South Atlantic Quarterly

Alain Gresh

The Free Officers and the Comrades:

The Sudanese Communist Party and Nimeiri
Face-to-Face, 19691971

Africas largest country, Sudan, is first and

foremost part of the Arab world, sensitive to the
political tides which sweep the Arab peoples
from the Atlantic to the Gulf. Like other mem-
bers of the Arab League, Sudan was taken by
surprise by the defeat of 1967. It was shaken by
the tidal wave that later engulfed Libya, Lebanon,
Iraq, and Syria; and on 25 May 1969, a military
regime took over in Khartoum. Its ideology was
Arab nationalism infused with socialism; its
social base, the army and the urban classes; and
its model, the Nasserist experiment.
During the 1960s, in line with the conclusions
reached at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Com-
munist Party, Arab Communists attached con-
siderable weight to alliances with Arab nation-
alists, whose leadership they recognized. The
Egyptian Communist party went as far as to dis-
solve itself, merging with Nassers Arab Social-
ist Union. Even apart from this exceptional case,
the Arab Communist parties agreed to play sec-
ond fiddle to the nationalistsas in Damascus
restricting their activities and only claiming a
modest share of power. They contented them-

Reprinted from International Journal of Middle East Studies 21.3

(August 1989): 393409. Reprinted with the permission of
Cambridge University Press.
DOI 10.1215/00382876-2009-022

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 South Atlantic Quarterly

10 Alain Gresh

selves with statist economic reforms (in particular, sweeping nationaliza-

tion measures), limited agrarian reform, and close cooperation with the
Soviet Union and other socialist states.
In Sudan, however, the existence of a powerful working-class movement
and a long-established Communist party made for an unusual situation.
Its singularity did not lie in the content of the reforms introduced by the
new regime from 1969 on, which were identical to the reforms carried out
by Nasser or those embarked upon by the Bathists in Syria and Iraq. These
developments, applauded elsewhere by Arab Communists and the Soviet
Union alike, were challenged by the Sudanese Communist party on the
basis of the original premises of the Revolution. Behind the debate on the
content and form of economic and social change in Sudan lay a more fun-
damental question. Who among Sudans various social and political forces
should guide the process of change?
By laying claim to a leading role for the Communist party and the work-
ing class, the Sudanese Communists were raising the question of leader-
ship for the first time in the Middle East.1 The self-assurance of the Com-
munist party and its most prestigious leader, Abd al-Khaliq Mahjub, gave
rise to many misunderstandings, both within the party itself, riven by a
long internal debate, and within the international Communist movement,
especially in the Soviet Union. These 26 months of Sudans political his-
tory, which ended tragically with an abortive coup attempt by the extreme
left in July 1971, provide an insight into the essential elements of Commu-
nist strategy in the Middle East, including that of the Soviet Union.
At dawn on 25 May 1969 a coup dtat put an end to Sudans second
parliamentary experiment. This had lasted since the fall of General Abbud
in October 1964, who was ousted during a series of strikes and demon-
strations. Opposed by the traditional parties linked to two main religious
groups, Mahdiyya and Khatmiyya,2 the October Revolution wore itself
out with internal disputes. The collapse of the regime was precipitated by a
deepening economic crisis, suppression of the rebellion in the South, and
an increase in antidemocratic measuresin particular, the prohibition of
the Communist party. The Free Officers were able to assume power in a
bloodless coup.
On the evening of 25 May, Jafar Nimeiri announced the formation of
a Revolutionary Council, to be headed by himself, which would take the
countrys future in hand. The council consisted of ten members, only one
of whom was a civilian: the new prime minister, Babikir Awadallah.3 The

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The Free Officers and the Comrades 11

initial statements and measures revealed the new regimes radical orien-
tation. The Revolutionary Manifesto stated that power must revert to the
hands of workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and nationalist capital-
ists who are not associated with imperialism. The new head of govern-
ment called on the country to expand and strengthen trade and economic
relations with socialist countries and the Arab world . . . in order to break
away from the imperialist market and to expand the base of the public
sector, particularly in industry, to allow it to replace foreign capital. 4
The government also affirmed its solidarity with the Palestinians and the
resistance movement in the struggle against Israel and Zionism. There is a
familiar ring to these professions of faith, of the type introduced by Nasser
and echoed by revolutionary nationalist movements throughout the Middle
East. Thus, while the 25 May coup had its roots in Sudans own internal
disputes, it was also part of the broader Arab framework, dominated by the
personality of Nasser, as well as the crushing 1967 defeat that affected the
stability of the entire region.
The Sudanese Free Officers were of the same mold as the men who
seized power in Baghdad in July 1968, or later in Tripoli on I September
1969, or the men who helped Hafez al-Asad to oust his rivals in Damascus
with the corrective movement of November 1970. Behind the obvious dif-
ferences, all these examples reflect the same role by the military, the same
ideological, anti-imperialist speeches and the same desire to eliminate the
results of Israeli aggression. More than 20 years later the same men are
still in power, with the exception of Nimeiri, whose fall was to some extent
related to his violent confrontation with the Sudanese Communist party.

Cocking a Snook at Dogmatic Marxism

The strength of the Communist party was a decisive factor in the situation
in Khartoum after 25 May. Without retracing the history of Sudanese com-
munism,5 there is one paradox that needs clarification: it is that one of the
most backward countries of the Arab world should have given birth to
one of the most powerful communist parties in the Middle Eastone of
the very few that has been in the running for power.
Cocking a snook at dogmatic Marxism has its roots in the special his-
tory of the Communist party and other Sudanese political organizations.
The nationalist parties were established at the same time as the Commu-
nist party (19401945). Therefore, they had no seniority or special claim

