2006 Labor Law Case Digests have misappropriated company funds in the sum of
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK VS. about P5, 000,000.00 and is hereby suspended from his
ANASTACIO D. ABAD
G.R. No. 158045. February 28, 2005
Facts: Anastacio D. Abad was the senior Assistant
Manager (Sales Head) of petitioner Philippine Commercial
International Bank (PCI Bank now Equitable PCI Bank)],
when he was dismissed from his work. Abad received a
Memorandum from petitioner Bank concerning the
irregular clearing of PNB-Naval Check of Sixtu Chu, the
Banks valued client. Abad submitted his Answer,
categorically denying that he instructed his subordinates
to validate the out-of-town checks of Sixtu Chu presented
for deposit or encashment as local clearing checks.
During the actual investigation conducted by petitioner
Bank, several transactions violative of the Banks Policies
and Rules and Regulations were uncovered by the Fact-
Finding Committee. Consequently, the Fact-Finding
Officer of petitioner Bank issued another Memorandum to
Abad asking the latter to explain the newly discovered
irregularities. Not satisfied with the explanations of Abad,
petitioner Bank served another Memorandum, terminating
his employment effective immediately upon receipt of the
same. Thus, Abad instituted a Complaint for Illegal
Dismissal.
Issue: Whether or not awarding of separation pay
equivalent to one-half (1/2) months pay for every year of
service to respondent is gross, the same being contrary to
law and jurisprudence.
Held: The award of separation pay is required for dismissals
due to causes specified under Articles 283 and 284 of the
Labor Code, as well as for illegal dismissals in which
reinstatement is no longer feasible. On the other hand, an
employee dismissed for any of the just causes
enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is not, as
a rule, entitled to separation pay.
As an exception, allowing the grant of separation pay or
some other financial assistance to an employee dismissed
for just causes is based on equity. The Court has granted
separation pay as a measure of social justice even when
an employee has been validly dismissed, as long as the
dismissal was not due to serious misconduct or reflective
of personal integrity or morality.
BERNARDINO A. CAINGAT, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, STA. LUCIA REALTY & DEVT., INC., R.S.
MAINTENANCE & SERVICES, INC., and R.S. NIGHT HAWK
SECURITY & INVESTIGATION AGENCY, INC
G.R. No. 154308. March 10, 2005
Facts: Petitioner Benardino A. Caingat was hired by
respondent Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc.
(SLRDI) as the General Manager of SLRDIs sister
companies, R.S. Night Hawk Security and Investigation
Agency, Inc., and R.S. Maintenance and Services Inc.
both organized to service the malls and subdivisions
owned by SLRDI. In connection with this, he was allowed
to use 10% of the total payroll of respondent R.S.
Maintenance to defray operating expenses. Later, the
Finance Manager discovered that petitioner deposited
company funds in the latters personal account and used
the funds to pay his credit card purchases, utility bills, trips
abroad and acquisition of a lot in Laguna. Thus,
complainant received a memorandum stating that upon
verification of financial records, it was found that the latter
duties as Manager of the stated companies. Without
conducting any investigation, respondent R.S.
Maintenance filed a complaint for sum of money and
damages with prayer for writ of preliminary attachment.
Petitioner in turn filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against the respondents.
Issue: Did respondents illegally dismiss petitioner?
Held: As firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence, loss of trust
and confidence as a just cause for termination of
employment is premised on the fact that an employee
concerned holds a position where greater trust is placed
by management and from whom greater fidelity to duty is
correspondingly expected. This includes managerial
personnel entrusted with confidence on delicate matters,
such as the custody, handling, or care and protection of
the employers property. The betrayal of this trust is the
essence of the offense for which an employee is
penalized. Managements loss of trust and confidence on
petitioner was well justified. Private respondents had every
right to dismiss petitioner. Petitioners long period of
disappearance from the scene and departure for abroad
before making a claim of illegal dismissal does not
contribute to its credibility.
Nonetheless, while dismissal may truly be justified by loss of
confidence, the management failed to observe fully the
procedural requirement of due process for the termination
of petitioners employment. Two notices should be sent to
the employee. The respondents only sent the first notice,
gleaned from the memorandum. There was no second
notice.
