokethedoctrineofseparationof
powerstoprotectCongressfromwhathewouldcalljudicialintrusion,thesecounselpracticallyimploredtheCourt
to examine the questioned proceedings and to this end go beyond the journals of each House, scrutinize the
minutes of the committee, and investigate all other matters relating to the passage of the bill (or bills) that
eventuallybecameR.A.No.7716.
Ineffect,thepetitionerswouldhaveusdisregardthetimehonoredinhibitionslaiddownbytheCourtuponitselfin
thelandmarkcaseofU.S.v.Pons (34 Phil. 725), where it refused to consider extraneous evidence to disprove
therecitalsinthejournalsofthePhilippineLegislaturethatithadadjournedsinedieatmidnightofFebruary28,
1914.Althoughitwasgenerallyknownthenthatthespecialsessionhadactuallyexceededthedeadlinefixedby
theGovernorGeneralinhisproclamation,theCourtchosetobeguidedsolelybythelegislativejournals,holding
significantlyasfollows:
...Fromtheirverynatureandobject,therecordsofthelegislatureareasimportantasthoseofthe
judiciary,andtoinquireintotheveracityofthejournalsofthePhilippineLegislature,whentheyare,
as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic
laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions of the Legislature. But counsel in his argument says that the public knows that the
Assembly'sclockwasstoppedonFebruary28,1914,atmidnightandleftsountilthedetermination
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
of the discussion of all pending matters. Or, in other words, the hands of the clock were stayed in
order to enable the Assembly to effect an adjournment apparently within the fixed time by the
Governor's proclamation for the expiration of the special session, in direct violation of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902. If the clock was, in fact, stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant evil
might be slight as compared with that of altering the probative force and character of legislative
records, and making the proof of legislative action depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to
lossbydeathorabsence,andsoimperfectonaccountofthetreacheryofmemory.
...ThejournalssaythattheLegislatureadjournedat12midnightonFebruary28,1914.Thissettles
thequestion,andthecourtdidnoterrindecliningtogobeyondthejournals.
As one who has always respected the rationale of the separation of powers, I realize only too well the serious
implicationsoftherelaxationofthedoctrineexceptonlyfortheweightiestofreasons.Theloweringofthebarriers
nowdividingthethreemajorbranchesofthegovernmentcouldleadtoindividiousincursionsbyonedepartment
into the exclusive domains of the other departments to the detriment of the proper discharge of the functions
assignedtoeachofthembytheConstitution.
Still,whileacknowledgingthevalueoftraditionandthereasonsforjudicialnoninterferenceannouncedinPons,I
am not disinclined to take a second look at the ruling from a more pragmatic viewpoint and to tear down, if we
must,theironcurtainithashung,perhapsimprovidently,aroundtheproceedingsofthelegislature.
IampersuadedevennowthatwhereaspecificprocedureisfixedbytheConstitutionitself,itshouldnotsuffice
forCongresstosimplysaythattheruleshavebeenobservedandflatlyconsiderthematterclosed.Itdoesnot
havetobeasfinalasthat.Iwouldimaginethatthejudiciary,andparticularlythisCourt,shouldbeabletoverify
that statement and determine for itself, through the exercise of its own powers, if the Constitution has, indeed,
beenobeyed.
In fact, the Court had already said that the question of whether certain procedural rules have been followed is
justiciableratherthanpoliticalbecausewhatisinvolvedisthelegalityandnotthewisdomoftheactinquestion.
So we ruled in Sanidad v. Commission on Elections (73 SCRA 333) on the amendment of the Constitution in
Dazav.Singson(180SCRA496)onthecompositionoftheCommissiononAppointmentsandintheearliercase
ofTaadav.Cuenco(100SCRA1101)ontheorganizationoftheSenateElectoralTribunal,amongseveralother
cases.
Bythesametoken,theascertainmentofwhetherabillunderwenttheobligatorythreereadingsinbothHousesof
Congress should not be considered an invasion of the territory of the legislature as this would not involve an
inquiryintoitsdiscretioninapprovingthemeasurebutonlythemannerinwhichthemeasurewasenacted.
Theseviewsmayupsettheconservativesamonguswhoaremostcomfortablewhentheyallowthemselvestobe
petrified by precedents instead of venturing into uncharted waters. To be sure, there is much to be said of the
wisdomofthepastexpressedbyvanishedjudgestalkingtothefuture.Viatritaesttuttisima.Exceptwhenthereis
aneedtorevisethembecauseofanalteredsituationoranemergentidea,precedentsshouldtellusthat,indeed,
thetroddenpathisthesafestpath.
Itcouldbethatthealteredsituationhasarrivedtowelcometheemergentidea.ThejurisdictionofthisCourthas
been expanded by the Constitution, to possibly include the review the petitioners would have us make of the
congressionalproceedingsbeingquestioned.PerhapsitisalsotimetodeclarethattheactivitiesofCongresscan
no longer be smokescreened in the inviolate recitals of its journals to prevent examination of its sacrosanct
recordsinthenameoftheseparationofpowers.
But then again, perhaps all this is not yet necessary at this time and all these observations are but wishful
musingsforamoreactivistjudiciary.ForIfindthatthisisnotevennecessary,atleastforme,toleavethetrodden
pathinthesearchfornewadventuresinthebywaysofthelaw.Theanswerweseek,asIseeit,isnotfarafield.It
seemstomethatitcanbefoundthroughastudyoftheenrolledbillaloneandthatwedonothavetogobeyond
thatmeasuretoascertainifR.A.No.7716hasbeenvalidlyenacted.
Itissettledinthisjurisdictionthatincaseofconflictbetweentheenrolledbillandthelegislativejournals,itisthe
formerthatshouldprevailexceptonlyastomattersthattheConstitutionrequirestobeenteredinthejournals.
(Mabanagv.LopezVito,78Phil.1).Thesearetheyeasandnaysonthefinalreadingofabilloronanyquestion
attherequestofatleastonefifthofthememberoftheHouse(Constitution,Art.VI,Sec.16[4]),theobjectionsof
thePresidenttoavetoedbilloritem(Ibid,Sec.27[1]),andthenamesofthemembersvotingfororagainstthe
overridingofhisveto(Id.Section27[1]),TheoriginalofabillisnotspecificallyrequiredbytheConstitutiontobe
enteredinthejournals.Hence,onthisparticularmanner,itistherecitalsintheenrolledbillandnotinthejournals
thatmustcontrol.
ArticleVI,Section24,oftheConstitutionprovides:
Sec.24.Allappropriation,revenueortariffbills,billsauthorizingincreaseofthepublicdebt,billsof
TheenrolledbillsubmittedtoandlaterapprovedbythePresidentofthePhilippinesasR.A.No.7716wassigned
by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. It carried the following
certification over the signatures of the Secretary of the Senate and the Acting Secretary of the House of
Representatives:
This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 11630 was finally
passedbytheHouseofRepresentativeandtheSenateonApril27,1994,andMay2,1994.
LetusturntoWebsterforthemeaningofcertainwords,
To "originate" is "to bring into being to create something (original) to invent to begin start." The word
"exclusively" means "excluding all others" and is derived from the word "exclusive," meaning "not shared or
dividedsolesingle."Applyingthesemeanings,IwouldreadSection24assayingthatthebillsmentionedtherein
mustbebroughtintobeing,orcreated,orinvented,orbegunorstarted,onlyorsinglyorbynootherbodythan
thehouseofRepresentatives.
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Accordingtothecertification,R.A.No.7716"isaconsolidationofHouseBillNo.11197andSenateBillNo.1630."
Againgivingthewordsusedtheirnaturalandordinarysenseconformablytoanacceptedcanonofconstruction,I
would read the word "consolidation" as a "combination or merger" and derived from the word "consolidated,"
meaning"tocombineintoonemergeunite."
ThetwobillswereseparatelyintroducedintheirrespectiveChambers.Bothretainedtheirindependentexistence
until they reached the bicameral conference committee where they were consolidated. It was this consolidated
measurethatwasfinallypassedbyCongressandsubmittedtothePresidentofthePhilippinesforhisapproval.
HouseBillNo.11197originatedintheHouseofRepresentativesbutthiswasnotthebillthateventuallybecame
R.A.No.7716.ThemeasurethatwassignedintolawbyPresidentRamoswastheconsolidationofthatbilland
anotherbill,viz.,SenateBillNo.1630,whichwasintroducedintheSenate.Theresultantenrolledbillthusdidnot
originateexclusivelyintheHouseofRepresentatives.Theenrolledbillitselfsaysthatpartofit(anditdoesnot
mattertowhatextent)originatedintheSenate.
ItwouldhavebeendifferentiftheonlyparticipationoftheSenatewasintheamendmentofthemeasurethatwas
originally proposed in the House of Representatives. But this was not the case. The participation of the Senate
wasnotinproposingorconcurringwithamendmentsthatwouldhavebeenincorporatedinHouseBillNo.11197.
Its participation was in originating its own Senate Bill No. 1630, which was not embodied in but merged with
HouseBillNo.11197.
SenateBillNo.1630wasnotevenanamendmentbysubstitution,assumingthiswaspermissible.To"substitute"
means "to take the place of to put or use in place of another." Senate Bill No. 1630 did not, upon its approval
replace (and thus eliminate) House Bill No. 11197. Both bills retained their separate identities until they were
joinedorunitedintowhatbecametheenrolledbillandultimatelyR.A.No.7716.
The certification in the enrolled bill says it all. It is clear that R.A. No. 7716 did not originate exclusively in the
To go back to my earlier observations, this conclusion does not require the reversal of U.S. vs. Pons and an
inquirybythisCourtintotheproceedingsofthelegislaturebeyondtherecitalsofitsjournals.Allweneedtodois
considerthecertificationintheenrolledbilland,withoutenteringtheprecinctsofCongress,declarethatbythis
ownadmissionithas,indeed,notcompliedwiththeConstitution.
WhilethisCourtrespectstheprerogativesoftheotherdepartments,itwillnothesitatetorisetoitshigherdutyto
requirefromthem,iftheygoastray,fullandstrictcompliancewiththefundamentallaw.Ourfidelitytoitmustbe
total. There is no loftier principle in our democracy than the supremacy of the Constitution, to which all must
submit.
IvotetoinvalidateR.A.No.7716forviolationofArticleVI,Sec.24,oftheConstitution.
REGALADO,J.:
ItwouldseemlikeaninconceivableironythatRepublicActNo.7716which,sorespondentsclaim,wasconceived
bythecollectivewisdomofabicameralCongressandcraftedwithsedulouscarebytwobranchesofgovernment
should now be embroiled in challenges to its validity for having been enacted in disregard of mandatory
prescriptions of the Constitution itself. Indeed, such impugnment by petitioners goes beyond merely the
proceduralflawsintheparturitionofthelaw.Creatingandregulatingasitdoesdefiniterightstoproperty,butwith
itsownpassagehavingbeenviolativeofexplicitprovisionsoftheorganiclaw,evenwithoutgoingintotheintrinsic
meritsoftheprovisionsofRepublicActNo.7716itssubstantiveinvalidityisprofactonecessarilyentailed.
Howitwaslegislatedintoitspresentstatutoryexistenceisnotinseriousdisputeandneednotdetainusexcept
forarecitalofsomesalientandrelevantfacts.TheHouseofRepresentativespassedHouseBillNo.11197 1 on
third reading on November 17, 1993 and, the following day, It transmitted the same to the Senate for concurrence. On its
part,theSenateapprovedSenateBillNo.1630onsecondandthirdreadingsonMarch24,1994.Itisimportanttonotein
this regard that on March 22, 1994, said S.B. No. 1630 had been certified by President Fidel V. Ramos for immediate
enactment to meet a public emergency, that is, a growing budgetary deficit. There was no such certification for H.B. No.
11197althoughitwastheinitiatingrevenuebill.
It is, therefore, not only a curious fact but, more importantly, an invalid procedure since that Presidential
certificationwaserroneouslymadeforandconfinedtoS.B.No.1630whichwasindisputablyataxbilland,under
theConstitution,couldnotvalidlyoriginateintheSenate.WhateverisclaimedinfavorofS.B.No.1630underthe
blessings of that certification, such as its alleged exemption from the three separate readings requirement, is
accordinglynegatedandrenderedinutilebytheinefficaciousnatureofsaidcertificationasitcouldlawfullyhave
beenissuedonlyforarevenuemeasureoriginatingexclusivelyfromthelowerHouse.Toholdotherwisewouldbe
tovalidateaPresidentialcertificationofabillinitiatedintheSenatedespitetheConstitutionalprohibitionagainst
itsoriginatingtherefrom.
Equally of serious significance is the fact that S.B. No. 1630 was reported out in Committee Report No. 349
submittedtotheSenateonFebruary7,1994andapprovedbythatbody"insubstitutionofS.B.No.1129,"while
merely "taking into consideration P.S. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197." 2 S.B. No. 1630, therefore, was never filed in
substitutionofeitherP.S.No.734or,moreemphatically,ofH.B.No.11197asthesetwolegislativeissuancesweremerely
takenaccountof,atthemost,asreferentialbasesormaterials.
This is not a play on misdirection for, in the first instance, the respondents assure us that H.B. No. 11197 was
actuallythesolesourceofandstartedthewholelegislativeprocesswhichculminatedinRepublicActNo.7716.
TheparticipationoftheSenateinenactingS.B.No.1630was,itisclaimed,justifiedasitwasmerelyinpursuance
ofitspowertoconcurinorproposeamendmentstoH.B.No.11197.Citingthe83yearoldcaseofFlintvs.Stone
TracyCo., 3 it is blithely announced that such power to amend includes an amendment by substitution, that is, even the
extentofsubstitutingtheentireH.B.No.11197byanaltogethercompletelynewmeasureofSenateprovenance.Ergo,so
thejustificationgoes,theSenateactedperfectlyinaccordancewithitsamendingpowerunderSection24,ArticleVIofthe
Constitutionsinceitmerelyproposedamendmentsthroughabillallegedlypreparedinadvance.
Thisisamodeofargumentationwhich,byreasonoffactualinaccuracyandlogicalimplausibility,bothastounds
andconfounds.For,itisofofficialrecordthatS.B.No.1630wasfiled,certifiedandenactedinsubstitutionofS.B.
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No.1129whichinitselfwaslikewiseinderogationoftheConstitutionalprohibitionagainstsuchinitiationofatax
billintheSenate.Inanyevent,S.B.No.1630wasneitherintendedasabilltobeadoptedbytheSenatenortobe
referred to the bicameral conference committee as a substitute for H.B. No. 11197. These indelible facts
appearing in official documents cannot be erased by any amount of strained convolutions or incredible
pretensionsthatS.B.No.1630wassupposedlyenactedinanticipationofH.B.No.11197.
On that score alone, the invocation by the Solicitor General of the hoary concept of amendment by substitution
fallsflatonitsface.Worse,hisconcomitantcitationofFlinttorecoverfromthatpronepositiononlysucceededin
turning the same postulation over, this time supinely flat on its back. As elsewhere noted by some colleagues,
which I will just refer to briefly to avoid duplication, respondents initially sought sanctuary in that doctrine
supposedlylaiddowninFlint,thus:"Ithas,infact,beenheldthatthesubstitutionofanentirelynewmeasurefor
theoneoriginallyproposedcanbesupportedasavalidamendment."4(Emphasissupplied.)Duringtheinterpellation
bythewriterattheoralargumentheldinthesecases,theattentionoftheSolicitorGeneralwascalledtothefactthatthe
amendment in Flint consisted only of a single item, that its, the substitution of a corporate tax for an inheritance tax
proposed in a general revenue bill and that the text of the decision therein nowhere contained the supposed doctrines he
quotedandascribedtothecourt,asthoseweremerelysummationsofargumentsofcounseltherein.Itisindeedasource
ofdisappointmentforus,butanadmissionofdesperationonhispart,that,insteadofmakingaclarificationoradefenseof
hiscontention,theSolicitorGeneralmerelyreproducedalloveragain 5thesamequotationsastheyappearedinhisoriginal
consolidatedcomment,withoutventuringanyexplanationorjustification.
Theaforestateddissemblance,thusunmasked,hasfurtherundesirableimplicationsonthecontentionsadvanced
byrespondentsintheirdefense.For,evenindulgingrespondentsexgratiaargumentiintheirpretensionthatS.B.
No. 1630 substituted or replaced H.B. No. 11197, aside from muddling the issue of the true origination of the
disputedlaw,thiswouldfurtherenmeshrespondentsinahopelesscontradiction.
InapublicationauthorizedbytheSenateandfromwhichtheSolicitorGeneralhasliberallyquoted,itisreported
asanacceptedrulethereinthat"(a)namendmentbysubstitutionwhenapprovedtakestheplaceoftheprincipal
bill.C.R.March19,1963,p.943."6Statedelsewise,theprincipalbillissupplantedandgoesoutofactuality.Appliedto
the present situation, and following respondents' submission that H.B. No. 11197 had been substituted or replaced in its
entirety, then in law it had no further existence for purposes of the subsequent stages of legislation except, possibly, for
referentialdata.
Now, the enrolled bill thereafter submitted to the President of the Philippines, signed by the President of the
SenateandtheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,carriedthissolemncertificationoverthesignaturesof
the respective secretaries of both chambers: "This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and
SenateBillNo.1630wasfinallypassedbytheHouseofRepresentativesandtheSenateonApril27,1994,and
May2,1994."(Emphasismine.)Inreliancethereon,theChiefExecutivesignedthesameintolawasRepublicAct
No.7716.
The confusion to which the writer has already confessed is now compounded by that official text of the
aforequotedcertificationwhichspeaks,andthiscannotbeamerelapsuscalami,oftwoindependentandexisting
bills (one of them being H.B. No. 11197) which were consolidated to produce the enrolled bill. In parliamentary
usage,toconsolidatetwobills,istounitethemintoone7andwhich,inthecaseatbar,necessarilyassumesthatH.B.
No.11197neverbecamelegallyinexistent.ButdidnottheSolicitorGeneral,underthetheoryofamendmentbysubstitution
oftheentireH.B.No.11197byS.B.No.1630,therebypremisethesameuponthereplacement,hencethetotalelimination
fromthelegislativeprocess,ofH.B.11197?
Itresults,therefore,thattoprovecompliancewiththerequirementfortheexclusiveoriginationofH.B.No.11197,
twoalternativebutinconsistenttheorieshadtobeespousedanddefendedbyrespondents'counsel.Tojustifythe
introductionandpassageofS.B.No.1630intheSenate,itwassupposedlyenactedonlyasanamendmentby
substitution,henceonthattheoryH.B.No.11197hadtobeconsideredasdisplacedandterminatedfromitsrole
orexistence.Yet,likewiseforthesamepurposebutthistimeonthetheoryoforiginationbyconsolidation,H.B.
No.11197hadtoberesuscitatedsoitcouldbeunitedormergedwithS.B.No.1630.Thislatteralternativetheory,
unfortunately,alsoexacerbatestheconstitutionaldefectforthenitisanadmissionofadualoriginationofthetwo
taxbills,eachrespectivelyinitiatedinandcomingfromthelowerandupperchambersofCongress.
Parenthetically,itwasalsothiswriterwhopointedlybroughtthisbafflingsituationtotheattentionoftheSolicitor
Generalduringtheaforesaidoralargument,totheextentofreadingaloudthecertificationinfull.Wehadhoped
therebytobeclarifiedonthesevitalissueinrespondents'projectedmemorandum,butwehavenotbeenfavored
with an explanation unraveling this delimma. Verily, by passing sub silentio on these intriguing submissions,
respondents have wreaked havoc on both logic and law just to gloss over their noncompliance with the
Constitutional mandate for exclusive origination of a revenue bill. The procedure required therefor, we
emphatically add, can be satisfied only by complete and strict compliance since this is laid down by the
Constitutionitselfandnotbyamerestatute.
This writer consequently agrees with the clearly tenable proposition of petitioners that when the Senate passed
andapprovedS.B.No.1630,haditcertifiedbytheChiefExecutive,andthereaftercauseditsconsiderationbythe
bicameral conference committee in total substitution of H.B. No. 11197, it clearly and deliberately violated the
requirementsoftheConstitutionnotonlyintheoriginationofthebillbutintheveryenactmentofRepublicActNo.
7716.Contrarily,theshiftingsandsofinconsistencyintheargumentsadducedforrespondentsbetraysuchlack
ofintellectualrectitudeastogivetheimpressionofbeingmererhetoricsindefenseoftheindefensible.
We are told, however, that by our discoursing on the foregoing issues we are introducing into nonjusticiable
areas long declared verboten by such timehonored doctrines as those on political questions, the enrolled bill
theory and the respect due to two coequal and coordinate branches of Government, all derived from the
separationofpowersinherentinrepublicanism.Weappreciatethelectures,butwearenotexactlyunawareofthe
teachingsinU.S.vs.Pons,8Mabanag,vs.LopezVito,9 Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, etc., et al.,
10Moralsvs.Subido,etc., 11andPhilippineJudgesAssociation,etc.,etal.vs.Prado,etc.,etal., 12ontheonehand,and
Taada,etal.vs.Cuenco,etal.,13Sanidad,etal.,vs.CommissiononElections,etal.,14 and Daza vs. Singson, et al.,

15ontheother,toknowwhichwouldbeapplicabletothepresentcontroversyandwhichshouldberejected.
But,first,apositionalexordium.Thewriterofthisopinionwouldbeamongthefirsttoacknowledgeandenjoinnot
onlycourtesyto,butrespectfor,theofficialactsoftheExecutiveandLegislativedepartments,butonlysolongas
thesameareinaccordancewithoraredefensibleunderthefundamentalcharterandthestatutorylaw.Hewould
readilybenumberedintheranksofthosewhowouldpreachareasonedsermonontheseparationofpowers,but
with the qualification that the same are not contained in tripartite compartments separated by empermeable
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
membranes.HealsoascribestothegeneralvalidityofAmericanconstitutionaldoctrinesasamatterofhistorical
and legal necessity, but not to the extent of being oblivious to political changes or unmindful of the fallacy of
unduegeneralizationarisingfrommyopicdisregardofthefactualsettingofeachparticularcase.
These ruminations have likewise been articulated and dissected by my colleagues, hence it is felt that the only
issue which must be set aright in this dissenting opinion is the socalled enrolled bill doctrine to which we are
urgedtoclingwithreptiliantenacity.Itwillbepreliminarilynotedthattheofficialcertificationappearingrightonthe
face of Republic Act No. 7716 would even render unnecessary any further judicial inquiry into the proceedings
whichtranspiredinthetwolegislativechambersand,onaparodyoftricameralism,inthebicameralconference
committee. Moreover, we have the excellent dissertations of some of my colleagues on these matters, but
respondentsinsistencontra that the congressional proceedings cannot properly be inquired into by this Court.
Suchobjectionconfirmsasuppressivepatternaimedatsacrificingtheruleoflawtothefiatofexpediency.
Respondents thus emplaced on their battlements the pronouncement of this Court in the aforecited case of
PhilippineJudgesAssociationvs.Prado. 16 Their reliance thereon falls into the same error committed by their seeking
refugeintheFlintcase,ante.which,ashasearlierbeendemonstrated(asidefromthequotationalmisrepresentation),could
not be on par with the factual situation in the present case. Flint, to repeat, involved a mere amendment on a single
legislative item, that is, substituting the proposal therein of an inheritance tax by one on corporate tax. Now, in their
submissionbasedonPhilippine Judges Association, respondents studiously avoid mention of the fact that the questioned
insertionreferredlikewisetoasingleitem,thatis,therepealofthefrankingprivilegethretoforegrantedtothejudiciary.That
both cases cannot be equated with those at bar, considering the multitude of items challenged and the plethora of
constitutionalviolationsinvolved,istooobvioustobelabor.Legaladvocacyandjudicialadjudicationmusthaveabecoming
sense of qualitative proportion, instead of lapsing into the discredited and maligned practice of yielding blind adherence to
precedents.
Thewriterunqualifiedlyaffirmshisrespectforvalidofficialactsofthetwobranchesofgovernmentandeschews
any unnecessary intrusion into their operational management and internal affairs. These, without doubt, are
matters traditionally protected by the republican principle of separation of powers. Where, however, there is an
overridingnecessityforjudicialinterventioninlightofthepervasivemagnitudeoftheproblemspresentedandthe
gravity of the constitutional violations alleged, but this Court cannot perform its constitutional duty expressed in
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution unless it makes the inescapable inquiry, then the confluence of such
factorsshouldcompelanexceptiontotheruleasanultimaterecourse.Thecasesnowbeforeuspresentboth
theinevitablechallengeandtheinescapableexigencyforjudicialreview.FortheCourttonowshirkitsbounden
duty would not only project it as a citadel of the timorous and the slothful, but could even undermine its raison
d'etreasthehighestandultimatetribunal.
Hence,thisdissentingopinionhastouchedoneventsbehindandwhichtranspiredpriortothepresentationofthe
enrolledbillforapprovalintolaw.Thedetailsofthatlawwhichresultedfromthelegislativeactionfollowedbyboth
houses of Congress, the substantive validity of whose provisions and the procedural validity of which legislative
process are here challenged as unconstitutional, have been graphically presented by petitioners and admirably
explainedintherespectiveopinionsofmybrethren.Thewriterconcursintheconclusionsdrawntherefromand
rejectsthecontentionthatwehaveunjustifiablybreachedthedikeoftheenrolledbilldoctrine.
Eveninthelandofitssource,thesocalledconclusivepresumptionofvalidityoriginallyattributedtothatdoctrine
haslongbeenrevisitedandqualified,ifnotaltogetherrejected.Onthecompetencyofjudicialinquiry,ithasbeen
heldthat"(u)nderthe'enrolledbillrule'bywhichanenrolledbillissoleexpositoryofitscontentsandconclusive
evidence of its existence and valid enactment, it is nevertheless competent for courts to inquire as to what
prerequisites are fixed by the Constitution of which journals of respective houses of Legislature are required to
furnishtheevidence."17
Infact,inGwynnvs.Hardee,etc.,etal.,18theSupremeCourtofFloridadeclared:
(1)Whilethepresumptionisthattheenrolledbill,assignedbythelegislativeofficersandfiledwith
thesecretaryofstate,isthebillasitpassed,yetthispresumptionisnotconclusive,andwhenitis
shown from the legislative journals that a bill though engrossed and enrolled, and signed by the
legislativeofficers,containsprovisionsthathavenotpassedbothhouses,suchprovisionswillbeheld
spurious and not a part of the law. As was said by Mr. Justice Cockrell in the case of Wade vs.
AtlanticLumberCo.,51Fla.628,text633,41So.72,73:
ThisCourtisfirmlycommittedtotheholdingthatwhenthejournalsspeaktheycontrol,
andagainstsuchprooftheenrolledbillisnotconclusive.
MoreenlighteningandapropostothepresentcontroversyisthedecisionpromulgatedonMay13,1980bythe
SupremeCourtofKentuckyinD&WAutoSupply,etal.vs.DepartmentofRevenue,etal., 19 pertinent exceprts
wherefromareextensivelyreproducedhereunder:
...Inarrivingatourdecisionwemust,perforce,reconsiderthevalidityofalonglineofdecisionsof
thiscourtwhichcreatedandnurturedthesocalled"enrolledbill"doctrine.
xxxxxxxxx
[1] Section 46 of the Kentucky Constitution sets out certain procedures that the legislature must
followbeforeabillcanbeconsideredforfinalpassage.....
xxxxxxxxx
...UndertheenrolledbilldoctrineasitnowexistsinKentucky,acourtmaynotlookbehindsucha
bill,enrolledandcertifiedbytheappropriateofficers,todetermineifthereareanydefects.
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...InLafferty,passageofthelawinquestionviolatedthisprovision,yetthebillwasproperlyenrolled
and approved by the governor. In declining to look behind the law to determine the propriety of its
enactment,thecourtenunciatedthreereasonsforadoptingtheenrolledbillrule.First,thecourtwas
reluctant to scrutinize the processes of the legislature, an equal branch of government. Second,
reasonsofconvenienceprevailed,whichdiscouragedrequiringthelegislaturetopreserveitsrecords
and anticipated considerable complex litigation if the court ruled otherwise. Third, the court
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acknowledged the poor recordkeeping abilities of the General Assembly and expressed a
preference for accepting the final bill as enrolled, rather than opening up the records of the
legislature.....
xxxxxxxxx
Nowhere has the rule been adopted without reason, or as a result of judicial whim. There are four
historicalbasesforthedoctrine.(1)Anenrolledbillwasa"record"and,assuch,wasnotsubjectto
attack at common law. (2) Since the legislature is one of the three branches of government, the
courts,beingcoequal,mustindulgeineverypresumptionthatlegislativeactsarevalid.(3)Whenthe
rulewasoriginallyformulated,recordkeepingofthelegislatureswassoinadequatethatabalancing
of equities required that the final act, the enrolled bill, be given efficacy. (4) There were theories of
convenienceasexpressedbytheKentuckycourtinLafferty.
Theruleisnotunanimousintheseveralstates,however,andithasnotbeenwithoutitscritics.From
an examination of cases and treaties, we can summarize the criticisms as follows: (1) Artificial
presumptions, especially conclusive ones, are not favored. (2) Such a rule frequently (as in the
present case) produces results which do not accord with facts or constitutional provisions. (3) The
rule is conducive to fraud, forgery, corruption and other wrongdoings. (4) Modern automatic and
electronic recordkeeping devices now used by legislatures remove one of the original reasons for
therule.(5)Theruledisregardstheprimaryobligationofthecourtstoseekthetruthandtoprovidea
remedyforawrongcommittedbyanybranchofgovernment.Inlightoftheseconsiderations,weare
convincedthatthetimehascometoreexaminetheenrolledbilldoctrine.
[2]Thiscourtisnotunmindfuloftheadmonitionofthedoctrineofstaredecisis.Themaximis"Stare
decisisetnonquietamovere," which simply suggests that we stand by precedents and not disturb
settledpointsoflaw.Yet,thisruleisnotinflexible,norisitofsuchanatureastorequireperpetuation
of error or logic. As we stated in Daniel's Adm'r v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky 834, 155 S.W. 2d 469, 47172
(1941)(citationsomitted):
The force of the rule depends upon the nature of the question to be decided and the
extentofthedisturbanceofrightsandpracticeswhichachangeintheinterpretationof
thelaworthecourseofjudicialopinionsmaycreate.Cogentconsiderationsarewhether
thereisclearerrorandurgentreasons"forneitherjusticenorwisdomrequiresacourtto
gofromonedoubtfulruletoanother,"andwhetherornottheevilsoftheprinciplethat
hasbeenfollowedwillbemoreinjuriousthancanpossiblyresultfromachange.
Certainly,whenatheorysupportingaruleoflawisnotgroundedonfacts,oruponsoundlogic,orisunjust,orhas
beendiscreditedbyactualexperience,itshouldbediscarded,andwithittheruleitsupports.
[3] It is clear to us that the major premise of the Lafferty decision, the poor recordkeeping of the
legislature, has disappeared. Modern equipment and technology are the rule in recordkeeping by
our General Assembly. Tape recorders, electric typewriters, duplicating machines, recording
equipment,printingpresses,computers,electronicvotingmachines,andthelikeremovealldoubts
andfearsastotheabilityoftheGeneralAssemblytokeepaccurateandreadilyaccessiblerecords.
It is also apparent that the "convenience" rule is not appropriate in today's modern and developing
judicial philosophy. The fact that the number and complexity of lawsuits may increase is not
persuasiveifoneismindfulthattheoverridingpurposeofourjudicialsystemistodiscoverthetruth
and see that justice is done. The existence of difficulties and complexities should not deter this
pursuitandwerejectanydoctrineorpresumptionthatsoprovides.
Lastly, we address the premises that the equality of the various branches of government requires
that we shut our eyes to constitutional failings and other errors of our coparceners in government.
Wesimplydonotagree.Section26oftheKentuckyConstitutionprovidesthatanylawcontrarytothe
constitutionis"void."Theproperexerciseofjudicialauthorityrequiresustorecognizeanylawwhich
isunconstitutionalandtodeclareitvoid.Withoutbelaboringthepoint,webelievethatundersection
228 of the Kentucky Constitution it is our obligation to "support . . . the Constitution of the
commonwealth." We are sworn to see that violations of the constitution by any person,
corporation, state agency or branch of government are brought to light and corrected. To
countenance an artificial rule of law that silences our voices when confronted with violations of our
constitutionisnotacceptabletothiscourt.
We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one which Professor Sutherland describes as the
"extrinsicevidence"rule...Underthisapproachthereisaprimafaciepresumptionthatanenrolled
billisvalid,butsuch presumption may be overcome by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence
establishingthatconstitutionalrequirementshavenotbeenmet.
We therefore overrule Lafferty v. Huffman and all other cases following the socalled enrolled bill
doctrine,totheextentthatthereisnolongeraconclusivepresumptionthatanenrolledbillisvalid...
.(Emphasismine.)
Undeniably, the valueadded tax system may have its own merits to commend its continued adoption, and the
proposed widening of its base could achieve laudable governmental objectives if properly formulated and
conscientiouslyimplemented.Wewouldliketobelieve,however,thatoursisnotonlyanenlighteneddemocracy
nurtured by a policy of transparency but one where the edicts of the fundamental law are sacrosanct for all,
barringnone.Whiletherealizationoftheloftyendsofthisadministrationshouldindeedbethedevoutwishofall,
likewise barring none, it can never be justified by methods which, even if unintended, are suggestive of
Machiavellism.
Accordingly,IvotetogranttheinstantpetitionsandtoinvalidateRepublicActNo.7716forhavingbeenenacted
inviolationofSection24,ArticleVIoftheConstitution.
DAVIDE,JR.,J.:
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
The legislative history of R.A. No. 7716, as highlighted in the Consolidated Memorandum for the public
respondents submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General, demonstrates beyond doubt that it was passed in
violationordeliberatedisregardofmandatoryprovisionsoftheConstitutionandoftherulesofbothchambersof
Congressrelatingtotheenactmentofbills.
IthereforevotetostrikedownR.A.No.7716asunconstitutionalandashavingbeenenactedwithgraveabuseof
discretion.
The Constitution provides for a bicameral Congress. Therefore, no bill can be enacted into law unless it is
approved by both chambers the Senate and the House of Representatives (hereinafter House). Otherwise
stated,eachchambermayproposeandapproveabill,butuntilitissubmittedtotheotherchamberandpassed
bythelatter,itcannotbesubmittedtothePresidentforitsapprovalintolaw.
Paragraph2,Section26,ArticleVIoftheConstitutionprovides:
NobillpassedbyeitherHouseshallbecomealawunlessithaspassedthreereadingsonseparate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
beforeitspassage,exceptwhenthePresidentcertifiestothenecessityofitsimmediateenactmentto
meetapubliccalamityoremergency.Uponthelastreadingofabill,noamendmenttheretoshallbe
allowed,andthevotethereonshallbetakenimmediatelythereafter,andtheyeasandnaysentered
inthejournal.
The"threereadings"referstothethreereadingsinbothchambers.
Thereare,however,billswhichmustoriginateexclusivelyintheHouse.Section24,ArticleVIoftheConstitution
enumeratesthem:
Sec.24.Allappropriation,revenueortariffbills,billsauthorizingincreaseofthepublicdebt,billsof
Webster'sThirdNewInternationalDictionary1definesoriginateasfollows:
vt1:tocausethebeginningof:giveriseto:INITIATE...2.tostart(apersonorthing)onacourseor
journey...vi:totakeorhaveorigin:bederived:ARISE,BEGIN,START...
Black'sLawDictionary2definesthewordexclusivelyinthiswise:
Apart from all others only solely substantially all or for the greater part. To the exclusion of all
otherswithoutadmissionofotherstoparticipationinamannertoexclude.
InCityMayorvs.TheChiefofPhilippineConstabulary,3thisCourtsaid:
Theterm"exclusive"initsusualandgenerallyacceptedsense,meanspossessedtotheexclusionof
othersappertainingtothesubjectalone,notincluding,admittingorpertainingtoanotherorothers,
undivided,sole.(15WordsandPhrases,p.510,citingMitchelv.TulsaWater,Light,HeatandPower
Co., 95 P. 961, 21 Okl. 243 and p. 513, citing Commonwealth v. Superintendent of House of
Correction,64Pa.Super.613,615).
Indisputablythen,onlytheHousecancausethebeginningorinitiatethepassageofanyappropriation,revenue,
ortarriffbill,anybillincreasingthepublicdebt,anybilloflocalapplication,oranyprivatebill.TheSenatecanonly
"proposeorconcurwithamendments."
Under the Rules of the Senate, the first reading is the reading of the title of the bill and its referral to the
correspondingcommitteethesecondreadingconsistsofthereadingofthebillintheformrecommendedbythe
corresponding committee and the third reading is the reading of the bill in the form it will be after approval on
secondreading.4Duringthesecondreading,thefollowingtakesplace:
(1)Secondreadingofthebill
(2) Sponsorship by the Committee Chairman or any member designated by the corresponding
committee
(3)Ifadebateensues,turnsforandagainstthebillshallbetakenalternately
(4)Thesponsorofthebillclosesthedebate
(5)Afterthecloseofthedebate,theperiodofamendmentsfollows
(6)Then,aftertheperiodofamendmentsisclosed,thevotingonthebillonsecondreading.5
Afterapprovalonsecondreadings,printedcopiesthereofinitsfinalformshallbedistributedtotheMembersof
theSenateatleastthreedayspriortothethirdreading,exceptincasesofcertifiedbills.Atthethirdreading,the
finalvoteshallbetakenandtheyeasandnaysshallbeenteredintheJournal.6
Under the Rules of the House, the first reading of a bill consists of a reading of the number, title, and author
followedbythereferraltotheappropriatecommittees 7 the second reading consists of the reading in full of the bill
with the amendments proposed by the committee, it any 8 and the third reading is the reading of the bill in the form as
approved on second reading and takes place only after printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to the
Membersatleastthreedaysbefore,unlessthebillis
certified.9Atthesecondreading,thefollowingtakesplace:
(1)Readingofthebill
(2)Sponsorship
(3)Debates
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(4)PeriodofAmendmentsand
(5)VotingonSecondReading.10
Atthethirdreading,thevotesshallbetakenimmediatelyandtheyeasandnaysenteredintheJournal.11
Clearly,whetherintheSenateorintheHouse,everybillmustpassthethreereadingsonseparatedays,except
whenthebilliscertified.Amendmentstothebillonthirdreadingareconstitutionallyprohibited.12
Afteritspassagebyonechamber,thebillshouldthenbetransmittedtotheotherchamberforitsconcurrence.
Section83,RuleXIVoftheRulesoftheHouseexpresslyprovides:
Sec. 83. Transmittal to Senate. The Secretary General, without need of express order, shall
transmittotheSenateforitsconcurrenceallthebillsandjointorconcurrentresolutionsapprovedby
theHouseortheamendmentsoftheHousetothebillsorresolutionsoftheSenate,asthecasemay
be. If the measures approved without amendments are bills or resolutions of the Senate, or if
amendmentsoftheSenatetobillsoftheHouseareaccepted,heshallforthwithnotifytheSenateof
theactiontaken.
Simplified,thisrulemeansthat:
1.AstoabilloriginatingintheHouse:
(a)UponitsapprovalbytheHouse,thebillshallbetransmittedtotheSenate
(b)TheSenatemayapproveitwithorwithoutamendments
(c)TheSenatereturnsthebilltotheHouse
(d) The House may accept the Senate amendments if it does not, the Secretary
General shall notify the Senate of that action. As hereinafter be shown, a request for
conferenceshallthenbeinorder.
2.AstobillsoriginatingintheSenate
(a)UponitsapprovalbytheSenate,thebillshallbetransmittedtotheHouse
(b)TheHousemayapproveitwithorwithoutamendments
(c)TheHousethenreturnsittotheSenate,informingitoftheactiontaken
(d) The Senate may accept the House amendements if it does not, it shall notify the
Houseandmakearequestforconference.
Thetransmittedbillshallthenpassthreereadingsintheotherchamberonseparatedays.Section84,RuleXIVof
theRulesoftheHousestates:
Sec.84.BillsfromtheSenate. The bills, resolutions and communications of the Senate shall be

referredtothecorrespondingcommitteeinthesamemannerasbillspresentedbyMembersofthe
House.
andSection51,RuleXXIIIoftheRulesoftheSenateprovides:
Sec.51.Priortotheirfinalapproval,billsandjointresolutionsshallbereadatleastthreetimes.
Itisonlywhentheperiodofdisagreementisreached,i.e.,amendedproposedbyonechambertoabilloriginating
fromtheotherarenotacceptedbythelatter,thatarequestforconferenceismadeorisinorder.Therequestfor
conferenceisspecificallycoveredbySection26,RuleXIIoftheRulesoftheSenatewhichreads:
Sec. 26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the
provisionofanybillorjointresolution,thedifferencesshallbesettledbyaconferencecommitteeof
bothHouseswhichshallmeetwithintendaysafteritscomposition.
andSection85,RuleXIVoftheRulesoftheHousewhichreads:
Sec. 85. Conference Committee Reports. In the event that the House does not agree with the
Senate on the amendments to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled by
conferencecommitteesofbothChambers.
TheforegoingprovisionsoftheConstitutionandtheRulesofbothchambersofCongressaremandatory.
InhisTreatiseOntheConstitutionalLimitations,13moreparticularlyonenactmentofbill,Cooleystates:
Where, for an instance, the legislative power is to be exercised by two houses, and by settled and
wellunderstood parliamentary law these two houses are to hold separate sessions for their
deliberations, and the determination of the one upon a proposes law is to be submitted to the
separate determination of the other, the constitution, in providing for two houses, has evidently
spokeninreferencetothissettledcustom,incorporatingitasaruleofconstitutionalinterpretationso
thatitwouldrequirenoprohibitoryclausetoforbidthetwohousesfromcombininginone,andjointly
enactinglawsbythevoteofamajorityofall.Allthoseruleswhichareoftheessentialsoflawmaking
must be observed and followed and it is only the customary rules of order and routine, such as in
every deliberative body are always understood to be under its control, and subject to constant
changeatitswill,thattheconstitutioncanbeunderstoodtohaveleftasmattersofdiscretion,tobe
established, modified, or abolished by the bodies for whose government in nonessential matters
theyexist.
In respect of appropriation, revenue, or tariff bills, bills increasing the public debt, bills of local application, or
private bills, the return thereof to the House after the Senate shall have "proposed or concurred with
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
amendments"fortheformereithertoacceptorrejecttheamendmentswouldnotonlybeinconformitywiththe
foregoingrulesbutisalsoimplicitfromSection24ofArticleVI.
Withtheforegoingasourguidinglight,IshallnowshowtheviolationsoftheConstitutionandoftheRulesofthe
SenateandoftheHouseinthepassageofR.A.No.7716.
VIOLATIONSOFSECTION24,ARTICLEVI
OFTHECONSTITUTION:
Firstviolation.SinceR.A.No.7716isarevenuemeasure,itmustoriginateexclusivelyintheHousenotin
theSenate.AscorrectlyassertedbypetitionerTolentino,onthefaceoftheenrolledcopyofR.A.No.7716,itisa
"CONSOLIDATIONOFHOUSEBILLNO.11197ANDSENATEBILLNO.1630."Inshort,itisanillicitmarriageofa
bill which originated in the House and a bill which originated in the Senate. Therefore, R.A. No. 7716 did not
originateexclusivelyintheHouse.
TheonlybillwhichcouldserveasavalidbasisforR.A.No.7716isHouseBill(HB)No.11197.Thisbill,whichis
thesubstitutebillrecommendedbytheHouseCommitteeonWaysandMeansinsubstitutionofHouseBillsNos.
253, 771, 2450, 7033, 8086, 9030, 9210, 9397, 10012, and 10100, and covered by its Committee Report No.
367,14 was approved on third reading by the House on 17 November 1993. 15 Interestingly, HB No. 9210, 16 which was
filedbyRepresentativeExequielB.Javieron19May1993,wascertifiedbythePresidentinhislettertoSpeakerJosede
Venecia,Jr.of1June1993.17Yet,HBNo.11197,whichsubstitutedHBNo.9210andtheothersabovestated,wasnot.Its
certificationseemedtohavebeenentirelyforgotten.
On18November1993,theSecretaryGeneraloftheHouse,pursuanttoSection83,RuleXIVoftheRulesofthe
House, transmitted to the President of the Senate HB No. 11197 and requested the concurrence of the Senate
therewith.18
However,HBNo.11197hadpassedonlyitsfirstreadinginthatSenatebyitsreferraltoitsCommitteeonWays
and Means. That Committee never deliberated on HB No. 11197 as it should have. It acted only on Senate Bill
(SB)No.1129 19introducedbySenatorErnestoF.Herreraon1March1993.ItthenpreparedandproposedSBNo.1630,
andinitsCommitteeReportNo.
349 20 which was submitted to the Senate on 7 February 1994, 21 it recommended that SB No. 1630 be approved "in
substitutionofS.B.No.1129,takingintoconsiderationP.S.Res.No.734andH.B.No.11197."22Itmustbecarefullynoted
thatSBNo.1630wasproposedandsubmittedforapprovalbytheSenateinSUBSTITUTIONofSBNo.1129,andnotHB
No.11197.Obviously,theprincipalmeasurewhichtheCommitteedeliberatedonandacteduponwasSBNo.1129andnot
HB No. 11197. The latter, instead of being the only measure to be taken up, deliberated upon, and reported back to the
Senate for its consideration on second reading and, eventually, on third reading, was, at the most, merely given by the
Committeeapassingglance.
This specific unequivocal action of the Senate Committee on Ways and Means, i.e., proposing and
recommendingapprovalofSBNo.1630asasubstitutefororinsubstitutionofSBNo.1129demolishesatonce
thethesisoftheSolicitorGeneralthat:
AssumingthatSB1630isdistinctfromHB11197,amendmentbysubstitutioniswithinthepurviewof
Section24,ArticleVIoftheConstitution.
because,accordingtohim,(a)"Section68,RuleXXIXoftheRulesoftheSenateauthorizesanamendmentby
substitutionandtheonlyconditionrequiredisthat"thetextthereofissubmittedinwriting"and(b)"[I]nFlint vs.
StoneTracyCo.(220U.S.107)theUnitedStatedSupremeCourt,interpretingtheprovisionintheUnitedStates
ConstitutionsimilartoSection24,ArticleVIofthePhilippineConstitution,statedthatthepoweroftheSenateto
amend a revenue bill includes substitution of an entirely new measure for the one originally proposed by the
HouseofRepresentatives."23
Thisthesisisutterlywithoutmerit.Inthefirstplace,itreadsintotheCommitteeReportsomethingwhichithadnot
contemplated,thatis,toproposeSBNo.1630insubstitutionofHBNo.11197orspeculatesthattheCommittee
mayhavecommittedanerrorinstatingthatitisSBNo.1129,andnotHBNo.11197,whichistobesubstitutedby
SB No. 1630. Either, of course, is unwarranted because the words of the Report, solemnly signed by the
Chairman,ViceChairman(whodissented),sevenmembers,andthreeexofficio
members,24leavenoroomfordoubtthatalthoughSBNo.1129,P.S.ResNo.734,andHBNo.11197werereferredtoand
consideredbytheCommittee,ithadpreparedtheattachedSBNo.1630whichitrecommendsforapproval"in substitution
ofS.B.No.11197,takingintoconsiderationP.S.No.734andH.B.No.11197withSenatorsHerrera,Angara,Romulo,Sotto,
OpleandShahaniasauthors."TodoassuggestedwouldbetosubstitutethejudgmentoftheCommitteewithanotherthat
iscompletelyinconsistentwithit,or,simply,tocapriciouslyignorethefacts.
In the second place, the Office of the Solicitor General intentionally made it appear, to mislead rather than to
persuadeus,thatinFlintvs.StoneTracy
Co.25TheU.S.SupremeCourtruled,asquotedbyitintheConsolidatedMemorandumforRespondents,asfollows:26
The Senate has the power to amend a revenue bill. This power to amend is not confined to the
elimination of provisions contained in the original act, but embraces as well the addition of such
provisions thereto as may render the original act satisfactory to the body which is called upon to
support it. It has, in fact, been held that the substitution of an entirely new measure for the one
originallyproposedcanbesupportedasavalidamendment.
xxxxxxxxx
Itiscontendedinthefirstplacethatthissectionoftheactisunconstitutional,becauseitisarevenue
measure, and originated in the Senate in violation of Section 7 of article 1 of the Constitution,
providing that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the
Senatemayproposeorconcurwiththeamendments,asonotherbills."
ThefirstpartisnotastatementoftheCourt,butasummaryoftheargumentsofcounselinoneofthecompanion
cases(No.425,entitled,"Gayvs.BalticMiningCo.").Thesecondpartisthesecondparagraphoftheopinionof
the Court delivered by Mr. Justice Day. The misrepresentation that the first part is a statement of the Court is
highlycontemptuous.Toshowsuchdeliberatemisrepresentation,itiswelltoquotewhatactuallyarefoundin55
L.Ed.408,410,towit:
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
Messrs.CharlesA.SnowandJosephH.KnightfiledabriefforappelleesinNo.425:
xxxxxxxxx
The Senate has the power to amend a revenue bill. This power to amend is not confined to the
elimination of provisions contained in the original act, but embraces as well the addition of such
provisions thereto as may render the original act satisfactory to the body which is called upon to
support it. It has, in fact, been held that the substitution of an entirely new measure for the one
originallyproposedcanbesupportedasavalidamendment.
Brakev.Collison,122Fed.722.
Mr.JamesL.QuackenbushfiledastatementforappelleesinNo.442.
SolicitorGeneralLehmann(byspecialleave)arguedthecausefortheUnitedStatesonreargument.
Mr.JusticeDaydeliveredtheopinionofthecourt:
These cases involve the constitutional validity of 38 of the act of Congress approved
August5,1909,knownas"thecorporationtax"law.36Stat.atL.11,112117,chap.6,
U.S.Comp.Stat.Supp.1909,pp.659,844849.
Itiscontendedinthefirstplacethatthissectionoftheactisunconstitutional,becauseit
is a revenue measure, and originated in the Senate in violation of 7 of article 1 of the
Constitution, providing the "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with the amendments, as on
otherbills."Thehistoryoftheactiscontainedinthegovernment'sbrief,andisaccepted
ascorrect,noobjectionbeingmadetoitsaccuracy.
This statement shows that the tariff bill of which the section under consideration is a
part, originated in the House of Representatives, and was there a general bill for the
collectionofrevenue.Asoriginallyintroduced,itcontainedaplanofinheritancetaxation.
IntheSenatetheproposedtaxwasremovedfromthebill,andthecorporationtax,ina
measure, substituted therefor. The bill having properly originated in the House, we
perceive no reason in the constitutional provision relied upon why it may not be
amended in the Senate in the manner which it was in this case. The amendment was
germane to the subjectmatter of the bill, and not beyond the power of the Senate to
propose.(Emphasissupplied)
xxxxxxxxx
As shown above, the underlined portions were deliberately omitted in the quotation made by the Office of the
SolicitorGeneral.
Inthethirdplace,aSenateamendmentbysubstitutionwithanentirelynewbillofabill,whichunderSection24,
ArticleVIoftheConstitutioncanonlyoriginateexclusivelyintheHouse,isnotauthorizedbysaidSection24.Flint
vs.StoneTracyCo.cannotbeinvokedinfavorofsuchaview.AspointedoutbyMr.JusticeFlorenzD.Regalado
duringtheoralargumentsofthesecasesandduringtheinitialdeliberationsthereonbytheCourt,Flintinvolvesa
Senateamendmenttoarevenuebillwhich,undertheUnitedStatesConstitution,shouldoriginatefromtheHouse
of Representatives. The amendment consisted of the substitution of a corporation tax in lieu of the plan of
inheritance taxation contained in a general bill for the collection of revenue as it came from the House of
Representatives where the bill originated. The constitutional provision in question is Section 7, Article I of the
UnitedStatesConstitutionwhichreads:
Sec. 7. Bills and Resolutions. All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
RepresentativesbuttheSenatemayproposeorconcurwithAmendments,asonotherBills.
Thisprovision,contrarytothemisleadingclaimoftheSolicitorGeneral,isnotsimilartoSection24,ArticleVIof
ourConstitution,whichforeasycomparisonishereunderquotedagain:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Note that in the former the word exclusively does not appear. And, in the latter, the phrase "as on other Bill,"
whichisfoundintheformer,doesnotappear.Theseareverysignificantindeterminingtheauthorityoftheupper
chamberoverthebillsenumeratedinSection24.SincetheoriginationisnotexclusivelyvestedintheHouseof
RepresentativesoftheUnitedStates,theSenate'sauthoritytoproposeorconcurwithamendmentsisnecessarily
broader.Thatbroaderauthorityisfurtherconfirmedbythephrase"asonotherBills,"i.e.,itspowertoproposeor
concurwithamendmentsthereonisthesameasinordinarybills.TheabsenceofthisphraseinourConstitution
wasclearlyintendedtorestrictorlimitthePhilippineSenate'spowertoproposeorconcurwithamendments.In
thelightoftheexclusivityoforiginationandtheabsenceofthephrase"asonotherBills,"thePhilippineSenate
cannotamendbysubstitutionwithanentirelynewbillofitsownanybillcoveredbySection24ofArticleVIwhich
theHouseofRepresentativestransmittedtoitbecausesuchsubstitutionwouldindirectlyviolateSection24.
TheseobvioussubstantivedifferencesbetweenSection7,ArticleIoftheU.S.ConstitutionandSection24,Article
VIofourConstitutionareenoughreasonswhythisCourtshouldneitherallowitselftobemisledbyFlintvs.Stone
nor be awed by Rainey vs. United States 27 and the opinion of Messrs. Ogg and Ray 28 which the majority cites to
supporttheviewthatthepoweroftheU.S.Senatetoamendarevenuemeasureisunlimited.RaineyconcernstheTariffAct
of1909oftheUnitedStatesofAmericaandspecificallyinvolvedwasitsSection37whichwasanamendmentintroduced
bytheU.S.Senate.Itwasclaimedbythepetitionersthatthesaidsectionisarevenuemeasurewhichshouldoriginatein
theHouseofRepresentatives.TheU.S.SupremeCourt,however,adoptedandapprovedthefindingofthecourtaquothat:
thesectioninquestionisnotvoidasabillforraisingrevenueoriginatingintheSenate,andnotinthe
House of Representatives. It appears that the section was proposed by the Senate as an
amendmenttoabillforraisingrevenuewhichoriginatedintheHouse.Thatissufficient.
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Messrs.OggandRay,whoareprofessorsemeritusofpoliticalscience,basedtheirstatementnotevenonacase
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court but on their perception of what Section 7, Article I of the U.S. Constitution
permits.Inthetenthedition(1951)oftheirwork,theystate:
Anybillmaymakeitsfirstappearanceineitherhouse,exceptonlythatbillsforraisingrevenueare
requiredbytheconstitutionto"originate"intheHouseofRepresentatives.Indeed,throughitsrightto
amendrevenuebills,eventotheextentofsubstitutingnewones,theSenatemay,ineffect,originate
themalso.29
Their "in effect" conclusion is, of course, logically correct because the word exclusively does not appear in said
Section7,ArticleIoftheU.S.Constitution.
NeithercanIfindmyselfinagreementwiththeviewofthemajoritythattheConstitutiondoesnotprohibitthefiling
in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House so long as action by the
SenateasabodyiswithheldpendingreceiptoftheHousebill,therebystating,ineffect,thatS.B.No.1129was
suchananticipatorysubstitutebill,which,nevertheless,doesnotseemtohavebeenconsideredbytheSenate
exceptonlyafteritsreceiptofH.B.No.11179on23November1993whentheprocessoflegislationinrespectof
itbeganwithareferraltotheSenateCommitteeonWaysandMeans.Firstly,tosaythattheConstitutiondoesnot
prohibititistorendermeaninglessSection24ofArticleVIortosanctionitsblatantdisregardthroughthesimple
expedientoffilingintheSenateofasocalledanticipatorysubstitutebill.Secondly,itsuggeststhatS.B.No.1129
wasfiledasananticipatorymeasuretosubstituteforH.B.No.11179.Thisisaspeculationwhicheventheauthor
ofS.B.No.1129maynothaveindulgedin.S.B.No.1129wasfiledintheSenatebySenatorHerreraon1March
1993.H.B.No.11197wasapprovedbytheHouseonthirdreadingonlyon17November1993.Frankly,Icannot
believethatSenatorHerrerawasabletoprophesythattheHousewouldpassanyVATbill,muchlesstoknowits
provisions.That"itdoesnotseemthattheSenateevenconsidered"thelatternotuntilafteritsreceiptofH.B.No.
11179isanotherspeculation.Asstatedearlier,S.B.No.1129wasfiledintheSenateon1March1993,whileH.B.
No.11197wastransmittedtotheSenateonlyon18November1993.Thereisnoevidenceonrecordtoshowthat
bothwerereferredtotheSenateCommitteeonWaysandMeansatthesametime.Finally,inrespectofH.B.No.
11197,itslegislativeprocessdidnotbeginwithitsreferraltotheSenate'sWaysandMeansCommittee.Itbegan
uponitsfiling,asaCommitteeBilloftheHouseofCommitteeonWaysandMeans,intheHouse.
Secondviolation.SinceSBNo.1129isarevenuemeasure,itcouldnotevenbevalidlyintroducedorinitiated
intheSenate.Itfollowstoo,thattheSenatecannotvalidlyactthereon.
Thirdviolation. Since SB No. 1129 could not have been validly introduced in the Senate and could not have
been validly acted on by the Senate, then it cannot be substituted by another revenue measure, SB No. 1630,
which the Senate Committee on Ways and Means introduced in substitution of SB No. 1129. The filing or
introductionintheSenateofSBNo.1630alsoviolatedSection24,ArticleVIoftheConstitution.
VIOLATIONSOFSECTION26(2),ARTICLEVI
OFTHECONSTITUTION:
Firstviolation.TheSenate,despiteitslackofconstitutionalauthoritytoconsiderSBNo.1630orSBNo.1129
whichtheformersubstituted,openeddeliberationsonsecondreadingofSBNo.1630on8February1994.On24
March 1994, the Senate approved it on secondreading and on thirdreading. 30 That approval on the same day
violated Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. The justification therefor was that on 24 February 1994 the President
certifiedto"thenecessityoftheenactmentofSBNo.1630...tomeetapublicemergency."31
I submit, however, that the Presidential certification is void abinitio not necessarily for the reason adduced by
petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc., but because it was addressed to the Senate for a bill which is prohibited from
originatingtherein.Theonlybillwhichcouldbeproperlycertifiedonpermissibleconstitutionalgroundsevenifit
had already been transmitted to the Senate is HB No. 11197. As earlier observed, this was not so certified,
althoughHBNo.9210(oneofthoseconsolidatedintoHBNo.11197)wascertifiedon1June1993.32
Also, the certification of SB No. 1630 cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be extended to HB No. 11197
becauseSBNo.1630didnotsubstituteHBNo.11197butSBNo.1129.
Considering that the certification of SB No. 1630 is void, its approval on second and third readings in one day
violatedSection26(2),ArticleVIoftheConstitution.
Secondviolation.Itfurtherappearsthaton24June1994,aftertheapprovalofSBNo.1630,theSecretaryof
theSenate,upondirectiveoftheSenatePresident,formallynotifiedtheHouseSpeakeroftheSenate'sapproval
thereofanditsrequestforabicameralconference"inviewofthedisagreeingprovisionsofsaidbillandHouseBill
No.11197."33
ItmustbestressedagainthatHBNo.11197wasneversubmittedfororactedonsecondandthirdreadingsinthe
Senate,andSBNo.1630wasneversenttotheHouseforitsconcurrence.Elsewisestated,bothwereonlyhalf
way through the legislative mill. Their submission to a conference committee was not only anomalously
premature,butviolativeoftheconstitutionalruleonthreereadings.
The suggestion that SB No. 1630 was not required to be submitted to the House for otherwise the procedure
would be endless, is unacceptable for, firstly, it violates Section 26, Rule XII of the Rules of the Senate and
Section85,RuleXIVoftheRulesoftheHouse,and,secondly,itisneverendless.Ifthechamberoforiginrefuses
toaccepttheamendmentsoftheotherchamber,therequestforconferenceshallbemade.
VIOLATIONSOFTHERULESOFBOTHCHAMBERS
GRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETION.
The erroneous referral to the conference committee needs further discussion. Since S.B. No. 1630 was not a
substitutebillforH.B.No.11197butforS.B.No.1129,it(S.B.No.1630)remainedabillwhichoriginatedinthe
Senate. Even assuming arguendo that it could be validly initiated in the Senate, it should have been first
transmitted to the House where it would undergo three readings. On the other hand, since HB No. 11197 was
never acted upon by the Senate on second and third readings, no differences or inconsistencies could as yet
arisesoastowarrantarequestforaconference.ItshouldbenotedthatunderSection83,RuleXIVoftheRules
of the House, it is only when the Senate shall have approved with amendments HB no. 11197 and the House
declinestoaccepttheamendmentsafterhavingbeennotifiedthereofthattherequestforaconferencemaybe
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madebytheHouse,notbytheSenate.Conversely,theSenate'srequestforaconferencewouldonlybeproper
if,followingthetransmittalofSBNo.1630totheHouse,itwasapprovedbythelatterwithamendmentsbutthe
Senaterejectedtheamendments.
Indisputablythen,whentherequestforabicameralconferencewasmadebytheSenate,SBNo.1630wasnot
yet transmitted to the House for consideration on three readings and HB No. 11197 was still in the Senate
awaiting consideration on second and third readings. Their referral to the bicameral conference committee was
palpablyprematureand,insodoing,boththeSenateandtheHouseactedwithoutauthorityorwithgraveabuse
of discretion. Nothing, and absolutely nothing, could have been validly acted upon by the bicameral conference
committee.
GRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETIONCOMMITTEDBY
THEBICAMERALCONFERENCECOMMITTEE.
Serious irregularities amounting to lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion were committed by the
bicameralconferencecommittee.
First,itassumed,andtookforgrantedthatSBNo.1630couldvalidlyoriginateintheSenate.Thisassumptionis
erroneous.
Second,itassumedthatHBNo.11197andSBNo.1630hadproperlypassedbothchambersofCongressand
wereproperlyandregularlysubmittedtoit.Asearlierdiscussed,theassumptionisunfoundedinfact.
Third, per the bicameral conference committee's proceedings of 19 April 1994, Representative Exequiel Javier,
ChairmanofthepanelfromtheHouse,initiallysuggestedthatHBNo.11197shouldbethe"frameofreference,"
becauseitisarevenuemeasure,towhichSenatorErnestoMacedaconcurred.However,afteranincompletely
recordedreactionofSenatorErnestoHerrera,ChairmanoftheSenatepanel,RepresentativeJavierseemedto
agree that "all amendments will be coming from the Senate." The issue of what should be the "frame of
reference" does not appear to have been resolved. These facts are recorded in this wise, as quoted in the
ConsolidatedMemorandumforRespondents:34
CHAIRMANJAVIER.
