Gonzales Vs Comelec (GR No. L-28196)

3/16/2017 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATEDVOLUME021
774 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
No.L28196.November9,1967.
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS,DIRECTOR OF PRINTING and AUDITOR
GENERAL,respondents.
No.L28224.November9,1967.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA),

petitioner,vs.COMMISSIONONELECTIONS,respondent.
775
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9,1967 775
Constitutional law Power of judicial department to determine

allocationofpowersbetweenseveraldepartments.Thejudicialdepartment
is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
properallocationofpowersbetweentheseveraldepartmentsandamongthe
integralorconstituentunitsthereof.
Same Power to pass upon validity of constitutional amendmtnt.In
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil. 1), the Court declined to pass upon the
questionwhetherornotagivennumberofvotescastinCongressinfavorof
a proposed amendment to the Constitution satisfied the threefourths vote
requirement of the fundamental law, characterizing the issue as a political
one. The force of this precedent has been weakened by Suanes vs. Chief
AccountantoftheSenate(81Phil.818),Avelinovs.Cuenco(L2851,March
4&14,1949),Taadavs.Cuenco(L10520,Feb.28,1957),andMaciasvs.
CommissiononElections(L18684,Sept.14,1961).TheCourtrejectedthe
theory advanced in these four cases that the issues therein raised were
politicalquestions,thedeterminationofwhichisbeyondjudicialreview.
Same Nature of power to amend the Constitution.The power to
amendtheConstitutionortoproposeamendmentstheretoisnotincludedin
the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. It (is a part of the
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000015ad57657aa3d93e2ad003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/60
inherent powers of the peopleas the repository of sovereignty in a

republican state, such as oursto make, and hence, to amend their own
fundamental law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution
merely because the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when
exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of
Representativesact,notasmembersofCongress,butascompetentelements
of a constituentassembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress
derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when
performingthesamefunction,fortheirauthoritydoesnotemanatefromthe
Constitutionthey are the very source of all powers of government,
includingtheConstitutionitself.
Power of reapportionment of congressional districts.It is not true
that Congress has not made a reapportionment within three years after the
enumeration or census made in 1960. It did actually pass a bill, which
became Republic Act 3040 (approved June 17, 1961), purporting to make
reapportionment. This act was, however, declared unconstitutional on the
ground that the apportionment therein undertaken had not been made
according to the number of inhabitants of the different provinces of the
Philippines.
Same Same Failure of Congress to make reapportionment did not
makeCongressillegalorunconstitutional.ThefactthatCongressisunder
obligation to make apportionment, as required under the Constitution, does
notjustifytheconclusion
776
that such failure rendered Congress illegal or unconstitutional, or that its

Members have become de facto officers. The effect of this omission has
been envisioned in the Constitution which provides that until such
apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall
have the same number of members as that fixed by law for the National
Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified elections from the present
Assemblydistricts.Thisprovisiondoesnotsupporttheviewthat,uponthe
expiration of the period to make the apportionment, a Congress which fails
to make it is dissolved or becomes illegal. On the contrary, it implies
necessarily that Congress shall continue to function with the representative
districtsexistingatthetimeoftheexpirationofsaidperiod.
SameSameNovalidapportionmentsinceadoptionofConstitutionin
1935.Since the adoption of the Constitution in 1935, Congress has not
madeavalidapportionmentasrequiredinthefundamentallaw.
SameSameSenate and House constituted on Dec. 30, 1961 were de