RETRENCHMENT; NOTICE REQUIREMENT;SEPARATION PAY
JAKA FOOD PROCESSING CORPORATION, vs. DARWIN
PACOT, ROBERT PAROHINOG, DAVID BISNAR, MARLON
DOMINGO, RHOEL LESCANO and JONATHAN CAGABCAB.
G.R. No. 151378. March 28, 2005
Facts: Respondents were earlier hired by petitioner JAKA
Foods Processing Corporation until the latter terminated
their employment because the corporation was in dire
financial straits. It is not disputed, however, that the
termination was effected without JAKA complying with
the requirement under Article 283 of the Labor Code
regarding the service of a written notice upon the
employees and the Department of Labor and
Employment at least one (1) month before the intended
date of termination. Respondents filed complaints for
illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and
nonpayment of service incentive leave and 13th month
pay against JAKA. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision
declaring the termination illegal and ordering JAKA to
reinstate respondents with full backwages, and separation
pay if reinstatement is not possible. The Court of Appeals
reversed said decision and ordered respondent JAKA to
pay petitioners separation pay equivalent to one (1)
month salary, the proportionate 13th month pay and, in
addition, full backwages from the time their employment
was terminated.
Issue: What are the legal implications of a situation where
an employee is dismissed for cause but such dismissal was
effected without the employers compliance with the
notice requirement under the Labor Code?
Held: It was established that there was ground for
respondents dismissal, i.e., retrenchment, which is one of
the authorized causes enumerated under Article 283 of
the Labor Code. Likewise, it is established that JAKA failed
to comply with the notice requirement under the same
Article. Considering the factual circumstances in the
instant case, the Court deem it proper to fix the indemnity
at P50, 000.00. The Court of Appeals have been in error
when it ordered JAKA to pay respondents separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of
service. In all cases of business closure or cessation of
operation or undertaking of the employer, the affected
employee is entitled to separation pay. This is consistent
with the state policy of treating labor as a primary social
economic force, affording full protection to its rights as
well as its welfare. The exception is when the closure of
business or cessation of operations is due to serious
business losses or financial reverses; duly proved, in which
case, the right of affected employees to separation pay is
lost for obvious reasons.
HACIENDA BINO/HORTENCIA STARKE, INC./HORTENCIA L.
STARKE VS. CANDIDO
CUENCA ET AL.
G.R. No. 150478. April 15, 2005
Facts: Hacienda Bino is a 236-hectare sugar plantation
located at Negros Occidental, and represented in this
case by Hortencia L. Starke, owner and operator of the
said hacienda. The 76 individual respondents were part of
the workforce of Hacienda Bino consisting of 220 workers,
performing various works, such as cultivation, planting of
cane points, fertilization, watering, weeding, harvesting,
and loading of harvested sugarcanes to cargo trucks.
During the off-milling season, petitioner Starke issued an
Order or Notice which stated, that all Hacienda
employees who signed in favor of CARP are expressing
their desire to get out of employment on their own volition.
The respondents regarded such notice as a termination of
their employment. As a consequence, they filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal. The respondents as
complainants alleged that they are regular and
permanent workers of the hacienda and that they were
dismissed without just and lawful cause.
Issue: Whether the respondents are regular or seasonal
employees.
Held: The primary standard for determining regular
employment is the reasonable connection between the
particular activity performed by the employee in relation
to the usual trade or business of the employer. There is no
doubt that the respondents were performing work
necessary and desirable in the usual trade or business of
an employer. Hence, they can properly be classified as
regular employees. For respondents to be excluded from
those classified as regular employees, it is not enough that
they perform work or services that are seasonal in nature.
They must have been employed only for the duration of
one season. While the records sufficiently show that the
respondents work in the hacienda was seasonal in
nature, there was, however, no proof that they were hired
for the duration of one season only.
ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB INC., ET AL. VS. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.
