Advancing CPEC by stealth

Khurram HusainUpdated July 20, 2017

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The writer is a member of staff.

This newspaper carried a report back in May revealing a document that could be called the CPEC
master plan. That report drew a sharp response from the government, particularly the minister
planning who is in charge of all CPEC coordination. He argued that the report was factually
incorrect and that the real long-term plan was under negotiation and would be released to the
public upon finalisation.

But a number of developments since then show that the plan as revealed, far from being
factually incorrect, is in fact being implemented as we speak. The implementation is taking
place below the headlines, and many of the initiatives outlined in the plan are being advanced by
burying them under other policy initiatives to give them a different name and thereby deflect
attention. This mode of implementation is contrary to how those CPEC projects that the
government is keen to tout are being projected as massive signature achievements. An entire
website has been created simply for the purpose of purveying information about specific CPEC
projects, but there are many that find no mention on that site.

The corridor is only minimally about transit trade. The

power plants, too, are little more than early harvest
projects.

Lets take an example. One of the elements of the plan published in this newspaper that took a lot
of people by surprise was its emphasis on agriculture. A careful reading of that plan document
shows agriculture is, in fact, one of the biggest priorities for the Chinese government when they
look at CPEC not transit trade, not power plants. There is no mention of agriculture on the
CPEC website (accessed on July 19).

But the recently announced National Food Security Policy, which went almost completely
unnoticed as was undoubtedly the intention, contains a couple of paragraphs which show that the
government is, in fact, moving fast to create an enabling environment to facilitate the entry of
Chinese enterprises into Pakistans agricultural sector. Of course, there is nothing wrong with
this. The agri-sector is in dire need of investments. But the fact that this is being done with some
care to ensure no attention is brought to bear upon it is curious.

The policy has an entire section that details the creation of what it calls CPEC agricultural
development zones. It identifies areas for the agricultural economic and technical cooperation
between China and Pakistan, and details that the corridor is divided into nine sections, each of
which possesses distinct opportunities for establishing diverse agro-based businesses since the
corridor traverses different agro-ecologies.

The commodities that can be potentially exported to China include cereals, dairy, eggs, honey,
live animals, tobacco, meat, seafood, fruit and nuts. The idea advanced by the policy is
developing business clusters for more than 40 commodities identified across the corridor for
promoting rural businesses through developing entrepreneurship, processing zones, skilled
manpower and modern market infrastructure.

The whole enterprise is then wrapped up in agrarian development objectives. Overall, the
establishment of agricultural economic zones along CPEC in collaboration with Chinese
counterparts can help to achieve: a) food sovereignty; b) benefiting farmers and rural
communities; c) smarter food production and yields; d) biodiversity conservation; e) sustainable
soil health and cleaner water; f) ecological pest management; and g) resilient food systems.

In another place, the policy says all this is being done to advance the Sustainable Development
Goals, in particular the one that relates to hunger, to which it says the government has a strong
commitment.

The policy measures advanced to catalyse the creation of the CPEC agri-development zones also
sound like they came straight out of the plan document revealed in the Dawn report. They are
designed to facilitate the entry of private enterprises into the agrarian markets (again, nobody
should construe this to be a bad thing), with a focus on market intelligence, reducing post
harvest losses, and so on.

This suggests that a policy framework is being built, under the guise of a national food security
policy, that, in reality, is designed to lay the groundwork to advance the agriculture-related
priorities of Chinese enterprises, as the master plan document revealed in the Dawn report
clearly stated.

The same thing can be seen in many other areas too. In finance, for example, work is under way
to facilitate a greater role for the yuan in Pakistans economy, for payment and settlement
purposes. The attorney general has said that disputes between commercial entities of the two
countries are bound to crop up, for which a bilateral institution for arbitration between China
and Pakistan could be necessary, so recourse to other bodies like the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes and the International Chambers of Commerce is not
necessary.