jure bodies.The Senate and House of Representatives organized or
constituted on December 30, 1961 were de jure bodies and the Members
thereofweredejureofficers.
SameSameEffectoffailureofCongresstodischargemandatoryduty.
Neither our political law, in general, nor our law on public officers in
particular, supports the view that failure to discharge a mandatory duty,
whateveritmaybe,wouldautomaticallyresultintheforfeitureofanoffice,
intheabsenceofastatutetothiseffect.
SayneSameSameProvisions of Election Law relative to election of
membersofCongressin1965notrepealed.TheprovisionofourElection
Law relative to the election of members of Congress in 1965 were not
repealedinconsequenceofthefailureofsaidbodytomakeanapportionment
withinthreeyearsafterthecensusof1960.Inasmuchasthegeneralelections
in1965werepresumablyheldinconformitywithsaidElectionLawandthe
legal provisions creating Congress with a House of Representatives
composed of members elected by qualified voters of representative districts
astheyexistedatthetimeofsaidelectionsremainedinforce,wecannotsee
how said Members of the House of Representatives can be regarded as de
facto officers owing to the failure of their predecessors in office to make a
reapportionmentwithintheperiodaforementioned.
Same De facto doctrine Reason therefor.The main reason for the
existenceofthedefactodoctrineisthatpublicinterestdemandsthatactsof
personsholding,undercoloroftitle,anofficecreatedbyavalidstatutebe,
likewise, deemed valid insofar as the publicas distinguished from the
officerinquestionisconcerned.Indeed,otherwisethosedealingwith
777
officersandemployeesoftheGovernmentwouldbeentitledtodemandfrom
them satisfactory proof of their title to the positions they hold, before
dealing with them, or before recognizing their authority or obeying their
commands, even if they should act within the limits of the authority vested
in their respective offices, position or employments. One can imagine the
great inconvenience, hardships and evils that would result in the absence of
thedefactodoctrine.
Same Same Title of de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally.
Thetitleofadefactoofficercannotbeassailedcollaterally.Itmaynotbe
contestedexceptdirectly,byquowarrantoproceedings.
Same Same Validity of acts of de facto officer cannot be assailed
collaterally.Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the
groundthatheismerelyadefactoofficer.Andthereasonsareobvious:(1)
itwouldbeanindirectinquiryintothetitletotheofficeand(2)theactsofa
defactoofficer,ifwithinthecompetenceofhisoffice,arevalid,insofaras
thepublicisconcerned.
Same Construction of terms Meaning of the term or.The term
orhas,oftentimes,beenheldtomeanandorviceversa,whenthespirit
orcontextofthelawwarrantsit.
Same Power of Congress to approve resolutions amending the
Constitution.ThereisnothingintheConstitutionorinthehistorythereof
that would negate the authority of different Congresses to approve the
contestedresolutions,orofthesameCongresstopassthesameindifferent
sessions or different days of the same Congressional session. Neither has
anyplausiblereasonbeenadvancedtojustifythedenialofauthoritytoadopt
saidresolutionsonthesameday.
SameMeaning of term election in Art. XI, Constitution,There is
inthisprovisionnothingtoindicatethattheelectionthereinreferredtoisa
special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous
amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for
ratificationinspecialelectionsmerelyshowsthatCongressdeemeditbestto
dosounderthecircumstancesthenobtaining.Itdoesnotnegateitsauthority
tosubmitproposedamendmentsforratificationingeneralelections.
SameLegislation cannot be nullified for failure of certain sectors to
discuss it sufficiently.A legislation cannot be nullified by reason of the
failure of certain sectors of the community to discuss it sufficiently. Its
constitutionality or unconstitutionally depends upon no other factor than
thoseexistingatthetimeoftheenactmentthereof,unaffectedbytheactsor
omissions of law enforcing to agencies, particularly those that take place
subsequentlytothepassageorapprovalofthelaw.
SamePublicknowledgeofproposedamendments.Acon
778
siderableportionofthepeoplemaynotknowhowover160oftheproposed
maximumofrepresentativedistrictsareactuallyapportionedbyRBHNo.1
among the provinces in the Philippines. It is not improbable, however, that
they are not interested in the details of the apportionment, or that a careful
reading thereof may tend, in their simple minds, to impair a clear vision
thereof. Upon the other hand, those who are more sophisticated may
enlighten themselves sufficiently by reading the copies of the proposed
amendmentspostedinpublicplaces,thecopieskeptinthepollingplacesand
the text of the contested resolutions, as printed in full on the back of the
ballotstheywilluse.
Same Judicial power to nullify executive or legislative acts, not
violative of principle of separation of powers.The system of checks and
balances underlying the judicial power to strike down acts of the Executive
orofCongresstranscendingtheconfinessetforthinthefundamentallawis
not in derogation of powers, pursuant to which each department is supreme
withinitsownsphere.
Same Determination of conditions for submission of amendments to
peoplepurelylegislative.Thedeterminationoftheconditionsunderwhich
the proposed amendments shall be submitted to the people is concededly a
matterwhichfallswithinthelegislativesphere.
MAKALINTAL,J.,concurring:
ConstitutionallawRep.Act4913Mannerprescribedinlawsufficient
to have amendments submitted for ratification by people.The manner
prescribed in Sections 2 and 4 of Republic Act 4913 is sufficient for the
purpose of having the proposed amendments submitted to the people for
theirratification,asenjoinedinSection1,ArticleXVoftheConstitution.
SameDefect is in implementation.The defect is not intrinsic in the
law,butinitsimplementation.Thesamemannerofsubmittingtheproposed
amendments to the people for ratification may, in a different setting, be
sufficient for the purpose. The constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a
law may not be made to depend willynilly on factors not inherent in its
provisions.
SameRequisite for declaring law unconstitutional.For a law to be
struck down as unconstitutional, it must be so by reason of some
irreconcilableconflictbetweenitandtheConstitution.Otherwisealawmay
be either valid or invalid, according to circumstances not found in its
provisions, such as the zeal with which they are carried out. The criterion
wouldbetoobroadandrelative,anddependentuponindividualopinionsthat
atbestaresubjective.Whatonemayregardassufficientcompliancewiththe
requirementofsubmissiontothepeople,withinthecontextofthesamelaw,
maynotbesotoanother.
779
Same Ratification of amendments need not be in special election or

