RCBC vs. METROCAN G.R. No. 127913 13
By reason
September 2001
FACTS:
In 1990, Ley Construction Corporation contracted a
loan from Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation in the
amount of P30 million with a real estate mortgage over
property in Valenzuela secured. LEYCON failed to settle
its obligation to pay back the loan thereby prompting
RCBC to foreclose the mortgage with the latter being
the highest bidder in 1992. LEYCON promptly filed an
action for Nullification of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale
and Damages against RCBC. The case was raffled to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Branch
172. Meanwhile, RCBC consolidated its ownership over
the property due to LEYCONs failure to redeem it
within the 12-month redemption period and a new TCT
was issued if favor of the bank. By virtue thereof, RCBC
demanded rental payments from Metro Container
Corporation (METROCAN) which was leasing the
property from LEYCON. In 1994, LEYCON filed an action
for Unlawful Detainer against RCBC before MeTC
Valenzuela Branch 82. METROCAN filed later a
complaint for Interpleader before RTC Valenzuela
Branch 75 against LEYCON and RCBC to compel them
to interplead their claims between themselves and to
determine which of them shall rightfully receive the
payment rentals on the subject property. In 1995,
judgment was rendered in the Unlawful Detainer case,
which ordered METROCAN to pay LEYCON whatever
rentals were due on the subject land. Said MeTC
decision became final and executory.
thereof, METROCAN and LEYCON separately filed
motions to dismiss the interpleader case. However,
said motions were dismissed for lack of merit.
METROCAN went to the Court of Appeals seeking relief
via a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for issuance of TRO and preliminary injunction. In
1996, CA ruled in favor of METROCAN and ordered the
dismissal of the interpleader case.
ISSUE:
May METROCAN unilaterally have the interpleader
case dismissed?
RULING:
Yes. An action for interpleader is afforded to protect a
person not against double liability but against double
vexation in respect of one liability. It requires that
conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or
may be made against the plaintiff-in-interpleader who
claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an
interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the
claimants. When the decision in the Unlawful Detainer
case became final and executory, METROCAN had no
other alternative left but to pay rentals to LEYCON.
Precisely because there was a judicial fiat to
METROCAN, there was no more reason to continue
with the interpleader case. Thus, METROCAN moved
for the dismissal of the interpleader action not
because it was no longer interested but because there
was no more need to pursue the action. The Unlawful
Detainer case resolved the conflicting claims insofar as
payment of rentals was concerned. RCBC correctly
contended that it was not bound by the decision in the
Unlawful Detainer case as it was not a party thereto.
However, it could not compel METROCAN to pursue the
Interpleader case. RCBC has other avenues to prove its
claim.
LIM vs. COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. L-41818; G.R. No. L-41831 18 February
1976
FACTS:
In 1973, Continental Development Corporation filed a
complaint for interpleader against Benito Gervasio Tan
and Zoila Co Lim alleging that: in plaintiffs books,
Tans name appears as one of its stockholders in 1957
with 50 common shares, and subsequently credited
with 75 shares by way of dividends, or an outstanding
total of 125 shares of par value of P250 each; that Tan
had since December 1972 been demanding CDC to
release the certificates of stock but which plaintiff had
not done so far and was prevented from doing so
because of Lims adverse claims; that Lim laid claim on
the very same shares of stock being demanded by Tan,
alleging that the same belonged to her late mother;
that both defendants threatened to take punitive
measures against CDC should it take any step that
shall prejudice their interests; that plaintiff was not
sufficiently informed of the rights of the respective
claimants and therefore not in a sufficient position to
adjudicate their claims; that CDC has no interest of
any kind of stock and was willing to issue certificates
of stock to the claimants; and prayed that defendants
be directed to interplead between themselves their
respective claims over the said shares of stock and
determine which truly belong to them. CFI Manila
Branch XXVI dismissed the complaint for lack of cause
of action invoking Sec. 35 of Act No. 1459 (Corporation
Law). Lim and CDC filed their respective motions for
reconsideration of the order to which Tan filed his
rejoinder. Said motions were denied in 1974.
RULING:
The interpleader must be granted. It is patent from the
pleadings in the lower court that both Tan and Lim
assert conflicting rights to the questioned shares of
stock. Precisely in his motion to dismiss the complaint
for interpleader, Tan states that petitioner corporation,
through its Vice-President, notified him on July 23,
1973 "that the shares of stock are in the possession of
its treasurer Mr. Ty Lim, and urged defendant to
directly obtain them from the former, who allegedly
was on vacation at the time. Mr. Ty Lim, on August 30,
1973, through counsel, replied to Tan that said
certificates were not in his possession but surmised,
without reference to any record, that the same might
have been delivered to the deceased So Bi.
Continental Development Corporation expressly stated
in the complaint that both defendants, through their
respective lawyers, threatened to take punitive
measures against it should it adopt any steps that may
prejudice their respective interests in the shares of
stock in question; and that it is not sufficiently
informed of the rights of the respective claimants and
therefore not in a position to determine justly and
correctly their conflicting claims. And in its
opposition to the motion to dismiss its complaint,
petitioner Continental Development Corporation
stressed that it might be liable to one defendant
should it comply with the demands of the other with
respect to the transfer or entry of the shares of stock
in the books of the corporation. Since there is an
active conflict of interests between the two
defendants, now herein respondent Benito Gervasio
Tan and petitioner Zoila Co Lim, over the disputed
shares of stock, the trial court gravely abused its
discretion in dismissing the complaint for interpleader,
which practically decided ownership of the shares of
stock in favor of defendant Benito Gervasio Tan. The
two defendants should be given full opportunity to
litigate their respective claims. Rule 63, Section 1 of
the New Rules of Court tells us when a cause of action
exists to support a complaint in interpleader:
"Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject
matter are or may be made against a person, who
claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or
an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by
the claimants, he may bring an action against the
conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and
litigate their several claims among themselves." This
provision only requires as an indispensable requisite:
"that conflicting claims upon the same subject matter
are or may be made against the plaintiff-in-
interpleader who claims no interest whatever in the
subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part
is not disputed by the claimants." Indeed, CDC is
placed in the same situation as a lessee who does not
know the person to whom he will pay the rentals due
to the conflicting claims over tine property leased, or a
sheriff who finds himself puzzled by conflicting claims
to a property seized by him. In these examples, the
lessee (Pangkalinawan v. Rodas, 80 Phil. 28) and the
sheriff (Sy-Quia v. Sheriff, 46 Phil. 400) were each
allowed to file a complaint in interpleader to determine
the respective rights of the claimants.