All this is happening beneath the radar of the headlines. There are no flashy announcements, and
often the work being undertaken is not mentioned at all. Look at the CPEC website run by the
government of Pakistan, and you will find no mention of any of this, only of roads and power
plants. The descriptions contained in the National Food Security Policy are a rare example, but
even they are vaguely expressed, couched in other development objectives, and with pains taken
to draw little or no attention to them.
Yet, this is where the reality of CPEC is. The corridor is only minimally about transit trade. The
power plants, too, are little more than the early harvest projects, on commercial terms,
designed to jump-start the economy before the real game begins. The real game of CPEC is about
granting access to Chinese enterprises to Pakistans domestic markets, raw materials and the
agrarian economy.

But that side of the entire equation is being kept deliberately quiet while we are encouraged to
think of the projects in terms of roads and power plants alone.

There is a growing and urgent need for our CPEC conversation to move beyond transit trade and
balance of payments. The real game has not even begun, and few understand the form it will take.

The writer is a member of staff.

khurram.husain@gmail.com

Twitter: @khurramhusain

Published in Dawn, July 20th, 2017

Panama lessons
I.A. RehmanJuly 20, 2017
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WHATEVER its final outcome, the Panama leaks case offers the countrys politicians many
important lessons which, if properly followed, could help Pakistan realise the goal of democratic
consolidation.

The first lesson is that no party in power should drive an opposition group to the wall because the
latter might seek extra-constitutional support to gain what it considers to be its due. This is fully
borne out by the course adopted by opposition parties in their fights with governments. The most
significant example is, of course, the PNAs labours to queer the pitch, leading to Gen Ziaul Haqs
takeover.

The whole campaign against Nawaz Sharif had its roots in his rejection of Imran Khans demand
to have the 2013 results of some National Assembly constituencies rechecked, which prompted
the PTI chief to look for other means to settle his scores with the prime minister. It was perhaps
through his shielding of a couple of loyalists that the prime minister started building his road to
disaster. If the parties in power remember this, Pakistans politics and democracy will gain
considerably.
The second lesson is that the consolidation of democratic institutions is impossible without
properly functioning democratic parties. For months, the state of Pakistan has been virtually
paralysed and critical issues of governance and public interest have been ignored. And all this to
throw out a prime minister, something for which the Constitution provides a simple and speedy
procedure.

Throughout this period, we have seen neither the government nor its challenger consult their
respective parties. This means that both sides treat their parties as packs of bonded slaves. A
most serious corollary is the exclusion of the masses from the political discourse. They cannot be
represented by a small group of intermediaries of dubious character. If, in future, those in power
and those in the opposition operate through their party apparatus, they might find among the
masses people who are capable of guiding them out of any crisis.

It is time serious students of politics pondered the

states distaste for democratic practices.

Another significant lesson offered by the Big Case is that those who enter politics and aspire to
elected offices have no private life. What they do or what they avoid doing in private life has a
bearing on their public life. They cannot denounce child labour in public and employ children at
home. Even if the countrys middle class believes in living beyond its means, the politicians must
at least appear to be living within their legitimate resources. Regardless of the states being
notorious for lack of documentation or for its reliance on unverified statistics, they must keep
their books in order.

The next lesson relates to the confusion caused in underdeveloped democracies by morality
brigades. Universally acknowledged authorities have given clear warnings against mixing
morality with politics and justice because politics is the art of the possible and not what is
morally desirable. Meanwhile, the law must be interpreted by the courts without being linked to
the morality issues raised by political parties.

Yet we are caught in a noisy hullabaloo caused by attempts to decide political issues by what goes
as public morality, a practice which should have gone out of favour after the career of a popular
Irish leader was destroyed by his rival MPs by planting a sex worker in his room.
Specifically, the present case has underlined the dangers of relying on Ziaul Haqs amendments
to Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution that are incompatible with democratic norms. This does
not mean that violators of the law should not be prevented from becoming or continuing as
lawmakers they can be dealt with under the normal law. Anyone found guilty of an offence
involving moral turpitude has no right to sit in any elective body for a certain period.

Yet another lesson of the present commotion is the need to review the tradition of looking only at
the charge sheet against a politician and ignoring the need to look at the credentials of the
challengers or likely successors. We made the mistake of accepting Ayub Khans indictment of
politicians and were rewarded with a decade of dictatorial rule that made disintegration of the
state inevitable. We accepted the demonisation of politicians by Ziaul Haq, and quite a few of our
coming generations are going to pay for his gifts of extremism, gun culture, abuse of religion for
political ends and authoritarian patterns of governance.