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12 Alain Gresh

to legitimacy, as was often the case in the Third World (for example, in
Egypt or India); this was more particularly the case since the links of the
Umma party or the Democratic Unionist party with the Mahdiyya or the
Khatmiyya made them less attractive to important strata of the bourgeoisie
or petty bourgeoisie (such as intellectuals, lawyers, engineers, etc.). The
quality and influence of the Communist leadership (Secretary General
Abd al-Khaliq Mahjub, trade union chief Shafi Ahmad al-Sheikh, Joseph
Garang, Ibrahim Noqud et al.) derived from the adherence of a large sec-
tion of the elite to the party. In the election for the National Assembly, the
Communists gained 11 of the 15 seats reserved for the special category of
graduates. At the same time, the symbiosis between the Communist party
and the labor movement was displayed decisively, as shown particularly
by the railway workers, who not only had all the characteristics of a mod-
ern proletariat but also, because of the nature of their work, were present
everywhere in the country.6 The party even managed to take root among the
farmers of the Jazira.7
In his analysis of the Sudanese Communist party, Warburg noted that
it took root in only three groups, all of which were affected by moderniza-
tion: the Jazira farmers, the railway workers, and students and graduates.
He went on to say that these groups, despite their importance, accounted
for less than 10 percent of the population; the vast majority of Sudanese
remained loyal to their traditional leaders and sects, and were largely unaf-
fected by modern concepts of society and politics.8 This statement appears
questionable in part, or at any rate is incomplete. In a little-urbanized
society, with the majority of the population living in self-sufficiency and
with political power concentrated in Khartoum, the influence of the Com-
munist party in the sections of society affected by modernizationinclud-
ing the armyenabled it to play a decisive role; a parallel can be drawn with
Russia in 1917.
Three other factors helped the Sudanese Communists. First, as an off-
shoot of the Egyptian Communist movement,9 rather than of the Com-
munist party of the colonial power itself, they took part in the struggle
for national independence from the very start. Second, their cadres, unlike
those of many communist parties in the Middle East, were neither of for-
eign origin nor members of minorities. Third, the partys genuinely national
character could not be seriously challenged. In addition, the Communists
had the advantage of being organized in modern structures with base units
(called combat units), regional offices, a central committee elected at the

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The Free Officers and the Comrades 13

Party Congress, and a Political Bureau, which was responsible for putting
the party directives into application.10 Last, the Sudanese Communist
party had come into being at a time when the Communist movement was
enjoying unrivaled prestige, as a result of the Soviet victory over Nazism
and its aid during the 1950s and 1960s to the Arabs and other colonized
peoples.

The Communist Party in the Face of a Coup dtat

On 24 November 1965, Communist propaganda was banned by the Con-
stituent Assembly, which was established by the October 1964 Revolution
but was dominated by the traditional parties. In December the party was
dissolved and its deputies expelled from Parliament. It was forced under-
ground by the severe repression which followed, even though it did not
abandon all legal forms of action. However, the hopes born in October
1956 gradually faded, the forces of progress were on the defensive, and an
attempt at a general strike in February 1969 failed.
In these extremely difficult circumstances, the Central Committee of the
Communist party held its more or less annual plenum in March. During
a preliminary debate on the role of the army and the possibility of a coup
dtat, a split developed, and it continued to deepen as the months went
by.11 The possible eruption of the military onto the political scene seemed
particularly attractive to some cadres, as an organization of Free Officers
in which the Communists played an influential role, alongside Nasserists,
Bathists and independentshad existed since the early 1960s. This posi-
tion was publicly defended in December 1968, by Ahmad Sulayman, a
member of the Central Committee. Drawing a lesson from the defeat that
had followed the October 1964 movement, he argued that only the army
was capable of safeguarding revolutionary changes.12 However, the majority
of the Central Committee refused to embark on the road to a coup: not only
was the Communist party dissuaded by the Indonesian example,13 but it
only saw a role for the army within the framework of a popular movement
that had taken the offensive.
In April a meeting of the Free Officers discussed the possibility of a coup
dtat. Of the 13 officers present, 7 supported the Communist position of
rejection, but the remaining 6 decided to go ahead.14 On 9 May the Political
Bureau confirmed its opposition to military intervention. On the evening
of 24 May Nimeiri warned Shafi al-Sheikh, the trade union leader and a

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14 Alain Gresh

member of the Communist Partys Political Bureau, that a move was immi-
nent, and once more Shafi al-Sheikh expressed his disagreement.15
Although its advice had been disregarded, the Sudanese Communist
party nonetheless joined ranks with the coup leaders and on the morn-
ing of 25 May called on all revolutionary elements in the army (i.e., the
numerous officers and soldiers that it influenced) to ensure the success of
the movement. Three Communist officers, Major Hashim al-Ata, Lieuten-
ant Colonel Babikir al-Nur, and Faruk Hamdallah, joined the Revolutionary
Council while four other Communists entered the government, including
Joseph Garang, a member of the Political Bureau, who became Minister for
Southern Affairs on 19 June.

Nuances in Analysis
Joining forces with the new regime by no means removed the partys wor-
ries. Mahjub was even opposed to joining the government.16 On the eve-
ning of 25 May, the Central Committee held a plenary session that issued
a circular for party members only, which set out explicitly the conclu-
sions of the majority of the Committee. The circular stated that after the
failure of the strike of February 1969 the country had been faced with a
counterrevolution based on violence, which had put the Communist Party
on the defensive. Their strategy, as defined by their Fourth Congress in
1967 and by meetings of the leadership, aimed at ensuring the accession
to power of a Democratic National Front (DNF) to carry out the tasks of a
democratic national revolution and follow a socialist path. The DNF com-
prisesunder the leadership of the working classthe peasant masses, the
national bourgeoisie, revolutionary intellectuals and revolutionary army
factions which put themselves at the service of the Front. Success would
require broadly based work among the people who could not be replaced by
a coup (inqilab). The tactic of a coup dtat as an alternative to grassroots
work, in the final analysis, reflects the interests of the bourgeoisie and petty
bourgeoisie.17
On the basis of this theory, the movement of 25 May, was qualified as
a military coup dtatand not as a revolutionwhich had put power
in the hands of the petty bourgeoisie, one of the groups within the DNF.
Accordingly, counterrevolutionary elements had been ousted from impor-
tant positions, and more favorable conditions had been created for the
growth of democratic revolution. However, the Communist role was deci-