GREGORIO SYQUIA vs. SHERIFF OF ILOCOS SUR
G.R. No. L-22807 10 October 1924
FACTS:
In 1915, Miguel Aglipay Cheng-Laco and Feliciano
Reyes Cheng-Kiangco executed a chattel mortgage in
favor of Gregorio Syquia on their mercantile
establishment as a security for a debt of P6,000. The
chattel mortgage was duly registered and due date fell
two years later. From its terms, it was the parties
intention that the mortgagors were to be permitted to
sell their merchandise replenishing their stock from
time to time and that the new stock shall also be
subject to the mortgage. In 1924, Cheng-Laco
executed another chattel mortgage over the same
establishment in favor of Filadelfo de Leon. After the
second mortgage was registered, Syquia requested the
sheriff to take possession of the mortgaged property to
sell it at public auction under the Chattel Mortgage
Law. The sheriff then seized the property in question
but de Leon presented an adverse claim to the
property stating that by virtue of the second chattel
mortgage, Syquias was no longer effective. In doubt
as to the priority of the claims, the sheriff suspended
the proceedings and brought an action for
interpleader. Thereupon, the present proceeding in
mandamus was instituted, the petitioner alleging that
the duty of the sheriff to proceed with the sale was a
ministerial one and praying that the sheriff be
commanded to proceed.
RULING:
Though it perhaps, would have been better practice for
the sheriff to sell the property and hold the proceeds of
the sale subject to the outcome of the action of
interpleader, we, nevertheless, are of the opinion that
the facts shown do not justify our interference by
mandamus. The sheriff might lay himself open to an
action for damages if he sold the goods without the
consent of the holder of the last mortgage, and it does
not appear that the petitioner offered to give bond to
hold him harmless in such an event. In these
circumstances, his action in suspending the sale
pending the determination of the action of interpleader
seems justified. We may say further that in cases such
as the present, the petition for mandamus should be
addressed to the Courts of First Instance rather than to
this court.
ALFONSO PAGKALINAWAN vs. SOTERO RODAS
G.R. No. L- 1806
25 February 1948
FACTS:
In an ejectment suit between Manuel Tambunting and
Alfonso and Manuel Pagkalinawan, the latter appealed
from the lower court to CFI Manila. The appellate court
then rendered a decision sentencing the
Pagkalinawans to vacate the house in question and
pay rentals due to Tambunting from November 1946 at
P45 per month plus costs. Acting upon a motion for
reconsideration filed by the Pagkalinawans, CFI
granted the motion and absolved them from the
complaint. On motion from Tambunting, the same
court reversed the Pagkalinawans motion and ordered
the latter to pay the rent for the property in question.
Defendants, however, moved to stay execution of the
new judgment on the ground that they had filed with
the same court an interpleader suit against plaintiff
and Angel de Leon Ong, praying that the latter two be
ordered to litigate their conflicting claims over rentals
due from the defendants. CFI acceded to the motion
but did not stop the execution of its judgment. Failing
to obtain a reconsideration of the latter order, the
defendants instituted the present petition for certiorari
and prohibition, seeking from us an order directing
Hon. Sotero Rodas, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, and Joaquin Garcia, sheriff, to desist from
carrying out the writ of execution.
RULING:
Petition has merit. It is true that the decision ordering
the payment of rentals to Tambunting is now final and
executory. However, in connection with the suit for
interpleader filed by petitioners, said rentals were
deposited with the Clerk of Court, of which fact the
respondent judge was informed by petitioners. Such
deposits, in our opinion, constitute a bona fide
compliance with the decision of the respondent judge,
since it is undeniable that the petitioners were warned
by Angel de Leon Ong not to pay rentals to the
respondent Manuel Tambunting. That there is really a
conflicting claim between Angel de Leon Ong and
respondent Manuel Tambunting is evidenced by the
fact that there are pending in the Court of First
Instance of Manila civil case No. 815, between Manuel
Tambunting, plaintiff, and Angel de Leon Ong and Ong
Hoa, defendants, for the annulment of a contract of
sale involving the premises in question, and civil case
No. 2690, between Angel de Leon Ong, plaintiff, and
Manuel Tambunting, defendant, for the ejectment of
Tambunting from the property located at Nos. 329 to
339 Tanduay Street, Manila, which includes the
premises held by the petitioners. Under the law, the
latter have a right to file the interpleader suit in view
of the claim for rentals of Angel de Leon Ong; and if
the respondent Tambunting believes that he is legally
entitled to said rentals, he is free to move for the
withdrawal of the deposits made by the petitioners.
UCPB vs. IAC and MAKATI BEL-AIR
CONDOMINIUM
G. R. Nos. 72664-5 20 March 1990
FACTS:
In 1979, United Coconut Planters Bank filed in the
lower court a complaint-in-interpleader against Makati
Bel-Air Condominium Developers and against Altiura
Investors. The subject matter of the complaint was a
managers check in the amount of P494,000 issued by
UCPB payable to Makati Bel-Air, having been
purchased by Altiura. Altiura delivered the check to
Makati Bel-Air as part payment on an office
condominium unit in the Cacho-Gonzales Building.
