MODES OF DISCOVERY
REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN (1991)
NARVASA, J.
FACTS:
1) The case was commenced on July 21, 1987 by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
2) The complaint which initiated the action was denominated
one "for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution
and damages," and was avowedly filed pursuant to
Executive Order No. 14 of President Corazon C. Aquino
3) After having been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr. and
Santiago, instead of filing their answer, jointly filed a
"MOTION TO STRIKE OUT SOME PORTIONS OF THE
COMPLAINT AND FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS OF OTHER
PORTIONS"
4) The PCGG filed an opposition thereto, and the movants, a
reply to the opposition
5) The Sandiganbayan, in order to expedite proceedings and
accommodate the defendants, gave the PCGG forty-five
(45) days to expand its complaint to make more specific
certain allegations
6) Tantoco and Santiago then presented a "motion for leave
to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court"
dated February 1, 1988, and "Interrogatories under Rule
25."
a) Basically, they sought an answer to the question:
"Who were the Commissioners of the PCGG (aside from
its Chairman, Hon. Ramon Diaz, who verified the
complaint) who approved or authorized the inclusion
of Messrs. Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R.
Santiago as defendants in the ** case?"
7) The PCCG responded by filing a motion dated February 9,
1988 to strike out said motion and interrogatories as being
impertinent, "queer," "weird," or "procedurally bizarre as
the purpose thereof lacks merit as it is improper,
impertinent and irrelevant under any guise."
8) In compliance with the Order of January 29, 1988, the
PCGG filed an Expanded Complaint
9) As regards this expanded complaint, Tantoco and Santiago
reiterated their motion for bill of particulars, through a
Manifestation
10) Afterwards, by Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied the
motion to strike out, for bill of particulars, and for leave to
file interrogatories, holding them to be without legal and
factual basis
11) Also denied was the PCGG's motion to strike out
impertinent pleadings
12) The Sandiganbayan declared inter alia the complaint to
be "sufficiently definite and clear enough," there are
adequate allegations ** which clearly portray the supposed
involvement and/or alleged participation of defendants-
movants in the transactions described in detail in said
Complaint," and "the other matters sought for
particularization are evidentiary in nature which
should be ventilated in the pre-trial or trial proper ** ."
It also opined that "(s)ervice of interrogatories before
joinder of issue and without leave of court is
premature * * (absent) any special or extraordinary
circumstances * * which would justify * * (the same)."
13) Tantoco and Santiago then filed an Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim
14) In response, the PCGG presented a "Reply to Answer with
Motion to Dismiss Compulsory Counterclaim."
15) The case was set for pre-trial on July 31, 1989.[13] On July
25, 1989, the PCGG submitted its PRE-TRIAL BRIEF was
reset parties were required to submit pre-trial briefs
16) Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a
pleading denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff,
[13]
followed by an Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff" 1
as well as a Motion for Production and Inspection of
Documents2
17) The Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories
and granted the motion for production and inspection of
documents (production being scheduled on September 14
and 15, 1989), respectively
18) The PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of August 25, 1989 (allowing production and
inspection of documents) also filed on September 4,
1989 an opposition to the Amended Interrogatories, which
the Sandiganbayan treated as a motion for reconsideration
19) After hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2)
Resolutions on September 29, 1989, the first, denying
reconsideration (of the Resolution allowing production of
documents), and the second, reiterating by implication the
permission to serve the amended interrogatories on the
plaintiff (PCGG)
20) HENCE, THIS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
PCGG
Contends that said orders, both dated September 29, 1989,
should be nullified because rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction
SUPREME COURT
Issued a temporary restraining order on October 27, 1989,
directing the Sandiganbayan to desist from enforcing its
questioned resolutions
SUBJECT OF THE CASE: TWO MODES OF DISCOVERY:
interrogatories to parties; production and inspectionof
documents and things
SUPREME COURT
1) "Evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and
learned by the parties before the trial. Indeed, it is the
purpose and policy of the law that the parties -- before the
1 "1. In connection with the allegations ** in paragraph 1 **
, what specific property or properties does the plaintiff
claim it has the right to recover from defendants Tantoco, Jr.
and Santiago for being 'ill-gotten'?"
"3. In connection with the allegations ** in paragraph 10 (a)
** , what specific act or acts ** were committed by
defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago in 'concert with'
defendant Ferdinand Marcos and in furtherance or pursuit,
of the alleged systematic plan of said defendant Marcos to
accumulate ill-gotten wealth?"
"5. In connection with ** paragraph 13 ** , what specific
act or acts of the defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago **
were committed by said defendants as part, or in
furtherance, of the alleged plan to conceal assets of
defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos?"
"7. In connection with ** paragraph 15 (c) ** is it plaintiffs
position or theory of the case that Tourist Duty Free Shops,
Inc., including all the assets of said corporation, are
beneficially owned by either or both defendants Ferdinand
and Imelda Marcos and that the defendants Tantoco, Jr. and
Santiago, as well as, the other stockholders of record of the
same corporation are mere 'dummies' of said defendants
Ferdinand and/or Imelda R. Marcos?
2 1) the "official records and other evidence" on the basis
of which the verification of the Amended Complaint asserted
that the allegations thereof are "true and correct;"
2) the documents listed in PCGG's Pre-Trial Brief as those
"intended to be presented and ** marked as exhibits for the
plaintiff;" and
3) "the minutes of the meeting of the PCGG which
chronicles the discussion (if any) and the decision (of the
Chairman and members) to file the complaint" in the case at
bar.
 trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial -- should
discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to
the action, not only those known to them individually, but
also those known to their adversaries; in other words, the
desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on
in the dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal
possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism
set forth in Rules 24 to 29.
2) The experience in other jurisdictions has been that ample
discovery before trial, under proper regulation,
accomplished one of the most necessary ends of modern
procedure: it not only eliminates unessential issues from
trials thereby shortening them considerably, but also
requires parties to play the game with the cards on the
table so that the possibility of fair settlement before trial is
measurably increased.
a) As just intimated, the deposition-discovery procedure
was designed to remedy the conceded inadequacy and
cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-
giving, issue-formulation and fact revelation
theretofore performed primarily by the pleadings.