It is time serious students of politics pondered the states distaste for democratic practices. What
will be said about a country that first deposes a prime minister and then hangs him after a
controversial trial, sacks and imprisons another prime minister and puts yet another prime
minister on the rack?

The fault lines must be seen beyond the persons involved. The future of Nawaz Sharif does not
matter; he has to answer for whatever he has done, but Pakistan will not become a healthy polity
until the basic assumptions underlying state policies narrow-minded religiosity, elitism,
discrimination against women and minorities and disregard for the week and the poor are not
abandoned.

Every righteous-looking movement is a disguise for a political objective. The anti-Ahmadi

agitation was a political affair and so were the PNA agitation and Ziaul Haqs claims of promoting
Islam. What has Nawaz Sharif done apart from making money to earn the wrath of powerful
forces?

One explanation doing the rounds is that if he stays on till March 2018 his party will capture the
Senate and he will enjoy a heavy mandate such as he had in 1999, and there will be trouble. Even
otherwise, a strong elected government is not considered good for the country. But instead of
throwing the country in turmoil every now and then, a mechanism of checks and balances can be
devised to keep heavy majorities under control to the necessary extent.

Pakistan will only have itself to blame for the consequences of not learning from the Panama
case.

Published in Dawn, July 20th, 2017

A gathering storm
S. Mudassir Ali ShahJuly 20, 2017
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The writer is a freelance journalist based in Peshawar.

THE thwarting of Afghan Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostums attempt to return home from
Turkey after his de facto exile represents a brewing political crisis for the beleaguered National
Unity Government led by President Ashraf Ghani.
Amid allegations that he ordered his guards to kidnap, beat and rape a political opponent in
Shiberghan in 2016, the former Uzbek warlord quietly flew to Turkey in late May this year. His
abrupt departure touched off a wave of speculation about deep divisions within the government.
The rumours gained credence as a result of his prolonged stay in Ankara, where he reportedly
underwent medical treatment for an unnamed ailment. However, he remained in touch with his
acolytes back home on the hyper-fluid political landscape.

Less than two weeks before his botched homecoming, Dostum was hobnobbing in Turkey with
several political heavyweights, including Balkh governor Atta Mohammad Noor, acting foreign
minister Salahuddin Rabbani and ex-vice president Mohammad Mohaqiq.

At the Ankara meeting, the one-time rivals agreed on cobbling together a broad-based alliance to
steer the country out of multiple problems, like militant attacks, economic stagnation and the
presidents dithering on honouring his campaign pledges.

The Dostum episode reflects the growing crisis in

Kabul.

Announcement of the coalition, which ironically involves senior government figures, caused
jitters. The presidents panic was palpable last week when he ordered his spymaster to air-dash to
Turkey to persuade Dostum to return.

But late on Monday, the private jet carrying Dostum was denied landing in Mazar-i-Sharif,
reflecting Kabuls unnerved response to his return. Leaders of the made-in-Turkey alliance were
preparing to unveil their future line of action after Dostums landing.

The vice president chose to land in the Balkh capital, a redoubt of Atta Mohammad Noor, instead
of Kabul where a rape and torture case against him was filed in court. Subsequently, the plane
touched down in neighbouring Turkmenistan, from where he may take the land route to
Afghanistan.

Annoyed by what he calls a denial of his constitutionally guaranteed discretion, Dostum has been
at daggers drawn with Ghani for months. He has gone as far as to censure the president of
concentrating power and pushing his coalition partners to the wall.
His wringing denunciation of the government, of which he is part and parcel, indicates the
gathering political storm in Kabul. The looming crisis could pose a formidable challenge to a
government whose constitutionality has come under a cloud.

The power-sharing deal, envisaging constitutional amendments within a year, is yet to be

implemented in toto. Three years on, the amendments legalising the chief executive slot, cleaning
up the electoral system and calling a loya jirga are yet to be made.