UCPB received instructions from Altiura to hold
payment of the check, in view of a material
discrepancy in the area of the office unit purchased by
Altiura which unit actually measured 124.58 square
meters, instead of 165 square meters as stipulated in
the contract of sale. Petitioner Bank immediately
requested private respondent Makati Bel-Air to advise
the Bank why it should not issue the stop payment
order requested by Altiura. The next day, UCPB
received a reply from Makati Bel-Air explaining the
latter's side of the controversy and at the same
proposing a possible reduction of the office unit's
purchase price. UCPB received a letter from Altiura
requesting the Bank to hold payment of its manager's
check while Altiura was discussing Makati Bel-Air's
proposal for reduction of the purchase price and
requesting the Bank to give both parties fifteen (15)
days within which to settle their differences. UCPB
requested Makati Bel-Air to hold in abeyance for a
period not exceeding fifteen (15) days the presentation
of the manager's check, so that both parties could
settle their differences amicably, but UCPB did not
agree to such arrangement. Thereupon, UCPB filed a
complaint-in-interpleader against Altiura and Makati
Bel-Air to require the latter to litigate with each other
their respective claims over the funds represented by
the manager's check involved, and at the same time
asking the court for authority to deposit the funds in a
special account until the conflicting claims shall have
been adjudicated. The trial court ordered the deposit
of the funds into a special account with any reputable
banking institution subject to further orders of the
court. Makati Bel-Air filed its answer and incorporated
therein a counter-claim against petitioner Bank and a
cross-claim against Altiura. In turn, Altiura filed an
answer to the complaint-in-interpleader, with motion
to dismiss the cross-claim of Makati Bel-Air. Meantime,
on 23 July 1979, Altiura had filed a complaint for
rescission of the contract of sale of the condominium
unit, with damages, against Makati Bel-Air docketed as
Civil Case No. 33967, which case was eventually
consolidated with the interpleader case. UCPB filed a
"motion to withdraw complaint and motion to dismiss
counter-claim", stating that there was no longer any
conflict between Makati Bel-Air and Altiura as to who
was entitled to the funds covered by the manager's
check, since Makati Bel-Air in its answer had alleged
that it had cancelled and rescinded the sale of the
condominium unit and had relinquished any claim it
had over the funds covered by the manager's check.
Makati Bel-Air delivered to petitioner Bank the original
of the manager's check. The trial court in Civil Case
No. 33961 issued an order directing the release of the
funds covered by the manager's check to Altiura. On
28 April 1983, the trial court issued an order resolving
petitioner Bank's motion to withdraw complaint-in-
interpleader and to dismiss counter-claim, declaring
that motion to withdraw the complaint-in-interpleader
had been rendered moot and academic by the court's
earlier order of 18 February 1980 directing petitioner
Bank to release to Altiura the P494,000.00 covered by
the manager's check, which Makati Bel-Air had not
opposed nor appealed from. In the same order, the
trial court granted Makati Bel-Air's motion to
consolidate Civil Case No. 33961 (the interpleader
case) and Civil Case No. 33967 (the rescission plus
damages case). Makati Bel-Air moved for
reconsideration of the 12 July 1983 clarificatory order
of the trial court, without success. Makati Bel-Air then
went to the respondent appellate court on petition for
certiorari. In its decision dated 27 June 1985, the
appellate court granted certiorari and nullified the trial
court's orders of 12 July and 30 August 1983 to the
extent that these had dismissed Makati Bel-Air's
counter-claim. The appellate court held that the
withdrawal of the complaint-in-interpleader and its
dismissal as moot and academic did not operate ipso
facto to dismiss Makati Bel-Air's counter-claim for the
reason that said counter-claim was based on "an
entirely different cause of action from that in the
complaint-[in]-interpleader."
RULING:
Interpleader is a proper remedy where a bank which
had issued a manager's check is subjected to opposing
claims by persons who respectively claim a right to the
funds covered by the manager's check. The Bank is
entitled to take necessary precautions so that, as far
possible, it does not make a mistake as to who is
entitled to payment; the necessary precautions
include, precisely, recourse to an interpleader suit. In
the instant case, petitioner Bank having been informed
by both Altiura and Makati Bel-Air of their respective
positions in their controversy, and Makati Bel-Air
having refused the Bank's suggestion voluntarily to
refrain for fifteen (15) days from presenting the check
for payment, petitioner Bank felt compelled to resort
to the remedy of interpleader. It will be seen that
Makati Bel-Air's counter-claim arose out of or was
necessarily connected with the recourse of petitioner
to this remedy of interpleader. Makati Bel-Air was in
effect claiming that petitioner Bank had in bad faith
refused to honor its undertaking to pay represented by
the manager's check it had issued. When the trial
court granted petitioner's motion for withdrawal of its
complaint-in-interpleader, as having become moot and
academic by reason of Makati Bel-Air's having
cancelled the sale of the office unit to Altiura and
having returned the manager's check to the Bank and
acquiesced in the release of the funds to Altiura, the
trial court in effect held that petitioner Bank's recourse
to interpleader was proper and not a frivolous or
malicious maneuver to evade its obligation to pay to
the party lawfully entitled the funds represented by
the manager's check. Having done so, the trial court
could not have logically allowed Makati Bel-Air to
recover on its counterclaim for damages against
petitioner Bank. There are other considerations
supporting the conclusion reached by this Court that
respondent appellate court had committed reversible
error. Makati Bel-Air was a party to the contract of sale
of an office condominium unit to Altiura, for the
payment of which the manager's check was issued.