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The Free Officers and the Comrades 15

sive, not only in order to guarantee the protection of the new regime in the
face of possible destabilization, but also in order to transfer control to the
working class. The Central Committee concluded that its main tasks were
therefore to organize the people, spread Marxist ideology, and resist the
influence of the petty bourgeoisie.18

The Weight of Words

The circular was supported by Abd al-Khaliq Mahjub but met with strong
opposition from Umar Mustafa al-Makki and Muawiya Ibrahim, two of the
eight members of the Political Bureau, as well as from several members of
the Central Committee, including Muhammad Ahmad Sulayman, Secre-
tary of the Control Commission and responsible for the underground party
machine. They believed19 that the party had made a serious mistake by not
taking part in the coup, as well as by continuing to qualify the coup leaders
as petty bourgeois and underestimating the revolutionary capacity of the
new movement. The debate could almost be summed up as a semantic
argument. The one side saw the Revolutionary Council as being led by the
so-called petty bourgeois, the other by revolutionary democrats. A triv-
ial difference perhaps? But not for anyone familiar with the debate which
raged within the communist movement at the time.
Without going into the details of the discussion,20 which began with
the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist party, it is worth noting how
Soviet theoreticians envisaged revolutionary democracy in the 1960s:
In many former colonies and semi-colonial countries, socialist evolu-
tion is both possible and necessary before class differentiations have
become pronounced. In such conditions, when the proletariat has not
been transformed into a driving force, the intermediate stratasuch
as peasants, exploited urban classes and democratic intellectualsplay
a particularly active role and acquire political independence. Revolu-
tionary democracy appears as the mouthpiece of their interests . . . Its
programme goes beyond the framework of capitalism. It comprises a
large proportion of the demands which appear on the program of Com-
munist parties of countries which have recently been liberated.21
According to this theory, if Nimeiri and his colleagues had been revolu-
tionary democrats, they could have led Sudan towards socialism. The role
of the Communist party would then have been to support them. It could

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16 Alain Gresh

even have countenanced its own dissolution and absorption into a new
movementas was the case in Egypt in 1965. If, on the other hand, the
Revolutionary Council was under petty bourgeois control, it was the duty
of the Sudanese Communist party to support all positive aspects of the
regime, but at the same time to make the movement more radical and gain
control of it in the name of the working class. There were, thus, two very
different strategies open to the Communists.
Although the two concepts were separated by a deep divide, the Sudan-
ese Communist party continued to oscillate for several months. Despite
the 25 May text, the dispute was far from settled within the Political Bureau
and the Central Committee. There was indecision on the part of several
prominent leaders, including two members of the BureauShafi al-
Sheikh, head of the powerful Trade Union Federation which had hundreds
of thousands of members, and, in particular, Fatima Ibrahim, head of the
Womens Union. In addition, the new regime met with fierce opposition
from the right, especially from the Umma party and the Muslim Brothers.
In the face of these dangers, the Communist party was obliged to choose
camps.
Signs of tension soon appeared. Without consulting the party, Nimeiri
appointed Communist ministers, three out of four of whom were members
of what already seemed to be an anti-Mahjub group, which was later to
enjoy considerable support from the new regime. Ahmad Sulayman, Min-
ister of Economy and Foreign Trade as of 28 October 1969, admitted that
Abdel Khaliq Mahjub had always accused me of being a coup-monger, so
it was natural for the Free Officers, whom he similarly accused, to take
my side rather than his.22 Another suspicious sign was Nimeiris disso-
lution of the Free Officers organization, which Communist pressure had
deterred from carrying out a coup. Even more ominous was the calling up
of some Communist cadres by the Ministry of the Interior on 18 September
1969. The activities of the Sudanese Communists may have been tolerated,
but the party itself was still not legal and it remained under the Sword of
Damocles.

An Alliance of Conflict
For better or worse the alliance between the Communist party and Nimeiri
lasted until November 1970. This marriage of convenience was forced on
the two sides by a common enemy, the traditional power groups. The new

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The Free Officers and the Comrades 17

regime was too weak and under too much threat to do without the support
of a party that controlled the trade unions, had influence in the army, and
had various popular organizations at its beck and call. It was for this reason
that Nimeiri, against the advice of some of his colleagues, finally included
the Communists in the Revolutionary Council.
The Communist party, deeply divided, swung between support and criti-
cism of the regime in response to its own internal conflicts. The crisis of
October 1969, provides a good illustration of this behavior. During a visit
to the German Democratic Republic on 49 November 1969, Prime Min-
ister Awadallah announced that the Sudanese revolution cannot make
progress without the Communists.23 Unfavorable reactions to this decla-
ration prompted the Revolutionary Council to issue a communique disas-
sociating itself from Awadallahs statement, saying that all political parties
have been dissolved since the start of the revolution. Despite repeated
denials, a ministerial reshuffle looked inevitable.
In this tense situation the Political Bureau held an urgent meeting on
9 October.24 It condemned the Revolutionary Councils declaration and
decided to take measures to safeguard the security of the party. However,
internal opposition managed to paralyze all further action, and during this
time the Political Bureau held no less than ten unproductive meetings. On
17 October, Mahjub made the following proposals:
the publication of a Marxist analysis of the problem for party members
and the popular movement;
a campaign to prevent any ministerial reshuffle and a frank discussion
with Awadallah to dissuade him from this course of action, letting him
know at the same time that they would take his side if he resigned;
action by the Political Bureau to safeguard the partys security;
the mobilization of members to work among the people, in order to
help the regime free itself from right wing pressure25
On 18 November, when the Political Bureau was preparing to settle
the matter, Umar al-Mahdi told the leadership that the reshuffle would
not take place; all measures were suspended by the party. However, on
28 November, Nimeiri announced that he would himself take the post of
prime minister. This relative move to the right, and increased army con-
trol over the government, took place without the Communist party being
able to exercise any real influence over the course of events. Those who
supported unconditional collaboration with the Free Officers had demon-