plebiscite.TheratificationoftheamendmentstotheConstitutionneednot
necessarilybeinaspecialelectionorplebiscitecalledforthatpurposealone.
While such procedure is highly to be preferred, the Constitution speaks
simplyofanelectionatwhichtheamendmentsaresubmittedtothepeople
fortheirratification.
BENGZON,J.,concurring:
ConstitutionallawValidityofRep.Act1493Jurisdictionofthecourt.
Since observance of constitutional provisions on the procedure for
amendingtheConstitutionisconcerned,theissueiscognizablebythisCourt
underitspowerstoreviewanActofCongresstodetermineitsconformityto
the fundamental law. For though the Constitution leaves Congress free to
propose whatever constitutional amendment it deems fit, so that the
substanceorcontentof said proposed amendment is a matter of policy and
wisdomandthusapoliticalquestion,theConstitutionneverthelessimposes
requisites as to the manner or procedure of proposing such amendments,
e.g.,thethreefourthsvoterequirement.Saidprocedureormanner,therefore,
far from being left to the discretion of Congress, as a matter of policy and
wisdom, is fixed by the Constitution. And to that extent, all questions
bearing on whether Congress in proposing amendments followed the
procedurerequiredbytheConstitution,isperforcejusticiable,itnotbeinga
matterofpolicyorwisdom.
SameSpecialelectionnotrequiredtoratifyconstitutionalamendment.
To join the ratification of the proposed amendments with an election for
candidates to public office, that is to make it concurrent with such election,
doesnotrenderitanylessanelectionatwhichtheproposedamendmentsare
submitted to the people for their ratification. No prohibition being found in
theplaintermsoftheConstitution,noneshouldbeinferred.Hadtheframers
of the Constitution thought of requiring a special election for the purpose
onlyoftheproposedamendments,theycouldhavesaidso,byqualifyingthe
phrasewithsomewordsuchasspecialorsolelyorexclusively.They
didnot.
Same Validity of Rep. Act 4913 3/4 vote not required.Congress
validly enacted Republic Act 4913 to fix the details of the date and manner
of submitting the proposed amendments to the people for their ratification,
since it does not propose amendments in the sense referred to by Section
1,ArticleXVoftheConstitution,butmerelyprovidesforhowandwhenthe
amendments, already proposed, are going to be voted upon, the same does
notneedthe3/4voteinjointsessionrequiredinSection1,ArticleXVofthe
Constitution.
780
Same Same Law complies with substantive due process.An