Many Jamiat-i-Islami leaders are incensed by the sidelining of Abdullah and his team in the
decision-making process. They want him to part ways with Ghani, who has delayed
parliamentary elections that were due in May 2015 besides keeping vital state institutions under
his control.

Earlier, Ghani sacked Ahmad Zia Massoud as his special representative on reforms and good
governance literally with a single stroke of the pen. Bodyguards of Massoud were disarmed and
his staff sent home. Prior to that, the National Directorate of Security chief, Rahmatullah Nabil,
had also been dismissed summarily.

Ghanis growing intolerance of dissent has prompted his critics to join hands against him; hence
the creation of several alliances. The opposition groupings have vowed to oust the president and
his hand-picked cabinet.

In large measure, the alliances are the outcome of growing disillusionment with Ghanis
autocratic style of governance and his disdain for democratic ideals. A number of powerful
politicians, feeling cornered, have decided to ramp up the pressure on the government.

Today, Ghani is faced with unprecedented aversion from the High Council of the Coalition for
Afghanistans Salvation, Mehwar-i-Mardum-i-Afghanistan, Herasat and Subat Council and
Jabha-i-Nawin Millie. Jihadi figures led by Abdul Rab Rasoul Sayyaf are also baying for the
presidents blood. Former commerce minister Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi is also at loggerheads with
Ghani.

Though Dostum is accused of grave war crimes and human rights violations, he has been
instrumental in frustrating attempts by militant groups to foment trouble in the north. Recently,
he personally led anti-Taliban offensives in Faryab and Jawzjan, forcing the insurgents to take to
their heels.

In order to stay in the saddle, Ghani may offer Gulbadin Hekmatyar a significant role in the near
future. But in the final analysis, the presidential woes would mount if Dostum teams up with
other power brokers. Prosecuting the vice president at this point in time will be a huge misstep by
the government.

The writer is a freelance journalist based in Peshawar.

Published in Dawn, July 20th, 2017

Financing SDGs
Ignacio ArtazaJuly 20, 2017
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The writer is country director, UNDP Pakistan.

THE international community adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015 as a
new global development agenda, encompassing the economic, social and environmental
dimensions of sustainable development for all. Meeting the goals requires international, national
and local commitments, partnerships and innovative thinking. But it also requires money. To
achieve the ambitious targets, estimates suggest that $5 to 7 trillion per year will be needed
globally. Pakistan also requires phenomenal resources given its population and development
status, and funds are needed from multiple sources; government, private sector, international
development partners and local philanthropy must combine and coordinate to find the funds.

Pakistan has already shown strong commitment to the SDGs, adopting them as Pakistans
National Development Goals. National and sub-national planning and financing frameworks are
being aligned to the SDG agenda. New frameworks are being established to track related
expenditures, while district-level frameworks are being piloted to highlight priorities, especially
those related to health and education.

Domestic resources must be mobilised.

Official Development Assistance was the cornerstone of earlier development agendas. Yet, while
developed countries agreed to allocate 0.7 per cent of their gross national incomes to developing
countries, in reality their contributions reached merely 0.32pc in 2016. Pakistan is amongst the
top 10 ODA recipients globally, but ODA only accounts for 1.3pc of its GNI. While ODA will
remain critical to achieving the SDGs, relying on international aid will not help Pakistan achieve
its ambitious objectives. Domestic resources need to be mobilised more to finance development.

This poses a major challenge. Despite recent improvements, Pakistans tax-to-GDP ratio is only
12.6pc, amongst the lowest in South Asia. This narrow tax base, a large untaxed informal sector, a
partially taxed agriculture sector, and preferential treatment continue to hamper revenue
mobilisation. By addressing these, Pakistan can take the lead in financing its own development.

Pakistan has historically maintained high fiscal deficits. Public debt servicing stands at 40.4pc of
revenue, constraining its capacity to finance SDG achievement. Thus, the private sector must step
up to meet this national challenge. Through public-private partnerships, the private sector can
become a true partner, complementing government efforts to provide essential infrastructure and
public services, without increasing the governments fiscal burden. With responsible and
sustainable business practices, the private sector can contribute to inclusive growth.