Accordingly, Makati Bel-Air was fully aware, at the time
it had received the manager's check, that there was,
or had arisen, at least partial failure of consideration
since it was unable to comply with its obligation to
deliver office space amounting to 165 square meters
to Altiura. Makati Bel-Air was also aware that petitioner
Bank had been informed by Altiura of the claimed
defect in Makati Bel-Air's title to the manager's check
or its right to the proceeds thereof. Vis a vis both
Altiura and petitioner Bank, Makati Bel-Air was not a
holder in due course 3 of the manager's check.
ELIZABETH DEL CARMEN vs. SPOUSES
RESTITUTO AND MIMA SABORDO G.R. No.
181723 11 August 2014
FACTS:
Spouses Toribio and Eufrocina Suico entered into a
business venture by establishing a rice and corn mill in
Mandaue, Cebu. As part of their capital, they obtained
a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines
and had mortgaged 4 parcels of land of theirs (Lots
506, 512, 513 and 514) as well as a lot belonging to
one of their partners, Juliana del Rosario.
Subsequently, the Suico spouses and their business
partners failed to pay their loan obligations forcing
DBP to foreclose the mortgage. After the Suico spouses
and their partners failed to redeem the foreclosed
properties, DBP consolidated its ownership over the
same. Nonetheless, DBP later allowed the Suico
spouses and spouses Reginald and Beatriz Flores, as
substitutes for Juliana Del Rosario, to repurchase the
subject lots by way of a conditional sale for the sum of
P240,571.00. The Suico and Flores spouses were able
to pay the downpayment and the first monthly
amortization, but no monthly installments were made
thereafter. Threatened with the cancellation of the
conditional sale, the Suico and Flores spouses sold
their rights over the said properties to herein
respondents Restituto and Mima Sabordo, subject to
the condition that the latter shall pay the balance of
the sale price. On September 3, 1974, respondents
and the Suico and Flores spouses executed a
supplemental agreement whereby they affirmed that
what was actually sold to respondents were Lots 512
and 513, while Lots 506 and 514 were given to them
as usufructuaries. DBP approved the sale of rights of
the Suico and Flores spouses in favor of herein
respondents. Subsequently, respondents were able to
repurchase the foreclosed properties of the Suico and
Flores spouses. On September 13, 1976, respondent
Restituto Sabordo filed with the then Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental an original action for
declaratory relief with damages and prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction raising the issue of whether
or not the Suico spouses have the right to recover from
respondents Lots 506 and 514. In its Decision dated
December 17, 1986, the Regional Trial Court of San
Carlos City, Negros Occidental, ruled in favor of the
Suico spouses directing that the latter have until
August 31, 1987 within which to redeem or buy back
from respondents Lots 506 and 514. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals modified the decision and gave the
Suicos until 31 October 1990 to redeem the lot from
respondents by paying P127,500. The Suicos were
given an additional 90 days from notice to redeem the
property. In the meantime, Toribio Suico (Toribio) died
leaving his widow, Eufrocina, and several others,
including herein petitioner, as legal heirs. Later, they
discovered that respondents mortgaged Lots 506 and
514 with Republic Planters Bank (RPB) as security for a
loan which, subsequently, became delinquent.
Thereafter, claiming that they are ready with the
payment of P127,500.00, but alleging that they cannot
determine as to whom such payment shall be made,
petitioner and her co-heirs filed a Complaint with the
RTC of San Carlos City, Negros Occidental seeking to
compel herein respondents and RPB to interplead and
litigate between themselves their respective interests
on the abovementioned sum of money. The Complaint
also prayed that respondents be directed to substitute
Lots 506 and 514 with other real estate properties as
collateral for their outstanding obligation with RPB and
that the latter be ordered to accept the substitute
collateral and release the mortgage on Lots 506 and
514. Upon filing of their complaint, the heirs of Toribio
deposited the amount of P127,500.00 with the RTC of
San Carlos City, Branch 59. Respondents filed their
Answer with Counterclaim praying for the dismissal of
the above Complaint on the grounds that (1) the action
for interpleader was improper since RPB is not laying
any claim on the sum of P127,500.00; (2) that the
period within which the complainants are allowed to
purchase Lots 506 and 514 had already expired; (3)
that there was no valid consignation, and (4) that the
case is barred by litis pendencia or res judicata. On the
other hand, RPB filed a Motion to Dismiss the subject
Complaint on the ground that petitioner and her co-
heirs had no valid cause of action and that they have
no primary legal right which is enforceable and binding
against RPB. On December 5, 2001, the RTC rendered
judgment, dismissing the Complaint of petitioner and
her co-heirs for lack of merit. Respondents'
Counterclaim was likewise dismissed. Petitioner and
her co-heirs filed an appeal with the CA contending
that the judicial deposit or consignation of the amount
of P127,500.00 was valid and binding and produced
the effect of payment of the purchase price of the
subject lots. In its assailed Decision, the CA denied the
above appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the
disputed RTC Decision.
RULING:
Petition lacks merit. This court quotes the CAs prior
decision to wit on consignation: consignation [is]
the act of depositing the thing due with the court or
judicial authorities whenever the creditor cannot
accept or refuses to accept payment, and it generally
requires a prior tender of payment. It should be
distinguished from tender of payment which is the
manifestation by the debtor to the creditor of his
desire to comply with his obligation, with the offer of
immediate performance. Tender is the antecedent of
consignation, that is, an act preparatory to the
consignation, which is the principal, and from which
are derived the immediate consequences which the
debtor desires or seeks to obtain. Tender of payment
may be extrajudicial, while consignation is necessarily
judicial, and the priority of the first is the attempt to
make a private settlement before proceeding to the
solemnities of consignation. Tender and consignation,
where validly made, produces the effect of payment
and extinguishes the obligation. This Court held that
while [t]he deposit, by itself alone, may not have
been sufficient, but with the express terms of the
petition, there was full and complete offer of payment
made directly to defendants-appellants (Arzaga vs.