G.R. No. 157611. August 9, 2005
Facts: Petitioner Alabang Country Club Inc. (ACCI), is a
stock, non-profit corporation that operates and maintains
a country club and various sports and recreational
facilities for the exclusive use of its members. Sometime in
1993, Francisco Ferrer, then President of ACCI, requested
its Internal Auditor, to conduct a study on the profitability
of ACCIs Food and Beverage Department (F & B
Department). Consequently, report showed that from
1989 to 1993, F & B Department had been incurring
substantial losses. Realizing that it was no longer profitable
for ACCI to maintain its own F & B Department, the
management decided to cease from operating the
department and to open the same to a contractor, such
as a concessionaire, which would be willing to operate its
own food and beverage business within the club. Thus,
ACCI sent its F & B Department employees individual
letters informing them that their services were being
terminated and that they would be paid separation pay.
The Union in turn, with the authority of individual
respondents, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
Issue: Whether or not the clubs right to terminate its
employees for an authorized cause, particularly to secure
its continued viability and existence is valid.
Held: When petitioner decided to cease operating its F &
B Department and open the same to a concessionaire, it
did not reduce the number of personnel assigned thereat.
It terminated the employment of all personnel assigned at
the department.
Petitioners failure to prove that the closure of its F & B
Department was due to substantial losses notwithstanding,
the Court finds that individual respondents were dismissed
on the ground of closure or cessation of an undertaking
not due to serious business losses or financial reverses,
which is allowed under Article 283 of the Labor Code. The
closure of operation of an establishment or undertaking
not due to serious business losses or financial reverses
includes both the complete cessation of operations and
the cessation of only part of a companys activities.
ELEMENTS OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROSE DUJUA, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 149014-16. February 5, 2004
Facts: Ramon Dujua, his mother Rose, his aunt, Editha
Singh, and his uncle, Guillermo Samson were charged with
illegal recruitment in large scale. Only Ramon was
arrested. Four testified against Ramon Dujua. All of them
were promised work abroad upon payment of fees but
they were not actually deployed. Ramon pleaded not
guilty and denied the allegations that he was a recruiter.
Issue: Whether or not illegal recruitment in large scale was
committed by Raon Dujua, et al.
Held: The essential elements of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale are: 1) The accused engages in
acts of recruitment and placement of workers defined
under Article 13 (b) or in any prohibited activities under
Article 34 of the Labor Code; 2) the accused has not
complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment particularly with respect to the
securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy
workers either locally or overseas; and 3) the accused
commits the unlawful acts against three or more persons
individually or as a group.
All three elements were established beyond reasonable
doubt.
First, the testimonies of the complaining witnesses
satisfactorily proved that Dujua promised them
employment and assured them of placement overseas.
All of them identified Dujua as the person who recruited
them for employment abroad. As against the positive and
categorical testimonies of the three complainants, Dujuas
mere denials cannot prevail. As long as the prosecution is
able to establishthrough credible testimonial evidence
that Dujua has engaged in illegal recruitment , a
conviction for the offense can very well be justified.
Second, Dujua did not have any license or authority to
recruit persons for overseas work, as shown by the
Certification issued by the POEA. Neither did his employer,
World Pack Travel and Tours, possess such license or
authority.
Third, it has been alleged and proven that Dujua
undertook the recruitment of more than three persons.
CBA; REFUSAL TO RENEGOTIATE ECONOMIC PROVISIONS
OF THE CBA BY THE MANAGEMENT CONSTITUTES ULP
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION VS. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 146728. February 11, 2004
Facts: General Milling Corporation employed 190 workers.
All the employees were members of a union which is a
duly certified bargaining agent. The GMC and the union
entered into a collective bargaining agreement which
included the issue of representation that is effective for a
term of three years which will expire on November 30,
1991. On November 29, 1991, a day before the expiration
of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed CBA, with a
request that a counter proposal be submitted within ten
days. on October 1991, GMC received collective and
individual letters from the union members stating that they
have withdrawn from their union membership. On
December 19, 1991, the union disclaimed any massive
disaffiliation of its union members. On January 13, 1992,
GMC dismissed an employee who is a union member. The
union protected the employee and requested GMC to
submit to the grievance procedure provided by the CBA,
but GMC argued that there was no basis to negotiate
with a union which is no longer existing. The union then
filed a case with the Labor Arbiter but the latter ruled that
there must first be a certification election to determine if
the union still enjoys the support of the workers.
