EN BANC Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari[3] on May 7, 2010.

However, under
the Rules of Court, the filing of such petition would not stay the execution of the judgment,
ATTY. EVILLO C. PORMENTO, G.R. No. 191988 final order or resolution of the COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed. [4] Besides, petitioner
Petitioner, did not even pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
CORONA, C.J., injunction. Hence, private respondent was able to participate as a candidate for the position
CARPIO, of President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second highest number of
CARPIO MORALES, votes.[5]
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran. Since the issue
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, on the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection will be premised on a persons second
BRION,* (whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be
versus PERALTA,** resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. [6] There is in this case no definite,
BERSAMIN, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having
DEL CASTILLO, adverse legal interests.[7] No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in
ABAD, this case that will benefit any of the parties herein.[8] As such, one of the essential requisites
VILLARAMA, JR., for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy,
PEREZ, is sorely lacking in this case.
MENDOZA and As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.[9] The Court
SERENO, JJ. is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles
JOSEPH ERAP EJERCITO or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it.[10] In
ESTRADA and COMMISSION other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.[11]
ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents. An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy
Promulgated: because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has
August 31, 2010 already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is
x--------------------------------------------------x likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the
determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.[12]
RESOLUTION
CORONA, C.J.: Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a
President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true
What is the proper interpretation of the following provision of Section 4, Article VII of the today. Following the results of that elections, private respondent was not elected President for
Constitution: [t]he President shall not be eligible for any reelection? the second time. Thus, any discussion of his reelection will simply be hypothetical and
The novelty and complexity of the constitutional issue involved in this case present speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.
a temptation that magistrates, lawyers, legal scholars and law students alike would find hard Accordingly, the petition is denied due course and is hereby DISMISSED.
to resist. However, prudence dictates that this Court exercise judicial restraint where the issue SO ORDERED.
before it has already been mooted by subsequent events. More importantly, the constitutional
requirement of the existence of a case or an actual controversy for the proper exercise of the
power of judicial review constrains us to refuse the allure of making a grand pronouncement EN BANC
that, in the end, will amount to nothing but a non-binding opinion.
[G.R. No. 133495. September 3, 1998]
The petition asks whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR., petitioner vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO,
the ban on the President from any reelection. Private respondent was elected President of the JR., respondents.
Republic of the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the
presidency again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C.
Pormento opposed private respondents candidacy and filed a petition for disqualification. DECISION
However, his petition was denied by the Second Division of public respondent Commission on MENDOZA, J.:
Elections (COMELEC).[1] His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the
COMELEC en banc.[2]
 This case presents for determination the scope of the constitutional provision barring Accordingly, private respondent was voted for in the elections. He received 16,558 votes
elective officials, with the exception of barangay officials, from serving more than three against petitioners 7,773 votes and was proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of
consecutive terms. In particular, the question is whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the Canvassers.
office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have
served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit. This is a petition for certiorari brought to set aside the resolution, dated May 7, 1998, of
he COMELEC and to seed a declaration that private respondent is disqualified to serve another
Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, term as Mayor of Pateros, Metro Manila.
1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation
of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected Petitioner contends that private respondent Capcos service as mayor from September 2,
mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was 1989 to June 30, 992 should be considered as service for full one term, and since he thereafter
reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June 30, 1998.[1] served from 1992 to 1998 two more terms as mayor, he should be considered to have served
three consecutive terms within the contemplation of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution and 43(b) of
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor the Local Government Code. Petitioner stresses the fact that, upon the death of Mayor Cesar
of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was Borja on September 2, 1989, private respondent became the mayor and thereafter served the
also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter would remainder of the term. Petitioner argues that it is irrelevant that private respondent became
have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would mayor by succession because the purpose of the constitutional provision in limiting the
therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that. number of terms elective local officials may serve is to prevent a monopolization of political
power.