Firstofall,whatwouldbethebasis,no,orframeworkparahuwagnamanmawalayungpersonality
namin dito sa bicameral, no, because the bill originates from the House because this is a revenue
bill, so we would just want to ask, we make the House Bill as the frame of reference, and then
everythingwilljustbeinserted?
HON.MACEDA.
Yes.That'strueforeveryrevenuemeasure.There'snootherway.TheHouseBillhasgottobethe
base. Of course, for the record, we know that this is an administration this is certified by the
President and I was about to put into the records as I am saying now that your problem about the
impactonpricesonthepeoplewasalreadydecidedwhenthePresidentandtheadministrationsent
thistousandcertifiedit.Theyhavealreadygottenoverthatpoliticalimplicationofthisbillandthe
economicimpactonprices.
CHAIRMANHERRERA.
Yungconcernmoaboutthebillasthereferenceinthisdiscussionissomethingthatwecanjust...
CHAIRMANJAVIER.
Wewilljust...alltheamendmentswillbecomingfromtheSenate.
(BICAMERAL CONFERENCE ON MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HB NO. 11197 AND SB NO.

1630[Cte.onWays&Means]APRIL19,1994,II6andII7Emphasissupplied)
These exchanges would suggest that Representative Javier had wanted HB No. 11197 to be the principal
measureonwhichreconciliationofthedifferencesshouldbebased.However,sincetheSenatedidnotactonthis
BillonsecondandthirdreadingsbecauseitsCommitteeonWaysandMeansdidnotdeliberateonitbutinstead
proposedSBNo.1630insubstitutionofSBNo.1129,thesuggestionhasnofactualbasis.Then,whenfinallyhe
agreed that "all amendments will be coming from the Senate," he in fact withdrew the former suggestion and
agreed that SB No. 1630, which is the Senate version of the Value Added Tax (VAT) measure, should be the
"frame of reference." But then SB No. 1630 was never transmitted to the House for the latter's concurrence.
Hence, it cannot serve as the "frame of reference" or as the basis for deliberation. The posture taken by
RepresentativeJavieralsoindicatesthatSBNo.1630shouldbetakenastheamendmenttoHBNo.11197.This,
too,isunfoundedbecauseSBNo.1630wasnotproposedinsubstitutionofHBNo.11197.
Since SB No. 1630 did not pass three readings in the House and HB No. 11197 did not pass second and third
readings in the Senate, it logically follows that no disagreeing provisions had as yet arisen. The bicameral
conferencecommitteeerroneouslyassumedthecontrary.
EvengrantingarguendothatbothHBNo.11197andSBNo.1630hadbeenvalidlyapprovedbybothchambers
of Congress and validly referred to the bicameral conference committee, the latter had very limited authority
thereon. It was created "in view of the disagreeing provisions of" the two bills. 35 Its duty was limited to the
reconciliation of disagreeing provisions or the resolution of differences or inconsistencies. The committee recognized that
limitedauthorityintheopeningparagraphofitsReport36whenitsaid:
TheConferenceCommitteeonthedisagreeingprovisionsofHouseBillNo.11197...andSenateBill
No.1630....
Under such limited authority, it could only either (a) restore, wholly or partly, the specific provisions of HB No.
11197 amended by SB No. 1630, (b) sustain, wholly or partly, the Senate's amendments, or (c) by way of a
compromise, to agree that neither provisions in HB No. 11197 amended by the Senate nor the latter's
amendmentstheretobecarriedintothefinalformoftheformer.
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But as pointed out by petitioners Senator Raul Roco and Kilosbayan, Inc., the bicameral conference committee
notonlystruckoutnondisagreeingprovisionsofHBNo.11197andSBNo.1630,i.e.,provisionswherebothbills
are in full agreement it added more activities or transactions to be covered by VAT, which were not within the
contemplationofbothbills.
Since both HB No. 11197 and SB No. 1630 were still halfcooked in the legislative vat, and were not ready for
referral to a conference, the bicameral conference committee clearly acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuseofdiscretionwhenitconsolidatedbothintoonebillwhichbecameR.A.No.7716.
APPROVALBYBOTHCHAMBERSOFCONFERENCE
COMMITTEEREPORTANDPROPOSEDBILLDID
NOTCURECONSTITUTIONALINFIRMITIES.
I cannot agree with the suggestion that since both the Senate and the House had approved the bicameral
conference committee report and the bill proposed by it in substitution of HB No. 11197 and SB No. 1630,
whatever infirmities may have been committed by it were cured by ratification. This doctrine of ratification may
applytominorproceduralflawsortolerablebreachsoftheparametersofthebicameralconferencecommittee's
limited powers but never to violations of the Constitution. Congress is not above the Constitution. In the instant
case,sinceSBNo.1630wasintroducedinviolationofSection24,ArticleVIoftheConstitution,waspassedinthe
Senate in violation of the "three readings" rule, and was not transmitted to the House for the completion of the
constitutional process of legislation, and HB No. 11197 was not likewise passed by the Senate on second and
thirdreadings,neithertheSenatenortheHousecouldvalidlyapprovethebicameralconferencecommitteereport
andtheproposedbill.
In view of the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable that for noncompliance with mandatory provisions of the
Constitution and of the Rules of the Senate and of the House on the enactment of laws, R.A. No. 7716 is
unconstitutionaland,therefore,nullandvoid.Adiscussionthenoftheinstrinsicvalidityofsomeofitsprovisions
wouldbeunnecessary.
The majority opinion, however, invokes the enrolled bill doctrine and wants this Court to desist from looking
behind the copy of the assailed measure as certified by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House. I
respectfully submit that the invocation is misplaced. First, as to the issue of origination, the certification in this
caseexplicitlystatesthatR.A.No.7716isa"consolidationofHouseBillNo.11197andSenateBillNo.1630."This
is conclusive evidence that the measure did not originate exclusively in the House. Second, the enrolled bill
doctrine is of American origin, and unquestioned fealty to it may no longer be justified in view of the expanded
jurisdiction 37 of this Court under Section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution which now expressly grants authority to this
Courtto:
determinewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessof
jurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityoftheGovernment.
Third,evenundertheregimeofthe1935Constitutionwhichdidnotcontaintheaboveprovision,thisCourt,
through Mr. Chief Justice Makalintal, in Astorga vs. Villegas, 38 declared that it cannot be truly said that
Mabanagvs.Lopez
Vito39haslaidtorestthequestionofwhethertheenrolledbilldoctrineorthejournalentryruleshouldbeadheredto
inthisjurisdiction,andstated:
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the
presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends
whenthebillisapprovedbybothHouses,andthecertificationdoesnotaddtothevalidityofthebill
orcureanydefectalreadypresentuponitspassage.Inotherwords,itistheapprovalofCongress
and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says
that"[e]verybillpassedbytheCongressshall,beforeitbecomeslaw,bepresentedtothePresident."
In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the
StateConstitution,saidthatthesame"makesitclearthattheindispensablestepinthepassage"and
itfollowsthatifabill,otherwisefullyenactedasalaw,isnotattestedbythepresidingofficer,other
proofthatithas"passedbothhouseswillsatisfytheconstitutionalrequirement."
Fourth,evenintheUnitedStates,theenrolledbilldoctrinehasbeensubstantiallyundercut.Thisisshowninthe
disquisitionsofMr.JusticeReynatoS.Punoinhisdissentingopinion,citingSutherland,StatutoryConstruction.
Last,thepleadingsofthepartieshaveestablishedbeyonddoubtthatHBNo.11197wasnotactedonsecondand
thirdreadingsintheSenateandSBNo.1630,whichwasapprovedbytheSenateonsecondandthirdreadingsin
substitutionofSBNo.1129,wasnevertransmittedtotheHouseforitspassage.Otherwisestated,theywereonly
passed in their respective chamber of origin but not in the other. In no way can each become a law under
paragraph2,Section26,ArticleVIoftheConstitution.FortheCourttocloseitseyestothisfactbecauseofthe
enrolledbilldoctrineistoshrinkitsdutytohold"inviolatewhatisdecreedbytheConstitution."40
IvotethentoGRANTthesepetitionsandtodeclareR.A.No.7716asunconstitutional.
ROMERO,J.:
FewissuesbroughtbeforethisCourtforresolutionhaveroiledthecitizenryasmuchastheinstantcasebrought
byninepetitionerswhichchallengestheconstitutionalityofRepublicActNo.7716(tobereferredtohereinasthe
"Expanded Value Added Tax" or EVAT law to distinguish it from Executive Order No. 273 which is the VAT law
proper)thatwasenactedonMay5,1994.Avisceralissue,ithasgalvanizedthepopulaceintomassactionand
strident protest even as the EVAT proponents have taken to podia and media in a post facto information
campaign.
TheCourtisconfrontedherewithanatypicalcase.Notonlyisitavatfulofseethingcontroversybutsomeunlikely
petitioners invoke unorthodox remedies. Three Senatorpetitioners would nullify a statute that bore the
indispensablestampofapprovaloftheirownChamberwithtwoofthempubliclyrepudiatingwhattheyhadearlier
endorsed.Withtwoformercolleagues,oneofthemanerstwhileSenatePresident,makingcommoncausewith
them, they would stay the implementation by the Executive Department of a law which they themselves have
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initiated. They address a prayer to a coequal Department to probe their official acts for any procedural
irregularities they have themselves committed lest the effects of these aberrations inflict such damage or
irreparablelossaswouldbringdownthewrathofthepeopleontheirheads.
To the extent that they perceive that a vital cog in the internal machinery of the Legislature has malfunctioned
fromhavingoperatedinblatantviolationoftheenablingRulestheyhavethemselveslaiddown,theywouldnow
plead that this other Branch of Government step in, invoking the exercise of what is at once a delicate and
awesomepower.Undoubtedly,thecaseatbenchisasmuchatestfortheLegislatureasitisfortheJudiciary.
AbackwardglanceontheValueAddedTax(VAT)isinorderatthispoint.
Thefirstcodificationofthecountry'sinternalrevenuelawswaseffectedwiththeenactmentofCommonwealthAct
No.466,commonlyknownasthe'NationalInternalRevenueCode'whichwasapprovedonJune15,1939and
tookeffectonJuly1,1939,althoughtheprovisionsontheincometaxweremaderetroactivetoJanuary1,1939.
Since1939whentheturnovertaxwasreplacedbythemanufacturer'ssalestax,theTaxCodehad
provided for a singlestage valueadded tax on original sales by manufacturers, producers and
importers computed on the "cost deduction method" and later, on the basis of the "tax credit
method."Theturnovertaxwasreintroducedin1985byPresidentialDecreeNo.1991(asamended
byPresidentialDecreeNo.2006).1
In1986,ataxreformpackagewasapprovedbytheAquinoCabinet.Itcontainedtwentyninemeasures,oneof
whichproposedtheadoptionoftheVAT,aswellasthesimplificationofthesalestaxstructureandtheabolitionof
theturnovertax.
Upuntil1987,thesystemoftaxinggoodsconsistedof(a)anexcisetaxoncertainselectedarticles
(b) fixed and percentage taxes on original and subsequent sales, on importations and on milled
articles and (c) mining taxes on mineral products. Services were subjected to percentage taxes
basedmainlyongrossreceipts.2
OnJuly25,1987,PresidentCorazonC.AquinosignedintolawExecutiveOrderNo.273whichadoptedtheVAT.
Fromtheformersinglestagevalueaddedtax,itintroducedthemultistageVATsystemwhere"thevalueadded
tax is imposed on the sale of and distribution process culminating in sale, to the final consumer. Generally
described,thetaxpayer(theseller)determineshistaxliabilitybycomputingthetaxonthegrosssellingpriceor
grossreceipt("outputtax")andsubtractingorcreditingtheearlierVATonthepurchaseorimportationofgoodsor
onthesaleofservice("inputtax")againstthetaxdueonhisownsale."3
On January 1, 1988, implementing rules and regulations for the VAT were promulgated. President Aquino then
issued Proclamation No. 219 on February 12, 1988 urging the public and private sectors to join the nationwide
consumers'educationcampaignforVAT.
SoonaftertheimplementationofExecutiveOrderNo.273,itsconstitutionalitywasassailedbeforethisCourtin
the case of Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc., et al. v. Tan. 4 The four petitioners
sought to nullify the VAT law "for being unconstitutional in that its enactment is not allegedly within the powers of the
PresidentthattheVATisoppressive,discriminatory,regressive,andviolatesthedueprocessandequalprotectionclauses
andotherprovisionsofthe1987Constitution."5Indismissingtheconsolidatedpetitions,thisCourtstated:
The Court, following the timehonored doctrine of separation of powers cannot substitute its
judgmentforthatofthePresidentastothewisdom,justiceandadvisabilityoftheVAT.TheCourtcan
only look into and determine whether or not Executive Order No. 273 was enacted and made
effective as law, in the manner required by and consistent with, the Constitution, and to make sure
thatitwasnotissuedingraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictionand,in
thisregard,theCourtfindsnoreasontoimpedeitsapplicationorcontinuedimplementation.6
Althoughdeclaredconstitutional,theVATlawwassoughttobeamendedfrom1992onbyaseriesofbillsfiledin
bothHousesofCongress.Inchronologicalsequence,thesewere:
HB/SBNo.DateFiledinCongress
HBNo.253July22,1992
HBNo.771August10,1992
HBNo.2450September9,1992
SenateRes.No.7347September10,1992
HBNo.7033February3,1993
SBNo.11298March1,1993
HBNo.8086March9,1993
HBNo.9030May11,1993
HBNo.92109May19,1993
HBNo.9297May25,1993
HBNo.10012July28,1993
HBNo.11197insubstitutionofHBNos.253,771,2450,7033,8086,9030,9210,9297,
10012and
1010010November5,1993
WenowtracethecoursetakenbyH.B.No.11197andS.B.No.1129.
HB/SBNo.
HBNo.11197wasapprovedintheLowerHouseonsecondreadingNovember11,
1993
HBNo.11197wasapprovedin
theLowerHouseonthird
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readingandvotedupon
with114Yeasand12NaysNovember17,1993
HBNo.11197wastransmitted
totheSenateNovember18,1993
SenateCommitteeonWaysand
MeanssubmittedCom.
ReportNo.349recommeding
forapprovalSBNo.1630in
substitutionofSBNo.1129,
takingintoconsiderationPSRes.No.
734andHBNo.1119711February7,1994
CertificationbyPresidentFidelV.
RamosofSenateBillNo.
1630forimmediateenactment
tomeetapublicemergencyMarch22,1994
SBNo.1630wasapprovedby
theSenateonsecondandthird
readingsandsubsequently
voteduponwith13yeas,none
againstandoneabstentionMarch24,1994
TransmittalbytheSenatetothe
LowerHouseofarequest
foraconferenceinviewof
disagreeingprovisionsof
SBNo.1630andHBNO.
11197March24,1994
TheBicameralConferenceCommittee
conductedvariousmeetingsto
reconciletheproposalsonthe
VATApril13,19,20,21,25
TheHouseagreedontheConference
CommitteeReportApril27,1994
TheSenateagreedontheConference
CommitteeReportMay2,1994
ThePresidentsignedRepublicAct
No.7716TheExpanded
VATLaw12May5,1994
RepublicActNo.7716was
publishedintwonewspapers
ofgeneralcirculationMay12,1994
RepublicActNo.7716became
effectiveMay28,1994
Republic Act No. 7716 merely expanded the base of the VAT law even as the tax retained its multistage
character.
AttheoralhearingheldonJuly7,1994,thisCourtdelimitedpetitioners'argumentstothefollowingissuesculled
fromtheirrespectivepetitions.
PROCEDURALISSUES
DoesRepublicActNo.7716violateArticleVI,Section24,oftheConstitution?13
DoesitviolateArticleVI,Section26,paragraph2,ofthe
Constitution?14
WhatistheextentofthepoweroftheBicameralConferenceCommittee?
SUBSTANTIVEISSUES
DoesthelawviolatethefollowingprovisionsinArticleIII(BillofRights)oftheConstitution:
1.Section115
2.Section416
3.Section517
4.Section1018
DoesthelawviolatethefollowingotherprovisionsoftheConstitution?
1.ArticleVI,Section28,paragraph119
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AsaresultoftheunedifyingexperienceofthepastwheretheCourthadthepropensitytosteerclearofquestions
itperceivedtobe"political"innature,thepresentConstitution,incontrast,hasexplicitlyexpandedjudicialpower
to include the duty of the courts, especially the Supreme Court, "to determine whether or not there has been a
graveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentality
of the Government." 21 I submit that under this explicit mandate, the Court is empowered to rule upon acts of other
Government entities for the purpose of determining whether there may have been, in fact, irregularities committed
tantamounttoviolationoftheConstitution,whichcasewouldclearlyconstituteagraveabuseofdiscretionontheirpart.
In the words of the sponsor of the abovequoted Article of the Constitution on the Judiciary, the former Chief
Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, "the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of
governmentoranyofitsofficialshasactedwithoutjurisdictionorinexcessofjurisdiction,orsocapriciouslyasto
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a
judicialpowerbutadutytopassjudgmentonmattersofthisnature.
This is the back ground of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter exhibit its
wontedreticencebyclaimingthatsuchmattersconstituteapoliticalquestion."22
Intheinstantpetitions,thisCourtiscalledupon,notsomuchtoexerciseitstraditionalpowerofjudicialreviewas
to determine whether or not there has indeed been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Legislature
amountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction.
Where there are grounds to resolve a case without touching on its constitutionality, the Court will do so with
utmost alacrity in due deference to the doctrine of separation of powers anchored on the respect that must be
accorded to the other branches of government which are coordinate, coequal and, as far as practicable,
independentofoneanother.
Onceitispalpablethattheconstitutionalissueisunavoidable,thenitistimetoassumejurisdiction,providedthat
the following requisites for a judicial inquiry are met: that there must be an actual and appropriate case a
personalandsubstantialinterestofthepartyraisingtheconstitutionalquestiontheconstitutionalquestionmust
beraisedattheearliestpossibleopportunityandthedecisionoftheconstitutionalquestionmustbenecessaryto
thedeterminationofthecaseitself,thesamebeingthelismotaofthecase.23
Havingassuredourselvesthattheabovecitedrequisitesarepresentintheinstantpetitions,weproceedtotake
themup.
ARTICLEVI,SECTION24
SomepetitionersassailtheconstitutionalityofRepublicActNo.7716asbeinginviolationofArticleVI,Section24
oftheConstitutionwhichprovides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
InG.R.Nos.115455and115781,petitionersargue:
(a) The bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives.
The Senate, after receiving H.B. No. 11197, submitted its own bill, S.B. No. 1630, and proceeded to vote and
approvethesameaftersecondandthirdreadings.
(b)TheSenateexceededitsauthorityto"proposeorconcurwithamendments"whenitsubmitteditsownbill,S.B.
No.1630,recommendingitsapproval"insubstitutionofS.B.No.1129,takingintoconsiderationP.S.Res.No.734
andH.B.No.11197."
(c)H.B.No.11197wasnotdeliberateduponbytheSenate.NeitherwasitvoteduponbytheSenateonsecond
andthirdreadings,aswhatwasvoteduponwasS.B.No.1630.
ArticleVI,Section24istakenwordforwordfromArticleVI,Section18ofthe1935Constitutionwhichwas,inturn,
patternedafterArticleI,Section7(1)oftheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,whichstates:
All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may
proposeorconcurwithamendmentsasonotherbills.
The historical precedent for requiring revenue bills to originate in Congress is explained in the U.S. case of
Morganv.Murray.24
The constitutional requirement that all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of
RepresentativesstemmedfromaremedialoutgrowthofthehistoricconflictbetweenParliament(i.e.,
Commons) and the Crown, whose ability to dominate the monarchially appointive and hereditary
Lords was patent. See 1 Story, Constitution, S 875 et seq., 5th Ed. 1 Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations,pp.267,268,8thEd.,1Sutherland,StatutoryConstruction,S806,3dEd.Therewasa
measure of like justification for the insertion of the provision of article I, S 7, cl. 1, of the Federal
Constitution. At that time (1787) and thereafter until the adoption (in 1913) of the Seventeenth
Amendment providing for the direct election of senators, the members of the United States Senate
were elected for each state by the joint vote of both houses of the Legislature of the respective
states,andhence,wereremovedfromthepeople...
The legislative authority under the 1935 Constitution being unicameral, in the form of the National Assembly, it
servednopurposetoincludethesubjectprovisioninthedraftsubmittedbythe1934ConstitutionalConventionto
theFilipinopeopleforratification.
In1940,however,theConstitutionwasamendedtoestablishabicameralCongressofthePhilippinescomposed
ofaHouseofRepresentativesandaSenate.
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Inthewakeofthecreationofanewlegislativemachinery,newprovisionswereenactedregardingthelawmaking
power of Congress. The National Assembly explained how the final formulation of the subject provision came
about:
The concurrence of both houses would be necessary to the enactment of a law. However, all
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, bills of local
application,andprivatebills,shouldoriginateexclusivelyintheHouseofRepresentatives,although
theSenatecouldproposeorconcurwithamendments.
In one of the first drafts of the amendments, it was proposed to give both houses equal powers in
lawmaking.Therewas,however,muchoppositiononthepartofseveralmembersoftheAssembly.
In another draft the following provision, more restrictive than the present provision in the
amendment,wasproposedandforsometimewasseriouslyconsidered:
All bills appropriating public funds, revenue or tariff bills, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the Assembly, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments. In case of disapproval by the Senate of any such bills, the
Assemblymayrepassthesamebyatwothirdsvoteofallitsmembers,andthereupon,
thebillsorepassedshallbedeemedenactedandmaybesubmittedtothePresidentfor
correspondingaction.IntheeventthattheSenateshouldfailtofinallyactonanysuch
bills,theAssemblymay,afterthirtydaysfromtheopeningofthenextregularsessionsof
the same legislative term, reapprove the same with a vote of twothirds of all the
membersoftheAssembly.Anduponsuchreapproval,thebillshallbedeemedenacted
andmaybesubmittedtothepresidentforcorrespondingaction.
However, the special committee voted finally to report the present amending provision as it is now
wordedandinthatformitwasapprovedbytheNationalAssemblywiththeapprovalofResolution
No.38andlaterofResolutionNo.73.25(Emphasissupplied)
Thus,thepresentConstitutionisidenticallywordedasits1935precursor:"Allappropriation,revenueortariffbills,
billsauthorizingincreaseofthepublicdebt,billsoflocalapplication,andprivatebills,shalloriginateexclusivelyin
theHouseofRepresentatives,buttheSenatemayproposeorconcurwithamendments."(Emphasissupplied)
That all revenue bills, such as Republic Act No. 7716, should "originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives"logicallyflowsfromthemorerepresentativeandbroadlybasedcharacterofthisChamber.
ItissaidthattheHouseofRepresentativesbeingthemorepopularbranchofthelegislature,being
closertothepeople,andhavingmorefrequentcontactswiththemthantheSenate,shouldhavethe
privilege of taking the initiative in the proposals of revenue and tax project, the disposal of the
people'smoney,andthecontractingofpublicindebtedness.
These powers of initiative in the raising and spending of public funds enable the House of
Representatives not only to implement but even to determine the fiscal policies of the government.
They place on its shoulders much of the responsibility of solving the financial problems of the
government,whicharesocloselyrelatedtotheeconomiclifeofthecountry,andofdecidingonthe
properdistributionofrevenuesforsuchusesasmaybestadvancepublicinterests.26
ThepopularnatureoftheLowerHousehasbeenmorepronouncedwiththeinclusionofPresidentiallyappointed
sectoral representatives, as provided in Article VI, Section 5 (2), of the Constitution, thus: "The partylist
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under
thepartylist.ForthreeconsecutivetermsaftertheratificationofthisConstitution,onehalfoftheseatsallocated
to partylist representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant,
urbanpoor,indigenousculturalcommunities,women,youth,andsuchothersectorsasmaybeprovidedbylaw,
exceptthereligioussector."(Emphasissupplied)
This novel provision which was implemented in the Batasang Pambansa during the martial law regime 27 was
eventuallyincorporatedinthepresentConstitutioninordertogivethosefromthemarginalizedandoftendeprivedsector,an
opportunitytohavetheirvoicesheardinthehallsoftheLegislature,thusgivingsubstanceandmeaningtotheconceptof
"peopleempowerment."
That the Congressmen indeed have access to, and consult their constituencies has been demonstrated often
enough by the fact that even after a House bill has been transmitted to the Senate for concurrence, some
Congressmen have been known to express their desire to change their earlier official position or reverse
themselvesafterhavingheardtheirconstituents'adversereactionstotheirrepresentations.
In trying to determine whether the mandate of the Constitution with regard to the initiation of revenue bills has
been preserved inviolate, we have recourse to the tried and tested method of definition of terms. The term
"originate"isdefinedbyWebster'sNewInternationalDictionary(3rdEdition,1986)asfollows:"v.i., to come into
beingbegintostart."
Ontheotherhand,theword"exclusively"isdefinedbythesameWebster'sDictionaryas"inanexclusivemanner
totheexclusionofallothersonlyas,itishis,exclusively."Black'sLawDictionaryhasthisdefinition:"apartfrom
allothersonlysolelysubstantiallyallorforthegreaterpart.Totheexclusionofallotherwithoutadmissionof
others to participation in a manner to exclude. Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. State, Tex. Civ. App., 142 S.W. 2d
519,521,522,523."
ThisCourthadoccasiontodefinetheterm"exclusive"asfollows:
...Initsusualandgenerallyacceptedsense,thetermmeanspossessedtotheexclusionofothers
appertaining to the subject alone not including, admitting or pertaining to another or others
undivided,sole.28
Whenthiswriter,duringtheoralargumentofJuly7,1994,askedthepetitionerinG.R.No.115455whetherhe
considerstheword"exclusively"tobesynonymouswith"solely,"herepliedintheaffirmative.29
A careful examination of the legislative history traced earlier in this decision shows that the original VAT law,
ExecutiveOrderNo.273,wassoughttobeamendedbytenHousebillswhichfinallyculminatedinHouseBillNo.
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
11197,aswellastwoSenatebills.ItistobenotedthatthefirstHouseBillNo.253wasfiledonJuly22,1992,and
two other House bills followed in quick succession on August 10 and September 9, 1992 before a Senate
Resolution,namely,SenateRes.No.734,wasfiledonSeptember10,1992andmuchlater,aSenateBillproper,
viz.,SenateBillNo.1129onMarch1,1993.Undoubtedly,therefore,thesebillsoriginatedorhadtheirstartinthe
HouseandbeforeanySenatebillamendingtheVATlawwasfiled.Inpointoftimeandvenue,theconclusionis
ineluctable that Republic Act No. 7716, which is indisputably a revenue measure, originated in the House of
RepresentativesintheformofHouseBillNo.253,thefirstEVATbill.
Additionally,thecontentandsubstanceofthetenamendatoryHouseBillsfiledovertheroughlyoneyearperiod
fromJuly1992toAugust1993reenforcethepositionthattheserevenuebills,pertainingastheydo,toExecutive
OrderNo.273,theprevailingVATlaw,originatedintheLowerHouse.
HouseBillNos.253,771,2450,7033,8086,9030,9210,9297,10012and10100wereintendedtorestructure
the VAT system by exempting or imposing the tax on certain items or otherwise introducing reforms in the
mechanicsofimplementation. 30Ofthese,HouseBillNo.9210wasfavoredwithaPresidentialcertificationontheneed
for its immediate enactment to meet a public emergency. Easily the most comprehensive, it noted that the revenue
performance of the VAT, being far from satisfactory since the collections have always fallen short of projections, "the
system is rendered inefficient, inequitable and less comprehensive." Hence, the Bill proposed several amendments
designedtowidenthetaxbaseoftheVATandenhanceitsadministration.31
ThatHouseBillNo.11197beingarevenuebill,originatedfromtheLowerHousewasacknowledged,infactwas
virtually taken for granted, by the Chairmen of the Committee on Ways and Means of both the House of
Representatives and the Senate. Consequently, at the April 19, 1994 meeting of the Bicameral Conference
Committee,theMembersagreedtomaketheHouseBillasthe"frameofreference"or"base"ofthediscussions
oftheBicameralConferenceCommitteewiththe"amendments"or"insertionstoemanatefromtheSenate."32
AstowhetherthebillsoriginatedexclusivelyintheLowerHouseisaltogetheradifferentmatter.Obviously,bills
amendatoryofVATdidnotoriginatesolelyintheHousetotheexclusionofallothersfortherewereP.S.Res.No.
734 filed in the Senate on September 10, 1992 followed by Senate Bill No. 1129 which was filed on March 1,
1993. About a year later, this was substituted by Senate Bill No. 1630 that eventually became the EVAT law,
namely,RepublicActNo.7716.
Adverting to the passage of the amendatory VAT bills in the Lower House, it is to be noted that House Bill No.
11197whichsubstitutedallthepriorbillsintroducedinsaidHousecompliedwiththerequiredreadings,thatis,the
firstreadingconsistingofthereadingofthetitleandreferraltotheappropriateCommittee,approvalonsecond
readingonNovember11,1993andonthirdreadingonNovember17,1993beforebeingfinallytransmittedtothe
Senate. In the Senate, its identity was preserved and its provisions were taken into consideration when the
SenateCommitteeonWaysandMeanssubmittedCom.ReportNo.349whichrecommendedforapproval"S.B.
No.1630insubstitutionofS.B.No.1129,takingintoconsiderationP.S.Res.No.734andH.B.No.11197."Atthis
stage,thesubjectbillmaybeconsideredtohavepassedfirstreadingintheSenatewiththesubmissionofsaid
CommitteeReportNo.349bytheSenateCommitteeonWaysandMeanstowhichithadbeenreferredearlier.
What remained, therefore, was no longer House Bill No. 11197 but Senate Bill No. 1630. Thence, the Senate,
insteadoftransmittingthebilltotheLowerHouseforitsconcurrenceandamendments,ifany,tooka"shortcut,"
bypassedtheLowerHouseandinstead,approvedSenateBillNo.1630onbothsecondandthirdreadingsonthe
sameday,March24,1994.
Thefirstirregularity,thatis,thefailuretoreturnSenateBillNo.1630totheLowerHouseforitsapprovalisfatal
inasmuchastheotherchamberoflegislaturewasnotaffordedtheopportunitytodeliberateandmakeknownits
views.ItisnoidledictumthatnolessthantheConstitutionordains:"Thelegislativepowershallbevestedinthe
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives . . ." 33 (Emphasis
supplied)
Itistobepointedouttoo,thatinasmuchasSenateBillNo.1630whichhad"takenintoconsideration"HouseBill
No.11197wasnotreturnedtotheLowerHousefordeliberation,thelatterChamberhadnoopportunityatallto
express its views thereon or to introduce any amendment. The customary practice is, after the Senate has
consideredtheLowerHouseBill,itreturnsthesametotheHouseoforiginwithitsamendments.Intheeventthat
there may be any differences between the two, the same shall then be referred to a Conference Committee
composedofmembersfrombothChamberswhichshallthenproceedtoreconcilesaiddifferences.
In the instant case, the Senate transmitted to the Lower House on March 24, 1994, a letter informing the latter
thatithad"passedS.No.1630
entitled . . . (and) in view of the disagreeing provisions of said bill and House Bill No. 11197, entitled . . . the
Senaterequestsaconference..."This,inspiteofthefactthatCom.ReportNo.349oftheSenateCommitteeon
Ways and Means had already recommended for approval on February 7, 1994 "S.B. No. 1630 . . . taking into
consideration H.B. No. 11197." Clearly, the Conference Committee could only have acted upon Senate Bill No.
1630,forHouseBillNo.11197hadalreadybeenfusedintotheformer.
AttheoralhearingofJuly7,1994,petitionerinG.R.No.115455admitted,inresponsetothiswriter'squery,that
hehadattemptedtorectifysomeoftheperceivedirregularitiesbypresentingamotionintheSenatetorecallthe
billfromtheConferenceCommitteesothatitcouldreverttotheperiodofamendment,buthewasoutvoted,in
fact"slaughtered."34
InaccordancewiththeRulesoftheHouseofRepresentativesandtheSenate,RepublicActNo.7716wasduly
authenticatedafteritwassignedbythePresidentoftheSenateandtheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives
followed by the certifications of the Secretary of the Senate and the Acting Secretary General of the House of
Representatives. 35 With the signature of President Fidel V. Ramos under the words "Approved: 5 May 1994," it was
finallypromulgated.
Itslegislativejourneyended,RepublicActNo.7716attainedthestatusofanenrolledbillwhichisdefinedasone
"whichhasbeendulyintroduced,finallypassedbybothhouses,signedbytheproperofficersofeach,approved
bythegovernor(orpresident)andfiledbythesecretaryofstate."36
Stateddifferently:
Itisadeclarationbythetwohouses,throughtheirpresidingofficers,tothepresident,thatabill,thus
attested,hasreceivedindueform,thesanctionofthelegislativebranchofthegovernment,andthat
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
itisdeliveredtohiminobediencetotheconstitutionalrequirementthatallbillswhichpassCongress
shallbepresentedtohim.Andwhenabill,thusattested,receiveshisapproval,andisdepositedin
thepublicarchives,itsauthenticationasabillthathaspassedCongressshouldbedeemedcomplete
andunimpeachable.AsthePresidenthasnoauthoritytoapproveabillnotpassedbyCongress,an
enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the
SpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,ofthePresidentoftheSenate,andofthePresidentofthe
UnitedStates,carries,onitsface,asolemnassurancebythelegislativeandexecutivedepartments
of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it
was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the
judicialdepartmenttoactuponthatassurance,andtoaccept,ashavingpassedCongress,allbills
authenticated in the manner stated leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly
arises,whethertheAct,soauthenticated,isinconformitywiththeConstitution.37
Theenrolledbillassumesimportancewhenthereissomevariancebetweenwhatactuallytranspiredinthehalls
ofCongress,asreflectedinitsjournals,andasshowninthetextofthelawasfinallyenacted.Butsupposethe
journalsofeitherorbothHousesfailtodisclosethatthelawwaspassedinaccordancewithwhatwascertifiedto
by their respective presiding officers and the President. Or that certain constitutional requirements regarding its
passagewerenotobserved,asintheinstantcase.Whichshallprevail:thejournalortheenrolledbill?
Awordonthejournal.
The journal is the official record of the acts of a legislative body. It should be a true record of the
proceedingsarrangedinchronologicalorder.Itshouldbearecordofwhatisdoneratherthanwhat
issaid.Thejournalshouldbeaclear,concise,unembellishedstatementofallproposalsmadeand
all actions taken complying with all requirements of constitutions, statutes, charters or rules
concerningwhatistoberecordedandhowitistoberecorded.38
ArticleVI,Section16(4)oftheConstitutionordains:
Each house shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same,
exceptingsuchpartsasmay,initsjudgment,affectnationalsecurityandtheyeasandnaysonany
questionshall,attherequestofonefifthoftheMemberspresent,beenteredintheJournal.
EachHouseshallalsokeepaRecordofitsproceedings."(Emphasissupplied)
Therationalebehindtheaboveprovisionandofthe"journalentryrule"isasfollows:
Itisapparentthattheobjectofthisprovisionistomakethelegislatureshowwhatithasdone,leaving
nothingwhatevertoimplication.And,whenthelegislaturesayswhatithasdone,withregardtothe
passage of any bill, it negatives the idea that it has done anything else in regard thereto. Silence
provesnothingwhereoneiscommandedtospeak....Ourconstitutioncommandscertainthingsto
be done in regard to the passage of a bill, and says that no bill shall become a law unless these
thingsaredone.Itseemsatravestyuponoursupremelawtosaythatitguarantiestothepeoplethe
righttohavetheirlawsmadeinthismanneronly,andthatthereisnowayofenforcingthisright,or
forthecourttosaythatthisislawwhentheconstitutionsaysitisnotlaw.Thereisonesafecourse
whichisinharmonywiththeconstitution,andthatistoadheretotherulethatthelegislaturemust
show,ascommandedbytheconstitution,thatithasdoneeverythingrequiredbytheconstitutionto
bedoneintheseriousandimportantmatterofmakinglaws.Thisistheruleofevidenceprovidedby
theconstitution.Itisnotpresumptuousinthecourts,nordisrespectfultothelegislature,tojudgethe
actsofthelegislaturebyitsownevidence.39
Confronted with a discrepancy between the journal proceedings and the law as duly enacted, courts have
indulgedindifferenttheories.The"enrolledbill"and"journalentry"rules,beingrooteddeepintheParliamentary
practicesofEnglandwherethereisnowrittenconstitution,andthentransplantedtotheUnitedStates,itmaybe
instructivetoexaminewhichruleprevailsinthelattercountrythroughwhich,byaprocessoflegislativeosmosis,
weadoptedtheminturn.
Thereseemstobethreedistinctanddifferentrulesasapplicabletotheenrolledbillrecognizedby
the various courts of this country. The first of these rules appears to be that the enrolled bill is the
ultimate proof and exclusive and conclusive evidence that the bill passed the legislature in
accordancewiththeprovisionsoftheConstitution.SuchhasbeentheholdinginCalifornia,Georgia,
Kentucky, Texas, Washington, New Mexico, Mississippi, Indiana, South Dakota, and may be some
others.
Thesecondoftherulesseemstobethattheenrolledbillisaverityandresortcannotbehadtothe
journals of the Legislature to show that the constitutional mandates were not complied with by the
Legislature, except as to those provisions of the Constitution, compliance with which is expressly
required to be shown on the journal. This rule has been adopted in South Carolina, Montana,
Oklahoma,Utah,Ohio,NewJersey,UnitedStatesSupremeCourt,andothers.
Thethirdoftherulesseemstobethattheenrolledbillraisesonlyaprimafaciepresumptionthatthe
mandatoryprovisionsoftheConstitutionhavebeencompliedwithandthatresortmaybehadtothe
journalstorefutethatpresumption,andiftheconstitutionalprovisionisone,compliancewithwhichis
expressly required by the Constitution to be shown on the journals, then the mere silence of the
journalstoshowacompliancetherewithwillrefutethepresumption.Thisrulehasbeenadoptedin
Illinois, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, Arkansas, Idaho, Minnesota, Nebraska, Arizona,
Oregon,NewJersey,Colorado,andothers.40
In the 1980 case of D & W Auto Supply v. Department of Revenue, the Supreme Court of Kentucky which had
subscribedinthepasttothefirstofthethreetheories,madethepronouncementthatithadshifteditsstandand
wouldhenceforthadoptthethird.Itjustifieditschangedstance,thus:
We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one which Professor Sutherland describes as the
"extrinsicevidence"rule....Underthisapproachthereisaprimafaciepresumptionthatanenrolled
bill is valid, but such presumption may be overcome by clear satisfactory and convincing evidence
establishingthatconstitutionalrequirementshavenotbeenmet.41
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
Whatrule,ifany,hasbeenadoptedinthisjurisdiction?
Advocatesofthe"journalentryrule"citethe1916decisioninU.S.v.Pons42wherethisCourtplacedrelianceonthe
legislative journals to determine whether Act No. 2381 was passed on February 28, 1914 which is what appears in the
Journal, or on March 1, 1914 which was closer to the truth. The confusion was caused by the adjournment sine die at
midnightofFebruary28,1914ofthePhilippineCommission.
A close examination of the decision reveals that the Court did not apply the "journal entry rule" visavis the
"enrolledbillrule"buttheformerasagainstwhatare"behindthelegislativejournals."
Passing over the question of whether the printed Act (No. 2381), published by authority of law, is
conclusive evidence as to the date when it was passed, we will inquire whether the courts may go
behind the legislative journals for the purpose of determining the date of adjournment when such
journalsareclearandexplicit.43
ItistobenotedfromtheabovethattheCourt"passedover"theprobativevaluetobeaccordedtotheenrolled
bill.
Optingforthejournals,theCourtproceededtoexplain:
From their very nature and object, the records of the Legislature are as important as those of the
judiciary,andtoinquireintotheveracityofthejournalsofthePhilippineLegislature,whentheyare,
aswehavesaidclearandexplicit,wouldbetoviolateboththeletterandthespiritoftheorganiclaws
by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functionsoftheLegislature.44
FollowingthecourtsintheUnitedStatessincetheConstitutionofthePhilippineGovernmentismodeledafterthat
of the Federal Government, the Court did not hesitate to follow the courts in said country, i.e., to consider the
journalsdecisiveofthepointatissue.Thus:"ThejournalssaythattheLegislatureadjournedat12midnighton
February28,1914.Thissettlesthequestionandthecourtdidnoterrindecliningtogobehindthesejournals."45
TheCourtmadeacategoricalstandforthe"enrolledbillrule"forthefirsttimeinthe1947caseofMabanag v.
LopezVito46whereitheldthatanenrolledbillimportsabsoluteverityandisbindingonthecourts.ThisCourthelditself
bound by an authenticated resolution, despite the fact that the vote of threefourths of the Members of the Congress (as
required by the Constitution to approve proposals for constitutional amendments) was not actually obtained on account of
the suspension of some members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. In this connection, the Court invoked
the "enrolled bill rule" in this wise: "If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political
departments,adulycertifiedlaworresolutionalsobindsthejudgesunderthe'enrolledbillrule'bornofthatrespect."47
MindfulthattheU.S.SupremeCourtisonthesideofthosewhofavortheruleandfornootherreasonthanthatit
conforms to the expressed policy of our law making body (i.e., Sec. 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as
amendedbyActNo.2210),theCourtsaidthat"dulycertifiedcopiesshallbeconclusiveproofoftheprovisionsof
suchActsandofthedueenactmentthereof."WithoutpullingthelegalunderpinningsfromU.S.v.Pons,itjustified
its position by saying that if the Court at the time looked into the journals, "in all probability, those were the
documentsofferedinevidence"andthat"evenifboththejournalsandauthenticatedcopyoftheActhadbeen
presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the
enrolled theory for as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways
specifiedinSection313ofActNo.190asamended."48ThreeJusticesvoicedtheirdissentfromthemajoritydecision.
Again,theCourtmadeitspositionplaininthe1963caseofCasco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez 49

when a unanimous Court ruled that: "The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure
passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of a bill before it was
certifiedbytheofficersofCongressandapprovedbytheExecutive,theremedyisbyamendmentorcurativelegislationnot
by judicial decree." According to Webster's New 20th Century Dictionary, 2nd ed., 1983, the word "tenor" means, among
others,"thegeneraldriftofsomethingspokenorwrittenintent,purport,substance."
Thus, the Court upheld the respondent Auditor General's interpretation that Republic Act No. 2609 really
exemptedfromthemarginfeeonforeignexchangetransactions"ureaformaldehyde"asfoundinthelawandnot
"ureaandformaldehyde"whichpetitionerinsistedwerethewordscontainedinthebillandweresointendedby
Congress.
In 1969, the Court similarly placed the weight of its authority behind the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. In
denyingthemotionforreconsideration,theCourtruledinMoralesv.Subidothat"theenrolledActintheofficeof
thelegislativesecretaryofthePresidentofthePhilippinesshowsthatSection10isexactlyasitisinthestatuteas
officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing . . . Expressed elsewise, this is a matter worthy of the
attentionnotofanOliverWendellHolmesbutofaSherlockHolmes." 50Theallegedomissionofaphraseinthefinal
Actwasmade,notatanystageofthelegislativeproceedings,butonlyinthecourseoftheengrossmentofthebill,more
specificallyintheproofreadingthereof.
ButtheCourtdidincludeacaveatthatqualifiedtheabsolutenessofthe"enrolledbill"rulestating:
Bywhatwehaveessayedabovewearenotofcoursetobeunderstoodasholdingthatinallcases
thejournalsmustyieldtotheenrolledbill.TobesuretherearecertainmatterswhichtheConstitution
(Art.VI,secs.10[4],20[1],and21[1])expresslyrequiresmustbeenteredonthejournalofeach
house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such
mattersenteredonthejournal,isaquestionwhichwedonotnowdecide(Cf.e.g.,WilkesCountry
Comm'rs. v. Coler, 180 U.S. 506 [1900]). All we hold is that with respect to matters not expressly
requiredtobeenteredonthejournal,theenrolledbillprevailsintheeventofanydiscrepancy.51
More recently, in the 1993 case of Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 52 this Court, in ruling on the
unconstitutionality of Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from the entire hierarchy of
courts,didnotsomuchadheretotheenrolledbillrulealoneastoboth"enrolledbillandlegislativejournals."ThroughMr.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz, we stated: "Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted,i.e.,inaccordancewithArticleVI,Sec.26(2)oftheConstitution.Weareboundbysuchofficialassurancesfroma
coordinatedepartmentofthegovernment,towhichweowe,attheveryleast,abecomingcourtesy."
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
Awareoftheshiftingsandsonwhichthevalidityandcontinuingrelevanceofthe"enrolledbill"theoryrests,Ihave
takenpainstotracethehistoryofitsapplicabilityinthisjurisdiction,asinfluencedinvaryingdegreesbydifferent
Federalrulings.
Asappliedtotheinstantpetition,theissueposediswhetherornottheproceduralirregularitiesthatattendedthe
passageofHouseBillNo.11197andSenateBillNo.1630,outsideofthereadingandprintingrequirementswhich
were exempted by the Presidential certification, may no longer be impugned, having been "saved" by the
conclusivenessonusoftheenrolledbill.Iseenocogentreasonwhywecannotcontinuetoplacerelianceonthe
enrolled bill, but only with respect to matters pertaining to the procedure followed in the enactment of bills in
Congress and their subsequent engrossment, printing errors, omission of words and phrases and similar
relatively minor matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and
substanceofthelawitself.
Certainly, "courts cannot claim greater ability to judge procedural legitimacy, since constitutional rules on
legislative procedure are easily mastered. Procedural disputes are over facts whether or not the bill had
enough votes, or three readings, or whatever not over the meaning of the constitution. Legislators, as
eyewitnesses, are in a better position than a court to rule on the facts. The argument is also made that
legislatureswouldbeoffendedifcourtsexaminedlegislativeprocedure.53
Sucharationale,however,cannotconceivablyapplytosubstantivechangesinabillintroducedtowardstheend
of its tortuous trip through Congress, catching both legislators and the public unawares and altering the same
beyondrecognitionevenbyitssponsors.
ThisissueIwishtoaddressforthwith.
EXTENTOFTHEPOWEROFTHEBICAMERALCONFERENCECOMMITTEE
Oneoftheissuesraisedinthesepetitions,especiallyinG.R.Nos.115781,115543and115754,respectively,is
whetherornot
Congress violated Section 26, par. 2, Article VI (of the 1987 Constitution) when it approved the
BicameralConferenceCommitteeReportwhichembodied,inviolationofRuleXIIoftheRulesofthe
Senate,aradicallyalteredtaxmeasurecontainingprovisionsnotreportedoutordiscussedineither
HouseaswellasprovisionsonwhichtherewasnodisagreementbetweentheHouseandtheSenate
and,worse,provisionscontrarytowhattheHouseandtheSenatehadapprovedafterthreeseparate
readings.54
and
By adding or deleting provisions, when there was no conflicting provisions between the House and
Senateversions,theBICAMactedinexcessofitsjurisdictionorwithsuchgraveabuseofdiscretion
as to amount to loss of jurisdiction. . . . In adding to the bill and thus subjecting to VAT, real
properties, media and cooperatives despite the contrary decision of both Houses, the BICAM
exceededitsjurisdictionoractedwithsuchabuseofdiscretionastoamounttolossofjurisdiction...
.55
IwishtoconsiderthisissueinlightofArticleVIII,Sec.1oftheConstitutionwhichprovidesthat"(j)udicialpower
includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." We are also guided by the principle that a court may interfere with the internal procedures of its
coordinatebranchonlytoupholdtheConstitution.56
Aconferencecommitteehasbeendefined:
. . . unlike the joint committee is two committees, one appointed by each house. It is normally
appointedforaspecificbillanditsfunctionistogainaccordbetweenthetwohouseseitherbythe
recessionofonehousefromitsbilloritsamendmentsorbythefurtheramendmentoftheexisting
legislationorbythesubstitutionofanentirelynewbill.Obviouslytheconferencecommitteeisalways
aspecialcommitteeandnormallyincludesthememberwhointroducedthebillandthechairmanof
the committee which considered it together with such other representatives of the house as seem
expedient. (Horack, Cases and Materials on Legislation [1940] 220. See also Zinn, Conference
ProcedureinCongress,38ABAJ864[1952]Steiner,TheCongressionalConferenceCommittee[U
ofIII.Press,
1951]).57
From the foregoing definition, it is clear that a bicameral conference committee is a creature, not of the
Constitution,butofthelegislativebodyunderitspowertodeterminerulesofitsproceedingsunderArticleVI,Sec.
16(3)oftheConstitution.Thus,itdrawsitslifeandvitalityfromtherulesgoverningitscreation.Thewhy,when,
howandwhereforeofitsoperations,inotherwords,theparameterswithinwhichitistofunction,aretobefound
inSection26,RuleXIIoftheRulesoftheSenateandSection85oftheRulesoftheHouseofRepresentatives,
respectively,whichprovide:
RuleXII,RulesoftheSenate
Sec. 26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the
provisionofanybillorjointresolution,thedifferencesshallbesettledbyaconferencecommitteeof
bothHouseswhichshallmeetwithintendaysaftertheircomposition.
The President shall designate the members of the conference committee in accordance with
subparagraph(c),Section8ofRuleIII.
changesinoramendmentstothesubjectmeasure,andshallbesignedbytheconferees.
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless the report has been filed with the
SecretaryoftheSenateandcopiesthereofhavebeendistributedtotheMembers.
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Sec. 85. Conference Committee Reports. In the event that the House does not agree with the
Senate on the amendments to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled by
conferencecommitteeofbothChambers.
Theconsiderationofconferencecommitteereportsshallalwaysbeinorder,exceptwhenthejournal
is being read, while the roll is being called or the House is dividing on any question. Each of the
pages of such reports shall contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or
amendmentstothesubjectmeasure.
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless copies thereof are distributed to the
Members:Provided,Thatinthelastfifteendaysofeachsessionperioditshallbedeemedsufficient
thatthreecopiesofthereport,signedasaboveprovided,aredepositedintheofficeoftheSecretary
General.
UndertheseRules,abicameralconferencecommitteecomesintobeingonlywhentherearedisagreementsand
differences between the Senate and the House with regard to certain provisions of a particular legislative act
whichhavetobereconciled.
Jefferson'sManual,which,accordingtoSection112,RuleXLIXoftheSenateRules,supplementsit,statesthata
conferencecommitteeisusuallycalled"ontheoccasionofamendmentsbetweentheHouses"and"inallcasesof
differenceofopinionbetweenthetwoHouseonmatterspendingbetween
them."58Itfurtherstates:
The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences committed to them, and may not
includesubjectsnotwithinthedisagreements,eventhoughgermanetoaquestioninissue.Buttheymayperfect
amendments committed to them if they do not in so doing go beyond the differences. . . . Managers may not
changethetexttowhichbothHouseshaveagreed.59(Emphasissupplied.)
Mason'sManualofLegislativeProcedureswhichisalsoconsideredascontrollingauthorityforanysituationnot
coveredbyaspecificlegislative
rule,60statesthateitherHousemay"requestaconferencewiththeotheronanymatterofdifferenceordisputebetween
them"andthatinsucharequest,"thesubjectoftheconferenceshouldalwaysbestated."61
In the Philippines, as in the United States, the Conference Committee exercises such a wide range of authority
that they virtually constitute a third House in the Legislature. As admitted by the Solicitor General, "It was the
practice in past Congresses for Conference Committees to insert in bills approved by the two Houses new
provisionsthatwerenotoriginallycontemplatedbythem."62
InLegislativeProcedure,RobertLucegivesagraphicdescriptionofthemilieuandthecircumstanceswhichhave
conspired to transform an initially innocuous mechanism designed to facilitate action into an allpowerful
Frankensteinthatbrooksnochallengetoitsauthorityevenfromitsownmembers.
Theirpowerlieschieflyinthefactthatreportsofconferencecommitteesmustbeacceptedwithout
amendmentorelserejectedintoto.Theimpulseistogetdonewiththemattersandsothemotionto
accept has undue advantage, for some members are sure to prefer swallowing unpalatable
provisionsratherthanprolongcontroversy.Thisisthemorelikelyifthereportcomesintherushof
businesstowardtheendofasession,whentoseekfurtherconferencemightresultinthelossofthe
measure altogether. At any time in the session there is some risk of such a result following the
rejectionofaconferencereport,foritmaynotbepossibletosecureasecondconference,ordelay
maygiveoppositiontothemainproposalchancetodevelopmorestrength.
xxxxxxxxx
Entangled in a network of rule and custom, the Representative who resents and would resist this
theft of his rights, finds himself helpless. Rarely can he vote, rarely can he voice his mind, in the
matterofanyfractionofthebill.Usuallyhecannotevenrecordhimselfasprotestingagainstsome
onefeaturewhileacceptingthemeasureaswhole.Worstofall,hecannotbyargumentorsuggested
change,trytoimprovewhattheotherbranchhasdone.
Thismeansmorethanthesubversionofindividualrights.Itmeanstoadegreetheabandonmentof
whateveradvantagethebicameralsystemmayhave.Bysomuchitineffecttransfersthelawmaking
powertoasmallgroupofmemberswhoworkoutinprivateadecisionthatalmostalwaysprevails.
Whatisworse,thesemenarenotchoseninawaytoensurethewisestchoice.Ithasbecomethe
practice to name as conferees the ranking members of the committee, so that the accident of
seniority determines. Exceptions are made, but in general it is not a question of who are most
competenttoserve.Chancegoverns,sometimesgivingwaytofavor,rarelytomerit.
xxxxxxxxx
Speaking broadly, the system of legislating by conference committee is unscientific and therefore
defective. Usually it forfeits the benefit of scrutiny and judgment by all the wisdom available.
Uncontrolled, it is inferior to that process by which every amendment is secured independent
discussionandvote....63(Emphasissupplied)
Not surprisingly has it been said: "Conference Committee action is the most undemocratic procedure in the
legislativeprocessitisanappropriatetargetforlegislativecritics."64
Inthecaseatbench,petitionersinsistthattheConferenceCommitteetowhichSenateBillNo.1630andHouse
Bill No. 11197 were referred for the purpose of harmonizing their differences, overreached themselves in not
confining their "reconciliation" function to those areas of disagreement in the two bills but actually making
"surreptitiousinsertions"anddeletionswhichamountedtoagraveabuseofdiscretion.
Atthispoint,itbecomesimperativetofocusontheerrantprovisionswhichfoundtheirwayintoRepublicActNo.
7716.Belowisabreakdowntofacilitateunderstandingthegroundsforpetitioners'objections:
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
INSERTIONSMADEBYBICAMERALCONFERENCECOMMITTEE(BICAM)TOSENATEBILL(SB)NO.1630
ANDHOUSEBILL(HB)NO.11197
1.Sec.99oftheNationalInternalRevenueCode(NIRC)
(1) Under the HB, this section includes any person who, in the course of trade or business, sells, barters or
exchangesgoodsORPROPERTIESandanypersonwhoLEASESPERSONALPROPERTIES.
(2)TheSBcompletelychangedthesaidsectionanddefinedanumberofwordsandphrases.Also,Section99A
wasaddedwhichincludedonewhosells,exchanges,bartersPROPERTIESandonewhoimportsPROPERTIES.
(3) The BICAM version makes LESSORS of goods OR PROPERTIES and importers of goods LIABLE to VAT
(subjectofpetitioninG.R.No.115754).
2.Section100(VATonSaleofGoods)
Theterm"goods"or"properties"includesthefollowing,whichwerenotfoundineithertheHBortheSB:
In addition to radio and television time SATTELITE TRANSMISSION AND CABLE TELEVISION
TIME.
Theterm"Othersimilarproperties"wasdeleted,whichwaspresentintheHBandtheSB.
Real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course or
business were included, which was neither in the HB nor the SB (subject of petition in G.R. No.
115754).
3.Section102
On what are included in the term "sale or exchange of services," as to make them subject to VAT, the BICAM
included/insertedthefollowing(notfoundineitherHouseorSenateBills):
1.Servicesoflessorsofproperty,whetherpersonalorreal(subjectofpetitioninG.R.No.115754)
2.Warehousingservices
3.Keepersofresthouses,pensionhouses,inns,resorts
4.Commoncarriersbyland,airandsea
5.Servicesoffranchisegranteesoftelephoneandtelegraph
6.Radioandtelevisionbroadcasting
7. All other franchise grantees except those under Section 117 of this Code (subject of petition in
G.R.No.115852)
8.Servicesofsurety,fidelity,indemnity,andbondingcompanies
9.AlsoinsertedbytheBICAM(onpage8thereof)istheleaseoruseofortherighttouseofsatellite
transmissionandcabletelevisiontime.
4.Section103(ExemptTransactions)
The BICAM deleted subsection (f) in its entirety, despite its inclusion in both the House and Senate Bills.
Therefore, under Republic Act No. 7716, the "printing, publication, importation or sale of books and any
newspaper,magazine,review,orbulletinwhichappearsatregularintervalswithfixedpricesforsubscriptionand
saleandwhichisnotdevotedprincipallytothepublicationofadvertisements"issubjecttoVAT(subjectofpetition
inG.R.No.115931andG.R.No.115544).
The HB and SB did not touch Subsection (g) but it was amended by the BICAM by changing the word TEN to
FIVE.Thus,importationofvesselswithtonnageofmorethanfivethousandtonsisVATexempt.
SubsectionL,whichwasidenticalintheHBandtheSBthatstatedthatmedical,dental,hospitalandveterinary
services were exempted from the VAT was amended by the BICAM by adding the qualifying phrase: EXCEPT
THOSERENDEREDBYPROFESSIONALS,thussubjectingdoctors,dentistsandveterinarianstotheVAT.
SubsectionUwhichexemptsfromVAT"transactionswhichareexemptunderspeciallaws,"wasamendedbythe
BICAMbyaddingthephrase:EXCEPTTHOSEGRANTEDUNDERPDNos.66,529,972,1491,AND1590,AND
NONELECTRICCOOPERATIVESUNDERRA6938(subjectofpetitioninG.R.No.115873),notfoundineither
theHBortheSB,resultingintheinclusionofallcooperativestotheVAT,exceptnonelectriccooperatives.
ThesaleofrealpropertieswasincludedintheexempttransactionsundertheHouseBill,buttheBICAMqualified
thiswiththeprovision:
(S)SALEOFREALPROPERTIESNOTPRIMARILYHELDFORSALETOCUSTOMERSORHELD
FOR LEASE IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF TRADE OR BUSINESS OR REAL PROPERTY
UTILIZED FOR LOWCOST AND SOCIALIZED HOUSING AS DEFINED BY RA NO. 7279
OTHERWISEKNOWNASTHEURBANDEVELOPMENTANDHOUSINGACTOF1992ANDOTHER
RELATEDLAWS.(subjectofpetitioninG.R.No.115754)
The BICAM also exempted the sale of properties, the receipts of which are not less than P480,000.00 or more
thanP720,000.00.UndertheSB,noamountwasgiven,butintheHBitwasstatedthatreceiptsfromthesaleof
propertiesnotlessthanP350,000.00normorethanP600,000.00wereexempt.
Itdidnotinclude,asVATexempt,thesaleortransferofsecurities,asdefinedintheRevisedSecuritiesAct(BP
178)whichwascontainedinbothSenateandHouseBills.
5.Section104
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
NotincludedintheHBortheSBisthephrase"INCLUDINGPACKAGINGMATERIALS"whichwasinsertedbythe
BICAM in Section 104 (A) (1) (B), thus excluding from creditable input tax packaging materials and the phrase
"ONWHICHAVALUEADDEDTAXHASBEENACTUALLYPAID"inSection104(A)(2).
6.Section107
BothHouseandSenateBillsprovideforthepaymentofP500.00VATregistrationfeebutthiswasincreasedby
BICAMtoP1,000.00.
7.Section112
RegardingapersonwhosesalesorreceiptsareexemptunderSection103(w),theBICAMinsertedthephrase:
"THREE PERCENT UPON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT AND FOUR PERCENT (4%) TWO YEARS
THEREAFTER,"althoughtheSBandtheHBprovideonly"threepercentofhisgrossquarterlysales."
8.Section115
The BICAM adopted the HB version which subjects common carriers by land, air or water for the transport of
passengersto3%oftheirgrossquarterlysales,whichisnotfoundintheSB.
9.Section117
The BICAM amended this section by subjecting franchises on electric, gas and water utilities to a tax of two
percent(2%)ongrossreceipts
derived...,althoughneithertheHBnortheSBhasasimilarprovision.
10.Section17(d)
(a)TheBICAMdefersforonly2yearstheVATonservicesofactorsandactresses,althoughtheSBdefersitfor3
years.
(b) The BICAM uses the word "EXCLUDE" in the section on deferment of VAT collection on certain goods and
services.TheHBdoesnotcontainanycounterpartprovisionandSBonlyallowsdefermentfornolongerthan3
years.
11. Section 18 on the Tax Administration Development Fund is an entirely new provision not contained in the
House/SenateBills.ThisfundissupposedtoensureeffectiveimplementationofRepublicActNo.7716.
12.Section19
No period within which to promulgate the implementing rules and regulations is found in the HB or the SB but
BICAMprovided"within90days"whichfounditswayinRepublicActNo.7716.
Evenacursoryperusaloftheaboveoutlinewillconvinceonethat,indeed,theBicameralConferenceCommittee
(henceforthtobereferredtoasBICAM)exceededthepowerandauthoritygrantedintheRulesofitscreation.
Both Senate and House Rules limit the task of the Conference Committee in almost identical language to the
settlementofdifferencesintheprovisionsoramendmentstoanybillorjointresolution.Ifitmeansanythingatall,
itisthatthereareprovisionsinsubjectbill,tostartwith,whichdifferand,therefore,needreconciliation.Nowhere
in the Rules is it authorized to initiate or propose completely new matter. Although under certain rules on
legislativeprocedure,likethoseinJefferson'sManual,aconferencecommitteemayintroducegermane matters
in a particular bill, such matters should be circumscribed by the committee's sole authority and function to
reconciledifferences.
Parenthetically,intheSenateandintheHouse,amatteris"germane"toaparticularbillifthereisacommontie
between said matter and the provisions which tend to promote the object and purpose of the bill it seeks to
amend.Ifitintroducesanewsubjectmatternotwithinthepurviewofthebill,thenitisnot"germane"tothebill.65
The test is whether or not the change represented an amendment or extension of the basic purpose of the original, or the
introductionofanentirelynewanddifferentsubjectmatter.66
IntheBICAM,however,thegermanesubjectmattermustbewithintheambitofthedisagreementbetweenthe
twoHouses.Ifthe"germane"subjectisnotcoveredbythedisagreementbutitisreflectedinthefinalversionof
thebillasreportedbytheConferenceCommitteeor,ifwhatappearstobea"germane"matterinthesensethatit
is"relevantorcloselyallied" 67 with the purpose of the bill, was not the subject of a disagreement between the Senate
andtheHouse,itshouldbedeemedanextraneousmatterorevena"rider"whichshouldneverbeconsideredlegallypassed
fornothavingundergonethethreedayreadingrequirement.InsertionofnewmatteronthepartoftheBICAMis,therefore,
anultraviresactwhichmakesthesamevoid.