Issue: Whether or not GMC is guilty of unfair labor practice
for violating its duty to bargain collectively and/or for
interfering with the right of its employees to self-
organization.
Held: GMC is guilty of unfair labor practice when it refused
to negotiate with the union upon its request for the
renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA on
November 29, 1991. the unions proposal was submitted
within the prescribed 3-year period from the date of
effectivity of the CBA. It was obvious that GMC had no
valid reason to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the
union. The refusal to send counter proposal to the union
and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the CBA
is tantamount to an unfair labor practice under Article 248
of the Labor Code.
Under Article 252 of the Labor Code, both parties are
required to perform their mutual obligation to meet and
convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the
purpose of negotiating an agreement. The union lived up
to this obligation when it presented proposals for a new
CBA to GMC within 3 years from the effectivity of the
original CBA. But GMC failed in its duty under Article 252.
What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning
the existence of the union and the status of its
membership to prevent any negotiation. It bears stressing
that the procedure in collective bargaining prescribed by
the Code is mandatory because of the basic interest of
the state in ensuring lasting industrial peace.
The Court of Appeals found that the letters between
February to June, 1993 by 13 union members signifying
their resignation from the union clearly indicated that
GMC exerted pressure on the employees. We agree with
the Court of Appeals conclusion that the ill-timed letters
of resignation from the union members indicate that GMC
interfered with the right of its employee to self-
organization.
UNIONS; UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE; STRIKES; ILLEGAL
DISMISSAL
STAMFORD MARKETING CORP., ET AL. VS. JOSEPHINE
JULIAN, ET AL.
G.R. No. 145496. February 24, 2004
Facts: On November 2, 1994, Zoilo de la Cruz, president of
the Philippine Agricultural Commercial and Industrial
Workers Union (PACIWU-TUCP), sent a letter to Rosario
Apacible, treasurer and general manager of Stamford
Marketing Corporation, GSP Manufacturing Corporation,
Giorgio Antonio Marketing Corporation, Clementine
Marketing Corporation and Ultimate Concept Phils., Inc.
The letter informed her that the rank-and-file employees of
the said companies had formed the Apacible Enterprises
Employees Union-PACIWU-TUCP and demanded that it
be recognized. After such notice, the following three
cases arose:
In the First Case, Josephine Julian, president of PACIWU-
TUCP, Jacinta Tejada and Jecina Burabod, a Board
Member and a member of the said union, were dismissed.
They filed a suit with the Labor Arbiter alleging that their
employer had not paid them with their overtime pay,
holiday pay/premiums, rest day premium, 13th month pay
for the year 1994 salaries for services actually rendered,
and that illegal deduction had been made without their
consent from their salaries for a cash bond. Stamford
alleged that the three were dismissed for not reporting for
work when required to do so and for not giving notice or
explanation when asked.
In the Second Case, PACIWU-TUCP filed, on behalf of 50
employees allegedly dismissed illegally for union
membership by the petitioners, a case for unfair labor
practice against GSP which denied such averments. GSP
countered that the BLR did not list Apacible Enterprises
Employees Union as a local chapter of PACIWU or TUCP.
Thus, the strike that said union organized after the GSP
refused to negotiate with them was illegal and that they
refused to return to work when asked.
The Third Case was filed for claims of the 50 employees
dismissed in the second case. Petitioner corporations,
however, maintained that they have been paying
complainants the wages/salaries mandated by law and
that the complaint should be dismissed in view of the
execution of quitclaims and waivers by the private
respondents.
The Labor Arbiter ordered the three cases consolidated as
the issues were interrelated and the respondent
corporations were under one management.
First Case: The dismissal was illegal and Stamford was
ordered to reinstate the complainants as well as pay the
backwages and other benefits claimed. It was held that
the reassignment and transfer of the complainants were
forms of interference in the formation and membership of
a union, an unfair labor practice. Stamford also failed to
substantiate their claim that the said employees
abandoned their employment. It also failed to prove the
necessity of the cash deposit of P2,000 and failed to
furnish written notice of dismissal to any complainants.