On April 30, 1998, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of
petitioner and declared private respondent Capco disqualified from running for reelection as This contention will not bear analysis. Article X, 8 of the Constitution provides:
mayor of Pateros.[2]However, on motion of private respondent, the COMELEC en banc, voting
5-2, reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor in the May 11, 1998 SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
elections.[3] The majority stated in its decision: determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
In both the Constitution and consecutive terms.Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
the Local Government Code, considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
the three-term limitation refers was elected.
to the term of office for which
the local official was elected. It This provision is restated in 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160):
made no reference to
succession to an office to which Sec. 43. Term of Office - . . .
he was not elected. In the case
before the Commission,
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
respondent Capco was not
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
elected to the position of
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
mayor in the January 18, 1988
elective official concerned was elected.
local elections. He succeeded to
such office by operation of law
and served for the unexpired First, to prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy embodied
term of his in the constitutional provision in question. The other policy is that of enhancing the freedom
predecessor. Consequently, of choice of the people. To consider, therefore, only stay in office regardless of how the official
such succession into office is concerned came to that office whether by election or by succession by operation of law would
not counted as one (1) term for be to disregard one of the purposes of the constitutional provision in question.
purposes of the computation of Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution reveals
the three-term limitation under that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving
the Constitution and the Local the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of
Government Code. political power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F.
Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further
reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of
Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the
same position in the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive
term.[4] Monsod warned against prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose
asa result of the proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft constitution
provision recognizing peoples power.[5]
Commissioner Blas F. Ople, who supported the Monsod proposal, said:
The principle involved is really whether this Commission shall impose a temporary or a
perpetual disqualification on those who have served their terms in accordance with the limits
on consecutive service as decided by the Constitutional Commission. I would be very wary
about this Commission exercising a sort of omnipotent power in order to disqualify those
who will already have served their terms from perpetuating themselves in office. I think the
Commission achieves its purpose in establishing safeguards against the excessive
accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. We do put a cap on consecutive
service in the case of the President, six years; in the case of the Vice-President, unlimited;
and in the case of the Senators, one reelection. In the case of the Members of Congress, both
from the legislative districts and from the party list and sectoral representation, this is now
under discussion and later on the policy concerning local officials will be taken up by the
Committee on Local Governments.The principle remains the same. I think we want to
prevent future situations where, as a result of continuous service and frequent reelections,
officials from the President down to the municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary
interest in their position and to accumulate those powers and perquisites that permit them
to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts to members of their families in a subsequent
election. I think that is taken care of because we put a gap on the continuity or the unbroken
service of all of these officials. But where we now decide to put these prospective servants of
the people or politicians, if we want to use the coarser term, under a perpetual
disqualification, I have a feeling that we are taking away too much from the people, whereas
we should be giving as much to the people as we can in terms of their own freedom of
choice.[6]
Other commissioners went on record against perpetually disqualifying elective officials
who have served a certain number of terms as this would deny the right of the people to
choose. As Commissioner Yusup R. Abubakar asked, why should we arrogate unto ourselves
the right to decide what the people want?[7]
Commisioner Felicitas S. Aquino spoke in the same vein when she called on her
colleagues to "allow the people to exercise their own sense of proportion and [rely] on their
own strength to curtail power when it overreaches itself.[8]
Commissioner Teodoro C. Bacani stressed: Why should we not leave [perpetual
disqualification after serving a number of terms] to the premise accepted by practically
everybody here that our people are politically mature? Should we use this assumption only
when it is convenient for us, and not when it may also lead to a freedom of choice for the
people and for politicians who may aspire to serve them longer? [9]
Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission. The first is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the
accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea
of election, derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose those whom they
wish to govern them be preserved.
It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution
did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of reelection. This
is clear from the following exchange in the Constitutional Commission concerning term limits,
now embodied in Art. VI 4 and 7 of the Constitution, for members of Congress:
MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the second
term. We will allow the Senator to rest for a period of time before he
can run again?
MR. DAVIDE. That is correct.
MR. GASCON. And the question that we left behind before if the Gentlemen will
remember- was: How long will that period of rest be? Will it be one election which
is three years or one term which is six years?
MR. DAVIDE. If the Gentlemen will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the view
that during the election following the expiration of the first 12 years, whether
such election will be on the third year or on the sixth year thereafter, this particular
member of the Senate can run. So it is not really a period of hibernation for six
years. That was the Committees stand.[10]
Indeed, a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people should be
allowed to choose whom they please to govern them. [11] To bar the election of a local official
because he has already served three terms, although the first as a result of succession by
operation of law rather than election, would therefore be to violate this principle.
Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling
of the COMELEC that Art. X, 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive
terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of the term of office of elective local
officials and bars such official[s] from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The
second sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served
his full term of office, states that voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected. The term served must therefore be one for which [the official
concerned] was elected. The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the
limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving
a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he
succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term now withstanding
his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas comment on Art. VI, 7, which similarly bars
members of the House of Representatives from serving for more than three
terms. Commissioner Bernas states that if one is elected Representative to serve the unexpired
term of another, that unexpired term, no matter how short, will be considered one term for
the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed.[12]
This is actually based on the opinion expressed by Commissioner Davide in answer to a
query of Commissioner Suarez: For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the
Senator newly elected would have to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Would that
mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is already considered one term? So, half
a term, which is actually the correct statement, plus one term would disqualify the Senator
concerned from running? Is that the meaning of this provision on disqualification, Madam
President? Commissioner Davide said: Yes, because we speak of term and if there is a special
election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion of that particular term plus one more
term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower House.[13]
There is a difference, however, between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member
of the House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes
incapacitated, or is removed from office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by
operation of law.[14] On the other hand, the Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. [15] In
a real sense, therefore, such Representative serves a term for which he was elected. As the
purpose of the constitutional provision is to limit the right ot be elected and to serve in
Congress, his service of the unexpired term is rightly counted as his first term.Rather than
refute what we believe to be the intendment of Art. X, 8 with regard to elective local officials,
the case of a Representative who succeeds another confirms the theory.
Petitioner also cites Art. VII, 4 of the Constitution which provides for succession of the
Vice-President to the Presidency in case of vacancy in that office. After stating that The
President shall not be eligible for any reelection, this provision says that No person who has
succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for
election to the same office at any time.Petitioner contends that, by analogy, the vice-mayor
should likewise be considered to have served a full term as mayor if he succeeds to the latters
office and serves for the remainder of the term.
The framers of the Constitution included such a provision because, without it, the Vice-
President, who simply steps into the Presidency by succession would be qualified to run for
President even if he has occupied that office for more than four years. The absence of a similar
provision in Art. X, 8 on elective local officials throws in bold relief the difference between the
two cases. It underscores the constitutional intent to cover only the terms of office to which
one may have been elected for purpose of the three-term limit on local elective officials,
disregarding for this purpose service by automatic succession.
There is another reason why the Vice-President who succeeds to the Presidency and
serves in that office for more than four years is ineligible for election as President. The Vice-
President is elected primarily to succeed the President in the event of the latters death,
permanent disability, removal or resignation. While he may be appointed to the cabinet, his
becoming so is entirely dependent on the good graces of the President. In running for Vice-
President, he may thus be said to also seek the Presidency. For their part, the electors likewise
choose as Vice-President the candidate who they think can fill the Presidency in the event it
becomes vacant. Hence, service in the presidency for more than four years may rightly be
considered as service for a full term.
This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under the local Government Code, he is the
presiding officer of the sanggunian and he appoints all officials and employees of such local
assembly. He has distinct powers and functions, succession to mayorship in the event of
vacancy therein being only one of them.[16] It cannot be said of him, as much as of the Vice-
President in the event of a vacancy in the Presidency, that in running for vice-mayor, he also
seeks the mayorship. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of vacancy is more a matter
of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the
application of any term limit.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to
the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently,
it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office,
he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply. This point can be made clearer by considering the following cases
or situations:
Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the death of the
incumbent. Six months before the next election, he resigns and is twice elected
thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the next election.
Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor by succession and subsequently
resigned from office before the full term expired, he has not actually served three full terms
in all for the purpose of applying the term limit. Under Art. X, 8, voluntary renunciation of the
office is not considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
only if the term is one for which he was elected. Since A is only completing the service of the
term for which the deceased and not he was elected. A cannot be considered to have
completed one term. His resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term.
Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected Mayor and, during his first term, he is twice suspended for
misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he run for one
more term in the next election?
Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.
In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions for
the application of the disqualification provisions have not concurred, namely, that the local
official concerned has been elected three consecutive times and that he has fully served three
consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the local official is considered to have served three
full terms notwithstanding his resignation before the end of the first term, the fact remains
that he has not been elected three times. In the second case, the local official has been elected
three consecutive times, but he has not fully served three consecutive terms.
Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves a total
failure of the two conditions to concur for the purpose of applying Art. X 8. Suppose he is
twice elected after that term, is he qualified to run again in the next election?
Yes, because he was not elected to the office of the mayor in the first term but simply found
himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only
continued the service, interrupted by the death , of the deceased mayor.