Rumbaoa).In the instant case, however, petitioner
and her co-heirs, upon making the deposit with the
RTC, did not ask the trial court that respondents be
notified to receive the amount that they have
deposited. In fact, there was no tender of payment.
Instead, what petitioner and her co-heirs prayed for is
that respondents and RPB be directed to interplead
with one another to determine their alleged respective
rights over the consigned amount; that respondents be
likewise directed to substitute the subject lots with
other real properties as collateral for their loan with
RPB and that RPB be also directed to accept the
substitute real properties as collateral for the said
loan. Nonetheless, the trial court correctly ruled that
interpleader is not the proper remedy because RPB did
not make any claim whatsoever over the amount
consigned by petitioner and her co-heirs with the
court. tender of payment involves a positive and
unconditional act by the obligor of offering legal tender
currency as payment to the obligee for the formers
obligation and demanding that the latter accept the
same. In the instant case, the Court finds no cogent
reason to depart from the findings of the CA and the
RTC that petitioner and her co-heirs failed to make a
prior valid tender of payment to respondents.
It is settled that compliance with the requisites of a
valid consignation is mandatory. Failure to comply
strictly with any of the requisites will render the
consignation void. One of these requisites is a valid
prior tender of payment. Under Article 1256, prior
tender of payment is excused: (1) when the creditor is
absent or unknown, or does not appear at the place of
payment; (2) when the creditor is incapacitated to
receive the payment at the time it is due; (3) when,
without just cause, the creditor refuses to give a
receipt; (4) when two or more persons claim the same
right to collect; and (5) when the title of the obligation
has been lost. None of these instances are present in
the instant case. Hence, the fact that the subject lots
are in danger of being foreclosed does not excuse
petitioner and her co-heirs from tendering payment to
respondents, as directed by the court.
SUBASH PASRICHA vs. DON LUIS DISON REALTY
G.R. No. 136409 14 March 2008
FACTS:
Don Luis Dison Realty and the Pasrichas (Subash and
Josephine) executed two lease contracts whereby the
former agreed to lease to the latter Units 22, 24, 32,
33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the San Luis Building,
located at 1006 M.Y. Orosa cor. T.M. Kalaw Streets,
Ermita, Manila. Petitioners, in turn, agreed to pay
monthly rentals as well as utilities expenses therefor.
While the contracts were in effect, petitioners dealt
with Francis Pacheco, then General Manager of private
respondent. Thereafter, Pacheco was replaced by
Roswinda Bautista. Petitioners religiously paid the
monthly rentals until May 1992. After that, however,
despite repeated demands, petitioners continuously
refused to pay the stipulated rent. Consequently,
respondent was constrained to refer the matter to its
lawyer who, in turn, made a final demand on
petitioners for the payment of the accrued rentals
amounting to P916,585.58. Because petitioners still
refused to comply, a complaint for ejectment was filed
by private respondent through its representative, Ms.
Bautista, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Manila. The case was raffled to Branch XIX. Petitioners
admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent for the
leased premises starting July until November 1992, but
claimed that such refusal was justified because of the
internal squabble in respondent company as to the
person authorized to receive payment. To further
justify their non-payment of rent, petitioners alleged
that they were prevented from using the units subject
matter of the lease contract, except Room 35.
Petitioners eventually paid their monthly rent for
December 1992 in the amount of P30,000.00, and
claimed that respondent waived its right to collect the
rents for the months of July to November 1992 since
petitioners were prevented from using Rooms 22, 24,
32, 33, and 34. However, they again withheld payment
of rents starting January 1993 because of respondent's
refusal to turn over Rooms 36, 37 and 38. To show
good faith and willingness to pay the rents, petitioners
alleged that they prepared the check vouchers for
their monthly rentals from January 1993 to January
1994. Petitioners further averred in their Amended
Answer that the complaint for ejectment was
prematurely filed, as the controversy was not referred
to the barangay for conciliation. On November 24,
1994, the MeTC rendered a Decision dismissing the
complaint for ejectment. It considered petitioners' non-
payment of rentals as unjustified. The court held that
mere willingness to pay the rent did not amount to
payment of the obligation; petitioners should have
deposited their payment in the name of respondent
company. On the matter of possession of the subject
premises, the court did not give credence to
petitioners' claim that private respondent failed to turn
over possession of the premises. The court, however,
dismissed the complaint because of Ms. Bautista's
alleged lack of authority to sue on behalf of the
corporation. Deciding the case on appeal, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 1, in Civil Case No.
94-72515, reversed and set aside the MeTC Decision.
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals in a petition for review on certiorari.
On March 18, 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus
Motion to cite Ms. Bautista for contempt; to strike
down the MeTC and RTC Decisions as legal nullities;
and to conduct hearings and ocular inspections or
delegate the reception of evidence. Without resolving
the aforesaid motion, on May 26, 1998, the CA
affirmed the RTC Decision.
RULING:
Petition lacks merit. It is undisputed that petitioners
and respondents entered into 2 separate contracts of
lease involving 9 rooms. Records likewise show that
respondent repeatedly demanded that petitioners
vacate the premises, but the latter refused to heed the
demand; thus, they remained in possession of the
premises. What was clearly established by the
evidence was petitioners' non-payment of rentals
because ostensibly, they did not know to whom
payment should be made. However, this did not justify
their failure to pay, because if such were the case,
they were not without any remedy. They should have
availed of the provisions of the Civil Code on
consignation of payment and of the Rules of Court on
interpleader. An action for interpleader is proper when
the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals
should be made due to conflicting claims on the
property (or on the right to collect). The remedy is
afforded not to protect a person against double liability
but to protect him against double vexation in respect
of one liability. Notably, instead of availing of the
above remedies, petitioners opted to refrain from
making payments. Neither can petitioners validly
invoke the non-delivery of Rooms 36, 37 and 38 as a
justification for non-payment of rentals. Although the
two contracts embraced the lease of nine (9) rooms,
the terms of the contracts - with their particular
reference to specific rooms and the monthly rental for
each - easily raise the inference that the parties
intended the lease of each room separate from that of
the others. There is nothing in the contract which
would lead to the conclusion that the lease of one or
more rooms was to be made dependent upon the lease
of all the nine (9) rooms. Accordingly, the use of each
room by the lessee gave rise to the corresponding
obligation to pay the monthly rental for the same.