Further, it failed to prove payments of the amounts being
claimed.
Second Case: The strike was illegal and the officers of the
union have lost their employment status, thus terminating
their employment with GSP. GSP is however ordered to
reinstate the complainants who were members of the
union without backwages, save some employees
specified. It was established that the union was not
registered, and thus had staged an illegal strike. The
officers of the union should be liable and dismissed, but
the members should not, as they acted in good faith in
the belief that their actions were within legal bounds.
Third Case: GSP was ordered to pay each complainant
their claims, as computed by each individual. All other
claims were dismissed for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter
found petitioners liable for salary differentials and other
monetary claims for petitioners failure to sufficiently prove
that it had paid the same to complainants as required by
law. It was also ordered to return the cash deposits of the
complainants, citing the same reasons as in the First Case.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision in the First and
Third Cases, but set aside the judgment of the Second
Case for further proceedings in view of the factual issues
involved.
On May 14, 1996, a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal
was filed which was decided in favor of Stamford,
upholding the dismissal of the union officers. The officers
made no prior notice to strike, no vote was taken among
union members, and the issue involved was non-strikable,
a demand for salary increases
On elevation to the appellate court, it was ruled that the
officers should be given separation pay, and that Jacina
Burabod and the rest of the members should be
reinstated without loss of seniority, plus backwages. It
provided for the payment of the backwages despite the
illegality of the strike because the dismissals were done
prior to the strike. Such is considered an unfair labor
practice as there was lack of due process and valid
cause. Thus, the dismissed employees were still entitled to
backwages and reinstatement, with exception to the
union officers who may be given separation pay due to
strained relations with their employers.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the respondents union officers
and members were validly and legally dismisses from
employment considering the illegality of the strike.
(2) Whether or not the respondents union officers were
entitled to backwages, separation pay and
reinstatement, respectively.
Held: (1) The termination of the union officers was legal
under Article 264 of the Labor Code as the strike
conducted was illegal and that illegal acts attended the
mass action. Holding a strike is a right that could be
availed of by a legitimate labor organization, which the
union is not. Also, the mandatory requirements of following
the procedures in conducting a strike under paragraph
(c) and (f) of Article 263 were not followed by the union
officers.
Article 264 provides for the consequences of an illegal
strike, as well as the distinction between officers and
members who participated therein. Knowingly
participating in an illegal strike is a sufficient ground to
terminate the employment of a union officer but mere
participation is not sufficient ground for termination of
union members. Thus, absent clear and substantial proof,
rank-and-file union members may not be terminated. If he
is terminated, he is entitled to reinstatement.
The Court affirmed the ruling of the CA on the illegal
dismissal of the union members, as there was non-
observance of due process requirements and union
busting by management. It also affirmed that the charge
of abandonment against Julian and Tejada were without
credence. It reversed the ruling that the dismissal was
unfair labor practice as there was nothing on record to
show that Julian and Tejada were discouraged from
joining any union. The dismissal of the union officers for
participation in an illegal strike was upheld. However,
union officers also must be given the required notices for
terminating employment, and Article 264 of the Labor
Code does not authorize immediate dismissal of union
officers participating in an illegal strike. No such requisite
notices were given to the union officers.
The Court upheld the appellate courts ruling that the
union members, for having participated in the strike in
good faith and in believing that their actions were within
the bound of the law meant only to secure economic
benefits for themselves, were illegally dismissed hence
entitled to reinstatement and backwages.
(2) The Supreme Court declared the dismissal of the union
officers as valid hence, the award of separation pay was
deleted. However, as sanction for non-compliance with
the notice requirements for a lawful termination,
backwages were awarded to the union officers
computed from the time they were dismissed until the final
entry of the judgment.
JURISDICTION OF THE LABOR ARBITERS AND THE NLRC
EVELYN TOLOSA VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
G.R. No. 149578. April 10, 2003
Facts: Captain Virgilio Tolosa was master of the vessel M/V
Donna owned by Quana-Kaiun, and was hired through its
manning agent, Asia Bulk Transport Phils., Inc. (Asia Bulk).