To consider C in the third case to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible
to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict
the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. If the vice-mayor turns out
to be a bad mayor, the people can remedy the situation by simply not reelecting him for
another term. But if, on the other hand, he proves to be a good mayor, there will be no way
the people can return him to office (even if it is just the third time he is standing for reelection)
if his service of the first term is counted as one of the purpose of applying the term limit.
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the
Constitutional Commission that while the people should be protected from the evils that a
monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of
choice is not unduly curtailed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban,
Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., on official leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress
the mischief at which it is aimed. 1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for
election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he
shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the election." 2 The mischief which this provision reproduced verbatim from the
1973 Constitution seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the
latter, from an elective office to serve that community." 3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March
8, 1995, providing the following information in item no. 8: 4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years
and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of
the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner
did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent
contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for
candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in
Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3349772 6and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed
that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of
candidacy." 7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended
certificate. 8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner
that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of
Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the
filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on
or before the March 20, 1995 deadline. 9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the
COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise
filed with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry
of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in
her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained
Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the
petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending
to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First
District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended
registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said
city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered
as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six month actual
residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to
transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District
 and pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to
remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the congressional
election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte
Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to
remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his
purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on
such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same
objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with
respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First
District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections
on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote
of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for
Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended
Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of
Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the original
Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and
petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed
word "Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or
honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment should
subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought that what was
asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence
of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could
have responded "since childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she
stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First
District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent and
which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she
tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that
she has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since
childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality of
Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been a resident
of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before coming to the
Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in
Tolosa, respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban
City so that she can be a candidate for the District. However, this
intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of
Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and
not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly
acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or
honest mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for
RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of
"residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious
why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her
explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual and physical
presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none in the
question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate
of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I
seek to be elected immediately preceding the election." Thus, the
explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or
misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be
made, she cited the case of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance
of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to
the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of the
election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure
timely and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that case
considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant
case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an
inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of
residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a
substantial matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy,
specially those intended to suppress, accurate material representation in
the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the
amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds
of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the
election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of
her residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is
to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The
arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated
in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her
Voter's Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which
reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at
the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is
further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro
Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of her
registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-
registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these
three (3) different documents show the respondent's consistent
conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the
last week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7
months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in
the respondent's contention that it was an error.
 xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy
cannot be admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear
that respondent has not complied with the one year residency
requirement of the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as
synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or
for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo
Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In
respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the
residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus,
her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the
First District since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of
qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It
cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the respondent in
her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some
years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila.
In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in
San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she
lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In
1978, she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the
representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor
of Metro Manila. She could not have served these positions if she had not
been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her
certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she
claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on
August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of
San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration
in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or
transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she
could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the
time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident
of many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior
to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First
Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make
Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and
on several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although
she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have
abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other
different places. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC(226 SCRA 408) the
Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must
concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention
to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other
words there must basically be animus manendi with animus non
revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in
Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter
there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is
deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her
childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise
be conduct indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements to the
effect that she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the
accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her
choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show
that her conduct, one year prior the election, showed intention to reside
in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her residence in
Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the
First District of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident
of the First District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly
pointed out that on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at
precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her
Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa
for a period of six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the
respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her
failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior
to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she
had been a resident of the district for six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en
banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution
declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives
for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission
RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised
 therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition
for disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation
should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC
reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner
be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte
held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on
May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471
votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said
Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional
seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her
proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal
issues may be classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the
First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9,
1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in
disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus
Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed
exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after
the May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in
the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the
COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of
election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to
substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended
for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of
Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose
of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of
civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong
vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent
home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to
return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose
intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of
residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of
returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a
certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country.
The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the
intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One
may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to
remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established
it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different
residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for
various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.