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18 Alain Gresh

strated thateven though they were a minoritythey could counter the

strategy of the majority by virtue of their key positions within the party and
the ministries.
After its August 1969 session the Central Committee did not recon-
vene until March 1970. A special meeting of cadres, which was to settle
the dispute, was postponed from March to August 1970. But the October
crisis strengthened Mahjubs determination to get rid of what he called
right-wing elements. Meanwhile, Sudan was shaken by other events that
increased the tension between Nimeiri and the Communist party.
On 28 March 1970, an insurrection on the island of Aba, the traditional
seat of the Mahdi family 150 kilometers south of Khartoum, marked a turn-
ing point in the governments history. Sparked off by the spiritual leader of
the Mahdist Brotherhood, al-Hadi al-Mahdi, it resulted in violent confron-
tations between Mahdist militants and the army; hundreds of people were
killed, including al-Hadi himself. Nimeiri emerged as victor of the confron-
tation, profiting from strong support by the Communist party and the trade
unions. On 29 March, the partys Central Committee called on the popu-
lation to rally to the support of the military in its struggle against armed
forces of reaction.26 A huge demonstration took place on the same day in
Khartoum, helping to crush the revolt that had followed that of al-Mahdi.
On the day after the Aba plot, Mahjub was arrested, and on 3 April, he
was expelled to Egypt. Ironically, he traveled on the same aircraft as Sadiq
al-Mahdi, head of the Umma party, the political wing of the Mahdists, who
was also being sent into exile. Could Nimeiris decision to exile Mahjub be
explained by the reluctance of the Communists to use force against a deeply
rooted popular movement?27 This is not completely convincing, since the
party had been unsparing in its support of the regime during the crisis. The
Communist position, reaffirmed on several occasions, expressed approval
of the rude blow dealt to all the reactionary forces in our country by the
annihilation of the armed rightist grouping on Aba island.28 Furthermore,
one of the ministers emphasized that there was no connection between the
expulsion of the secretary general and the events on Aba.29
In fact, the president of the Revolutionary Council had two motives for
exiling Mahjub. First, he wanted to win over those, both in Sudan and
abroad, who were concerned that the movement was going too far to the
left; second, he wanted to reward those in the party who had given uncon-
ditional support to the regime. The hesitation on the part of the Political
Bureau and the Central Committee about which line to follow inclined

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The Free Officers and the Comrades 19

Nimeiri to believe that Mahjubs removal would definitively tip the balance
inside the Communist party.30 The task was all the more urgent as Nimeiri
was accelerating the process of creating a single party system.

Towards a Single Party?

The political parties have placed themselves into the circuit of imperial-
ism.31 This short statement by Nimeiri on the morning of 25 May, aptly
summed up his thinking. It was aimed first of all at the traditional parties,
but also at the Communist party, which had never been legalized. Sudans
new strongman returned several times to the idea of a one-party system,
inspired by Nasser and the example of the Arab Socialist Union, a single
body that had absorbed all the progressive forces within Egypt.
On 31 May 1969, Nimeiri announced that the formation of a political
organization was being studied and it would include all the groups which
have a common interest in protecting and consolidating the revolution.32
Work was started on a National Charter, on the Egyptian model, which was
published on 1 June 1970, several months behind the target date, and pre-
sented for discussion. It was to serve as a platform for the creation of a new
party which would include all the revolutionaries.
The Communist party adopted a cautious attitude towards this move of
Nimeiris. It did not boycott the committees in which the Charter was dis-
cussed, nor did it rule out setting up a Front around this platform. But, as
far as Mahjub and his colleagues were concerned, there was no question of
dissolving the party; the disbanding of the Egyptian Communist party in
1965, which the Sudanese Communists had approved at the time, could not
be allowed to constitute a precedent. From his exile in Cairo, the Secretary
General of the Sudanese Communist party said that any such organization
must either be a Front or take a flexible form.33
Mahjub explained his position in a long manifesto, published in Feb-
ruary 1970, which formed the basis for organizing a conference of party
cadres, that would not take place until that August.34
From the point of view of the tasks of the period of transition in our
country, change (in political life) is necessary on a democratic basis,
in order to transform the military coup [of 25 May] into a true popular
revolution. The decision to dissolve all political parties reflects a false
vision; it is evidence of a serious misunderstanding of the nature of

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20 Alain Gresh

the transitional period as a time for deepening the social and class
struggle, which will assure the victory of democratic revolution and
lead to socialist revolution. Thus it is a question of principle, and we
must struggle resolutely for the right of the working class to democ-
racy,35 organization and independent activity.
The question raised by Mahjub was, in fact, that of the leadership of the
revolutionary process, which he was claiming for his party and the working
class. In such conditions any compromise with Nimeiri would prove fragile
and provisional. This thinking was developed further some months later
when the Sudanese Communist party opposed the formation of the Federa-
tion between Egypt, Libya, and Sudan, which came into being on 8 Novem-
ber 1970. In a statement by the Political Bureau,36 the party sharply criti-
cized the situation in Egypt for its lack of a vanguard revolutionary party,
the weakness of the Arab Socialist Union, the role of the bureaucratic state
machinery and the antidemocratic secret services, and the hostility to
Marxism.
The Nasserist experiment, which served as a reference point for all the
ideological debates, was behind a letter by Ibrahim Noqud, the member
of the Political Bureau who was to succeed Mahjub as Secretary General
after his execution in 1971, and is still in 1989 the leader of the party. The
Egyptian Communists chose the course of merging their organization and
becoming absorbed into the Arab Socialist Union in the hope of setting up
a vanguard organization, which would unite them with the Nasserists on
the basis of the general principles of socialism. The Sudanese Communist
party does not wish to follow this path . . . the experience of the Egyptian
Communists is not relevant to us . . . we reject both its basis and its form . . .
We were wrong to believe that the dissolution of the Egyptian Communist
party could have been a beneficial experience. The letter went on to con-
demn those who had dissolved and liquidated the Communist organiza-
tion in Egypt, disarmed the working class and subjected it to the party of
the progressive petty bourgeoisie.37
This view ran counter to that of the international Communist move-
ment, and especially to that of the Soviet Union, which had described Egypt
as a country embarking on the road to socialism. It was also contrary to
the Soviet approach, which tended to subordinate the strategy of the local
Arab Communist parties to relations between the Soviet Union and the
Arab regimes. The socialist countries failure to understand the Sudanese
Communist partys reservations towards the new regime was heightened