Notably, respondent demanded payment of rentals
only for the rooms actually delivered to, and used by,
petitioners. It may also be mentioned that the contract
specifically provides that the lease of Rooms 36, 37
and 38 was to take effect only when the tenants
thereof would vacate the premises. Absent a clear
showing that the previous tenants had vacated the
premises, respondent had no obligation to deliver
possession of the subject rooms to petitioners. Thus,
petitioners cannot use the non-delivery of Rooms 36,
37 and 38 as an excuse for their failure to pay the
rentals due on the other rooms they occupied. In light
of the foregoing disquisition, respondent has every
right to exercise his right to eject the erring lessees.
The parties' contracts of lease contain identical
provisions, to wit: In case of default by the LESSEE in
the payment of rental on the fifth (5th) day of each
month, the amount owing shall as penalty bear
interest at the rate of FOUR percent (4%) per month,
to be paid, without prejudice to the right of the
LESSOR to terminate his contract, enter the premises,
and/or eject the LESSEE as hereinafter set forth;
Moreover, Article 1673 of the Civil Code gives the
lessor the right to judicially eject the lessees in case of
non-payment of the monthly rentals. A contract of
lease is a consensual, bilateral, onerous and
commutative contract by which the owner temporarily
grants the use of his property to another, who
undertakes to pay the rent therefor.[64] For failure to
pay the rent, petitioners have no right to remain in the
leased premises.
EDGAR ARREZA vs. MONTANO DIAZ, JR.
G.R. No. 133113 30 August 2001
FACTS:
Bliss Development owned a housing unit located at Lot
27, Block 30, New Capitol Estates, Quezon City. It filed
before RTC Makati Branch 146 a complaint for
interpleader in the midst of a conflict of ownership
between Edgar Arreza and Montano Diaz, Jr. The trial
court ruled on the interpleader in favor of Arreza, and
Bliss, in view of that decision, made a contract to sell
the property to Arreza and Diaz was ordered to
transfer possession and fruits of the property to
Arreza. Thereafter, Diaz sued Arreza, Domingo Tapay
and Bliss before RTC Makati Branch 59. He sought to
hold Bliss and Arreza liable for the reimbursement to
him of P1,706,915.58 representing the cost of
acquisition and improvements on the property with 8%
interest per annum. Arreza filed a Motion to Dismiss
the case, citing as grounds res adjudicata or
conclusiveness of the judgment in the interpleader
case as well as lack of cause of action. Said motion
and a subsequent motion for reconsideration were
dismissed by the RTC. Arreza filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals alleging that the
Orders dated February 4 and March 20, 1997, were
issued against clear provisions of pertinent laws, the
Rules of Court, and established jurisprudence such that
respondent court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition was
dismissed for lack of merit. The CA held that res
judicata does not apply because the interpleader case
only settled the issue on who had a better right. It did
not determine the partiesrespective rights and
obligations. The action filed by Diaz seeks principally
the collection of damages in the form of the payments
Diaz made to Bliss and the value of the improvements
he introduced on the property matters that were not
adjudicated upon in the previous case for interpleader.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Diazs claims for reimbursement
against Arreza are barred by res adjudicata.
RULING:
The court in a complaint for interpleader shall
determine the rights and obligations of the parties and
adjudicate their respective claims. Such rights,
obligations and claims could only be adjudicated if put
forward by the aggrieved party in assertion of his
rights. That party in this case referred to respondent
Diaz. The second paragraph of Section 5 of Rule 62 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
parties in an interpleader action may file
counterclaims, cross-claims, third party complaints and
responsive pleadings thereto, as provided by these
Rules. The second paragraph was added to Section 5
to expressly authorize the additional pleadings and
claims enumerated therein, in the interest of a
complete adjudication of the controversy and its
incidents. Pursuant to said Rules, respondent should
have filed his claims against petitioner Arreza in the
interpleader action. Having asserted his rights as a
buyer in good faith in his answer, and praying relief
therefor, respondent Diaz should have crystallized his
demand into specific claims for reimbursement by
petitioner Arreza. This he failed to do. Having failed to
set up his claim for reimbursement, said claim of
respondent Diaz being in the nature of a compulsory
counterclaim is now barred. Elements of res judicata:
(1) the former judgment must be final; (b) the court
which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter; (c) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be
between the first and second causes of action identity
of parties, subject matter, and cause of action. In the
present case, we find there is an identity of causes of
action between Civil Case No. 94-2086 and Civil Case
No. 96-1372. Respondent Diaz's cause of action in the
prior case, now the crux of his present complaint
against petitioner, was in the nature of an unpleaded
compulsory counterclaim, which is now barred. There
being a former final judgment on the merits in the
prior case, rendered in Civil Case No. 94-2086 by
Branch 146 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, which
acquired jurisdiction over the same parties, the same
subject property, and the same cause of action, the
present complaint of respondent herein (Diaz) against
petitioner Arreza docketed as Civil Case No. 96-1372
before the Regional Trial of Makati, Branch 59 should
be dismissed on the ground of res adjudicata.
LEONCIA BACLAYON, et. al. vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, et. al.