examination of the provisions of the law shows no violation of the due
processclauseoftheConstitution.ThepublicationintheOfficialGazetteat
least20daysbeforetheelection,thepostingofnoticesinpublicbuildingnot
later than October 14, 1967, to remain posted until after the elections, the
placing of copies of the proposed amendments in the polling places, aside
from printing the same at the back of the ballot, provide sufficient
opportunity to the voters to cast an intelligent vote on the proposal. Due
process refers only to providing fair opportunity it does not guarantee that
the opportunity given will in fact be availed of that is the lookout of the
voter and the responsibility of the citizen. As long as fair and reasonable
opportunity to be informed is given, and it is, the due process cause is not
infringed.Nonprintingoftheprovisionstobeamendedastheynowstand,
and the printing of the full proposed amendments at the back of the ballot
instead of the substance thereof at the face of the ballot, do not deprive the
voteroffairopportunitytobeinformed.
Same Effect of failure of Congress to pass valid redistricting law.
ThefailureofCongresstopassavalidredistrictinglawsincethetimethe
above provision (Art. VI, Sec. 5, Const.) was adopted, does not render the
present districting illegal or unconstitutional. For the Constitution itself
provides for its continuance in such case, rendering legal and de jure the
statusquo.
FERNANDO,J.,concurringwiththeChiefJustice:
Constitutional law Constitutional amendments Certain aspects of

amending process deemed political.Certain aspects of the amending
process may be considered political. The process itself is political in its
entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes part of the
Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference
atanypoint.
SANCHEZ,J.,dissenting:
ConstitutionallawAmendmentsMeaningofphrasesubmittedtothe
peoplefortheirratification.Thewordssubmittedtothepeoplefortheir
ratification, if construed in the light of the nature of the Constitutiona
fundamental charter that is legislation direct from the people, an expression
of their sovereign willis that it can only be amended by the people
expressing themselves according to the procedures ordained by the
Constitution. Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid before the people
fortheirblessingorspurning.Thepeoplearenottobemererubberstamps.
Theyarenottovoteblindly.
781
They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original

provisions,comparethemwiththeproposedamendments,andtrytoreacha
conclusionasthedictatesoftheirconsciencesuggest,freefromtheincubus
of extraneous or possibly insidious influences. The word submitted can
only mean that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should
strain every effort to inform every citizen of the provisions to be amended,
and the proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof.
WhattheConstitutionineffectdirectsisthatthegovernment,insubmitting
an amendment for ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency
within its structural framework to enlighten the people, educate them with
respect to their act of ratification or rejection. There must be fair
submission, intelligent consent or rejection. If with all these safeguards the
people still approve the amendment no matter how prejudicial it is to them,
thensobeit.Forthepeopledecreetheirownfate.
Same: Procedure for dissemination of information on amendments
defective.Theproceduredoesnoteffectivelybringthemattertothepeople.
First, the Official Gazette is not widely read. It does not reach the barrios.
Andevenifitreachedthebarrios,itisnotavailabletoall.Secondly,many
citizens,especiallythoseintheoutlyingbarriosdonotgotomunicipal,city
and or provincial office buildings, except on special occasions like paying
taxesorrespondingtocourtsummonses.Thirdly,itwouldnothelpanyifat
least five copies are kept in the polling place for examination by qualified
electors on election day. Fourthly, copies in the principal native language
shallbekeptineachpollingplacebutthisisnotinthenatureofacommand
because such copies shall be kept therein only when practicable and as
maybedeterminedbytheCommissiononElections.Fifthly,itistruethat
the Comelec is directed to make available copies of such amendments in
English, Spanish or whenever practicable in the principal native languages,
forfreedistribution.However,Comelecisnotrequiredtoactivelydistribute
them to the people. Finally, it is of common knowledge that Comelec has
more than its hands full in these preelection days. They cannot possibly
make extensive distribution. Surely enough, the voters do not have the
benefitofpropernoticeoftheproposedamendmentsthroughdissemination
bypublicationinextenso. People do not have at hand the necessary data on
which to base their stand on the merits and demerits of said amendments.
There is, therefore, no proper submission of the proposed constitutional
amendmentofSection1,ArticleXVoftheConstitution.
SameSamePropersubmissionofamendmentstothepeoplerequired.
That proper submission of amendments to the people to enable them to
equallyratifythemproperlyisthemeatoftheconstitutionalrequirement,is
reflectedinthesequenceof
782
uniformpastpractices.TheConstitutionhasbeenamendedthricein1939,
1940 and 1947. In each case the amendments were embodied in resolutions
adopted by the Legislature, which thereafter fixed the dates at which the
proposedamendmentsweretoberatifiedorrejected.Theseplebisciteshave
been referred to either as an election or general election. At no time,
however, was the vote for amendments of the Constitution held
simultaneouslywiththeelectionofofficials,nationalorlocal.
REYES,J.B.L.,J.,concurringwithJusticeSanchez:
Constitutionallaw Constitutional amendment Majority votes cast at