Cooperation among countries of the global south can help finance development by exchanging
low-cost solutions, with mutual benefits for both lender and recipient. Through CPEC, for
example, China is investing billions of dollars to address Pakistans infrastructural bottlenecks
whilst promoting its own strategic and economic interests.

Innovative development financing can help achieve sustainable development. In Bangladesh,

microcredit has accounted for a 10pc (2.5 million people) reduction in rural poverty over the past
two decades. Microfinance there covers 32m recipients, extending $ 7.2 billion annually. In
contrast, Pakistan has only 3.6m microfinance borrowers. With a supportive policy environment
and strong regulation, microfinance can be expanded to accelerate Pakistans progress towards
achieving many SDGs.

While additional resources are required, there is also a need to improve planning, budgeting and
resource allocation, to target long-ignored social sectors such as education and health,
geographical areas, and disadvantaged groups. Historically, Pakistan has allocated limited
resources towards social sector development expenditures. Preliminary estimates from the
federal and provincial budgets 2016-17 reflect improved allocations.

The Planning Commissions Multidimensional Poverty Index reveals that whilst poverty has
declined overall, there are wide disparities between districts. District-level analysis through the
MPI provides a tool to influence national and provincial finance commissions to increase
allocations to lagging districts. In the past 20 years, outcome-based and participatory budgeting
has been used globally to ensure that budgeted funds achieve their intended results. Such
instruments can achieve the transformation in governance that is necessary to achieve the SDGs.

The world community has realised the need for holistic efforts to finance and adopt the SDG
agenda. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda (2015) provides a foundation for implementing this
road map, collecting more than 100 concrete measures to support financing for development,
including domestic resource mobilisation, private investment and improved policy and
regulatory frameworks for effective resource utilisation. Now is a good time for Pakistan to
develop a multipronged financing approach, harnessing the potential that exists in both public
and non-public sectors.

The writer is country director, UNDP Pakistan.

Published in Dawn, July 20th, 2017

Saudi-led alliance
EditorialJuly 20, 2017
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IS retired Gen Raheel Sharif commanding a ghost army? Government representatives have
insisted that so long as the terms of reference of the Saudi-led Islamic Military Alliance to Fight
Terrorism are not finalised, Pakistans participation cannot be determined. But with the prime
ministers foreign adviser, Sartaj Aziz, once again struggling to answer questions in the Senate on
Tuesday, it is obvious that the Pakistani government is not clear when these terms will be
finalised. So why was an NoC issued to Gen Sharif, allowing him to proceed to Saudi Arabia to
take command of an army that does not exist and to implement the orders of an alliance whose
terms have not yet been finalised? Despite another round of questions by senators on Tuesday,
Mr Aziz was unable to offer anything resembling an acceptable answer.

It is possible to attribute the decision to issue Gen Sharif an NoC to a civil-military relationship
that is forever shrouded in secrecy and in which the civilians are arm-twisted into making poor
choices. But so long as the veil of secrecy remains, it is also possible to interpret the decision to
send Gen Sharif to Saudi Arabia in other ways. Could the civilian government have struck a deal
with the then army chief to provide him a job post retirement if he gave up on his rumoured
ambition to secure a second term as army chief? The problem with secrecy is that it breeds
rumours and suspicion, especially when it concerns individuals at the very top of the de facto
power structure in the country. The phrase in the national interest is bandied about easily;
surely, when it comes to Pakistan joining a foreign military alliance, with the possibility of troop
deployments abroad, the national interest demands clarity and transparency.

There is also a problem that the government refuses to acknowledge: parliament has debated and
rejected the possibility of sending troops to a sectarian cauldron in the Middle East and the Gulf.
Saudi Arabia is rightly a close ally of Pakistan and the ties between the two countries are deep
and long-standing, but Saudi Arabias interests are not automatically Pakistans. As the war in
Yemen and now the blockade of Qatar have indicated, the Saudi leadership, undergoing a
generational change, is making questionable decisions. Pakistans core national interest is to
defeat militancy of all stripes. But in their quest for ascendancy over rival states, several Middle
Eastern and Gulf countries have embraced groups that can have disastrous consequences for this
country. There is already speculation that recent sectarian attacks in the country are the militant
Islamic State groups purported retaliation against Pakistanis fighting in Syria. The warning signs
are too big to ignore. Gen Sharif ought to unilaterally reconsider his position. If he does not, the
government must consider ways to cancel the NoC he has been granted.