3) The various modes or instruments of discovery are
meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial
hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic
issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for
ascertaining the facts relative to those issues.
4) The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable the parties,
consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest
possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil
trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the
dark
5) To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by
depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when the
interrogated party is called as a witness to testify orally at
trial. The inquiry extends to all facts which are relevant,
whether they be ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only
those matters which are privileged. The objective is as
much to give every party the fullest possible information of
all the relevant facts before the trial as to obtain evidence
for use upon said trial.
6) SECTION 2, RULE 24 allows the examination of the
deponent:
a) regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant
to the subject of the pending action, whether relating
to the claim or defense of any other party;
b) as well as
i) the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition and location of any books, documents,
or other tangible things; and
ii) the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of relevant facts
7) What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit
of information which may be useful in the preparation for
trial, such as the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of relevant facts; those relevant facts
themselves; and the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any books, documents, or other
tangible things
a) Deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad
and liberal treatment
b) Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by
both parties is essential to proper litigation
c) The deposition-discovery procedure simply
advances the stage at which the disclosure can be
compelled from the time of trial to the period
preceding it, thus reducing the possibility of
surprise
8) Such modes of discovery as (a) depositions (whether
by oral examination or written interrogatories) under
Rule 24, (b) interrogatories to parties under Rule 25,
and (c) requests for admissions under Rule 26, may be
availed of without leave of court, and generally, without
court intervention. The Rules of Court explicitly
provide that leave of court is not necessary to avail of
said modes of discovery after an answer to the
complaint has been served.
9) It is only when an answer has not yet been filed (but
after jurisdiction has been obtained over the
defendant or property subject of the action) that prior
leave of court is needed to avail of these modes of
discovery, the reason being that at that time the issues
are not yet joined and the disputed facts are not clear.
10) Leave of court is required as regards discovery by (a)
production or inspection of documents or things in
accordance with Rule 27, or (b) physical and mental
examination of persons under Rule 28, which may be
granted upon due application and a showing of due cause
11) To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is
otherwise untrammeled and efficacious, the law imposes
serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make
discovery, such as dismissing the action or proceeding or
part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the
disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party
or agent of the party; payment of the amount of reasonable
expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel
discovery; taking the matters inquired into as established
in accordance with the claim of the party seeking
discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party support
or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out
pleadings or parts thereof; staying further proceedings
12) LIMITATIONS TO DISCOVERY: arise when it can be shown
that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in
such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the
person subject to the inquiry; when the inquiry touches
upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized
domains of privilege
WON THE PCGGS CONTENTIONS3 AS REGARDS THE
INTERROGATORIES HOLD WATER AND SHOULD BE
SUSTAIINED?
1) NO.
2) First, in this case, there was no need for the private
respondents to seek such leave to serve their "Amended
Interrogatories to Plaintiff (dated August 2, 1989) after
they had filed their answer to the PCGG's complaint, just as
there was no need for the Sandiganbayan to act thereon
3) Also, the first part of petitioner's submission is adequately
confuted by Section 1, Rule 25 which states that if the
party served with interrogatories is a juridical entity
such as "a public or private corporation or a
partnership or association," the same shall be "answered
** by any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf."
a) There is absolutely no reason why this proposition
should not be applied by analogy to the
interrogatories served on the PCGG. That the
interrogatories are addressed only to the PCGG,
without naming any specific commissioner or officer
thereof, is utterly of no consequence, and may not be
invoked as a reason to refuse to answer.
4) A bill of particulars may elicit only ultimate facts, not so-
called evidentiary facts. The latter are without doubt
proper subject of discovery
3 1) that said interrogatories are not specific and do not
name the particular individuals to whom they are
propounded, being addressed only to the PCGG;
2) that the interrogatories deal with factual matters
which the Sandiganbayan (in denying the movants motion
for bill of particulars) had already declared to be part of the
PCGG's proof upon trial; and
3) that the interrogatories would make PCGG
Commissioners and officers witnesses, in contravention of
Executive Order No. 14 and related issuances
5) Neither may it be validly argued that the amended
interrogatories lack specificity. The merest glance at
them disproves the argument. The interrogatories are
made to relate to individual paragraphs of the PCGG's
expanded complaint and inquire about details of the
ultimate facts therein alleged. What the PCGG may
properly do is to object to specific items of the
interrogatories, on the ground of lack of relevancy, or
privilege, or that the inquiries are being made in bad faith,
or simply to embarass or oppress it.
6) That the interrogatories deal with factual matters which
will be part of the PCGG's proof upon trial, is not ground
for suppressing them, either. As already pointed out, it is
the precise purpose of discovery to ensure mutual
knowledge of all the relevant facts on the part of all
parties even before trial, this being deemed essential
to proper litigation. This is why either party may compel
the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his
possession; and the stage at which disclosure of evidence
is made is advanced from the time of trial to the period
preceding it.
7) Also unmeritorious is the objection that the
interrogatories would make PCGG Commissioners and
officers witnesses, in contravention of Executive Order No.
14 and related issuances. In the first place, there is
nothing at all wrong in a party's making his adversary his
witness (SEE SECTION 6, RULE 132)
8) It suffices to point out that "fishing expeditions" are
precisely permitted through the modes of discovery.