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The Free Officers and the Comrades 21

by a series of diplomatic actions: Khartoums recognition of the German

Democratic Republic, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and North
Korea; the relations established with Moscow underlined by Nimeiris visit
to the Soviet Union; and the KhartoumCairo alliance. Is it therefore sur-
prising that the Soviets took the side of Mahjubs opponents in the internal
debate?

The Party Split and Soviet Mediation

Mahjub returned to Khartoum from his Cairo exile in July 1970, thanks to
the personal intervention of Nasser, with whom he was on friendly terms.
Although under house arrest, he played an active part in organizing a spe-
cial conference of party cadres, which was to take place on 21 August, in
the presence of 113 leading members, 32 members of the Central Commit-
tee, 17 permanent cadres, 41 elected representatives from the 25 regions,
and 23 representatives of the Central Committee bureaus (internal rela-
tions, organization, etc.) and of Communists working in mass organiza-
tions.38 It was a decisive step, which marked the victory of Mahjub over his
opponents.
The final resolutions, adopted by 80 percent of the delegates, reinforced
the essential points of the Secretary Generals thesis: Sudan was going
through a period of national democratic revolution. This stage, which
should not be confused with that of socialism, required a National Demo-
cratic Front, representative of the different classes involved in the revolu-
tion. In the conditions prevailing in Sudanwith its special national, politi-
cal, tribal, and social features and its class divisionsthe various groups
and classes could not be represented within a single organization, not even
the Communist party. Hence, the need for a multiparty system in which
the working class and its allies could take a leading rolean indispensable
step towards achieving victory and setting out on the path to socialism. The
conference firmly rejected Nimeiris proposals for the creation of a single
party and reiterated Mahjubs analysis of the events of 25 May 1969. As a
small concession to the rightists, it recognized that some government
circles are influenced by the ideas of the revolutionary democrats of the
Arab world, in particular those of the UAR, but in no case was the govern-
ment given the attribute of revolutionary democracy.39
Although the conference took a fairly positive view of Nimeiris decisions
in the economic field (nationalization of banks and foreign interests and

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22 Alain Gresh

the five-year plan), they were much more critical of his democratic achieve-
ments, where Sudan was still only at the beginning of the road. The con-
ference put forth its own proposals: first, the democratization of the pub-
lic sector and, second, the development of democracy for the working
masses, especially in rural areas. Further proposals ratified by the confer-
ence dealt with the role of the masses, increasing their activity and even
arming them. It is easy to understand the dual concerns of the Communist
party: on the one hand, not to make a sectarian judgment of the regimea
mistake made in other Arab countries, especially in Egypt in 1952and,
on the other hand, to reject categorically any process which might lead to
the partys dissolution (as in Egypt in 1965) or completely tie its hands (as
happened in Syria and Iraq in 1972 and 1973).
Despite his clear victory, Mahjub wanted to go further and exclude right-
ist elements from leading positions. With 12 out of the 32 seats on the
Central Committee, the rightists wielded considerable influence in some
quarters and, with Nimeiris help, could sabotage party decisions, as they
had already managed to do in October 1969. They were also in control of
the Department of Foreign Affairs and the partys theoretical monthly jour-
nal, al-Shiyui, as well as its underground organization.40 Finally, through
their broad access to the local media, the rightists were partly responsible
for identifying the Communist party with the government at a time of
burgeoning discontent over aspects of its policy on the economy and the
universities.41 Thus, the Central Committee meeting, planned for October,
could have had no other aim than to get rid of the opposition leaders: two
out of the eight members of the Political Bureau and about a third of the
Central Committee.42
It was in this context that Soviet mediation took place. Asking the Soviet
Communist party to help resolve internal party differences was an old
practice that had survived the dissolution of the Comintern. Two of the
interventions that took place in the Middle East in the 1960s were public
knowledge: one during the Israeli Communist party crisis between 1965
and 1967, and the other during the split in the Syrian Communist party
during the years 1969 and 1971. In the Israeli case, despite deep ideological
divisions, Moscow displayed great caution, only coming down on the side
of Meir Vilner after June 1967; even in Syria, a degree of circumspection
was apparent.
It is unlikely that the Soviet mediation in Sudan was in answer to a
request by the Sudanese Communist leadership, but rather by Muawiya

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The Free Officers and the Comrades 23