In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is
used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary;
"domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent,
one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one
place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is
residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A
man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he
may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is
generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so
since no length of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar
criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly
and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile
which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the
same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of
Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the
absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter
other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So
settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law
cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent
residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective
positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of
"residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971
Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in
the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of
residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it
the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the
National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides,
among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period
of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in
effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was
domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think
Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has
been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual
residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper
time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially
considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage
says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have
to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not
physical residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term
residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied
the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what
significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her
residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be
decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's
residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is
or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to
deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead
to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting
the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The
circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent
confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa,
Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in
the space provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's
Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance,
when herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make
her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same,
claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then
registered in her place of actual residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact
which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said
certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item
No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a
candidate seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years
and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte
instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her
period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and
Item 8 the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile coupled
with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led
to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest
mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if
such fact were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First
District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April
24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some
years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution
additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be
any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to
the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also
registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine
presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she
served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could
not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the
COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if
he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating,
implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal
residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or
semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the
COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the
time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places"
flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions
between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena
vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own
house wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having
ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either
alone or with his family in another municipality, has his residence in the
former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector
in the other municipality in question and having been a candidate for
various insular and provincial positions, stating every time that he is a
resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures,"
as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study
in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When
an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his
lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for
professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not
absent himself from his professional or business activities; so there he
registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not
willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are
to run the government especially in national elections. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or
residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation
why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of
origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss
of such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing of
every person to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of
attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive
proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its
proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of
(actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on
residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of
petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed
Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she
established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in
the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she
graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's
College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her
degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School,
still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin,
the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos
when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a
voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959,
she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she
registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President
of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang
Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted
and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home
to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as President of the
Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated
that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that
petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None
of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in
Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally
followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there
and eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons.
Even during her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers,
petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province,
instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and
establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of
power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or
consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of
the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the
COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the
country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of
origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving
the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could
not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there
again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a
new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila,
Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not
established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private
respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin
should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three
requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of
residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private
respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an
abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect
an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with
an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium
voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by
operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in
1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of
"domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains the
husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the
term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the
two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and
residence. Both terms imply relations between a person and a place; but
in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or
juridical, independent of the necessity of physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the
court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live
abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence
as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the
female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of
residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which
states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su
residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla
de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o'
a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article,
which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article
clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family
home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase
"cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the
husband shall transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the
family to another home or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be
understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one
place to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family,
a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the
law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife
bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of
family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual
residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading:
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article
110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe
mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together.
This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case
of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the
wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is
illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we
shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for
professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino
further explains:
Residence and Domicile Whether the word "residence" as used with
reference to particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a
question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made from
a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is used.
Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are
distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical
presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or more
residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence is
acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without
actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once
residence has been established in one place, there be an intention to stay
there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during
the marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of
a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain
situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the
wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for
obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt
for a new one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may
acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of
the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed
the wife either to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In
instances where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately from her
husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has
held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt.
In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not
within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel
one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the
other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded,
an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are
disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by
process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the
purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be
effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under
the same roof; and he experience of those countries where the courts of
justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people
shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in
England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the
restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife;
and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a
mandatory decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of
disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and
render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by
the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon
v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the
Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice,
expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same
as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence,
equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England,
could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by
imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment
against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the
remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal
rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in
appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a
stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so
far as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory order
requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case
where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had
changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to
(Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code
of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided
many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in
 the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of
enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc.,
1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to
have affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring
a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her
failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and
effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as
administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest
which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to
the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this
order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by
any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her
in respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear
that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed
by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954,
petitioner was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband's
actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had
several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There
is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming
that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner
gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have
been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil
Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the
intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been
supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in
meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary
changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of
domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law
(or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that
insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife
the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The
inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that
when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and
merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her
marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's
acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but
expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her
domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the
PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in
Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a
home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992
in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary
intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone
straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously
looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of
Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover,
and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse
either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the
marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original
domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where
situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile
different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up
to this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in
favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First
District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that
the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the
election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner
contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC
which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of Representatives in
accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is
generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not
invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would
have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is
often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American
authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often
determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury
results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of
the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute
containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be
entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory
provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without
affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which
 relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the
aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act."
Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed merely
to be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from
rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked
jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse
to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given
or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of
B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear
and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the
elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction
over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say
that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member
of the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the
question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to
either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality
of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely,
many established principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake
perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including
the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles of law
to deny an individual what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we
condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte,
the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE,
JR., respondent.
