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of Strategic Studies (IISS) London for giving me the opportunity to be here and share
approach towards nuclear diplomacy and nuclear policy, before focusing on the
capacity of Visiting Research Fellow at the IISS, and not necessarily a governmental
or organizational perspective.
Nuclear Diplomacy
not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the
principle of honesty and fair play in national and international dealings and are
prepared to make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity
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1. To preserve strategic stability and peace in South Asia at lowest level of
armament.
with India.
proliferation efforts.
engagements with the bilateral partners, including the United Kingdom, United States
and others, as well as multilateral institutions such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
Nuclear Policy
As you know, Pakistan was a reluctant entrant into the club of nuclear weapon
states. India conducted first nuclear test in 1974, by diverting nuclear material from its
peaceful nuclear program, which actually prompted the creation of the NSG to
prevent further misuse of peaceful nuclear trade. Going nuclear thus became a
strategic compulsion for Pakistan. Eventfully, Pakistan became an overt nuclear state
strategic balance in the region. In fact, both India and Pakistan recognized early on
After becoming overt nuclear weapon state, Pakistan has taken a number of
program. These steps have been taken in supreme national interest but they also
program.
Pakistan has established a robust command and control structure led by the
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chaired by the Prime Minister. The NCA represents a fusion of important civilian,
over all aspects of Pakistans nuclear policy such as development, operations, security,
Plans Division (SPD) is the Secretariat and the workhorse of the NCA. SPD ensures
The NSG Guidelines also require that such high standards of nuclear security should
be ensured during nuclear transfers between states. Pakistan also ratified the 2005
at the national level to handle nuclear and radiological emergencies. To prevent illicit
portal monitors at entry/ exit points. In a short span of few years, Pakistans Centre of
Excellence in Nuclear Security has earned world-wide praise for its professional and
Pakistan has also streamlined and strengthened its export control regime.
Pakistans export control lists are completely harmonized with standards adopted by
NSG and other multilateral export control regimes. Pakistan therefore considers that
it has strong credentials to become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
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Another important aspect of Pakistans nuclear program that remains
peaceful nuclear program, which includes over four decades of experience of running
nuclear power plants, research reactors with impeccable safety, security and
medicine and industrial sectors. You would be happy to know that over two dozens
of nuclear medical centres are currently operating in Pakistan and providing quality
During July last year Pakistan also became the Associate Member of the
Pakistans nuclear weapon capabilities are intended solely for Pakistans own
defence against a specific existential threat from India to preserve peace and stability
in South Asia. Unlike some other states, Pakistan has neither relied upon extended
deterrence from other nuclear weapon states nor has any commitment to extend its
nuclear umbrella to any non-nuclear weapon state against nuclear threats. There
Pakistans policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence is based. Pakistan neither has the
intent nor can afford to engage in conventional or nuclear arms race with India.
Pakistan does not seek parity with India but a strategic balance that prevents space for
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dialogue process with India. Nonetheless, durable peace in South Asia would remain
complex at Karnataka that could potentially be used for developing mega-ton yield
thermo-nuclear weapons.
Alongside these capabilities, India military has also developed offensive Cold
Start Doctrine (CSD), with an aim to fight limited conventional war below Pakistans
perceived nuclear threshold. The basic rationale behind CSD was that Indias military
could wage a conventional war against Pakistan, thinking that Pakistan would not
risk retaliating with its bigger strategic nuclear weapon. Since CSD was announced in
2004, the military forces in India have been re-organized, re-equipped and the concept
have been tested in military exercises. In order to deter India from such military
adventurism, Pakistan was bound to respond, which came in the form of Full
Spectrum Deterrence (FSD), which essentially signals that Pakistan has the nuclear
capability at entire threat spectrum, including the strategic, operational, and tactical
levels. It is worth emphasizing that while Indias Cold Start Doctrine is intended to
find space for war, Pakistans Full Spectrum Deterrence does exactly the opposite
In fact, during conclusion of last Nuclear Security Summit held this year at
Washington D.C., the US President Obama himself has emphasized upon India and
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Pakistan to not to move in wrong direction as they develop military doctrines.
While it is good that US President Obama has realized that Indias Cold Start Doctrine
statement and most western narrative fails to consider is that Pakistan developed its
India. This essentially means, in retrospective sense, that had there been no cold start,
there would not have been full spectrum deterrence by Pakistan. And in prospective
sense, if CSD does not operationalize, in all likelihood the FSD will also not get
operationalized.
I would again emphasize that Pakistans foreign policy and nuclear diplomacy
is aimed to preserve strategic stability in South Asia. It is also incumbent upon the
stability in the region rather than undermining it. That is one of the reasons why the
ongoing discussion on membership of India and Pakistan in the NSG are so important.