Ibrahim, who was responsible for foreign affairs and a well-known oppo-
nent of Mahjub. Whatever the case may be, the close relationship between
Moscow and Khartoum was by itself a sufficient reason for the Soviet Com-
munist partys involvement in the dispute that was racking the Sudanese
Communists. This is apparent from a long letter sent by the Central Com-
mittee of the Soviet Communist Party to its Sudanese counterpart in Octo-
ber 1970.43
Although couched in diplomatic terms, the letter took a fairly clear stand
in favor of the rightist opposition. In the year and a half of its existence,
the May Revolution (a term totally rejected by Mahjub) has taken initiatives
and carried out measures in line with the program of the Communist party
in both domestic and foreign policy. The Communist party (of the Soviet
Union) has adopted a firm policy of strengthening its future relations in
all spheres with the government of the Democratic Republic of Sudan,
which has, since the revolution of 25 May, put itself in the forefront of the
Arab national democratic revolution. This policy was consistent with the
general Soviet strategy at that time of supporting progressive regimes in
Egypt and Syria. The Soviet Communists called on their Sudanese counter-
parts to spare no effort to achieve unity, without making hasty decisions
which would threaten the partys unity. This position was also consonant
with that of the opposition, which hoped to prolong the debate. The letter
ended by saying that the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist
party hopes that the indications given in this letter will receive your full
attention, esteem and understanding.44
The attempt came to nothing. Rejecting Soviet advice, Mahjub set out
to get rid of his opposition.45 In fact, the letter marked the start of a long
decline in relations between the Sudanese Communists and Moscow. In
May 1971, a Soviet official told the Syrian Communist party that Mahjubs
position is incomprehensible.46 After the attempted coup of July 1971,
Bilak, second-in-command to the Czech party leader, condemned the irre-
sponsibility of the Sudanese Communists in a confidential report.47 More-
over, despite Nimeiris violent anti-Communist repression in August 1971,
the Soviets were quick to resume relations with Khartoum, not only at gov-
ernment level but also between the mass organizations (of women, youth,
etc.) of the two countries. Finally, in 1977, as Nimeiri gradually joined the
AmericanEgyptian camp, SovietSudanese relations went into an inevi-
table decline.

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24 Alain Gresh

The Confrontation
The die was now cast. The traditional centers of power, weakened by repres-
sion, kept their distance from the Sudanese Communist party. Two blocs
confronted each other, one around Nimeiri, the other around a reunited
Communist party. Although they agreed on certain points, their strategic
aims were, if not contradictory, at any rate different. A western diplomat
explained the situation to French journalist Eric Rouleau five weeks after
the events of 25 May 1969: Behind the ideological screen raised by the
authors of the 25 May coup lies the hand of the nationalist technocrats,
whose main goal is to push the country into the 20th century.48 Mahjub
was the first to understand the position. He also realized that the military
movement would not allow an autonomous political force to stand at its
sidethe Egyptian example was imprinted on the mind of one and all.
Indeed, events in Syria and Iraq subsequently proved the soundness of this
analysis.
Taking into account the failure of the rightist wing of the Communist
party, Nimeiri had Mahjub arrested and expelled three members of the
Revolutionary Council who were regarded as too close to the Communists.
The Communist party condemned both the rightist elements of the
regime and the putschist methods used to resolve differences between
revolutionaries.49 However, both parties tried for some months to avoid
an irrevocable breach. Joseph Garang, minister for southern affairs, who
had not given up his responsibilities as a member of the Political Bureau,
declared that the Communists still consider the government to be patri-
otic and progressive, even if we have reservations about some of its mem-
bers. However, this does not stop us from warning the government about
the dangerous line which it is now pursuing in detaining three members
of the Revolutionary Council, whom we consider to be our friends, and
dismissing numerous Communists.50
Nimeiris reaction was swift. Using as a pretext the Communist partys
distribution of leaflets protesting against the visit to Khartoum by the
Zarian Head of State, Zeke Mobutu, in February 1971, he called for the
partys dismemberment. On 20 April, he dissolved the mass organiza-
tions linked to the Communists.51 Finally, on 25 May, he announced the
formation of the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU), which became the sole
party, and at the same time the police arrested many Communist cadres.
These attacks on all frontsencouraged by Sadat, who, in May 1971, had
taken over from the Nasserist old guardtook place in a political climate

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The Free Officers and the Comrades 25

which was extremely unfavorable to the Communist party. On the regional

scale, the party had become isolated by the death of Nasser, the Egyptian
shift to the right, and the violent anti-Communism of Qadhdhafi. Mahjubs
earlier purge of the party had left deep scars and disaffected elements were
quick to denounce previous comrades to the police. Ideological problems
had not completely disappeared either. Finally, much of the partys energy
had been expended on internal debates at the expense of action among the
people.
Without any doubt, Nimeiri had understood the difficulties of the Com-
munist party, and had also found a provisional but efficient ally in the Mus-
lim Brothers. On 30 May, with its back to the wall, the party had no alter-
native but to condemn the military and police dictatorship and call for
building up the power of the National Democratic Front.52

The Coup dtat of 19 July . . . and the Aftermath

On 29 June, after several months imprisonment, Abd al-Khaliq Mahjub
escaped. He found refuge with the head of the presidential guard in the
very heart of the palace from which Nimeiri was conducting his hunt of
Communists. Several dozen Communist party leaders were arrested in the
next few days. Under pressure from Ahmad Sulayman, the Sudanese presi-
dent decided to arrest members of the armed forces linked to the party,53
starting with Hashim al-Ata. Forewarned, al-Ata decided to go into action,
and on the evening of 19 July, with the support of various army units, he
seized power. Nimeiri was arrested and a new leadership, very close to the
Communist party, took over.54 In a speech to the nation, the new strong-
man announced the establishment of a democratic political regime, the
pursuit of non-capitalist development opening up to socialism, the dis-
solution of organizations created by Nimeiri, and the establishment of
regional autonomy for the South. Al-Ata also proclaimed his solidarity
with the Palestinians and anti-imperialist forces, the socialist camp and
the Soviet Union.55 In a text dated 20 July, the Central Committee of the
Sudanese Communist party saluted the new page in the history of our
people and the new dawn which is breaking.56 On 22 July, a huge rally
organized by the Federation of Trade Unions took place in Khartoum in
front of Hashim al-Ata and Shafi Ahmad al-Sheikh.
But in fact the game was already over. Nimeiris defense minister, Gen-
eral Khalid Abbas Hasan, had fled to Cairo and was organizing a counter-