[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD
ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are
deserving of the privilege. It is a precious heritage, as well as an inestimable
acquisition,[1]that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those
who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of
profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the
qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our people are
waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver
screen, and now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is
he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial
roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the fusion
resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the
forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald
Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No.
04-003 before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due
course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino
citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie
Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son
of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a
Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain
Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage
had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner,
in support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of
birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez
attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an
English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth
of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and
Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a
Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a
certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives to the
effect that no available information could be found in the files of the National Archives
regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the
more significant ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives
Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available information regarding
the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification
issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives that no
available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c)
a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax
Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a
copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract
between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar
of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during the
period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three
days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was
denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner
assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation
to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824,
likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other
resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No.
161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on
Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the
other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting
that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme
Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny
due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material
fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus
Election Code -
Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers
and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive
charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections
for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any
interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any
nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court per Rule 64[2] in an action for certiorari under Rule 65[3] of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of
the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power
is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law which
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated
to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial
to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on
who could or should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the
provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the
Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The
Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate
its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973
Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential
contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,[4] as not (being) justiciable
controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to
enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral
Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the
Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the
Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the
parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected
Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under
the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-
election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo
warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to
dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13,
and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme
Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -
Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.
Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or
a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protest shall
not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an
election protest.
Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President
of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the
election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified
petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the
proclamation of the winner.
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of
the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo
warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. [5] In such context, the election
contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate
who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an
election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it,
questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission
on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on
the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who,
sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the
administration of justice and in the holding of an office.[6] Aristotle saw its significance if only
to determine the constituency of the "State," which he described as being composed of such
persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence.[7] The
concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for which qualifications
like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with
rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other.[8] In
its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private
interests to the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th
century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights
necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice. [9] Its
meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship, which encompassed
the right to participate in the exercise of political power.[10] The 20th century saw the next
stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen
to economic well-being and social security.[11] The idea of citizenship has gained expression in
the modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of
development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be
the internationalization of citizenship.[12]
The Local Setting - from Spanish
Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects
of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."[13] In church records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting
a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly
codified during the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one
comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to
the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees. [14]
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated
in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained
to be the subject of differing views among experts;[15] however, three royal decrees were
undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14
August 1841,[16] the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the political status of
children born in the Philippine Islands,[17] and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July
1870, which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July
1870.[18]
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because
of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of
the Ultramaramong which this country was included, would be governed by special laws.[19]
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December
1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. -
(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of
Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of
any town of the Monarchy.[20]
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of
decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an
upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international law dictated
that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force,
would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United
States.[21] Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native
inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined by its Congress
- period.[25] More about this later.
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the
present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may
remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to
sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry
on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws
as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the
date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve
such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to
have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside.
Thus
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded
to the United States shall be determined by the Congress."[22]
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on
the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although
they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under
American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines
entitled to the protection of the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine
Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first
comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were
Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their
children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions
of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth
eighteen hundred and ninety eight."[23]
Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an inhabitant of the
Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken
to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain,
and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.[24]
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899
to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight
was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law
principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the
United States and England, governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to
the Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not
come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the United
States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens
of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."[26]
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had
for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil
Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The
Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones
Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of
Congress in 1912 -
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day
of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their
children born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown
of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States
and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except
such others as have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the
Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition
of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within
the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such
other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who
could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States, if residing
therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a
citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2)
residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other
country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode
of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common
law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of
Filipino citizenship -
Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines -
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law
provisions at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino
citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that
effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their
legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully
cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the
1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such
concerns -
Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship,
unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have renounced her
citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except
for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the
questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election,
and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship."[27]
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the
regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship -
naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis[28] had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus
soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs[29] (1912), did not last long. With the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of
Labor[30] (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of
citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest
established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to
Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been
presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident
of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The
certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915
to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by
petitioner was an uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F.
Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate,
Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie
Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of
FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four
years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries
on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only
conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be
that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September,
1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a
natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the
birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record
in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both
contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for
respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit
"21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his
Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitted in evidence for respondent, the
admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which they purported to
show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie
Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in
San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material
statements in his argument. All three documents were certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:
xxxxxxxxx
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a
public office.