NSG Membership
membership before I conclude. For past few months, international media was abuzz
with news of intense nuclear diplomacy by India and Pakistan to build support for
their respective cases for membership of the NSG, which was expected to be decided
in its annual meeting held last month at Seoul. A month earlier, India and Pakistan
had formally applied for membership. Since NSG reinforces NPTs core objective of
requires a potential member to also be a state party to the NPT. This remains the major
roadblock in reaching a decision on membership bids of India and Pakistan, the other
being the consensus itself. The NSG faces the predicament of either choosing an India-
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The NSG membership and South Asian security dynamics are closely inter-
linked. As I said before NSG was created in direct response to Indias diversion of
nuclear material from peaceful program to conduct nuclear test in 1974. In past four
decades, NSG has evolved into an effective and credible non-proliferation institution.
The NSG was also following a principled and objective approach of nuclear non-
commerce with India and Pakistan, primarily due to their non-NPT status. The NSG
was living up to its principle adopted with consensus in 1992 plenary meeting to
fulfilling the commercial and geo-political interests of few member states and granted
cooperation with NSG in 2008. It is well established that NSG exemption was driven
started negotiating nuclear cooperation with India, even a year before NSG exemption
got finalized. Instead of conscious decision, the NSG exemption was actually a
September 2008, when the consensus was finally evolved. Since then India has
concluded more than dozen nuclear deals to secure foreign nuclear technology and
material.
from India such as signing or ratification of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and
ending fissile material production. And it seems highly unlikely that India would
accept such conditions, if put as criteria for membership. Indias safeguards approach
negotiated with the IAEA contains several loopholes that could allow India, at its will,
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augment its military nuclear arsenal. Indias Additional Protocol is deemed a mickey
There was also a total disregard to how NSG exemption would impact the
regional stability in South Asia. The NSG exemption at one hand freed up Indias
domestic reserves for military program but at the same time due to lack of proper
weapon developments.
Now the NSG is facing the unique and unprecedented question of giving NSG
membership to India and Pakistan. The US continues to push for India-only approach
which has support from other major players, including the United Kingdom. China
leads other members who call for through deliberations, while many amongst them
table, NSG has the golden opportunity to restore its credentials, by demanding
stringent non-proliferation criteria for admission, rather than succumbing yet again
Like it happened in 2008, voices against a repeat of 2008 exemption are gaining
strength within the US. The New York Times has written in its editorial against
non-proliferation experts have argued against bending rules in favour of India and
key US officials have warned against dangers of renewed arms race in South Asia, as
Pakistan clearly knows that once India becomes an NSG member ahead of Pakistan,
The NSG has to understand the motivations of Pakistan and India in seeking
membership and assess whether they conform to its non-proliferation objectives. For
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example, NSG and India hold competing views on transfers related to sensitive
nuclear technologies such as Enrichment and reprocessing (ENR). India claims it won
clean exemption in 2008, with full access to such technologies, and wants to join NSG
with the same understanding. Whereas, ENR transfers are not permissible to non-NPT
states, such as India, as per 2011 revision of NSG guidelines. Indias NSG membership
bid should also be seen in the context of its aspiration to become a global power. India
has long pursued nuclear route to become a permanent member of United Nations
Security Council.
states into the fold of non-proliferation regime. In that context Pakistan has indicated
its interest to play its part as mainstreamed partner in global non-proliferation efforts
and shown willingness to accept any objective criteria for membership which should
be equally applicable on India and Pakistan; and secondly, Pakistan considers that
criteria-based approach would help preserve strategic stability in South Asia. It would
re-hyphenate the two nuclear states and might induce India to engage with Pakistan
Conclusion
In conclusion, I would say that the lack of consensus on this issue at last
pressure. The division might also suggest that NSG is re-thinking its past decision of
lifting trade restrictions on India in 2008 and learning from it. That decision by the
NSG did not require strong non-proliferation commitments from India, inadvertently
on nuclear restraint in South Asia. This legacy largely explains the current split within
the NSG. But the outgoing US administration may still attempt to win over the NSG,
in its final few months ahead. The irony is that the US continues to push contradictory
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policies in South Asia. At one hand, it wants nuclear restraint and progress made in
dialogue between India and Pakistan but at the same time pursues actions which
breed arms race and instability. The US approach in NSG is reflective of this duplicity.
extracting the United Kingdom from the European Union is not going to make
either body stronger With so little clarity on what Brexit is intended to achieve, it
Like the Brexit, it might not happen that the NSG in particular and the
strengthening the non-proliferation regime and strategic stability in South Asia. The
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