9) Moreover, a defendant who files a counterclaim against the
plaintiff is allowed by the Rules to implead persons
(theretofore strangers to the action) as additional
defendants on said counterclaim (SECTION 14, RULE 6)
RE: STATE IMMUNITY
1) The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that
it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its consent. But it is
axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its
sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit,
descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The PCGG
cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the
State, even while assuming to represent or act for the
State
2) The consent of the State to be sued may be given expressly
or impliedly. Express consent may be manifested either
through a general law or a special law. Implied consent is
given when the State itself commences litigation or when it
enters into a contract
RE: PCGGS CONTENTION AS REGARDS TO THE NULLITY OF
THE SBS ORDER FOR THE PRODUCTION AND INSPECTION
OF SPECIFIED DOCUMENTS AND THINGS ALLEGEDLY IN ITS
POSSESSION
1) UNTENABLE
2) The Court gives short shrift to the argument that some
documents sought to be produced and inspected had
already been presented in Court and marked
preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits, the movants having
in fact viewed, scrutinized and even offered objections
thereto and made comments thereon.
3) Obviously, there is nothing secret or confidential about
these documents.
4) No serious objection can therefore be presented to the
desire of the private respondents to have copies of those
documents in order to study them some more or
otherwise use them during the trial for any purpose
allowed by law.
5) The PCGG says that some of the documents are non-
existent. This it can allege in response to the
corresponding question in the interrogatories, and it will
incur no sanction for doing so unless it is subsequently
established that the denial is false.
6) The claim that use of the documents is proscribed by
Executive Order No. 1 has already been dealt with. The
PCGG is however at liberty to allege and prove that said
documents fall within some other privilege, constitutional
or statutory.
7) THERE IS GOOD CAUSE FOR THE PRODUCTION AND
INSPECTION OF THE SUBJECT DOCUMENTS
8) Some of the documents are, according to the verification of
the amended complaint, the basis of several of the material
allegations of said complaint. Others, admittedly, are to be
used in evidence by the plaintiff.
PETITION DENIED.
Notes
All that is entailed to activate or put in motion the
process of discovery by interrogatories to parties under
Rule 25 of the Rules of Court, is simply the delivery
directly to a party of a letter setting forth a list of
questions with the request that they be answered
individually. The service of such a communication on the
party has the effect of imposing on him the obligation of
answering the questions "separately and fully in writing
under oath," and serving "a copy of the answers on the
party submitting the interrogatories within fifteen (15)
days after service of the interrogatories
So, too, discovery under Rule 26 is begun by nothing
more complex than the service on a party of a letter or
other written communication containing a request that
specific facts therein set forth and/or particular documents
copies of which are thereto appended, be admitted in
writing. Again, the receipt of such a communication by the
party has the effect of imposing on him the obligation of
serving the party requesting admission with "a sworn
statement either denying specifically the matters of which
an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the
reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny
those matters," failing in which "(e)ach of the matters of
which admission is requested shall be deemed admitted
The resolution of controversies is, as everyone knows,
the raison d'etre of courts. This essential function is
accomplished by first, the ascertainment of all the material
and relevant facts and second, after that determination of
the facts has been completed, by the application of the law
thereto
A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which
one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of
movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It
is rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and
fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then
brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all
imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks
that justice be done on the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels,
are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it
deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its
great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration from courts. There should be no vested right
in technicalities.
It is the duty of each contending party to lay
before the court the facts in issue -- fully and fairly; i.e.,
to present to the court all the material and relevant
facts known to him, suppressing or concealing nothing,
nor preventing another party, by clever and adroit
manipulation of the technical rules of pleading and
evidence, from also presenting all the facts within his
knowledge.

FORTUNE CORPORATION V. CA
REGALADO, J.
FACTS:
1) This is a petition for certiorari of the decision of the
respondent CA affirming the decision of the RTC of San
Pablo City disallowing the taking of the oral deposition of
Juanito A. Teope who was the chairman of the Board
Directors of private respondent.
2) An action for breach of contract was filed by the petitioner
against the private respondent and after the latter filed its
answer petitioner served them with written
interrogatories pursuant to Rule 25 of the ROC. The pre-
trial was scheduled for January 9, February 12 and April
22, 1992.
3) On March 26, 1992, petitioner served the private
respondent a Notice to Take Deposition upon Oral
Examination notifying the latter that petitioner would take
the deposition of the chairman in accordance with Section
15, Rule 24.
4) Private Respondent filed an Urgent Motion Not to Take
Deposition/Vehement Opposition to Plaintiffs Notice to
Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination alleging that: a)
petitioner has previously availed of one mode of discovery,
b) there is absolutely no sound reason or justification
advanced for the taking of the oral deposition, c) such
taking would cause annoyance, embarrassment and
oppression upon the prospective deponent, d) deponent has
no intention of leaving the country, e)the intended deponent
is available to testify in open court if required during the
trial on the merits.
5) Trial court ruled that the deposition should not be taken
on the grounds that the deposition of Juanito A. Teope
appears unwarranted since the proposed deponent had
already responded to the written interrogatories of the
plaintiff and has signified his availability to testify in court.
6) The petitioner filed an original action for certiorari before
the SC and was referred to the CA for further adjudication
on the merits.
7) CA ruled dismissing the petition holding that the RTC has
jurisdiction to direct, in its discretion, that a deposition
shall not be taken, if there are valid reasons for the ruling.
This is provided for in Sections 16 and 18, Rule 24 of the
ROC which imply that the right of the party to take
depositions as means of discovery is not absolute. They
reasoned that: a)proposed deponent had earlier
responded to the written interrogatories; b)deponent had
signified his availability to testify in court; c)to allow the
deposition would deprive the trial court of the opportunity
to ask clarificatory question.
8) With the denial of the petitioners MFR the instant petition
was filed with the SC.
ISSUES:
1) WON that the decision of respondent court dismissing its
petition on the ground that appeal and not certiorari is the
proper remedy in this case, is erroneous for the reason
that such ruling is based on facts which are not obtaining
in the case at bar, viz.: (a) that petitioner had already
obtained a deposition, which it had not; (b) that said
deposition was offered as evidence, which was not done
because there was nothing yet to offer, and (c) that said
offer was rejected, which did not happen because there
was nothing to reject as nothing was offered. YES
2) WON the trial court gravely abused its discretion in
ordering that the deposition be not taken in the absence of
good cause therefor. It asserts that the reasons advanced
by the trial court cannot be considered "good cause"
within the contemplation of the law, which reasons, to
repeat, are: (a) that the proposed deponent had earlier
responded to written interrogatories; (b) that the
proposed deponent had signified his availability to testify
in court; and (c) that to allow the deposition would
deprive the trial court of the opportunity to ask
clarificatory questions to the vital witness.