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan
F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their
contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
 The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein
could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement made,
2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested
origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the
prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred.[31]
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954,
at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou
was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner
would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898
to 1902 considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the Records
Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo
Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of
Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of
a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely
doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would have had complete records of
all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of
the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the
child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to petitioner,
the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December
1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect,
acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either
judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only
if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be
had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document.[32] Complementary to the new code was
Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the
parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not
be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to
acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be
identified.
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of
filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The
failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document of
recognition.[33] In Mendoza vs. Mella,[34] the Court ruled -
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here really
is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy of the
registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily
recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the
names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to
its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have happened, it was
not even they or either of them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil
register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public
document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to
the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement in the
document that the parent recognizes the child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the
document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently executed, or
at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of
voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public document." In Pareja vs.
Pareja,[35] this Court defined what could constitute such a document as proof of voluntary
acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by
private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent
public officials by reason of their office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as
one of the means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate
children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be
expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any
authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters
of an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory
acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor any
evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the
lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim
acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing,"
so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a
genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would include a public instrument (one
duly acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official) or a private writing
admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175
provide:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime
and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of
insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute
the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either
or both of the parties.
x x x x x x x x x.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,[36] the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided
under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that
'the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if
the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30,
1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or
recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of
keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the
greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the
private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate
or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in general,
his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the
Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain of civil
law; particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the
family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts
which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among
members of a family, and those which exist among members of a society for the protection
of private interests."[37]
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards
although they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil
nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the
domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the separation of their
properties, the rules governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal property, the
classification of their property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority
to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and
properties of the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of
the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article
15 of the Civil Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions
on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in different parts
of the Civil Code,[39] such as on successional rights and family relations.[40] In adoption, for
instance, an adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded
the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights
under civil law[41] and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory
attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining
proprietary and successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in the rights
of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution
and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to
keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil
Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the
primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should remain
only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
 The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status
should thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for
civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity,
although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family
relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the
matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or
Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may
be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship
between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
`pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and
the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts
of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead
or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a
relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the
controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person
whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie
Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts
of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with
Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton,
California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that:
1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more
popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital,
Magdalena Street, Manila.
xxxxxxxxx
7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they
were students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also
introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth,
Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother
at our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until
the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months between 1943-
1944.
10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more
children after Ronald Allan Poe.
xxxxxxxxx
18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald
Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of
Fernando Poe, Sr.
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Declarant
DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would
be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of
the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A
positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court
has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern
and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using
DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural
Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to
conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the
fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the
other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are
analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA
test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts
should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts
should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented,
since to reject said result is to deny progress."
Petitioners Argument For
Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According
to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted
marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley
bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of
marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the
documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth
certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born
on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each
other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an
illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the
citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of
this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,[43] citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon[44] and Serra vs. Republic.[45]
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most
convincing; he states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the
pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement would
be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement
was irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter
dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these
cases.
First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was
about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese
father. The issue was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the
stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the
naturalized stepfather.
Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino
father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by election to
public office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935
Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino
father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The issue was
whether one who was already a Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be
naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.
Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship
of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father,
Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore
argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that
there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court
therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his
son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a
Filipino.
The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The
Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be
Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary
to fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure
and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
xxxxxxxxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the
Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution not once
but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an
illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the
illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People vs.
Cayat.[47] I would grant that the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate
children rests on real differences. x x x But real differences alone do not justify invidious
distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another
purpose.
x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What
possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a
public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive
the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate
child from holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his
parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor
rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause
and must be reprobated.
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court),
Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar
views.The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed
fail.
 Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its
mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the
illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody,
would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to
help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935
Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of
respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor
distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are those whose
fathers are citizens of the Philippines. There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe
conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position
and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which,
as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,[48] must not only be material, but also
deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr.,
Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe,
Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio
Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for
want of jurisdiction.

In Sum 2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on
Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure to show
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the
the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules petition in SPA No. 04-003.No Costs.SO ORDERED.
of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has
prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the position of President in
the 10th May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has committed material
representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines.

(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R.
No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in the latters
capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election contest
under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked
only after, not before, the elections are held.

(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been
committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent
FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative,
whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the
Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo
Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old,
Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under
Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in
the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death,
such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during
which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent
FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate
in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section
74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before