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26 Alain Gresh

coup. On the morning of 22 July, as 2,000 Sudanese soldiers were disem-

barking in Khartoumairlifted by Egyptian planes from the Suez Canala
BOAC aircraft from London was diverted to Benghazi. It was carrying two
passengers of note: Babikir al-Nur and Faruk Uthman Hamdallah, two of
the main instigators of the 19 July coup. They were later handed over to
Nimeiri by Qadhdhafi and executed.57 By the evening of 22 July al-Atas end
had come: Nimeiri had regained power. He took revenge in a bloodbath
that resulted in the deaths of the members of the armed forces linked to
the Communist party, as well as Abd al-Khaliq Mahjub, Shafi al-Sheikh,
Joseph Garang, and hundreds of Communists.
What was the precise involvement of the Communist party in this coup
dtat? The pieces of evidence subsequently gathered together have revealed
that there had been no decision in support of the coup by the Political
Bureau or the Central Committee. The Communists lack of preparation
gives broad support to this thesis: first, two of the military leaders of the
movement were outside the country; second, more than five hours elapsed
after the initial success of the coup, before the first radio announcement
by Hashim al-Ata; and last, for the space of 72 hours there was no govern-
ment. To this a final argument has to be added: after Nimeiris fall in April
1985, when the Communist party had every interest in vaunting its spon-
sorship of the movement of 19 July, the current Secretary General Noqud
continued to deny that his party had organized the coup.58 Another possible
hypothesis is that Mahjub took the decision on his own without consulting
his colleagues. This theory, which cannot be completely disproved, none-
theless gives rise to some skepticism. Not only is it hard to see Mahjub
taking such a far-reaching decision on his ownif only because it required
detailed planning on the part of the entire party apparatusbut also Mah-
jub mistrusted military intervention, as had been established in the course
of this essay. Whatever the case, the Communist party decided, as of 20
July, to put its full weight behind the new regimeand lost.
This failure ended the first round of confrontations between the Com-
munists and Nimeiri, who emerged as the clear winner. However, as I
have written elsewhere, the political positions taken by Mahjub during
this period would bear their fruit. The Sudanese Communists denied the
regime all chance at lasting stability by refusing to award Nimeiri with a
certificate of socialism, help him forge a dynamic ideology, or supply him
with the necessary cadres and the vital experience of the mass organiza-
tions (starting with the trade unions) to harness the people. The Sudanese

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The Free Officers and the Comrades 27

Communist party thus prevented Nimeiri, during his 16 years in power,

from acquiring that total hegemony that is made up simultaneously of con-
sent and repression,59 which the Syrian and Iraqi military were able to exert
in far less time during the 1970s with Communist assistance. Nimeiris
inability to find a solid power base was one of the origins of the 1985
Sudanese spring, which, for the first time in 15 years in the Arab world,
saw a popular movement putting an end to a military dictatorshipAbd
al-Khaliq Mahjubs posthumous revenge.

Notes
1 In 1959, the Political Bureau of the Iraqi Communist party also discussed the necessity
of seizing power but rejected it. On another case of relations between Communists and
nationalists, see my Communistes et nationalistes au Proche-Orient: le cas palestinien
depuis 1948, in Communisme (Paris, 1984), pp. 5689.
2 On the religious fraternities, which is an approximate translation of the Arabic term
taifa, see Didar Fawzi, Le Soudan. Problmes du passage de la cration de lEtat la libration
de la nation, 2 vols. (Lille, 1981), esp. pp. 28794, on their role as prenational structures
which nevertheless go beyond the tribal framework.
3 Speaker of the Parliament in 1954, he was one of the leaders of the October 1964 move-
ment. He resigned from his position as chief justice in 1967 after the refusal of the
National Assembly to accept the readmission of the Communist deputies as decided by
the Supreme Court.
4 For these quotations cf. Middle East Record 19691970 (Tel Aviv, 1977), pp. 107576, cited
hereafter as MER.
5 One may consult Gabriel Warburg, Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional
Society: The Case of Sudan (London, 1978) and Didar Fawzi, op. cit.
6 On the Sudanese labor movement, cf. Saad Eddin Fawzi, The Labour Movement in the
Sudan, 19461955 (London, 1957); Abd al-Munim al-Ghazali, Shafi Ahmad al-Sheikh wal-
harakat alnaqabiyya wal-wataniyyat al-sudaniyya (Beirut, 1972).
7 The Jazira project was put into effect after the First World War to provide high quality
cotton. Situated south of Khartoum with an area of 400,000 hectares the Jazira belongs
to the state which lets the land to the farmers.
8 Warburg, op. cit., p. 148.
9 The SCP was formed in 1946 on the initiative of the Democratic Movement for National
Liberation (DMNL) headed by Henri Curiel. At first its name was Sudanese Movement
for National Liberation.
10 Didar Fawzi, op. cit., p. 303.
11 Since 1961, the Communist party has given preference to the mass political strike as the
central method of struggle against the military dictatorships. This tactic twice succeeded:
in October 1964 and in April 1985. Cf. in this connection to two texts of central impor-
tance for an understanding of the party strategy, Thawrat shab (Khartoum, n.d. [1965?]);
Report to the 4th Party Congress in October 1967: al-marxiyya wa-qadayat al-thawrat al-
sudaniyya (Khartoum, n.d.).