RULING:
1) The SC discussed that the finer attributes of the rules of
discovery would contribute immensely to the attainment
of the judiciarys primordial goal of expediting the
disposition of cases. The deposition-discovery procedure
was designed to remedy the conceded inadequacy and
cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-
giving, issue formulation and face revelation theretofore
performes primarily by the pleadings. The various modes
or instruments of discovery are meant to serve 1) as a
device, along with the pre trial hearing under Rule 20, to
narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties
and 2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to
those issues. The evident purpose is to enable the parties
consistent with recognized privileges to obtain the fullest
possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil
trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the
dark. To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered
by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when the
interrogated party is called as witness to testify orally at
trial.
I. Section 1, Rule 24. Depositions pending action, when
may be taken. - By leave of court after jurisdiction has been
obtained over any defendant or property which is the
subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer
has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a
party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by
deposition upon oral examination or written
interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be
compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 23.
Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these
rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison may
be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the court
prescribes.
Section 16 of Rule 24 provides that after notice is
served for taking a deposition by oral examination,
upon motion seasonably made by any party or by the
person to be examined and upon notice and for good
cause shown, the court in which the action is pending
may, among others, make an order that the deposition
shall not be taken.
This provision explicitly vests in the court the power to
order that the deposition shall not be taken and this
grant connotes the authority to exercise discretion in
connection therewith. It is well settled, however, that
the discretion conferred by law is not unlimited: that it
must be exercised, not arbitrarily, capriciously, or
oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in
consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that
its purpose may be attained.
Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that certiorari
will not lie to review or correct discovery orders made
prior to trial. This is because, like other discovery
orders, orders made under Section 16, Rule 24 are
interlocutory and not appealable, 12 considering that
they do not finally dispose of the proceeding or of any
independent offshoot of it.
However, such rules are subject to the exception that
discretionary acts will be reviewed where the lower
court or tribunal has acted without or in excess of its
 jurisdiction, where an interlocutory order does not
conform to essential requirements of law and may
reasonably cause material injury throughout
subsequent proceedings for which the remedy of
appeal will be inadequate, or where there is a clear or
serious abuse of discretion. It is our considered
opinion that on the bases of circumstances obtaining
in the case at bar, and which will hereinafter be
discussed, certiorari may be availed of to review the
questioned order of the trial court. SC ruled that
certiorari may be availed of to review the questioned
order of the trial court.
2) II. It is true that to ensure that availment of the modes of
discovery would be untrammeled and efficacious, Rule 29
imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to
comply with or respond to the modes of discovery, such as
dismissing his action or proceeding or part thereof, or
rendering judgment by default against the disobedient
party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of
the party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses
incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery;
taking the matters inquired into as established in
accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery;
refusal to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose
designated claims or defenses; striking out his pleadings
or parts thereof; or staying further proceedings.
Section 16 of Rule 24 clearly states that it is only upon
notice and for good cause shown that the court may
order that the deposition shall not be taken. The
matter of good cause is to be determined by the court
in the exercise of judicial discretion. Good cause means
a substantial reason -- one that affords a legal excuse.
Whether or not substantial reasons exist is for the court to
determine, as there is no hard and fast rule for determining
the question as to what is meant by the term "for good cause
shown."
The requirement, however, that good cause be shown
for a protective order puts the burden on the party
seeking relief to show some plainly adequate reasons
for the order. A particular and specific demonstration
of facts, as distinguished from conclusive statements,
is required to establish good cause for the issuance of
a protective order. 16 What constitutes good cause
furthermore depends upon the kind of protective
order that is sought.
All motions under these subparagraphs of the rule
must be supported by "good cause" and a strong
showing is required before a party will be denied
entirely the right to take a deposition. A mere
allegation, without proof, that the deposition is being
taken in bad faith is not a sufficient ground for such an
order. Neither is an allegation that it will subject the
party to a penalty or forfeiture. The mere fact that the
information sought by deposition has already been
obtained through a bill of particulars, interrogatories,
or other depositions will not suffice, although if it is
entirely repetitious a deposition may be forbidden.
The allegation that the deponent knows nothing about the
matters involved does not justify prohibiting the taking of
the deposition, nor that whatever the witness knows is
protected by the "work product doctrine," nor that
privileged information or trade secrets will be sought in
the course of the examination, nor that all the transactions
were either conducted or confirmed in writing. 18 In the
present case, private respondent failed to sufficiently
establish that there is good cause to support the order of
the trial court that the deposition shall not be taken.
1. the fact that petitioner had previously availed of the
mode of discovery, which is by written interrogatories
supposedly covering all claims, counterclaims and
defenses in the case, cannot be considered "good cause,"
because: (a) the fact that information similar to that
sought had been obtained by answers to interrogatories
does not bar an examination before trial, and is not a valid
objection to the taking of a deposition where there is no
duplication and the examining party is not acting in bad
faith; and (b) knowledge of the facts by the petitioner
concerning which the proposed deponent is to be
examined does not justify a refusal of such examination.
On the question of whether an oral deposition might be
taken after service of interrogatories, the courts took a
relatively liberal view. In Howard v. States Marine Corp.,
the first case in which this question was raised, Judge
Hilbert said that:
"Where it develops that examination by interrogatories
has been inadequate, the court unquestionably has, and in
a proper case should exercise, discretion to permit an oral
examination. But it should be made to clearly appear that
the relevant subject matter will not involve the
interrogation of the witness with respect to those
particulars upon which he was examined by
interrogatories."