Thedeterminationofwhatis"germane"andwhatisnotmayappeartobeadifficulttaskbuttheCongress,having
been confronted with the problem before, resolved it in accordance with the rules. In that case, the Congress
approved a Conference Committee's insertion of new provisions that were not contemplated in any of the
provisionsinquestionbetweentheHousessimplybecauseoftheprovisioninJefferson'sManualthatconferees
mayreportmatters"whicharegermanemodificationsofsubjectsindisagreementbetweentheHousesandthe
committee.68Inotherwords,thematterwasgermanetothepointsofdisagreementbetweentheHouseandtheSenate.
As regards insertedamendments in the BICAM, therefore, the task of determining what is germane to a bill is
simplified, thus: If the amendments are not circumscribed by the subjects of disagreement between the two
Houses,thentheyarenotgermanetothepurposeofthebill.
Intheinstantcasebeforeus,theinsertionsanddeletionsmadedonotmerelyspellaneffortatsettlingconflicting
provisionsbuthavemateriallyalteredthebill,thusgivingrisetotheinstantpetitionsonthepartofthosewhowere
caughtunawaresbythelegislativelegerdemainthattookplace.Goingbythedefinitionoftheword"amendment"
inBlack'sLawDictionary,5thEd.,1979,whichmeans"tochangeormodifyforthebettertoalterbymodification,
deletion, or addition," said insertions and deletions constitute amendments. Consequently, these violated Article
VI,Section26(2)whichprovidesinteralia:"Uponthelastreadingofabill,noamendmenttheretoshallbe
allowed..."Thisproscriptionisintendedtosubjectallbillsandtheiramendmentstointensivedeliberationbythe
legislators and the ample ventilation of issues to afford the public an opportunity to express their opinions or
objections issues to afford the public an opportunity to express their opinions or objections thereon. The same
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
rationaleunderliesthethreereadingrequirementtotheendthatnosurprisesmaybesprungonanunsuspecting
citizenry.
Provisionsofthe"nowyouseeit,nowyoudon't"variety,meaningthosewhichwereeitherintheHouseand/or
Senate versions but simply disappeared or were "bracketed out" of existence in the BICAM Report, were
eventually incorporated in Republic Act No. 7716. Worse, some goods, properties or services which were not
coveredbythetwoversionsand,therefore,wereneverintendedtobesocovered,suddenlyfoundtheirwayinto
thesameReport.Noadvancenoticeofsuchinsertionspreparedtherestofthelegislators,muchlessthepublic
whocouldbeadverselyaffected,sothattheycouldbegiventheopportunitytoexpresstheirviewsthereon.Well
hasthefinalBICAMreportbeendescribed,therefore,asaninstanceof"taxationwithoutrepresentation."
ThattheconfereesordelegatesintheBICAMrepresentingthetwoChamberscouldnotpossiblybechargedwith
badfaithorsinistermotivesor,attheveryleast,unseemlybehavior,isofnomoment.Thestarkfactisthatitems
notpreviouslysubjectedtotheVATnowfellunderitscoveragewithoutinterestedsectorsorpartieshavingbeen
afforded the opportunity to be heard thereon. This is not to say that the Conference Committee Report should
haveundergonethethreereadingsrequiredinArticleVI,Section26(2),forthisclearlyrefersonlytobillswhich,
afterhavingbeeninitiallyfiledineitherHouse,negotiatedthelabyrinthinepassagethereinuntilitsapproval.The
compositionoftheBICAMincludingasitusuallydoes,theChairmanoftheappropriateCommittee,thesponsorof
the bill and other interested members ensures an informed discussion, at least with respect to the disagreeing
provisions.Thesamedoesnotobtainasregardscompletelynewmatterwhichsuddenlyspringonthelegislative
horizon.
Ithasbeenpointedoutthatsuchextraneousmattersnotwithstanding,allCongressmanandSenatorsweregiven
theopportunitytoapproveorturndowntheCommitteeReportintoto,thus"curing"whateverdefectorirregularity
itbore.
Earlierinthisopinion,Iexplainedthatthesourceoftheacknowledgedpowerofthisadhoccommitteestemsfrom
the precise fact that, the meetings, being scheduled "take it or leave it" basis. It has not been uncommon for
legislators who, for one reason or another have been frustrated in their attempt to pass a pet bill in their own
chamber, to work for its passage in the BICAM where it may enjoy a more hospitable reception and faster
approval. In the instant case, had there been full, open and unfettered discussion on the bills during the
Committee sessions, there would not have been as much vociferous objections on this score. Unfortunately,
however, the Committee held two of the five sessions behind closed doors, sans stenographers, recordtakers
and interested observers. To that extent, the proceedings were shrouded in mystery and the public's right to
information on matters of public concern as enshrined in Article III, Section 7 69 and the government's policy of
transparencyintransactionsinvolvingpublicinterestinArticleII,Section28ofthe
Constitution70areundermined.
Moreover,thatwhichisvoidabinitiosuchastheobjectionableprovisionsintheConferenceCommitteeReport,
cannotbe"cured"orratified.Forallintentsandpurposes,theseneverexisted.Quaeabinitiononvalent,expost
factoconvalescerenonpossunt.Thingsthatareinvalidfromthebeginningarenotmadevalidbyasubsequent
act.
Should this argument be unacceptable, the "enrolled bill" doctrine, in turn, is invoked to support the proposition
that the certification by the presiding officers of Congress, together with the signature of the President, bars
further judicial inquiry into the validity of the law. I reiterate my submission that the "enrolled bill ruling" may be
applicablebutonlywithrespecttoquestionspertainingtotheproceduralenactment,engrossment,printing,the
insertionordeletionofawordorphrasehereandthere,butwoulddrawadividinglinewithrespecttosubstantial
substantivechanges,suchasthoseintroducedbytheBICAMherein.
We have before us then the spectacle of a body created by the two Houses of Congress for the very limited
purpose of settling disagreements in provisions between bills emanating therefrom, exercising the plenary
legislative powers of the parent chambers but holding itself exempt from the mandatory constitutional
requirementsthatarethehallmarksoflegislationundertheaegisofademocraticpoliticalsystem.Fromtheinitial
filing, through the three readings which entail detailed debates and discussions in Committee and plenary
sessions,andontothetransmittaltotheotherHouseinarepetitionoftheentireprocesstoensureexhaustive
deliberationsallthesehavebeenskippedover.Intheproverbialtwinklingofaneye,provisionsthatprobably
may not have seen the light of day had they but run their full course through the legislative mill, sprang into
existenceandemergedfullblownlaws.
YetourConstitutionveststhelegislativepowerin"theCongressofthePhilippineswhichshallconsistofaSenate
andaHouseof
Representatives..." 71 and not in any special, standing or super committee of its own creation, no matter that these
havebeendescribed,accuratelyenough,as"theeye,theear,thehand,andveryoftenthebrainofthehouse."
Firstly, that usage or custom has sanctioned this abbreviated, if questionable, procedure does not warrant its
being legitimized and perpetuated any longer. Consuetudo, contra rationem introducta, potius usurpatio quam
consuetudo appellari debet. A custom against reason is rather an usurpation. In the hierarchy of sources of
legislativeprocedure,constitutionalrules,statutoryprovisionsandadoptedrules(asforexample,theSenateand
HouseRules),rankhighest,certainlymuchaheadofcustomsandusages.
Secondly,isthisCourttoassumetheroleofpassivespectatororindulgentthirdparty,timorousaboutexercising
itspowerormoreimportantly,performingitsduty,ofmakingajudicialdeterminationontheissueofwhetherthere
hasbeengraveabuseofdiscretionbytheotherbranchesorinstrumentalitiesofgovernment,wherethesameis
properlyinvoked?ThetimeispastwhentheCourtwasnotloathetoraisethebogeymanofthepoliticalquestion
toavertaheadoncollisionwitheithertheExecutiveorLegislativeDepartments.Eventheseparationofpowers
doctrinewasburnishedtoabrightsheenasoftenasitwasinvokedtokeepthejudiciarywithinbounds.Nolonger
doesthisconditionobtain.ArticleVIII,Section2oftheConstitutionpartlyquotedinthisparagraphhasbroadened
the scope of judicial inquiry. This Court can now safely fulfill its mandate of delimiting the powers of coequal
departmentsliketheCongress,itsofficersoritscommitteeswhichmayhavenocompunctionsaboutexercising
legislativepowersinfull.
Thirdly, dare we close our eyes to the presumptuous assumption by a runaway committee of its progenitor's
legislativepowersinderogationoftherightsofthepeople,intheprocess,subvertingthedemocraticprincipleswe
allaresworntouphold,whenapropercaseismadeoutforourintervention?Theanswerstotheabovequeries
areselfevident.
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
I call to mind this exhortation: "We are sworn to see that violations of the constitution by any person,
corporation, state agency or branch of government are brought to light and corrected. To countenance an
artificialruleoflawthatsilencesourvoiceswhenconfrontedwithviolationsofourConstitutionisnotacceptableto
thisCourt."72
Iamnotunawarethataratherrecentdecisionofoursbrushedasideanargumentthataprovisioninsubjectlaw
regarding the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court itself, not having been
included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or of House Bill No. 4200 but only in the Conference
Committee Report, was violative of Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the Constitution. Likewise, that said Section 35,
never having been a subject of disagreement between both Houses, could not have been validly added as an
amendmentbeforetheConferenceCommittee.
Themajorityopinioninsaidcaseexplained:
WhileitistruethataconferencecommitteeisthemechanismforcompromisingdifferencesbetweentheSenate
andtheHouse,itisnotlimitedinitsjurisdictiontothisquestion.Itsbroaderfunctionisdescribedthus:
Aconferencecommitteemaydealgenerallywiththesubjectmatteroritmaybelimitedtoresolving
theprecisedifferencesbetweenthetwohouses.Evenwheretheconferencecommitteeisnotbyrule
limitedinitsjurisdiction,legislativecustomseverelylimitsthefreedomwithwhichnewsubjectmatter
can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces
unexpected results, results beyond its mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules
imposestrictlimitationsonconferencecommitteejurisdiction.Thisissymptomaticoftheauthoritarian
power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p.
81).73(Emphasissupplied)
At the risk of being repetitious, I wish to point out that the general rule, as quoted above, is: "Even where the
conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with
which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill." What follows, that is, "occasionally a
conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its mandate. . ." is the exception. Then it
concludeswithadeclarationthat:"Thisissymptomaticoftheauthoritarianpowerofconferencecommittee."Are
we about to reinstall another institution that smacks of authoritarianism which, after our past experience, has
becomeanathematotheFilipinopeople?
TherulingabovecanhardlybecitedinsupportofthepropositionthataprovisioninaBICAMreportwhichwas
notthesubjectofdifferencesbetweentheHouseandSenateversionsofabillcannotbenullified.Itsubmitthat
such is not authorized in our Basic Law. Moreover, this decision concerns merely one provision whereas the
BICAMReportthatculminatedintheEVATlawhasawiderscopeasit,infact,expandedthebaseoftheoriginal
VATlawbyimposingthetaxonseveralitemswhichwerenotsocoveredpriortotheEVAT.
One other flaw in most BICAM Reports, not excluding this one under scrutiny, is that, hastily drawn up, it often
fails to conform to the Senate and House Rules requiring no less than a "detailed" and "sufficiently explicit
statementofthechangesinoramendmentstothesubjectmeasure."TheReportofthecommittee,asmaybe
gleanedfromtheprecedingpages,wasnomorethanthefinalversionofthebillas"passed"bytheBICAM.The
amendmentsorsubjectsofdissension,aswellasthereconciliationmadebythecommittee,arenotevenpointed
out,muchlessexplainedtherein.
Itmaybearguedthatlegislativerulesofproceduremayproperlybesuspended,modified,revokedorwaivedat
willbythelegislatorsthemselves. 74 This principle, however, does not come into play in interpreting what the record of
theproceedingsshowswas,orwasnot,done.Itisratherdesignedtotestthevalidityoflegislativeactionwheretherecord
shows a final action in violation or disregard of legislative rules. 75 Utilizing the Senate and the House Rules as both
guidelinesandyardstick,theBICAMhereobviouslydidnotadheretotheruleonwhattheReportshouldcontain.
GivenalltheseirregularitiesthathaveapparentlybeenengraftedintotheBICAMsystem,andwhichhavebeen
tolerated,ifnotaccordedoutrightacceptancebyeveryoneinvolvedinorconversantwith,theinstitution,itmaybe
asked:Whynotleavewellenoughalone?
Thatthesepracticeshaveremainedunchallengedinthepastdoesnotjustifyourclosingoureyesandturninga
deaf ear to them. Writ large is the spectacle of a mechanism ensconced in the very heart of the people's
legislativehalls,thatnowstandsindictedwiththechargeofarrogatinglegislativepowersuntoitselfthroughthe
useofdubious"shortcuts."Here,forthepeopletojudge,isthe"motherofallshortcuts."
Inthepetitionsatbench,weareconfrontedwiththeenactmentofataxlawwhichwasdesignedtobroadenthe
tax base. It is rote learning for any law student that as an attribute of sovereignty, the power to tax is "the
strongestofallthepowersofgovernment."76Admittedly,"forallitsplenitude,thepowertotaxisnotunconfined.There
are restrictions." 77 Were there none, then the oftquoted 1803 dictum of Chief Justice Marshall that "the power to tax
involvesthepowertodestroy" 78would be a truism. Happily, we can concur with, and the people can find comfort in, the
reassuringwordsofMr.JusticeHolmes:"ThepowertotaxisnotthepowertodestroywhilethisCourtsits."79
Manakanaka, mayroong dumudulog dito sa Kataastaasang Hukuman na may kamanghamanghang hinaing.

Angkopnahalimbawaayangmgapetisyonginiharapngayonsaamin.
Ang ilan sa kanila ay mga Senador na nais mapawalang bisa ang isang batas ukol sa buwis na ipinasa mismo
nila. Diumano ito ay hindi tumalima sa mga itinatadhana ng Saligang Batas. Bukod sa rito, tutol sila sa mga
bagongtalatanaisiningitng"BicameralConferenceCommittee"nanagdagdagngmgabagongbagaybagayat
serbisyonapapatawanngbuwis.Ayonsakanila,ginampananngkomitengiyananggawainnanauukolsabuong
Kongreso. Kung kaya't ang nararapat na mangyari ay ihatol ng Kataastaasang Hukuman na malabis na
pagsasamantalasasarilingpagpapasiyaangginawangKongreso.
Bagama't bantulot kaming makialam sa isang kapantay na sangay ng Pamahalaan, hindi naman nararapat na
kamiaytumangginggampananangtungkulinnainiatassaaminngSaligangBatas.Lalu'tlalonangangbatasna
kinauukulanaymaaaringmakapinsalasanakararamisasambayanan.
Saganangakin,itongbatasnainihaharapsaaminngayon,aytotoonglabagsaSaligangBatas,samakatuwiday
walangbisa.Nguni'titoaynauukollamangsamgakatiwaliannamaykinalamansaparaanngpagpapasabatas
nito.HindinaminpatakaranangmakialamohumadlangsaitinakdanggawainngSaligangBatassaPanguloatsa
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
Kongreso. Ang dalawang sangay na iyan ng Pamahalaan ang higit na maalam ukol sa kung ang anumang
panukalangbatasaynararapat,kanaisnaisomagagampanankungkaya'thindikaminararapatnamaghatolo
magpapasiya sa mga bagay na iyan. Ang makapapataw ng angkop na lunas sa larangan na iyan ay ang
mismongmgakinatawanngsambayanansaKongreso.
Faced with this challenge of protecting the rights of the people by striking down a law that I submit is
unconstitutional and in the process, checking the wonted excesses of the Bicameral Conference Committee
system,IseeinthiscaseasuitablevehicletodischargetheCourt'sConstitutionalmandateanddutyofdeclaring
thattherehasindeedbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartof
theLegislature.
Republic Act No. 7716, being unconstitutional and void, I find no necessity to rule on the substantive issues as
dealt with in the majority opinion as they have been rendered moot and academic. These issues pertain to the
intrinsicmeritsofthelaw.Itisaxiomaticthatthewisdom,desirabilityandadvisabilityofenactingcertainlawslie,
notwithintheprovinceoftheJudiciarybutthatofthepoliticaldepartments,theExecutiveandtheLegislative.The
reliefsoughtbypetitionersfromwhattheyperceivetobetheharshandonerouseffectoftheEVATonthepeople
is within their reach. For Congress, of which Senatorpetitioners are a part, can furnish the solution by either
repealingoramendingthesubjectlaw.
Fortheforegoingreasons,IVOTEtoGRANTthepetition.
PUNO,J.:
Petitioners plead that we affirm the selfevident proposition that they who make law should not break the law.
There are many evils whose elimination can be trusted to time. The evil of lawlessness in lawmaking cannot. It
mustbeslainonsightforitsubvertsthesovereigntyofthepeople.
First,afastsnapshotofthefacts.OnNovember17,1993,theHouseofRepresentativespassedonthirdreading
House Bill (H.B.) No. 11197 entitled "An Act Restructuring the Value Added Tax (VAT) System to Widen its Tax
BaseandEnhanceitsAdministration,AmendingforThesePurposesSections99,100,102to108and110TitleV
and 236, 237 and 238 of Title IX, and Repealing Sections 113 and 114 of Title V, all of the National Internal
RevenueCodeasAmended."Thevotewas114Yeasand12Nays.Thenextday,November18,1993,H.B.No.
11197wastransmittedtotheSenateforitsconcurrencebytheHon.CamiloL.Sabio,SecretaryGeneralofthe
On February 7, 1994, the Senate Committee on Ways and Means submitted Senate Bill (S.B.) No. 1630,
recommendingitsapproval"insubstitutionofSenateBillNo.1129takingintoconsiderationP.S.Res.No.734and
HouseBillNo.11197."OnMarch24,1994,S.B.No.1630wasapprovedonsecondandthirdreadings.Onthe
sameday,theSenate,thruSecretaryEdgardoE.Tumangan,requestedtheHouseforaconference"inviewof
the disagreeing provisions of S.B. No. 1630 and H.B. No. 11197." It designated the following as members of its
Committee: Senators Ernesto F. Herrera, Leticia R. Shahani, Alberto S. Romulo, John H. Osmea, Ernesto M.
Maceda,BlasF.Ople,FranciscoS.Tatad,RodolfoG.Biazon,andWigbertoS.Taada.OnthepartoftheHouse,
the members of the Committee were: Congressmen Exequiel B. Javier, James L. Chiongbian, Renato V. Diaz,
ArnulfoP.Fuentebella,MarianoM.Tajon,GregorioAndolong,ThelmaAlmario,andCatalinoFigueroa.Afterfive
(5)meetings,1theBicameralConferenceCommitteesubmitteditsReporttotheSenateandtheHousestating:
237,AND238OFTITLEIX,ANDREPEALINGSECTIONS113AND114OFTITLEV,ALLOFTHE
NATIONALINTERNALREVENUECODE,ASAMENDED
102,103,104,106,107,108AND110OFTITLEIV,112,115,117AND121OFTITLEV,AND236,
237,AND238OFTITLEIX,ANDREPEALINGSECTIONS113,114,116,119AND120OFTITLEV,
ALLOFTHENATIONALINTERNALREVENUECODE,ASAMENDEDANDFOROTHERPURPOSES
havingmet,afterfullandfreeconference,hasagreedtorecommendanddoherebyrecommendto
their respective Houses that House Bill No. 11197, in consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be
approved in accordance with the attached copy of the bill as reconciled and approved by the
conferees.
Approved.
TheReportwasapprovedbytheHouseonApril27,1994.TheSenateapproveditonMay2,1994.OnMay5,
1994,thePresidentsignedthebillintolawasR.A.No.7716.
There is no question that the Bicameral Conference Committee did more than reconcile differences between
House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630. In several instances, it either added new provisions or deleted
provisions already approved in House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630. These insertions/deletions
numberingtwentyfour(24)arespecifiedindetailbypetitionerTolentinoasfollows:2
SOMESALIENTPOINTSONTHE
(AMENDMENTSTOTHEVATELAW[EO273])
SHOWINGADDITIONS/INSERTIONSMADEBYBICAMERAL
CONFERENCECOMMITTEETOSB1630&HB11197
IOnSec.99oftheNIRC
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
H.B.11197amendsthissectionbyincluding,asliabletoVAT,anypersonwhointhecourseoftrade
of business, sells, barters, or exchanges goods or PROPERTIES and any person who LEASES
PERSONALPROPERTIES.
Senate Bill 1630 deleted Sec. 99 to give way for a new Section 99 DEFINITION OF TERMS
whereeleven(11)termsweredefined.AnewSection,Section99Awasincorporatedwhichincluded
as subject to VAT, one who sells, exchanges, barters PROPERTIES and one who imports
PROPERTIES.
TheBCCversion(R.A.7716)makesLESSORSofgoodsORPROPERTIESandimportersofgoods
LIABLEtoVAT.
IIOnSection100(VATonsaleofgoods)
A.TheH.B.,S.B.,andtheBCC(R.A.7716)allincludedsaleofPROPERTIESassubjecttoVAT.
ThetermGOODSorPROPERTIESincludesthefollowing:
HB(pls.refer SB(pls.refer BCC(RA7716
toSec.2) ToSec.1(4) (Sec.2)
1.Rightorthe 1.Thesame 1.Thesame
privilegetouse
patent,copyright,
design,ormodel,
plan,secret
formulaorprocess,
goodwilltrademark,
tradebrandorother
likepropertyor
right.
privilegetouse
inthePhilippines
ofanyindustrial,
commercial,or
scientificequip
ment.
privilegetouse
motionpicturefilms,
films,tapesand
discs.
4.Radioand 4.Thesame 4.Inaddition
Televisiontime toradioand
televisiontimethe
followingwere
included:
SATELLITE
TRANSMISSION
andCABLE
TELEVISIONTIME

8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455

5.OtherSimilar 5.TheSame 5.'Other
properties similarproperties'
wasdeleted
6. 6. 6.Real
propertiesheld
primarilyforsaleto
customersorheld
forleaseinthe
ordinarycourseor
business
B.TheHBandtheBCCBillshaseachaprovisionwhichincludesTHESALEOFGOLDTOBANGKO
SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS as falling under the term Export Sales, hence subject to 0% VAT. The
SenateBilldoesnotcontainsuchprovision(SeeSection102Athereof).
III.OnSection102
Thissectionwasamendedtoincludeassubjecttoa10%VATthegrossreceiptsderivedfromTHE
SALEOREXCHANGEOFSERVICES,INCLUDINGTHEUSEORLEASEOFPROPERTIES.
TheSB,HB,andBCChavethesameprovisionsonthis.
However, on what are included in the term SALE OR EXCHANGE OF SERVICES, the BCC
included/insertedthefollowing(notfoundineithertheHouseorSenateBills):
1. Services of lessors of property WHETHER PERSONAL OR REAL (See BCC

Report/Billp.7)
2.WAREHOUSINGSERVICES(Ibid.,)
3.KeepersofRESTHOUSES,PENSIONHOUSES,INNS,RESORTS(Ibid.,)
4.CommoncarriersbyLAND,AIRANDSEA(Ibid.,)
5.SERVICESOFFRANCHISEGRANTEESOFTELEPHONEANDTELEGRAPH
6.RADIOANDTELEVISIONBROADCASTING
7. ALL OTHER FRANCHISE GRANTEES EXCEPT THOSE UNDER SECTION 117 OF

THISCODE
8.SERVICESOFSURETY,FIDELITY,INDEMNITY,ANDBONDINGCOMPANIES.
9. Also inserted by the BCC (on page B thereof) is the LEASE OR USE OF OR THE
RIGHTTOUSEOFSATTELITETRANSMISSIONANDCABLETELEVISIONTIME
IV.OnSection103(ExemptTransactions)
TheBCCdeletedsubsection(f)initsentirety,despiteitsretentioninboththeHouseandSenateBills,
thus under RA 7716, the "printing, publication, importation or sale of books and any newspaper,
magazine,review,orbulletinwhichappearsatregularintervalswithfixedpricesforsubscriptionand
saleandwhichisnotdevotedprincipallytothepublicationofadvertisements"issubjecttoVAT.
Subsection (g) was amended by the BCC (both Senate and House Bills did not) by changing the
wordTENtoFIVE,thus:"Importationofpassengerand/orcargovesselofmorethanfivethousand
ton to ocean going, including engine and spare parts of said vessel to be used by the importer
himselfasoperatorthereof."Inshort,importationofvesselswithtonnageofmorethan5thousandis
VATexempt.
Subsection L, was amended by the BCC by adding the qualifying phrase: EXCEPT THOSE
RENDEREDBYPROFESSIONALS.
Subsection U which exempts from VAT "Transactions which are exempt under special laws", was
amendedbyBCCbyaddingthephrase:EXCEPTTHOSEGRANTEDUNDERPDNOS.66,529,972,
1491, and 1590, and NONELECTRIC COOPERATIVES under RA 6938. This is the reason why
cooperativesarenowsubjecttoVAT.
WhiletheSALEOFREALPROPERTIESwasincludedintheexempttransactionsundertheHouse
Bill,theBCCmadeaqualificationbystating:
(S)SALEOFREALPROPERTIESNOTPRIMARILYHELDFORSALETOCUSTOMERS
OR HELD FOR LEASE IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF TRADE OR BUSINESS OR
REAL PROPERTY UTILIZED FOR LOWCOST AND SOCIALIZED HOUSING AS
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
DEFINED BY R.A. NO. 7279 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT

ANDHOUSINGACTOF1992ANDOTHERRELATEDLAWS.
Under the Senate Bill, the sale of real property utilized for lowcost and socialized
housingasdefinedbyRA7279,isoneoftheexempttransactions.
Under the House Bill, also exempt from VAT, is the SALE OF PROPERTIES OTHER
THAN THE TRANSACTIONS MENTIONED IN THE FOREGOING PARAGRAPHS WITH
AGROSSANNUALSALESAND/ORRECEIPTSOFWHICHDOESNOTEXCEEDTHE
AMOUNT PRESCRIBED IN THE REGULATIONS TO BE PROMULGATED BY THE
SECRETARY OF FINANCE WHICH SHALL NOT BE LESS THAN P350,000.00 OR
HIGHERTHANP600,000.00...UndertheSenateBill,theamountisP240,000.00.The
BCC agreed at the amount of not less than P480,000.00 or more than P720,000.00
SUBJECTTOTAXUNDERSEC.112OFTHISCODE.
TheBCCdidnotinclude,asVATexempt,thesaleortransferofsecuritiesasdefinedin
the Revised Securities Act (BP 178) which was contained in both Senate and House
Bills.
VOnSection104
ThephraseINCLUDINGPACKAGINGMATERIALSwasincludedbytheBCConSection104(A)(1)
(B),andthephraseONWHICHAVALUEADDEDTAXHASBEENACTUALLYonSection104(A)(2).
ThesephrasesarenotcontainedineitherHouseandSenateBills.
VIOnSection107
Both House and Senate Bills provide for the payment of P500.00 VAT registration fee. The BCC
providesforP1,000.00VATfee.
VIIOnSection112
WhileboththeSenateandHouseBillsprovidethatapersonwhosesalesorreceiptsandareexempt
under Section 103[w] of the Code, and who are not VAT registered shall pay a tax equivalent to
THREE(3)PERCENTofhisgrossquarterlysalesorreceipts,theBCCinsertedthephrase:THREE
PERCENT UPON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT AND FOUR PERCENT (4%) TWO YEARS
THEREAFTER.
VIIIOnSection115
Sec. 17 of SB 1630 Sec. 12 of House Bill 11197 amends this Section by clarifying that common
carriersbyland,airorwaterFORTHETRANSPORTOFPASSENGERSaresubjecttoPercentage
Taxequivalentto3%oftheirquarterlygrosssales.
The BCC adopted this and the House Bill's provision that the GROSS RECEIPTS OF COMMON
CARRIERS DERIVED FROM THEIR INCOMING AND OUTGOING FREIGHT SHALL NOT BE
SUBJECTED TO THE LOCAL TAXES IMPOSED UNDER RA 7160. The Senate Bill has no similar
provision.
IXOnSection117
This Section has not been touched by either Senate and House Bills. But the BCC amended it by
subjecting franchises on ELECTRIC, GAS and WATER UTILITIES A TAX OF TWO PERCENT (2%)
ONGROSSRECEIPTSDERIVED....
XOnSection121
TheBCCadoptedtheSenateBills'amendmenttothissectionbysubjectingto5%premiumtaxon
lifeinsurancebusiness.
TheHouseBilldoesnotcontainthisprovision.
XIOthers
A) The House Bill does not contain any provision on the deferment of VAT collection on Certain
Goods and Services as does the Senate Bill (Section 19, SB 1630). But although the Senate Bill
authorizes the deferment on certain goods and services for no longer than 3 years, there is no
specificprovisionthatauthorizesthePresidenttoEXCLUDEfromVATanyofthese.TheBCCuses
thewordEXCLUDE.
B)Moreover,theSenateBilldeferstheVATonservicesofactorsandactressesetc.for3yearsbut
theBCCdefersitforonly2years.
C) Section 18 of the BCC Bill (RA 7716) is an entirely new provision not contained in the
House/SenateBills.
D) The period within which to promulgate the implementing rules and regulations is within 60 days
underSB1630NospecificperiodundertheHouseBill,within90daysunderRA7716(BCC).
E)TheHouseBillprovidesforageneralrepealingclausei.e.,allinconsistentlawsetc.arerepealed.
Section16oftheSenateBillexpresslyrepealsSections113,114,116,119and120ofthecode.The
sameSenateBillhowevercontainsageneralrepealingclauseinSec.21thereof.
RA7716(BCC'sBill)expresslyrepealsSections113,114and116oftheNIRCArticle39(c)(d)and
(e)ofEO226andprovidestherepealofSec.119and120oftheNIRCupontheexpirationoftwo(2)
yearsunlessotherwiseexcludedbythePresident.
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
ThechargethattheBicameralConferenceCommitteeaddednewprovisionsinthebillsofthetwochambersis
hardlydisputedbyrespondents.Instead,respondentsjustifythem.Accordingtorespondents:(1)theBicameral
ConferenceCommitteehasanexpostvetopoweroravetoafterthefactofapprovalofthebillbybothHouses
(2) the bill prepared by the Bicameral Conference Committee, with its additions and deletions, was anyway
approvedbybothHouses(3)itwasthepracticeinpastCongressesforconferencecommitteestoinsertinbills
approvedbythetwoHousesnewprovisionsthatwerenotoriginallycontemplatedbythemand(4)theenrolled
billdoctrineprecludesinquiryintotheregularityoftheproceedingsthatledtotheenactmentofR.A.7716.
Withduerespect,Irejectthesecontentionswhichwillcaveinoncloserexamination.
First. There is absolutely no legal warrant for the bold submission that a Bicameral Conference Committee
possessesthepowertoadd/deleteprovisionsinbillsalreadyapprovedonthirdreadingbybothHousesoranex
post veto power. To support this postulate that can enfeeble Congress itself, respondents cite no constitutional
provision,nolaw,notevenanyruleorregulation. 3Worse,theirstanceiscategoricallyrepudiatedbytherulesofboth
the Senate and the House of Representatives which define with precision the parameters of power of a Bicameral
ConferenceCommittee.Thus,Section209,RuleXIIoftheRulesoftheSenateprovides
In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the provision of
anybillorjointresolution,thedifferencesshallbesettledbyaconferencecommitteeofbothHouses
whichshallmeetwithintendaysaftertheircomposition.
changesinoramendmentstothesubjectmeasure,andshallbesignedbytheconferees.(Emphasis
supplied)
ThecounterpartruleoftheHouseofRepresentativesiscastinnearidenticallanguage.Section85oftheRulesof
theHouseofRepresentativespertinentlyprovides:
IntheeventthattheHousedoesnotagreewiththeSenateontheamendmentstoanybillorjoint
resolution,thedifferencesmaybesettledbyaconferencecommitteeofbothchambers.
. . . . Each report shall contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or
amendmentstothesubjectmeasure.(Emphasissupplied)
TheJefferson'sManualhasbeenadopted 4 as a supplement to our parliamentary rules and practice. Section 456 of

Jefferson'sManualsimilarlyconfinesthepowersofaconferencecommittee,viz:5
The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences committed to them . . .
and may not include subjects not within the disagreements, even though germane to a question in
issue.
ThisruleofantiquityhasbeenhonedandhonoredinpracticebytheCongressoftheUnitedStates.Thus,itis
chronicledbyFloydBiddick,ParliamentarianEmeritusoftheUnitedStatesSenate,viz:6
Committees of conference are appointed for the sole purpose of compromising and adjusting the
differing and conflicting opinions of the two Houses and the committees of conference alone can
grant compromises and modify propositions of either Houses within the limits of the disagreement.
ConfereesarelimitedtotheconsiderationofdifferencesbetweenthetwoHouses.
Conferees shall not insert in their report matters not committed to them by either House, nor shall
they strike from the bill matters agreed to by both Houses. No matter on which there is nothing in
eithertheSenateorHousepassedversionsofabillmaybeincludedintheconferencereportand
actionstothecontrarywouldsubjectthereporttoapointoforder.(Emphasisours)
In fine, there is neither a sound nor a syllable in the Rules of the Senate and the House of Representative to
support the thesis of the respondents that a bicameral conference committee is clothed with an ex post veto
power.
ButthethesisthataBicameralConferenceCommitteecanwieldexpostvetopowerdoesnotonlycontravenethe
rulesofboththeSenateandtheHouse.Itwageswaragainstoursettledidealsofrepresentativedemocracy.For
the inevitable, catastrophic effect of the thesis is to install a Bicameral Conference Committee as the Third
ChamberofourCongress,similarlyvestedwiththepowertomakelawsbutwiththedissimilaritythatitslawsare
notthesubjectofafreeandfulldiscussionofbothHousesofCongress.Withsuchavagrantpower,aBicameral
ConferenceCommitteeactingasaThirdChamberwillbeaconstitutionalmonstrosity.
It needs no omniscience to perceive that our Constitution did not provide for a Congress composed of three
chambers.Onthecontrary,section1,ArticleVIoftheConstitutionprovidesinclearandcertainlanguage:"The
legislativepowershallbevestedintheCongressofthePhilippineswhichshallconsistofaSenateandaHouseof
Representatives . . ." Note that in vesting legislative power exclusively to the Senate and the House, the
Constitutionusedtheword"shall."ItscommandforaCongressoftwohousesismandatory.Itisnotmandatory
sometimes.
In vesting legislative power to the Senate, the Constitution means the Senate ". . . composed of twentyfour
Senators...electedatlargebythequalifiedvotersofthePhilippines...."7Similarly,whentheConstitutionvested
thelegislativepowertotheHouse,itmeanstheHouse"...composedofnotmorethantwohundredandfiftymembers...
who shall be elected from legislative districts . . . and those who . . . shall be elected through a partylist system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." 8 The Constitution thus, did not vest on a Bicameral
Conference Committee with an ad hoc membership the power to legislate for it exclusively vested legislative power to the
Senate and the House as coequal bodies. To be sure, the Constitution does not mention the Bicameral Conference
Committees of Congress. No constitutional status is accorded to them. They are not even statutory creations. They owe
their existence from the internal rules of the two Houses of Congress. Yet, respondents peddle the disconcerting idea that
theyshouldberecognizedasaThirdChamberofCongressandwithexpostvetopoweratthat.
The thesis that a Bicameral Conference Committee can exercise law making power with expost veto power is
freighted with mischief. Law making is a power that can be used for good or for ill, hence, our Constitution
carefullylaidoutaplanandaprocedureforitsexercise.Firstly,itvouchsafedthatthepowertomakelawsshould
be exercised by no other body except the Senate and the House. It ought to be indubitable that what is
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
contemplated is the Senate acting as a full Senate and the House acting as a full House. It is only when the
SenateandtheHouseactaswholebodiesthattheytrulyrepresentthepeople.Anditisonlywhentheyrepresent
thepeoplethattheycanlegitimatelypasslaws.Lawsthatarenotenactedbythepeople'srightfulrepresentatives
subvert the people's sovereignty. Bicameral Conference Committees, with their ad hoc character and limited
membership,cannotpasslawsfortheydonotrepresentthepeople.TheConstitutiondoesnotallowthetyranny
ofthemajority.Yet,therespondentswillimposetheworstkindoftyrannythetyrannyoftheminorityoverthe
majority. Secondly, the Constitution delineated in deft strokes the steps to be followed in making laws. The
overriding purpose of these procedural rules is to assure that only bills that successfully survive the searching
scrutiny of the proper committees of Congress and the full and unfettered deliberations of both Houses can
becomelaws.Forthisreason,abillhastoundergothree(3)mandatoryseparatereadingsineachHouse.Inthe
case at bench, the additions and deletions made by the Bicameral Conference Committee did not enjoy the
enlightenedstudiesofappropriatecommittees.Itismeettonotethatthecomplexitiesofmoderndaylegislations
havemadeourcommitteesystemasignificantpartofthelegislativeprocess.ThomasReedcalledthecommittee
systemas"theeye,theear,thehand,andveryoftenthebrainofthehouse."PresidentWoodrowWilsonofthe
United States once referred to the government of the United States as "a government by the Chairman of the
Standing Committees of Congress. . . " 9 Neither did these additions and deletions of the Bicameral Conference
CommitteepassthroughthecoilsofcollectivedeliberationofthemembersofthetwoHousesactingseparately.Duetothis
shortcircuiting of the constitutional procedure of making laws, confusion shrouds the enactment of R.A. No. 7716. Who
inserted the additions and deletions remains a mystery. Why they were inserted is a riddle. To use a Churchillian phrase,
lawmakingshouldnotbeariddlewrappedinanenigma.Itcannotbe,forArticleII,section28oftheConstitutionmandates
the State to adopt and implement a "policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest." The
Constitution could not have contemplated a Congress of invisible and unaccountable John and Mary Does. A law whose
rationaleisariddleandwhoseauthorshipisobscurecannotbindthepeople.
Allthesenotwithstanding,respondentsresorttothelegalcosmetologythattheseadditionsanddeletionsshould
governthepeopleaslawsbecausetheBicameralConferenceCommitteeReportwasanywaysubmittedtoand
approvedbytheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentatives.Thesubmissionmayhavesomemeritwithrespectto
provisionsagreeduponbytheCommitteeintheprocessofreconcilingconflictsbetweenS.B.No.1630andH.B.
No.11197.Intheseinstances,theconflictingprovisionshadbeenpreviouslyscreenedbythepropercommittees,
deliberated upon by both Houses and approved by them. It is, however, a different matter with respect to
additionsanddeletionswhichwereentirelynewandwhichweremadenottoreconcileinconsistenciesbetween
S.B. No. 1630 and H.B. No. 11197. The members of the Bicameral Conference Committee did not have any
authoritytoaddnewprovisionsordeleteprovisionsalreadyapprovedbybothHousesasitwasnotnecessaryto
discharge their limited task of reconciling differences in bills. At that late stage of law making, the Conference
Committeecannotadd/deleteprovisionswhichcanbecomelawswithoutundergoingthestudyanddeliberationof
bothchambersgiventobillson1st,2nd,and3rdreadings.EventheSenateandtheHousecannotenactalaw
which will not undergo these mandatory three (3) readings required by the Constitution. If the Senate and the
Housecannotenactsuchalaw,neithercanthelesserBicameralConferenceCommittee.
Moreover, the socalled choice given to the members of both Houses to either approve or disapprove the said
additionsanddeletionsismoreofanopticalillusion.Theseadditionsanddeletionsarenotsubmittedseparately
for approval. They are tucked to the entire bill. The vote is on the bill as a package, i.e., together with the
insertionsanddeletions.Andthevoteiseither"aye"or"nay,"withoutanyfurtherdebateanddeliberation.Quite
often, legislators vote "yes" because they approve of the bill as a whole although they may object to its
amendmentsbytheConferenceCommittee.ThislackofrealchoiceiswellobservedbyRobertLuce:10
amendmentorelserejectedintoto.Theimpulseistogetdonewiththematterandsothemotionto
accept has undue advantage, for some members are sure to prefer swallowing unpalatable
provisionsratherthanprolongcontroversy.Thisisthemorelikelyifthereportcomesintherushof
businesstowardtheendofasession,whentoseekfurtherconferencemightresultinthelossofthe
measure altogether. At any time in the session there is some risk of such a result following the
rejectionofaconferencereport,foritmaynotbepossibletosecureasecondconference,ordelay
maygiveoppositiontothemainproposalchancetodevelopmorestrength.
Inasimilarvein,Prof.JackDaviescommentedthat"conferencereportsarereturnedtoassemblyandSenateon
a takeit or leaveitbasis, and the bodies are generally placed in the position that to leaveit is a practical
impossibility." 11 Thus, he concludes that "conference committee action is the most undemocratic procedure in the
legislativeprocess."12
The respondents also contend that the additions and deletions made by the Bicameral Conference Committee
wereinaccordwithlegislativecustomsandusages.Theargumentdoesnotpersuadeforitmisappreciatesthe
value of customs and usages in the hierarchy of sources of legislative rules of procedure. To be sure, every
legislative assembly has the inherent right to promulgate its own internal rules. In our jurisdiction, Article VI,
section16(3)oftheConstitutionprovidesthat"EachHousemaydeterminetherulesofitsproceedings..."Butit
ishornbooklawthatthesourcesofRulesofProcedurearemanyandhierarchicalincharacter.Masonlaidthem
downasfollows:13
xxxxxxxxx
1.RulesofProcedurearederivedfromseveralsources.Theprincipalsourcesareasfollows:
a.Constitutionalrules.
b.Statutoryrulesorcharterprovisions.
c.Adoptedrules.
d.Judicialdecisions.
e.Adoptedparliamentaryauthority.
f.Parliamentarylaw.
g.Customsandusages.
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
2.Therulesfromthedifferentsourcestakeprecedenceintheorderlistedaboveexceptthatjudicial
decisions, since they are interpretations of rules from one of the other sources, take the same
precedence as the source interpreted. Thus, for example, an interpretation of a constitutional
provisiontakesprecedenceoverastatute.
3.Wheneverthereisconflictbetweenrulesfromthesesourcestherulefromthesourcelistedearlier
prevails over the rule from the source listed, later. Thus, where the Constitution requires three
readingsofbills,thisprovisioncontrolsoveranyprovisionofstatute,adoptedrules,adoptedmanual,
or of parliamentary law, and a rule of parliamentary law controls over a local usage but must give
waytoanyrulefromahighersourceofauthority.(Emphasisours)
As discussed above, the unauthorized additions and deletions made by the Bicameral Conference Committee
violatedtheprocedurefixedbytheConstitutioninthemakingoflaws.Itisreasonlessforrespondentsthereforeto
justifytheseinsertionsassanctionedbycustomsandusages.
Finally,respondentsseeksanctuaryintheconclusivenessofanenrolledbilltobaranyjudicialinquiryonwhether
Congress observed our constitutional procedure in the passage of R.A. No. 7716. The enrolled bill theory is a
historicalrelicthatshouldnotcontinuouslyruleusfromthefossilizedpast.Itshouldbeimmediatelyemphasized
thattheenrolledbilltheoryoriginatedinEnglandwherethereisnowrittenconstitutionandwhereParliamentis
supreme.14Inthisjurisdiction,wehaveawrittenconstitutionandthelegislatureisabodyoflimitedpowers.Likewise,it
mustbepointedoutthatstartingfromthedecadeofthe40's,evenAmericancourtshaveveeredawayfromtherigidityand
unrealismoftheconclusivenessofanenrolledbill.Prof.Sutherlandobserved:15
xxxxxxxxx.
Wherethefailureofconstitutionalcomplianceintheenactmentofstatutesisnotdiscoverablefrom
the face of the act itself but may be demonstrated by recourse to the legislative journals, debates,
committeereportsorpapersofthegovernor,courtshaveusedseveralconflictingtheorieswithwhich
to dispose of the issue. They have held: (1) that the enrolled bill is conclusive and like the sheriff's
return cannot be attacked (2) that the enrolled bill is prima facie correct and only in case the
legislativejournalshowsaffirmativecontradictionoftheconstitutionalrequirementwillthebillbeheld
invalid,(3)thatalthoughtheenrolledbillisprimafaciecorrect,evidencefromthejournals,orother
extrinsicsourcesisadmissibletostrikethebilldown(4)thatthelegislativejournalisconclusiveand
the enrolled bill is valid only if it accords with the recital in the journal and the constitutional
procedure.
Various jurisdictions have adopted these alternative approaches in view of strong dissent and dissatisfaction
against the philosophical underpinnings of the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill. Prof. Sutherland further
observed:
...Numerousreasonshavebeengivenforthisrule.Traditionally,anenrolledbillwas"arecord"and
assuchwasnotsubjecttoattackatcommonlaw.Likewise,theruleofconclusivenesswassimilarto
thecommonlawruleoftheinviolabilityofthesheriff'sreturn.Indeed,theyhadthesameorigin,that
is, the sheriff was an officer of the king and likewise the parliamentary act was a regal act and no
official might dispute the king's word. Transposed to our democratic system of government, courts
held that as the legislature was an official branch of government the court must indulge every
presumptionthatthelegislativeactwasvalid.Thedoctrineofseparationofpowerswasadvancedas
astrongreasonwhythecourtshouldtreattheactsofacoordinatebranchofgovernmentwiththe
samerespectasittreatstheactionofitsownofficersindeed,itwasthoughtthatitwasentitledto
evengreaterrespect,elsethecourtmightbeinthepositionofreviewingtheworkofasupposedly
equal branch of government. When these arguments failed, as they frequently did, the doctrine of
convenience was advanced, that is, that it was not only an undue burden upon the legislature to
preserveitsrecordstomeettheattackofpersonsnotaffectedbytheprocedureofenactment,but
alsothatitunnecessarilycomplicatedlitigationandconfusedthetrialofsubstantiveissues.
Although many of these arguments are persuasive and are indeed the basis for the rule in many
states today, they are not invulnerable to attack. The rule most relied on the sheriff's return or
swornofficialruledidnotincivillitigationdeprivetheinjuredpartyofanaction,foralwayshecould
sue the sheriff upon his official bond. Likewise, although collateral attack was not permitted, direct
attackpermittedraisingtheissueoffraud,andatalaterdateattackinequitywasalsoavailableand
that the evidence of the sheriff was not of unusual weight was demonstrated by the fact that in an
actionagainstthesheriffnopresumptionofitsauthenticityprevailed.
Theargumentthattheenrolledbillisa"record"andthereforeunimpeachableislikewisemisleading,
forthecorrectionofrecordsisamatterofestablishedjudicialprocedure.Apparently,thejustification
iseitherthehistoricalonethattheking'swordcouldnotbequestionedortheseparationofpowers
principlethatonebranchofthegovernmentmusttreatasvalidtheactsofanother.
Persuasive as these arguments are, the tendency today is to avoid reaching results by artificial
presumptionsandthusitwouldseemdesirabletoinsistthattheenrolledbillstandorfallonthebasis
oftherelevantevidencewhichmaybesubmittedfororagainstit.
(Emphasisours)
Thus, as far back as the 1940's, Prof. Sutherland confirmed that ". . . the tendency seems to be toward the
abandonment of the conclusive presumption rule and the adoption of the third rule leaving only a prima facie
presumptionofvaliditywhichmaybeattackedbyanyauthoritativesourceofinformation."16
I am not unaware that this Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill as enunciated in the
1947leadcaseofMabanagv.LopezVito,andreiteratedinsubsequentcases.17
Withduerespect,Isubmitthattheserulingsarenolongergoodlaw.PartoftheratiocinationinMabanagstates:
xxxxxxxxx
If for no other reason than that it conforms to the expressed policy of our law making body, we
choose to follow the rule. Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No.
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2210, provides: "Official documents" may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the
PhilippineCommission,orofanylegislativebodythatmaybeprovidedforinthePhilippineIslands,
orofCongress,bythejournalsofthosebodiesorofeitherhousethereof,orbypublishedstatutesor
resolutions,orbycopiescertifiedbytheclerkorsecretary,orprintedbytheirorderProvided,Thatin
the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an
existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be
conclusiveproofoftheprovisionsofsuchActsandofthedueenactmentthereof.
Sufficetostatethatsection313oftheOldCodeofCivilProcedureasamendedbyActNo.2210isnolongerin
our statute books. It has long been repealed by the Rules of Court. Mabanag also relied on jurisprudence and
authoritiesintheUnitedStateswhichareunderseverecriticismsbymodernscholars.Hence,evenintheUnited
StatestheconclusivenessofanenrolledbillhasbeenjunkedbymostoftheStates.Itisalsotruethataslateas
lastyear,inthecaseofPhilippineJudgesAssociationv.Prado,op.cit.,thisCourtstillreliedontheconclusiveness
of an enrolled bill as it refused to invalidate a provision of law on the ground that it was merely inserted by the
bicameral conference committee of both Houses. Prado, however, is distinguishable. In Prado, the alleged
insertionofthesecondparagraphofsection35ofR.A.No.7354repealingthefrankingprivilegeofthejudiciary
doesnotappeartobeanuncontestedfact.Inthecaseatbench,thenumerousadditions/deletionsmadebythe
Bicameral Conference Committee as detailed by petitioners Tolentino and Salonga are not disputed by the
respondents. In Prado, the Court was not also confronted with the argument that it can no longer rely on the
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill in light of the new provision in the Constitution defining judicial power. More
specifically,section1ofArticleVIIInowprovides:
Sec.1.ThejudicialpowershallbevestedinoneSupremeCourtandinsuchlowercourtsasmaybe
establishedbylaw.
Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactualcontroversiesinvolvingrights
whicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andto determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentalityoftheGovernment.(Emphasissupplied)
Former Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, the sponsor of this provision in the Constitutional Commission
explainedthesenseandthereachofjudicialpowerasfollows:18
xxxxxxxxx
. . . In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not
onlyajudicialpowerbutadutytopassjudgmentonmattersofthisnature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter
evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute political
question.(Emphasisours)
TheConstitutioncannotbeanyclearer.WhatitgrantedtothisCourtisnotamerepowerwhichitcandeclineto
exercise.Preciselytodeterthisdisinclination,theConstitutionimposeditasadutyofthisCourttostrikedownany
act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion
amountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction.Rightlyorwrongly,theConstitutionhaselongatedthecheckingpowers
of this Court against the other branches of government despite their more democratic character, the President
andthelegislatorsbeingelectedbythepeople.
It is, however, theorized that this provision is nothing new. 19 I beg to disagree for the view misses the significant
changes made in our constitutional canvass to cure the legal deficiencies we discovered during martial law. One of the
areas radically changed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution is the imbalance of power between and among the three
great branches of our government the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary. To upgrade the powers of the
Judiciary,theConstitutionalCommissionstrengthenedsomemoretheindependenceofcourts.Thus,itfurtherprotectedthe
securityoftenureofthemembersoftheJudiciarybyproviding"NolawshallbepassedreorganizingtheJudiciarywhenit
underminesthesecurityoftenureofitsMembers."20ItalsoguaranteedfiscalautonomytotheJudiciary.21
More, it depoliticalized appointments in the judiciary by creating the Judicial and Bar Council which was tasked
with screening the list of prospective appointees to the judiciary. 22 The power of confirming appointments to the
judiciarywasalsotakenawayfromCongress.23ThePresidentwaslikewisegivenaspecifictimetofillupvacanciesinthe
judiciaryninety(90)daysfromtheoccurrenceofthevacancyincaseoftheSupremeCourt 24andninety(90)daysfrom
thesubmissionofthelistofrecommendeesbytheJudicialandBarCouncilincaseofvacanciesinthelowercourts. 25To
furtherinsulateappointmentsinthejudiciaryfromthevirusofpolitics,theSupremeCourtwasgiventhepowerto"appoint
allofficialsandemployeesoftheJudiciaryinaccordancewiththeCivilServiceLaw." 26Andtomaketheseparationofthe
judiciary from the other branches of government more watertight, it prohibited members of the judiciary to be " . . .
designated to any agency performing quasi judicial or administrative functions." 27While the Constitution strengthened the
sinews of the Supreme Court, it reduced the powers of the two other branches of government, especially the Executive.
NotableofthepowersofthePresidentclippedbytheConstitutionishispowertosuspendthewritofandtoproclaimmartial
law.TheexerciseofthispowerisnowsubjecttorevocationbyCongress.Likewise,thesufficiencyofthefactualbasisfor
theexerciseofsaidpowermaybereviewedbythisCourtinanappropriateproceedingfiledbyanycitizen.habeas corpus
28
Theprovisiondefiningjudicialpowerasincludingthe"dutyofthecourtsofjustice...todeterminewhetherornot
therehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranch
orinstrumentalityoftheGovernment"constitutesthecapstoneoftheeffortsoftheConstitutionalCommissionto
upgradethepowersofthisCourtvisavistheotherbranchesofgovernment.Thisprovisionwasdictatedbyour
experienceundermartiallawwhichtaughtusthatastrongerandmoreindependentjudiciaryisneededtoabort
abuses in government. As sharply stressed by petitioner Salonga, this provision is distinctly Filipino and its
interpretationshouldnotbedepreciatedbyunduerelianceoninapplicableforeignjurisprudence.Itisthuscrystal
clear that unlike other Supreme Courts, this Court has been mandated by our new Constitution to be a more
active agent in annulling acts of grave abuse of discretion committed by a branch of government or any of its
officials. This new role, however, will not compel the Court, appropriately defined by Prof. A. Bickel as the least
dangerousbranchofgovernment,toassumeimperialpowersandrunroughshodovertheprincipleofseparation
of power for that is judicial tyranny by any language. But while respecting the essential of the principle of
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separation of power, the Court is not to be restricted by its nonessentials. Applied to the case at bench, by
voiding R.A. No. 7716 on the ground that its enactment violated the procedure imposed by the Constitution in
lawmaking,theCourtisnotbyanymeanswreckingthewallseparatingthepowersbetweenthelegislatureand
thejudiciary.Forinsodoing,theCourtisnotengaginginlawmakingwhichistheessenceoflegislativepower.
ButtheCourt'sinterpositionofpowershouldnotbedefeatedbytheconclusivenessoftheenrolledbill.Aresortto
thisfictionwillresultintheenactmentoflawsnotproperlydeliberateduponandpassedbyCongress.Certainly,
theenrolledbilltheorywasnotconceivedtocoverupviolationsoftheconstitutionalprocedureinlawmaking,a
procedureintendedtoassurethepassageofgoodlaws.Theconclusivenessoftheenrolledbillcan,therefore,be
disregardedforitisnotnecessarytopreservetheprincipleofseparationofpowers.
Insum,IsubmitthatinimposingtothisCourtthedutytoannulactsofgovernmentcommittedwithgraveabuseof
discretion,thenewConstitutiontransformedthisCourtfrompassivitytoactivism.Thistransformation,dictatedby
our distinct experience as a nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions,thisCourtapproachedconstitutionalviolationsbyinitiallydeterminingwhatitcannotdounderthe
1987Constitution,thereisashiftinstressthisCourtismandatedtoapproachconstitutionalviolationsnotby
finding out what it should not do but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not
resuscitatingapastthatpetrifiesthepresent.
IvotetodeclareR.A.No.7716unconstitutional.
BELLOSILLO,J.:
Withaconsensusalreadyreachedafterduedeliberations,silenceperhapsshouldbethebetterpartofdiscretion,
excepttovote.Thedifferentviewsandopinionsexpressedaresopersuasiveandconvincingtheyaremorethan
enoughtoswaythependulumfororagainstthesubjectpetitions.Thepenetratingandscholarlydissertationsof
my brethren should dispense with further arguments which may only confound and confuse even the most
learnedofmen.
Butthereisacrucialpoint,aconstitutionalissuewhich,Isubmit,hasbeenbelittled,treatedlightly,ifnotalmost
consideredinsignificantandpurposeless.Itiselementary,asmuchasitisfundamental.Iamreferringtotheword
"exclusively" appearing in Sec. 24, Art. VI, of our 1987 Constitution. This is regrettable, to say the least, as it
involvesaconstitutionalmandatewhich,wittinglyorunwittingly,hasbeencastasideastrivialandmeaningless.
A comparison of the particular provision on the enactment of revenue bills in the U.S. Constitution with its
counterpartinthePhilippineConstitutionwillhelpexplainmyposition.
UndertheU.S.Constitution,"[a]llbillsforraisingrevenueshalloriginateintheHouseofRepresentativesbutthe
Senatemayproposeorconcurwithamendmentsasonotherbills"(Sec.7,par.[1],Art.I).Incontrast,our1987
Constitution reads: "All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
localapplication,andprivatebillsshalloriginateexclusivelyintheHouseofRepresentatives,buttheSenatemay
proposeorconcurwithamendments"(Sec.24,Art.VIEmphasissupplied).
As may be gleaned from the pertinent provision of our Constitution, all revenue bills are required to originate
"exclusively" in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, the U.S. Constitution does not use the word
"exclusively"itmerelysays,"[a]llbillsforraisingrevenueshalloriginateintheHouseofRepresentatives."
Since the term "exclusively" has already been adequately defined in the various opinions, as to which there
seemstobenodispute,Ishallnolongeroffermyowndefinition.
Verily, the provision in our Constitution requiring that all revenue bills shall originate exclusively from the Lower
House is mandatory. The word "exclusively" is an "exclusive word," which is indicative of an intent that the
provisionismandatory. 1Hence,allAmericanauthoritiesexpoundingonthemeaningandapplicationofSec.7,par.(1),
Art.I,oftheU.S.ConstitutioncannotbeusedintheinterpretationofSec.24,Art.VI,ofour1987Constitutionwhichhasa
distinctfeatureof"exclusiveness"allitsown.Thus,whenourConstitutionabsolutelyrequiresasitismandatorythat
aparticularbillshouldexclusivelyemanatefromtheLowerHouse,thereisnoalternativetotherequirementthatthebillto
becomevalidlawmustoriginateexclusivelyfromthatHouse.
Intheinterpretationofconstitutions,questionsfrequentlyariseastowhetherparticularsectionsaremandatoryor
directory. The courts usually hesitate to declare that a constitutional provision is directory merely in view of the
tendency of the legislature to disregard provisions which are not said to be mandatory. Accordingly, it is the
general rule to regard constitutional provisions as mandatory, and not to leave any discretion to the will of the
legislature to obey or disregard them. This presumption as to mandatory quality is usually followed unless it is
unmistakablymanifestthattheprovisionsareintendedtobemerelydirectory.Sostrongistheinclinationinfavor
ofgivingobligatoryforcetothetermsoftheorganiclawthatithasevenbeensaidthatneitherbythecourtsnor
by any other department of the government may any provision of the Constitution be regarded as merely
directory, but that each and everyone of its provisions should be treated as imperative and mandatory, without
referencetotherulesanddistinguishingbetweenthedirectoryandthemandatorystatutes.2
The framers of our 1987 Constitution could not have used the term "exclusively" if they only meant to replicate
and adopt the U.S. version. By inserting "exclusively" in Sec. 24, Art. VI, of our Constitution, their message is
clear:theywanteditdifferent,strong,stringent.Theremustbeacompellingreasonfortheinclusionoftheword
"exclusively," which cannot be an act of retrogression but progression, an improvement on its precursor. Thus,
"exclusively" must be given its true meaning, its purpose observed and virtue recognized, for it could not have
beenconceivedtobeofminorconsequence.Thatconstructionistobesoughtwhichgiveseffecttothewholeof
thestatuteitseveryword..
intotoUtmagisvaleatquampereat
Consequently,anyreferencetoAmericanauthorities,decisionsandopinions,howeverwiselyanddelicatelyput,
canonlymisleadintheinterpretationofourownConstitution.Torefertothemindefendingtheconstitutionalityof
R.A. 7716, subject of the present petitions, is to argue on a false premise, , that Sec. 24, Art. VI, of our 1987
Constitutionis,ormeansexactly,thesameasSec.7,par.(1),Art.I,oftheU.S.Constitution,whichisnotcorrect.
Hence,onlyawrongconclusioncanbedrawnfromawrongpremise.
i.e.
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Forexample,itisarguedthatintheUnitedStates,fromwhereourownlegislatureispatterned,theSenatecan
practicallysubstituteitsowntaxmeasureforthatoftheLowerHouse.Thus,accordingtotheMajority,citingan
Americancase,"thevalidityofSec.37whichtheSenatehadinsertedintheTariffActof1909byimposingantax
based on the weight of vessels, was upheld against the claim that the revenue bill originated in the Senate in
contraventionofArt.I,Sec.7,oftheU.S.Constitution."
advalorem3Inanefforttobemoreconvincing,theMajorityevenquotesthefootnoteinwhichreadsIntroductionto
AmericanGovernmentbyF.A.OggandP.O.Ray
Thus in 1883 the upper house struck out everything after the enacting clause of a tariff bill and wrote its own
measure, which the House eventually felt obliged to accept. It likewise added 847 amendments to the Payne
Aldrich tariff act of 1909, dictated the schedules of the emergency tariff act of 1921, rewrote an extensive tax
revisionbillinthesameyear,andrecastmostofthepermanenttariffbillof1922
which in fact suggests, very clearly, that the subject revenue bill actually originated from the Lower House and
wasonlyamended,perhapsconsiderably,bytheSenate
afteritwaspassedbytheformerandtransmittedtothelatter.
Inthecasescited,wherethestatutespassedbytheU.S.Congresswereupheld,therevenuebillsdidnotactually
originate from the Senate but, in fact, from the Lower House. Thus, the Supreme Court of the United States,
speakingthroughChiefJusticeWhitein
Raineyv.UnitedStates5upheldtherevenuebillpassedbyCongressandadoptedtherulingofthelowercourtthat
...thesectioninquestionisnotvoidasabillforraisingrevenueoriginatingintheSenateandnotintheHouseof
Representatives. It appears that the section was proposed by the Senate as an amendment to a bill for raising
revenuewhichoriginatedintheHouse.Thatissufficient.
Flintv.StoneTracyCo.,
6onwhichtheSolicitorGeneralheavilyleansinhisConsolidatedCommentaswellasinhisMemorandum,doesnotsupport
thethesisoftheMajoritysincethesubjectbillthereinactuallyoriginatedfromtheLowerHouseandnotfromtheSenate,
andtheamendmentmerelycoveredacertainprovisionintheHousebill.