election,insufficienttoratifyproposedamendmentsinRep.Act4913.Itis
impossible to believe that it was ever intended by the framers of the
Constitution that an amendment should be submitted and ratified by just a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification, if the concentration of the
people'sattentionthereonistobedivertedbyotherextraneousissuessuchas
the choice of local and national officials. The framers of the Constitution,
aware of the fundamental character thereof, and of the need of giving it as
muchstabilityasispracticable,couldhaveonlymeantthatanyamendments
thereto should be debated, considered and voted at an election wherein the
people could devote undivided attention to the subject. That this was the
intention and spirit of the provision is corroborated in the case of all other
constitutional amendments in the past, that were submitted to and approved
inspecialelectionsexclusivelydevotedtotheissuewhetherthelegislature's
amendatoryproposalsshouldberatifiedornot.
ORIGINALACTIONintheSupremeCourt.Prohibitionwith
preliminaryinjunction.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.No.28196:
RamonA.Gonzalesinhisownbehalf.
JuanT.Davidasamicuscuriae
SolicitorGeneralforrespondents.No.28224:
SalvadorAranetaforpetitioner.
SolicitorGeneralforrespondent.
CONCEPCION,C.J.:
G. R. No. L28196 is an original action for prohibition, with

preliminaryinjunction.
Petitionerthereinpraysforjudgment:
783
1) Restraining: (a) the Commission on Elections from

enforcingRepublicActNo.4913,orfromperformingany
act that will result in the holding of the plebiscite for the
ratification of the constitutional amendments proposed in
Joint Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 of the two Houses of
CongressofthePhilippines,approvedonMarch16,1967
(b) the Director of Printing from printing ballots, pursuant
to said Act and Resolutions and (c) the Auditor General
from passing in audit any disbursement from the
appropriationoffundsmadeinsaidRepublicActNo.4913
and
2) declaringsaidActunconstitutionalandvoid.
Themainfactsarenotdisputed.OnMarch16,1967,theSenateand
theHouseofRepresentativespassedthefollowingresolutions:
1. R.B.H.(ResolutionofBothHouses)No.1,proposingthat
Section5,ArticleVI,oftheConstitutionofthePhilippines,
beamendedsoastoincreasethemembershipoftheHouse
ofRepresentativesfromamaximumof120,asprovidedin
the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be
apportionedamongtheseveralprovincesasnearlyasmay
be according to the number of their respective inhabitants,
althougheachprovinceshallhave,atleast,one(1)member
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose
amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be
composed of two (2) elective delegates from each
representative district, to be elected in the general
elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November,
1971and
3. R.B.H.No.3,proposingthatSection16,ArticleVI,ofthe
sameConstitution,beamendedsoastoauthorizeSenators
and members of the House of Representatives to become
delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention,
withoutforfeitingtheirrespectiveseatsinCongress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the