It is quite clear, therefore, and we so hold that under the
present Rules the fact that a party has resorted to a
particular method of discovery will not bar subsequent
use of other discovery devices, as long as the party is not
attempting to circumvent a ruling of the court, or to harass
or oppress the other party. As a matter of practice, it will
often be desirable to resort to both interrogatories and
depositions in one or the other sequence.
2. The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in
court does not constitute "good cause" to justify the court's
order that his deposition shall not be taken. That the
witness is unable to attend or testify is one of the grounds
when the deposition of a witness may be used in court
during the trial. 25 But the same reason cannot be
successfully invoked to prohibit the taking of his
deposition.
The right to take statements and the right to use them in
court have been kept entirely distinct. The utmost freedom
is allowed in taking depositions; restrictions are imposed
upon their use.
Regardless of the development of devices for pre-trial fact
investigation, our legal system is now thoroughly
committed to the notion that on the trial itself the
adducing of facts by viva voce testimony of witnesses
whose demeanor and manner are subject to the
observation of the judge is superior to the use of
written statements of the same witnesses. Preference for
oral testimony has dictated most of the limitations on the
use of depositions as evidence. And since their use as
evidence was originally conceived as the sole function of
depositions proper, the limitations on their taking
dovetailed with the limitations on their use. But under the
concept adopted by the new Rules, the deposition serves
the double function of a method of discovery with use
on trial not necessarily contemplated and a method of
presenting testimony. Accordingly, no limitations other
than relevancy and privilege have been placed on the
taking of depositions, while the use at the trial is subject to
circumscriptions looking toward the use of oral testimony
wherever practicable.
3. The main reason given in support of the contested order
is that, if the deposition were taken, the court could not
observe the behavior of the deponents. The insufficiency of
this circumstance to justify the interdiction of the taking of
a deposition becomes apparent when we consider that,
otherwise, no deposition could ever be taken, said
objection or handicap being common to all depositions
alike. Finally, in the absence of proof, the allegation that
petitioner merely intended to annoy, harass or oppress the
proposed deponent cannot ably support the setting aside
of a notice to take deposition.
Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance,
embarrassment or oppression may be issued if the
following requirements are complied with: (a) that there is
a motion made by any party or by the person to be
examined; (b) that the motion has been seasonably filed;
(c) that there is good cause shown; and (d) that notice of
such motion has been served to the other party.
(d) Testimony is preserved, so that if a witness
unexpectedly dies or becomes unavailable at the trial, his
deposition is available.
2. It is an effective means of detecting and exposing false,
fraudulent, and sham claims and defenses.
3. It makes available in a simple, convenient, and often,
inexpensive way facts which otherwise could not have
been proved, except with great difficulty and sometimes
not at all.
4. It educates the parties in advance of trial as to the real
value of their claims and defenses, thereby encouraging
settlements out of court.

4. Finally, in the absence of proof, the allegation that 5. It expedites the disposal of litigation saves the time of
petitioner merely intended to annoy, harass or oppress the the courts, and clears the docket of many cases by
proposed deponent cannot ably support the setting aside settlements and dismissals which otherwise would have to
of a notice to take deposition. be tried.
Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance,
embarrassment or oppression may be issued if the 6. It safeguards against surprise at the trial, prevents
following requirements are complied with: (a) that there is delays, and narrows and simplifies the issues to be tried,
a motion made by any party or by the person to be thereby expediting the trial.
examined; (b) that the motion has been seasonably filed;
(c) that there is good cause shown; and (d) that notice of 7. It facilitates both the preparation and the trial of cases.
such motion has been served to the other party.
Inconvenience to the party whose deposition is to be taken
is not a valid objection to the taking of his deposition. 32
No doubt, private respondent and its representative who is
to be examined will be inconvenienced as are all
parties when required to submit to examination but this
is no ground for denial of the deposition-discovery
process.
On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, we find and so
hold that the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in issuing an order that the deposition shall not
be taken in this case, and that respondent court erred in
affirming the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and judgment is
hereby rendered ORDERING the court a quo to allow
herein petitioner to take the deposition upon oral
examination of Juanito S. Teope in and for purposes of
Civil Case No. SP-3469 pending before it. SO ORDERED.

Other Notes
The other principal benefits derivable from the availability
and operation of a liberal discovery procedure are the
following:

1. It is of great assistance in ascertaining the truth and in

checking and preventing perjury. The reasons for this are:

(a) The witness (including a party) is examined while his

memory is fresh:

(b) The witness (including a party) is generally not

coached in preparation for a pretrial oral examination with
the result that his testimony is likely to be more
spontaneous. Where the examination is upon written
interrogatories, however, it appears that some lawyers
furnish the witness with copies of the interrogatories and
thereby enable him to prepare his answers in advance.

(c) A party or witness whose deposition has been taken at

an early stage in the litigation cannot, at a later date,
readily manufacture testimony in contradiction to his
deposition;

[G.R. No. 137136. November 3, 1999]
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. CAMILLE T.
CRUZ and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Facts:
PR Camille T. Cruz, then a teenage girl who would be
travelling alone for the first time, purchased from P Northwest
Airlines a round-trip ticket for a flight from Manila to
Boston via Tokyo and back. The scheduled departure date from
Manila to Boston was August 27, 1992 at 8:40 a.m. in economy
class while the scheduled return flight from Boston to Manila in
business class was on December 22, 1992 at 10:25 a.m.
On November 25, 1992, PR re-scheduled her return flight
from Boston to Manila to December 17, 1992 at 10:05
a.m. Accordingly, P booked her on a Northwest flight with route
as follows: Boston to Chicago; Chicago to Tokyo; and, Tokyo to
Manila.
P reconfirmed the flight from Boston, U.S.A. to Manila
scheduled on December 17, 1992 at least 72 hours prior to the
said scheduled flight.
However, barely a day before the scheduled date of
departure, P called PR and informed her that instead of
following her original itinerary, PR should instead board the
TWA flight from Boston to Kennedy International Airport in
New York and she was further instructed by P to proceed to the
latters counter at the Logan Airport in Boston before boarding
the TWA flight on the scheduled date of departure.