Infine,inthecasescitedwhichwereliftedfromAmericanauthorities,itappearsthattherevenuebillsinquestion
actually originated from the House of Representatives and were amended by the Senate only after they were
transmitted to it. Perhaps, if the factual circumstances in those cases were exactly the same as the ones at
bench, then the subject revenue or tariff bill may be upheld in this jurisdiction on the principle of substantial
compliance,astheywereintheUnitedStates,exceptpossiblyininstanceswheretheHousebillundergoeswhat
isnowreferredtoas"amendmentbysubstitution,"forthatwouldbeinderogationofourConstitutionwhichvests
solely in the House of Representatives the power to initiate revenue bills. A Senate amendment by substitution
simply means that the bill in question did not in effect originate from the lower chamber but from the upper
chamberandnotdisguisesitselfasamereamendmentoftheHouseversion.
ItisalsotheorizedthatintheU.S.,amendmentbysubstitutionisrecognized.Thatmaybetrue.Buttheprocess
may be validly effective only under the U.S. Constitution. The cases before us present a totally different factual
backdrop.SeveralmonthsbeforetheLowerHousecouldevenpassHBNo.11197,P.S.Res.No.734andSBNo.
1129 had already been filed in the Senate. Worse, the Senate subsequently approved SB No. 1630 "in
substitutionofSBNo.1129,takingintoconsiderationP.S.Res.No.734andHBNo.11197,"andnotHBNo.11197
itself "as amended." Here, the Senate could not have proposed or concurred with amendments because there
was nothing to concur with or amend except its own bill. It must be stressed that the process of concurring or
amendingpresupposesthatthereexistsabilluponwhichconcurrencemaybebasedoramendmentsintroduced.
The Senate should have reported out HB No. 11197, as amended, even if in the amendment it took into
consideration SB No. 1630. It should not have submitted to the Bicameral Conference Committee SB No. 1630
which,admittedly,didnotoriginatefromtheLowerHouse.
exclusively
ButevenassumingthatinourjurisdictionarevenuebilloftheLowerHousemaybeamendedbysubstitutionby
theSenatealthoughIamnotpreparedtoacceptitinviewofSec.24,Art.VI,ofourConstitutionstillR.A.
7716couldnothavebeentheresultofamendmentbysubstitutionsincetheSenatehadnoHousebilltospeakof
thatitcouldamendwhentheSenatestarteddeliberatingonitsownversion.
Be that as it may, I cannot rest easy on the proposition that a constitutional mandate calling for the exclusive
powerandprerogativeoftheHouseofRepresentativesmayjustbediscardedandignoredbytheSenate.Since
the Constitution is for the observance of all the judiciary as well as the other departments of government
and the judges are sworn to support its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its
commands. And it is not fair and just to impute to them undue interference if they look into the validity of
legislativeenactmentstodeterminewhetherthefundamentallawhasbeenfaithfullyobservedintheprocess.Itis
their duty to give effect to the existing Constitution and to obey all constitutional provisions irrespective of their
opinionastothewisdomofsuchprovisions.
Theruleisfixedthatthedutyinapropercasetodeclarealawunconstitutionalcannotbedeclinedandmustbe
performedinaccordancewiththedeliberatejudgmentofthetribunalbeforewhichthevalidityoftheenactmentis
directlydrawnintoquestion.Whenitisclearthatastatutetransgressestheauthorityvestedinthelegislatureby
theConstitution,itisthedutyofthecourtstodeclaretheactunconstitutionalbecausetheycannotshirkfromit
withoutviolatingtheiroathsofoffice.ThisdutyofthecourtstomaintaintheConstitutionasthefundamentallawof
thestateisimperativeandunceasingand,asChiefJusticeMarshalsaid,wheneverastatuteisinviolationofthe
fundamentallaw,thecourtsmustsoadjudgeandtherebygiveeffecttotheConstitution.Anyothercoursewould
lead to the destruction of the Constitution. Since the question as to the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial
matter, the courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action might be taken by
politicalagenciesindisregardofthejudgmentofthejudicialtribunals.
7
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ItismysubmissionthatthepowerandauthoritytooriginaterevenuebillsunderourConstitutionisvestedinthe
HouseofRepresentatives.ItsmembersbeingmorenumerousthanthoseoftheSenate,electedmorefrequently,
and more directly represent the people, are therefore considered better aware of the economic life of their
individualconstituencies.Itisjustproperthatrevenuebillsoriginatefromthem.
exclusivelyexclusively
Inthisregard,wedonothavetodevotemuchtimedelvingintoAmericandecisionsandopinionsandinvokethem
in the interpretation of our own Constitution which is different from the American version, particularly on the
enactment of revenue bills. We have our own Constitution couched in a language our own legislators thought
best. Insofar as revenue bills are concerned, our Constitution is not American it is distinctively Filipino. And no
amplitudeoflegerdemaincandetractfromourconstitutionalrequirementthatallappropriation,revenueortariff
bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate in the
HouseofRepresentatives,althoughtheSenatemayproposeorconcurwithamendments.
exclusively
Inthismilieu,IamleftnooptionbuttovotetograntthepetitionsandstrikedownR.A.7716asunconstitutional.
#SeparateOpinions
NARVASA,C.J.:
Ifullyconcurwiththeconclusionssetforthinthescholarlyopinionofmylearnedcolleague,MrJusticeVicenteV.
Mendoza.Iwritethisseparateopiniontoexpressmyownviewsrelativetotheproceduralissuesraisedbythe
variouspetitionsanddeathwithbysomeotherMembersoftheCourtintheirseparateopinions.
Bytheirverynature,itwouldseem,discussionsofconstitutionalissuesprovefertilegroundforanotuncommon
phenomenon:debatemarkedbypassionatepartisanshipamountingsometimestoimpatiencewithadverse
views,aneagernessonthepartoftheproponentsoneachsidetoassumetheroleof,orbeperceivedas,
staunchdefendersofconstitutionalprinciples,manifestingitselfinflightsofrhetoric,evenhyperbole.Theperilin
this,obviously,isadiminutionofobjectivitythatqualitywhich,onthepartofthosechargedwiththedutyand
authorityofinterpretingthefundamentallaw,isoftheessenceoftheirgreatfunction.FortheCourt,more
perhapsthanforanyotherpersonorgroup,itisnecessarytomaintainthatdesirableobjectivity.Itmustmake
certainthatonthisasonanyotheroccasion,thejudicialfunctionismeticulouslyperformed,thefactsascertained
ascomprehensivelyandasaccuratelyaspossible,alltheissuesparticularlyidentified,alltheargumentsclearly
understoodelse,itmayitselfbeaccused,byitsownmembersorbyothers,ofalackofadherenceto,ora
carelessobservanceof,itsownprocedures,thesignaturesofitsindividualmembersonitsenrolledverdicts
notwithstanding.
InthematternowbeforetheCourt,andwhateverreservationssomepeoplemayentertainabouttheirintellectual
limitationsormoralscruples,Icannotbringmyselftoacceptthethesiswhichnecessarilyimpliesthatthe
membersofouraugustCongress,inenactingtheexpandedVATlaw,exposedtheirignorance,orindifferenceto
theobservance,oftherulesofproceduresetdownbytheConstitutionorbytheirrespectivechambers,orwhatis
worse,deliberatelyignoredthoserulesforsomeyetundiscoveredpurposenefariousinnature,oratleastsome
purposeotherthanthepublicwealorthatafewoftheirfellows,actingasabicameralconferencecommittee,by
deviousschemesandcunningmaneuvers,andinconspiracywithofficialsoftheExecutiveDepartmentand
others,succeededin"pullingthewoolovertheeyes"ofalltheirothercolleaguesandfoistingonthemabill
containingprovisionsthatneitherchamberofourbicamerallegislatureconceivedorcontemplated.Thisisthe
thesisthatthepetitionerswouldhavethisCourtapprove.ItisathesisIconsiderbereftofanyfactualorlogical
foundation.
Otherthanthebaredeclarationsofsomeofthepetitioners,orargumentsfromtheuseandimportofthe
languageemployedintherelevantdocumentsandrecords,thereisnoevidencebeforetheCourtadequateto
supportafindingthatthelegislatorsconcerned,whetheroftheupperorlowerchamber,actedotherwisethanin
goodfaith,inthehonestdischargeoftheirfunctions,inthesincerebeliefthattheestablishedprocedureswere
beingregularlyobservedor,atleast,thatthereoccurrednoseriousorfataldeviationtherefrom.Thereisno
evidenceonwhichreasonablytorestaconclusionthatanyexecutiveorotherofficialtookpartinorunduly
influencedtheproceedingsbeforethebicameralconferencecommittee,orthatthemembersofthelatterwere
motivatedbyadesiretosurreptitiouslyintroduceimproperrevisionsinthebillswhichtheywererequiredto
reconcile,orthatafteragreementhadbeenreachedonthemodeandmannerofreconciliationofthe
"disagreeingprovisions,"hadresortedtostratragemsoremployedunderhandedploystoensuretheirapproval
andadoptionbyeitherHouse.NeitheristhereanyproofthatinvotingontheBicameralConferenceCommittee
(BCC)versionofthereconciledbills,themembersoftheSenateandtheHousedidsoinignoranceof,orwithout
understanding,thecontentsthereoforthebillsthereinreconciled.
AlsounacceptableisthetheorythatsincetheConstitutionrequiresappropriationandrevenuebillstooriginate
exclusivelyintheHouseofRepresentatives,itisimproperifnotunconstitutionalfortheSenatetoformulate,or
eventhinkaboutformulating,itsowndraftofthistypeofmeasureinanticipationofreceiptofonetransmittedby
thelowerChamber.Thisisspeciallycogentasregardsmuchpublicizedsuggestionsforlegislation(likethe
expandedVATLaw)emanatingfromoneormorelegislators,orfromtheExecutiveDepartment,ortheprivate
sector,etc.whichunderstandablycouldbeexpectedtoforthwithgeneratemuchCongressionalcogitation.
Exclusiveorigination,Isubmit,shouldhavenoreferencetotimeofconception.Asapracticalmatter,origination
shouldrefertotheaffirmativeactwhicheffectivelyputsthebicamerallegislativeprocedureinmotion,,the
transmissionbyonechambertotheotherofabillforitsadoption.Thisisthepurposefulactwhichsetsthe
legislativemachineryinoperationtoeffectivelyleadtotheenactmentofastatute.Untilthistransmissiontakes
place,theformulationanddiscussions,orthereadingforthreeormoretimesofproposedmeasuresineither
chamber,wouldbemeaninglessinthecontextoftheactivityleadingtowardsconcretelegislation.Unless
transmittedtotheotherchamber,abillpreparedbyeitherhousecannotpossiblybecomelaw.Inotherwords,the
firstaffirmative,efficaciousstep,theoperativeactasitwere,leadingtoactualenactmentofastatute,isthe
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
transmissionofabillfromonehousetotheotherforactionbythelatter.Thisistheoriginationthatisspokenofin
theConstitutioninitsArticleVI,Section24,inreferencetoappropriation,revenue,ortariffbills,etc.
i.e.
ItmaybethatintheSenate,revenueortaxmeasuresarediscussed,evendrafted,andthisbeforeasimilar
activitytakesplaceintheHouse.Thisisofnomoment,solongasthosemeasuresor
MISSINGPAGE3
Report(No.349)statingthatHB11197was,andrecommendingthatSB1630beapproved"insubstitutionof
S.B.No.1129,takingintoconsiderationP.S.Res.No.734
considered 1
andH.B.No.11197."ThisReportmadeknowntotheSenate,andclearly
indicates,thatH.B.No.11197wasindeeddeliberatedonbytheCommitteeintruth,asSenatorHerrerapointedout,the
BCClater"agreedtoadopt(abroadercoverageoftheVAT)whichiscloselyadheringtotheSenateversion****withsome
newprovisionsoramendments."TheplainimplicationisthattheSenateCommitteehadindeeddiscussedHB11197in
comparisonwiththeinconsistentpartsofSB1129andafterwardsproposedamendmentstotheformerintheformofanew
bill(No.1630)morecloselyakintotheSenatebill(No.1129).
Anditisasreasonabletosupposeasnotthatlater,duringthesecondandthirdreadingsonMarch24,1994,the
Senators,assembledasabody,hadbeforethemcopiesofHB11197andSB1129,aswellasoftheCommittee's
new"SB1630"thathadbeenrecommendedfortheirapproval,orattheveryleastwereotherwiseperfectly
awarethattheywereconsideringtheparticularprovisionsofthesebills.Thattherewassuchadeliberationinthe
SenateonHB11197inlightofinconsistentportionsofSB1630,mayfurtherbenecessarilyinferredfromthe
request,madebytheSenateonthesameday,March24,1994,fortheconvocationofabicameralconference
committeetoreconcile"thedisagreeingprovisionsofsaidbill(SB1630)andHouseBillNo.11197,"arequestthat
couldnothavebeenmadehadnottheSenatorsmoreorlesscloselyexaminedtheprovisionsofHB11197and
comparedthemwiththoseofthecounterpartSenatemeasures.
Weretheproceedingsbeforethebicameralconferencecommitteefatallyflawed?Theaffirmativeissuggested
becausethecommitteeallegedlyoverlookedorignoredthefactthatSB1630couldnotvalidlyoriginateinthe
Senate,andthatHB11197andSB1630neverproperlypassedbothchambers.Theuntenabilityofthese
contentionshasalreadybeendemonstrated.Now,demonstrationoftheindefensibilityofotherarguments
purportingtoestablishtheimproprietyoftheBCCproceedingswillbeattempted.
Thereistheargument,forinstance,thattheconferencecommitteeneverusedHB11197evenas"frameof
reference"becauseitdoesnotappearthatthesuggestiontherefor(madebyHousePenalChairmanExequiel
Javieratthebicameralconferencecommittee'smeetingonApril19,1994,withtheconcurrenceofSenator
Maceda)waseverresolved,theminutesbeingregrettablyvagueastowhatoccurredafterthatsuggestionwas
made.Itis,however,asreasonabletoassumethatitwas,asitwasnot,giventhevaguenessoftheminutes
alreadyalludedto.Infact,areadingoftheBCCReportpersuasivelydemonstratesthatHB11197wasnotonly
utilizedasa"frameofreference"butactuallydiscussedanddeliberatedon.
SaidBCCReportpertinentlystates:
2
TheConferenceCommitteeonofHouseBillNo.11197,entitled:
thedisagreeingprovisions
ANACTRESTRUCTURINGTHEVALUEADDEDTAX(VAT)SYSTEMTOWIDENITSTAXBASEAND
ENHANCEITSADMINISTRATION,AMENDINGFORTHESEPURPOSESSECTIONS99,100,102,1013,
104,105,106,107,108AND110OFTITLEIV,112,115AND116OFTITLEV,AND236,237,AND238
OFTITLEIX,ANDREPEALINGSECTIONS113SDAND114OFTITLEV,ALLOFTHENATIONAL
INTERNALREVENUECODE,ASAMENDED
ANACTRESTRUCTURINGTHEVALUEADDEDTAX(VAT)SYSTEMTOWIDENITSTAXBASEAND
ENHANCEITSADMINISTRATION,AMENDINGFORTHESEPURPOSESSECTIONS99,100,102,103,
104,1106,107,108AND110OFTITLEIV,112,115,117AND121OFTITLEV,ACND236,237,AND238
OFTITLEIX,ANDREPEALINGSECTIONS1113,114,116,119AND120OFTITLEV,ALLOFTHE
NATIONALINTERNALREVENUECODE,ASAMENDEDANDFOROTHERPURPOSES
havingmet,after,hasagreedtorecommendanddoherebyrecommendtotheirrespectiveHousesthat,
beapprovedinaccordancewiththeattachedcopyofthebillasbytheconferees.
fullandfreeconferenceHouseBillNo.11197,inconsolidationwithSenateBillNo.1630reconciledandapproved
Approved.
TheReport,itwillbenoted,explicitlyadvertstoHouseBillNo.11197,itbeinginfactmentionedaheadofSenate
BillNo.1630graphicallyshowstheverycloseidentityofthesubjectsofbothbills(indicatedintheirrespective
titles)andclearlysaysthatthecommitteemetinofbothbills(obviouslyinanefforttoreconcilethem)andthat
reconciliationofsaid"disagreeingprovisions"hadbeeneffected,theBCChavingagreedthat"HouseBillNo.
11197,inconsolidationwithSenateBillNo.1630,beapprovedinaccordancewiththeattachedcopyofthebill
andapprovedbytheconferees."
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
"fullandfreeconference"onthe"disagreeingprovisions"asreconciled
Itmaybeconcluded,inotherwords,that,conformablytotheprocedureprovidedintheConstitutionwithwhichall
theMembersofthebicameralconferencecommitteecannotbutbepresumedtobefamiliar,andnoprooftothe
contraryhavingbeenadducedonthepoint,itwastheoriginalbill(HB11197)whichsaidbodyhadconsidered
anddeliberatedonindetail,reconciledorharmonizedwithSB1630,andusedasbasisfordrawingupthe
amendedversioneventuallyreportedoutandsubmittedtobothhousesofCongress.
ItisfurthercontendedthattheBCCwascreatedandconvokedprematurely,thatSB1630shouldfirsthavebeen
senttotheHouseofRepresentativesforconcurrenceItismaintained,inotherwords,thatthelatterchamber
shouldhaverefusedtheSenaterequestforabicameralconferencecommitteetoreconcilethe"disagreeing
provisions"ofbothbills,andshouldhaverequiredthatSB1630befirsttransmittedtoit.This,seemingly,isnit
pickinggiventheurgencyoftheproposedlegislationascertifiedbythePresident(tobothhouses,infact).Time
wasoftheessence,accordingtothePresident'sbestjudgmentasregardswhichabsolutelynooneineither
chamberofCongresstookexception,generalacceptancebeingonthecontraryotherwisemanifestedandthat
judgmenttheCourtwillnotnowquestion.Inlightofthaturgency,whatwassovitalorindispensableaboutsucha
transmittalthatitsabsencewouldinvalidateallelsethathadbeendonetowardsenactmentofthelaw,completely
escapesme,speciallyconsideringthattheHousehadimmediatelyaccededwithoutdemurtotherequestfor
convocationoftheconferencecommittee.
Whathasjustbeensaidshoulddisposeoftheargumentthatthestatementintheenrolledbill,that"ThisAct
whichisaofHouseBillNo.11197andSenateBillNo.11630wasfinallypassedbytheHouseofRepresentatives
andtheSenateonApril27,1994andMay2,1994,"necessarilysignifiesthatthereweretwo(2)billsseparately
introduced,retainingtheirindependentexistenceuntiltheyreachedthebicameralconferencecommitteewhere
theywere,andtherefore,theVATlawdidnotoriginateexclusivelyintheHousehavingoriginatedinpartinthe
SenateasSB1630,whichbillwasnotembodiedinbutmerelymergedwithHB11197,retainingitsseparate
identityuntilitwasjoinedbytheBCCwiththehousemeasure.Themorelogical,andfairer,courseistoconstrue
theexpression,"consolidationofHouseBillNo.11197andSenateBillNo.11630"inthecontextofaccompanying
andcontemporaneousstatements,.:(a)thedeclarationintheBCCReport,,thatthecommitteemettoreconcile
thedisagreeingprovisionsofthetwobills,"andafterfullandfreeconference"onthematter,agreedandso
recommendedthat"HouseBillNo.11197,inconsolidationwithSenateBillNo.1630,beapprovedinaccordance
withtheattachedcopyofthebillasreconciledandapprovedbytheconferees"and(b)theavermentofSenator
Herrera,intheReportoftheWaysandMeansCommittee,,thatthecommitteehadactually"considered"
(discussed)HBNo.11197andtakenit"intoconsideration"inrecommendingthatitsownversionofthemeasure
(SB1630)betheoneapproved.
consolidationconsolidatedi.esuprasupra
ThattheSenatemighthavedrawnupitsownversionoftheexpandedVATbill,contemporaneouslywithoreven
beforetheHousedid,isofnomoment.ItbearsrepeatinginthisconnectionthatnoVATbilleverintheSenate
neitheritsSB1129orSB1630oranyofitsdraftswaseverofficiallytransmittedtotheHouseasaninitiatingbill
which,asalreadypointedout,iswhattheConstitutionforbidsitwasHB11197thatwasfirstsenttotheSenate,
underwentfirstreading,wasreferredtoCommitteeonWaysandMeansandtherediscussedinrelationtoandin
comparisonwiththecounterpartSenateversionorversionsthemereformulationofwhichwas,asalsoalready
discussed,notprohibitedtoitandafterwardsconsideredbytheSenateitself,alsoinconnectionwithSB1630,
onsecondandthirdreadings.HB11197wasinthetruestsense,theoriginatingbill.
originated
Anissuehasalsoarisenrespectingthesocalled"enrolledbilldoctrine"which,itissaid,whateversacrosanct
statusitmightoriginallyhaveenjoyed,isnowinbadodorwithmodernscholarsonaccountofitsimputedrigidity
andunrealismitbeingalsosubmittedthattherulingin(78Phil.1)andthecasesreaffirmingit,isnolongergood
law,itbeingbasedonaprovisionoftheCodeofCivilProcedure
Mabanagv.LopezVito3longsincestrickenfromthestatutebooks.
Iwouldmyselfconsiderthe"enrolledbill"theoryaslayingdownapresumptionofsostrongacharacterastobe
wellnighabsoluteorconclusive,fullyinaccordwiththefamiliarandfundamentalphilosophyofseparationof
powers.Theresult,asfarasIamconcerned,istomakediscussionoftheenrolledbillprinciplepurelyacademic
forasalreadypointedout,thereisnoproofworthyofthenameofanyfactstojustifyitsreexaminationand,
possibly,disregard.
Theotherquestionis,whatisthenatureofthepowergiventoabicameralconferencecommitteeofreconciling
differencesbetween,or"disagreeingprovisions"in,abilloriginatingfromtheHouseinrelationtoamendments
proposedbytheSenatewhetherasregardssomeorallofitsprovisions?Isthemodeofreconciliation,subject
tofixedprocedureandguidelines?Whatexactlycanthecommitteedo,ornotdo?Canitonlyclarifyorrevise
provisionsfoundineitherSenateorHousebill?Isitforbiddentoproposeadditionalornewprovisions,evenon
mattersnecessarilyorreasonablyconnectedwithorgermanetoitemsinthebillsbeingreconciled?
Inanswer,itispostulatedthatthereconciliationfunctionisquitelimited.Inthesecases,theconference
committeeshouldhaveconfineditselftoreconciliationofdifferencesorinconsistenciesonlyby(a)restoring
provisionsofHB11197aliminatedbySB1630,or(b)sustainingwhollyorpartlytheSenateamendments,or(c)as
acompromise,agreeingthatneitherprovisionsnoramendmentsbecarriedintothefinalformofHB11197for
submissiontobothchambersofthelegislature.
Thetroubleis,itistheorized,thecommitteeincorporatedactivitiesortransactionswhichwerenotwithinthe
contemplationofbothbillsitmadeadditionsanddeletionswhichdidnotenjoytheenlightenmentofinitial
committeestudiesitexercisedwhatisknownasan"vetopower"grantedtoitbynolaw,ruleorregulation,a
powerthatintruthisdeniedtoitbytherulesofboththeSenateandtheHouse.Insubstantiation,theSenaterule
iscited,similartothatoftheHouse,providingthat"differencesshallbesettledbyaconferencecommittee"whose
reportshallcontain"detailedandsufficientlyexplicitstatementofthechangesinoramendmentstothesubject
measure,**(tobe)signedbytheconferees"aswellasthe"Jefferson'sManual,"adoptedbytheSenateas
supplementtoitsownrules,directingthatthemanagersoftheconferencemustconfinethemselvesto
differencessubmittedtothemtheymaynotincludesubjectsnotwithinthedisagreementseventhoughgermane
toaquestioninissue."
expost
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
Itissignificantthatthelimitingprovisointherelevantruleshasbeenconstruedandappliedasdirectory,not
mandatory.Duringtheoralargument,counselforpetitionersadmittedthatthepracticefordecadeshasbeenfor
bicameralconferencecommitteestoincludesuchprovisionsinthereconciledbillastheybelievedtobegermane
ornecessaryandacceptabletobothchambers,evenifnotwithinanyofthe"disagreeingprovisions,"andthe
reconciledbills,containingsuchprovisionshadinvariablybeenapprovedandadoptedbybothhousesof
Congress.Itisapractice,theysay,thatshouldbestopped.Butitisapracticethatestablishesinnouncertain
mannertheprevailingconceptinbothhousesofCongressofthepermissibleandacceptablemodesof
reconciliationthattheirconferencecommitteesmayadopt,onewhoseundesirabilityisnotallthatpatentifnot,
indeed,incapableofunquestionabledemonstration.Thefactisthatconferencecommitteesonlytakeupbills
whichhavealreadybeenfreelyandfullydiscussedinbothchambersofthelegislature,butastowhichthereis
needofreconciliationinviewof"disagreeingprovisions"betweenthemandbothchambersentrustthefunction
ofreconcilingthebillstotheirdelegatesataconferencecommitteewithfullawareness,andtacitconsent,that
conformablywithestablishedpracticeunquestioninglyobservedovermanyyears,newprovisionsmaybe
includedevenifnotwithinthe"disagreeingprovisions"butofwhich,togetherwithotherchanges,theywillbe
givendetailedandsufficientlyexplicitinformationpriortovotingontheconferencecommitteeversion.
Inanyevent,afairlyrecentdecisionwrittenfortheCourtbySeniorAssociateJusticeIsaganiA.Cruz,
promulgatedonNovember11,1993(G.R.No.105371,.),shouldleavenodoubtofthecontinuingvitalityofthe
enrolledbilldoctrineandgiveaninsightintothenatureofthereconcilingfunctionofbicameralconference
committees.Inthatcase,abilateralconferencecommitteewasconstitutedandmettoreconcileSenateBillNo.
720andHouseBillNo.4200.Itadopteda"reconciled"measurethatwassubmittedtoandapprovedbyboth
chambersofCongressandultimatelysignedintolawbythePresident,asR.A.No.7354.Aprovisioninthis
statute(removingthefrankingprivilegefromthecourts,amongothers)wasassailedasbeinganinvalid
amendmentbecauseitwasnotincludedintheoriginalversionofeitherthesenateorthehousebillandhence
hadgeneratednodisagreementbetweenthemwhichhadtobereconciled.TheCourtheld:
ThePhilippineJudgesAssociation,etc.,etal.v.Hon.PetePrado,etc.,etal
Aconferencecommitteemaydealgenerallywiththesubjectmatteroritmaybelimitedtoresolvingtheprecise
differencesbetweenthetwohouses.Evenwheretheconferencecommitteeisnotbyrulelimitedinitsjurisdiction,
legislativecustomseverelylimitsthefreedomwithwhichnewsubjectmattercanbeinsertedintotheconference
bill.Butoccasionallyaconferencecommitteeproducesunexpectedresults,resultsbeyonditsmandate.These
excursionsoccurevenwheretherulesimposestrictlimitationsonconferencecommitteejurisdiction.Thisis
symptomaticoftheauthoritarianpowerofconferencecommittee(Davies,LegislativeLawandProcess:InA
Nutshell,1987Ed.,p.81).
ItisamatterofrecordthattheConferenceCommitteeReportonthebillinquestionwasreturnedtoandduly
approvedbyboththeSenateandtheHouseofRepresentatives.Thereafter,thebillwasenrolledwithits
certificationbySenatePresidentNeptaliA.GonzalesandSpeakerRamonV.MitraoftheHouseof
RepresentativesashavingbeendulypassedbybothHousesofCongress.Itwasthenpresentedtoand
approvedbyPresidentCorazonC.AquinoonApril3,1992.
Underthedoctrineofseparationofpowers,theCourtmaynotinquirebeyondthecertificationoftheapprovalofa
billfromthepresidingofficersofCongress.CascoPhilippineChemicalCo.v.Gimenez(7SCRA347)laiddown
therulethattheenrolledbillisconclusiveupontheJudiciary(exceptinmattersthathavetobeenteredinthe
journalsliketheandonthefinalreadingofthebill)(Mabanagv.LopezVito,78Phil.1).Thejournalsare
themselvesalsobindingontheSupremeCourt,asweheldintheold(butstillvalid)caseofU.S.v.Pons(34Phil.
729),whereweexplainedthereasonthus:
yeasnays
ToinquireintotheveracityofthejournalsofthePhilippinelegislaturewhentheyare,aswehavesaid,clearand
explicit,wouldbetoviolateboththeletterandspiritoftheorganiclawsbywhichthePhilippineGovernmentwas
broughtintoexistence,toinvadeacoordinateandindependentdepartmentoftheGovernment,andtointerfere
withthelegitimatepowersandfunctionsoftheLegislature.Applyingtheseprinciples,weshalldeclinetolookinto
thepetitioners'chargesthatanamendmentwasmadeuponthelastreadingofthebillthateventuallyR.A.No.
7354andthatcopiesthereofinitsfinalformwerenotdistributedamongthemembersofeachHouse.Boththe
enrolledbillandthelegislativejournalscertifythatthemeasurewasdulyenacted,inaccordancewithArticleVI,
Sec.26(2)oftheConstitution.Weareboundbysuchofficialassurancesfromacoordinatedepartmentofthe
government,towhichweowe,attheveryleast,abecomingcourtesy.
i.e.
Withal,ananalysisofthechangesmadebytheconferencecommitteeinHB11197andSB1630bywayof
reconcilingtheir"disagreeingprovisions,"assailedbypetitionersasunauthorizedorincongrouousreveals
thatmanyofthechangesrelatedtoactual"disagreeingprovisions,"andthatthosethatmightperhapsbe
consideredasentirelynewareneverthelessnecessarilyorlogicallyconnectedwithorgermanetoparticular
mattersinthebillsbeingreconciled.
Forinstance,thechangemadebythebicameralconferencecommittee(BCC)concerningamendmentsto
Section99oftheNationalInternalRevenueCode(NIRC)theadditionof""isreallyareconciliationof
disagreeingprovisions,forwhileHB11197mentionsasamongthosesubjecttotax,"onewhosells,barters,or
exchangesgoodsorpropertiesand,"SB1630doesnot.Thechangealsomerelyclarifiestheprovisionby
providingthatthecontemplatedtaxpayersincludes"importers."Therevisionasregardstheamendmentto
Section100,NIRC,isalsosimplereconciliation,beingnothingmorethantheadoptionbytheBCCoftheprovision
inHB11197governingthesaleofgoldtoBangkoSentral,incontrasttoSB1630containingnosuchprovision.
Similarly,onlysimplereconciliationwasinvolvedasregardsapprovalbytheBCCofaprovisiondeclaringasnot
exempt,thesaleofrealpropertiesprimarilyheldforsaletocustomersorheldforleaseintheordinarycourseof
tradeorbusiness,whichprovisionisfoundinHB11197butnotinSB1630asregardstheadoptionbytheBCC
ofaprovisiononlifeinsurancebusiness,containedinSB1630butnotfoundinHB11197asregardsadoptionby
theBCCoftheprovisioninSB1630fordefermentoftaxoncertaingoodsandservicesfornolongerthan3
years,astowhichtherewasnocounterpartprovisioninSB11197andasregardsthefixingofaperiodforthe
adoptionofimplementingrules,aperiodbeingprescribedinSB1630andnoneinHB11197.
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
lessorsofgoodsorpropertiesandimportersofgoodsanypersonwholeasespersonalproperties
Inrespectofotherrevisions,itwouldseemthatquestionslogicallyaroseinthecourseofthediscussionof
specific"disagreeingprovisions"towhichanswersweregivenwhich,becausebelievedacceptabletobothhouses
ofCongress,wereplacedintheBCCdraft.Forexample,duringconsiderationof(Sec.100,NIRC)dealtwithin
bothHouseandSenatebills,thequestionapparentlycameup,therelevanceofwhichisapparentonitsface,
relativeto.Hence,aprovisionintheBCCbillonthematter.Again,whiledeliberatingonthedefinitionofgoodsor
propertiesinrelationtotheprovisionsubjectingsalesthereoftotax,aquestionapparentlyarose,logically
relevant,aboutrealpropertiesintendedtobesoldbyapersonineconomicdifficulties,orbecausehewishesto
buyacar,,notaspartofabusiness,theBCCevidentlyresolvedtoclarifythematterbyexcludingfromthetax,
"."Andinthecourseofconsiderationoftheterm,(Sec102,NIRC),theinquirymostprobablywasposedasto
whetherthetermshouldbeunderstoodasincludingotherservices:e.g.,servicesoflessorsofpropertywhether
realorpersonal,ofwarehousemen,ofkeepersofresthouses,pensionhouses,inns,resorts,orofcommon
carriers,etc.,andpresumablytheBCCresolvedtoclarifythematterbyincludingtheservicesjustmentioned.
Surely,changesofthisnatureareobviouslytobeexpectedinproceedingsbeforebicameralconference
committeesandmayevenbeconsideredgristfortheirmill,giventhehistoryofsuchBCCsandtheirgeneral
practicehereandabroad
radioandtelevisiontimesatellitetransmissionandcabletelevisiontimei.e.realpropertiesheldprimarilyforsaleto
customersorheldforleaseintheordinarycourseofbusinesssaleorexchangeofservices
Inanycase,allthechangesandrevisions,anddeletions,madebytheconferencecommitteewereall
subsequentlyconsideredbyandapprovedbyboththeSenateandtheHouse,meetingandvotingseparately.Itis
anunacceptabletheorization,torepeat,thatwhentheBCCreportanditsproposedbillweresubmittedtothe
SenateandtheHouse,themembersthereofdidnotbothertoread,orwhatisworse,havingreaddidnot
understand,whatwasbeforethem,ordidnotrealizethattherewerenewprovisionsinthereconciledversion
unrelatedtoany"disagreeingprovisions,"orthatsaidnewprovisionsorrevisionswereeffectivelyconcealedfrom
them
Moreover,itcertainlywasentirelywithinthepowerandprerogativeofeitherlegislativechambertorejecttheBCC
billandrequiretheorganizationofanewbicameralconferencecommittee.Thatthisoptionwasnotexercisedby
eitherhouseonlyprovesthattheBCCmeasurewasfoundtobeacceptableasinfactitwasapprovedand
adoptedbybothchambers.
IvotetoDISMISSthepetitionsforlackofmerit.
PADILLA,J.:
TheoriginalVATlawandtheexpandedVATlaw
InKapatiranv.Tan,
1wheretheponentewasthewriterofthisSeparateOpinion,aSupremeCourtupheldthevalidityoftheoriginalVATlaw
(ExecutiveOrderNo.273,approvedon25July1987).Itwill,inmyview,bepointlessatthistimetoreopenarguments
advancedinsaidcaseastowhysaidVATlawwasinvalid,anditwillbeequallyredundanttorestatetheprincipleslaid
downbytheCourtinthesamecaseaffirmingthevalidityoftheVATlawasataxmeasure.Andyet,thesamearguments
are,ineffect,marshalledagainstthemeritsandsubstanceoftheexpandedVATlaw(Rep.Act.No.7716,approvedon5
May1994).ThesameSupremeCourtdecisionshouldthereforedispose,inthemain,ofsucharguments,fortheexpanded
VATlawispredicatedbasicallyonthesameprinciplesastheoriginalVATlaw,exceptthatnowthetaxbaseoftheVAT
impositionhasbeenexpandedorbroadened.unanimousenbanc
Itonlyneedstobestatedwhatactuallyshouldbeobviousthatataxmeasure,liketheexpandedVATlaw
(RepublicAct.No.7716),isenactedbyCongressandapprovedbythePresidentintheexerciseoftheState's
powertotax,whichisanattributeofsovereignty.Andwhilethepowertotax,ifexercisedwithoutlimit,isapower
todestroy,andshould,therefore,notbeallowedinsuchform,ithastobeequallyrecognizedthatthepowerto
taxisanessentialrightofgovernment.Withouttaxes,basicservicestothepeoplecancometoahalteconomic
progresswillbestunted,and,inthelongrun,thepeoplewillsufferthepainsofstagnationandretrogression.
Consequently,uponcarefuldeliberation,IhavenodifficultyinreachingtheconclusionthattheexpandedVATlaw
comeswithinthelegitimatepowerofthestatetotax.AndasIhadoccasiontopreviouslystate:
ConstitutionalLaw,tobeginwith,isconcernedwithpowernotpoliticalconvenience,wisdom,exigency,oreven
necessity.NeithertheExecutivenorthelegislative(CommissiononAppointments)cancreatepowerwherethe
Constitutionconfersnone."
2
Likewise,inthefirstVATcase,Isaid:
Inanyevent,ifpetitionersseriouslybelievethattheadoptionandcontinuedapplicationoftheVATareprejudicial
tothegeneralwelfareortheinterestsofthemajorityofthepeople,theyshouldseek,recourseandrelieffromthe
politicalbranchesofthegovernment.TheCourt,followingthetimehonoreddoctrineofseparationofpowers,
cannotsubstituteitsjudgmentforthatofthePresident(andCongress)astothewisdom,justiceandadvisability
oftheadoptionoftheVAT.
ThisCourtshouldnot,asarule,concernitselfwithquestionsofpolicy,muchless,economicpolicy.Thatisbetter
lefttothetwo(2)politicalbranchesofgovernment.ThattheexpandedVATlawisunwise,unpopularandeven
antipoor,amongotherthingssaidagainstit,areargumentsandconsiderationswithintherealmofpolicydebate,
whichonlyCongressandtheExecutivehavetheauthoritytodecisivelyconfront,alleviate,remedyandresolve.
II
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
TheprocedurefollowedintheapprovalofRep.ActNo.7716
PetitionershoweverpositthatthepresentcaseraisesafarreachingconstitutionalquestionwhichtheCourtis
dutyboundtodecideunderitsexpandedjurisdictioninthe1987Constitution.
4PetitionersmorespecificallyquestionandimpugnthebywhichtheexpandedVATlaw(Rep.Act.No.7716)wasapproved
byCongress.TheycontendthatitwasapprovedinviolationoftheConstitutionfromwhichfactitfollows,asa
consequence,thatthelawisnullandvoid.MainrelianceofthepetitionersintheirassaultinSection24,Art.VIofthe
Constitutionwhichprovides:manner
Sec.24.Allappropriation,revenueortariffbills,billsauthorizingincreaseofthepublicdebt,billoflocal
application,andprivatebillsshalloriginateexclusivelyintheHouseofRepresentatives,buttheSenatemay
proposeorconcurwithamendments.
Whileitshouldbeadmittedattheoutsetthattherewasnorigorousandstrictadherencetotheliteralcommandof
theaboveprovision,itmayhoweverbesaid,aftercarefulreflection,thattherewaswiththeprovision.
substantialcompliance
ThereisnoquestionthatHouseBillNo.11197expandingtheVATlaworiginatedfromtheHouseof
Representatives.ItisundeniablyaHousemeasure.Ontheotherhand,SenateBillNo.1129,alsoexpandingthe
VATlaw,originatedfromtheSenate.ItisundeniablyaSenatemeasurewhich,,actuallyantedatedHouseBillNo.
11197.
inpointoftime
ButitisofrecordthatwhenHouseBillNo.11197was,afterapprovalbytheHouse,senttotheSenate,itwas
referredto,andconsideredbytheSenateCommitteeonWaysandMeans(afterfirstreading)togetherwith
SenateBillNo.1129,andtheCommitteecameoutwithSenateBillNo.1630insubstitutionofSenateBillNo.
1129butafterexpresslytakingintoconsiderationHouseBillNo.11197.
SincetheSenateis,undertheabovequotedconstitutionalprovision,empoweredtoconcurwitharevenue
measureexclusivelyoriginatingfromtheHouse,ortoproposeamendmentsthereto,totheextentofproposing
amendmentsbySUBSTITUTIONtotheHousemeasure,theapprovalbytheSenateofSenateBillNo.1630,after
ithadconsideredHouseBillNo.11197,maybetaken,inmyview,asanAMENDMENTBYSUBSTITUTIONby
theSenatenotonlyofSenateBillNo.1129butofHouseBillNo.11197aswellwhich,itmustberemembered,
originatedexclusivelyfromtheHouse.
Butthen,inrecognitionofthefactthatHouseBillNo.11197whichoriginatedexclusivelyfromtheHouseand
SenateBillNo.1630containedconflictingprovisions,bothbills(HouseBillNo.11197andSenateBillNo.1630)
werereferredtotheBicameralConferenceCommitteeforjointconsiderationwithaviewtoreconcilingtheir
conflictingprovisions.
TheConferenceCommitteecameouteventuallywithaConferenceCommitteeBillwhichwassubmittedtoboth
chambersofCongress(theSenateandtheHouse).TheConferenceCommitteereportedoutabillconsolidating
provisionsinHouseBillNo.11197andSenateBillNo.1630.Whattranspiredinbothchambersafterthe
ConferenceCommitteeReportwassubmittedtothemisnotclearfromtherecordsinthiscase.Whatisclear
howeveristhatbothchambersvotedseparatelyonthebillreportedoutbytheConferenceCommitteeandboth
chambersapprovedthebilloftheConferenceCommittee.
Tomethen,whatshouldreallybeimportantisthatbothchambersofCongressapprovedthebillreportedoutby
theConferenceCommittee.Inmyconsideredview,theactofbothchambersofCongressinapprovingthe
ConferenceCommitteebill,shouldputanendtoanyinquirybythisCourtastohowthebillcameabout.Whatis
more,suchseparateapprovalsCUREDwhateverconstitutionalinfirmitiesmayhavearisenintheprocedures
leadingtosuchapprovals.For,ifsuchinfirmitieswereseriousenoughtoimpugntheveryvalidityofthemeasure
itself,therewouldhavebeenanobjectionorobjectionsfrommembersofbothchamberstotheapproval.The
Courthasbeenshownnosuchobjectiononrecordinbothchambers.
PetitionerscontendthattherewereviolationsofSec.26paragraph2,ArticleVIoftheConstitutionwhichprovides:
SEC.26....
(2)NobillpassedbyeitherHouseshallbecomealawunlessithaspassedthreereadingsonseparatedays,and
printedcopiesthereofinitsfinalformhavebeendistributedtoitsMembersthreedaysbeforeitspassage,except
whenthePresidentcertifiestothenecessityofitsimmediateenactmenttomeetapubliccalamityoremergency.
Uponthelastreadingofabill,noamendmenttheretoshallbeallowed,andthevotethereonshallbetaken
immediatelythereafter,andtheyeasandnaysenteredintheJournal.
inthat,whenSenateBillNo.1630(theSenatecounterpartofHouseBillNo.11197)wasapprovedbytheSenate,
afterithadbeenreportedoutbytheSenateCommitteeonWaysandMeans,thebillwentthroughsecondand
thirdreadingsonthesameday(notseparatedays)andprintedcopiesthereofinitsfinalformwerenotdistributed
tothemembersoftheSenateatleastthree(3)daysbeforeitspassagebytheSenate.Butwearetoldbythe
respondentsthatthereasonforthis"shortcut"wasthatthePresidenthadcertifiedtothenecessityofthebill's
immediateenactmenttomeetanemergencyacertificationthat,byleaveofthesameconstitutionalprovision,
dispensedwiththesecondandthirdreadingsonseparatedaysandtheprintedformatleastthree(3)days
beforeitspassage.
WehaveherethenasituationwherethePresidentdidcertifytothenecessityofSenateBillNo.1630'simmediate
enactmenttomeetanemergencyandtheSenaterespondedaccordingly.WhileIwouldbethelasttosaythatthis
CourtcannotreviewtheexerciseofsuchpowerbythePresidentinappropriatecasesripeforjudicialreview,Iam
notpreparedhowevertosaythatthePresidentgravelyabusedhisdiscretionintheexerciseofsuchpowerasto
requirethatthisCourtoverturnhisaction.Wehavebeenshownnofactorcircumstancewhichwouldimpugnthe
judgmentofthePresident,concurredinbytheSenate,thattherewasanemergencythatrequiredtheimmediate
enactmentofSenateBillNo.1630.Ontheotherhand,abecomingrespectforacoequalandcoordinate
departmentofgovernmentpointsthatweightandcredibilitybegiventosuchPresidentialjudgment.
TheauthorityorpoweroftheConferenceCommitteetomakeinsertionsinanddeletionsfromthebillsreferredto
it,namely,HouseBillNo.11197andSenateBillNo.1630islikewiseassailedbypetitioners.Again,whatappears
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
importanthereisthatbothchambersapprovedandratifiedthebillasreportedoutbytheConferenceCommittee
(withthereportedinsertionsanddeletions).Thisisperhapsattributabletotheknownlegislativepracticeof
allowingaConferenceCommitteetomakeinsertionsinanddeletionsfrombillsreferredtoitforconsideration,as
longastheyaregermanetothesubjectmatterofthebillsunderconsideration.Besides,whentheConference
Committeemadetheinsertionsanddeletionscomplainedofbypetitioners,wasitnotactuallyperformingthetask
assignedtoitofreconcilingconflictingprovisionsinHouseBillNo.11197andSenateBillNo.1630?
ThisCourtimpliedlyifnotexpresslyrecognizedthefactofsuchlegislativepracticein
PhilippineJudgesAssociation,etc.vs.Hon.PeterPrado,etc.,5Insaidcase,westatedthus:
ThepetitionersalsoinvokeSec.74oftheRulesoftheHouseofRepresentatives,requiringthatamendmentto
anybillwhentheHouseandtheSenateshallhavedifferencesthereonmaybesettledbyaconferencecommittee
ofbothchambers.TheystressthatSec.35wasneverasubjectofanydisagreementbetweenbothHousesand
sothesecondparagraphcouldnothavebeenvalidlyaddedasanamendment.
Theseargumentsareunacceptable.
andtheHouse,isdescribedthus:
itisnotlimitedinitsjurisdictiontothisquestion.Itsbroaderfunction
Aconferencecommitteemaydealgenerallywiththesubjectmatteroritmaybelimitedtoresolvingtheprecise
legislativecustomseverelylimitsthefreedomwithwhichnewsubjectmattercanbeinsertedintotheconference
bill.Butoccasionallyaconferencecommitteeproducesunexpectedresults,resultsbeyonditsmandate.These
excursionsoccursevenwheretherulesimposestrictlimitationsonconferencecommitteejurisdiction.Thisis
symptomaticoftheauthoritarianpowerofconferencecommittee
(Davies,LegislativeLawandProcess:InANutshell,1986Ed.,p.81).
ItisamatterofrecordthattheConferenceCommitteeReportonthebillinquestionwasreturnedtoandduly
approvedbyboththeSenateandtheHouseofRepresentatives.Thereafter,thebillwasenrolledwithits
certificationbySenatePresidentNeptaliA.GonzalesandSpeakerRamonV.MitraoftheHouseof
RepresentativesashavingbeendulypassedbybothHousesofCongress.Itwasthenpresentedtoand
approvedbyPresidentCorazonC.AquinoonApril3,1992.
ItwouldseemthatifcorrectivemeasuresareinordertothepowersoftheConferenceCommittee,theremedy
shouldcomefromeitherorbothchambersofCongress,notfromthisCourt,underthetimehonoreddoctrineof
separationofpowers.
clip
Finally,ascertifiedbytheSecretaryoftheSenateandtheSecretaryGeneraloftheHouseofRepresentatives
ThisAct(Rep.ActNo.7716)isaconsolidationofHouseBillNo.11197andSenateBillNo.1630(w)asfinally
passedbytheHouseofRepresentativesandtheSenateonApril27,1994andMay2,1994respectively.
Underthelongaccepteddoctrineofthe"enrolledbill,"theCourtindeferencetoacoequalandcoordinate
branchofgovernmentisheldtoarecognitionofRep.ActNo.7716asalawvalidlyenactedbyCongressand,
thereafter,approvedbythePresidenton5May1994.Again,wequotefromoutrecentdecisionin:
PhilippineJudgesAssociation,supra
Underthedoctrineofseparationofpowers,theCourtmaynotinquirebeyondthecertificationoftheapprovalofa
billfromthepresidingofficersofCongress.laiddowntherulethattheenrolledbillisconclusiveupontheJudiciary
(exceptinmattersthathavetobeenteredinthejournalsliketheandonthefinallyreadingofthebill).The
journalsarethemselvesalsobindingontheSupremeCourt,asweheldintheold(butstillvalid)caseof,
CascoPhilippineChemicalCo.v.GimenezyeasnaysU.S.vs.Pons8whereweexplainedthereasonthus:
ToinquireintotheveracityofthejournalsofthePhilippinelegislaturewhentheyare,aswehavesaid,clearand
explicit,wouldbetoviolateboththeletterandspiritoftheorganiclawsbywhichthePhilippineGovernmentwas
broughtintoexistence,toinvadeacoordinateandindependentdepartmentoftheGovernment,andtointerfere
withthelegitimatepowersandfunctionsoftheLegislature.
Applyingtheseprinciples,weshalldeclinetolookintothepetitioners'chargesthatanamendmentwasmade
uponthelastreadingofthebillthateventuallybecameR.A.No.7354andthatcopiesthereofinitsfinalformwere
notdistributedamongthemembersofeachHouse.Boththeenrolledbillandthelegislativejournalscertifythat
themeasurewasdulyenacted,inaccordancewithArticleVI,Sec.26(2)oftheConstitution.Weareboundby
suchofficialassurancesfromacoordinatedepartmentofthegovernment,towhichweowe,attheveryleast,a
becomingcourtesy.
i.e.
III
PressFreedomandReligiousFreedomandRep.ActNo.7716
ThevalidityofthepassageofRep.ActNo.7716notwithstanding,certainprovisionsofthelawhavetobe
examinedseparatelyandcarefully.
Rep.Act.No.7716inimposingavalueaddedtaxoncirculationincomeofnewspapersandsimilarpublications
andonincomederivedfrompublishingadvertisementsinnewspapers
9,tomymind,violatesSec.4,Art.IIIoftheConstitution.Indeed,eventheExecutiveDepartmenthastriedtocurethis
defectbytheissuanceoftheBIRRegulationNo.precludingimplementationofthetaxinthisarea.Itshouldbeclear,
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
however,thattheBIRregulationcannotamendthelaw(Rep.ActNo.7716).Onlylegislation(asdistinguishedfrom
administrationregulation)canamendanexistinglaw.1194
FreedomofthepresswasvirtuallyunknowninthePhilippinesbefore1900.Infact,aprimecauseofthe
revolutionagainstSpainattheturnofthe19centurywastherepressionofthefreedomofspeechandexpression
andofthepress.Nolessthanournationalhero,Dr.JoseP.Rizal,in""(ThePhilippinesaCenturyHence)
describingthereformswhichtheFilipinoswereinsistingupon,stated:"Theminister...whowantshisreformsto
bereforms,mustbeginbydeclaringthepressinthePhilippinesfree...".
thFilipinasDespuesdeCienAnossinequibusnon10
PressfreedominthePhilippineshasmetrepressions,mostnotableofwhichwastheclosureofalmostallforms
ofexistingmassmediaupontheimpositionofmartiallawon21September1972.
Section4,Art.IIIoftheConstitutionmaybetracedtotheUnitedStatesFederalConstitution.Theguaranteeof
freedomofexpressionwasplantedinthePhilippinesbyPresidentMcKinleyintheMagnaCartaofPhilippine
Liberty,InstructionstotheSecondPhilippineCommissionon7April1900.
Thepresentconstitutionalprovisionwhichreads:
Sec.4Nolawshallbepassedabridgingthefreedomofspeech,ofexpression,orofthepress,ortherightofthe
peoplepeaceablytoassembleandpetitionthegovernmentforredressofgrievances.
isessentiallythesameasthatguaranteedintheU.S.FederalConstitution,forwhichreason,Americancaselaw
givingjudicialexpressionastoitsmeaningishighlypersuasiveinthePhilippines.
Theplainwordsoftheprovisionrevealtheclearintentionthatcanbeimposedontheexerciseoffreespeechand
expressioniftheyaretoremaineffectiveandmeaningful.
nopriorrestraint
TheU.S.SupremeCourtintheleadingcaseof
Grosjeanv.AmericanPressCo.Inc @=.11declaredastatuteimposingagrossreceiptslicensetaxof2%oncirculationandadvertisingincomeof
newspaperpublishersasconstitutingapriorrestraintwhichiscontrarytotheguaranteeoffreedomofthepress.
In
BantamBooks,Inc.v.Sullivan 12 ,theU.S.SupremeCourtstated:"Anysystemofpriorrestraintofexpressioncomestothis
Courtbearingaheavypresumptionagainstitsconstitutionality."
Inthisjurisdiction,priorrestraintontheexerciseoffreeexpressioncanbejustifiedonlyonthegroundthatthere
isaclearandpresentdangerofasubstantiveevilwhichtheStatehastherighttoprevent
13.
Inthepresentcase,thetaximposedoncirculationandadvertisingincomeofnewspaperpublishersisinthe
natureofaoncirculationandfreeexpressionand,absentaclearshowingthattherequisiteforpriorrestraintis
present,theconstitutionalflawinthelawisatonceapparentandshouldnotbeallowedtoproliferate.
priorrestraint
Similarly,theimpositionoftheVATonthesaleanddistributionofreligiousarticlesmustbestruckdownforbeing
contrarytoSec.5,Art.IIIoftheConstitutionwhichprovides:
Sec.5.Nolawshallbemaderespectinganestablishmentofreligion,orprohibitingthefreeexercisethereof.The
freeexerciseandenjoymentofreligiousprofessionandworship,withoutdiscriminationorpreference,shall
foreverbeallowed.Noreligioustestshallberequiredfortheexerciseofcivilorpoliticalrights.
Thatsuchataxonthesaleanddistributionofreligiousarticlesisunconstitutional,hasbeenlongsettledin
AmericanBibleSociety,.
supra
Insofar,therefore,asRep.ActNo.7716imposesavalueaddedtaxontheexerciseoftheabovediscussedtwo
(2)basicconstitutionalrights,Rep.ActNo.7716shouldbedeclaredunconstitutionalandofnolegalforceand
effect.
IV
PetitionsofCREBAandPALandRep.ActNo.7716
TheChamberofRealEstateandBuilder'sAssociation,Inc.(CREBA)fileditsownpetition(GRNo.11574)arguing
thattheprovisionsofRep.ActNo.7716imposinga10%valueaddedtaxonthegrosssellingpriceorgrossvalue
inmoneyofeverysale,barterorexchangeofgoodsorproperties(Section2)anda10%valueaddedtaxon
grossreceiptsderivedfromthesaleorexchangeofservices,includingtheuseorleaseofproperties(Section3),
violatetheequalprotection,dueprocessandnonimpairmentprovisionsoftheConstitutionaswellastherule
thattaxationshouldbeuniform,equitableandprogressive.
Theissueofwhetherornotthevalueaddedtaxisuniform,equitableandprogressivehasbeensettledin.
Kapatiran
CREBAwhichspecificallyassailsthe10%valueaddedtaxonthegrosssellingpriceofrealproperties,failsto
distinguishbetweenasaleofrealpropertiesprimarilyheldforsaletocustomersorheldforleaseintheordinary
courseoftradeorbusinessandisolatedsalesbyindividualrealpropertyowners(Sec.103[s]).Thatthose
engagedinthebusinessofrealestatedevelopmentrealizegreatprofitsisofcommonknowledgeandneednot
bediscussedatlengthhere.Thequalificationinthelawthatthe10%VATcoversonlysalesofrealproperty
primarilyheldforsaletocustomers,fortradeorbusinessthustakesintoconsiderationataxpayer'scapacityto
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
pay.Thereisnoshowingthattheconsequentdistinctioninrealestatesalesisarbitraryandinviolationofthe
equalprotectionclauseoftheConstitution.TheinherentpowertotaxoftheState,whichisvestedinthe
legislature,includesthepowertodeterminewhomorwhattotax,aswellashowmuchtotax.Intheabseenceof
aclearshowingthatthetaxviolatesthedueprocessandequalprotectionclausesoftheConstitution,thisCourt,
inkeepingwiththedoctrineofseparationofpowers,hastodefertothediscretionandjudgmentofCongresson
thispoint.
i.e.
PhilippineAirlines(PAL)inaseparatepetition(G.R.No.115852)claimsthatitsfranchiseunderPDNo.1590
whichmakesitliableforafranchisetaxofonly2%ofgrossrevenues"inlieuofalltheotherfeesandchargesof
anykind,natureordescription,imposed,levied,established,assessedorcollectedbyanymunicipal,city,
provincial,ornationalauthorityorgovernmentagency,noworinthefuture,"cannotbeamendedbyRep.ActNo.
7716astomakeit(PAL)liablefora10%valueaddedtaxonrevenues,becauseSec.24ofPDNo.1590provides
thatPAL'sfranchisecanonlybeamended,modifiedorrepealedbyaspeciallawspecificallyforthatpurpose.
ThevalidityofPAL'saboveargumentcanbetestedbyascertainingthetrueintentionofCongressinenacting
Rep.ActNo.7716.Sec.4thereofdealingwithExemptTransactionsstates:
Section103.ExemptTransactions.Thefollowingshallbeexemptfromthevalueaddedtax:
xxxxxxxxx
(q)Transactionswhichareexemptunderspeciallaws,66,529,972,1491,,..."(Italicssupplied)
exceptthosegrantedunderPresidentialDecreesNo.1590
TherepealingclauseofRep.ActNo.7716furtherreads:
Sec.20.Repealingclauses.repealed.
Theprovisionsofanyspeciallawrelativetotherateoffranchisetaxesareherebyexpressly
xxxxxxxxx
Allotherlaws,orders,issuances,rulesandregulationsorpartsthereofinconsistentwiththisActarehereby
repealed,amendedormodifiedaccordingly(italicssupplied)
Therecanbenodispute,inmymind,thattheclearintentofCongresswastomodifyPAL'sfranchisewithrespect
tothetaxesithastopay.Tothisextent,Rep.ActNo.7716canbeconsideredasaamendingPAL'sfranchiseand
itstaxliabilitythereunder.ThatRep.Act.No.7716imposesthevalueaddedtaxesonothersubjectsdoesnot
makeitagenerallawwhichcannotamendPDNo.1590.
speciallaw
Tosumup:itismyconsideredviewthatRep.ActNo.7716(theexpandedvalueaddedtax)isavalidlaw,viewed
frombothsubstantiveandproceduralstandards,exceptonlyinsofarasitviolatesSecs.4and5,Art.IIIofthe
Constitution(theguaranteesoffreedomofexpressionandthefreeexerciseofreligion).Tothatextent,itis,inits
presentform,unconstitutional.
I,therefore,votetoDISMISSthepetitions,subjecttotheabovequalification.
VITUG,J.:
Lestwebelostbyaquagmireoftrifles,therealthresholdandprejudicialissue,tomymind,iswhetherornotthis
Courtisreadytoassumeandtotakeuponitselfwithanoverridingauthoritytheowesomeresponsibilityof
overseeingtheentirebureaucracy.Farfromit,oursismerelytoconstrueandtoapplythelawregardlessofits
wisdomandsalutariness,andtostrikeitdownonlywhenitclearlydisregardsconstitutionalproscriptions.Itis
whatthefundamentallawmandates,anditiswhattheCourtmustdo.Icannotyetconcedetothenoveltheory,
sochallenginglyprovocativeasitmightbe,thatunderthe1987ConstitutiontheCourtmaynowatgoodliberty
intrude,intheguiseofthepeople'simprimatur,intoeveryaffairofthegovernment.Whatsignificancecanstill
thenremain,Iask,ofthetimehonoredandwidelyacclaimedprincipleofseparationofpowers,ifateveryturnthe
Courtallowsitselftopassupon,atwill,thedispositionofacoequal,independentandcoordinatebranchinour
systemofgovernment.Idreadtothinkofthesovarieduncertaintiesthatsuchanundueinterferencecanleadto.
Therespectforlongstandingdoctrinesinourjurisprudence,anourishedthroughtime,isoneofmaturitynot
timidity,ofstabilityratherthanquiescence.
Ithasneveroccurredtome,andneitherdoIbelieveithasbeenintended,thatjudicialtyrannyisenvisioned,let
aloneinstitutionalized,byourpeopleinthe1987Constitution.Thetestoftyrannyisnotsolelyonhowitiswielded
butonhow,inthefirstplace,itcanbecapableofbeingexercised.Itistimethatanysuchperceptionofjudicial
omnipotenceiscorrected.
Againstallthathasbeensaid,Isee,inactualityinthesecasesatbench,neitheraconstitutionalinfringementof
substance,judgingfromprecedentsalreadylaiddownbythisCourtinpreviouscases,norajusticiabilityeven
nowoftheissuesraised,morethananattempttosadlyhighlighttheperceivedshortcomingsintheprocedural
enactmentoflaws,amatterwhichisinternaltoCongressandanareathatisbestlefttoitsownbasicconcern.
Thefactofthematteristhatthelegislativeenactment,initsfinalform,hasreceivedtheultimateapprovalofboth
housesofCongress.Thefinestrhetoric,indeedfashionableintheearlypartofthisclosingcentury,wouldstillbe
apoorsubstitutefortangibility.Ijoin,nonetheless,someofmycolleaguesinrespectfullyinvitingthekindattention
ofthehonorablemembersofourCongressinthesuggestedcircumspectobservanceoftheirownrules.
Afinalremark.Ishouldliketomakeitclearthatthisopiniondoesnotnecessarilyforeclosetheright,peculiarto
anytaxpayeradverselyaffected,topursueatthepropertime,inappropriateproceedings,andinproperfora,the
specificremediesprescribedthereforbytheNationalInternalRevenueCode,RepublicAct1125,andotherlaws,
aswellasrulesofprocedure,suchasmaybepertinent.SomepetitionsfiledwiththisCourtare,inessence,
althoughstyleddifferently,inthenatureofdeclaratoryreliefoverwhichthisCourtisbereftoforiginaljurisdiction.
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
Allconsidered,I,therefore,joinmycolleagueswhoarevotingforthedismissalofthepetitions.
CRUZ,J.:
ItisacuriousandalmostincrediblefactthatatthehearingofthesecasesonJuly7,1994,thelawyerswho
arguedforthepetitionerstwoofthemformerpresidentsoftheSenateandthethirdalsoamemberofthatbody
allaskedthisCourttolookintotheinternaloperationsoftheirChamberandcorrecttheirregularitiesthey
claimedhadbeencommittedthereaswellasintheHouseofRepresentativesandinthebicameralconference
committee.
Whileamemberofthelegislativewouldnormallyresistsuchinterventionandinvokethedoctrineofseparationof
powerstoprotectCongressfromwhathewouldcalljudicialintrusion,thesecounselpracticallyimploredtheCourt
toexaminethequestionedproceedingsandtothisendgobeyondthejournalsofeachHouse,scrutinizethe
minutesofthecommittee,andinvestigateallothermattersrelatingtothepassageofthebill(orbills)that
eventuallybecameR.A.No.7716.