President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913,
providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the
aforementionedResolutionsNo.1and3besubmitted,forapproval
bythepeople,
784
atthegeneralelectionswhichshallbeheldonNovember14,1967.
The petition in L28196 was filed on October 21, 1967. At the
hearingthereof,onOctober28,1967,theSolicitorGeneralappeared
onbehalfofrespondents.Moreover,Atty.JuanT.Davidandcounsel
for the Philippine Constitution Associationhereinafter referred to
as the PHILCONSAwere allowed to argue as amicicuriae. Said
counselforthePHILCONSA,Dr.SalvadorAraneta,likewiseprayed
that the decision in this case be deferred until after a substantially
identicalcasebroughtbysaidorganizationbeforetheCommission
1
onElections, whichwasexpectedtodecideitanytime,andwhose
decision would, in all probability, be appealed to this Courthad
been submitted thereto for final determination, for a joint decision
ontheidenticalissuesraisedinbothcases.Infact,onOctober31,
1967, the PHILCONSA filed with this Court the petition in G. R.
No. L28224, for review 2
by certiorari of the resolution of the
CommissiononElections dismissing the petition therein. The two
(2)casesweredeemedsubmittedfordecisiononNovember8,1967,
uponthefilingoftheanswerofrespondent,thememorandumofthe
petitionerandthereplymemorandumofrespondentinL28224.
Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L28196, is admittedly a
Filipinocitizen,ataxpayer,andavoter.Heclaimstohaveinstituted
case L28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens,
taxpayers, and voters similarly situated. Although respondents and
theSolicitorGeneralhavefiledananswerdenyingthetruthofthis
allegation, upon the ground that they have no knowledge or
information to form a belief as to the truth thereof, such denial
wouldappeartobeaperfunctoryone.Infact,atthehearingofcase
L28196, the Solicitor General expressed himself in favor of a
judicialdeterminationof
________________
1UrgingthelattertorefrainfromimplementingRepublicActNo.4913andfrom
submittingtoaplebisciteinthegeneralelectionstobeheldonNovember14,1967,
theConstitutionalamendmentsproposedintheaforementionedR.B.H.Nos.1and3.
2DatedOctober30,1967.
785
themeritsoftheissuesraisedinsaidcase.
The PHILCONSA, petitioner in L28224, is admittedly a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines,andacivic,nonprofitandnonpartisanorganizationthe
objectiveofwhichistoupholdtheruleoflawinthePhilippinesand
to defend its Constitution against erosions or onslaughts from
whateversource.DespitehisaforementionedstatementinL28196,
in his answer in L28224 the Solicitor General maintains that this
Court has no jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of L28224, upon
the ground that3 the same is merely political as held in Mabanag
vs.LopezVito. SenatorArturoM.Tolentino,whoappearedbefore
the Commission on Elections and filed an opposition to the
PHILCONSA petition therein, was allowed to appear before this
Court and objected to said petition upon the ground: a) that the
Court has no jurisdiction either to grant the relief sought in the
petition,ortopassuponthelegalityofthecompositionoftheHouse
ofRepresentativesb)thatthepetition,ifgranted,would,ineffect,
render inoperational the legislative department and c) that the
failure of Congress to enact a valid reapportionment law xxx does
not have the legal effect of rendering illegal the House of
Representativeselectedthereafter,norofrenderingitsactsnulland
void.
JURISDICTION
4
AsearlyasAngaravs.ElectoralCommission, thisCourtspeaking
through one of the leading members of the Constitutional
Convention and a respected professor of Constitutional Law, Dr.
Jose P. Laureldeclared that the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
amongtheintegralorconstituentunitsthereof.
5
ItistruethatinMabanagvs.LopezVito, thisCourt
_______________
378Phil.1.
463Phil.139,157.
5Supra.
786
characterizingtheissuesubmittedtheretoasapoliticalone,declined
to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes
cast in Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to the
Constitutionwhich was being submitted to the people for
ratificationsatisfied the threefourths vote requirement of the
fundamental law. The force of this precedent has been weakened,
6
however,bySuanesvs.ChiefAccountantoftheSenate
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000015ad57657aa3d93e2ad003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False Avelinovs. 12/60