Published in Dawn, July 20th, 2017

Hindus in Thar
EditorialJuly 20, 2017
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THE part of the Thar desert that lies within Pakistan has long been a bastion of communal
harmony in this country. Given there is near parity between the Hindu and Muslim populations
living in the area, that peaceful coexistence has been an example for other Pakistanis to emulate.
However, there have been indications for a while now that Thars benign social ethos is
undergoing a change, a change that bodes ill for the future of those who call it home and one that
may well have wider repercussions for the rest of the country. An investigative report about
forced conversions of Hindus that appeared in this newspaper recently detailed how certain
mullahs and feudals are exploiting poverty and class distinctions to put Thars Hindu community
under unprecedented pressure.

Certainly, exploitation along these lines happens elsewhere as well, but in Thar, with its huge
Hindu population, it assumes a different dimension, especially against the recent backdrop of the
mushroom growth of seminaries in Umerkot and Tharparkar districts. The spread of the
madressah culture has led to a wave of fundamentalism in which conversion to Islam, whether by
force or otherwise, has become a means to an end. For one, the conversion of Hindu girls many
of them underage and young women, is often used to legitimise their kidnapping and rape.
Cowed into submission, and afraid of rejection by their community if they return, they can do
little else but say their conversion was voluntary. How else can one explain that young girls and
women of marriageable age comprise the vast majority of such cases? Moreover, if they do
convert willingly, why is it they never contact their families again? On the other hand, there is an
active effort by certain elements to offer material inducement to impoverished Hindus to convert.
Such assistance, including ration, livestock, proper housing, etc is calculated to appeal to a people
who are not even able to meet their basic needs. Surely charity should be predicated on need
rather than on faith, or upon a change of faith. It is heartening that most Muslims who live
alongside Hindus in Thar as part of an integrated social milieu are equally disturbed by the
changes they are witnessing in a land that has seen none of the religious conflict that much of
Pakistan has been witness to. The state has a duty to protect the Hindu community and its right
to live as Hindus.

Published in Dawn, July 20th, 2017

Pak-India culture ties

EditorialJuly 20, 2017
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IN a welcome development, the Lahore High Court has struck down a notification issued by
Pemra last year regarding a ban on the broadcasting of Indian dramas on this countrys licensed
private television channels. It is definitely a case of better sense having prevailed. On Tuesday,
Lahore High Court Chief Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah ruled that the electronic media regulator
needed to revisit its policy, given that the world had become a global village, and that the placing
of unreasonable restrictions was not reasonable.

The decision deserves appreciation. For one thing, in this age of internet connectivity and digital
media, there is no sense in attempting to block certain content when there are so many ways of
accessing it. The idea that Pakistanis might be harmed by watching Indian television content
indeed, Pemras counsel made the argument that the content of Indian dramas was objectionable
and contrary to the ideology of the country appears besides the point given this larger reality.
Where the greater picture is concerned, however, what must be thought about is the future of
Pakistan-India relations. In recent months, cultural ties have increasingly become a casualty in
the historically difficult diplomatic relationship between the two countries. Notwithstanding
what is happening on the political front, the long-term goal is for Pakistan and India to conclude
some framework of mutual cohabitation. However, what we are seeing is the expansion of the
theatre of confrontation; in large part, this is the result of moves across the border where
resentment against Pakistani artists working in India in the wake of the Uri attack last year has
increased. Such trajectories stymie possibilities of future thaws. Now that the ban on Indian
content on Pakistani channels has been struck down, it would be a welcome move for Indian
broadcasters to reciprocate especially when Pakistani television shows reportedly enjoy the
same popularity across the border as Bollywood fare does over here. Trite as it sounds, the future
lies in cooperation.

Published in Dawn, July 20th, 2017