On December 17, 1992, PR proceeded early to the Ps
counter at Logan Airport in Boston but was referred to the TWA
counter where she was informed that she may not be able to
take the TWA flight because it was cancelled.
Due to the unexplained and belated cancellation of the
TWA flight, PR had to rush back from the International Gate to
Ps counter in Logan Airport in Boston where she was again
told to proceed immediately to the Delta Airlines terminal to
catch the Delta Airlines flight to La Guardia Airport in New York
where shell take a service car to Kennedy Airport in New York.
In her haste to catch the said flight, PR tripped and fell
down on her way from petitioners counter to the Delta Airlines
counter in Logan Airport in Boston thereby suffering slight
physical injuries and embarrassment.
When PR reached La Guardia Airport in New York, she
again had to rush to the service car. In her haste and anxiety to
catch her flight, PR again tripped and fell down thereby
suffering more physical injuries, embarrassment and great
inconvenience.
Upon arrival, she was informed at Ps counter in Kennedy
International Airport that she was issued the wrong ticket to
Seoul instead of Tokyo. Although the error was rectified by P,
PR was by then extremely nervous, worried, stressed out, and
exhausted.
To make matters worse, P downgraded PR from business
class to economy class on two legs of her flight without notice
nor apology. Neither did P offer to refund the excess fare PR
paid for a business class seat.
Hence, on August 6, 1993, PR filed a complaint against
petitioner Northwest Airlines, Inc. for breach of contract of
carriage. PR claimed to have suffered actual, moral and
exemplary damages.
P filed its answer with compulsory counterclaim alleging
therein that the flight on which PR was originally booked was
cancelled due to maintenance problems and bad weather, and
that the airline had done its best to re-book private respondent
on the next available flights.
Trial progressed until 1995 when it was Ps turn to
present its witness on three scheduled dates. Two of the
settings were cancelled when Ps counsel filed notice for oral
deposition of one Mario Garza, witness for P, in New York. PR
filed her opposition and suggested written interrogatories
instead. In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court denied
PRs opposition, thus allowing the deposition to proceed. The
oral deposition took place in New York on July 24, 1995 or
notably two days before the issuance of the trial courts
order allowing the deposition to proceed.
The records show that although it was the Honorable
Consul Milagros R. Perez who swore in the deponent, she
thereafter designated one Attorney Gonzalez as Deposition
Officer.
On November 9, 1995, at the hearing of the instant case, P
presented the deposition record of its witness while PR
reserved her right to cross-examine and present rebuttal
evidence.
PR, likewise, questioned the conduct of the oral
deposition as irregular and moved for suppression of the same
on the following grounds:
1. The deposition has been improperly and irregularly taken
and returned in that:
(a) The deposition was taken on July 24, 1995 despite
the fact that this Honorable Court only ruled on the
matter on July 26, 1995.
(b) There is no certification given by the officer
taking the deposition that the same is a true record of
the testimony given by the deponent in violation of
Rule 24, Section 20 of the Rules of Court.
(c) The deposition was not securely sealed in an
envelope indorsed with the title of the action and
marked Deposition of (here insert the name of
witness) in violation of Rule 24, Section 20 of the
Rules of Court.
(d) The officer taking the deposition did not give any
notice to the plaintiff of the filing of the deposition in
violation of Rule 24, Section 21 of the Rules of Court.
(e) The person designated as deposition officer is not
among those persons authorized to take deposition in
foreign countries in violation of Rule 24, Section 11 of
the Rules of Court.
(f) There is no showing on record that the deponent
read and signed the deposition in violation of Rule 24,
Section 19 of the Rules of Court.
2. These irregularities or defects were discovered by the
plaintiff during the hearing on November 9, 1995 and plaintiff
has acted with reasonable promptness after having ascertained
the existence of the aforesaid irregularities and defects.
However, PRs motion was denied by the trial court. In its
Order, dated July 23, 1996, the trial court admitted Ps formal
offer of evidence with supplement thereto and gave PR three
days from receipt within which to signify her intention to
present rebuttal evidence.
On August 2, 1996, PR filed a manifestation and motion
stating that the court failed to rule on its motion to suppress
deposition and to grant her the right to cross-examine Ps
deponent. PR also manifested her intention to present rebuttal
evidence.
In its Order, dated September 5, 1996, the trial court
denied PRs manifestation and motion. Said court, likewise,
denied PRs motion for reconsideration of the above order.
Hence, PR filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals on April 7, 1998.
CA- set aside RTC judgment and ordered RTC to disallow the
deposition
P Northwest, thereafter, filed this instant petition for review
Issue/Held:
WoN PR can still cross-examine the deponent -YES
Ratio:
Section 16 of Rule 24 (now Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure of 1997) provides that after notice is served for taking
a deposition by oral examination, upon motion seasonably made
by any party or by the person to be examined and for good cause
shown, the court in which the action is pending may, among
others, make an order that the deposition shall not be taken. The
rest of the same section allows the taking of the deposition
subject to certain conditions specified therein.
The provision explicitly vesting in the court the power to
order that the deposition shall not be taken connotes the
authority to exercise discretion on the matter. However, the
discretion conferred by law is not unlimited. It must be
exercised, not arbitrarily or oppressively, but in a reasonable
manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law. The
courts should always see to it that the safeguards for the
protection of the parties and deponents are firmly
maintained. As aptly stated by Chief Justice Moran:
xxx. Any discovery involves a prying into another persons
affairs prying that is quite justified if it is to be a legitimate aid
to litigation, but not justified if it is not to be such an aid. For
this reason, courts are given ample powers to forbid discovery
which is intended not as an aid to litigation, but merely to
annoy, embarrass or oppress either the deponent or the
adverse party, or both.