Ineffect,thepetitionerswouldhaveusdisregardthetimehonoredinhibitionslaiddownbytheCourtuponitselfin
thelandmarkcaseof(34Phil.725),whereitrefusedtoconsiderextraneousevidencetodisprovetherecitalsin
thejournalsofthePhilippineLegislaturethatithadadjournedatmidnightofFebruary28,1914.Althoughitwas
generallyknownthenthatthespecialsessionhadactuallyexceededthedeadlinefixedbytheGovernorGeneral
inhisproclamation,theCourtchosetobeguidedsolelybythelegislativejournals,holdingsignificantlyasfollows:
U.S.v.Ponssinedie
...Fromtheirverynatureandobject,therecordsofthelegislatureareasimportantasthoseofthejudiciary,and
toinquireintotheveracityofthejournalsofthePhilippineLegislature,whentheyare,aswehavesaid,clearand
explicit,wouldbetoviolateboththeletterandthespiritoftheorganiclawsbywhichthePhilippineGovernment
wasbroughtintoexistence,toinvadeacoordinateandindependentdepartmentoftheGovernment,andto
interferewiththelegitimatepowersandfunctionsoftheLegislature.Butcounselinhisargumentsaysthatthe
publicknowsthattheAssembly'sclockwasstoppedonFebruary28,1914,atmidnightandleftsountilthe
determinationofthediscussionofallpendingmatters.Or,inotherwords,thehandsoftheclockwerestayedin
ordertoenabletheAssemblytoeffectanadjournmentapparentlywithinthefixedtimebytheGovernor's
proclamationfortheexpirationofthespecialsession,indirectviolationoftheActofCongressofJuly1,1902.If
theclockwas,infact,stopped,asheresuggested,"theresultantevilmightbeslightascomparedwiththatof
alteringtheprobativeforceandcharacteroflegislativerecords,andmakingtheproofoflegislativeactiondepend
uponuncertainoralevidence,liabletolossbydeathorabsence,andsoimperfectonaccountofthetreacheryof
memory.
...ThejournalssaythattheLegislatureadjournedat12midnightonFebruary28,1914.Thissettlesthequestion,
andthecourtdidnoterrindecliningtogobeyondthejournals.
Asonewhohasalwaysrespectedtherationaleoftheseparationofpowers,Irealizeonlytoowelltheserious
implicationsoftherelaxationofthedoctrineexceptonlyfortheweightiestofreasons.Theloweringofthebarriers
nowdividingthethreemajorbranchesofthegovernmentcouldleadtoindividiousincursionsbyonedepartment
intotheexclusivedomainsoftheotherdepartmentstothedetrimentoftheproperdischargeofthefunctions
assignedtoeachofthembytheConstitution.
Still,whileacknowledgingthevalueoftraditionandthereasonsforjudicialnoninterferenceannouncedinPons,I
amnotdisinclinedtotakeasecondlookattherulingfromamorepragmaticviewpointandtoteardown,ifwe
must,theironcurtainithashung,perhapsimprovidently,aroundtheproceedingsofthelegislature.
IampersuadedevennowthatwhereaspecificprocedureisfixedbytheConstitutionitself,itshouldnotsuffice
forCongresstosimplysaythattheruleshavebeenobservedandflatlyconsiderthematterclosed.Itdoesnot
havetobeasfinalasthat.Iwouldimaginethatthejudiciary,andparticularlythisCourt,shouldbeabletoverify
thatstatementanddetermineforitself,throughtheexerciseofitsownpowers,iftheConstitutionhas,indeed,
beenobeyed.
Infact,theCourthadalreadysaidthatthequestionofwhethercertainproceduralruleshavebeenfollowedis
justiciableratherthanpoliticalbecausewhatisinvolvedistheandnottheoftheactinquestion.Soweruledin
(73SCRA333)ontheamendmentoftheConstitutionin(180SCRA496)onthecompositionoftheCommission
onAppointmentsandintheearliercaseof(100SCRA1101)ontheorganizationoftheSenateElectoral
Tribunal,amongseveralothercases.
legalitywisdomSanidadv.CommissiononElectionsDazav.SingsonTaadav.Cuenco
Bythesametoken,theascertainmentofwhetherabillunderwenttheobligatorythreereadingsinbothHousesof
Congressshouldnotbeconsideredaninvasionoftheterritoryofthelegislatureasthiswouldnotinvolvean
inquiryintoitsinapprovingthemeasurebutonlytheinwhichthemeasurewasenacted.
discretionmanner
Theseviewsmayupsettheconservativesamonguswhoaremostcomfortablewhentheyallowthemselvestobe
petrifiedbyprecedentsinsteadofventuringintounchartedwaters.Tobesure,thereismuchtobesaidofthe
wisdomofthepastexpressedbyvanishedjudgestalkingtothefuture..Exceptwhenthereisaneedtorevise
thembecauseofanalteredsituationoranemergentidea,precedentsshouldtellusthat,indeed,thetrodden
pathisthesafestpath.
Viatritaesttuttisima
Itcouldbethatthealteredsituationhasarrivedtowelcometheemergentidea.ThejurisdictionofthisCourthas
beenexpandedbytheConstitution,topossiblyincludethereviewthepetitionerswouldhaveusmakeofthe
congressionalproceedingsbeingquestioned.PerhapsitisalsotimetodeclarethattheactivitiesofCongresscan
nolongerbesmokescreenedintheinviolaterecitalsofitsjournalstopreventexaminationofitssacrosanct
recordsinthenameoftheseparationofpowers.
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
Butthenagain,perhapsallthisisnotyetnecessaryatthistimeandalltheseobservationsarebutwishful
musingsforamoreactivistjudiciary.ForIfindthatthisisnotevennecessary,atleastforme,toleavethetrodden
pathinthesearchfornewadventuresinthebywaysofthelaw.Theanswerweseek,asIseeit,isnotfarafieldIt
seemstomethatitcanbefoundthroughastudyoftheenrolledbillaloneandthatwedonothavetogobeyond
thatmeasuretoascertainifR.A.No.7716hasbeenvalidlyenacted.
Itissettledinthisjurisdictionthatincaseofconflictbetweentheenrolledbillandthelegislativejournals,itisthe
formerthatshouldprevailexceptonlyastomattersthattheConstitutionrequirestobeenteredinthejournals.
(Mabanagv.LopezVito,78Phil.1).Thesearetheyeasandnaysonthefinalreadingofabilloronanyquestion
attherequestofatleastonefifthofthememberoftheHouse(Constitution,Art.VI,Sec.16[4]),theobjectionsof
thePresidenttoavetoedbilloritem(,Sec.27[1]),andthenamesofthemembersvotingfororagainstthe
overridingofhisveto(27[1]),TheoriginalofabillisnotspecificallyrequiredbytheConstitutiontobeenteredin
thejournals.Hence,onthisparticularmanner,itistherecitalsintheenrolledbillandnotinthejournalsthatmust
control.
IbidId.Section
ArticleVI,Section24,oftheConstitutionprovides:
Sec.24.Allappropriation,revenueortariffbills,billsauthorizingincreaseofthepublicdebt,billsoflocal
TheenrolledbillsubmittedtoandlaterapprovedbythePresidentofthePhilippinesasR.A.No.7716wassigned
bythePresidentoftheSenateandtheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives.Itcarriedthefollowing
certificationoverthesignaturesoftheSecretaryoftheSenateandtheActingSecretaryoftheHouseof
Representatives:
ThisActwhichisaconsolidationofHouseBillNo.11197andSenateBillNo.11630wasfinallypassedbythe
HouseofRepresentativeandtheSenateonApril27,1994,andMay2,1994.
LetusturntoWebsterforthemeaningofcertainwords,
To"originate"is"tobringintobeingtocreatesomething(original)toinventtobeginstart."Theword
"exclusively"means"excludingallothers"andisderivedfromtheword"exclusive,"meaning"notsharedor
dividedsolesingle."Applyingthesemeanings,IwouldreadSection24assayingthatthebillsmentionedtherein
mustbebroughtintobeing,orcreated,orinvented,orbegunorstarted,onlyorsinglyorbynootherbodythan
thehouseofRepresentatives.
Accordingtothecertification,R.A.No.7716"isaconsolidationofHouseBillNo.11197andSenateBillNo.1630."
Againgivingthewordsusedtheirnaturalandordinarysenseconformablytoanacceptedcanonofconstruction,I
wouldreadtheword"consolidation"asa"combinationormerger"andderivedfromtheword"consolidated,"
meaning"tocombineintoonemergeunite."
ThetwobillswereseparatelyintroducedintheirrespectiveChambers.Bothretainedtheirindependentexistence
untiltheyreachedthebicameralconferencecommitteewheretheywereconsolidated.Itwasthisconsolidated
measurethatwasfinallypassedbyCongressandsubmittedtothePresidentofthePhilippinesforhisapproval.
HouseBillNo.11197originatedintheHouseofRepresentativesbutthiswasnotthebillthateventuallybecame
R.A.No.7716.ThemeasurethatwassignedintolawbyPresidentRamoswastheconsolidationofthatbilland
anotherbill,.,SenateBillNo.1630,whichwasintroducedintheSenate.Theresultantenrolledbillthusdidnot
originateintheHouseofRepresentatives.Theenrolledbillitselfsaysthatpartofit(anditdoesnotmattertowhat
extent)originatedintheSenate.
vizexclusively
ItwouldhavebeendifferentiftheonlyparticipationoftheSenatewasintheamendmentofthemeasurethatwas
originallyproposedintheHouseofRepresentatives.Butthiswasnotthecase.TheparticipationoftheSenate
wasnotinproposingorconcurringwithamendmentsthatwouldhavebeenincorporatedinHouseBillNo.11197.
ItsparticipationwasinitsownSenateBillNo.1630,whichwasnotembodiedinbutwithHouseBillNo.11197.
originatingmerged
SenateBillNo.1630wasnotevenanamendmentbysubstitution,assumingthiswaspermissible.To"substitute"
means"totaketheplaceoftoputoruseinplaceofanother."SenateBillNo.1630didnot,uponitsapproval
replace(andthuseliminate)HouseBillNo.11197.Bothbillsretainedtheirseparateidentitiesuntiltheywere
joinedorunitedintowhatbecametheenrolledbillandultimatelyR.A.No.7716.
Thecertificationintheenrolledbillsaysitall.ItisclearthatR.A.No.7716didnotoriginateexclusivelyinthe
Togobacktomyearlierobservations,thisconclusiondoesnotrequirethereversalofandaninquirybythisCourt
intotheproceedingsofthelegislaturebeyondtherecitalsofitsjournals.Allweneedtodoisconsiderthe
certificationintheenrolledbilland,withoutenteringtheprecinctsofCongress,declarethatbythisownadmission
ithas,indeed,notcompliedwiththeConstitution.
U.S.vs.Pons
WhilethisCourtrespectstheprerogativesoftheotherdepartments,itwillnothesitatetorisetoitshigherdutyto
requirefromthem,iftheygoastray,fullandstrictcompliancewiththefundamentallaw.Ourfidelitytoitmustbe
total.ThereisnoloftierprincipleinourdemocracythanthesupremacyoftheConstitution,towhichallmust
submit.
IvotetoinvalidateR.A.No.7716forviolationofArticleVI,Sec.24,oftheConstitution.
REGALADO,J.:
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
ItwouldseemlikeaninconceivableironythatRepublicActNo.7716which,sorespondentsclaim,wasconceived
bythecollectivewisdomofabicameralCongressandcraftedwithsedulouscarebytwobranchesofgovernment
shouldnowbeembroiledinchallengestoitsvalidityforhavingbeenenactedindisregardofmandatory
prescriptionsoftheConstitutionitself.Indeed,suchimpugnmentbypetitionersgoesbeyondmerelythe
proceduralflawsintheparturitionofthelaw.Creatingandregulatingasitdoesdefiniterightstoproperty,butwith
itsownpassagehavingbeenviolativeofexplicitprovisionsoftheorganiclaw,evenwithoutgoingintotheintrinsic
meritsoftheprovisionsofRepublicActNo.7716itssubstantiveinvalidityisprofactonecessarilyentailed.
Howitwaslegislatedintoitspresentstatutoryexistenceisnotinseriousdisputeandneednotdetainusexcept
forarecitalofsomesalientandrelevantfacts.TheHouseofRepresentativespassedHouseBillNo.11197
1onthirdreadingonNovember17,1993and,thefollowingday,IttransmittedthesametotheSenateforconcurrence.On
itspart,theSenateapprovedSenateBillNo.1630onsecondandthirdreadingsonMarch24,1994.Itisimportanttonotein
thisregardthatonMarch22,1994,saidS.B.No.1630hadbeencertifiedbyPresidentFidelV.Ramosforimmediate
enactmenttomeetapublicemergency,thatis,agrowingbudgetarydeficit..TherewasnosuchcertificationforH.B.No.
11197althoughitwastheinitiatingrevenuebill
Itis,therefore,notonlyacuriousfactbut,moreimportantly,ansincethatPresidentialcertificationwas
erroneouslymadeforandconfinedtoS.B.No.1630whichwasindisputablyataxbilland,undertheConstitution,
couldnotvalidlyoriginateintheSenate.WhateverisclaimedinfavorofS.B.No.1630undertheblessingsofthat
certification,suchasitsallegedexemptionfromthethreeseparatereadingsrequirement,isaccordinglynegated
andrenderedinutilebythenatureofsaidcertificationasitcouldlawfullyhavebeenissuedonlyforarevenue
measureoriginatingfromthelowerHouse.ToholdotherwisewouldbetovalidateaPresidentialcertificationofa
billinitiatedintheSenatedespitetheConstitutionalprohibitionagainstitsoriginatingtherefrom.
invalidprocedureinefficaciousexclusively
EquallyofserioussignificanceisthefactthatS.B.No.1630wasreportedoutinCommitteeReportNo.349
submittedtotheSenateonFebruary7,1994andapprovedbythatbody","whilemerely"takinginto
considerationP.S.No.734andH.B.No.11197."
insubstitutionofS.B.No.11292S.B.No.1630,therefore,wasneverfiledinsubstitutionofeitherP.S.No.734or,more
emphatically,ofH.B.No.11197asthesetwolegislativeissuancesweremerelytakenaccountof,atthemost,asreferential
basesormaterials.
Thisisnotaplayonmisdirectionfor,inthefirstinstance,therespondentsassureusthatH.B.No.11197was
actuallythesolesourceofandstartedthewholelegislativeprocesswhichculminatedinRepublicActNo.7716.
TheparticipationoftheSenateinenactingS.B.No.1630was,itisclaimed,justifiedasitwasmerelyinpursuance
ofitspowertoconcurinorproposeamendmentstoH.B.No.11197.Citingthe83yearoldcaseofFlintvs.Stone
TracyCo.,
3itisblithelyannouncedthatsuchpowertoamendincludesanamendmentbysubstitution,thatis,eventheextentof
substitutingtheentireH.B.No.11197byanaltogethercompletelynewmeasureofSenateprovenance.Ergo,sothe
justificationgoes,theSenateactedperfectlyinaccordancewithitsamendingpowerunderSection24,ArticleVIofthe
Constitutionsinceitmerelyproposedamendmentsthroughabillallegedlypreparedinadvance.
Thisisamodeofargumentationwhich,byreasonoffactualinaccuracyandlogicalimplausibility,bothastounds
andconfounds.For,itisofofficialrecordthatS.B.No.1630wasfiled,certifiedandenactedinsubstitutionof
whichinitselfwaslikewiseinderogationoftheConstitutionalprohibitionagainstsuchinitiationofataxbillinthe
Senate.Inanyevent,S.B.No.1630wasneitherintendedasabilltobeadoptedbytheSenatenortobereferred
tothebicameralconferencecommitteeasasubstitutefor.Theseindeliblefactsappearinginofficialdocuments
cannotbeerasedbyanyamountofstrainedconvolutionsorincrediblepretensionsthatS.B.No.1630was
supposedlyenactedinanticipationofH.B.No.11197.
S.B.No.1129H.B.No.11197
Onthatscorealone,theinvocationbytheSolicitorGeneralofthehoaryconceptofamendmentbysubstitution
fallsflatonitsface.Worse,hisconcomitantcitationoftorecoverfromthatpronepositiononlysucceededin
turningthesamepostulationover,thistimesupinelyflatonitsback.Aselsewherenotedbysomecolleagues,
whichIwilljustreferstobrieflytoavoidduplication,respondentsinitiallysoughtsanctuaryinthatdoctrine
supposedlylaiddownin,thus:"Ithas,infact,beenheldthatthefortheoneoriginallyproposedcanbesupported
asavalidamendment."
FlintFlintsubstitutionofanentirelynewmeasure4(Italicssupplied.)Duringtheinterpellationbythewriterattheoral
argumentheldinthesecases,theattentionoftheSolicitorGeneralwascalledtothefactthattheamendmentinconsisted
onlyofa,thatits,thesubstitutionofacorporatetaxforaninheritancetaxproposedinageneralrevenuebillandthatthe
textofthedecisionthereinnowherecontainedthesupposeddoctrineshequotedandascribedtothecourt,asthosewere
merelysummationsofargumentsofcounseltherein.Itisindeedasourceofdisappointmentforus,butanadmissionof
desperationonhispart,that,insteadofmakingaclarificationoradefenseofhiscontention,theSolicitorGeneralmerely
reproducedalloveragainFlintsingleitem5thesamequotationsastheyappearedinhisoriginalconsolidatedcomment,
withoutventuringanyexplanationorjustification.
Theaforestateddissemblance,thusunmasked,hasfurtherundesirableimplicationsonthecontentionsadvanced
byrespondentsintheirdefense.For,evenindulgingrespondentsintheirpretensionthatS.B.No.1630
substitutedorreplacedH.B.No.11197,asidefrommuddlingtheissueofthetrueoriginationofthedisputedlaw,
thiswouldfurtherenmeshrespondentsinahopelesscontradiction.
exgratiaargumenti
InapublicationauthorizedbytheSenateandfromwhichtheSolicitorGeneralhasliberallyquoted,itisreported
asanacceptedrulethereinthat"(a)namendmentbysubstitutionwhenapprovedtakestheplaceoftheprincipal
bill.C.R.March19,1963."
6Statedelsewise,theprincipalbillissupplantedandgoesoutofactuality.Appliedtothepresentsituation,andfollowing
respondents'submissionthatH.B.No.11197hadbeensubstitutedorreplacedinitsentirety,theninlawithadnofurther
existenceforpurposesofthesubsequentstagesoflegislationexcept,possibly,forreferentialdata.
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
Now,theenrolledbillthereaftersubmittedtothePresidentofthePhilippines,signedbythePresidentofthe
SenateandtheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,carriedthissolemncertificationoverthesignaturesof
therespectivesecretariesofbothchambers:"ThisActwhichisaandSenateBillNo.1630wasfinallypassedby
theHouseofRepresentativesandtheSenateonApril27,1994,andMay2,1994."(Italicsmine.)Inreliance
thereon,theChiefExecutivesignedthesameintolawasRepublicActNo.7716.
consolidationofHouseBillNo.11197
Theconfusiontowhichthewriterhasalreadyconfessedisnowcompoundedbythatofficialtextofthe
aforequotedcertificationwhichspeaks,andthiscannotbeamere,oftwoandbills(oneofthembeingH.B.No.
11197)whichwereconsolidatedtoproducetheenrolledbill.Inparliamentaryusage,toconsolidatetwobills,isto
unitethemintoone
lapsuscalamiindependentexisting7andwhich,inthecaseatbar,necessarilyassumesthatH.B.No.11197neverbecame
legallyinexistent.ButdidnottheSolicitorGeneral,underthetheoryofamendmentbysubstitutionoftheentireH.B.No.
11197byS.B.No.1630,therebypremisethesameuponthereplacement,hencethetotaleliminationfromthelegislative
process,ofH.B.11197?
Itresults,therefore,thattoprovecompliancewiththerequirementfortheoriginationofH.B.No.11197,two
alternativebutinconsistenttheorieshadtobeespousedanddefendedbyrespondents'counsel.Tojustifythe
introductionandpassageofS.B.No.1630intheSenate,itwassupposedlyenactedonlyasanamendmentby
substitution,henceonthattheoryH.B.No.11197hadtobeconsideredasdisplacedandterminatedfromitsrole
orexistence.Yet,likewiseforthesamepurposebutthistimeonthetheoryoforiginationbyconsolidation,H.B.
No.11197hadtoberesuscitatedsoitcouldbeunitedormergedwithS.B.No.1630.Thislatteralternativetheory,
unfortunately,alsoexacerbatestheconstitutionaldefectforthenitisanadmissionofaoriginationofthetwotax
bills,eachrespectivelyinitiatedinandcomingfromthelowerandupperchambersofCongress.
exclusivedual
Parenthetically,itwasalsothiswriterwhopointedlybroughtthisbafflingsituationtotheattentionoftheSolicitor
Generalduringtheaforesaidoralargument,totheextentofreadingaloudthecertificationinfull.Wehadhoped
therebytobeclarifiedonthesevitalissueinrespondents'projectedmemorandum,butwehavenotbeenfavored
withanexplanationunravelingthisdelimma.Verily,bypassingontheseintriguingsubmissions,respondentshave
wreakedhavoconbothlogicandlawjusttoglossovertheirnoncompliancewiththeConstitutionalmandatefor
exclusiveoriginationofarevenuebill.Theprocedurerequiredtherefor,weemphaticallyadd,canbesatisfiedonly
bycompleteandstrictcompliancesincethisislaiddownbytheConstitutionitselfandnotbyamerestatute.
subsilentio
ThiswriterconsequentlyagreeswiththeclearlytenablepropositionofpetitionersthatwhentheSenatepassed
andapprovedS.B.No.1630,haditcertifiedbytheChiefExecutive,andthereaftercauseditsconsiderationbythe
bicameralconferencecommitteeintotalsubstitutionofH.B.No.11197,itclearlyanddeliberatelyviolatedthe
requirementsoftheConstitutionnotonlyintheoriginationofthebillbutintheveryenactmentofRepublicActNo.
7716.Contrarily,theshiftingsandsofinconsistencyintheargumentsadducedforrespondentsbetraysuchlack
ofintellectualrectitudeastogivetheimpressionofbeingmererhetoricsindefenseoftheindefensible.
Wearetold,however,thatbyourdiscoursingontheforegoingissuesweareintroducingintononjusticiable
areaslongdeclaredbysuchtimehonoreddoctrinesasthoseonpoliticalquestions,theenrolledbilltheoryand
therespectduetotwocoequalandcoordinatebranchesofGovernment,allderivedfromtheseparationof
powersinherentinrepublicanism.Weappreciatethelectures,butwearenotexactlyunawareoftheteachingsin
,
verbotenU.S.vs.Pons8Mabanag,vs.LopezVito,9CascoPhilippineChemicalCo.,.vs.Gimenez,etc.,etal.,10Moralsvs.
Subido,.,etc11and.,PhilippineJudgesAssociation,etc.,etal.vs.Prado,etc.,etal12ontheonehand,and.,Taada,et
al.vs.Cuenco,etal13Sanidad,etal.,vs.CommissiononElections,etal.,14and,Dazavs.Singson,etal.15ontheother,
toknowwhichwouldbeapplicabletothepresentcontroversyandwhichshouldberejected.
But,first,apositional.Thewriterofthisopinionwouldbeamongthefirsttoacknowledgeandenjoinnotonly
courtesyto,butrespectfor,theofficialactsoftheExecutiveandLegislativedepartments,butonlysolongasthe
sameareinaccordancewithoraredefensibleunderthefundamentalcharterandthestatutorylaw.Hewould
readilybenumberedintheranksofthosewhowouldpreachareasonedsermonontheseparationofpowers,but
withthequalificationthatthesamearenotcontainedintripartitecompartmentsseparatedbyempermeable
membranes.HealsoascribestothegeneralvalidityofAmericanconstitutionaldoctrinesasamatterofhistorical
andlegalnecessity,butnottotheextentofbeingoblivioustopoliticalchangesorunmindfulofthefallacyof
unduegeneralizationarisingfrommyopicdisregardofthefactualsettingofeachparticularcase.
exordium
Theseruminationshavelikewisebeenarticulatedanddissectedbymycolleagues,henceitisfeltthattheonly
issuewhichmustbesetarightinthisdissentingopinionisthesocalledenrolledbilldoctrinetowhichweare
urgedtoclingwithreptiliantenacity.Itwillbepreliminarilynotedthattheofficialcertificationappearingrightonthe
faceofRepublicActNo.7716wouldevenrenderunnecessaryanyfurtherjudicialinquiryintotheproceedings
whichtranspiredinthetwolegislativechambersand,onaparodyoftricameralism,inthebicameralconference
committee.Moreover,wehavetheexcellentdissertationsofsomeofmycolleaguesonthesematters,but
respondentsinsistencontrathatthecongressionalproceedingscannotproperlybeinquiredintobythisCourt.
Suchobjectionconfirmsasuppressivepatternaimedatsacrificingtheruleoflawtothefiatofexpediency.
RespondentsthusemplacedontheirbattlementsthepronouncementofthisCourtintheaforecitedcaseof.
PhilippineJudgesAssociationvs.Prado16Theirreliancethereonfallsintothesameerrorcommittedbytheirseekingrefuge
inthe.which,ashasearlierbeendemonstrated(asidefromthequotationalmisrepresentation),couldnotbeonparwiththe
factualsituationinthepresentcase.,torepeat,involvedamereamendmentonasinglelegislativeitem,thatis,
substitutingtheproposalthereinofaninheritancetaxbyoneoncorporatetax.Now,intheirsubmissionbasedon
respondentsstudiouslyavoidmentionofthefactthatthequestionedinsertionreferredlikewisetoasingleitem,thatis,the
repealofthefrankingprivilegethretoforegrantedtothejudiciary.Thatbothcasescannotbeequatedwiththoseatbar,
consideringthemultitudeofitemschallengedandtheplethoraofconstitutionalviolationsinvolved,istooobvioustobelabor.
Legaladvocacyandjudicialadjudicationmusthaveabecomingsenseofqualitativeproportion,insteadoflapsingintothe
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
discreditedandmalignedpracticeofyieldingblindadherencetoprecedents.Flintcase,anteFlintPhilippineJudges
Association,
Thewriterunqualifiedlyaffirmshisrespectforvalidofficialactsofthetwobranchesofgovernmentandeschews
anyunnecessaryintrusionintotheiroperationalmanagementandinternalaffairs.These,withoutdoubt,are
matterstraditionallyprotectedbytherepublicanprincipleofseparationofpowers.Where,however,thereisan
overridingnecessityforjudicialinterventioninlightofthepervasivemagnitudeoftheproblemspresentedandthe
gravityoftheconstitutionalviolationsalleged,butthisCourtcannotperformitsconstitutionaldutyexpressedin
Section1,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitutionunlessitmakestheinescapableinquiry,thentheconfluenceofsuch
factorsshouldcompelanexceptiontotheruleasanultimaterecourse.Thecasesnowbeforeuspresentboth
theinevitablechallengeandtheinescapableexigencyforjudicialreview.FortheCourttonowshirkitsbounden
dutywouldnotonlyprojectitasacitadelofthetimorousandtheslothful,butcouldevenundermineitsasthe
highestandultimatetribunal.
raisond'etre
Hence,thisdissentingopinionhastouchedoneventsbehindandwhichtranspiredpriortothepresentationofthe
enrolledbillforapprovalintolaw.Thedetailsofthatlawwhichresultedfromthelegislativeactionfollowedbyboth
housesofCongress,thesubstantivevalidityofwhoseprovisionsandtheproceduralvalidityofwhichlegislative
processareherechallengedasunconstitutional,havebeengraphicallypresentedbypetitionersandadmirably
explainedintherespectiveopinionsofmybrethren.Thewriterconcursintheconclusionsdrawntherefromand
rejectsthecontentionthatwehaveunjustifiablybreachedthedikeoftheenrolledbilldoctrine.
Eveninthelandofitssource,thesocalledconclusivepresumptionofvalidityoriginallyattributedtothatdoctrine
haslongbeenrevisitedandqualified,ifnotaltogetherrejected.Onthecompetencyofjudicialinquiry,ithasbeen
heldthat"(u)nderthe'enrolledbillrule'bywhichanenrolledbillissoleexpositoryofitscontentsandconclusive
evidenceofitsexistenceandvalidenactment,itisneverthelesscompetentforcourtstoinquireastowhat
prerequisitesarefixedbytheConstitutionofwhichjournalsofrespectivehousesofLegislaturearerequiredto
furnishtheevidence."
17
Infact,in.,
Gwynnvs.Hardee,etc.,etal18theSupremeCourtofFloridadeclared:
(1)Whilethepresumptionisthattheenrolledbill,assignedbythelegislativeofficersandfiledwiththesecretary
ofstate,isthebillasitpassed,yetthispresumptionisnotconclusive,andwhenitisshownfromthelegislative
journalsthatabillthoughengrossedandenrolled,andsignedbythelegislativeofficers,containsprovisionsthat
havenotpassedbothhouses,suchprovisionswillbeheldspuriousandnotapartofthelaw.AswassaidbyMr.
JusticeCockrellinthecaseofWadevs.AtlanticLumberCo.,51Fla.628,text633,41So.72,73:
ThisCourtisfirmlycommittedtotheholdingthatwhenthejournalsspeaktheycontrol,andagainstsuchproof
theenrolledbillisnotconclusive.'
MoreenlighteningandtothepresentcontroversyisthedecisionpromulgatedonMay13,1980bytheSupreme
CourtofKentuckyin,
aproposD&WAutoSupply,etal.vs.DepartmentofRevenue,etal.19pertinentexceprtswherefromareextensively
reproducedhereunder:
...Inarrivingatourdecisionwemust,perforce,reconsiderthevalidityofalonglineofdecisionsofthiscourt
whichcreatedandnurturedthesocalled'enrolledbill'doctrine.
xxxxxxxxx
[1]Section46oftheKentuckyConstitutionsetsoutcertainproceduresthatthelegislaturemustfollowbeforeabill
canbeconsideredforfinalpassage.....
xxxxxxxxx
...UndertheenrolledbilldoctrineasitnowexistsinKentucky,acourtmaynotlookbehindsuchabill,enrolled
andcertifiedbytheappropriateofficers,todetermineifthereareanydefects.
xxxxxxxxx
...In,passageofthelawinquestionviolatedthisprovision,yetthebillwasproperlyenrolledandapprovedbythe
governor.Indecliningtolookbehindthelawtodeterminetheproprietyofitsenactment,thecourtenunciated
threereasonsforadoptingtheenrolledbillrule.First,thecourtwasreluctanttoscrutinizetheprocessesofthe
legislature,anequalbranchofgovernment.Second,reasonsofconvenienceprevailed,whichdiscouraged
requiringthelegislaturetopreserveitsrecordsandanticipatedconsiderablecomplexlitigationifthecourtruled
otherwise.Third,thecourtacknowledgedthepoorrecordkeepingabilitiesoftheGeneralAssemblyand
expressedapreferenceforacceptingthefinalbillasenrolled,ratherthanopeninguptherecordsofthe
legislature.....
Lafferty
xxxxxxxxx
Nowherehastherulebeenadoptedwithoutreason,orasaresultofjudicialwhim.Therearefourhistoricalbases
forthedoctrine.(1)Anenrolledbillwasa'record'and,assuch,wasnotsubjecttoattackatcommonlaw.(2)
Sincethelegislatureisoneofthethreebranchesofgovernment,thecourts,beingcoequal,mustindulgeinevery
presumptionthatlegislativeactsarevalid.(3)Whentherulewasoriginallyformulated,recordkeepingofthe
legislatureswassoinadequatethatabalancingofequitiesrequiredthatthefinalact,theenrolledbill,begiven
efficacy.(4)ThereweretheoriesofconvenienceasexpressedbytheKentuckycourtin.
Lafferty
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
Theruleisnotunanimousintheseveralstates,however,andithasnotbeenwithoutitscritics.Froman
examinationofcasesandtreaties,wecansummarizethecriticismsasfollows:
(1)Artificialpresumptions,especiallyconclusiveones,arenotfavored.(2)Sucharulefrequently(asinthepresentcase)
producesresultswhichdonotaccordwithfactsorconstitutionalprovisions.(3)Theruleisconducivetofraud,forgery,
corruptionandotherwrongdoings.(4)Modernautomaticandelectronicrecordkeepingdevicesnowusedbylegislatures
removeoneoftheoriginalreasonsfortherule.(5)Theruledisregardstheprimaryobligationofthecourtstoseekthetruth
andtoprovidearemedyforawrongcommittedbyanybranchofgovernment.Inlightoftheseconsiderations,weare
convincedthatthetimehascometoreexaminetheenrolledbilldoctrine.
[2]Thiscourtisnotunmindfuloftheadmonitionofthedoctrineofstaredecisis.Themaximis"Staredecisiset
nonquietamovere,"whichsimplysuggeststhatwestandbyprecedentsandnotdisturbsettledpointsoflaw..As
westatedin,287Ky834,155S.W.2d469,47172(1941)(citationsomitted):
Yet,thisruleisnotinflexible,norisitofsuchanatureastorequireperpetuationoferrororlogicDaniel'sAdm'rv.Hoofnel
Theforceoftheruledependsuponthenatureofthequestiontobedecidedandtheextentofthedisturbanceof
rightsandpracticeswhichachangeintheinterpretationofthelaworthecourseofjudicialopinionsmaycreate.
Cogentconsiderationsarewhetherthereisclearerrorandurgentreasons'forneitherjusticenorwisdomrequires
acourttogofromonedoubtfulruletoanother,'andwhetherornottheevilsoftheprinciplethathasbeen
followedwillbemoreinjuriousthancanpossiblyresultfromachange.
Certainly,,andwithittheruleitsupports.
whenatheorysupportingaruleoflawisnotgroundedonfacts,oruponsoundlogic,orisunjust,orhasbeendiscreditedby
actualexperience,itshouldbediscarded
[3]ItiscleartousthatthemajorpremiseoftheLaffertydecision,thepoorrecordkeepingofthelegislature,has
disappeared.byourGeneralAssembly.Taperecorders,electrictypewriters,duplicatingmachines,recording
equipment,printingpresses,computers,electronicvotingmachines,andthelikeremovealldoubtsandfearsas
totheabilityoftheGeneralAssemblytokeepaccurateandreadilyaccessiblerecords.
Modernequipmentandtechnologyaretheruleinrecordkeeping
Itisalsoapparentthatthe'convenience'ruleisnotappropriateintoday'smodernanddevelopingjudicial
philosophy.Thefactthatthenumberandcomplexityoflawsuitsmayincreaseisnotpersuasiveifoneismindful
thattheTheexistenceofdifficultiesandcomplexitiesshouldnotdeterthispursuitandwerejectanydoctrineor
presumptionthatsoprovides.
overridingpurposeofourjudicialsystemistodiscoverthetruthandseethatjusticeisdone.
Lastly,weaddressthepremisesthattheequalityofthevariousbranchesofgovernmentrequiresthatweshutour
eyestoconstitutionalfailingsandothererrorsofourcoparcenersingovernment.Wesimplydonotagree.Section
26oftheKentuckyConstitutionprovidesthatanylawcontrarytotheconstitutionis'void.'.Withoutbelaboringthe
point,webelievethatundersection228oftheKentuckyConstitutionitisourobligationto'support...the
Constitutionofthecommonwealth.'Wearesworntoseethatviolationsoftheconstitutionbyanyperson,
corporation,stateagencyorbranchofgovernmentarebroughttolightandcorrected.
TheproperexerciseofjudicialauthorityrequiresustorecognizeanylawwhichisunconstitutionalandtodeclareitvoidTo
countenanceanartificialruleoflawthatsilencesourvoiceswhenconfrontedwithviolationsofourconstitutionisnot
acceptabletothiscourt.
WebelievethatamorereasonableruleistheonewhichProfessorSutherlanddescribesasthe'extrinsic
evidence'rule...Underthisapproachthereisaprimafaciepresumptionthatanenrolledbillisvalid,but
suchpresumptionmaybeovercomebyclear,satisfactoryandconvincingevidenceestablishingthatconstitutional
requirementshavenotbeenmet.
Wethereforeoverruleandallothercasesfollowingthesocalledenrolledbilldoctrine,totheextentthatthereis
nolongeraconclusivepresumptionthatanenrolledbillisvalid....(Italicsmine.)
Laffertyv.Huffman
Undeniably,thevalueaddedtaxsystemmayhaveitsownmeritstocommenditscontinuedadoption,andthe
proposedwideningofitsbasecouldachievelaudablegovernmentalobjectivesifproperlyformulatedand
conscientiouslyimplemented.Wewouldliketobelieve,however,thatoursisnotonlyanenlighteneddemocracy
nurturedbyapolicyoftransparencybutonewheretheedictsofthefundamentallawaresacrosanctforall,
barringnone.Whiletherealizationoftheloftyendsofthisadministrationshouldindeedbethedevoutwishofall,
likewisebarringnone,itcanneverbejustifiedbymethodswhich,evenifunintended,aresuggestiveof
Machiavellism.
Accordingly,IvotetogranttheinstantpetitionsandtoinvalidateRepublicActNo.7716forhavingbeenenacted
inviolationofSection24,ArticleVIoftheConstitution.
DAVIDE,JR.,J.:
ThelegislativehistoryofR.A.No.7716,ashighlightedintheConsolidatedMemorandumforthepublic
respondentssubmittedbytheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral,demonstratesbeyonddoubtthatitwaspassedin
violationordeliberatedisregardofmandatoryprovisionsoftheConstitutionandoftherulesofbothchambersof
Congressrelatingtotheenactmentofbills.
IthereforevotetostrikedownR.A.No.7716asunconstitutionalandashavingbeenenactedwithgraveabuseof
discretion.
TheConstitutionprovidesforabicameralCongress.Therefore,nobillcanbeenactedintolawunlessitis
approvedbybothchamberstheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentatives(hereinafter).Otherwisestated,
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
eachchambermayproposeandapproveabill,butuntilitissubmittedtotheotherchamberandpassedbythe
latter,itcannotbesubmittedtothePresidentforitsapprovalintolaw.
House
Paragraph2,Section26,ArticleVIoftheConstitutionprovides:
NobillpassedbyeitherHouseshallbecomealawunlessithaspassedthreereadingsonseparatedays,and
printedcopiesthereofinitsfinalformhavebeendistributedtoitsMembersthreedaysbeforeitspassage,except
whenthePresidentcertifiestothenecessityofitsimmediateenactmenttomeetapubliccalamityoremergency.
Uponthelastreadingofabill,noamendmenttheretoshallbeallowed,andthevotethereonshallbetaken
immediatelythereafter,andtheyeasandnaysenteredinthejournal.
The"threereadings"referstothethreereadingsinbothchambers.
Thereare,however,billswhichmustoriginateexclusivelyintheHouse.Section24,ArticleVIoftheConstitution
enumeratesthem:
SEC.24.Allappropriation,revenueortariffbills,billsauthorizingincreaseofthepublicdebt,billsoflocal
Webster'sThirdNewInternationalDictionary
1definesasfollows:originate
vt1:tocausethebeginningof:giveriseto:INITIATE...2.tostart(apersonorthing)onacourseor
journey...:totakeorhaveorigin:bederived:ARISE,BEGIN,START...
vi
Black'sLawDictionary
2definesthewordinthiswise:exclusively
Apartfromallothersonlysolelysubstantiallyallorforthegreaterpart.Totheexclusionofallotherswithout
admissionofotherstoparticipationinamannertoexclude.
In,
CityMayorvs.TheChiefofPhilippineConstabulary @=3thisCourtsaid:
Theterm'exclusive'initsusualandgenerallyacceptedsense,meanspossessedtotheexclusionofothers
appertainingtothesubjectalone,notincluding,admittingorpertainingtoanotherorothers,undivided,sole.(15
WordsandPhrases,p.510,citingMitchelv.TulsaWater,Light,HeatandPowerCo.,95P.961,21Okl.243and
p.513,citingCommonwealthv.SuperintendentofHouseofCorrection,64Pa.Super.613,615).
Indisputablythen,onlytheHousecancausethebeginningorinitiatethepassageofanyappropriation,revenue,
ortarriffbill,anybillincreasingthepublicdebt,anybilloflocalapplication,oranyprivatebill.TheSenatecanonly
"proposeorconcurwithamendments."
UndertheRulesoftheSenate,thefirstreadingisthereadingofthetitleofthebillanditsreferraltothe
correspondingcommitteethesecondreadingconsistsofthereadingofthebillintheformrecommendedbythe
correspondingcommitteeandthethirdreadingisthereadingofthebillintheformitwillbeafterapprovalon
secondreading.
4Duringthesecondreading,thefollowingtakesplace
(1)Secondreadingofthebill
(2)SponsorshipbytheCommitteeChairmanoranymemberdesignatedbythecorrespondingcommittee
(3)Ifadebateensues,turnsforandagainstthebillshallbetakenalternately
(4)Thesponsorofthebillclosesthedebate
(5)Afterthecloseofthedebate,theperiodofamendmentsfollows:
(6)Then,aftertheperiodofamendmentsisclosed,thevotingthebillonsecondreading.
5
Afterapprovalonsecondreadings,printedcopiesthereofinitsfinalformshallbedistributedtotheMembersof
theSenateatleastthreedayspriortothethirdreading,thefinalvoteshallbetakenandtheandshallbeentered
intheJournal.
yeasnays 6
UndertheRulesoftheHouse,thefirstreadingofabillconsistsofareadingofthenumber,title,andauthor
followedbythereferraltotheappropriatecommittees
7thesecondreadingconsistsofthereadinginfullofthebillwiththeamendmentsproposedbythecommittee,itany 8and
thethirdreadingisthereadingofthebillintheformasapprovedonsecondreadingandtakesplaceonlyafterprinted
copiesthereofinitsfinalformhavebeendistributedtotheMembersatleastthreedaysbefore,unlessthebilliscertified.
9Atthesecondreading,thefollowingtakesplace:
(1)Readingofthebill
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
(2)Sponsorship
3)Debates
(4)PeriodofAmendmentsand
(5)VotingonSecondReading.
10
Atthethirdreading,thevotesshallbetakenimmediatelyandtheandenteredintheJournal.
yeasnays 11
Clearly,whetherintheSenateorintheHouse,everybillmustpassthethreereadingsonseparatedays,except
whenthebilliscertified.Amendmentstothebillonthirdreadingareconstitutionallyprohibited.
12
Afteritspassagebyonechamber,thebillshouldthenbetransmittedtotheotherchamberforitsconcurrence.
Section83,RuleXIVoftheRulesoftheHouseexpresslyprovides:
SEC.83..TheSecretaryGeneral,withoutneedofexpressorder,shalltransmittotheSenateforits
concurrenceallthebillsandjointorconcurrentresolutionsapprovedbytheHouseortheamendmentsofthe
HousetothebillsorresolutionsoftheSenate,orifamendmentsoftheSenatetobillsoftheHouseareaccepted,
heshallforthwithnotifytheSenateoftheactiontaken.
TransmittaltoSenate
Simplified,thisrulemeansthat:
1.AstoabilloriginatingintheHouse:
(a)UponitsapprovalbytheHouse,thebillshallbetransmittedtotheSenate
(b)TheSenatemayapproveitwithorwithoutamendments
(c)TheSenatereturnsthebilltotheHouse
(d)TheHousemayaccepttheSenateamendmentsifitdoesnot,theSecretaryGeneralshallnotifytheSenate
ofthataction.Ashereinafterbeshown,arequestforconferenceshallthenbeinorder.
2.AstobillsoriginatingintheSenate
(a)UponitsapprovalbytheSenate,thebillshallbetransmittedtotheHouse
(b)TheHousemayapproveitwithorwithoutamendments
(c)TheHousethenreturnsittotheSenate,informingitoftheactiontaken
(d)TheSenatemayaccepttheHouseamendementsifitdoesnot,itshallnotifytheHouseandmakearequest
forconference.
Thetransmittedbillshallthenpassthreereadingsintheotherchamberonseparatedays.Section84,RuleXIVof
theRulesoftheHousestates:
SEC.84..Thebills,resolutionsandcommunicationsoftheSenateshallbereferredtothecorresponding
committeeinthesamemannerasbillspresentedbyMembersoftheHouse.
BillsfromtheSenate
andSection51,RuleXXIIoftheRulesoftheSenateprovides:
SEC.51.Priortotheirfinalapproval,billsandjointresolutionsshallbereadatleastthreetimes."Itisonlywhen
theperiodofdisagreementisreached,,amendmentsproposedbyonechambertoabilloriginatingfromthe
otherarenotacceptedbythelatter,thatarequestforconferenceismadeorisinorder.Therequestfor
conferenceisspecificallycoveredbySection26,RuleXIoftheRulesoftheSenatewhichreads:
i.e.
Itisonlywhentheperiodofdisagreementisreached,amendedproposedbyonechambertoabilloriginating
fromtheotherarenotacceptedbytheirlatter,thatarequestforconferenceismadeorisinorder.Therequest
forconferenceisspecificallycoveredbySection26,RuleXIIoftheRulesoftheSenatewhichreads:
i.e.,
SEC.26.IntheeventthattheSenatedoesnotagreewiththeHouseofRepresentativesontheprovisionofany
billorjointresolution,thedifferencesshallbesettledbyaconferencecommitteeofbothHouseswhichshallmeet
withintendaysafteritscomposition.
andSection85,RuleXIVoftheRulesoftheHousewhichreads:
SEC.85..IntheeventthattheHousedoesnotagreewiththeSenateontheamendmentstoanybillorjoint
resolution,thedifferencesmaybesettledbyconferencecommitteesofbothChambers.
ConferenceCommitteeReports
TheforegoingprovisionsoftheConstitutionandtheRulesofbothchambersofCongressaremandatory.
InhisTreatiseOntheConstitutionalLimitations,
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
13moreparticularlyonenactmentofbill,Cooleystates:
Where,foraninstance,thelegislativepoweristobeexercisedbytwohouses,andbysettledandwell
understoodparliamentarylawthesetwohousesaretoholdseparatesessionsfortheirdeliberations,andthe
determinationoftheoneuponaproposeslawistobesubmittedtotheseparatedeterminationoftheother,the
constitution,inprovidingfortwohouses,hasevidentlyspokeninreferencetothissettledcustom,incorporatingit
asaruleofconstitutionalinterpretationsothatitwouldrequirenoprohibitoryclausetoforbidthetwohouses
fromcombininginone,andjointlyenactinglawsbythevoteofamajorityofall.Allthoseruleswhichareofthe
essentialsoflawmakingmustbeobservedandfollowedanditisonlythecustomaryrulesoforderandroutine,
suchasineverydeliberativebodyarealwaysunderstoodtobeunderitscontrol,andsubjecttoconstantchange
atitswill,thattheconstitutioncanbeunderstoodtohaveleftasmattersofdiscretion,tobeestablished,modified,
orabolishedbythebodiesforwhosegovernmentinnonessentialmatterstheyexist.
Firstviolation.SinceR.A.No.7716isarevenuemeasure,itmustintheHousenotintheSenate.Ascorrectly
assertedbypetitionerTolentino,onthefaceoftheenrolledcopyofR.A.No.7716,itisa"CONSOLIDATIONOF
HOUSEBILLNO.11197ANDSENATEBILLNO.1630."Inshort,itisanillicitmarriageofabillwhichoriginatedin
theHouseandabillwhichoriginatedintheSenate.Therefore,R.A.No.7716intheHouse.
originateexclusivelydidnotoriginateexclusively
Inrespectofappropriation,revenue,ortariffbills,billsincreasingthepublicdebt,billsoflocalapplication,or
privatebills,thereturnthereoftotheHouseaftertheSenateshallhave"proposedorconcurredwith
amendments"fortheformereithertoacceptorrejecttheamendmentswouldnotonlybeinconformitywiththe
foregoingrulesbutisalsoimplicitfromSection24ofArticleVI.
Withtheforegoingasourguidinglight,IshallnowshowtheviolationsoftheConstitutionandoftheRulesofthe
SenateandoftheHouseinthepassageofR.A.No.7716.
VIOLATIONSOFSECTION24,ARTICLEVIOFTHECONSTITUTION:
TheonlybillwhichcouldserveasavalidbasisforR.A.No.7716isHouseBill(HB)No.11197.Thisbill,whichis
thesubstitutebillrecommendedbytheHouseCommitteeonWaysandMeansinsubstitutionofHouseBillsNos.
253,771,2450,7033,8086,9030,9210,9397,10012,and10100,andcoveredbyitsCommitteeReportNo.
367,
14wasapprovedonthirdreadingbytheHouseon17November1993. 15Interestingly,HBNo.9210, 16whichwasfiledby
RepresentativeExequielB.Javieron19May1993,wasbythePresidentinhislettertoSpeakerJosedeVenecia,Jr.of1
June1993.certified17Yet,HBNo.11197,whichsubstitutedHBNo.9210andtheothersabovestated,wasnot.Its
certificationseemedtohavebeenentirelyforgotten.
On18November1993,theSecretaryGeneraloftheHouse,pursuanttoSection83,RuleXIVoftheRulesofthe
House,transmittedtothePresidentoftheSenateHBNo.11197andrequestedtheconcurrenceoftheSenate
therewith.
18
However,HBNo.11197hadpassedonlyitsfirstreadinginthatSenatebyitsreferraltoitsCommitteeonWays
andMeans.ThatCommitteeneverdeliberatedonHBNo.11197asitshouldhave.ItactedonlyonSenateBill
(SB)No.1129
19introducedbySenatorErnestoF.Herreraon1March1993.ItthenpreparedandproposedSBNo.1630,andinits
CommitteeReportNo.34920whichwassubmittedtotheSenateon7February1994,21itrecommendedthatSBNo.1630
beapproved""insubstitutionofS.B.No.1129,takingintoconsiderationP.S.Res.No.734andH.B.No.11197.22Itmust
becarefullynotedthatSBNo.1630wasproposedandsubmittedforapprovalbytheSenateObviously,theprincipal
measurewhichtheCommitteedeliberatedonandacteduponwasSBNo.1129andnotHBNo.11197.Thelatter,insteadof
beingtheonlymeasuretobetakenup,deliberatedupon,andreportedbacktotheSenateforitsconsiderationonsecond
readingand,eventually,onthirdreading,was,atthemost,merelygivenbytheCommitteeapassingglance.in
SUBSTITUTIONofSBNo.1129,andnotHBNo.11197.
ThisspecificunequivocalactionoftheSenateCommitteeonWaysandMeans,proposingandrecommending
approvalofSBNo.1630asasubstitutefororinsubstitutionofSBNo.1129demolishesatoncethethesisofthe
SolicitorGeneralthat:
i.e.,
AssumingthatSB1630isdistinctfromHB11197,amendmentbysubstitutioniswithinthepurviewofSection24,
ArticleVIoftheConstitution.
because,accordingtohim,(a)"Section68,RuleXXIXoftheRulesoftheSenateauthorizesanamendmentby
substitutionandtheonlyconditionrequiredisthat"thetextthereofissubmittedinwriting'and(b)'[I]n.(220U.S.
107)theUnitedStatedSupremeCourt,interpretingtheprovisionintheUnitedStatesConstitutionsimilarto
Section24,ArticleVIofthePhilippineConstitution,statedthatthepoweroftheSenatetoamendarevenuebill
includessubstitutionofanentirelynewmeasurefortheoneoriginallyproposedbytheHouseof
Representatives.'"
Flintvs.StoneTracyCo23
Thisthesisisutterlywithoutmerit.Inthefirstplace,itreadsintotheCommitteeReportsomethingwhichithadnot
contemplated,thatis,toproposeSBNo.1630insubstitutionofHBNo.11197orspeculatesthattheCommittee
mayhavecommittedanerrorinstatingthatitisSBNo.1129,andnotHBNo.11197,whichistobesubstitutedby
SBNo.1630.Either,ofcourse,isunwarrantedbecausethewordsoftheReport,solemnlysignedbythe
Chairman,ViceChairman(whodissented),sevenmembers,andthreemembers,
exofficio24leavenoroomfordoubtthatalthoughSBNo.1129,P.S.ResNo.734,andHBNo.11197werereferredtoand
consideredbytheCommittee,ithadpreparedtheattachedSBNo.1630whichitrecommendsforapproval""Todoas
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
suggestedwouldbetosubstitutethejudgmentoftheCommitteewithanotherthatiscompletelyinconsistentwithit,or,
simply,tocapriciouslyignorethefacts.insubstitutionofS.B.No.11197,takingintoconsiderationP.S.No.734andH.B.No.
11197withSenatorsHerrera,Angara,Romulo,Sotto,OpleandShahaniasauthors.
Inthesecondplace,theOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralintentionallymadeitappear,tomisleadratherthanto
persuadeus,thatin
Flintvs.StoneTracyCo.25TheU.S.SupremeCourtruled,asquotedbyitintheConsolidatedMemorandumfor
Respondents,asfollows:26
TheSenatehasthepowertoamendarevenuebill.Thispowertoamendisnotconfinedtotheeliminationof
provisionscontainedintheoriginalact,butembracesaswelltheadditionofsuchprovisionstheretoasmay
rendertheoriginalactsatisfactorytothebodywhichiscalledupontosupportit.
Ithas,infact,beenheldthatthesubstitutionofanentirelynewmeasurefortheoneoriginallyproposedcanbesupportedas
avalidamendment.
xxxxxxxxx
Itiscontendedinthefirstplacethatthissectionoftheactisunconstitutional,becauseitisarevenuemeasure,
andoriginatedintheSenateinviolationofSection7ofarticle1oftheConstitution,providingthat'allbillsfor
raisingrevenueshalloriginateintheHouseofRepresentatives,buttheSenatemayproposeorconcurwiththe
amendments,asonotherbills.'
ThefirstpartisnotastatementoftheCourt,butasummaryoftheargumentsofcounselinoneofthecompanion
cases(No.425,entitled,"").ThesecondpartisthesecondparagraphoftheopinionoftheCourtdeliveredbyMr.
JusticeDay.ThemisrepresentationthatthefirstpartisastatementoftheCourtishighlycontemptuous.Toshow
suchdeliberatemisrepresentation,itiswelltoquotewhatactuallyarefoundin55L.Ed.408,410,towit:
Gayvs.BalticMiningCo.
Messrs.CharlesA.SnowandJosephH.KnightfiledabriefforappelleesinNo.425:
SolicitorGeneralLehmann(byspecialleave)arguedthecausefortheUnitedStatesonreargument.
xxxxxxxxx
TheSenatehasthepowertoamendarevenuebill.Thispowertoamendisnotconfinedtotheeliminationof
provisionscontainedintheoriginalact,butembracesaswelltheadditionofsuchprovisionstheretoasmay
rendertheoriginalactsatisfactorytothebodywhichiscalledupontosupportit.Ithas,infact,beenheldthatthe
substitutionofanentirelynewmeasurefortheoneoriginallyproposedcanbesupportedasavalidamendment.
Brakev.Collison,122Fed.722.
Mr.JamesL.QuackenbushfiledastatementforappelleesinNo.442.
Mr.JusticeDaydeliveredtheopinionofthecourt:
Thesecasesinvolvetheconstitutionalvalidityof38oftheactofCongressapprovedAugust5,1909,knownas
'thecorporationtax'law.36Stat.atL.11,112117,chap.6,U.S.Comp.Stat.Supp.1909,pp.659,844849.
Itiscontendedinthefirstplacethatthissectionoftheactisunconstitutional,becauseitisarevenuemeasure,
andoriginatedintheSenateinviolationof7ofarticle1oftheConstitution,providingthe'allbillsforraising
revenueshalloriginateintheHouseofRepresentatives,buttheSenatemayproposeorconcurwiththe
amendments,asonotherbills.'Thehistoryoftheactiscontainedinthegovernment'sbrief,andisacceptedas
correct,noobjectionbeingmadetoitsaccuracy.
Thisstatementshowsthatthetariffbillofwhichthesectionunderconsiderationisapart,originatedintheHouse
ofRepresentatives,andwasthereageneralbillforthecollectionofrevenue.Asoriginallyintroduced,itcontained
aplanofinheritancetaxation.IntheSenatetheproposedtaxwasremovedfromthebill,andthecorporationtax,
inameasure,substitutedtherefor.ThebillhavingproperlyoriginatedintheHouse,weperceivenoreasoninthe
constitutionalprovisionrelieduponwhyitmaynotbeamendedintheSenateinthemannerwhichitwasinthis
case.Theamendmentwasgermanetothesubjectmatterofthebill,andnotbeyondthepoweroftheSenateto
propose.(Italicssupplied)
xxxxxxxxx
Asshownabove,theunderlinedportionsweredeliberatelyomittedinthequotationmadebytheOfficeofthe
SolicitorGeneral.
Inthethirdplace,aSenateamendmentbysubstitutionwithanentirelynewbillofabill,whichunderSection24,
ArticleVIoftheConstitutioncanonlyoriginateexclusivelyintheHouse,isnotauthorizedbysaidSection24..
cannotbeinvokedinfavorofsuchaview.AspointedoutbyMr.JusticeFlorenzD.Regaladoduringtheoral
argumentsofthesecasesandduringtheinitialdeliberationsthereonbytheCourt,involvesaSenateamendment
toarevenuebillwhich,undertheUnitedStatesConstitution,shouldoriginatefromtheHouseofRepresentatives.
Theamendmentconsistedofthesubstitutionofacorporationtaxinlieuoftheplanofinheritancetaxation
containedinageneralbillforthecollectionofrevenueasitcamefromtheHouseofRepresentativeswherethe
billoriginated.TheconstitutionalprovisioninquestionisSection7,ArticleIoftheUnitedStatesConstitutionwhich
reads:
Flintvs.StoneTracyCoFlint
Section7..AllBillsforraisingRevenueshalloriginateintheHouseofRepresentativesbuttheSenatemay
proposeorconcurwithAmendments,asonotherBills.
BillsandResolutions
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
Thisprovision,contrarytothemisleadingclaimoftheSolicitorGeneral,isnotsimilartoSection24,ArticleVIof
ourConstitution,whichforeasycomparisonishereunderquotedagain:
Allappropriation,revenueortariffbills,billsauthorizingincreaseofthepublicdebt,billsoflocalapplication,and
privatebillsshalloriginateexclusivelyintheHouseofRepresentatives,buttheSenatemayproposeorconcur
withamendments.
Notethatintheformertheworddoesnotappear.And,inthelatter,thephrase"asonotherBill,"whichisfoundin
theformer,doesnotappear.Theseareverysignificantindeterminingtheauthorityoftheupperchamberover
thebillsenumeratedinSection24.SincetheoriginationisnotexclusivelyvestedintheHouseofRepresentatives
oftheUnitedStates,theSenate'sauthoritytoproposeorconcurwithamendmentsisnecessarilybroader.That
broaderauthorityisfurtherconfirmedbythephrase"asonotherBills,",itspowertoproposeorconcurwith
amendmentsthereonisthesameasinordinarybills.TheabsenceofthisphraseinourConstitutionwasclearly
intendedtorestrictorlimitthePhilippineSenate'spowertoproposeorconcurwithamendments.Inthelightof
theoforiginationandtheabsenceofthephrase"asonotherBills,"thePhilippineSenatecannotamendby
substitutionwithanentirelynewbillofitsownanybillcoveredbySection24ofArticleVIwhichtheHouseof
RepresentativestransmittedtoitbecausesuchsubstitutionwouldindirectlyviolateSection24.
exclusivelyi.e.exclusivity
TheseobvioussubstantivedifferencesbetweenSection7,ArticleIoftheU.S.ConstitutionandSection24,Article
VIofourConstitutionareenoughreasonswhythisCourtshouldneitherallowitselftobemisledbynorbeawed
by
Flintvs.StoneRaineyvs.UnitedStates27andtheopinionofMessrs.OggandRay28whichthemajoritycitestosupport
theviewthatthepoweroftheU.S.Senatetoamendarevenuemeasureisunlimited.RaineyconcernstheTariffActof1909
oftheUnitedStatesofAmericaandspecificallyinvolvedwasitsSection37whichwasanamendmentintroducedbythe
U.S.Senate.Itwasclaimedbythepetitionersthatthesaidsectionisarevenuemeasurewhichshouldoriginateinthe
HouseofRepresentatives.TheU.S.SupremeCourt,however,adoptedandapprovedthefindingofthecourtthat:aquo
thesectioninquestionisnotvoidasabillforraisingrevenueoriginatingintheSenate,andnotintheHouseof
Representatives.ItappearsthatthesectionwasproposedbytheSenateasanamendmenttoabillforraising
Messrs.OggandRay,whoareprofessorsemeritusofpoliticalscience,basedtheirstatementnotevenonacase
decidedbytheU.S.SupremeCourtbutontheirperceptionofwhatSection7,ArticleIoftheU.S.Constitution
permits.Inthetenthedition(1951)oftheirwork,theystate:
Anybillmaymakeitsfirstappearanceineitherhouse,exceptonlythatbillsforraisingrevenuearerequiredby
theconstitutionto'originate'intheHouseofRepresentatives.Indeed,throughitsrighttoamendrevenuebills,
eventotheextentofsubstitutingnewones,theSenatemay,ineffect,originatethemalso.
29
Secondviolation.SinceSBNo.1129isarevenuemeasure,itcouldnotevenbevalidlyintroducedorinitiatedin
theSenate.Itfollowstoo,thattheSenatecannotvalidlyactthereon.
Thirdviolation.SinceSBNo.1129couldnothavebeenvalidlyintroducedintheSenateandcouldnothave
beenvalidlyactedonbytheSenate,thenitcannotbesubstitutedbyanotherrevenuemeasure,SBNo.1630,
whichtheSenateCommitteeonWaysandMeansintroducedinsubstitutionofSBNo.1129.Thefilingor
introductionintheSenateofSBNo.1630alsoviolatedSection24,ArticleVIoftheConstitution.
Firstviolation.TheSenate,despiteitslackofconstitutionalauthoritytoconsiderSBNo.1630orSBNo.1129
whichtheformersubstituted,openeddeliberationsonsecondreadingofSBNo.1630on8February1994.On24
March1994,theSenateapproveditonandon.
secondreadingthirdreading30ThatapprovalonthesamedayviolatedSection26(2),ArticleVIoftheConstitution.The
justificationthereforwasthaton24February1994thePresidentcertifiedto"thenecessityoftheenactmentofSBNo.1630
...tomeetapublicemergency."31
Their"ineffect"conclusionis,ofcourse,logicallycorrectbecausetheworddoesnotappearinsaidSection7,
ArticleIoftheU.S.Constitution.
exclusively
NeithercanIfindmyselfinagreementwiththeviewofthemajoritythattheConstitutiondoesnotprohibitthefiling
intheSenateofasubstitutebillinanticipationofitsreceiptofthebillfromtheHousesolongasactionbythe
SenateasabodyiswithheldpendingreceiptoftheHousebill,therebystating,ineffect,thatS.B.No.1129was
suchananticipatorysubstitutebill,which,nevertheless,doesnotseemtohavebeenconsideredbytheSenate
exceptonlyafteritsreceiptofH.B.No.11179on23November1993whentheprocessoflegislationinrespectof
itbeganwithareferraltotheSenateCommitteeonWaysandMeans.Firstly,tosaythattheConstitutiondoesnot
prohibititistorendermeaninglessSection24ofArticleVIortosanctionitsblatantdisregardthroughthesimple
expedientoffilingintheSenateofasocalledanticipatorysubstitutebill.Secondly,itsuggeststhatS.B.No.1129
wasfiledasananticipatorymeasuretosubstituteforH.B.No.11179.Thisisaspeculationwhicheventheauthor
ofS.B.No.1129maynothaveindulgedin.S.B.No.1129wasfiledintheSenatebySenatorHerreraon1March
1993.H.B.No.11197wasapprovedbytheHouseonthirdreadingonlyon17November1993.Frankly,Icannot
believethatSenatorHerrerawasabletoprophesythattheHousewouldpassanyVATbill,muchlesstoknowits
provisions.That"itdoesnotseemthattheSenateevenconsidered"thelatternotuntilafteritsreceiptofH.B.No.