G.R. No. 89132 26 February 1990
FACTS:
Leoncia, Martin, Policarpio, Hilarion, Ireneo, Juliana and
Tomas, all surnamed Baclayon; Rosendo, Felicidad and
Silvestra, all surnamed Abanes; and Tomasa, Leoncia,
Anacleto, Monica, Guillerma and Gertrudes all
surnamed Abellare filed with the then CFI-Cebu,
Branch 2, in Civil Case No. R-11185, a complaint for
recovery of ownership and possession, and damages,
against spouses Marciano Bacalso and Gregoria
Sabandeja of Lot No. 5528 of the Cebu Cadastre. The
trial court ruled in favor of spouses Bacalso, declaring
them owners of the subject lot, which decision was
appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA reversed the trial
courts decision holding that the heirs of the late
Matias Baclayaon owned the land at bar. The decision
in favor of the petitioners having become final and
executory, they filed a motion for execution of
judgment and possession which was opposed by the
private respondents. The private respondents argued
that since they were builders in good faith, they were
entitled to the reimbursement of the necessary and
useful expenses incurred from the owner of the land.
The presiding judge of RTC Cebu Branch 15, Hon.
German Lee, granted the motion for execution and
ordered the judgment to be executed. Private
respondents appealed the said order but it was
dismissed by Lee. Later, private respondents filed a
petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with
CA concerning the orders of the RTC Cebu which was
granted by respondent court, thereby setting aside the
trial courts orders and ordering the same court to hear
respondents evidence that they were builders in good
faith.
RULING:
The rule is well established that once a decision has
become final and executory the only jurisdiction left
with the trial court is to order its execution. To require
now the trial court in a hearing supplementary to
execution, to receive private respondents' evidence to
prove that they are builders in good faith of the
improvements and the value of said improvements, is
to disturb a final executory decision; which may even
cause its substantial amendment. It appears that the
private respondent's opposition to the motion for the
execution of the judgment, possession and demolition
is their last straw to prevent the satisfaction of the
judgment. Sad to say, we have to cut this straw. We
disagree with the respondent court that any
counterclaim for reimbursement of the value of the
improvements thereon by reason of private
respondents' being builders in good faith, which
presupposes that they are not the owners of the land,
would run counter to the defense of ownership and
therefore could not have been set up before the trial
court. It should be emphasized that Rule 8, Section 2
of the Rules of Court allows a party to set forth two or
more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or
hypothetically, either in one cause of action or defense
or in separate causes of action or defenses. A
corollary question that We might as well resolve now
(although not raised as an issue in the present
petition, but conformably with Gayos, et al. v. Gayos,
et al., G.R. No. L-27812, September 26, 1975, 67 SCRA
146, that it is a cherished rule of procedure that a
court should always strive to settle the entire
controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or
branch to bear the seeds of future litigation) is
whether or not the private respondents can still file a
separate complaint against the petitioners on the
ground that they are builders in good faith and
consequently, recover the value of the improvements
introduced by them on the subject lot. The case of
Heirs of Laureano Marquez v. Valencia, 99 Phil. 740,
provides the answer: "If, aside from relying solely on
the deed of sale with a right to repurchase and failure
on the part of the vendors to purchase it within the
period stipulated therein, the defendant had set up an
alternative though inconsistent defense that he had
inherited the parcel of land from his late maternal
grandfather and presented evidence in support of both
defenses, the overruling of the first would not bar the
determination by the court of the second. The
defendant having failed to set up such alternative
defenses and chosen or elected to rely on one only,
the overruling thereof was a complete determination
of the controversy between the parties which bars a
subsequent action based upon an unpleaded defense,
or any other cause of action, except that of failure of
the complaint to state a cause of action and of lack of
jurisdiction of the Court. The determination of the
issue joined by the parties constitutes res judicata."
JOSE BELTRAN vs. PEOPLES HOMESITE &
HOUSING CORPORATION
G.R. No. L-25138 28 August 1969
FACTS:
In 1962, an interpleader suit was commenced by Jose
Beltran, et. al. in their own behalf and in behalf of the
residents of Project 4 in Quezon City, praying that the
Peoples Homesite & Housing Corporation and
Government Service Insurance System be compelled
to litigate between themselves their conflicting claims
over Project 4. PHHC leased out housing units to
plaintiffs in 1953. The lessees, paying monthly rentals
therefor, were assured by competent authority that
after 5 years of continuous occupancy, they would be
entitled to purchase these units. In 1961, the PHHC
announced that the management, administration and
ownership of Project 4 would be transferred to GSIS in
payment of PHHS debts to GSIS. PHHC also asked the
tenants to signify their conformity to buy the housing
units at the selling price indicated on the back thereof,
agreeing to credit the tenants, as down payment on
the selling price, 30% of what had been paid by them
as rentals. The tenants accepted the PHHC offer, and
on March 27, 1961, the PHHC announced in another
circular that all payments made by the tenants after
March 31, 1961 would be considered as amortizations
or installment payments. By the end of 1960,
administration and ownership of Project 4 was turned
over to GSIS. PHHC, however, through its new
Chairman-General Manager, Esmeraldo Eco,
refused to recognize agreements previously entered
into with GSIS, while GSIS insisted on its legal rights to
enforce the said agreements and was upheld in its
contention by both the Government Corporate
Counsel and the Secretary of Justice. Plaintiffs thus
claimed that these conflicting claims between
PHHC and GSIS caused them great inconvenience and
incalculable moral and material damage, as they did
not know to whom they should pay the monthly
amortizations or payments.
TC: Designated the People's First Savings Bank, QC "to
receive in trust the payments from the plaintiffs on
their monthly amortizations on PHHC lots and to be
released only upon proper authority of the Court."