During channeling activities upon the vessels departure
from Yokohama on November 6, 1992, Capt. Tolosa was
drenched with rainwater. Subsequently, he contracted
fever on November 11 which was later on accompanied
by loose bowel movement for the succeeding 12 days. His
condition was reported to Asia Bulk and the US Coast
Guard Headquarters in Hawaii on November 15. However,
before he could be evacuated, he died on November 18,
1992.
Evelyn Tolosa, the widow, filed a complaint before the
POEA for damages against Pedro Garate, Chief Mate of
the vessel, Mario Asis, Second Mate, Asia Bulk and Quana-
Kaiun. The case was transferred to the NLRC. The Labor
Arbiter ruled in favor of the widow, awarding actual
damages plus legal interest, as well as moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees. On appeal to
the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was vacated
and the complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action pursuant to the
provisions of the Labor Code, as amended. Sustaining the
NLRC, the CA ruled that the labor commission had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action filed by
petitioner. Her cause did not arise from an employer-
employee relation, but from a quasi-delict or tort. Under
Article 217 (a)(4) of the Labor Code which allows an
award of damages incident to an employer-employee
relation, the damages awarded were not proper as she is
not an employee, but merely the wife of an employee.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
had jurisdiction over petitioners action.
(2) Whether or not the monetary award granted by the
Labor arbiter has already reached finality.
Held: (1) The Court affirmed that the claim for damages
was filed not for claiming damages under the Labor Code
but under the Civil Code. The Court was convinced that
the allegations were based on a quasi-delict or tort. Also,
she had claimed for actual damages for loss of earning
capacity based on a life expectancy of 65 years, which is
cognizable under the Civil Code and can be recovered in
an action based on a quasi-delict. Though damages
under a quasi-delict may be recoverable under the
jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC, the relief must
be based on an action that has reasonable casual
connection with the Labor Code, labor statutes or CBAs.
It must be noted that a workers loss of earning capacity
and backlisting are not to be equated with wages,
overtime compensation or separation pay, and other
labor benefits that are generally cognized in labor
disputes. The loss of earning capacity is a relief or claim
resulting from a quasi-delict or a similar cause within the
realm of Civil Law. In the present case, Evelyn Tolosas
claim for damages is not related to any other claim under
Article 217, other labor statutes, or CBAs. She cannot
anchor her claim for damages to Article 161 of the Labor
Code, which does not grant or specify a claim or relief.
This provision is only a safety and health standard under
Book IV of the same Code. The enforcement of this labor
standard rests with the labor secretary. It is not the NLRC
but the regular courts that have jurisdiction over action for
damages, in which the employer-employee relation is
merely incidental, and in which the cause of action
proceeds from a different source of obligation such as a
tort.
(2) On the finality of the award, the Court ruled that issues
not raised in the court below cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal. Thus, the issue being not brought to the
attention of the Court of Appeals first, this cannot be
considered by the Supreme Court. It would be
tantamount to denial of the right to due process against
the respondents to do so.
ABANDONMENT OF WORK; REQUISITES
SAMUEL SAMARCA VS. ARC-MEN INDUSTRIES, INC.
G.R. No. 146118. September 29, 2003
Facts: Samuel Samarca was employed as a laborer by
Arc-Men Industries, Inc. On September 26, 1993, petitioner
filed an application for an emergency leave of absence
on account of his sons hospitalization. Upon his return for
work, petitioner was immediately served with a notice of
respondents order suspending him for 30 days. Feeling
aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
suspension against respondent and its owner. During the
pendency of the complaint, petitioners 30-day
suspension ended. Consequently, respondent, in a letter,
directed petitioner to report for work immediately.
However, he refused, prompting respondent to send him
a Notice to Terminate, directing him to submit, within 5
days, a written explanation why he should not be
dismissed from the service for abandonment of work. For
his part, petitioner submitted a letter-reply explaining that
because of the pendency of his complaint for illegal
suspension with the Labor arbiter, he could not report for
work. Respondent, finding the petitioners written
explanation insufficient, decided to terminate his services
via a Notice of Termination. Consequently, petitioner filed
an amended complaint for illegal dismissal.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner abandoned his work.