Respondent court correctly observed that the
deposition in this case was not used for discovery
purposes, as the examinee was the employee of P, but rather to
accommodate the former who was in Massachusetts,
U.S.A. Such being the case, the general rules on examination of
witnesses under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requiring said
examination to be done in court following the order set therein,
should be observed.
We note with approval respondent courts ruling
disallowing the depositions and upholding PRs right to cross-
examine:
xxx [The] deposition was not a mode of discovery but rather a
direct testimony by respondents witness and there appears a
strategy by respondent to exclude Ps participation from the
proceedings.
While a months notice would ordinarily be sufficient, the
circumstances in this case are different. Two days of trial were
cancelled and notice for oral deposition was given in lieu of the
third date. The locus of oral deposition is not easily within
reach of ordinary citizens for it requires time to get a travel visa
to the United States, book a flight in July to the United States,
and more importantly substantial travel fare is needed to
obtain a round trip ticket by place (sic) from Manila to New
York and back to Manila.
As an international carrier, Northwest could very conveniently
send its counsel to New York. However, the ends of justice
would have been better served if the witness were instead
brought to the Philippines. Written interrogatories was (sic)
requested to balance this inconvenience which was nonetheless
also objected to and denied for simply being time consuming.
The objections raised by P [PR], in the light of the above
considerations, take on a greater weight.
Section 11 of Rule 24 provides: In a foreign state or country,
depositions shall be taken (a) on notice before a secretary of
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul or
consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before
such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or
under letters rogatory.
The deposition document clearly indicates that while the
consul swore in the witness and the stenographer, it was
another officer in the Philippine Consulate who undertook
the entire proceedings thereafter. Respondent Northwest
argues on the presumption of regularity of official functions
and even obtained a certification to this effect plus an assertion
that none of the participants in the Consulate were in any way
related to the respondent or their counsel. But presumptions
should fail when the record itself bears out the irregularity.
The Rules (Rule 24, Sec. 29) indicate that objections to the oral
deposition will be waived unless the objections are made with
reasonable promptness. In this case, the objections have been
prompt and vehement, yet they were disregarded as not
material such that the deposition and the exhibits related
thereto were admitted.
In Fortune Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,[27] this Court
set aside upon review by certiorari the order of the trial court
allowing deposition because the order did not conform to the
essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause
material injury to the adverse party:
The rule is that certiorari will generally not lie to review a
discretionary action of any tribunal. Also, as a general
proposition, a writ of certiorari is available only to review final
judgment or decrees. Pursuant to this rule, it has been held
that certiorari will not lie to review or correct discovery orders
made prior to trial. This is because, like other discovery
orders, orders made under Section 16, Rule 24 are
interlocutory and not appealable considering that they do
not finally dispose of the proceeding or of any independent
offshoot of it.
However, such rules are subject to the exception that
discretionary acts will be reviewed where the lower court or
tribunal has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, where
an interlocutory order does not conform to essential
requirements of law and may reasonably cause material injury
throughout the subsequent proceedings for which the remedy
of appeal will be inadequate, or where there is a clear or
serious abuse of discretion.
PETITION DENIED.
BRIBONERIA V. CA
PADILLA, J.

FACTS:
1) On 23 May 1988, petitioner Salvador D. Briboneria, as
plaintiff, filed a complaint for Annulment of Document and
Damages, with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order against private respondent
Gertrudes B. Mag-isa, with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig
2) COMPLAINT: Plaintiff, together with his wife Nonita A.
Briboneria, are the registered owners (of) a parcel of land.
Among the improvements on this parcel of land is
plaintiff's residential house where his wife and children
used to stay until they migrated to the United States.
Plaintiff, as the duly registered owner, has declared the
above-described parcel of land and residential house for
tax purposes under P.D. No. 464. Of late, plaintiff was
surprised to learn that his wife Nonita A. Briboneria sold
to defendant Gertrudis B. Mag-isa by means of a Deed of
Absolute Sale the abovementioned house and lot. Plaintiff,
as the duly registered owner, never authorized or
empowered Nonita A. Briboneria or anybody for or on his
behalf, stead or representation to enter into any
transaction regarding the sale, transfer or conveyance of
the abovedescribed house and lot. Plaintiff had all along
been expecting that the house and lot shall be for his
family, particularly his children. As a result of the
unauthorized sale, plaintiff was denied the use and
enjoyment of his properties since defendant Gertrudis B.
Mag-isa had even leased the premises to another who in
turn had prohibited plaintiff from entering the premises.
By reason of the unlawful deprivation from him of his
properties, plaintiff suffered serious anxiety, fright, mental
anguish and wounded feelings and further subjected him
to social humiliation and embarassment, particularly
considering that the abovementioned properties came
from his hard-earned salaries and emoluments from his
employment abroad, for which defendants Mag-isa must
be adjudged liable for moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and other costs. The next move of
defendants - Mag-isa is to consolidate ownership over the
properties by means of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex C
herein) which is inceptually void. P now prays for the
issuance of a WPI, or at least a TRO. Plaintiff is ready and
willing to post a bond in such amount as this Honorable
Court may equitable determine subject to such conditions
and terms as may be appropriately imposed thereon.
3) MAG-ISAS ANSWER: She basically absolutely denied some
and admitted the others. She also partially admitted some
allegations.
4) On 13 September 1988, after issues in the case had been
joined, petitioner served on the private respondent Mag-
isa a request for admission4
4 The Material facts
1. That plaintiff, together with his wife Nonita A. Briboneria,
are the registered owners of a parcel of land together with
the improvements thereon covered under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N-29895 (Annex A-Complaint) located
at 59 Amsterdam Street, Provident Village, Marikina, Metro-
Manila.
2. That plaintiff, as the duly registered owner has declared
for the year 1988 the parcel of land and residential house
for tax purposes under P.D. 464.
3. That plaintiff's family used to live at the said residential
house.
4. That defendant Mag-isa actually lives near the location
address of plaintiff's properties.