PHHC and GSIS filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
of Beltran, et al. for failure to state a cause of action as
well as to lift the Court's order designating the People's
First Savings Bank as trustee to receive the tenants'
payments on the PHHC lots. TC granted the Motion,
ruling that the counsel for GSIS ratified the allegations
in his motion and made of record that GSIS has no
objection that payments on the monthly amortizations
be made directly to PHHC. There was thus no dispute
as to whom the residents pay and therefore no cause
of action for interpleading. Counsel for defendants
went further to say that whatever dispute, if any,
may exist between the two corporations over
the lots and buildings in Project 4, payments
made to the PHHC will not and cannot in any
way affect or prejudice the rights of the
residents thereof as they will be credited by either of
the two defendants.
On appeal, plaintiffs claim that the trial Court erred in
dismissing their suit, contending the allegations in
their complaint "raise questions of fact that can be
established only by answer and trial on the merits and
not by a motion to dismiss heard by mere oral
manifestations in open court," and that they "do not
know who, as between the GSIS and the PHHC, is
the right and lawful party to receive their
monthly amortizations as would eventually entitle
them to a clear title to their dwelling units."
ISSUE:
Whether the dismissal of the complaint for
interpleader was proper?
RULING:
Yes. Plaintiffs entirely missed the vital element of an
action of interpleader. Rule 62, section 1 of the Revised
Rules of Court requires as an indispensable element
that "conflicting claims upon the same subject matter
are or may be made" against the plaintiff-in-
interpleader "who claims no interest whatever in the
subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part
is not disputed by the claimants."
While PHHC and GSIS may have conflicting claims
between themselves with regard to the management,
administration and ownership of Project 4, such
conflicting claims are not against the plaintiffs nor do
they involve or affect the plaintiffs. No allegation is
made in their complaint that any corporation other
than the PHHC which was the only entity privy to their
lease-purchase agreement, ever made on them any
claim or demand for payment of the rentals or
amortization payments. The questions of fact raised in
their complaint concerning the enforceability, and
recognition or non-enforceability and non-recognition
of the turnover agreement of December 27, 1961
between the two defendant corporations are irrelevant
to their action of interpleader, for these conflicting
claims, loosely so-called, are between the two
corporations and not against plaintiffs. Both defendant
corporations were in conformity and had no dispute, as
pointed out by the trial court that the monthly
payments and amortizations should be made directly
to the PHHC alone.
WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB vs. LEE
WON
G.R. No. L-23851 26 March 1976
FACTS:
Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, a non-stock, civic and
athletic corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines, filed a complaint of interpleader. It
alleged, for its first cause of action, that defendants
Lee Won and Bienvenido Tan were both claiming
ownership over the Corporations membership fee
certificate (MFC) 201: Won, by virtue of the decision
of the CFI of Manila in civil case 26044 and by MFC
201-serial no. 1478 issued on Oct. 17, 1963 by the
deputy clerk of court for and in behalf of the president
and secretary of the corporation and of the Peoples
Bank & Trust Company; Tan, on the other hand, by
virtue of MFC 201-serial no. 1199 issued on July 24,
1950 pursuant to an assignment in his favor by Swan,
Culbertson and Fritz, the original owner of MFC 201.
For its second cause of action, the Corporation alleged
that MFC 201-serial no. 1478 issued by the deputy
clerk of court in behalf of the Corporation is null and
void because it was issued in violation of the
Corporations by-laws, which require the surrender and
cancellation of the outstanding MFC 201 before
issuance may be made to the transferee of a new
certificate duly signed by its president and secretary,
aside from the fact that the decision of the CFI of
Manila in civil case 26044 is not binding upon
defendant Tan. The Corporation prayed for the
issuance of an order requiring Lee and Tan to
interplead and litigate their conflicting claims,
declaring who the lawful owner of MFC 201 is, and
ordering the surrender and cancellation of MFC 201-
serial no. 1478 issued in the name of Lee. The trial
court dismissed the complaint upon motion of the
defendants on the grounds of res judicata, failure of
the complaint to state a cause of action, and bar by
prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action of interpleader was proper
and timely filed.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint. The action of interpleader, under 120 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, is a remedy whereby a
person who has personal property in his possession, or
an obligation to render wholly or partially, without
claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks
that the persons who claim the said personal property
or who consider themselves entitled to demand
compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate
among themselves in order to determine finally who is
entitled to tone or the one thing. The remedy is
afforded to protect a person not against double liability
but against double vexation in respect of one liability.
A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale
the contending claimants to court. He need not await
actual institution of independent suits against him
before filing a bill of interpleader. He should file an
action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a
dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by
either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he
may be barred by laches or undue delay. But where he
acts with reasonable diligence in view of the
environmental circumstances, the remedy is not
barred. If a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one of
the adverse claimants and allows said suit to proceed
to final judgment against him, he cannot later on have
that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader
suit. In the case at hand, the Corporation allowed civil
case 26044 to proceed to final judgment. And it
offered no satisfactory explanation for its failure to
implead Tan in the same litigation. In this factual
situation, it is clear that this interpleader suit cannot
prosper because it was filed much too late. A
successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his
defeated adversary in an interpleader suit and
compelled to prove his claim anew against other
adverse claimants, as that would in effect be a
collateral attack upon the judgment. In fine, the
interpleader suit cannot prosper because the
Corporation had already been made independently
liable in civil case 26044 and, therefore, its application
for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack
upon the final judgment in the said civil case; Lee had
already established his rights to MFC 201 in the civil
case and, therefore, this interpleader suit would
compel him to establish his rights anew, and thereby
increase instead of diminish litigations, which is one of
the purposes of an interpleader suit, with the
possibility that the benefits of the final judgment in the
said civil case might eventually be taken away from
him; and because the Corporation allowed itself to
be sued to final judgment in the said case, its
action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for
which reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable
delay.