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28 Alain Gresh

12 Cf. the series of articles published by the bourgeois daily Al-Ayyam (Khartoum, 5, 6, and
8 December 1968). At that time, the party still had a weekly paper but it was not there
that Sulayman decided to publish his arguments.
13 In Indonesia in 1965, an attempted coup dtat by the extreme left resulted in the liqui-
dation of the powerful Communist party and the massacre of hundreds of thousands of
its members and sympathizers. See also the article by Eric Rouleau: Le Soudan o les
militaires lpreuve du socialisme, Le Monde, 48 Sept. 1969.
14 Cf. the account in Tim Niblock, Class and Power in Sudan (London, 1987), p. 240.
15 Al-Ghazali, op. cit., p. 92.
16 Cf. Mohammed Sad Gaddal, al-Hizb al-shuyui al-sudani wa-inqilab 25 mayu (Khartoum,
1986), p. 39.
17 This text is reproduced in Husayn Abd al-Razzak, Haqaiq al-sidam maa al-hizb al-shuyui
al-sudani (Beirut, 1972).
18 I shall omit from the analysis of the debate between Nimeiri and the communists the
question of Southern Sudan. On this matter cf. Warburg, op. cit., pp. 15360. It should
also be noted that the radical positions adopted by the SCP on the Palestinian ques-
tion (refusal of recognizing Israels right to exist) removed an element of disagreement
between nationalists and communists.
19 These arguments and many other elements of the internal debate of the SCP are repro-
duced in the very partial book of Fuad Matar, al-Hizb al-shuyui al-sudani: naharuhu am
intahara? (Beirut, n.d.).
20 Cf. for instance, Hlne Carrre dEncausse, La politique sovitique au Moyen-Orient
(19551975) (Paris, 1975).
21 Karens Brutens, in Kommunist, the theoretical organ of the Communist party (CP) of the
Soviet quoted by Carrre dEncausse, op. cit., pp. 15657.
2 2 Statement made to Al-Anwar, Beirut, 30 December 1970, quoted by MER, p. 1079.
23 On the history of this crisis, see MER, pp. 108990.
2
4 For a detailed report of these discussions see the internal document of the CP about the
work of the Central Committee of the Sudanese CP at its March 1970 meeting, type-
script in Arabic, without place or date.
25 Ibid., p. 73.
26 See the internal document entitled Min al-lajnat al-markaziyya lil-hizb al-shuyui al-
sudani ila jami ada al-hizb, typescript, 2 pages, 29 March 1970. Note that the text also
calls for arming the people and orders party organizations to collect weapons.
27 Warburg, op. cit., pp. 12425; Razzak, op. cit., pp. 3031.
28 Documents of the meeting of cadres of the Sudanese Communist party (SCP) of August
1970 quoted by Matar, op. cit., p. 159.
29 Quoted in MER, p. 1099.
30 However on 4 April, the Central Committee protested to Nimeiri and the Revolutionary
Council against the exile of Mahjub: see the letter of the Central Committee dated Satur-
day 4 April 1970, to the President and members of the Revolutionary Council (typescript
in Arabic). See also the appeal of the Central Committee to the Sudanese masses repro-
duced in Al-Nida (Beirut), 16 April 1970, which rejects the attacks against Mahjub and
regards them as a plot against the entire party.
31 MER, p. 1075.

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The Free Officers and the Comrades 29

32 MER, p. 1103.
33 Interview with Al-Nahar (Beirut), 10 June 1970, quoted by MER, p. 1106. See also the
letter of the Central Committee to the Revolutionary Council dated 18 April 1970, Arabic
typescript, 2 pages.
34 Document reproduced by Matar, op. cit.
35 Mahjub alludes here to the ban on the right to strike imposed by Nimeiri.
36 Quoted by Matar, op. cit., pp. 19196.
37 Published in the left-wing Lebanese weekly Al-Hurriyya, 15 February 1971 and repro-
duced in the Thse troisime cycle of M. Ghassan Fawaz, Le Soudan, le PCS et le camp
socialiste: relations internationales et relations internationalistes, Universit de Paris 1.
38 M. S. Gaddal, op. cit., p. 49.
39 Reproduced by Matar, op. cit., pp. 14862.
40 Ahmad Sulayman was the secretary of the Control Commission. His knowledge of the
underground apparatus enabled him, in 1971, to help Nimeiri most efficiently in his
attempt at liquidating the CP. He was in 1988 a member of the Political Bureau of the
National Islamic Front (Muslim Brothers).
41 On the negative consequences for the CP of the support that it gave to certain govern-
ment measures in the university see Yahia Hussein Babiker, The Khartoum University
Students Union: Political Role during 19631979 (Khartoum, n.d.).
42 This influence went far beyond that of the rightists among the cadres and the base of
the CP.
43 The full text is found in Fawzi, op. cit., pp. 18891.
44 See for instance the text Call for Party Unity quoted by Matar, op. cit., pp. 26065.
45 The defeated opposition refused to take part in the Central Committee meeting of Octo-
ber 1970. It tried, without success, to set up a new party. The repressive measures taken
by the authorities led, on the contrary, to the return of some cadres to the ranks of the CP
by 1971. See for instance Tasfiyyat al-inqisam fi mantiqat al-jazira wal-manaqal, type-
script, May 1971, 7 pages.
46 Quoted by Fawaz, op. cit., p. 195.
47 The report is dated October 1971 (see Le Monde, 12 February 1972). Note also that Nou-
velle Revue Internationale (Prague), which expresses the views of the world communist
parties, did not publish any text by a leader of the Sudanese Communist party from 1970
to 1976.
48 Article cited in Le Monde, 5 September 1969.
49 See the statement of the Central Committee of 16 November 1970 in Warburg, op. cit.,
pp. 18391.
5 0 Quoted in MER, p. 1103.
51 On these events see the statement of the Central Committee Hawla ahdath wa-bayan 12
fibrayir, mimeographed document, 4 pages, dated 12 February 1971.
52 See the statement of the Central Committee al-Hizb al-shuyui yarfud tariq al-diktaturiyya
wa-muadat al-shab, typescript, 2 pages, dated 30 May 1970.
53 See Abd al-Razzaq, op. cit., p. 45.
54 For a detailed account of the coup dtat see Eric Rouleau, Soudan: la commune avorte,
Le Monde, 2023 August 1971.
55 See Le Monde, 21 July 1971, and Warburg, op. cit., page 131.

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30 Alain Gresh

5 6 See text in Abd al-Razzaq, op. cit., pp. 9296.

57 There is no doubt about the involvement of the Egyptian and Libyan governments in the
countercoupan involvement which is affirmed by Eric Rouleau, op. cit., and Matar, op.
cit., pp. 5965. Opinions differ only as to the scope of the intervention. Nimeiri himself
expressed satisfaction at the help given by the United Arab Republic and Libya: see Le
Monde, 27 July 1971.
58 Statement of 5 August 1985, reproduced in Gaddal, op. cit., p. 61.
5 9 Alain Gresh, Lexprience soudanaise, Recherches Internationales, 18 (OctoberDecem-
ber 1985), pp. 10819.

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