11179isanotherspeculation.Asstatedearlier,S.B.No.1129wasfiledintheSenateon1March1993,whileH.B.
No.11197wastransmittedtotheSenateonlyon18November1993.Thereisnoevidenceonrecordtoshowthat
bothwerereferredtotheSenateCommitteeonWaysandMeansatthesametime.Finally,inrespectofH.B.No.
11197,itslegislativeprocessdidnotbeginwithitsreferraltotheSenate'sWaysandMeansCommittee.Itbegan
uponitsfiling,asaCommitteeBilloftheHouseofCommitteeonWaysandMeans,intheHouse.
VIOLATIONSOFSECTION26(2),ARTICLEVIOFTHECONSTITUTION:
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
Isubmit,however,thatthePresidentialcertificationisvoidnotnecessarilyforthereasonadducedbypetitioner
Kilosbayan,Inc.,butbecauseitwasaddressedtotheSenateforabillwhichisprohibitedfromoriginatingtherein.
Theonlybillwhichcouldbeproperlycertifiedonpermissibleconstitutionalgroundsevenifithadalreadybeen
transmittedtotheSenateisHBNo.11197.Asearlierobserved,thiswasnotsocertified,althoughHBNo.9210
(oneofthoseconsolidatedintoHBNo.11197)wascertifiedon1June1993.
abinitio32
Secondviolation.Itfurtherappearsthaton24June1994,aftertheapprovalofSBNo.1630,theSecretaryof
theSenate,upondirectiveoftheSenatePresident,formallynotifiedtheHouseSpeakeroftheSenate'sapproval
thereofanditsrequestforabicameralconference"inviewofthedisagreeingprovisionsofsaidbillandHouseBill
No.11197."
33
Also,thecertificationofSBNo.1630cannot,byanystretchoftheimagination,beextendedtoHBNo.11197
becauseSBNo.1630didnotsubstituteHBNo.11197butSBNo.1129.
ConsideringthatthecertificationofSBNo.1630isvoid,itsapprovalonsecondandthirdreadingsinoneday
violatedSection26(2),ArticleVIoftheConstitution.
ItmustbestressedagainthatHBNo.11197wasneversubmittedfororactedonsecondandthirdreadingsinthe
Senate,andSBNo.1630wasneversenttotheHouseforitsconcurrence.Elsewisestated,bothwereonlyhalf
waythroughthelegislativemill.Theirsubmissiontoaconferencecommitteewasnotonlyanomalously
premature,butviolateoftheconstitutionalruleonthreereadings.
ThesuggestionthatSBNo.1630wasnotrequiredtobesubmittedtotheHouseforotherwisetheprocedure
wouldbeendless,isunacceptablefor,firstly,itviolatesSection26,RuleXIIoftheRulesoftheSenateand
Section85,RuleXIVoftheRulesoftheHouse,and,secondly,itisneverendless.Ifthechamberoforiginrefuses
toaccepttheamendmentsoftheotherchamber,therequestforconferenceshallbemade.
VIOLATIONSOFTHERULESOFBOTHCHAMBERSGRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETION.
Theerroneousreferraltotheconferencecommitteeneedsfurtherdiscussion.SinceS.B.No.1630wasnota
substitutebillforH.B.No.11197butforS.B.No.1129,it(S.B.No.1630)remainedabillwhichoriginatedinthe
Senate.EvenassumingthatitcouldbevalidlyinitiatedintheSenate,itshouldhavebeenfirsttransmittedtothe
Housewhereitwouldundergothreereadings.Ontheotherhand,sinceHBNo.11197wasneveracteduponby
theSenateonsecondandthirdreadings,nodifferencesorinconsistenciescouldasyetarisesoastowarranta
requestforaconference.ItshouldbenotedthatunderSection83,RuleXIVoftheRulesoftheHouse,itisonly
whentheSenateshallhaveapprovedwithamendmentsHBno.11197andtheHousedeclinestoacceptthe
amendmentsafterhavingbeennotifiedthereofthattherequestforaconferencemaybemadebytheHouse,not
bytheSenate.Conversely,theSenate'srequestforaconferencewouldonlybeproperif,followingthetransmittal
ofSBNo.1630totheHouse,itwasapprovedbythelatterwithamendmentsbuttheSenaterejectedthe
amendments.
arguendo
Indisputablythen,whentherequestforabicameralconferencewasmadebytheSenate,SBNo.1630wasnot
yettransmittedtotheHouseforconsiderationonthreereadingsandHBNo.11197wasstillintheSenate
awaitingconsiderationonsecondandthirdreadings.Theirreferraltothebicameralconferencecommitteewas
palpablyprematureand,insodoing,boththeSenateandtheHouseactedwithoutauthorityorwithgraveabuse
ofdiscretion.Nothing,andabsolutelynothing,couldhavebeenvalidlyacteduponbythebicameralconference
committee.
GRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETIONCOMMITTEDBYTHEBICAMERALCONFERENCECOMMITTEE.
Seriousirregularitiesamountingtolackofjurisdictionorgraveabuseofdiscretionwerecommittedbythe
bicameralconferencecommittee.
First,itassumed,andtookforgrantedthatSBNo.1630couldvalidlyoriginateintheSenate.Thisassumptionis
erroneous.
Second,itassumedthatHBNo.11197andSBNo.1630hadproperlypassedbothchambersofCongressand
wereproperlyandregularlysubmittedtoit.Asearlierdiscussed,theassumptionisunfoundedinfact.
Third,perthebicameralconferencecommittee'sproceedingsof19April1994,RepresentativeExequielJavier,
ChairmanofthepanelfromtheHouse,initiallysuggestedthatHBNo.11197shouldbethe"frameofreference,"
becauseitisarevenuemeasure,towhichSenatorErnestoMacedaconcurred.However,afteranincompletely
recordedreactionofSenatorErnestoHerrera,ChairmanoftheSenatepanel,RepresentativeJavierseemedto
agreethat"allamendmentswillbecomingfromtheSenate."Theissueofwhatshouldbethe"frameof
reference"doesnotappeartohavebeenresolved.Thesefactsarerecordedinthiswise,asquotedinthe
ConsolidatedMemorandumforRespondents:
34
Yungconcernmoaboutthebillasthereferenceinthisdiscussionissomethingthatwecanjust...
CHAIRMANJAVIER.
Firstofall,whatwouldbethebasis,no,orframeworkparahuwagnamanmawalayungpersonalitynamin
ditosabicameral,no,becausethebilloriginatesfromtheHousebecausethisisarevenuebill,sowewould
justwanttoask,,andtheneverythingwilljustbeinserted?
wemaketheHouseBillastheframeofreference
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
HON.MACEDA.
Yes.That'strueforeveryrevenuemeasure.There'snootherway..Ofcourse,fortherecord,weknowthat
thisisanadministrationthisiscertifiedbythePresidentandIwasabouttoputintotherecordsasIam
sayingnowthatyourproblemabouttheimpactonpricesonthepeoplewasalreadydecidedwhenthe
Presidentandtheadministrationsentthistousandcertifiedit.Theyhavealreadygottenoverthatpolitical
implicationofthisbillandtheeconomicimpactonprices.
TheHouseBillhasgottobethebase
CHAIRMANHERRERA.
CHAIRMANJAVIER.
Wewilljust...
alltheamendmentswillbecomingfromtheSenate.
(BICAMERALCONFERENCEONMAJORDIFFERENCESBETWEENHBNO.11197ANDSBNO.1630
[Cte.onWays&Means]APRIL19,1994,II6andII7Italicssupplied)
TheseexchangeswouldsuggestthatRepresentativeJavierhadwantedHBNo.11197tobetheprincipal
measureonwhichreconciliationofthedifferencesshouldbebased.However,sincetheSenatedidnotactonthis
BillonsecondandthirdreadingsbecauseitsCommitteeonWaysandMeansdidnotdeliberateonitbutinstead
proposedSBNo.1630insubstitutionofSBNo.1129,thesuggestionhasnofactualbasis.Then,whenfinallyhe
agreedthat"allamendmentswillbecomingfromtheSenate,"heinfactwithdrewtheformersuggestionand
agreedthatSBNo.1630,whichistheSenateversionoftheValueAddedTax(VAT)measure,shouldbethe
"frameofreference."ButthenSBNo.1630wasnevertransmittedtotheHouseforthelatter'sconcurrence.
Hence,itcannotserveasthe"frameofreference"orasthebasisfordeliberation.Theposturetakenby
RepresentativeJavieralsoindicatesthatSBNo.1630shouldbetakenastheamendmenttoHBNo.11197.This,
too,isunfoundedbecauseSBNo.1630wasnotproposedinsubstitutionofHBNo.11197.
SinceSBNo.1630didnotpassthreereadingsintheHouseandHBNo.11197didnotpasssecondandthird
readingsintheSenate,itlogicallyfollowsthatnodisagreeingprovisionshadasyetarisen.Thebicameral
conferencecommitteeerroneouslyassumedthecontrary.
EvengrantingthatbothHBNo.11197andSBNo.1630hadbeenvalidlyapprovedbybothchambersof
Congressandvalidlyreferredtothebicameralconferencecommittee,thelatterhadverylimitedauthority
thereon.Itwascreated"inviewofthedisagreeingprovisionsof"thetwobills.
arguendo35Itsdutywaslimitedtothereconciliationofdisagreeingprovisionsortheresolutionofdifferencesor
inconsistencies.ThecommitteerecognizedthatlimitedauthorityintheopeningparagraphofitsReport36whenitsaid:
TheConferenceCommitteeonthedisagreeingprovisionsofHouseBillNo.11197...andSenateBillNo.1630....
Undersuchlimitedauthority,itcouldonlyeither(a)restore,whollyorpartly,thespecificprovisionsofHBNo.
11197amendedbySBNo.1630,(b)sustain,whollyorpartly,theSenate'samendments,or(c)bywayofa
compromise,toagreethatneitherprovisionsinHBNo.11197amendedbytheSenatenorthelatter's
amendmentstheretobecarriedintothefinalformoftheformer.
ButaspointedoutbypetitionersSenatorRaulRocoandKilosbayan,Inc.,thebicameralconferencecommittee
notonlystruckoutnondisagreeingprovisionsofHBNo.11197andSBNo.1630,,provisionswherebothbillsare
infullagreementitaddedmoreactivitiesortransactionstobecoveredbyVAT,whichwerenotwithinthe
contemplationofbothbills.
i.e.
SincebothHBNo.11197andSBNo.1630werestillhalfcookedinthelegislativevat,andwerenotreadyfor
referraltoaconference,thebicameralconferencecommitteeclearlyactedwithoutjurisdictionorwithgrave
abuseofdiscretionwhenitconsolidatedbothintoonebillwhichbecameR.A.No.7716.
APPROVALBYBOTHCHAMBERSOFCONFERENCECOMMITTEEREPORTANDPROPOSEDBILLDIDNOT
CURECONSTITUTIONALINFIRMITIES.
IcannotagreewiththesuggestionthatsinceboththeSenateandtheHousehadapprovedthebicameral
conferencecommitteereportandthebillproposedbyitinsubstitutionofHBNo.11197andSBNo.1630,
whateverinfirmitiesmayhavebeencommittedbyitwerecuredbyratification.Thisdoctrineofratificationmay
applytominorproceduralflawsortolerablebreachsoftheparametersofthebicameralconferencecommittee's
limitedpowersbutnevertoviolationsoftheConstitution.CongressisnotabovetheConstitution.Intheinstant
case,sinceSBNo.1630wasintroducedinviolationofSection24,ArticleVIoftheConstitution,waspassedinthe
Senateinviolationofthe"threereadings"rule,andwasnottransmittedtotheHouseforthecompletionofthe
constitutionalprocessoflegislation,andHBNo.11197wasnotlikewisepassedbytheSenateonsecondand
thirdreadings,neithertheSenatenortheHousecouldvalidlyapprovethebicameralconferencecommitteereport
andtheproposedbill.
Inviewoftheforegoing,theconclusionisinevitablethatfornoncompliancewithmandatoryprovisionsofthe
ConstitutionandoftheRulesoftheSenateandoftheHouseontheenactmentoflaws,R.A.No.7716is
unconstitutionaland,therefore,nullandvoid.Adiscussionthenoftheinstrinsicvalidityofsomeofitsprovisions
wouldbeunnecessary.
Themajorityopinion,however,invokestheenrolledbilldoctrineandwantsthisCourttodesistfromlooking
behindthecopyoftheassailedmeasureascertifiedbytheSenatePresidentandtheSpeakeroftheHouse.I
respectfullysubmitthattheinvocationismisplaced.First,astotheissueoforigination,thecertificationinthis
caseexplicitlystatesthatR.A.No.7716isa"ofHouseBillNo.11197andSenateBillNo.1630."Thisis
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
conclusiveevidencethatthemeasuredidnotoriginateexclusivelyintheHouse.Second,theenrolledbilldoctrine
isofAmericanorigin,andunquestionedfealtytoitmaynolongerbejustifiedinviewoftheexpandedjurisdiction
consolidation37ofthisCourtunderSection1,ArticleVIIIofourConstitutionwhichnowexpresslygrantsauthoritytothis
Courtto:
determinewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction
onthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityoftheGovernment.
Third,evenundertheregimeofthe1935Constitutionwhichdidnotcontaintheaboveprovision,thisCourt,
throughMr.ChiefJusticeMakalintal,in,
Astorgavs.Villegas38declaredthatitcannotbetrulysaidthatMabanagvs.LopezVito39haslaidtorestthequestionof
whethertheenrolledbilldoctrineorthejournalentryruleshouldbeadheredtointhisjurisdiction,andstated:
AsfarasCongressitselfisconcerned,thereisnothingsacrosanctinthecertificationmadebythepresiding
officers.Itismerelyamodeofauthentication.ThelawmakingprocessinCongressendswhenthebillisapproved
bybothHouses,andthecertificationdoesnotaddtothevalidityofthebillorcureanydefectalreadypresent
uponitspassage.Inotherwords,itistheapprovalofCongressandnotthesignaturesofthepresidingofficers
thatisessential.Thusthe(1935)Constitutionsaysthat'[e]verybillpassedbytheCongressshall,beforeit
becomesalaw,bepresentedtothePresident.'In,theSupremeCourtofMissouri,interpretingasimilarprovision
intheStateConstitution,saidthatthesame'makesitclearthattheindispensablestepinthepassage'andit
followsthatifabill,otherwisefullyenactedasalaw,isnotattestedbythepresidingofficer,otherproofthatithas
'passedbothhouseswillsatisfytheconstitutionalrequirement.'
Brownvs.Morris,supra
Fourth,evenintheUnitedStates,theenrolledbilldoctrinehasbeensubstantiallyundercut.Thisisshowninthe
disquisitionsofMr.JusticeReynatoS.Punoinhisdissentingopinion,citing.
Sutherland,StatutoryConstruction
Last,thepleadingsofthepartieshaveestablishedbeyonddoubtthatHBNo.11197wasnotactedonsecondand
thirdreadingsintheSenateandSBNo.1630,whichwasapprovedbytheSenateonsecondandthirdreadingsin
substitutionofSBNo.1129,wastransmittedtotheHouseforitspassage.Otherwisestated,theywereonly
passedintheirrespectivechamberoforiginbutnotintheother.Innowaycaneachbecomealawunder
paragraph2,Section26,ArticleVIoftheConstitution.FortheCourttocloseitseyestothisfactbecauseofthe
enrolledbilldoctrineistoshrinkitsdutytohold"inviolatewhatisdecreedbytheConstitution."
never40
IvotethentoGRANTthesepetitionsandtodeclareR.A.No.7716asunconstitutional.
ROMERO,J.:
FewissuesbroughtbeforethisCourtforresolutionhaveroiledthecitizenryasmuchastheinstantcasebrought
byninepetitionerswhichchallengestheconstitutionalityofRepublicActNo.7716(tobereferredtohereinasthe
"ExpandedValueAddedTax"orEVATlawtodistinguishitfromExecutiveOrderNo.273whichistheVATlaw
proper)thatwasenactedonMay5,1994.Avisceralissue,ithasgalvanizedthepopulaceintomassactionand
stridentprotestevenastheEVATproponentshavetakentopodiaandmediainainformationcampaign.
postfacto
TheCourtisconfrontedherewithanatypicalcase.Notonlyisitavatfulofseethingcontroversybutsomeunlikely
petitionersinvokeunorthodoxremedies.ThreeSenatorpetitionerswouldnullifyastatutethatborethe
indispensablestampofapprovaloftheirownChamberwithtwoofthempubliclyrepudiatingwhattheyhadearlier
endorsed.Withtwoformercolleagues,oneofthemanerstwhileSenatePresident,makingcommoncausewith
them,theywouldstaytheimplementationbytheExecutiveDepartmentofalawwhichtheythemselveshave
initiated.TheyaddressaprayertoacoequalDepartmenttoprobetheirofficialactsforanyprocedural
irregularitiestheyhavethemselvescommittedlesttheeffectsoftheseaberrationsinflictsuchdamageor
irreparablelossaswouldbringdownthewrathofthepeopleontheirheads.
TotheextentthattheyperceivethatavitalcogintheinternalmachineryoftheLegislaturehasmalfunctioned
fromhavingoperatedinblatantviolationoftheenablingRulestheyhavethemselveslaiddown,theywouldnow
pleadthatthisotherBranchofGovernmentstepin,invokingtheexerciseofwhatisatonceadelicateand
awesomepower.Undoubtedly,thecaseatbenchisasmuchatestfortheLegislatureasitisfortheJudiciary.
AbackwardglanceontheValueAddedTax(VAT)isinorderatthispoint.
Thefirstcodificationofthecountry'sinternalrevenuelawswaseffectedwiththeenactmentofCommonwealthAct
No.466,commonlyknownasthe'NationalInternalRevenueCode'whichwasapprovedonJune15,1939and
tookeffectonJuly1,1939,althoughtheprovisionsontheincometaxweremaderetroactivetoJanuary1,1939.
Since1939whentheturnovertaxwasreplacedbythemanufacturer'ssalestax,theTaxCodehadprovidedfora
singlestagevalueaddedtaxonoriginalsalesbymanufacturers,producersandimporterscomputedonthe'cost
deductionmethod'andlater,onthebasisofthe'taxcreditmethod.'Theturnovertaxwasreintroducedin1985
byPresidentialDecreeNo.1991(asamendedbyPresidentialDecreeNo.2006).
1
In1986,ataxreformpackagewasapprovedbytheAquinoCabinet.Itcontainedtwentyninemeasures,oneof
whichproposedtheadoptionoftheVAT,aswellasthesimplificationofthesalestaxstructureandtheabolitionof
theturnovertax.
Upuntil1987,thesystemoftaxinggoodsconsistedof(a)anexcisetaxoncertainselectedarticles(b)fixedand
percentagetaxesonoriginalandsubsequentsales,onimportationsandonmilledarticlesand(c)miningtaxeson
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
mineralproducts.Servicesweresubjectedtopercentagetaxesbasedmainlyongrossreceipts.
2
OnJuly25,1987,PresidentCorazonC.AquinosignedintolawExecutiveOrderNo.273whichadoptedtheVAT.
Fromtheformersinglestagevalueaddedtax,itintroducedthemultistageVATsystemwhere"thevalueadded
taxisimposedonthesaleofanddistributionprocessculminatinginsale,tothefinalconsumer.Generally
described,thetaxpayer(theseller)determineshistaxliabilitybycomputingthetaxonthegrosssellingpriceor
grossreceipt("outputtax")andsubtractingorcreditingtheearlierVATonthepurchaseorimportationofgoodsor
onthesaleofservice("inputtax")againstthetaxdueonhisownsale."
3
OnJanuary1,1988,implementingrulesandregulationsfortheVATwerepromulgated.PresidentAquinothen
issuedProclamationNo.219onFebruary12,1988urgingthepublicandprivatesectorstojointhenationwide
consumers'educationcampaignforVAT.
SoonaftertheimplementationofExecutiveOrderNo.273,itsconstitutionalitywasassailedbeforethisCourtin
thecaseof.
KapatiranngmgaNaglilingkodsaPamahalaanngPilipinas,Inc.,etal.v.Tan4ThefourpetitionerssoughttonullifytheVAT
law"forbeingunconstitutionalinthatitsenactmentisnotallegedlywithinthepowersofthePresidentthattheVATis
oppressive,discriminatory,regressive,andviolatesthedueprocessandequalprotectionclausesandotherprovisionsof
the1987Constitution."5Indismissingtheconsolidatedpetitions,thisCourtstated:
TheCourt,followingthetimehonoreddoctrineofseparationofpowerscannotsubstituteitsjudgmentforthatof
thePresidentastothewisdom,justiceandadvisabilityoftheVAT.TheCourtcanonlylookintoanddetermine
whetherornotExecutiveOrderNo.273wasenactedandmadeeffectiveaslaw,inthemannerrequiredbyand
consistentwith,theConstitution,andtomakesurethatitwasnotissuedingraveabuseofdiscretionamounting
tolackorexcessofjurisdictionand,inthisregard,theCourtfindsnoreasontoimpedeitsapplicationor
continuedimplementation.
6
Althoughdeclaredconstitutional,theVATlawwassoughttobeamendedfrom1992onbyaseriesofbillsfiledin
bothHousesofCongress.Inchronologicalsequence,thesewere:
HB/SBNo.DateFiledinCongress
HBNo.253July22,1992
HBNo.2450September9,1992
SenateRes.No.734
7September10,1992
HBNo.7033February3,1993
SBNo.1129
8March1,1993
HBNo.8086March9,1993
HBNo.9030May11,1993
HBNo.9210
9May19,1993
HBNo.9297May25,1993
HBNo.10012July28,1993
HBNo.11197in
substitutionof
HBNos.253,771,
2450,7033,8086,
9030,9210,9297
10012and10100
10November5,1993
HBNo.11197wasapprovedintheLowerHouseonsecondreadingNovember
11,1993
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
HBNo.11197wasapprovedintheLowerHouseonthirdreadingandvotedupon
with114Yeasand12NaysNovember17,1993
HBNo.11197wastransmittedtotheSenateNovember18,1993
SenateCommitteeonWaysandMeanssubmittedCom.ReportNo.349
recommedingforapprovalSBNo.1630insubstitutionofSBNo.1129,takinginto
considerationPSRes.No.734andHBNo.11197
11February7,1994
CertificationbyPresidentFidelV.RamosofSenateBillNo.1630forimmediate
enactmenttomeetapublicemergencyMarch22,1994
SBNo.1630wasapprovedbytheSenateonsecondandthirdreadingsand
subsequentlyvoteduponwith13yeas,noneagainstandoneabstentionMarch
24,1994
TransmittalbytheSenatetotheLowerHouseofarequestforaconferencein
viewofdisagreeingprovisionsofSBNo.1630andHBNO.11197March24,
1994
TheBicameralConferenceCommitteeconductedvariousmeetingstoreconcile
theproposalsontheVATApril13,19,20,21,25
TheHouseagreedontheConferenceCommitteeReportApril27,1994
TheSenateagreedontheConferenceCommitteeReportMay2,1994
ThePresidentsignedRepublicActNo.7716TheExpandedVATLaw
12May5,1994
RepublicActNo.7716waspublishedintwonewspapersofgeneralcirculation
May12,1994
RepublicActNo.7716becameeffectiveMay28,1994
RepublicActNo.7716merelyexpandedthebaseoftheVATlawevenasthetaxretaineditsmultistage
character.
AttheoralhearingheldonJuly7,1994,thisCourtdelimitedpetitioners'argumentstothefollowingissuesculled
fromtheirrespectivepetitions.
PROCEDURALISSUES
DoesRepublicActNo.7716violateArticleVI,Section24,oftheConstitution?
13
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
DoesitviolateArticleVI,Section26,paragraph2,oftheConstitution?
14
WhatistheextentofthepoweroftheBicameralConferenceCommittee?
SUBSTANTIVEISSUES
DoesthelawviolatethefollowingprovisionsinArticleIII(BillofRights)oftheConstitution:
1.Section1
15
2.Section4
16
3.Section5
17
4.Section10
18
DoesthelawviolatethefollowingotherprovisionsoftheConstitution?
19
20
AsaresultoftheunedifyingexperienceofthepastwheretheCourthadthepropensitytosteerclearofquestions
itperceivedtobe"political"innature,thepresentConstitution,incontrast,hasexplicitlyexpandedjudicialpower
toincludethedutyofthecourts,especiallytheSupremeCourt,"todeterminewhetherornottherehasbeena
graveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentality
oftheGovernment."
21Isubmitthatunderthisexplicitmandate,theCourtisempoweredtoruleuponactsofotherGovernmententitiesforthe
purposeofdeterminingwhethertheremayhavebeen,infact,irregularitiescommittedtantamounttoviolationofthe
Constitution,whichcasewouldclearlyconstituteagraveabuseofdiscretionontheirpart.
InthewordsofthesponsoroftheabovequotedArticleoftheConstitutionontheJudiciary,theformerChief
JusticeRobertoR.Concepcion,"thejudiciaryisthefinalarbiteronthequestionofwhetherornotabranchof
governmentoranyofitsofficialshasactedwithoutjurisdictionorinexcessofjurisdiction,orsocapriciouslyasto
constituteanabuseofdiscretionamountingtoexcessofjurisdictionorlackofjurisdiction.Thisisnotonlya
judicialpowerbutadutytopassjudgmentonmattersofthisnature.
Thisisthebackgroundofparagraph2ofSection1,whichmeansthatthecourtscannothereafterexhibitits
wontedreticencebyclaimingthatsuchmattersconstituteapoliticalquestion."
22
Intheinstantpetitions,thisCourtiscalledupon,notsomuchtoexerciseitstraditionalpowerofjudicialreviewas
todeterminewhetherornottherehasindeedbeenagraveabuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheLegislature
amountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction.
Wheretherearegroundstoresolveacasewithouttouchingonitsconstitutionality,theCourtwilldosowith
utmostalacrityinduedeferencetothedoctrineofseparationofpowersanchoredontherespectthatmustbe
accordedtotheotherbranchesofgovernmentwhicharecoordinate,coequaland,asfaraspracticable,
independentofoneanother.
Onceitispalpablethattheconstitutionalissueisunavoidable,thenitistimetoassumejurisdiction,providedthat
thefollowingrequisitesforajudicialinquiryaremet:thattheremustbeanactualandappropriatecasea
personalandsubstantialinterestofthepartyraisingtheconstitutionalquestiontheconstitutionalquestionmust
beraisedattheearliestpossibleopportunityandthedecisionoftheconstitutionalquestionmustbenecessaryto
thedeterminationofthecaseitself,thesamebeingtheofthecase.
lismota23
Havingassuredourselvesthattheabovecitedrequisitesarepresentintheinstantpetitions,weproceedtotake
themup.
ARTICLEVI,SECTION24
SomepetitionersassailtheconstitutionalityofRepublicActNo.7716asbeinginviolationofArticleVI,Section24
oftheConstitutionwhichprovides:
Allappropriation,revenueortariffbills,billsauthorizingincreaseofthepublicdebt,billsoflocalapplication,and
privatebills,shalloriginateexclusivelyintheHouseofRepresentatives,buttheSenatemayproposeorconcur
withamendments.
InG.R.Nos.115455and115781,petitionersargue:
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
(a)ThebillwhichbecameRepublicActNo.7716didnotoriginateexclusivelyintheHouseofRepresentatives.
TheSenate,afterreceivingH.B.No.11197,submitteditsownbill,S.B.No.1630,andproceededtovoteand
approvethesameaftersecondandthirdreadings.
(b)TheSenateexceededitsauthorityto"proposeorconcurwithamendments"whenitsubmitteditsownbill,S.B.
No.1630,recommendingitsapproval"insubstitutionofS.B.No.1129,takingintoconsiderationP.S.Res.No.734
andH.B.No.11197."
(c)H.B.No.11197wasnotdeliberateduponbytheSenate.NeitherwasitvoteduponbytheSenateonsecond
andthirdreadings,aswhatwasvoteduponwasS.B.No.1630.
ArticleVI,Section24istakenwordforwordfromArticleVI,Section18ofthe1935Constitutionwhichwas,inturn,
patternedafterArticleI,Section7(1)oftheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,whichstates:
AllbillsforraisingrevenueshalloriginateintheHouseofRepresentatives,buttheSenatemayproposeorconcur
withamendmentsasonotherbills.
ThehistoricalprecedentforrequiringrevenuebillstooriginateinCongressisexplainedintheU.S.caseof.
Morganv.Murray 24
TheconstitutionalrequirementthatallbillsforraisingrevenueshalloriginateintheHouseof
RepresentativesstemmedfromaremedialoutgrowthofthehistoricconflictbetweenParliament(,
Commons)andtheCrown,whoseabilitytodominatethemonarchiallyappointiveandhereditaryLordswas
patent.See1Story,Constitution,S875etseq.,5thEd.1Cooley,ConstitutionalLimitations,pp.267,268,
8thEd.,1Sutherland,StatutoryConstruction,S806,3dEd.Therewasameasureoflikejustificationforthe
insertionoftheprovisionofarticleI,S7,cl.1,oftheFederalConstitution.Atthattime(1787)andthereafter
untiltheadoption(in1913)oftheSeventeenthAmendmentprovidingforthedirectelectionofsenators,the
membersoftheUnitedStatesSenatewereelectedforeachstatebythejointvoteofbothhousesofthe
Legislatureoftherespectivestates,andhence,wereremovedfromthepeople...
i.e.
Thelegislativeauthorityunderthe1935Constitutionbeingunicameral,intheformoftheNationalAssembly,it
servednopurposetoincludethesubjectprovisioninthedraftsubmittedbythe1934ConstitutionalConventionto
theFilipinopeopleforratification.
In1940,however,theConstitutionwasamendedtoestablishabicameralCongressofthePhilippinescomposed
ofaHouseofRepresentativesandaSenate.
Inthewakeofthecreationofanewlegislativemachinery,newprovisionswereenactedregardingthelawmaking
powerofCongress.TheNationalAssemblyexplainedhowthefinalformulationofthesubjectprovisioncame
about:
Theconcurrenceofbothhouseswouldbenecessarytotheenactmentofalaw.However,allappropriation,
revenueortariffbills,billsauthorizinganincreaseofthepublicdebt,billsoflocalapplication,andprivatebills,
shouldoriginateexclusivelyintheHouseofRepresentatives,althoughtheSenatecouldproposeorconcurwith
amendments.
Inoneofthefirstdraftsoftheamendments,itwasproposedtogivebothhousesequalpowersinlawmaking.
Therewas,however,muchoppositiononthepartofseveralmembersoftheAssembly.Inanotherdraftthe
followingprovision,morerestrictivethanthepresentprovisionintheamendment,wasproposedandfor
sometimewasseriouslyconsidered:
'Allbillsappropriatingpublicfunds,revenueortariffbills,billsoflocalapplication,andprivatebillsshalloriginate
exclusivelyintheAssembly,buttheSenatemayproposeorconcurwithamendments.Incaseofdisapprovalby
theSenateofanysuchbills,theAssemblymayrepassthesamebyatwothirdsvoteofallitsmembers,and
thereupon,thebillsorepassedshallbedeemedenactedandmaybesubmittedtothePresidentfor
correspondingaction.IntheeventthattheSenateshouldfailtofinallyactonanysuchbills,theAssemblymay,
afterthirtydaysfromtheopeningofthenextregularsessionsofthesamelegislativeterm,reapprovethesame
withavoteoftwothirdsofallthemembersoftheAssembly.Anduponsuchreapproval,thebillshallbedeemed
enactedandmaybesubmittedtothepresidentforcorrespondingaction.'
However,thespecialcommitteevotedfinallytoreportthepresentamendingprovisionasitisnowwordedandin
thatformitwasapprovedbytheNationalAssemblywiththeapprovalofResolutionNo.38andlaterofResolution
No.73.
25(Italicssupplied)
Thus,thepresentConstitutionisidenticallywordedasits1935precursor:"Allappropriation,revenueortariffbills,
billsauthorizingincreaseofthepublicdebt,billsoflocalapplication,andprivatebills,shallintheHouseof
Representatives,buttheSenatemayproposeorconcurwithamendments."(Italicssupplied)
originateexclusively
Thatallrevenuebills,suchasRepublicActNo.7716,should"originateexclusivelyintheHouseof
Representatives"logicallyflowsfromthemorerepresentativeandbroadlybasedcharacterofthisChamber.
ItissaidthattheHouseofRepresentativesbeingthemorepopularbranchofthelegislature,beingclosertothe
people,andhavingmorefrequentcontactswiththemthantheSenate,shouldhavetheprivilegeoftakingthe
initiativeintheproposalsofrevenueandtaxproject,thedisposalofthepeople'smoney,andthecontractingof
publicindebtedness.
ThesepowersofinitiativeintheraisingandspendingofpublicfundsenabletheHouseofRepresentativesnot
onlytoimplementbuteventodeterminethefiscalpoliciesofthegovernment.Theyplaceonitsshouldersmuch
oftheresponsibilityofsolvingthefinancialproblemsofthegovernment,whicharesocloselyrelatedtothe
economiclifeofthecountry,andofdecidingontheproperdistributionofrevenuesforsuchusesasmaybest
advancepublicinterests.
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
26
ThepopularnatureoftheLowerHousehasbeenmorepronouncedwiththeinclusionofPresidentiallyappointed
sectoralrepresentatives,asprovidedinArticleVI,Section5(2),oftheConstitution,thus:"Thepartylist
representativesshallconstitutetwentypercentumofthetotalnumberofrepresentativesincludingthoseunder
thepartylist.ForthreeconsecutivetermsaftertheratificationofthisConstitution,."(Italicssupplied)
onehalfoftheseatsallocatedtopartylistrepresentativesshallbefilled,asprovidedbylaw,byselectionorelectionfrom
thelabor,peasant,urbanpoor,indigenousculturalcommunities,women,youth,andsuchothersectorsasmaybeprovided
bylaw,exceptthereligioussector
ThisnovelprovisionwhichwasimplementedintheBatasangPambansaduringthemartiallawregime
27waseventuallyincorporatedinthepresentConstitutioninordertogivethosefromthemarginalizedandoftendeprived
sector,anopportunitytohavetheirvoicesheardinthehallsoftheLegislature,thusgivingsubstanceandmeaningtothe
conceptof"peopleempowerment."
ThattheCongressmenindeedhaveaccessto,andconsulttheirconstituencieshasbeendemonstratedoften
enoughbythefactthatevenafteraHousebillhasbeentransmittedtotheSenateforconcurrence,some
Congressmenhavebeenknowntoexpresstheirdesiretochangetheirearlierofficialpositionorreverse
themselvesafterhavingheardtheirconstituents'adversereactionstotheirrepresentations.
IntryingtodeterminewhetherthemandateoftheConstitutionwithregardtotheinitiationofrevenuebillshas
beenpreservedinviolate,wehaverecoursetothetriedandtestedmethodofdefinitionofterms.Theterm
"originate"isdefinedbyWebster'sNewInternationalDictionary(3rdEdition,1986)asfollows:",tocomeinto
beingbegintostart."
v.i.
Ontheotherhand,theword"exclusively"isdefinedbythesameWebster'sDictionaryas"inanexclusivemanner
totheexclusionofallothersonlyas,itishis,exclusively."Black'sLawDictionaryhasthisdefinition:"apartfrom
allothersonlysolelysubstantiallyallorforthegreaterpart.totheexclusionofallotherwithoutadmissionof
otherstoparticipationinamannertoexclude.StandardOilCo.ofTexasv.State,Tex.Civ.App.,142S.W.2d
519,521,522,523."
ThisCourthadoccasiontodefinetheterm"exclusive"asfollows:
...Initsusualandgenerallyacceptedsense,thetermmeanspossessedtotheexclusionofothersappertaining
tothesubjectalonenotincluding,admittingorpertainingtoanotherorothersundivided,sole.
28
Whenthiswriter,duringtheoralargumentofJuly7,1994,askedthepetitionerinG.R.No.115455whetherhe
considerstheword"exclusively"tobesynonymouswith"solely,"herepliedintheaffirmative.
29
AcarefulexaminationofthelegislativehistorytracedearlierinthisdecisionshowsthattheoriginalVATlaw,
ExecutiveOrderNo.273,wassoughttobeamendedbytenHousebillswhichfinallyculminatedinHouseBillNo.
11197,aswellastwoSenatebills.ItistobenotedthatthefirstHouseBillNo.253wasfiledonJuly22,1992,and
twootherHousebillsfollowedinquicksuccessiononAugust10andSeptember9,1992beforeaSenate
Resolution,namely,SenateRes.No.734,wasfiledonSeptember10,1992andmuchlater,aSenateBillproper,
.,SenateBillNo.1129onMarch1,1993.Undoubtedly,therefore,thesebillsoriginatedorhadtheirstartinthe
HouseandbeforeanySenatebillamendingtheVATlawwasfiled.Inpointoftimeandvenue,theconclusionis
ineluctablethatRepublicActNo.7716,whichisindisputablyarevenuemeasure,originatedintheHouseof
RepresentativesintheformofHouseBillNo.253,thefirstEVATbill.
viz
Additionally,thecontentandsubstanceofthetenamendatoryHouseBillsfiledovertheroughlyoneyearperiod
fromJuly1992toAugust1993reenforcethepositionthattheserevenuebills,pertainingastheydo,toExecutive
OrderNo.273,theprevailingVATlaw,originatedintheLowerHouse.
HouseBillNos.253,771,2450,7033,8086,9030,9210,9297,10012and10100wereintendedtorestructure
theVATsystembyexemptingorimposingthetaxoncertainitemsorotherwiseintroducingreformsinthe
mechanicsofimplementation.
30Ofthese,HouseBillNo.9210wasfavoredwithaPresidentialcertificationontheneedforitsimmediateenactmentto
meetapublicemergency.Easilythemostcomprehensive,itnotedthattherevenueperformanceoftheVAT,beingfarfrom
satisfactorysincethecollectionshavealwaysfallenshortofprojections,"thesystemisrenderedinefficient,inequitableand
lesscomprehensive."Hence,theBillproposedseveralamendmentsdesignedtowidenthetaxbaseoftheVATand
enhanceitsadministration.31
ThatHouseBillNo.11197beingarevenuebill,originatedfromtheLowerHousewasacknowledged,infactwas
virtuallytakenforgranted,bytheChairmenoftheCommitteeonWaysandMeansofboththeHouseof
RepresentativesandtheSenate.Consequently,attheApril19,1994meetingoftheBicameralConference
Committee,theMembersagreedtomaketheHouseBillasthe"frameofreference"or"base"ofthediscussions
oftheBicameralConferenceCommitteewiththe"amendments"or"insertionstoemanatefromtheSenate."
32
AstowhetherthebillsoriginatedintheLowerHouseisaltogetheradifferentmatter.Obviously,billsamendatory
ofVATdidnotoriginatesolelyintheHousetotheexclusionofallothersfortherewereP.S.Res.No.734filedin
theSenateonSeptember10,1992followedbySenateBillNo.1129whichwasfiledonMarch1,1993.Abouta
yearlater,thiswassubstitutedbySenateBillNo.1630thateventuallybecametheEVATlaw,namely,Republic
ActNo.7716.
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
exclusively
AdvertingtothepassageoftheamendatoryVATbillsintheLowerHouse,itistobenotedthatHouseBillNo.
11197whichsubstitutedallthepriorbillsintroducedinsaidHousecompliedwiththerequiredreadings,thatis,the
firstreadingconsistingofthereadingofthetitleandreferraltotheappropriateCommittee,approvalonsecond
readingonNovember11,1993andonthirdreadingonNovember17,1993beforebeingfinallytransmittedtothe
Senate.IntheSenate,itsidentitywaspreservedanditsprovisionsweretakenintoconsiderationwhenthe
SenateCommitteeonWaysandMeanssubmittedCom.ReportNo.349whichrecommendedforapproval"S.B.
No.1630insubstitutionofS.B.No.1129,takingintoconsiderationP.S.Res.No.734andH.B.No.11197."Atthis
stage,thesubjectbillmaybeconsideredtohavepassedfirstreadingintheSenatewiththesubmissionofsaid
CommitteeReportNo.349bytheSenateCommitteeonWaysandMeanstowhichithadbeenreferredearlier.
Whatremained,therefore,wasnolongerHouseBillNo.11197butSenateBillNo.1630.Thence,theSenate,
insteadoftransmittingthebilltotheLowerHouseforitsconcurrenceandamendments,ifany,tooka"shortcut,"
bypassedtheLowerHouseandinstead,approvedSenateBillNo.1630onbothsecondandthirdreadingsonthe
sameday,March24,1994.
Thefirstirregularity,thatis,thefailuretoreturnSenateBillNo.1630totheLowerHouseforitsapprovalisfatal
inasmuchastheotherchamberoflegislaturewasnotaffordedtheopportunitytodeliberateandmakeknownits
views.ItisnoidledictumthatnolessthantheConstitutionordains:"Thelegislativepowershallbevestedinthe
CongressofthePhilippineswhichshallconsistofaSenateandaHouseofRepresentatives..."
33(Italicssupplied)
Itistobepointedouttoo,thatinasmuchasSenateBillNo.1630whichhad"takenintoconsideration"HouseBill
No.11197wasnotreturnedtotheLowerHousefordeliberation,thelatterChamberhadnoopportunityatallto
expressitsviewsthereonortointroduceanyamendment.Thecustomarypracticeis,aftertheSenatehas
consideredtheLowerHouseBill,itreturnsthesametotheHouseoforiginwithitsamendments.Intheeventthat
theremaybeanydifferencesbetweenthetwo,thesameshallthenbereferredtoaConferenceCommittee
composedofmembersfrombothChamberswhichshallthenproceedtoreconcilesaiddifferences.
Intheinstantcase,theSenatetransmittedtotheLowerHouseonMarch24,1994,aletterinformingthelatter
thatithad"passedS.No.1630entitled...(and)inviewofthedisagreeingprovisionsofsaidbillandHouseBill
No.11197,entitled...theSenaterequestsaconference..."This,inspiteofthefactthatCom.ReportNo.349
oftheSenateCommitteeonWaysandMeanshadalreadyrecommendedforapprovalonFebruary7,1994"S.B.
No.1630...takingintoconsiderationH.B.No.11197."Clearly,theConferenceCommitteecouldonlyhaveacted
uponSenateBillNo.1630,forHouseBillNo.11197hadalreadybeenfusedintotheformer.
AttheoralhearingofJuly7,1994,petitionerinG.R.No.115455admitted,inresponsetothiswriter'squery,that
hehadattemptedtorectifysomeoftheperceivedirregularitiesbypresentingamotionintheSenatetorecallthe
billfromtheConferenceCommitteesothatitcouldreverttotheperiodofamendment,buthewasoutvoted,in
fact"slaughtered."
34
InaccordancewiththeRulesoftheHouseofRepresentativesandtheSenate,RepublicActNo.7716wasduly
authenticatedafteritwassignedbythePresidentoftheSenateandtheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives
followedbythecertificationsoftheSecretaryoftheSenateandtheActingSecretaryGeneraloftheHouseof
Representatives.
35WiththesignatureofPresidentFidelV.Ramosunderthewords"Approved:5May1994,"itwasfinallypromulgated.
Itslegislativejourneyended,RepublicActNo.7716attainedthestatusofanenrolledbillwhichisdefinedasone
"whichhasbeendulyintroduced,finallypassedbybothhouses,signedbytheproperofficersofeach,approved
bythegovernor(orpresident)andfiledbythesecretaryofstate."
36
Stateddifferently:
Itisadeclarationbythetwohouses,throughtheirpresidingofficers,tothepresident,thatabill,thusattested,
hasreceivedindueform,thesanctionofthelegislativebranchofthegovernment,andthatitisdeliveredtohim
inobediencetotheconstitutionalrequirementthatallbillswhichpassCongressshallbepresentedtohim.And
whenabill,thusattested,receiveshisapproval,andisdepositedinthepublicarchives,itsauthenticationasabill
thathaspassedCongressshouldbedeemedcompleteandunimpeachable.AsthePresidenthasnoauthorityto
approveabillnotpassedbyCongress,anenrolledActinthecustodyoftheSecretaryofState,andhavingthe
officialattestationsoftheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,ofthePresidentoftheSenate,andofthe
PresidentoftheUnitedStates,carries,onitsface,asolemnassurancebythelegislativeandexecutive
departmentsofthegovernment,charged,respectively,withthedutyofenactingandexecutingthelaws,thatit
waspassedbyCongress.Therespectduetocoequalandindependentdepartmentsrequiresthejudicial
departmenttoactuponthatassurance,andtoaccept,ashavingpassedCongress,allbillsauthenticatedinthe
mannerstatedleavingthecourtstodetermine,whenthequestionproperlyarises,whethertheAct,so
authenticated,isinconformitywiththeConstitution.
37
Theenrolledbillassumesimportancewhenthereissomevariancebetweenwhatactuallytranspiredinthehalls
ofCongress,asreflectedinitsjournals,andasshowninthetextofthelawasfinallyenacted.Butsupposethe
journalsofeitherorbothHousesfailtodisclosethatthelawwaspassedinaccordancewithwhatwascertifiedto
bytheirrespectivepresidingofficersandthePresident.Orthatcertainconstitutionalrequirementsregardingits
passagewerenotobserved,asintheinstantcase.Whichshallprevail:thejournalortheenrolledbill?
Awordonthejournal.
Thejournalistheofficialrecordoftheactsofalegislativebody.Itshouldbeatruerecordoftheproceedings
arrangedinchronologicalorder.Itshouldbearecordofwhatisdoneratherthanwhatissaid.Thejournalshould
beaclear,concise,unembellishedstatementofallproposalsmadeandallactionstakencomplyingwithall
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
requirementsofconstitutions,statutes,chartersorrulesconcerningwhatistoberecordedandhowitistobe
recorded.
38
ArticleVI,Section16(4)oftheConstitutionordains:
EachhouseshallkeepaJournalofitsproceedings,andfromtimetotimepublishthesame,exceptingsuch
partsasmay,initsjudgment,affectnationalsecurityandtheyeasandnaysonanyquestionshall,atthe
requestofonefifthoftheMemberspresent,beenteredintheJournal.
EachHouseshallalsokeepaRecordofitsproceedings."(Italicssupplied)
Therationalebehindtheaboveprovisionandofthe"journalentryrule"isasfollows:
Itisapparentthattheobjectofthisprovisionistomakethelegislatureshowwhatithasdone,leavingnothing
whatevertoimplication.And,whenthelegislaturesayswhatithasdone,withregardtothepassageofanybill,it
negativestheideathatithasdoneanythingelseinregardthereto.Silenceprovesnothingwhereoneis
commandedtospeak....Ourconstitutioncommandscertainthingstobedoneinregardtothepassageofabill,
andsaysthatnobillshallbecomealawunlessthesethingsaredone.Itseemsatravestyuponoursupremelaw
tosaythatitguarantiestothepeopletherighttohavetheirlawsmadeinthismanneronly,andthatthereisno
wayofenforcingthisright,orforthecourttosaythatthisislawwhentheconstitutionsaysitisnotlaw.Thereis
onesafecoursewhichisinharmonywiththeconstitution,andthatistoadheretotherulethatthelegislature
mustshow,ascommandedbytheconstitution,thatithasdoneeverythingrequiredbytheconstitutiontobedone
intheseriousandimportantmatterofmakinglaws.Thisistheruleofevidenceprovidedbytheconstitution.Itis
notpresumptuousinthecourts,nordisrespectfultothelegislature,tojudgetheactsofthelegislaturebyitsown
evidence.
39
Confrontedwithadiscrepancybetweenthejournalproceedingsandthelawasdulyenacted,courtshave
indulgedindifferenttheories.The"enrolledbill"and"journalentry"rules,beingrooteddeepintheParliamentary
practicesofEnglandwherethereisnowrittenconstitution,andthentransplantedtotheUnitedStates,itmaybe
instructivetoexaminewhichruleprevailsinthelattercountrythroughwhich,byaprocessoflegislativeosmosis,
weadoptedtheminturn.
Thereseemstobethreedistinctanddifferentrulesasapplicabletotheenrolledbillrecognizedbythevarious
courtsofthiscountry.Thefirstoftheserulesappearstobethattheenrolledbillistheultimateproofandexclusive
andconclusiveevidencethatthebillpassedthelegislatureinaccordancewiththeprovisionsoftheConstitution.
SuchhasbeentheholdinginCalifornia,Georgia,Kentucky,Texas,Washington,NewMexico,Mississippi,Indiana,
SouthDakota,andmaybesomeothers.
Thesecondoftherulesseemstobethattheenrolledbillisaverityandresortcannotbehadtothejournalsof
theLegislaturetoshowthattheconstitutionalmandateswerenotcompliedwithbytheLegislature,exceptasto
thoseprovisionsoftheConstitution,compliancewithwhichisexpresslyrequiredtobeshownonthejournal.This
rulehasbeenadoptedinSouthCarolina,Montana,Oklahoma,Utah,Ohio,NewJersey,UnitedStatesSupreme
Court,andothers.
Thethirdoftherulesseemstobethattheenrolledbillraisesonlyaprimafaciepresumptionthatthemandatory
provisionsoftheConstitutionhavebeencompliedwithandthatresortmaybehadtothejournalstorefutethat
presumption,andiftheconstitutionalprovisionisone,compliancewithwhichisexpresslyrequiredbythe
Constitutiontobeshownonthejournals,thenthemeresilenceofthejournalstoshowacompliancetherewithwill
refutethepresumption.ThisrulehasbeenadoptedinIllinois,Florida,Kansas,Louisiana,Tennessee,Arkansas,
Idaho,Minnesota,Nebraska,Arizona,Oregon,NewJersey,Colorado,andothers.
40
Inthe1980caseof,theSupremeCourtofKentuckywhichhadsubscribedinthepasttothefirstofthethree
theories,madethepronouncementthatithadshifteditsstandandwouldhenceforthadoptthethird.Itjustifiedits
changedstance,thus:
D&WAutoSupplyv.DepartmentofRevenue
WebelievethatamorereasonableruleistheonewhichProfessorSutherlanddescribesasthe'extrinsic
evidence'rule....Underthisapproachthereisaprimafaciepresumptionthatanenrolledbillisvalid,butsuch
presumptionmaybeovercomebyclearsatisfactoryandconvincingevidenceestablishingthatconstitutional
requirementshavenotbeenmet.
41
Whatrule,ifany,hasbeenadoptedinthisjurisdiction?
Advocatesofthe"journalentryrule"citethe1916decisionin
U.S.v.Pons42wherethisCourtplacedrelianceonthelegislativejournalstodeterminewhetherActNo.2381waspassed
onFebruary28,1914whichiswhatappearsintheJournal,oronMarch1,1914whichwasclosertothetruth.The
confusionwascausedbytheadjournmentatmidnightofFebruary28,1914ofthePhilippineCommission.sinedie
AcloseexaminationofthedecisionrevealsthattheCourtdidnotapplythe"journalentryrule"the"enrolledbill
rule"buttheformerasagainstwhatare"behindthelegislativejournals."
visavis
PassingoverthequestionofwhethertheprintedAct(No.2381),publishedbyauthorityoflaw,isconclusive
evidenceastothedatewhenitwaspassed,wewillinquirewhetherthecourtsmaygobehindthelegislative
journalsforthepurposeofdeterminingthedateofadjournmentwhensuchjournalsareclearandexplicit.
43
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
ItistobenotedfromtheabovethattheCourt"passedover"theprobativevaluetobeaccordedtotheenrolled
bill.
Optingforthejournals,theCourtproceededtoexplain:
Fromtheirverynatureandobject,therecordsoftheLegislatureareasimportantasthoseofthejudiciary,andto
inquireintotheveracityofthejournalsofthePhilippineLegislature,whentheyare,aswehavesaidclearand
explicit,wouldbetoviolateboththeletterandthespiritoftheorganiclawsbywhichthePhilippineGovernment
wasbroughtintoexistence,toinvadeacoordinateandindependentdepartmentoftheGovernment,andto
interferewiththelegitimatepowersandfunctionsoftheLegislature.
44
FollowingthecourtsintheUnitedStatessincetheConstitutionofthePhilippineGovernmentismodeledafterthat
oftheFederalGovernment,theCourtdidnothesitatetofollowthecourtsinsaidcountry,,toconsiderthe
journalsdecisiveofthepointatissue.Thus:"ThejournalssaythattheLegislatureadjournedat12midnighton
February28,1914.Thissettlesthequestionandthecourtdidnoterrindecliningtogobehindthesejournals."
i.e.45
TheCourtmadeacategoricalstandforthe"enrolledbillrule"forthefirsttimeinthe1947caseof
Mabanagv.LopezVito46whereitheldthatanenrolledbillimportsabsoluteverityandisbindingonthecourts.ThisCourt
helditselfboundbyanauthenticatedresolution,despitethefactthatthevoteofthreefourthsoftheMembersofthe
Congress(asrequiredbytheConstitutiontoapproveproposalsforconstitutionalamendments)wasnotactuallyobtainedon
accountofthesuspensionofsomemembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesandtheSenate.Inthisconnection,theCourt
invokedthe"enrolledbillrule"inthiswise:"Ifapoliticalquestionconclusivelybindsthejudgesoutofrespecttothepolitical
departments,adulycertifiedlaworresolutionalsobindsthejudgesunderthe'enrolledbillrule'bornofthatrespect."47
MindfulthattheU.S.SupremeCourtisonthesideofthosewhofavortheruleandfornootherreasonthanthatit
conformstotheexpressedpolicyofourlawmakingbody(,Sec.313oftheoldCodeofCivilProcedure,as
amendedbyActNo.2210),theCourtsaidthat"dulycertifiedcopiesshallbeconclusiveproofoftheprovisionsof
suchActsandofthedueenactmentthereof."Withoutpullingthelegalunderpinningsfrom,itjustifieditsposition
bysayingthatiftheCourtatthetimelookedintothejournals,"inallprobability,thosewerethedocumentsoffered
inevidence"andthat"evenifboththejournalsandauthenticatedcopyoftheActhadbeenpresented,the
disposaloftheissuebytheCourtonthebasisofthejournalsdoesnotimplyrejectionoftheenrolledtheoryfor
asalreadystated,thedueenactmentofalawmaybeprovedineitherofthetwowaysspecifiedinSection313of
ActNo.190asamended."
i.e.U.S.v.Pons48ThreeJusticesvoicedtheirdissentfromthemajoritydecision.
Again,theCourtmadeitspositionplaininthe1963caseof
CascoPhilippineChemicalCo.,Inc.v.Gimenez49whenaunanimousCourtruledthat:"Theenrolledbillisconclusiveupon
thecourtsIftherehasbeenanymistakeintheprintingofabillbeforeitwascertifiedbytheofficersofCongressand
approvedbytheExecutive,theremedyisbyamendmentorcurativelegislationnotbyjudicialdecree."Accordingto
Webster'sNew20thCenturyDictionary,2nded.,1983,theword"tenor"means,amongothers,"thegeneraldriftof
somethingspokenorwrittenintent,purport,substance."asregardsthetenorofthemeasurepassedbyCongressand
approvedbythePresident.
Thus,theCourtupheldtherespondentAuditorGeneral'sinterpretationthatRepublicActNo.2609really
exemptedfromthemarginfeeonforeignexchangetransactions""asfoundinthelawandnot""whichpetitioner
insistedwerethewordscontainedinthebillandweresointendedbyCongress.
ureaformaldehydeureaandformaldehyde
In1969,theCourtsimilarlyplacedtheweightofitsauthoritybehindtheconclusivenessoftheenrolledbill.In
denyingthemotionforreconsideration,theCourtruledinthat"theenrolledActintheofficeofthelegislative
secretaryofthePresidentofthePhilippinesshowsthatSection10isexactlyasitisinthestatuteasofficially
publishedinslipformbytheBureauofPrinting...Expressedelsewise,thisisamatterworthyoftheattentionnot
ofanOliverWendellHolmesbutofaSherlockHolmes."
Moralesv.Subido50TheallegedomissionofaphraseinthefinalActwasmade,notatanystageofthelegislative
proceedings,butonlyinthecourseoftheengrossmentofthebill,morespecificallyintheproofreadingthereof.
ButtheCourtdidincludeacaveatthatqualifiedtheabsolutenessofthe"enrolledbill"rulestating:
Bywhatwehaveessayedabovewearenotofcoursetobeunderstoodasholdingthatinallcasesthejournals
mustyieldtotheenrolledbill.TobesuretherearecertainmatterswhichtheConstitution(Art.VI,secs.10[4],20
[1],and21[1)])expresslyrequiresmustbeenteredonthejournalofeachhouse.Towhatextentthevalidityofa
legislativeactmaybeaffectedbyafailuretohavesuchmattersenteredonthejournal,isaquestionwhichwedo
notnowdecide(Cf.e.g.,WilkesCountryComm'rs.v.Coler,180U.S.506[1900]).Allweholdisthatwithrespect
tomattersnotexpresslyrequiredtobeenteredonthejournal,theenrolledbillprevailsintheeventofany
discrepancy.
51
Morerecently,inthe1993caseof,
PhilippineJudgesAssociationv.Prado52thisCourt,inrulingontheunconstitutionalityofSection35ofRepublicActNo.
7354withdrawingthefrankingprivilegefromtheentirehierarchyofcourts,didnotsomuchadheretotheenrolledbillrule
aloneastoboth"enrolledbillandlegislativejournals."ThroughMr.JusticeIsaganiA.Cruz,westated:"Boththeenrolled
billandthelegislativejournalscertifythatthemeasurewasdulyenacted,,inaccordancewithArticleVI,Sec.26(2)ofthe
Constitution.Weareboundbysuchofficialassurancesfromacoordinatedepartmentofthegovernment,towhichweowe,
attheveryleast,abecomingcourtesy."i.e.
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
Awareoftheshiftingsandsonwhichthevalidityandcontinuingrelevanceofthe"enrolledbill"theoryrests,Ihave
takenpainstotracethehistoryofitsapplicabilityinthisjurisdiction,asinfluencedinvaryingdegreesbydifferent
Federalrulings.
Asappliedtotheinstantpetition,theissueposediswhetherornottheproceduralirregularitiesthatattendedthe
passageofHouseBillNo.11197andSenateBillNo.1630,outsideofthereadingandprintingrequirementswhich
wereexemptedbythePresidentialcertification,maynolongerbeimpugned,havingbeen"saved"bythe
conclusivenessonusoftheenrolledbill.Iseenocogentreasonwhywecannotcontinuetoplacerelianceonthe
enrolledbill,butonlywithrespecttomatterspertainingtotheprocedurefollowedintheenactmentofbillsin
Congressandtheirsubsequentengrossment,printingerrors,omissionofwordsandphrasesandsimilar
relativelyminormattersrelatingmoretoformandfactualissueswhichdonotmateriallyaltertheessenceand
substanceofthelawitself.
Certainly,"courtscannotclaimgreaterabilitytojudgeprocedurallegitimacy,sinceconstitutionalruleson
legislativeprocedureareeasilymastered.Proceduraldisputesareoverfactswhetherornotthebillhadenough
votes,orthreereadings,orwhatevernotoverthemeaningoftheconstitution.Legislators,aseyewitnesses,are
inabetterpositionthanacourttoruleonthefacts.Theargumentisalsomadethatlegislatureswouldbe
offendedifcourtsexaminedlegislativeprocedure.
53
Sucharationale,however,cannotconceivablyapplytosubstantivechangesinabillintroducedtowardstheend
ofitstortuoustripthroughCongress,catchingbothlegislatorsandthepublicunawaresandalteringthesame
beyondrecognitionevenbyitssponsors.
ThisissueIwishtoaddressforthwith.
EXTENTOFTHEPOWEROFTHEBICAMERALCONFERENCECOMMITTEE
Oneoftheissuesraisedinthesepetitions,especiallyinG.R.Nos.115781,115543and115754,respectively,is
whetherornot
CongressviolatedSection26,par.2,ArticleVI(ofthe1987Constitution)whenitapprovedtheBicameral
ConferenceCommitteeReportwhichembodied,inviolationofRuleXIIoftheRulesoftheSenate,aradically
alteredtaxmeasurecontainingprovisionsnotreportedoutordiscussedineitherHouseaswellasprovisionson
whichtherewasnodisagreementbetweentheHouseandtheSenateand,worse,provisionscontrarytowhatthe
HouseandtheSenatehadapprovedafterthreeseparatereadings.
54
and
Byaddingordeletingprovisions,whentherewasnoconflictingprovisionsbetweentheHouseandSenate
versions,theBICAMactedinexcessofitsjurisdictionorwithsuchgraveabuseofdiscretionastoamounttoloss
ofjurisdiction....InaddingtothebillandthussubjectingtoVAT,realproperties,mediaandcooperativesdespite
thecontrarydecisionofbothHouses,theBICAMexceededitsjurisdictionoractedwithsuchabuseofdiscretion
astoamounttolossofjurisdiction....
55
IwishtoconsiderthisissueinlightofArticleVIII,Sec.1oftheConstitutionwhichprovidesthat"(j)udicialpower
includesthedutyofthecourtsofjustice...todeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseof
discretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityofthe
Government."Wearealsoguidedbytheprinciplethatacourtmayinterferewiththeinternalproceduresofits
coordinatebranchonlytoupholdtheConstitution.
56
Aconferencecommitteehasbeendefined:
...unlikethejointcommitteeistwocommittees,oneappointedbyeachhouse.Itisnormallyappointedfora
specificbillanditsfunctionistogainaccordbetweenthetwohouseseitherbytherecessionofonehousefromits
billoritsamendmentsorbythefurtheramendmentoftheexistinglegislationorbythesubstitutionofanentirely
newbill.Obviouslytheconferencecommitteeisalwaysaspecialcommitteeandnormallyincludesthemember
whointroducedthebillandthechairmanofthecommitteewhichconsideredittogetherwithsuchother
representativesofthehouseasseemexpedient.(Horack,CasesandMaterialsonLegislation[1940]220.See
alsoZinn,ConferenceProcedureinCongress,38ABAJ864[1952]Steiner,TheCongressionalConference
Committee[UofIII.Press,1951]).