Held: To constitute abandonment, two elements must
concur: (1) The failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention
to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested
by some overt acts. Mere absence is not sufficient. It is the
employer who has the burden of proof to show a
deliberate and justified refusal of the employee to resume
his employment without any intention of returning.
The above twin essential requirements for abandonment
to exist are not present in the case at bar. Petitioners
absence is not without a justifiable reason. It must be
recalled that upon receipt of the Notice to Terminate by
reason of abandonment, petitioner sent respondent a
letter explaining that he could not go back to work
because of the pendency of his complaint for illegal
suspension. And immediately after he was dismissed for
abandonment of work, he lost no time to amend his
complaint to illegal dismissal. This alone negates any
intention on his part to forsake his work. It is a settled
doctrine that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is
inconsistent with the charge of abandonment, for an
employee who takes steps to protest his dismissal cannot
by logic be said to have abandoned his work.
ABANDONMENT OF WORK; PROCEDURE FOR TERMINATING
AN EMPLOYEE; ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
AGABON VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 158693. November 17, 2004
Facts: Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements,
Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and installing
ornamental and construction materials. It employed
petitioner Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum
board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until
February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for
abandonment of work. Petitioners then filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision
declaring the dismissal illegal. On appeal, the NLRC
reversed the decision because it found that the
petitioners had abandoned their work and were not
entitled to backwages and separation pay. The Court of
Appeals in turn ruled that the dismissal of the petitioners
was not illegal because they had abandoned their
employment.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.
Held: The dismissal should be upheld because it was
established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to
work for another company. Private respondent, however,
did not follow the notice requirements and instead
argued that sending notices to the last known addresses
would have been useless because they did not reside
there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent,
this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the
twin notice requirements to the employees last known
address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance
with the procedural requirements of due process.
When the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory
due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it
illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should
indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory
rights.
George Arriola vs Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc.
A columnist whose column is removed by the newspaper
from publication is not ipso facto terminated from work by
the newspaper company.
Money claims arising from employer-employee
relationship: covered by Article 291 of the Labor Code.
Money claims, such as backwages, consequent to an
illegal dismissal case: covered by Article 1146 of the Civil
Code.
 G.R. No. 175689 Labor Law Labor Relations Illegal
Dismissal Abandonment
George Arriola was a column writer for the newspaper
Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. since 1986. His column thereat
was Tinig ng Pamilyang OFWs.
On November 15, 2002, he filed a case for illegal dismissal
against Pilipino Star as he averred that on November 15,
1999, he was arbitrarily dismissed when his column was
removed from publication by Pilipino Star.
In its defense, Pilipino Star argued that they never
removed Arriola; that it was Arriola who abandoned his
work because he went on to write for a rival newpaper,
Imbestigador.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of Pilipino Star. The labor
arbiter held that Arriolas case was filed out of time as it
was filed three years and one day from the date he was
allegedly illegally dismissed. The labor arbiter cited Art. 291
of the Labor Code:
Art. 291. MONEY CLAIMS. All money claims arising from
employer-employee relations accruing during the
effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years
from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they
shall be forever barred.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arriolas suit involves a money claim
contemplated by Art. 291 of the Labor Code.
HELD: No. Art. 291 of the Labor Code only covers the
following claims:
1. overtime pay,
2. holiday pay,
3. service incentive leave pay,
4. bonuses,
5. salary differentials,
6. illegal deductions by an employer, and
7. money claims arising from seafarer contracts.
It does not cover money claims consequent to an illegal
dismissal such as backwages. It also does not cover claims
for damages due to illegal dismissal. These claims are
governed by Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which provides:
Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within
four years:
(1) Upon injury to the rights of the plaintiff... xxx
Further, in an illegal dismissal case, the claim for
backwages, the money claim, is just but one of the reliefs
that an employee prays before the arbiter.
As such, Arriolas claim for backwages is still filed within the
prescriptive period of four years.
However, Arriolas case must still be dismissed because it
was established that he in fact abandoned his work. In the
first place, it is a newspapers prerogative whether or not
to remove a particular column from publication. The
removal of a certain column does not ipso facto mean
the removal of the columnist. That being, Arriola should
have reported to work even if his column was removed.