5. That defendant Mag-isa knows that plaintiff works abroad
but he (plaintiff) regularly comes home and stays with his
family at their residential house abovementioned.
6. That the abovementioned house and lot were acquired
through plaintiff's hard-earned salaries and benefits from his
5) On 10 November 1988, the private respondents filed with
the court a quo their Answer to Request for Admission,
alleging that most if not all the matters subject of
petitioner's request for admission had been admitted,
denied and/or clarified in their verified answer dated 20
June 1988, and that the other matters not admitted, denied
and/or clarified were either irrelevant or improper.
6) On 18 November 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, claiming that the Answer to Request for
Admission was filed by private respondents beyond the
ten (10) day period fixed in the request and that the
answer was not under oath; that, consequently the private
respondents are deemed to have admitted the material
facts and documents subject of the request for admission,
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. The
private respondents filed an opposition to the motion for
summary judgment, while the petitioner filed a reply to
said opposition DENIED MR GRANTED PR filed a
Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration P filed an
Opposition TC set aside its July 20 order granting Ps Mr,
and set the date for the pre-trial conference
7) The petitioner thereupon filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to annul
and set aside the order dated 1 Febuary 1989 of the court
a quo, alleging that the said order was issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
DISMISSED the matters of fact and the documents
requested to be admitted are mere reiterations and/or
reproductions of those alleged in the complaint
8) HENCE, THIS PETITION
employment abroad.
7. That plaintiff has reserved the house and lot as a place to
stay to (sic) with his family upon his retirement from his
employment.
8. That plaintiff had never authorized his wife or anybody for
that matter to sell or to dispose of the property covered
under TCT No. N-29895.
9. That plaintiff never executed the alleged Special Power of
Attorney dated November 14, 1984 appended as Annex 2 -
Answer.
10. That the alleged Special Power of Attorney mentions
Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-29995 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Rizal.
11. That plaintiff never personally appeared before Notary
Public Jose Constantino upon whom the acknowledgment of
said Special Power of Attorney was made.
12. That plaintiff never sold or disposed of, and never
consented to the sale or disposition of the properties
covered under TCT No. N-29995.
13. That plaintiff never received the consideration of the
alleged sale, and he never benefited therefrom in any
manner.
14. That defendant Mag-isa never confirmed with plaintiff
notwithstanding their being neighbors, the authenticity of
the alleged Special Power of Attorney and the validity of the
alleged Deed of Absolute Sale particularly considering that
the subject matter thereof involves plaintiff's properties.
15. That plaintiff was denied the use and enjoyment of his
properties since defendant Mag-isa had even leased the
premises to another who in turn had prohibited plaintiff from
entering the premises.
The Material Documents
1. Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-29895 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal, copy attached to the Complaint as Annex A.
2. The Declarations of Real Property filed by Salvador D.
Briboneria pursuant to P.D. 464 for the year 1988, copies
attached to the Complaint as Annexes B and B-1
PETITIONERS CONTENTIONS 9) In the present case, it will be noted that the request for
Claims that the material facts and documents described in the admission was not served upon the private
request for admission are relevant evidentiary matters respondent Mag-isa but upon her counsel, Atty.
supportive of his cause of action. He further argues that the Alfredo A. Alto. Private respondent Mag-isa, therefore,
private respondents have impliedly admitted the material facts cannot be deemed to have admitted the facts and
and documents subject of the request for admission on account documents subject of the request for admission for
of their failure to answer the request for admission within the having failed to file her answer thereto within the
period fixed therein, and for said answer not being under oath. period fixed in the request.
PETITION DENIED.
SUPREME COURT: THE PETITION CANNOT BE UPHELD.
1) To begin with, a cursory reading of the petitioner's
complaint and his request for admission clearly shows, as
found by respondent appellate court, that "the material
matters and documents set forth in the request for
admission are the same as those set forth in the complaint
which private respondents either admitted or denied in
their answer."
2) A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact
already admitted by his pleading and concerning which
there is no issue (Sherr vs. East, 71 A2d, 752, Terry 260,
cited in 27 C.J.S. 91), nor should he be required to make a
second denial of those already denied in his answer to the
complaint. A request for admission is not intended to
merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the
requesting party's pleading but should set forth relevant
evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and
exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish
said party's cause of action or defense
3) Moreover, under Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court,
the request for admission must be served directly upon the
party; otherwise, the party to whom the request is
directed cannot be deemed to have admitted the
genuineness of any relevant document described in and
exhibited with the request or relevant matters of fact set
forth therein, on account of failure to answer the request
for admission.
4) 'Whenever notice is necessary, it must appear that it was
served on the proper person, and there must be strict
compliance with a statute requiring service on a particular
person, so that service on another person is not sufficient.'
5) 'In general, service of notice of a modal or formal step in a
proceeding on the attorney of record is sufficient, if not
otherwise specifically provided by statute or rule of court
6) Section 1 of Rule 20 (now Section 1, Rule 25) provides that
any party may serve upon any adverse party written
interrogatories, and Chief Justice Moran commenting on
this rule states that the written interrogatories referred to
in the instant provision should be delivered directly to the
adverse party. We see no valid reason why a different rule
should govern request for admission inasmuch as written
interrogatories and request for admissions are both modes
of discovery
7) Section 1 of Rule 23 (now Section 1, Rule 26) of the Rules
of Court which expressly states that a party may serve
upon any other party a written request should receive no
other construction than that the request for admission
must be served directy on the party and not on his counsel.
Section 2 of Rule 27 (now Section 2, Rule 13) of the Rules
of Court does not control the mode of service of request
for admission. It should be observed that the orders,
motions and other papers mentioned in said section have
this property in common: they have to be filed with the
court. A request for admission, on the other hand, need not
be filed with the court; it was intended to operate extra-
judicially and courts are not burdened with the duty to
determine the propriety or impropriety of the request for
admission
8) Permission of the court is not required to make such a
request or demand, or to file it, or serve it on the adverse
party; but service must be made in the manner specified
by the statute or rule.