57
Fromtheforegoingdefinition,itisclearthatabicameralconferencecommitteeisacreature,notofthe
Constitution,butofthelegislativebodyunderitspowertodeterminerulesofitsproceedingsunderArticleVI,Sec.
16(3)oftheConstitution.Thus,itdrawsitslifeandvitalityfromtherulesgoverningitscreation.Thewhy,when,
howandwhereforeofitsoperations,inotherwords,theparameterswithinwhichitistofunction,aretobefound
inSection26,RuleXIIoftheRulesoftheSenateandSection85oftheRulesoftheHouseofRepresentatives,
respectively,whichprovide:
RuleXII,RulesoftheSenate
SEC.26.IntheeventthattheSenatedoesnotagreewiththeHouseofRepresentativesontheprovisionofany
billorjointresolution,thedifferencesshallbesettledbyaconferencecommitteeofbothHouseswhichshallmeet
withintendaysaftertheircomposition.
ThePresidentshalldesignatethemembersoftheconferencecommitteeinaccordancewithsubparagraph(c),
Section8ofRuleIII.
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
EachConferenceCommitteeReportshallcontainadetailedandsufficientlyexplicitstatementofthechangesin
oramendmentstothesubjectmeasure,andshallbesignedbytheconferees.
TheconsiderationofsuchreportshallnotbeinorderunlessthereporthasbeenfiledwiththeSecretaryofthe
SenateandcopiesthereofhavebeendistributedtotheMembers."
SEC.85..IntheeventthattheHousedoesnotagreewiththeSenateontheamendmentstoanybillorjoint
resolution,thedifferencesmaybesettledbyconferencecommitteeofbothChambers.
ConferenceCommitteeReports
Theconsiderationofconferencecommitteereportsshallalwaysbeinorder,exceptwhenthejournalisbeing
read,whiletherollisbeingcalledortheHouseisdividingonanyquestion.Eachofthepagesofsuchreports
shallcontainadetailed,sufficientlyexplicitstatementofthechangesinoramendmentstothesubjectmeasure.
TheconsiderationofsuchreportshallnotbeinorderunlesscopiesthereofaredistributedtotheMembers:,That
inthelastfifteendaysofeachsessionperioditshallbedeemedsufficientthatthreecopiesofthereport,signed
asaboveprovided,aredepositedintheofficeoftheSecretaryGeneral.
Provided
Jefferson'sManual,which,accordingtoSection112,RuleXLIXoftheSenateRules,supplementsit,statesthata
conferencecommitteeisusuallycalled"ontheoccasionofamendmentsbetweentheHouses"and"inallcasesof
differenceofopinionbetweenthetwoHouseonmatterspendingbetweenthem."
58Itfurtherstates:
UndertheseRules,abicameralconferencecommitteecomesintobeingonlywhentherearebetweentheSenate
andtheHousewithregardtocertainprovisionsofaparticularlegislativeactwhichhavetobereconciled.
disagreementsanddifferencesmanagersofaconferencemustconfinethemselvestothedifferencescommittedtothem,andmaynotinclude
subjectsnotwithinthedisagreements,eventhoughgermanetoaquestioninissue.Buttheymayperfectamendmentscommittedtothemiftheydonotin
sodoinggobeyondthedifferences
The
....ManagersmaynotchangethetexttowhichbothHouseshaveagreed.59 (Italicssupplied.)
Mason'sManualofLegislativeProcedureswhichisalsoconsideredascontrollingauthorityforanysituationnot
coveredbyaspecificlegislativerule,
60statesthateitherHousemay"requestaconferencewiththeotheronanymatterofdifferenceordisputebetweenthem"
andthatinsucharequest,"thesubjectoftheconferenceshouldalwaysbestated."61
InthePhilippines,asintheUnitedStates,theConferenceCommitteeexercisessuchawiderangeofauthority
thattheyvirtuallyconstituteathirdHouseintheLegislature.AsadmittedbytheSolicitorGeneral,"Itwasthe
practiceinpastCongressesforConferenceCommitteestoinsertinbillsapprovedbythetwoHousesnew
provisionsthatwerenotoriginallycontemplatedbythem."
62
In,RobertLucegivesagraphicdescriptionofthemilieuandthecircumstanceswhichhaveconspiredto
transformaninitiallyinnocuousmechanismdesignedtofacilitateactionintoanallpowerfulFrankensteinthat
brooksnochallengetoitsauthorityevenfromitsownmembers.
LegislativeProcedure
Theirpowerlieschieflyinthefactthatreportsofconferencecommitteesmustbeacceptedwithoutamendmentor
elserejected.Theimpulseistogetdonewiththemattersandsothemotiontoaccepthasundueadvantage,for
somemembersaresuretopreferswallowingunpalatableprovisionsratherthanprolongcontroversy.Thisisthe
morelikelyifthereportcomesintherushofbusinesstowardtheendofasession,whentoseekfurther
conferencemightresultinthelossofthemeasurealtogether.Atanytimeinthesessionthereissomeriskof
sucharesultfollowingtherejectionofaconferencereport,foritmaynotbepossibletosecureasecond
conference,ordelaymaygiveoppositiontothemainproposalchancetodevelopmorestrength.
intoto
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Entangledinanetworkofruleandcustom,theRepresentativewhoresentsandwouldresistthistheftofhis
rights,findshimselfhelpless.Rarelycanhevote,rarelycanhevoicehismind,inthematterofanyfractionofthe
bill.Usuallyhecannotevenrecordhimselfasprotestingagainstsomeonefeaturewhileacceptingthemeasure
aswhole.Worstofall,hecannotbyargumentorsuggestedchange,trytoimprovewhattheotherbranchhas
done.
Thismeansmorethanthesubversionofindividualrights.Itmeanstoadegreetheabandonmentofwhatever
advantagethebicameralsystemmayhave.Bysomuch.Whatisworse,thesemenarenotchoseninawayto
ensurethewisestchoice.Ithasbecomethepracticetonameasconfereestherankingmembersofthe
committee,sothattheaccidentofsenioritydetermines.Exceptionsaremade,butingeneralitisnotaquestionof
whoaremostcompetenttoserve.Chancegoverns,sometimesgivingwaytofavor,rarelytomerit.
itineffecttransfersthelawmakingpowertoasmallgroupofmemberswhoworkoutinprivateadecisionthatalmost
alwaysprevails
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8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
Speakingbroadly,thesystemoflegislatingbyconferencecommitteeisunscientificandthereforedefective.
Usuallyitforfeitsthebenefitofscrutinyandjudgmentbyallthewisdomavailable.Uncontrolled,itisinferiortothat
processbywhicheveryamendmentissecuredindependentdiscussionandvote....
63(Italicssupplied)
Notsurprisinglyhasitbeensaid:"ConferenceCommitteeactionisthemostundemocraticprocedureinthe
legislativeprocessitisanappropriatetargetforlegislativecritics."
64
Inthecaseatbench,petitionersinsistthattheConferenceCommitteetowhichSenateBillNo.1630andHouse
BillNo.11197werereferredforthepurposeofharmonizingtheirdifferences,overreachedthemselvesinnot
confiningtheir"reconciliation"functiontothoseareasofdisagreementinthetwobillsbutactuallymaking
"surreptitiousinsertions"anddeletionswhichamountedtoagraveabuseofdiscretion.
Atthispoint,itbecomesimperativetofocusontheerrantprovisionswhichfoundtheirwayintoRepublicActNo.
7716.Belowisabreakdowntofacilitateunderstandingthegroundsforpetitioners'objections:
INSERTIONSMADEBYBICAMERALCONFERENCECOMMITTEE(BICAM)TOSENATEBILL(SB)NO.1630
ANDHOUSEBILL(HB)NO.11197
1.Sec.99oftheNationalInternalRevenueCode(NIRC)
(1)UndertheHB,thissectionincludesanypersonwho,inthecourseoftradeorbusiness,sells,bartersor
exchangesgoodsORPROPERTIESandanypersonwhoLEASESPERSONALPROPERTIES.
(2)TheSBcompletelychangedthesaidsectionanddefinedanumberofwordsandphrases.Also,Section99A
wasaddedwhichincludedonewhosells,exchanges,bartersPROPERTIESandonewhoimportsPROPERTIES.
(3)TheBICAMversionmakesLESSORSofgoodsORPROPERTIESandimportersofgoodsLIABLEtoVAT
(subjectofpetitioninG.R.No.115754).
2.Section100(VATonSaleofGoods)
Theterm"goods"or"properties"includesthefollowing,whichwerenotfoundineithertheHBortheSB:
InadditiontoradioandtelevisiontimeSATTELITETRANSMISSIONANDCABLETELEVISIONTIME.
Theterm"Othersimilarproperties"wasdeleted,whichwaspresentintheHBandtheSB.
Realpropertiesheldprimarilyforsaletocustomersorheldforleaseintheordinarycourseorbusinesswere
included,whichwasneitherintheHBnortheSB(subjectofpetitioninG.R.No.115754).
3.Section102
Onwhatareincludedintheterm"saleorexchangeofservices,"astomakethemsubjecttoVAT,theBICAM
included/insertedthefollowing(notfoundineitherHouseorSenateBills):
1.Servicesoflessorsofproperty,whetherpersonalorreal(subjectofpetitioninG.R.No.115754)
2.Warehousingservices
3.Keepersofresthouses,pensionhouses,inns,resorts
4.Commoncarriersbyland,airandsea
5.Servicesoffranchisegranteesoftelephoneandtelegraph
6.Radioandtelevisionbroadcasting
7.AllotherfranchisegranteesexceptthoseunderSection117ofthisCode(subjectofpetitioninG.R.No.
115852)
8.Servicesofsurety,fidelity,indemnity,andbondingcompanies
9.AlsoinsertedbytheBICAM(onpage8thereof)istheleaseoruseofortherighttouseofsatellitetransmission
andcabletelevisiontime.
4.Section103(ExemptTransactions)
TheBICAMdeletedsubsection(f)initsentirety,despiteitsinclusioninboththeHouseandSenateBills.Therefore,under
RepublicActNo.7716,the"printing,publication,importationorsaleofbooksandanynewspaper,magazine,review,or
bulletinwhichappearsatregularintervalswithfixedpricesforsubscriptionandsaleandwhichisnotdevotedprincipallyto
thepublicationofadvertisements"issubjecttoVAT(subjectofpetitioninG.R.No.115931andG.R.No.115544).
TheHBandSBdidnottouchSubsection(g)butitwasamendedbytheBICAMbychangingthewordTENto
FIVE.Thus,importationofvesselswithtonnageofmorethanfivethousandtonsisVATexempt.
SubsectionL,whichwasidenticalintheHBandtheSBthatstatedthatmedical,dental,hospitalandveterinary
serviceswereexemptedfromtheVATwasamendedbytheBICAMbyaddingthequalifyingphrase:EXCEPT
THOSERENDEREDBYPROFESSIONALS,thussubjectingdoctors,dentistsandveterinarianstotheVAT.
SubsectionUwhichexemptsfromVAT"transactionswhichareexemptunderspeciallaws,"wasamendedbythe
BICAMbyaddingthephrase:EXCEPTTHOSEGRANTEDUNDERPDNos.66,529,972,1491,AND1590,AND
NONELECTRICCOOPERATIVESUNDERRA6938(subjectofpetitioninG.R.No.115873),notfoundineither
theHBortheSB,resultingintheinclusionofallcooperativestotheVAT,exceptnonelectriccooperatives.
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ThesaleofrealpropertieswasincludedintheexempttransactionsundertheHouseBill,buttheBICAMqualified
thiswiththeprovision:
(S)SALEOFREALPROPERTIESNOTPRIMARILYHELDFORSALETOCUSTOMERSORHELDFORLEASE
INTHEORDINARYCOURSEOFTRADEORBUSINESSORREALPROPERTYUTILIZEDFORLOWCOSTAND
SOCIALIZEDHOUSINGASDEFINEDBYRANO.7279OTHERWISEKNOWNASTHEURBANDEVELOPMENT
ANDHOUSINGACTOF1992ANDOTHERRELATEDLAWS.(subjectofpetitioninG.R.No.115754)
11.Section18ontheTaxAdministrationDevelopmentFundisanentirelynewprovisionnotcontainedinthe
House/SenateBills.ThisfundissupposedtoensureeffectiveimplementationofRepublicActNo.7716.
TheBICAMalsoexemptedthesaleofproperties,thereceiptsofwhicharenotlessthanP480,000.00ormore
thanP720,000.00.UndertheSB,noamountwasgiven,butintheHBitwasstatedthatreceiptsfromthesaleof
propertiesnotlessthanP350,000.00normorethanP600,000.00wereexempt.
Itdidnotinclude,asVATexempt,thesaleortransferofsecurities,asdefinedintheRevisedSecuritiesAct(BP
178)whichwascontainedinbothSenateandHouseBills.
5.Section104
NotincludedintheHBortheSBisthephrase"INCLUDINGPACKAGINGMATERIALS"whichwasinsertedbythe
BICAMinSection104(A)(1)(B),thusexcludingfromcreditableinputtaxpackagingmaterialsandthephrase
"ONWHICHAVALUEADDEDTAXHASBEENACTUALLYPAID"inSection104(A)(2).
6.Section107
BothHouseandSenateBillsprovideforthepaymentofP500.00VATregistrationfeebutthiswasincreasedby
BICAMtoP1,000.00.
7.Section112
RegardingapersonwhosesalesorreceiptsareexemptunderSection103(w),theBICAMinsertedthephrase:
"THREEPERCENTUPONTHEEFFECTIVITYOFTHISACTANDFOURPERCENT(4%)TWOYEARS
THEREAFTER,"althoughtheSBandtheHBprovideonly"threepercentofhisgrossquarterlysales."
8.Section115
TheBICAMadoptedtheHBversionwhichsubjectscommoncarriersbyland,airorwaterforthetransportof
passengersto3%oftheirgrossquarterlysales,whichisnotfoundintheSB.
9.Section117
TheBICAMamendedthissectionbysubjectingfranchisesonelectric,gasandwaterutilitiestoataxoftwo
percent(2%)ongrossreceiptsderived...,althoughneithertheHBnortheSBhasasimilarprovision.
10.Section17(d)
(a)TheBICAMdefersforonly2yearstheVATonservicesofactorsandactresses,althoughtheSBdefersitfor3
years.
(b)TheBICAMusestheword"EXCLUDE"inthesectionondefermentofVATcollectiononcertaingoodsand
services.TheHBdoesnotcontainanycounterpartprovisionandSBonlyallowsdefermentfornolongerthan3
years.
12.Section19
NoperiodwithinwhichtopromulgatetheimplementingrulesandregulationsisfoundintheHBortheSBbut
BICAMprovided"within90days"whichfounditswayinRepublicActNo.7716.
Evenacursoryperusaloftheaboveoutlinewillconvinceonethat,indeed,theBicameralConferenceCommittee
(henceforthtobereferredtoasBICAM)exceededthepowerandauthoritygrantedintheRulesofitscreation.
BothSenateandHouseRuleslimitthetaskoftheConferenceCommitteeinalmostidenticallanguagetothe
settlementofdifferencesintheprovisionsoramendmentstoanybillorjointresolution.Ifitmeansanythingatall,
itisthatthereareprovisionsinsubjectbill,tostartwith,whichdifferand,therefore,needreconciliation.Nowhere
intheRulesisitauthorizedtoinitiateorproposecompletelynewmatter.Althoughundercertainruleson
legislativeprocedure,likethosein,aconferencecommitteemayintroducemattersinaparticularbill,such
mattersshouldbecircumscribedbythecommittee'ssoleauthorityandfunctiontoreconciledifferences.
Jefferson'sManualgermane
Parenthetically,intheSenateandintheHouse,amatteris"germane"toaparticularbillifthereisacommontie
betweensaidmatterandtheprovisionswhichtendtopromotetheobjectandpurposeofthebillitseeksto
amend.Ifitintroducesanewsubjectmatternotwithinthepurviewofthebill,thenitisnot"germane"tothebill.
65Thetestiswhetherornotthechangerepresentedanamendmentorextensionofthebasicpurposeoftheoriginal,orthe
introductionofanentirelynewanddifferentsubjectmatter.66
IntheBICAM,however,thegermanesubjectmattermustbewithintheambitofthedisagreementbetweenthe
twoHouses.Ifthe"germane"subjectisnotcoveredbythedisagreementbutitisreflectedinthefinalversionof
thebillasreportedbytheConferenceCommitteeor,ifwhatappearstobea"germane"matterinthesensethatit
is"relevantorcloselyallied"
67withthepurposeofthebill,wasnotthesubjectofadisagreementbetweentheSenateandtheHouse,itshouldbe
deemedanextraneousmatterorevena"rider"whichshouldneverbeconsideredlegallypassedfornothavingundergone
thethreedayreadingrequirement.InsertionofnewmatteronthepartoftheBICAMis,therefore,anultraviresactwhich
makesthesamevoid.
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
Thedeterminationofwhatis"germane"andwhatisnotmayappeartobeadifficulttaskbuttheCongress,having
beenconfrontedwiththeproblembefore,resolveditinaccordancewiththerules.Inthatcase,theCongress
approvedaConferenceCommittee'sinsertionofnewprovisionsthatwerenotcontemplatedinanyofthe
provisionsinquestionbetweentheHousessimplybecauseoftheprovisioninthatconfereesmayreportmatters
"whicharebetweentheHousesandthecommittee.
Jefferson'sManualgermanemodificationsofsubjectsindisagreement68Inotherwords,thematterwasgermanetothe
pointsofdisagreementbetweentheHouseandtheSenate.
AsregardsintheBICAM,therefore,thetaskofdeterminingwhatisgermanetoabillissimplified,thus:Ifthe
amendmentsarenotcircumscribedbythesubjectsofdisagreementbetweenthetwoHouses,thentheyareto
thepurposeofthebill.
insertedamendmentsnotgermane
Intheinstantcasebeforeus,theinsertionsanddeletionsmadedonotmerelyspellaneffortatsettlingconflicting
provisionsbuthavemateriallyalteredthebill,thusgivingrisetotheinstantpetitionsonthepartofthosewhowere
caughtunawaresbythelegislativelegerdemainthattookplace.Goingbythedefinitionoftheword"amendment"
inBlack'sLawDictionary,5thEd.,1979,whichmeans"tochangeormodifyforthebettertoalterbymodification,
deletion,oraddition,"saidinsertionsanddeletionsconstituteamendments.Consequently,theseviolatedArticle
VI,Section26(2)whichprovides:"Uponthelastreadingofabill,noamendmenttheretoshallbeallowed..."
Thisproscriptionisintendedtosubjectallbillsandtheiramendmentstointensivedeliberationbythelegislators
andtheampleventilationofissuestoaffordthepublicanopportunitytoexpresstheiropinionsorobjections
thereon.Thesamerationaleunderliesthethreereadingrequirementtotheendthatnosurprisesmaybesprung
onanunsuspectingcitizenry.
interalia
Provisionsofthe"nowyouseeit,nowyoudon't"variety,meaningthosewhichwereeitherintheHouseand/or
Senateversionsbutsimplydisappearedorwere"bracketedout"ofexistenceintheBICAMReport,were
eventuallyincorporatedinRepublicActNo.7716.Worse,somegoods,propertiesorserviceswhichwerenot
coveredbythetwoversionsand,therefore,wereneverintendedtobesocovered,suddenlyfoundtheirwayinto
thesameReport.Noadvancenoticeofsuchinsertionspreparedtherestofthelegislators,muchlessthepublic
whocouldbeadverselyaffected,sothattheycouldbegiventheopportunitytoexpresstheirviewsthereon.Well
hasthefinalBICAMreportbeendescribed,therefore,asaninstanceof"taxationwithoutrepresentation."
ThattheconfereesordelegatesintheBICAMrepresentingthetwoChamberscouldnotpossiblybechargedwith
badfaithorsinistermotivesor,attheveryleast,unseemlybehavior,isofnomoment.Thestarkfactisthatitems
notpreviouslysubjectedtotheVATnowfellunderitscoveragewithoutinterestedsectorsorpartieshavingbeen
affordedtheopportunitytobeheardthereon.ThisisnottosaythattheConferenceCommitteeReportshould
haveundergonethethreereadingsrequiredinArticleVI,Section26(2),forthisclearlyrefersonlytobillswhich,
afterhavingbeeninitiallyfiledineitherHouse,negotiatedthelabyrinthinepassagethereinuntilitsapproval.The
compositionoftheBICAMincludingasitusuallydoes,theChairmanoftheappropriateCommittee,thesponsorof
thebillandotherinterestedmembersensuresaninformeddiscussion,atleastwithrespecttothedisagreeing
provisions.Thesamedoesnotobtainasregardscompletelynewmatterwhichsuddenlyspringonthelegislative
horizon.
Ithasbeenpointedoutthatsuchextraneousmattersnotwithstanding,allCongressmanandSenatorsweregiven
theopportunitytoapproveorturndowntheCommitteeReport,thus"curing"whateverdefectorirregularityit
bore.
intoto
Earlierinthisopinion,Iexplainedthatthesourceoftheacknowledgedpowerofthiscommitteestemsfromthe
precisefactthat,themeetings,beingscheduled"takeitorleaveit"basis.Ithasnotbeenuncommonfor
legislatorswho,foronereasonoranotherhavebeenfrustratedintheirattempttopassapetbillintheirown
chamber,toworkforitspassageintheBICAMwhereitmayenjoyamorehospitablereceptionandfaster
approval.Intheinstantcase,hadtherebeenfull,openandunfettereddiscussiononthebillsduringthe
Committeesessions,therewouldnothavebeenasmuchvociferousobjectionsonthisscore.Unfortunately,
however,theCommitteeheldtwoofthefivesessionsbehindcloseddoors,stenographers,recordtakersand
interestedobservers.Tothatextent,theproceedingswereshroudedinmysteryandthepublic'srightto
informationonmattersofpublicconcernasenshrinedinArticleIII,Section7
adhocsans69andthegovernment'spolicyoftransparencyintransactionsinvolvingpublicinterestinArticleII,Section28
oftheConstitution70areundermined.
Moreover,thatwhichissuchastheobjectionableprovisionsintheConferenceCommitteeReport,cannotbe
"cured"orratified.Forallintentsandpurposes,theseneverexisted..Thingsthatareinvalidfromthebeginning
arenotmadevalidbyasubsequentact.
voidabinitioQuaeabinitiononvalent,expostfactoconvalescerenonpossunt
Shouldthisargumentbeunacceptable,the"enrolledbill"doctrine,inturn,isinvokedtosupporttheproposition
thatthecertificationbythepresidingofficersofCongress,togetherwiththesignatureofthePresident,bars
furtherjudicialinquiryintothevalidityofthelaw.Ireiteratemysubmissionthatthe"enrolledbillruling"maybe
applicablebutonlywithrespecttoquestionspertainingtotheproceduralenactment,engrossment,printing,the
insertionordeletionofawordorphrasehereandthere,butwoulddrawadividinglinewithrespecttosubstantial
substantivechanges,suchasthoseintroducedbytheBICAMherein.
WehavebeforeusthenthespectacleofabodycreatedbythetwoHousesofCongressfortheverylimited
purposeofsettlingdisagreementsinprovisionsbetweenbillsemanatingtherefrom,exercisingtheplenary
legislativepowersoftheparentchambersbutholdingitselfexemptfromthemandatoryconstitutional
requirementsthatarethehallmarksoflegislationundertheaegisofademocraticpoliticalsystem.Fromtheinitial
filing,throughthethreereadingswhichentaildetaileddebatesanddiscussionsinCommitteeandplenary
sessions,andontothetransmittaltotheotherHouseinarepetitionoftheentireprocesstoensureexhaustive
deliberationsallthesehavebeenskippedover.Intheproverbialtwinklingofaneye,provisionsthatprobably
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
maynothaveseenthelightofdayhadtheybutruntheirfullcoursethroughthelegislativemill,spranginto
existenceandemergedfullblownlaws.
YetourConstitutionveststhelegislativepowerin"theCongressofthePhilippineswhichshallconsistofaSenate
andaHouseofRepresentatives..."
71andnotinanyspecial,standingorsupercommitteeofitsowncreation,nomatterthatthesehavebeendescribed,
accuratelyenough,as"theeye,theear,thehand,andveryoftenthebrainofthehouse."
Firstly,thatusageorcustomhassanctionedthisabbreviated,ifquestionable,proceduredoesnotwarrantits
beinglegitimizedandperpetuatedanylonger..Acustomagainstreasonisratheranusurpation.Inthehierarchy
ofsourcesoflegislativeprocedure,constitutionalrules,statutoryprovisionsandadoptedrules(asforexample,
theSenateandHouseRules),rankhighest,certainlymuchaheadofcustomsandusages.
Consuetudo,contrarationemintroducta,potiususurpatioquamconsuetudoappellaridebet
Secondly,isthisCourttoassumetheroleofpassivespectatororindulgentthirdparty,timorousaboutexercising
itspowerormoreimportantly,performingitsduty,ofmakingajudicialdeterminationontheissueofwhetherthere
hasbeengraveabuseofdiscretionbytheotherbranchesorinstrumentalitiesofgovernment,wherethesameis
properlyinvoked?ThetimeispastwhentheCourtwasnotloathetoraisethebogeymanofthepoliticalquestion
toavertaheadoncollisionwitheithertheExecutiveorLegislativeDepartments.Eventheseparationofpowers
doctrinewasburnishedtoabrightsheenasoftenasitwasinvokedtokeepthejudiciarywithinbounds.Nolonger
doesthisconditionobtain.ArticleVIII,Section2oftheConstitutionpartlyquotedinthisparagraphhasbroadened
thescopeofjudicialinquiry.ThisCourtcannowsafelyfulfillitsmandateofdelimitingthepowersofcoequal
departmentsliketheCongress,itsofficersoritscommitteeswhichmayhavenocompunctionsaboutexercising
legislativepowersinfull.
Thirdly,darewecloseoureyestothepresumptuousassumptionbyarunawaycommitteeofitsprogenitor's
legislativepowersinderogationoftherightsofthepeople,intheprocess,subvertingthedemocraticprincipleswe
allaresworntouphold,whenapropercaseismadeoutforourintervention?Theanswerstotheabovequeries
areselfevident.
Icalltomindthisexhortation:"Wearesworntoseethatviolationsoftheconstitutionbyanyperson,corporation,
stateagencyorbranchofgovernmentarebroughttolightandcorrected.Tocountenanceanartificialruleoflaw
thatsilencesourvoiceswhenconfrontedwithviolationsofourConstitutionisnotacceptabletothisCourt."
72
Iamnotunawarethataratherrecentdecisionofoursbrushedasideanargumentthataprovisioninsubjectlaw
regardingthewithdrawalofthefrankingprivilegefromthepetitionersandthisCourtitself,nothavingbeen
includedintheoriginalversionofSenateBillNo.720orofHouseBillNo.4200butonlyintheConference
CommitteeReport,wasviolativeofArticleVI,Section26(2)oftheConstitution.Likewise,thatsaidSection35,
neverhavingbeenasubjectofdisagreementbetweenbothHouses,couldnothavebeenvalidlyaddedasan
amendmentbeforetheConferenceCommittee.
Themajorityopinioninsaidcaseexplained:
'Aconferencecommitteemaydealgenerallywiththesubjectmatteroritmaybelimitedtoresolvingtheprecise
.Butoccasionallyaconferencecommitteeproducesunexpectedresults,resultsbeyonditsmandate.These
excursionsoccurevenwheretherulesimposestrictlimitationsonconferencecommitteejurisdiction.Thisis
symptomaticoftheauthoritarianpowerofconferencecommittee(Davies,LegislativeLawandProcess:Ina
Nutshell,1986Ed.,p.81).'
legislativecustomseverelylimitsthefreedomwithwhichnewsubjectmattercanbeinsertedintotheconferencebill
73(Italicssupplied)
Attheriskofbeingrepetitious,Iwishtopointoutthatthegeneralrule,asquotedabove,is:"Evenwherethe
conferencecommitteeisnotbyrulelimitedinitsjurisdiction,."Whatfollows,thatis,"occasionallyaconference
committeeproducesunexpectedresults,resultsbeyonditsmandate..."istheexception.Thenitconcludeswith
adeclarationthat:"Thisissymptomaticoftheauthoritarianpowerofconferencecommittee."Areweaboutto
reinstallanotherinstitutionthatsmacksofauthoritarianismwhich,afterourpastexperience,hasbecome
anathematotheFilipinopeople?
legislativecustomseverelylimitsthefreedomwithwhichnewsubjectmattercanbeinsertedintotheconferencebill
TherulingabovecanhardlybecitedinsupportofthepropositionthataprovisioninaBICAMreportwhichwas
notthesubjectofdifferencesbetweentheHouseandSenateversionsofabillcannotbenullified.Itsubmitthat
suchisnotauthorizedinourBasicLaw.Moreover,thisdecisionconcernsmerelyoneprovisionwhereasthe
BICAMReportthatculminatedintheEVATlawhasawiderscopeasit,infact,expandedthebaseoftheoriginal
VATlawbyimposingthetaxonseveralitemswhichwerenotsocoveredpriortotheEVAT.
OneotherflawinmostBICAMReports,notexcludingthisoneunderscrutiny,isthat,hastilydrawnup,itoften
failstoconformtotheSenateandHouseRulesrequiringnolessthana"detailed"and"sufficientlyexplicit
statementofthechangesinoramendmentstothesubjectmeasure."TheReportofthecommittee,asmaybe
gleanedfromtheprecedingpages,wasnomorethanthefinalversionofthebillas"passed"bytheBICAM.The
amendmentsorsubjectsofdissension,aswellasthereconciliationmadebythecommittee,arenotevenpointed
out,muchlessexplainedtherein.
Itmaybearguedthatlegislativerulesofproceduremayproperlybesuspended,modified,revokedorwaivedat
willbythelegislatorsthemselves.
74Thisprinciple,however,doesnotcomeintoplayininterpretingwhattherecordoftheproceedingsshowswas,orwasnot,
done.Itisratherdesignedtotestthevalidityoflegislativeactionwheretherecordshowsafinalactioninviolationor
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
disregardoflegislativerules.75UtilizingtheSenateandtheHouseRulesasbothguidelinesandyardstick,theBICAMhere
obviouslydidnotadheretotheruleonwhattheReportshouldcontain.
GivenalltheseirregularitiesthathaveapparentlybeenengraftedintotheBICAMsystem,andwhichhavebeen
tolerated,ifnotaccordedoutrightacceptancebyeveryoneinvolvedinorconversantwith,theinstitution,itmaybe
asked:Whynotleavewellenoughalone?
Thatthesepracticeshaveremainedunchallengedinthepastdoesnotjustifyourclosingoureyesandturninga
deafeartothem.Writlargeisthespectacleofamechanismensconcedintheveryheartofthepeople's
legislativehalls,thatnowstandsindictedwiththechargeofarrogatinglegislativepowersuntoitselfthroughthe
useofdubious"shortcuts."Here,forthepeopletojudge,isthe"motherofallshortcuts."
Inthepetitionsatbench,weareconfrontedwiththeenactmentofataxlawwhichwasdesignedtobroadenthe
taxbase.Itisrotelearningforanylawstudentthatasanattributeofsovereignty,thepowertotaxis"the
strongestofallthepowersofgovernment."
76Admittedly,"forallitsplenitude,thepowertotaxisnotunconfined.Therearerestrictions." 77Weretherenone,thenthe
oftquoted1803dictumofChiefJusticeMarshallthat"thepowertotaxinvolvesthepowertodestroy"78wouldbeatruism.
Happily,wecanconcurwith,andthepeoplecanfindcomfortin,thereassuringwordsofMr.JusticeHolmes:"Thepowerto
taxisnotthepowertodestroy."whilethisCourtsits 79
Manakanaka,mayroongdumudulogditosaKataastaasangHukumannamaykamanghamanghanghinaing.
Angkopnahalimbawaayangmgapetisyonginiharapngayonsaamin.
AngilansakanilaaymgaSenadornanaismapawalangbisaangisangbatasukolsabuwisnaipinasamismo
nila.DiumanoitoayhinditumalimasamgaitinatadhanangSaligangBatas.Bukodsarito,tutolsilasamga
bagongtalatanaisiningitng"BicameralConferenceCommittee"nanagdagdagngmgabagongbagaybagayat
serbisyonapapatawanngbuwis.Ayonsakanila,ginampananngkomitengiyananggawainnanauukolsabuong
Kongreso.Kungkaya'tangnararapatnamangyariayihatolngKataastaasangHukumannamalabisna
pagsasamantalasasarilingpagpapasiyaangginawangKongreso.
Bagama'tbantulotkamingmakialamsaisangkapantaynasangayngPamahalaan,hindinamannararapatna
kamiaytumangginggampananangtungkulinnainiatassaaminngSaligangBatas.Lalu'tlalonangangbatasna
kinauukulanaymaaaringmakapinsalasanakararamisasambayanan.
Saganangakin,itongbatasnainihaharapsaaminngayon,aytotoonglabagsaSaligangBatas,samakatuwiday
walangbisa.Nguni'titoaynauukollamangsamgakatiwaliannamaykinalamansaparaanngpagpapasabatas
nito.HindinaminpatakaranangmakialamohumadlangsaitinakdanggawainngSaligangBatassaPanguloatsa
Kongreso.AngdalawangsangaynaiyanngPamahalaananghigitnamaalamukolsakunganganumang
panukalangbatasaynararapat,kanaisnaisomagagampanankungkaya'thindikaminararapatnamaghatolo
magpapasiyasamgabagaynaiyan.Angmakapapatawngangkopnalunassalarangannaiyanayang
mismongmgakinatawanngsambayanansaKongreso.
FacedwiththischallengeofprotectingtherightsofthepeoplebystrikingdownalawthatIsubmitis
unconstitutionalandintheprocess,checkingthewontedexcessesoftheBicameralConferenceCommittee
system,IseeinthiscaseasuitablevehicletodischargetheCourt'sConstitutionalmandateanddutyofdeclaring
thattherehasindeedbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartof
theLegislature.
RepublicActNo.7716,beingunconstitutionalandvoid,Ifindnonecessitytoruleonthesubstantiveissuesas
dealtwithinthemajorityopinionastheyhavebeenrenderedmootandacademic.Theseissuespertaintothe
intrinsicmeritsofthelaw.Itisaxiomaticthatthewisdom,desirabilityandadvisabilityofenactingcertainlawslie,
notwithintheprovinceoftheJudiciarybutthatofthepoliticaldepartments,theExecutiveandtheLegislative.The
reliefsoughtbypetitionersfromwhattheyperceivetobetheharshandonerouseffectoftheEVATonthepeople
iswithintheirreach.ForCongress,ofwhichSenatorpetitionersareapart,canfurnishthesolutionbyeither
repealingoramendingthesubjectlaw.
Fortheforegoingreasons,IVOTEtoGRANTthepetition.
PUNO,J.:
Petitionerspleadthatweaffirmtheselfevidentpropositionthattheywhomakelawshouldnotbreakthelaw.
Therearemanyevilswhoseeliminationcanbetrustedtotime.Theeviloflawlessnessinlawmakingcannot.It
mustbeslainonsightforitsubvertsthesovereigntyofthepeople.
First,afastsnapshotofthefacts.OnNovember17,1993,theHouseofRepresentativespassedonthirdreading
HouseBill(H.B.)No.11197entitled"AnActRestructuringtheValueAddedTax(VAT)SystemtoWidenitsTax
BaseandEnhanceitsAdministration,AmendingforThesePurposesSections99,100,102to108and110TitleV
and236,237and238ofTitleIX,andRepealingSections113and114ofTitleV,alloftheNationalInternal
RevenueCodeasAmended."Thevotewas114Yeasand12Nays.Thenextday,November18,1993,H.B.
No.11197wastransmittedtotheSenateforitsconcurrencebytheHon.CamiloL.Sabio,SecretaryGeneralof
theHouseofRepresentatives.
OnFebruary7,1994,theSenateCommitteeonWaysandMeanssubmittedSenateBill(S.B.)No.1630,
recommendingitsapproval"insubstitutionofSenateBillNo.1129takingintoconsiderationP.S.Res.No.734and
HouseBillNo.11197."OnMarch24,1994,S.B.No.1630wasapprovedonsecondandthirdreadings.Onthe
sameday,theSenate,thruSecretaryEdgardoE.Tumangan,requestedtheHouseforaconference"inviewof
thedisagreeingprovisionsofS.B.No.1630andH.B.No.11197."Itdesignatedthefollowingasmembersofits
Committee:SenatorsErnestoF.Herrera,LeticiaR.Shahani,AlbertoS.Romulo,JohnH.Osmea,ErnestoM.
Maceda,BlasF.Ople,FranciscoS.Tatad,RodolfoG.Biazon,andWigbertoS.Taada.OnthepartoftheHouse,
themembersoftheCommitteewere:CongressmenExequielB.Javier,JamesL.Chiongbian,RenatoV.Diaz,
ArnulfoP.Fuentebella,MarianoM.Tajon,GregorioAndolong,ThelmaAlmario,andCatalinoFigueroa.Afterfive
(5)meetings,
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
1theBicameralConferenceCommitteesubmitteditsReporttotheSenateandtheHousestating:
ANACTRESTRUCTURINGTHEVALUEADDEDTAX(VAT)SYSTEMTOWIDENITSTAXBASEANDENHANCE
ITSADMINISTRATION,AMENDINGFORTHESEPURPOSESSECTIONS99,100,102,103,104,105,106,107,
108AND110OFTITLEIV,112,115AND116OFTITLEV,AND236,237,AND238OFTITLEIX,AND
REPEALINGSECTIONS113AND114OFTITLEV,ALLOFTHENATIONALINTERNALREVENUECODE,AS
AMENDED
ANACTRESTRUCTURINGTHEVALUEADDEDTAX(VAT)SYSTEMTOWIDENITSTAXBASEANDENHANCE
ITSADMINISTRATION,AMENDINGFORTHESEPURPOSESSECTIONS99,100,102,103,104,106,107,108
AND110OFTITLEIV,112,115,117AND121OFTITLEV,AND236,237,AND238OFTITLEIX,AND
REPEALINGSECTIONS113,114,116,119AND120OFTITLEV,ALLOFTHENATIONALINTERNALREVENUE
CODE,ASAMENDEDANDFOROTHERPURPOSES
havingmet,afterfullandfreeconference,hasagreedtorecommendanddoherebyrecommendtotheir
respectiveHousesthatHouseBillNo.11197,inconsolidationwithSenateBillNo.1630,beapprovedin
accordancewiththeattachedcopyofthebillasreconciledandapprovedbytheconferees.
Approved.
TheReportwasapprovedbytheHouseonApril27,1994.TheSenateapproveditonMay2,1994.OnMay5,
1994,thePresidentsignedthebillintolawasR.A.No.7716.
ThereisnoquestionthattheBicameralConferenceCommitteedidmorethanreconciledifferencesbetween
HouseBillNo.11197andSenateBillNo.1630.Inseveralinstances,iteitheraddednewprovisionsordeleted
provisionsalreadyapprovedinHouseBillNo.11197andSenateBillNo.1630.Theseinsertions/deletions
numberingtwentyfour(24)arespecifiedindetailbypetitionerTolentinoasfollows:
2
SOMESALIENTPOINTSONTHE(AMENDMENTSTOTHEVATELAW[EO273])SHOWING
ADDITIONS/INSERTIONSMADEBYBICAMERALCONFERENCECOMMITTEETOSB1630&HB11197
IOnSec.99oftheNIRC
H.B.11197amendsthissectionbyincluding,asliabletoVAT,anypersonwhointhecourseoftradeof
business,sells,barters,orexchangesgoodsorPROPERTIESandanypersonwhoLEASESPERSONAL
PROPERTIES.
SenateBill1630deletedSec.99togivewayforanewSection99DEFINITIONOFTERMSwhere
eleven(11)termsweredefined.AnewSection,Section99Awasincorporatedwhichincludedassubjectto
VAT,onewhosells,exchanges,bartersPROPERTIESandonewhoimportsPROPERTIES.
TheBCCversion(R.A.7716)makesLESSORSofgoodsORPROPERTIESandimportersofgoodsLIABLE
toVAT.
IIOnSection100(VATonsaleofgoods)
A.TheH.B.,S.B.,andtheBCC(R.A.7716)allincludedsaleofPROPERTIESassubjecttoVAT.
ThetermGOODSorPROPERTIESincludesthefollowing:
HB SB BCC
(pls.
refer
(pls. (RA
refer 7716
toSec.2)
ToSec.1(4)
(Sec.2)
. 1. 1.
Right The The
or same same
the1
privilegetouse
patent,copyright,
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
design,ormodel,
plan,secret
formulaorprocess,
goodwilltrademark,
tradebrandorother
likepropertyor
right.
2.Rightorthe
2.Thesame
2.Thesame
privilegetouse
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
inthePhilippines
ofanyindustrial,
commercial,or
scientificequip
ment.
3.Rightorthe
3.Thesame
3.Thesame
privilegetouse
motionpicturefilms,
films,tapesand
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
discs.
4.Radioand
4.Thesame
4.Inaddition
Televisiontime
toradioand
televisiontimethe
followingwere
included:
SATELLITETRANSMISSION
andCABLE
TELEVISIONTIME
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
5.OtherSimilar
5.TheSame
5.'Other
properties
similarproperties'
wasdeleted
6.
6.
6.Real
propertiesheld
primarilyforsaleto
customersorheld
forleaseinthe
8/31/2016 G.R.No.115455
ordinarycourseor
business
B.TheHBandtheBCCBillshaseachaprovisionwhichincludesTHESALEOFGOLDTOBANGKOSENTRAL
NGPILIPINASasfallingunderthetermExportSales,hencesubjectto0%VAT.TheSenateBilldoesnotcontain
suchprovision(SeeSection102Athereof).
III.
OnSection102
Thissectionwasamendedtoincludeassubjecttoa10%VATthegrossreceiptsderivedfromTHESALEOR
EXCHANGEOFSERVICES,INCLUDINGTHEUSEORLEASEOFPROPERTIES.
TheSB,HB,andBCChavethesameprovisionsonthis.
However,onwhatareincludedinthetermSALEOREXCHANGEOFSERVICES,theBCCincluded/insertedthe
following(notfoundineithertheHouseorSenateBills):
1.ServicesoflessorsofpropertyWHETHERPERSONALORREAL(SeeBCCReport/Billp.7)
2.WAREHOUSINGSERVICES(Ibid.,)
3.KeepersofRESTHOUSES,PENSIONHOUSES,INNS,RESORTS(Ibid.,)
4.CommoncarriersbyLAND,AIRANDSEA(Ibid.,)
5.SERVICESOFFRANCHISEGRANTEESOFTELEPHONEANDTELEGRAPH
6.RADIOANDTELEVISIONBROADCASTING
7.ALLOTHERFRANCHISEGRANTEESEXCEPTTHOSEUNDERSECTION117OFTHISCODE
8.SERVICESOFSURETY,FIDELITY,INDEMNITY,ANDBONDINGCOMPANIES.
9.AlsoinsertedbytheBCC(onpageBthereof)istheLEASEORUSEOFORTHERIGHTTOUSEOF
SATTELITETRANSMISSIONANDCABLETELEVISIONTIME
IV.
OnSection103(ExemptTransactions)
TheBCCdeletedsubsection(f)initsentirety,despiteitsretentioninboththeHouseandSenateBills,thusunder
RA7716,the'printing,publication,importationorsaleofbooksandanynewspaper,magazine,review,orbulletin
whichappearsatregularintervalswithfixedpricesforsubscriptionandsaleandwhichisnotdevotedprincipally
tothepublicationofadvertisements'issubjecttoVAT.
Subsection(g)wasamendedbytheBCC(bothSenateandHouseBillsdidnot)bychangingthewordTENto
FIVE,thus:"Importationofpassengerand/orcargovesselofmorethanfivethousandtontooceangoing,
includingengineandsparepartsofsaidvesseltobeusedbytheimporterhimselfasoperatorthereof."Inshort,
importationofvesselswithtonnageofmorethan5thousandisVATexempt.
SubsectionL,wasamendedbytheBCCbyaddingthequalifyingphrase:EXCEPTTHOSERENDEREDBY
PROFESSIONALS.
SubsectionUwhichexemptsfromVAT"Transactionswhichareexemptunderspeciallaws",wasamendedby
BCCbyaddingthephrase:EXCEPTTHOSEGRANTEDUNDERPDNOS.66,529,972,1491,and1590,and
NONELECTRICCOOPERATIVESunderRA6938.ThisisthereasonwhycooperativesarenowsubjecttoVAT.
WhiletheSALEOFREALPROPERTIESwasincludedintheexempttransactionsundertheHouseBill,theBCC
madeaqualificationbystating:
'(S)SALEOFREALPROPERTIESNOTPRIMARILYHELDFORSALETOCUSTOMERSORHELDFORLEASE
INTHEORDINARYCOURSEOFTRADEORBUSINESSORREALPROPERTYUTILIZEDFORLOWCOSTAND
SOCIALIZEDHOUSINGASDEFINEDBYR.A.NO.7279OTHERWISEKNOWNASTHEURBANDEVELOPMENT
ANDHOUSINGACTOF1992ANDOTHERRELATEDLAWS.
UndertheSenateBill,thesaleofrealpropertyutilizedforlowcostandsocializedhousingasdefinedbyRA7279,
isoneoftheexempttransactions.
UndertheHouseBill,alsoexemptfromVAT,istheSALEOFPROPERTIESOTHERTHANTHETRANSACTIONS
MENTIONEDINTHEFOREGOINGPARAGRAPHSWITHAGROSSANNUALSALESAND/ORRECEIPTSOF
WHICHDOESNOTEXCEEDTHEAMOUNTPRESCRIBEDINTHEREGULATIONSTOBEPROMULGATEDBY
THESECRETARYOFFINANCEWHICHSHALLNOTBELESSTHANP350,000.00ORHIGHERTHAN
P600,000.00...UndertheSenateBill,theamountisP240,000.00.TheBCCagreedattheamountofnotless
thanP480,000.00ormorethanP720,000.00SUBJECTTOTAXUNDERSEC.112OFTHISCODE.
TheBCCdidnotinclude,asVATexempt,thesaleortransferofsecuritiesasdefinedintheRevisedSecuritiesAct
(BP178)whichwascontainedinbothSenateandHouseBills.
9/1/2016 G.R.No.115455
OnSection104
ThephraseINCLUDINGPACKAGINGMATERIALSwasincludedbytheBCConSection104(A)(1)(B),andthe
phraseONWHICHAVALUEADDEDTAXHASBEENACTUALLYonSection104(A)(2).
ThesephrasesarenotcontainedineitherHouseandSenateBills.
VI
OnSection107
BothHouseandSenateBillsprovideforthepaymentofP500.00VATregistrationfee.TheBCCprovidesfor
P1,000.00VATfee.
VII
OnSection112
WhileboththeSenateandHouseBillsprovidethatapersonwhosesalesorreceiptsandareexemptunder
Section103[w]oftheCode,andwhoarenotVATregisteredshallpayataxequivalenttoTHREE(3)PERCENTof
hisgrossquarterlysalesorreceipts,theBCCinsertedthephrase:THREEPERCENTUPONTHEEFFECTIVITY
OFTHISACTANDFOURPERCENT(4%)TWOYEARSTHEREAFTER.
VIII
OnSection115
Sec.17ofSB1630Sec.12ofHouseBill11197amendsthisSectionbyclarifyingthatcommoncarriersbyland,
airorwaterFORTHETRANSPORTOFPASSENGERSaresubjecttoPercentageTaxequivalentto3%oftheir
quarterlygrosssales.
TheBCCadoptedthisandtheHouseBill'sprovisionthattheGROSSRECEIPTSOFCOMMONCARRIERS
DERIVEDFROMTHEIRINCOMINGANDOUTGOINGFREIGHTSHALLNOTBESUBJECTEDTOTHELOCAL
TAXESIMPOSEDUNDERRA7160.TheSenateBillhasnosimilarprovision.
IX
OnSection117
ThisSectionhasnotbeentouchedbyeitherSenateandHouseBills.ButtheBCCamendeditbysubjecting
franchisesonELECTRIC,GASandWATERUTILITIESATAXOFTWOPERCENT(2%)ONGROSSRECEIPTS
DERIVED....
OnSection121
TheBCCadoptedtheSenateBills'amendmenttothissectionbysubjectingto5%premiumtaxon.
lifeinsurancebusiness
TheHouseBilldoesnotcontainthisprovision.
XI
Others
A)TheHouseBilldoesnotcontainanyprovisiononthedefermentofVATcollectiononCertainGoodsand
ServicesasdoestheSenateBill(Section19,SB1630).ButalthoughtheSenateBillauthorizesthe
defermentoncertaingoodsandservicesfornolongerthan3years,thereisnospecificprovisionthat
authorizesthePresidenttoEXCLUDEfromVATanyofthese.TheBCCusesthewordEXCLUDE.
B)Moreover,theSenateBilldeferstheVATonservicesofactorsandactressesetc.for3yearsbutthe
BCCdefersitforonly2years.
C)Section18oftheBCCBill(RA7716)isanentirelynewprovisionnotcontainedintheHouse/Senate
Bills.
D)Theperiodwithinwhichtopromulgatetheimplementingrulesandregulationsiswithin60daysunder
SB1630NospecificperiodundertheHouseBill,within90daysunderRA7716(BCC).
E)TheHouseBillprovidesforageneralrepealingclause,allinconsistentlawsetc.arerepealed.Section
16oftheSenateBillexpresslyrepealsSections113,114,116,119and120ofthecode.ThesameSenate
BillhowevercontainsageneralrepealingclauseinSec.21thereof.
i.e.
RA7716(BCC'sBill)expresslyrepealsSections113,114and116oftheNIRCArticle39(c)(d)and(e)of
EO226andprovidestherepealofSec.119and120oftheNIRCupontheexpirationoftwo(2)years
unlessotherwiseexcludedbythePresident."
ThechargethattheBicameralConferenceCommitteeaddednewprovisionsinthebillsofthetwochambersis
hardlydisputedbyrespondents.Instead,respondentsjustifythem.Accordingtorespondents:(1)theBicameral
ConferenceCommitteehasanvetopoweroravetoafterthefactofapprovalofthebillbybothHouses(2)the
billpreparedbytheBicameralConferenceCommittee,withitsadditionsanddeletions,wasanywayapprovedby
bothHouses(3)itwasthepracticeinpastCongressesforconferencecommitteestoinsertinbillsapprovedby
thetwoHousesnewprovisionsthatwerenotoriginallycontemplatedbythemand(4)theenrolledbilldoctrine
precludesinquiryintotheregularityoftheproceedingsthatledtotheenactmentofR.A.7716.
9/1/2016 G.R.No.115455
expost
Withduerespect,Irejectthesecontentionswhichwillcaveinoncloserexamination.
First.ThereisabsolutelynolegalwarrantfortheboldsubmissionthataBicameralConferenceCommittee
possessesthepowertoadd/deleteprovisionsinbillsalreadyapprovedonthirdreadingbybothHousesoran
vetopower.TosupportthispostulatethatcanenfeebleCongressitself,respondentscitenoconstitutional
provision,nolaw,notevenanyruleorregulation.
expost3Worse,theirstanceiscategoricallyrepudiatedbytherulesofboththeSenateandtheHouseofRepresentatives
whichdefinewithprecisiontheparametersofpowerofaBicameralConferenceCommittee.Thus,Section209,RuleXIIof
theRulesoftheSenateprovides
IntheeventthattheSenatedoesnotagreewiththeHouseofRepresentativesontheprovisionofanybillorjoint
resolution,whichshallmeetwithintendaysaftertheircomposition.
thedifferencesshallbesettledbyaconferencecommitteeofbothHouses
EachConferenceCommitteeReportshallcontainadetailedandsufficientlyexplicitstatementofthechangesin
oramendmentstothesubjectmeasure,andshallbesignedbytheconferees.(Italicssupplied)
ThecounterpartruleoftheHouseofRepresentativesiscastinnearidenticallanguage.Section85oftheRulesof
theHouseofRepresentativespertinentlyprovides:
IntheeventthattheHousedoesnotagreewiththeSenateontheamendmentstoanybillorjointresolution,the
differencesmaybesettledbyaconferencecommitteeofbothchambers.
....Eachreportshallcontainadetailed,sufficientlyexplicitstatementofthechangesinoramendmentstothe
subjectmeasure.(Italicssupplied)
TheJefferson'sManualhasbeenadopted
4asasupplementtoourparliamentaryrulesandpractice.Section456ofJefferson'sManualsimilarlyconfinesthepowers
ofaconferencecommittee,:viz 5
Themanagersofaconferencemustconfinethemselvestothedifferencescommittedtothem...andmaynot
includesubjectsnotwithinthedisagreements,eventhoughgermanetoaquestioninissue.
ThisruleofantiquityhasbeenhonedandhonoredinpracticebytheCongressoftheUnitedStates.Thus,itis
chronicledbyFloydBiddick,ParliamentarianEmeritusoftheUnitedStatesSenate,:
viz 6
ConfereesshallnotinsertintheirreportmattersnotcommittedtothembyeitherHouse,norshall
theystrikefromthebillmattersagreedtobybothHouses.Nomatteronwhichthereisnothingin
eithertheSenateorHousepassedversionsofabillmaybeincludedintheconferencereportand
actionstothecontrarywouldsubjectthereporttoapointoforder.(Italicsours)
Committeesofconferenceareappointedfortheandthecommitteesofconferencealonecangrant
compromisesandmodifypropositionsofeitherHouseswithinthelimitsofthedisagreement.Confereesare
limitedtotheconsiderationofdifferencesbetweenthetwoHouses.
solepurposeofcompromisingandadjustingthedifferingandconflictingopinionsofthetwoHouses
Infine,thereisneitherasoundnorasyllableintheRulesoftheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativeto
supportthethesisoftherespondentsthatabicameralconferencecommitteeisclothedwithanpower.
expostveto
ButthethesisthataBicameralConferenceCommitteecanwieldpowerdoesnotonlycontravenetherulesof
boththeSenateandtheHouse.Itwageswaragainstoursettledidealsofrepresentativedemocracy.Forthe
inevitable,catastrophiceffectofthethesisistoinstallaBicameralConferenceCommitteeastheThirdChamber
ofourCongress,vestedwiththepowertomakelawsbutwiththethatitslawsarenotthesubjectofafreeandfull
discussionofbothHousesofCongress.Withsuchavagrantpower,aBicameralConferenceCommitteeactingas
aThirdChamberwillbeaconstitutionalmonstrosity.
expostvetosimilarlydissimilarity
ItneedsnoomnisciencetoperceivethatourConstitutiondidnotprovideforaCongresscomposedofthree
chambers.Onthecontrary,section1,ArticleVIoftheConstitutionprovidesinclearandcertainlanguage:"The
legislativepowerbevestedintheCongressofthePhilippineswhichconsistofaSenateandaHouseof
Representatives..."NotethatinvestinglegislativepowerexclusivelytotheSenateandtheHouse,the
Constitutionusedtheword"shall."ItscommandforaCongressoftwohousesismandatory.Itisnotmandatory
sometimes.
shallshall
InvestinglegislativepowertotheSenate,theConstitutionmeanstheSenate"...composedoftwentyfour
Senators...electedatlargebythequalifiedvotersofthePhilippines...."
7Similarly,whentheConstitutionvestedthelegislativepowertotheHouse,itmeanstheHouse"...composedofnotmore
thantwohundredandfiftymembers...whoshallbeelectedfromlegislativedistricts...andthosewho...shallbeelected
throughapartylistsystemofregisterednational,regional,andsectoralpartiesororganizations."8TheConstitutionthus,did
notvestonaBicameralConferenceCommitteewithanmembershipthepowertolegislateforitexclusivelyvested
legislativepowertotheSenateandtheHouseascoequalbodies.Tobesure,theConstitutiondoesnotmentionthe
BicameralConferenceCommitteesofCongress.Noconstitutionalstatusisaccordedtothem.Theyarenotevenstatutory
creations.TheyowetheirexistencefromtheinternalrulesofthetwoHousesofCongress.Yet,respondentspeddlethe
9/1/2016 G.R.No.115455
disconcertingideathattheyshouldberecognizedasaThirdChamberofCongressandwithvetopoweratthat.adhocex
post
ThethesisthataBicameralConferenceCommitteecanexerciselawmakingpowerwithvetopowerisfreighted
withmischief.Lawmakingisapowerthatcanbeusedforgoodorforill,hence,ourConstitutioncarefullylaidout
aplanandaprocedureforitsexercise.Firstly,itvouchsafedthatthepowertomakelawsshouldbeexercisedby
nootherbodyexcepttheSenateandtheHouse.Itoughttobeindubitablethatwhatiscontemplatedisthe
SenateactingasafullSenateandtheHouseactingasafullHouse.ItisonlywhentheSenateandtheHouseact
aswholebodiesthattheytrulyrepresentthepeople.Anditisonlywhentheyrepresentthepeoplethattheycan
legitimatelypasslaws.Lawsthatarenotenactedbythepeople'srightfulrepresentativessubvertthepeople's
sovereignty.BicameralConferenceCommittees,withtheircharacterandlimitedmembership,cannotpasslaws
fortheydonotrepresentthepeople.TheConstitutiondoesnotallowthetyrannyofthemajority.Yet,the
respondentswillimposetheworstkindoftyrannythetyrannyoftheminorityoverthemajority.Secondly,the
Constitutiondelineatedindeftstrokesthestepstobefollowedinmakinglaws.Theoverridingpurposeofthese
proceduralrulesistoassurethatonlybillsthatsuccessfullysurvivethesearchingscrutinyoftheproper
committeesofCongressandthefullandunfettereddeliberationsofbothHousescanbecomelaws.Forthis
reason,abillhastoundergothree(3)mandatoryseparatereadingsineachHouse.Inthecaseatbench,the
additionsanddeletionsmadebytheBicameralConferenceCommitteedidnotenjoytheenlightenedstudiesof
appropriatecommittees.Itismeettonotethatthecomplexitiesofmoderndaylegislationshavemadeour
committeesystemasignificantpartofthelegislativeprocess.ThomasReedcalledthecommitteesystemas"the
eye,theear,thehand,andveryoftenthebrainofthehouse."PresidentWoodrowWilsonoftheUnitedStates
oncereferredtothegovernmentoftheUnitedStatesas"agovernmentbytheChairmanoftheStanding
CommitteesofCongress..."
expostadhoc9NeitherdidtheseadditionsanddeletionsoftheBicameralConferenceCommitteepassthroughthecoilsof
collectivedeliberationofthemembersofthetwoHousesactingseparately.Duetothisshortcircuitingoftheconstitutional
procedureofmakinglaws,confusionshroudstheenactmentofR.A.No.7716.Whoinsertedtheadditionsanddeletions
remainsamystery.Whytheywereinsertedisariddle.TouseaChurchillianphrase,lawmakingshouldnotbeariddle
wrappedinanenigma.Itcannotbe,forArticleII,section28oftheConstitutionmandatestheStatetoadoptandimplement
a"policyoffullpublicdisclosureofallitstransactionsinvolvingpublicinterest."TheConstitutioncouldnothave
contemplatedaCongressofinvisibleandunaccountableJohnandMaryDoes.Alawwhoserationaleisariddleandwhose
authorshipisobscurecannotbindthepeople.
Allthesenotwithstanding,respondentsresorttothelegalcosmetologythattheseadditionsanddeletionsshould
governthepeopleaslawsbecausetheBicameralConferenceCommitteeReportwasanywaysubmittedtoand
approvedbytheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentatives.Thesubmissionmayhavesomemeritwithrespectto
provisionsagreeduponbytheCommitteeintheprocessofreconcilingconflictsbetweenS.B.No.1630andH.B.
No.11197.Intheseinstances,theconflictingprovisionshadbeenpreviouslyscreenedbythepropercommittees,
deliberateduponbybothHousesandapprovedbythem.Itis,however,adifferentmatterwithrespectto
additionsanddeletionswhichwereentirelynewandwhichweremadenottoreconcileinconsistenciesbetween
S.B.No.1630andH.B.No.11197.ThemembersoftheBicameralConferenceCommitteedidnothaveany
authoritytoaddnewprovisionsordeleteprovisionsalreadyapprovedbybothHousesasitwasnotnecessaryto
dischargetheirlimitedtaskofreconcilingdifferencesinbills.Atthatlatestageoflawmaking,theConference
Committeecannotadd/deleteprovisionswhichcanbecomelawswithoutundergoingthestudyanddeliberationof
bothchambersgiventobillson1st,2nd,and3rdreadings.EventheSenateandtheHousecannotenactalaw
whichwillnotundergothesemandatorythree(3)readingsrequiredbytheConstitution.IftheSenateandthe
Housecannotenactsuchalaw,neithercanthelesserBicameralConferenceCommittee.
Moreover,thesocalledchoicegiventothemembersofbothHousestoeitherapproveordisapprovethesaid
additionsanddeletionsismoreofanopticalillusion.Theseadditionsanddeletionsarenotsubmittedseparately
forapproval.Theyaretuckedtotheentirebill.Thevoteisonthebillasapackage,,togetherwiththeinsertions
anddeletions.Andthevoteiseither"aye"or"nay,"withoutanyfurtherdebateanddeliberation.Quiteoften,
legislatorsvote"yes"becausetheyapproveofthebillasawholealthoughtheymayobjecttoitsamendmentsby
theConferenceCommittee.ThislackofrealchoiceiswellobservedbyRobertLuce:
i.e.10
amendmentorelserejected.Theimpulseistogetdonewiththematterandsothemotiontoaccepthas
undueadvantage,forsomemembersaresuretopreferswallowingunpalatableprovisionsratherthan
prolongcontroversy.Thisisthemorelikelyifthereportcomesintherushofbusinesstowardtheendofa
session,whentoseekfurtherconferencemightresultinthelossofthemeasurealtogether.Atanytimein
thesessionthereissomeriskofsucharesultfollowingtherejectionofaconferencereport,foritmaynot
bepossibletosecureasecondconference,ordelaymaygiveoppositiontothemainproposalchanceto
developmorestrength.
intoto
Inasimilarvein,Prof.JackDaviescommentedthat"conferencereportsarereturnedtoassemblyandSenateon
atakeitorleaveitbasis,andthebodiesaregenerallyplacedinthepositionthattoleaveitisapractical
impossibility."
11Thus,heconcludesthat"conferencecommitteeactionisthemostundemocraticprocedureinthelegislativeprocess." 12
TherespondentsalsocontendthattheadditionsanddeletionsmadebytheBicameralConferenceCommittee
wereinaccordwithlegislativecustomsandusages.Theargumentdoesnotpersuadeforitmisappreciatesthe
valueofcustomsandusagesinthehierarchyofsourcesoflegislativerulesofprocedure.Tobesure,every
legislativeassemblyhastheinherentrighttopromulgateitsowninternalrules.Inourjurisdiction,ArticleVI,
section16(3)oftheConstitutionprovidesthat"EachHousemaydeterminetherulesofitsproceedings..."Butitis
hornbooklawthatthesourcesofRulesofProcedurearemanyandhierarchicalincharacter.Masonlaidthem
downasfollows:
13
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1.RulesofProcedurearederivedfromseveralsources.Theprincipalsourcesareasfollows:
9/1/2016 G.R.No.115455
a.Constitutionalrules.
b.Statutoryrulesorcharterprovisions.
c.Adoptedrules.
d.Judicialdecisions.
e.Adoptedparliamentaryauthority.
f.Parliamentarylaw.
g..
Customsandusages
2.exceptthatjudicialdecisions,sincetheyareinterpretationsofrulesfromoneoftheothersources,take
thesameprecedenceasthesourceinterpreted.Thus,forexample,aninterpretationofaconstitutional
provisiontakesprecedenceoverastatute.
Therulesfromthedifferentsourcestakeprecedenceintheorderlistedabove
3..Thus,wheretheConstitutionrequiresthreereadingsofbills,thisprovisioncontrolsoveranyprovision
ofstatute,adoptedrules,adoptedmanual,orofparliamentarylaw,andaruleofparliamentarylawcontrols
overalocalusagebutmustgivewaytoanyrulefromahighersourceofauthority.(Italicsours)
Wheneverthereisconflictbetweenrulesfromthesesourcestherulefromthesourcelistedearlierprevailsoverthe
rulefromthesourcelisted,later
Asdiscussedabove,theunauthorizedadditionsanddeletionsmadebytheBicameralConferenceCommittee
violatedtheprocedurefixedbytheConstitutioninthemakingoflaws.Itisreasonlessforrespondentsthereforeto
justifytheseinsertionsassanctionedbycustomsandusages.
Finally,respondentsseeksanctuaryintheconclusivenessofanenrolledbilltobaranyjudicialinquiryonwhether
CongressobservedourconstitutionalprocedureinthepassageofR.A.No.7716.Theenrolledbilltheoryisa
historicalrelicthatshouldnotcontinuouslyruleusfromthefossilizedpast.Itshouldbeimmediatelyemphasized
thattheenrolledbilltheoryoriginatedinEnglandwherethereisnowrittenconstitutionandwhereParliamentis
supreme.
14Inthisjurisdiction,wehaveawrittenconstitutionandthelegislatureisabodyoflimitedpowers.Likewise,itmustbe
pointedoutthatstartingfromthedecadeofthe40's,evenAmericancourtshaveveeredawayfromtherigidityand
unrealismoftheconclusivenessofanenrolledbill.Prof.Sutherlandobserved:15
xxxxxxxxx.
Wherethefailureofconstitutionalcomplianceintheenactmentofstatutesisnotdiscoverablefromthefaceofthe
actitselfbutmaybedemonstratedbyrecoursetothelegislativejournals,debates,committeereportsorpapers
ofthegovernor,courtshaveusedseveralconflictingtheorieswithwhichtodisposeoftheissue.Theyhaveheld:
(1)thattheenrolledbillisconclusiveandlikethesheriff'sreturncannotbeattacked(2)thattheenrolledbillis
correctandonlyincasethelegislativejournalshowsaffirmativecontradictionoftheconstitutionalrequirementwill
thebillbeheldinvalid,(3)thatalthoughtheenrolledbilliscorrect,evidencefromthejournals,orotherextrinsic
sourcesisadmissibletostrikethebilldown(4)thatthelegislativejournalisconclusiveandtheenrolledbillis
validonlyifitaccordswiththerecitalinthejournalandtheconstitutionalprocedure.
primafacieprimafacie
Persuasiveastheseargumentsare,thetendencytodayistoavoidreachingresultsbyartificialpresumptionsand
thusitwouldseemdesirabletoinsistthattheenrolledbillstandorfallonthebasisoftherelevantevidencewhich
maybesubmittedfororagainstit.(Italicsours)
Thus,asfarbackasthe1940's,Prof.Sutherlandconfirmedthat"...thetendencyseemstobetowardthe
abandonmentoftheconclusivepresumptionruleandtheadoptionofthethirdruleleavingonlyapresumptionof
validitywhichmaybeattackedbyanyauthoritativesourceofinformation."
primafacie16
IamnotunawarethatthisCourthassubscribedtotheconclusivenessofanenrolledbillasenunciatedinthe
1947leadcaseof,andreiteratedinsubsequentcases.
Mabanagv.LopezVito17
Withduerespect,Isubmitthattheserulingsarenolongergoodlaw.PartoftheratiocinationinMabanagstates:
xxxxxxxxx
Iffornootherreasonthanthatitconformstotheexpressedpolicyofourlawmakingbody,wechoosetofollow
therule.Section313oftheoldCodeofCivilProcedure,asamendedbyActNo.2210,provides:'Official
documents'maybeprovedasfollows:***(2)theproceedingsofthePhilippineCommission,orofanylegislative
bodythatmaybeprovidedforinthePhilippineIslands,orofCongress,bythejournalsofthosebodiesorofeither
housethereof,orbypublishedstatutesorresolutions,orbycopiescertifiedbytheclerkorsecretary,orprintedby
theirorderProvided,ThatinthecaseofActsofthePhilippineCommissionorthePhilippineLegislature,when
thereisanexistenceofacopysignedbythepresidingofficersandsecretariesofsaidbodies,itshallbe
conclusiveproofoftheprovisionsofsuchActsandofthedueenactmentthereof.
Sufficetostatethatsection313oftheOldCodeofCivilProcedureasamendedbyActNo.2210isnolongerin
ourstatutebooks.IthaslongbeenrepealedbytheRulesofCourt.alsoreliedonjurisprudenceandauthoritiesin
theUnitedStateswhichareunderseverecriticismsbymodernscholars.Hence,evenintheUnitedStatesthe
conclusivenessofanenrolledbillhasbeenjunkedbymostoftheStates.Itisalsotruethataslateaslastyear,in
9/1/2016 G.R.No.115455
thecaseof.,thisCourtstillreliedontheconclusivenessofanenrolledbillasitrefusedtoinvalidateaprovisionof
lawonthegroundthatitwasmerelyinsertedbythebicameralconferencecommitteeofbothHouses.,however,
isdistinguishable.In,theallegedinsertionofthesecondparagraphofsection35ofR.A.No.7354repealingthe
frankingprivilegeofthejudiciarydoesnotappeartobeanuncontestedfact.Inthecaseatbench,thenumerous
additions/deletionsmadebytheBicameralConferenceCommitteeasdetailedbypetitionersTolentinoand
Salongaarenotdisputedbytherespondents.In,theCourtwasnotalsoconfrontedwiththeargumentthatitcan
nolongerrelyontheconclusivenessofanenrolledbillinlightofthenewprovisionintheConstitutiondefining
judicialpower.Morespecifically,section1ofArticleVIIInowprovides:
MabanagPhilippineJudgesAssociationv.Prado,op.citPradoPradoPrado
Section1.ThejudicialpowershallbevestedinoneSupremeCourtandinsuchlowercourtsasmaybe
establishedbylaw.
Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactualcontroversiesinvolvingrightswhichare
legallydemandableandenforceable,and(Italicssupplied)
todeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthe
partofanybranchorinstrumentalityoftheGovernment.
FormerChiefJusticeRobertoR.Concepcion,thesponsorofthisprovisionintheConstitutionalCommission
explainedthesenseandthereachofjudicialpowerasfollows:
18
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...Inotherwords,thejudiciaryisthefinalarbiteronthequestionofwhetherornotoranyofitsofficialshas
actedwithoutjurisdictionorinexcessofjurisdiction,orsocapriciouslyastoconstituteanabuseof
discretionamountingtoexcessofjurisdiction.
abranchofgovernmentThisisnotonlyajudicialpowerbutadutytopassjudgmentonmattersofthisnature.
Thisisthebackgroundofparagraph2ofSection1,.(Italicsours)
whichmeansthatthecourtscannothereafterevadethedutytosettlemattersofthisnature,byclaimingthatsuch
mattersconstitutepoliticalquestion
TheConstitutioncannotbeanyclearer.WhatitgrantedtothisCourtisnotamerewhichitcandeclineto
exercise.Preciselytodeterthisdisinclination,theConstitutionimposeditasaofthisCourttostrikedownanyact
ofabranchorinstrumentalityofgovernmentoranyofitsofficialsdonewithgraveabuseofdiscretionamounting
tolackorexcessofjurisdiction.Rightlyorwrongly,theConstitutionhaselongatedthecheckingpowersofthis
Courtagainsttheotherbranchesofgovernmentdespitetheirmoredemocraticcharacter,thePresidentandthe
legislatorsbeingelectedbythepeople.
powerduty
Itis,however,theorizedthatthisprovisionisnothingnew.
19Ibegtodisagreefortheviewmissesthesignificantchangesmadeinourconstitutionalcanvasstocurethelegal
deficiencieswediscoveredduringmartiallaw.Oneoftheareasradicallychangedbytheframersofthe1987Constitutionis
theimbalanceofpowerbetweenandamongthethreegreatbranchesofourgovernmenttheExecutive,theLegislativeand
theJudiciary.ToupgradethepowersoftheJudiciary,theConstitutionalCommissionstrengthenedsomemorethe
independenceofcourts.Thus,itfurtherprotectedthesecurityoftenureofthemembersoftheJudiciarybyproviding"No
lawshallbepassedreorganizingtheJudiciarywhenitunderminesthesecurityoftenureofitsMembers."20Italso
guaranteedfiscalautonomytotheJudiciary.21
More,itdepoliticalizedappointmentsinthejudiciarybycreatingtheJudicialandBarCouncilwhichwastasked
withscreeningthelistofprospectiveappointeestothejudiciary.
22ThepowerofconfirmingappointmentstothejudiciarywasalsotakenawayfromCongress. 23ThePresidentwaslikewise
givenaspecifictimetofillupvacanciesinthejudiciaryninety(90)daysfromtheoccurrenceofthevacancyincaseofthe
SupremeCourt24andninety(90)daysfromthesubmissionofthelistofrecommendeesbytheJudicialandBarCouncilin
caseofvacanciesinthelowercourts.25Tofurtherinsulateappointmentsinthejudiciaryfromthevirusofpolitics,the
SupremeCourtwasgiventhepowerto"appointallofficialsandemployeesoftheJudiciaryinaccordancewiththeCivil
ServiceLaw."26Andtomaketheseparationofthejudiciaryfromtheotherbranchesofgovernmentmorewatertight,it
prohibitedmembersofthejudiciarytobe"...designatedtoanyagencyperformingquasijudicialoradministrative
functions."27WhiletheConstitutionstrengthenedthesinewsoftheSupremeCourt,itreducedthepowersofthetwoother
branchesofgovernment,especiallytheExecutive.NotableofthepowersofthePresidentclippedbytheConstitutionishis
powertosuspendthewritofhabeascorpusandtoproclaimmartiallaw.Theexerciseofthispowerisnowsubjectto
revocationbyCongress.Likewise,thesufficiencyofthefactualbasisfortheexerciseofsaidpowermaybereviewedby
thisCourtinanappropriateproceedingfiledbyanycitizen.28
Theprovisiondefiningjudicialpowerasincludingthe"dutyofthecourtsofjustice...todeterminewhetherornot
therehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranch
orinstrumentalityoftheGovernment"constitutesthecapstoneoftheeffortsoftheConstitutionalCommissionto
upgradethepowersofthisCourttheotherbranchesofgovernment.Thisprovisionwasdictatedbyour
experienceundermartiallawwhichtaughtusthatastrongerandmoreindependentjudiciaryisneededtoabort
abusesingovernment.AssharplystressedbypetitionerSalonga,thisprovisionisdistinctlyFilipinoandits
interpretationshouldnotbedepreciatedbyunduerelianceoninapplicableforeignjurisprudence.Itisthuscrystal
clearthatunlikeotherSupremeCourts,thisCourthasbeenmandatedbyournewConstitutiontobeamore
activeagentinannullingactsofgraveabuseofdiscretioncommittedbyabranchofgovernmentoranyofits
officials.Thisnewrole,however,willnotcompeltheCourt,appropriatelydefinedbyProf.A.Bickelastheleast
dangerousbranchofgovernment,toassumeimperialpowersandrunroughshodovertheprincipleofseparation
ofpowerforthatisjudicialtyrannybyanylanguage.Butwhilerespectingtheessentialoftheprincipleof
separationofpower,theCourtisnottoberestrictedbyitsnonessentials.Appliedtothecaseatbench,by
voidingR.A.No.7716onthegroundthatitsenactmentviolatedtheprocedureimposedbytheConstitutionin
9/1/2016 G.R.No.115455
lawmaking,theCourtisnotbyanymeanswreckingthewallseparatingthepowersbetweenthelegislatureand
thejudiciary.Forinsodoing,theCourtisnotengaginginlawmakingwhichistheessenceoflegislativepower.
ButtheCourt'sinterpositionofpowershouldnotbedefeatedbytheconclusivenessoftheenrolledbill.Aresortto
thisfictionwillresultintheenactmentoflawsnotproperlydeliberateduponandpassedbyCongress.Certainly,
theenrolledbilltheorywasnotconceivedtocoverupviolationsoftheconstitutionalprocedureinlawmaking,a
procedureintendedtoassurethepassageofgoodlaws.Theconclusivenessoftheenrolledbillcan,therefore,be
disregardedforitisnotnecessarytopreservetheprincipleofseparationofpowers.
visavis
Insum,IsubmitthatinimposingtothisCourtthedutytoannulactsofgovernmentcommittedwithgraveabuseof
discretion,thenewConstitutiontransformedthisCourtfrompassivitytoactivism.Thistransformation,dictatedby
ourdistinctexperienceasanation,isnotmerelyevolutionarybutrevolutionary.Underthe1935and1973
Constitutions,thisCourtapproachedconstitutionalviolationsbyinitiallydeterminingwhatitcannotdounderthe
1987Constitution,thereisashiftinstressthisCourtismandatedtoapproachconstitutionalviolationsnotby
findingoutwhatitshouldnotdobutwhatitmustdo.TheCourtmustdischargethissolemndutybynot
resuscitatingapastthatpetrifiesthepresent.
IvotetodeclareR.A.No.7716unconstitutional.
BELLOSILLO,J.:
Withaconsensusalreadyreachedafterduedeliberations,silenceperhapsshouldbethebetterpartofdiscretion,
excepttovote.Thedifferentviewsandopinionsexpressedaresopersuasiveandconvincingtheyaremorethan
enoughtoswaythependulumfororagainstthesubjectpetitions.Thepenetratingandscholarlydissertationsof
mybrethrenshoulddispensewithfurtherargumentswhichmayonlyconfoundandconfuseeventhemost
learnedofmen.
Butthereisacrucialpoint,aconstitutionalissuewhich,Isubmit,hasbeenbelittled,treatedlightly,ifnotalmost
consideredinsignificantandpurposeless.Itiselementary,asmuchasitisfundamental.Iamreferringtotheword
"exclusively"appearinginSec.24,Art.VI,ofour1987Constitution.Thisisregrettable,tosaytheleast,asit
involvesaconstitutionalmandatewhich,wittinglyorunwittingly,hasbeencastasideastrivialandmeaningless.
AcomparisonoftheparticularprovisionontheenactmentofrevenuebillsintheU.S.Constitutionwithits
counterpartinthePhilippineConstitutionwillhelpexplainmyposition.
UndertheU.S.Constitution,"[a]llbillsforraisingrevenueshalloriginateintheHouseofRepresentativesbutthe
Senatemayproposeorconcurwithamendmentsasonotherbills"(Sec.7,par.[1],Art.I).Incontrast,our1987
Constitutionreads:"Allappropriation,revenueortariffbills,billsauthorizingincreaseofthepublicdebt,billsof
localapplication,andprivatebillsshalloriginateintheHouseofRepresentatives,buttheSenatemayproposeor
concurwithamendments"(Sec.24,Art.VIItalicssupplied).
exclusively
AsmaybegleanedfromthepertinentprovisionofourConstitution,allrevenuebillsarerequiredtooriginate
"exclusively"intheHouseofRepresentatives.Ontheotherhand,theU.S.Constitutiondoesnotusetheword
"exclusively"itmerelysays,"[a]llbillsforraisingrevenueshalloriginateintheHouseofRepresentatives."
Sincetheterm"exclusively"hasalreadybeenadequatelydefinedinthevariousopinions,astowhichthere
seemstobenodispute,Ishallnolongeroffermyowndefinition.
Verily,theprovisioninourConstitutionrequiringthatallrevenuebillsshalloriginateexclusivelyfromtheLower
Houseismandatory.Theword"exclusively"isan"exclusiveword,"whichisindicativeofanintentthatthe
provisionismandatory.
1Hence,allAmericanauthoritiesexpoundingonthemeaningandapplicationofSec.7,par.(1),Art.I,oftheU.S.
ConstitutioncannotbeusedintheinterpretationofSec.24,Art.VI,ofour1987Constitutionwhichhasadistinctfeatureof
"exclusiveness"allitsown.Thus,whenourConstitutionabsolutelyrequiresasitismandatorythataparticularbillshould
exclusivelyemanatefromtheLowerHouse,thereisnoalternativetotherequirementthatthebilltobecomevalidlawmust
originateexclusivelyfromthatHouse.
Intheinterpretationofconstitutions,questionsfrequentlyariseastowhetherparticularsectionsaremandatoryor
directory.Thecourtsusuallyhesitatetodeclarethataconstitutionalprovisionisdirectorymerelyinviewofthe
tendencyofthelegislaturetodisregardprovisionswhicharenotsaidtobemandatory.Accordingly,itisthe
generalruletoregardconstitutionalprovisionsasmandatory,andnottoleaveanydiscretiontothewillofthe
legislaturetoobeyordisregardthem.Thispresumptionastomandatoryqualityisusuallyfollowedunlessitis
unmistakablymanifestthattheprovisionsareintendedtobemerelydirectory.Sostrongistheinclinationinfavor
ofgivingobligatoryforcetothetermsoftheorganiclawthatithasevenbeensaidthatneitherbythecourtsnor
byanyotherdepartmentofthegovernmentmayanyprovisionoftheConstitutionberegardedasmerely
directory,butthateachandeveryoneofitsprovisionsshouldbetreatedasimperativeandmandatory,without
referencetotherulesanddistinguishingbetweenthedirectoryandthemandatorystatutes.
2
Theframersofour1987Constitutioncouldnothaveusedtheterm"exclusively"iftheyonlymeanttoreplicate
andadopttheU.S.version.Byinserting"exclusively"inSec.24,Art.VI,ofourConstitution,theirmessageis
clear:theywanteditdifferent,strong,stringent.Theremustbeacompellingreasonfortheinclusionoftheword
"exclusively,"whichcannotbeanactofretrogressionbutprogression,animprovementonitsprecursor.Thus,
"exclusively"mustbegivenitstruemeaning,itspurposeobservedandvirtuerecognized,foritcouldnothave
beenconceivedtobeofminorconsequence.Thatconstructionistobesoughtwhichgiveseffecttothewholeof
thestatuteitseveryword..
intotoUtmagisvaleatquampereat
Consequently,anyreferencetoAmericanauthorities,decisionsandopinions,howeverwiselyanddelicatelyput,
canonlymisleadintheinterpretationofourownConstitution.Torefertothemindefendingtheconstitutionalityof
9/1/2016 G.R.No.115455
R.A.7716,subjectofthepresentpetitions,istoargueonafalsepremise,,thatSec.24,Art.VI,ofour1987
Constitutionis,ormeansexactly,thesameasSec.7,par.(1),Art.I,oftheU.S.Constitution,whichisnotcorrect.
Hence,onlyawrongconclusioncanbedrawnfromawrongpremise.
i.e.
Forexample,itisarguedthatintheUnitedStates,fromwhereourownlegislatureispatterned,theSenatecan
practicallysubstituteitsowntaxmeasureforthatoftheLowerHouse.Thus,accordingtotheMajority,citingan
Americancase,"thevalidityofSec.37whichtheSenatehadinsertedintheTariffActof1909byimposingantax
basedontheweightofvessels,wasupheldagainsttheclaimthattherevenuebilloriginatedintheSenatein
contraventionofArt.I,Sec.7,oftheU.S.Constitution."
advalorem3Inanefforttobemoreconvincing,theMajorityevenquotesthefootnoteinwhichreadsIntroductionto
AmericanGovernmentbyF.A.OggandP.O.Ray
Thusin1883theupperhousestruckouteverythingaftertheenactingclauseofatariffbillandwroteitsown
measure,whichtheHouseeventuallyfeltobligedtoaccept.Itlikewiseadded847amendmentstothePayne
Aldrichtariffactof1909,dictatedtheschedulesoftheemergencytariffactof1921,rewroteanextensivetax
revisionbillinthesameyear,andrecastmostofthepermanenttariffbillof1922
4
whichinfactsuggests,veryclearly,thatthesubjectrevenuebillactuallyoriginatedfromtheLowerHouseand
wasonlyamended,perhapsconsiderably,bytheSenate
afteritwaspassedbytheformerandtransmittedtothelatter.
Inthecasescited,wherethestatutespassedbytheU.S.Congresswereupheld,therevenuebillsdidnotactually
originatefromtheSenatebut,infact,fromtheLowerHouse.Thus,theSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates,
speakingthroughChiefJusticeWhitein
Raineyv.UnitedStates5upheldtherevenuebillpassedbyCongressandadoptedtherulingofthelowercourtthat
...thesectioninquestionisnotvoidasabillforraisingrevenueoriginatingintheSenateandnotintheHouseof
Representatives.ItappearsthatthesectionwasproposedbytheSenateasanamendmenttoabillforraising
Flintv.StoneTracyCo.,
6onwhichtheSolicitorGeneralheavilyleansinhisConsolidatedCommentaswellasinhisMemorandum,doesnotsupport
thethesisoftheMajoritysincethesubjectbillthereinactuallyoriginatedfromtheLowerHouseandnotfromtheSenate,
andtheamendmentmerelycoveredacertainprovisionintheHousebill.
Infine,inthecasescitedwhichwereliftedfromAmericanauthorities,itappearsthattherevenuebillsinquestion
actuallyoriginatedfromtheHouseofRepresentativesandwereamendedbytheSenateonlyaftertheywere
transmittedtoit.Perhaps,ifthefactualcircumstancesinthosecaseswereexactlythesameastheonesat
bench,thenthesubjectrevenueortariffbillmaybeupheldinthisjurisdictionontheprincipleofsubstantial
compliance,astheywereintheUnitedStates,exceptpossiblyininstanceswheretheHousebillundergoeswhat
isnowreferredtoas"amendmentbysubstitution,"forthatwouldbeinderogationofourConstitutionwhichvests
solelyintheHouseofRepresentativesthepowertoinitiaterevenuebills.ASenateamendmentbysubstitution
simplymeansthatthebillinquestiondidnotineffectoriginatefromthelowerchamberbutfromtheupper
chamberandnotdisguisesitselfasamereamendmentoftheHouseversion.
ItisalsotheorizedthatintheU.S.,amendmentbysubstitutionisrecognized.Thatmaybetrue.Buttheprocess
maybevalidlyeffectiveonlyundertheU.S.Constitution.Thecasesbeforeuspresentatotallydifferentfactual
backdrop.SeveralmonthsbeforetheLowerHousecouldevenpassHBNo.11197,P.S.Res.No.734andSBNo.
1129hadalreadybeenfiledintheSenate.Worse,theSenatesubsequentlyapprovedSBNo.1630"in
substitutionofSBNo.1129,takingintoconsiderationP.S.Res.No.734andHBNo.11197,"andnotHBNo.11197
itself"asamended."Here,theSenatecouldnothaveproposedorconcurredwithamendmentsbecausethere
wasnothingtoconcurwithoramendexceptitsownbill.Itmustbestressedthattheprocessofconcurringor
amendingpresupposesthatthereexistsabilluponwhichconcurrencemaybebasedoramendmentsintroduced.
TheSenateshouldhavereportedoutHBNo.11197,asamended,evenifintheamendmentittookinto
considerationSBNo.1630.ItshouldnothavesubmittedtotheBicameralConferenceCommitteeSBNo.1630
which,admittedly,didnotoriginatefromtheLowerHouse.
exclusively
ButevenassumingthatinourjurisdictionarevenuebilloftheLowerHousemaybeamendedbysubstitutionby
theSenatealthoughIamnotpreparedtoacceptitinviewofSec.24,Art.VI,ofourConstitutionstillR.A.7716
couldnothavebeentheresultofamendmentbysubstitutionsincetheSenatehadnoHousebilltospeakofthatit
couldamendwhentheSenatestarteddeliberatingonitsownversion.
Bethatasitmay,Icannotresteasyonthepropositionthataconstitutionalmandatecallingfortheexclusive
powerandprerogativeoftheHouseofRepresentativesmayjustbediscardedandignoredbytheSenate.Since
theConstitutionisfortheobservanceofallthejudiciaryaswellastheotherdepartmentsofgovernmentand
thejudgesaresworntosupportitsprovisions,thecourtsarenotatlibertytooverlookordisregarditscommands.
Anditisnotfairandjusttoimputetothemundueinterferenceiftheylookintothevalidityoflegislative
enactmentstodeterminewhetherthefundamentallawhasbeenfaithfullyobservedintheprocess.Itistheirduty
togiveeffecttotheexistingConstitutionandtoobeyallconstitutionalprovisionsirrespectiveoftheiropinionasto
thewisdomofsuchprovisions.
Theruleisfixedthatthedutyinapropercasetodeclarealawunconstitutionalcannotbedeclinedandmustbe
performedinaccordancewiththedeliberatejudgmentofthetribunalbeforewhichthevalidityoftheenactmentis
directlydrawnintoquestion.Whenitisclearthatastatutetransgressestheauthorityvestedinthelegislatureby
theConstitution,itisthedutyofthecourtstodeclaretheactunconstitutionalbecausetheycannotshirkfromit
withoutviolatingtheiroathsofoffice.ThisdutyofthecourtstomaintaintheConstitutionasthefundamentallawof
thestateisimperativeandunceasingand,asChiefJusticeMarshalsaid,wheneverastatuteisinviolationofthe
9/1/2016 G.R.No.115455
fundamentallaw,thecourtsmustsoadjudgeandtherebygiveeffecttotheConstitution.Anyothercoursewould
leadtothedestructionoftheConstitution.Sincethequestionastotheconstitutionalityofastatuteisajudicial
matter,thecourtswillnotdeclinetheexerciseofjurisdictionuponthesuggestionthatactionmightbetakenby
politicalagenciesindisregardofthejudgmentofthejudicialtribunals.
7
1H.Nos.253,771,2450,7033,8086,9030,9210,9297,10012and10100.(Respondents'Consolidated
Memorandum,Annexes312)
2U.S.CONST.,Art.I,7,cl.1:"AllbillsforraisingrevenueshalloriginateintheHouseofRepresentatives,
buttheSenatemayproposeorconcurwithamendments,asonotherbills."
3Art.VII,21.
4Art.VI,1.
5U.S.CONST.,Art.II,2,cl.2.
6Raineyv.UnitedStates,232U.S.309,58L.Ed.117(1914).
7F.A.OGGANDP.O.RAY,INTRODUCTIONTOAMERICANGOVERNMENT309,n.2(1945).
8 Although the 1935 Constitution did not expressly require that bills must pass three readings in each
House, this was clearly implied from its Art. VI, 21(2) so that the two Houses by their rules prescribed
three readings for the passage of bills. Later the requirement was expressly provided in the 1973
ConstitutionfromwhichArt.VI,26(2)wastaken.Art.VIII,19(2)ofthe1973documentprovided:
No bill shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies
thereofinitsfinalformhavebeendistributedtotheMembersthreedaysbeforeitspassage,exceptwhen
the Prime Minister certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency.Uponthelastreadingofabill,noamendmenttheretoshallbeallowed,andthevotethereon
shallbetakenimmediatelythereafter,andtheandenteredintheJournal.
yeasnays
9Respondents'ConsolidatedReply,Annex14.
10MemorandumofPetitionerArturoM.Tolentino,SupplementC.
11 Art. VII, 10 provides: "The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the
vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules
withoutneedofacallandwithinsevendaysenactalawcallingforaspecialelectiontoelectaPresident
andaVicePresidenttobeheldnotearlierthanfortyfivedaysnorlaterthansixtydaysfromthetimeof
such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26,
Article VI of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress.
Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be
exemptfromtherequirementsofparagraph4,Section25,ArticleVIofthisConstitution.Theconveningof
theCongresscannotbesuspendednorthespecialelectionpostponed.Nospecialelectionshallbecalledif
thevacancyoccurswithineighteenmonthsbeforethedateofthenextpresidentialelection."
12JOURNALOFTHEHOUSEOFREPRESENTATIVES,SIXTHCONGRESS,FOURTHSESSION398399
(1968).
13Zinn,ConferenceProcedureinCongress,38ABAJ864865(1952).
14 CONG. QUARTERLY 65 (1983) M. JEWELL, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES
169(1986)LEESANDSHAW,COMMITTEESINLEGISLATURES163(1979).
15W.KEEFEANDM.OGUL,THEAMERICANLEGISLATIVEPROCESS149(1985).
16W.OLESZEK,CONGRESSIONALPROCEDURESANDPOLICYPROCESS214(1984).
17PhilippineJudgesAssociationv.Prado,G.R.No.105371,Nov.11,1993.
18 The charge is an old one. In the United States, the same charge, including claims that important
provisionswerebeing"surreptitiouslyadded"inthecommittee,wasmadeinthe1940s.Butnosatisfactory
alternative to the conference committee has been devised. And today, given the bicameral nature of the
U.S.Congress,thechargeisnolongerheard.Comparethefollowingfroma1945comment:"Asadevise
foroilingthemachineryoflegislation,committeesofconferenceare,underAmericanconditions,useful,if
not indispensable. Nevertheless, they have shortcomings. Without exception, they work behind closed
doors,holdnohearings,andgivetheirproceedingsnopublicity.Doubtlessitwouldbedifficultforthemto
makeheadwayiftheydidotherwise.Nevertheless,inviewofthepowerwhichtheywield,strongobjection
canbe,andis,raised.For,whilethecommitteesaresupposedtodealonlywithactualdifferencesbetween
thehousesandtostaywellwithintheboundssetbytheextremepositionswhichthehouseshavetaken,
theyoftenworkintomeasures,asreported,provisionsoftheirowndevising,evengoingsofarastorewrite
whole sections with the sole purpose of incorporating the views which the majority members happen to
hold....Inpractice,thisoftenresultsintheadoptionofimportantprovisions,moreorlesssurreptitiously
added, without consideration by either house in other words, legislation nominally by Congress but
actuallybyconferencecommittee.Anyremedyfoundwillprobablytaketheformofreducingtheneedfor
usingconferencecommitteesatallandtheprincipalsuggestiontothatendisthatbillsandresolutionsbe
referred, not, as now, to separate committees of the two houses, but to joint committees, which not only
would hold single sets of hearings, but might deliberate and report back bills to the two houses in such
agreedformthatfurthersignificantdifferenceswouldnotbelikelytodevelop.Arrangementsofthisnature
yieldexcellentresultsinthelegislatureofMassachusetts.Butthereareobstaclestoadoptionoftheplanfor
Congress,nottheleastofthembeinganaturalaversionofHousememberstojointcommitteesinwhich
senators seem likely to dominate and, as below, the outlook for the reform is problematical." F.A. OGG
ANDP.O.RAY,note7at310311.
9/1/2016 G.R.No.115455
indicatedsupra
19Osmeav.Pendatun,109Phil.863,871(1960).
20.,Mabanagv.LopezVito,78Phil.1(1947)Casco(Phil.)Inc.v.Gimenez,7SCRA347(1963)Morales
v.Subido,27SCRA131(1969).
E.g
21Mabanagv.LopezVito,note20.
supra
22Moralesv.Subido,note20.
supra
23Astorgav.Villegas,56SCRA714(1974).
24.,Alalayanv.NationalPowerCorp.,24SCRA172(1968)Corderov.Cabatuando,6SCRA418(1962)
Sumulongv.COMELEC,73Phil.288(1941).
See,e.g
2540Phil.224(1919).
26Art.VI,28(4)provides:"Nolawgrantinganytaxexemptionshallbepassedwithouttheconcurrenceof
amajorityofalltheMembersoftheCongress."
27AssociatedPressv.NLRB,301U.S.103,132,81L.Ed.953,961(1937).
28297U.S.233,80L.Ed.660(1936).
29297U.S.at250,80L.Ed.at669.
30MinneapolisStarv.MinnesotaCommissionerofRevenue,460U.S.575,75L.Ed.2d295(1983).
31460U.S.at591,75L.Ed.2dat3089(1983).
32481U.S.221,95L.Ed.2d209(1987).
33103(t)oftheNIRCexemptsfromtheVAT"Saleorleaseofgoodsorpropertiesortheperformanceof
services other than the transactions mentioned in the preceeding paragraphs, the gross annual sales
and/or receipts [of which] do not exceed the amount prescribed in regulations to be promulgated by the
PresidentupontherecommendationbytheSecretaryofFinancewhichshallnotbelessthanFourhundred
eightythousandpesos(P480,000.00)ormorethanSevenhundredtwentythousandpesos(P720,000.00)
subjecttotaxunderSection112ofthisCode."
34297U.S.at250,80L.Ed.at668.
35460U.S.at581,75L.Ed.2dat302.
36493U.S.378,107L.Ed.2d796(1990).
37107oftheNIRCprovides:"AnypersonsubjecttoavalueaddedtaxunderSections100and102of
thisCodeshallregisterwiththeappropriateRevenueDistrictOfficerandpayanannualregistrationfeein
the amount of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for every separate or distinct establishment or place of
business and every year thereafter on or before the last day of January. Any person just commencing a
businesssubjecttothevalueaddedtaxmustpaythefeebeforeengagingtherein...."
38101Phil.386(1957).
39319U.S.105,113,87L.Ed.1292(1943).
40319U.S.at114,87L.Ed.1292at1298.Forthesamereason,inPeoplev.Korins,385N.Y.S.2d474
(1976) a decision of the city court of Utica, Oneida County held that to apply an ordinance requiring a
businesslicensetobeobtainedbeforeapersoncouldsellnewspapersinthestreetswouldbetoimposea
priorrestraintonpressfreedombecause"anewspaperisnotinthesamecategoryaspineappleorasoap
powderorapairofshoes"whosesalemaybeconditionedonthepossessionofabusinesslicense.
41 P.A. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 11 (1950), quoted in Ermita, Malate
HotelandMotelOperatorsAss'nv.CityMayor,21SCRA449,459(1967).
42Art.VI,28(1).RelatedtothisargumentistheclaimthatRepublicActNo.7716likewiseinfringesthe
DueProcessandEqualProtectionClausesoftheBillofRights,Art.III,1(1).
43Neri,"InSupportoftheExpandedValueAddedTax,"(CRCEconomicPolicyPapersNo.5,1994)pp.3
4.
44Lutzv.Araneta,98Phil.148,153(1955)
Cf.
45KapatiranngmgaNaglilingkodsaPamahalaanngPilipinasInc.v.Tan,163SCRA371.
46PhilippineAmericanLifeIns.Co.v.AuditorGeneral,22SCRA135(1968)
Cf.
47E.M.FERNANDO,THECONSTITUTIONOFTHEPHILIPPINES560561(2dEd.,1977).
9/1/2016 G.R.No.115455
See
48ThetermisProfessorJaffe's(JUDICIALCONTROLOFADMINISTRATIVEACTION(1965))adoptedby
Justice Harlan in his dissent in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119120, 20 L.Ed.2d 947, 973 (1968) to
distinguishbetweenthepersonalandproprietaryinterestoftraditionalplaintiffsandthepublicinterestofa
citizensuinginapublicaction.ThetermwasmentionedbysomemembersofthisCourtintheLottocase
(Kilosbayan,Inc.v.Guingona,G.R.No.113375,May5,1994).
49 Compare Justice Laurel: "Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutionalquestionraisedortheverypresented.Anyattemptatabstractioncouldonlyleadtodialectics
and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities." Angara v. Electoral
Commission,63Phil.139,158(1936).
lismota
501Cranch137,2L.Ed.60(1803)(emphasisadded).
51note49(emphasisadded).
Supra
52 People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 94 (1937) Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, 10612 (1957) Macias v.
COMELEC,3SCRA1,78(1961).
NARVASA,C.J.,concurring:
1 Resolution "Urging the Senate Committee on Ways and Means to Study the Proposal to Exempt Local
MovieProducersfromthePaymentoftheValueAddedTaxasanIncentivetotheProductionofQualityand
WholesomeFilipinoMoviesWhenevertheyFeatureanAllFilipinoCastofActorsandActresses"
2Italicssupplied
3Giving"conclusive"charactertocopiesofActsofthePhilippineCommissionwhichhavebeensignedby
itspresidingofficersandsecretaries
PADILLA,J.:SeparateOpinion:
1G.R.No.81311,30June1988,163SCRA371.
2Bautistav.Salonga,G.R.No.86439,13April1989,172SCRA160.
3Kapatiran,at385
supra
4Sec.1,Art.VIII.
5G.R.No.103371,11November1993.
67SCRA347.
7Mabanagv.LopezVito,78Phil.1.
834Phil.729.
9ExecutiveOrderNo.273,inSec.103(f),hadexemptedthiskindofincomefromtheVAT.Rep.Act.No.
7716removedtheexemption.
10UnitedStatesv.Bustos,37Phil.731.
11297U.S.233.
12372U.S.58.
13AmericanBibleSocietyv.CityofManila,101Phil.386.
REGALADO,J.:Dissenting:
1InsubstitutionofH.B.Nos.253,771,2450,7033,8086,9030,9210,9297,10012and10100whichwere
filedovertheperiodfromJuly22,1992toAugust3,1993.
2P.S.Res.No.734hadearlierbeenfiledintheSenateonSeptember10,1992,whileS.B.No.1129was
filedonMarch1,1993.
3220U.S.107,55L.Ed.389(1911).
4ConsolidatedComment3637.
5ConsolidatedMemorandumforRespondents,5657.
6Orquiola,H.M.,AnnotatedRulesoftheSenateandProcedure,PrecedentsandPracticesoftheSenateof
theRepublicofthePhilippinessince1946,1991Ed.,108.
7Black'sLawDictionary,4thEd.(1951),381,citingFairviewvs.Durham,45Iowa56.
834Phil.729(1916).
978Phil.1(1947).
9/1/2016 G.R.No.115455
10L17931,February28,1963,7SCRA347.
11L29658,February27,1969,27SCRA131.
12G.R.No.105371,November11,1993,227SCRA703.
13103Phil.1051(1957).
14L46640,October12,1976,73SCRA333.
15G.R.No.86344,December21,1989,180SCRA496.
17Brailsfordvs.Walker,31S.E.2d385,387,388,205S.C.228.
18110So.343,346.
19602SouthWesternReporter,2dSeries,402425,jointlydecidingCarrolltonWholesaleTobaccos,Inc.et
al.vs.DepartmentofRevenue,etal.,andBluegrassProvisionsCo.,Inc.,etal.vs.DepartmentofRevenue,
etal.
DAVIDEJR.,J.:Dissenting:
11971ed.,1592.
2SixthEdition(1990),565,citingStandardOilCo.ofTexasvs.State,Tex.Civ.App.,142S.W.2d519,521,
522,523.
321SCRA665,673[1967].
4Section52and53,RuleXXIII
5Section57,RuleXXV.
6Section26(2),ArticleVI,Constitutionparagraph(7),Section57,RuleXXV.
7Section69,RuleXIV.
8Section77,.
Id
9Section82,RuleXIV.
10Sections7781,.
Id
11Section82,.,inrelationtoSection26(2),ArticleVI,Constitution.
Id
12Section26(2),ArticleVI,Constitution.
13VolumeI,EightEdition,ChapterVI,267.SeeMillervs.Mardo,2SCRA539[1961]EverlastingPictures,
Inc.vs.Fuentes,3SCRA539[1961].
14ConsolidatedMemorandumforRespondents,Annexes"2"to"12,"inclusive.
16.,Annex"9."
Id
17.,Annex"1."
Id
18.,18.
Id
19 ., Annex "15." Entitled "An Act Restructuring the ValueAdded Tax (VAT) System By Expanding Its Tax
Base,AmendingSections103,113,114,oftheNationalInternalRevenueCode,asAmended."
Id
20.,Annex"17."
Id
21.,20.
Id
22Emphasissupplied.
9/1/2016 G.R.No.115455
24ConsolidatedMemorandumforRespondent,Annex"17."Twosignedwithreservationsandfoursigned
subjecttoamendments.
25Andcompanioncases,220U.S.107,55L.Ed.389[1911].
26Page56.
27232U.S.309,58Led.117[1914].
28,309,n.2[1945].
IntroductiontoAmericanGovernment
29At317.
31.,Annex"14."
Id
32.,Annex"1."
Id
33ConsolidatedMemorandumforRespondents,Annex"18."
34Page22.
35ConsolidatedMemorandumforRespondents,Annex"18."
36.,Annex"19."
Id
37ISAGANIA.CRUZ,,1991ed.,226Dazavs.Singson,180SCRA496[1989]Cosetengvs.Mitra,187
SCRA377[1990]Gonzalesvs.Macaraig,191SCRA452[1990]Llamasvs.Orbos,202SCRA844[1991]
Bengzonvs.SenateBlueRibbonCommittee,203SCRA767[1991]Oposavs.Factoran,224SCRA792
[1993].
PhilippinePoliticalLaw
3856SCRA714,719,723[1974].
3978Phil.1[1947].
40Mutocvs.COMELEC,36SCRA228[1970].
ROMERO,J.:Dissenting:
1Vitug,JoseC.,COMPENDIUMOFTAXLAWANDJURISPRUDENCE,ThirdRevisedEdition,1993at201.
2.
Ibid
3.
Ibid
4L81311,June30,1988,163SCRA371withJusticeTeodoroR.Padillaas.
ponente
5at378.
Ibid
6at385.
Ibid
7 Senate Resolution No. 734 filed on September 10, 1992 was entitled "Resolution Urging the House
CommitteeonWaysandMeanstoStudytheProposaltoExemptLocalMovieProducersfromthePayment
of the ValueAdded Tax as an Incentive to the Production of Quality and Wholesome Filipino Movies,
WheneverTheyFeatureanAllFilipinoCastofActorsandActresses."
8 SB No. 1129 sought to include under the VAT Law such items as lease of real properties, excluding
agricultural lands and residential properties with monthly rentals of less than P10,000.00 hotels
restaurants, eating places, caterers services by persons in the exercise of their professions actors,
actresses, talents, singers and professional athletes and lawyers, accountants, doctors and other
professionalsregisteredwiththePhilippineRegulatoryCommission.
9 On June 1, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos certified for immediate enactment House Bill No. 9210
entitled "An Act Amending Title IV and Sections 237 and 238 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended,tomeetapublicemergency."
10 House Bill No. 11197 is entitled "An Act Restructuring the ValueAdded Tax (VAT) System to Widen its
TaxBaseandEnhanceItsAdministration,AmendingforthesePurposesSections99,100,102,103,104,
9/1/2016 G.R.No.115455
105,106,107,108and110ofTitleIV,112,115and116ofTitleV,and236,237,and238ofTitleIXand
RepealingSections113and114ofTitleV,alloftheNationalInternalRevenueCode,asAmended."
11SenateBillNo.1630isentitled"AnActRestructuringTheValueAddedTax(VAT)SystemtoWidenits
TaxBaseandEnhanceitsAdministration,AmendingforthesePurposesSections99,100,102,103,104,
105,107,108and110ofTitleIV,112ofTitleV,and236,237and238ofTitleIX,andRepealingSections
113, 114 and 116 of Title V, all of the National Internal Revenue Code, as Amended, and for other
Purposes."
12RepublicActNo.7716isentitled"AnActRestructuringTheValueAddedTax(VAT)System,Widening
Its Tax Base and Enhancing Its Administration, And For These Purposes Amending And Repealing The
RelevantProvisionsOfTheNationalInternalRevenueCode,asamended,andforotherpurposes."
13 Article VI, Section 24: "All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt,billsoflocalapplication,andprivatebillsshalloriginateexclusivelyintheHouseofRepresentatives,
buttheSenatemayproposeorconcurwithamendments."
14 Article VI, Section 26, paragraph 2: "No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passedthreereadingsonseparatedays,andprintedcopiesthereofinitsfinalformhavebeendistributed
to its Members three days before its passage, except when the president certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendmenttheretoshallbeallowed,andthevotethereonshallbetakenimmediatelythereafter,andthe
andenteredintheJournal."
yeasnays
15ArticleIII,Section1:"Nopersonshallbedeprivedoflife,liberty,orpropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw,
norshallanypersonbedeniedtheequalprotectionofthelaws."
16ArticleIII,Section4:"Nolawshallbepassedabridgingthefreedomofspeech,ofexpression,orofthe
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances."
17 Article III, Section 5: "No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
freeexerciseandenjoymentofreligiousprofessionandworship,withoutdiscriminationorpreference,shall
foreverbeallowed.Noreligioustestshallberequiredfortheexerciseofcivilorpoliticalrights."
18ArticleIII,Section10:"Nolawimpairingtheobligationofcontractsshallbepassed."
19ArticleVI,Section28,paragraph1:"Therulesoftaxationshallbeuniformandequitable.TheCongress
shallevolveaprogressivesystemoftaxation."
20 Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 3: "Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents
appurtenantthereto,mosques,nonprofitcemeteries,andalllands,buildings,andimprovements,actually,
directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxation."
21Constitution,ArticleVIII,Section1.
22VolumeOne,CONCOMRECORD,p.436.
23LuzFarmsv.TheHon.SecretaryoftheDepartmentofAgrarianReform,G.R.No.86889,December4,
1990, 192 SCRA 51 Dumlao, et al. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 72245, January 22, 1980, 95
SCRA392Peoplev.Vera,65Phil.56(1937).
24328P.2d644(1958).
25 Aruego, Jose M., PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, KNOW YOUR CONSTITUTION, University Publishing
Co.,1950,pp.6566.
26Sinco,VicenteG.,PHILIPPINEPOLITICALLAW,EleventhEdition,p.196.
27 Remarks of Commissioner Eulogio Lerum: "At a time when we did not have a lawmaking body after
martiallawwasdeclared,thereweretripartiteconferencescalledbythePresidentforthepurposeofacting
as a recommendatory body regarding settlement of labor and management disputes. During the said
conferences, labor had shown that it can act with maturity. As a result, in 1976, an amendment was
introducedintheConstitutionprovidingforsectoralrepresentation.IntheConstitutionthatwasapproved,
the number of sectors was not indicated. However, in the Election Code of 1978, it provided for three
sectors namely, industrial labor, agricultural labor and the youth. The agricultural labor was given four
seatstwoforLuzon,onefortheVisayasandoneforMindanao.Thesameistruewiththeindustriallabor
sector. As far as the youth are concerned, they were also given four seats: two for Luzon, one for
MindanaoandonefortheVisayas,withtheconditionthattherewillbeanadditionaltwoatlarge.Andso,
the youth had six representatives plus four from the agricultural labor sector and four from the industrial
laborsectorwehad14seats.
In1981,theConstitutionwasagainamended.Inthecourseoftheamendment,thelaborrepresentativesin
theBatasangPambansaproposedthatsectoralrepresentationbeincludedasapermanentadditiontothe
lawmakingbody.
Again,inthatConstitutionwhichwasapprovedin1981,thenumberandthenameofthesectorswerenot
indicated. However, in the Election Code that was approved before the 1984 election, there was really a
definitionofwhowillconstitutethesectorsandhowtheywillbeappointed.Letmequotefromthatlawthat
was passed in 1984. Under Section 27 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, the scope of the sectors has been
definedasfollows:
Theagriculturallaborsectorcoversallpersonswhopersonallyandphysicallytillthelandastheirprincipal
occupation. It includes agricultural tenants and lessees, rural workers and farm employees, owner
cultivators,settlersandsmallfishermen.
9/1/2016 G.R.No.115455
Theindustriallaborsectorincludesallnonagriculturalworkersandemployees.
The youth sector embraces persons not more than twentyfive years of age." (Volume Two, CONCOM
RECORD,p.564).
28CityMayor,etal.v.TheChief,PhilippineConstabularyandCol.NicanorGarcia,L20346,October31,
1967,21SCRA673.
29TranscriptoftheStenographicNotes(TSN)ontheHearingHadonThursday,July7,1994,pp.1819:
JUSTICEFLERIDARUTHP.ROMERO:
QMr.Counsel,mayIinterruptatthisstage?
WhenyousaythataccordingtotheConstitutionsuchRevenueBillsshouldoriginateexclusivelyfromthe
House.Inthisinstance,diditnotoriginallyoriginateexclusivelyfromtheHouse.?
Thewordusedwasnot"solely"iftherewereBillslateralsointroduced,letussayintheSenate,butthe
HouseBillcameahead.
So,areyouusingthetwo(2)wordsoriginate"exclusively"and"solely"synonymously?
SENATORTOLENTINO:
A The verb "originate" remains the same, Your Honor, but the word "exclusively", as I said, means
"solely."...
30 H.B. 771 exempting the sale of copra from VAT coverage H.B. 2450 exempting the lessors or
distributorsofcinematographicfilmsfrompayingtheVATH.B.7033amendingSec.103oftheNational
Internal Revenue Code, as amended by EO 273 H.B. 8086 exempting packaging materials of export
products from the VAT H.B. 9030 amending Sec. 120 of the NIRC, as renumbered by EO 273 H.B.
9210 amending Title IV and Section 237 and 238 of the NIRC H.B. 9297 restructuring the VAT
systembyexpandingitstaxbase,andamendingSections99,100(A),102(A),103,113,114,115and116
oftheNIRCH.B.10012reducingtherateofVATimposedonsaleandimportationofgoods,andsaleof
servicesH.B.10100amendingcertainprovisionsoftheNIRConVAT.
31ExplanatoryNoteofHouseBillNo.9210.
32ExcerptsfromtheApril19,1994meetingoftheBicameralConferenceCommittee:"CHAIRMANJavier.
Firstofall,whatwouldbethebasis,no,orframeworkparahuwagnamanmawalayungpersonalitynamin
ditosabicameral,no,becausethebilloriginatesfromtheHousebecausethisisarevenuebill,sowewould
justwanttoask,,andtheneverythingwilljustbeinserted?
wemaketheHouseBillastheframeofreference
"HON. MACEDA. Yes, That's true for every revenue measure. There's no other way. . Of course, for the
record,weknowthatthisisanadministrationbillthisiscertifiedbythepresidentandIwasabouttoput
into the records as I am saying now that your problem about the impact on prices on the people was
already decided when the President and the administration sent this to us and certified it. They have
alreadygottenoverthatpoliticalimplicationofthisbillandtheeconomicimpactonprices.
TheHouseBillhasgottobethebase
"CHAIRMANHERRERA.issomethingthatwecanjust....
Yungconcernmoaboutthebillasthereferenceinthisdiscussion
"CHAIRMANJAVIER.Wewilljust...."
alltheamendmentswillbecomingfromtheSenate
33ArticleVI,Section1.
34TranscriptoftheStenographicNotes(TSN)ontheHearingHadonThursday,July7,1994,pp.4546.
"Justice Romero: Q: Mr. Counsel, is it not a fact that in the Bicameral Conference Committee, you
presented a Motion to return the Bill as it was to the Lower House with also your proposal that this be
referredtoaReferendumfortheentirenationtovoteupon,thenSenatorWigbertoTaadaamendedyour
MotionandconvincedyoutodropthatportionaboutreferraltoaReferendumandyouagreed.
So, that Motion of yours to return to the House was the one voted upon by the Bicameral Conference
Committeeanditlost.
Whatcanyousaytothat?
SenatorTolentino:A:No,no,ifYourHonorplease.MyMotionwasvoteduponbytheSenateitselfbecause
IpresentedthatsaidMotioninordertorecalltheBillfromtheBicameralConferenceCommitteesothatthe
SenatecouldgobacktotheperiodofamendmentandseeifwecouldamendtheHouseBillitself,butthat
wasdefeated.So,itbecameacademic.Thus,whatwedidweproceededwiththeprocedurealreadybeing
followedbytheSenate.
Ithought,asamatteroffact,thatwastheonewayofcorrectingthisproceduralerror,butIwasonlyone
(1),ortwo(2),orthree(3)ofusonly,thenweweredefeatedinthevoting,ifYourHonorplease.
JusticeRomero:Q:Youmeanyouwereoutvoted?
Senator Tolentino: A: Yes, Your Honor we were actually slaughtered in the voting, so to speak, if Your
Honorplease."
9/1/2016 G.R.No.115455
35 The certification states: "This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No.
1630 was finally passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on April 7, 1994 and May 2,
1994,respectively."
36BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY,5thEd.(1979).
37Fieldv.Clark,143U.S.649,36Led.294.
38Mason,Paul,MASON'sMANUALOFLEGISLATIVEPROCEDURE,1953.
39Cohnv.Kingsley,49P.985(1897).
40Smithv.Thompson,258N.W.190.
41602S.W.2d420(1980).
4234Phil.729(1916).
43at733.
Ibid
44at733734.
Ibid
45at735.
Ibid
4678Phil.1(1947).
47at3.
Ibid
48at18.
Ibid
49117Phil.363(1963).
50136Phil.405,409(1969).
51at412.
Ibid
52G.R.No.105371,November11,1993,227SCRA703.
53Davies,Jack,LEGISLATIVELAWANDPROCESS,2nded.,1986.
54PetitioninG.R.No.115781,p.18.
55PetitioninG.R.No.115543,pp.23.
56Davies,Jack,at90.
supra
57Sutherland,J.G.,STATUTESANDSTATUTORYCONSTRUCTION,Vol.I,4thed.,pp.293294.
58Page261.
59Page268.
60Davies,,at65.
supra
61Sec.764,p.541.
62ConsolidatedMemorandumforRespondents,p.71.
63Pages404405and407.
64Davies,,at81.
supra
65 : 18 Words and Phrases 482 citing Kennedy v. Truss, Del. Super., 13 A. 2nd 431, 435, 1 Terry 424
(1940).
See
66UnitedStatesGypsumCo.v.State,Dept.ofRevenue,110N.W.2d698,71,363Mich.548(1961).
67BLACK'sDICTIONARY,6thed.,p.687citingStateRileyv.DistrictCourtofSecondJudicialDist.inand
forSilverBowCounty,103Mont.576,64P.2d115,119(1937).
ex.rel.
9/1/2016 G.R.No.115455
68CONGRESSIONALRECORD,May3,1951,p.885citedinOrquiola,,1991ed.,pp.4041.
AnnotatedRulesoftheSenate
69 Article III, Section 7. "The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions,ordecisions,aswellastogovernmentresearchdatausedasbasisforpolicydevelopment,
shallbeaffordedthecitizen,subjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybeprovidedbylaw."
70 Article II, Section 28. "Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implementsapolicyoffullpublicdisclosureofallitstransactionsinvolvingpublicinterest."
71ArticleVI,Section1.
72D&WAutoSupplyv.DepartmentofRevenue,.
supra
73 The Philippine Judges Association v. Hon. Pete Prado, G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993, 227
SCRA703,709.
74 In Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun (109 Phil. 863 [1960]), the Court held that parliamentary rules are merely
proceduralandtheymaybewaivedordisregardedbythelegislativebody.Hence,merefailuretoconform
toparliamentaryusagewillnotinvalidatetheactiontakenbyadeliberativebodywhentherequisitenumber
ofmembershaveagreedtoaparticularmeasure.
75Statev.Essling,128N.W.2d307,316(1964).
76Sarasolav.Trinidad,40Phil.252,262(1919).
77Sison,Jr.v.Ancheta,L59431,July25,1984,130SCRA654,660.
78McCullockv.Maryland,4Wheaton316.
79QuotedinGraves.v.NewYork,306U.S.466,490.
PUNO,J.:Dissenting:
1April13,19,20,21,and25,1994.
2SeealsoAnnex"A",MemorandumofPetitionerKilosbayaninG.R.No.115781alsothePetitioninG.R.
No.115543,pp.23.
3Seep.66oftheConsolidatedMemorandumforRespondentswheretheyrefertocertainstatementsfrom
Canlan,WeightsonandBeambutwithoutcitingtheirspecificbookorarticle.
4SeeRule49oftheRulesoftheSenate.
5 See p. 22 Memorandum of Petitioners in G.R. No. 115781 citing Jefferson's Manual and Rules of the
HouseofRepresentatives,byLewisDeschler,Parliamentarian,U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,1967,p.
264.
6,citingRiddick,SenateProcedure:PrecedentsandPractices,USSenate,1981,USGovernmentPrinting
Office,pp.383384.
Ibid
7Section2,ArticleVI.
8Section5(1),ArticleVI.
9Sutherland,StatutoryConstruction,3rded.,Vol.I,p.151.
10LegislativeProcedure,1922ed.,RiversidePress,p.404.
11LegislativeLawandProcessinaNutShell,WestPublishingCo.,1986ed.,p.81.
12.
Ibid
13ManualofLegislativeProcedureforLegislativeandotherGovernmentalBodies,McGrawHillCo.,Inc.,
1953ed.,pp.3233.
1482CJS136.
15StatutoryConstruction,3rded.,Vol.I.,p.223.
16 ., pp. 224225 citing Barndall Refining v. Welsh, 64 S.D. 647, 269 N.W. 853, 859 [1936]. Jones,
Constitutional Provisions Regulating the Mechanics of Enactment in Iowa (1935), 21 Iowa Law Rev. 79,
Charlton,ConstitutionalRegulationofLegislativeProcedure(1936),21IowaLawRev.538Note(1936)21
IowaLawRev.573.
Op.cit
17 See Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. Rep. 1 [1947] Casco Phil. Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, L17931,
February 28, 1963 Morales v. Subido, No. L29658, February 27, 1969 27 SCRA 131 Phil. Judges
Associationv.Prado,G.R.No.105371,November11,1993.
9/1/2016 G.R.No.115455
18Record,ConstitutionalCommission,Vol.I,p.436seealso,Bernas,TheConstitutionoftheRepublicof
thePhilippines.ACommentary,1988ed.,p.255.
19CitingMarburyv.Madison,1Cranch137L.ed[1803].
20ArticleVIII,section2.
24ArticleVIII,section4(1).
28ArticleVII,section18.
BELLOSILLO,J.:Dissenting:
1SeeMcGeev.Republic,94Phil.821(1954).
2SeeTaadav.Cuenco,103Phil.1051(1957).
3SeeMajorityOpinion,p.15,citingRaineyv.UnitedStates,232U.S.,309,58LawEd.617.
4.,citingF.A.OggandP.O.Ray,IntroductiontoAmericanGovernment,302,n.2(1945).
Id
5SeeNote3.
622U.S.107.
711Am.Jur.,pp.71213,713715.
ItismysubmissionthatthepowerandauthoritytooriginaterevenuebillsunderourConstitutionisvestedinthe
HouseofRepresentatives.ItsmembersbeingmorenumerousthanthoseoftheSenate,electedmorefrequently,
andmoredirectlyrepresentthepeople,arethereforeconsideredbetterawareoftheeconomiclifeoftheir
individualconstituencies.Itisjustproperthatrevenuebillsoriginatefromthem.
exclusivelyexclusively
Inthisregard,wedonothavetodevotemuchtimedelvingintoAmericandecisionsandopinionsandinvokethem
intheinterpretationofourownConstitutionwhichisdifferentfromtheAmericanversion,particularlyonthe
enactmentofrevenuebills.WehaveourownConstitutioncouchedinalanguageourownlegislatorsthought
best.Insofarasrevenuebillsareconcerned,ourConstitutionisnotAmericanitisdistinctivelyFilipino.Andno
amplitudeoflegerdemaincandetractfromourconstitutionalrequirementthatallappropriation,revenueortariff
bills,billsauthorizingincreaseofthepublicdebt,billsoflocalapplication,andprivatebillsshalloriginateinthe
HouseofRepresentatives,althoughtheSenatemayproposeorconcurwithamendments.
exclusively
Inthismilieu,IamleftnooptionbuttovotetograntthepetitionsandstrikedownR.A.7716asunconstitutional.
#Footnotes
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation
Variousjurisdictionshaveadoptedthesealternativeapproachesinviewofstrongdissentand
dissatisfactionagainstthephilosophicalunderpinningsoftheconclusivenessofanenrolledbill.Prof.Sutherland
furtherobserved:
...Numerousreasonshavebeengivenforthisrule.Traditionally,anenrolledbillwas'arecord'andassuchwas
notsubjecttoattackatcommonlaw.Likewise,theruleofconclusivenesswassimilartothecommonlawruleof
theinviolabilityofthesheriff'sreturn.Indeed,theyhadthesameorigin,thatis,thesheriffwasanofficerofthe
kingandlikewisetheparliamentaryactwasaregalactandnoofficialmightdisputetheking'sword.Transposed
toourdemocraticsystemofgovernment,courtsheldthatasthelegislaturewasanofficialbranchofgovernment
thecourtmustindulgeeverypresumptionthatthelegislativeactwasvalid.Thedoctrineofseparationofpowers
wasadvancedasastrongreasonwhythecourtshouldtreattheactsofacoordinatebranchofgovernmentwith
thesamerespectasittreatstheactionofitsownofficersindeed,itwasthoughtthatitwasentitledtoeven
greaterrespect,elsethecourtmightbeinthepositionofreviewingtheworkofasupposedlyequalbranchof
government.Whentheseargumentsfailed,astheyfrequentlydid,thedoctrineofconveniencewasadvanced,
thatis,thatitwasnotonlyanundueburdenuponthelegislaturetopreserveitsrecordstomeettheattackof
personsnotaffectedbytheprocedureofenactment,butalsothatitunnecessarilycomplicatedlitigationand
confusedthetrialofsubstantiveissues.
Althoughmanyoftheseargumentsarepersuasiveandareindeedthebasisfortheruleinmanystatestoday,
theyarenotinvulnerabletoattack.Therulemostreliedonthesheriff'sreturnorswornofficialruledidnotin
civillitigationdeprivetheinjuredpartyofanaction,foralwayshecouldsuethesheriffuponhisofficialbond.
Likewise,althoughcollateralattackwasnotpermitted,directattackpermittedraisingtheissueoffraud,andata
9/1/2016 G.R.No.115455
laterdateattackinequitywasalsoavailableandthattheevidenceofthesheriffwasnotofunusualweightwas
demonstratedbythefactthatinanactionagainstthesheriffnopresumptionofitsauthenticityprevailed.
Theargumentthattheenrolledbillisa'record'andthereforeunimpeachableislikewisemisleading,forthe
correctionofrecordsisamatterofestablishedjudicialprocedure.Apparently,thejustificationiseitherthe
historicalonethattheking'swordcouldnotbequestionedortheseparationofpowersprinciplethatonebranch
ofthegovernmentmusttreatasvalidtheactsofanother.
WenowtracethecoursetakenbyH.B.No.11197andS.B.No.1129.
HB/SBNo.

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8/31/2016 G.R.No.

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