6
however,bySuanesvs.ChiefAccountantoftheSenate
7 8
Avelinovs.
Cuenco, 9Taada vs. Cuenco, and Macias vs. Commission on
Elections. Inthefirst,weheldthattheofficersandemployeesofthe
SenateElectoralTribunalareunderitssupervisionandcontrol,not
of that of the Senate President, as claimed by the latter in the
second, this Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators
necessaryforaquorumintheSenateinthethird,wenullifiedthe
election, by Senators belonging to the party having the largest
numberofvotesinsaidchamber,purportingtoactonbehalfofthe
partyhavingthesecondlargestnumberofvotestherein,oftwo(2)
Senators belonging to the first party, as members, for the second
party, of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and in the fourth, we
declaredunconstitutionalanactofCongresspurportingtoapportion
the representative districts for the House of Representatives, upon
the ground that the apportionment had not been made as may be
possible according to the number of inhabitants of each province.
Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4) cases, that
the issues therein raised were political questions the determination
ofwhichisbeyondjudicialreview.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose
amendments thereto is not 10included in the general grant of
legislativepowerstoCongress. Itispartoftheinherentpowersof
the peopleas11
the repository of sovereignty in a republican state,
suchasours to
________________
681Phil.818.
7L2851,March4and14,1949.
8L10520,February28,1957.
9118684,September14,1961.
10Section1,Art.VI,ConstitutionofthePhilippines.
11Section1,Art.II,ConstitutionofthePhilippines.
787
make,and,hence,toamendtheirownFundamentalLaw.Congress
may propose amendments to the Constitution
12
merely because the
same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exercising the
same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of
Representativesact,notasmembersofCongress,butascomponent
elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the
members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution,
13
unlike the people, when performing the same function. for their
authoritydoesnotemanatefromtheConstitutiontheyarethevery
sourceofallpowersofgovernment,includingtheConstitutionitself.
Since,whenproposing,asaconstituentassembly,amendmentsto
the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority
fromtheFundamentalLaw,itfollows,necessarily,thattheydonot
havethefinalsayonwhetherornottheiractsarewithinorbeyond
constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the
sameatnaught,contrarytothebasictenetthatoursisagovernment
oflaws,notofmen,andtotherigidnatureofourConstitution.Such
rigidity is stressed by the fact that,
14
the Constitution expressly
confers upon the 15
Supreme Court, the power to declare a treaty
unconstitutional, despitetheeminentlypoliticalcharacteroftreaty
makingpower.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress
acting as a constituent assemblyviolates the Constitution
essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial
review,and,totheextentthatthisviewmaybeinconsistentwiththe
16
standtakeninMabanagvs.LopezVito, thelattershouldbedeemed
modifiedaccordingly.TheMembersoftheCourtareunanimouson
thispoint.
THEMERITS
Section1ofArticleXVoftheConstitution,asamended,reads:
_______________
12Section1,Art.XV,ConstitutionofthePhilippines.
13OfamendingtheConstitution.
14And,inferentially,tolowercourts.
15Sec.2(1),Art.VIIIoftheConstitution.
16Supra.
788
TheCongressinjointsessionassembledbyavoteofthreefourthsofallthe
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a
conventionforthatpurpose.Suchamendmentsshallbevalidaspartofthis
Constitutionwhenapprovedbyamajorityofthevotescastatanelectionat
whichtheamendmentsaresubmittedtothepeoplefortheirratification.
Pursuant to this provision, amendments to the Constitution may be

proposed,eitherbyCongress,orbyaconventioncalledbyCongress
forthatpurpose.Ineithercase,thevoteofthreefourthsofallthe
membersoftheSenateandoftheHouseofRepresentativesvoting
separately is necessary. And, such amendments shall be valid as
partoftheConstitutionwhenapprovedbyamajorityofthevotes
cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
peoplefortheirratification.
Inthecasesatbar,itisconcededthattheR.B.H.Nos.1and3
havebeenapprovedbyavoteofthreefourthsofallthemembersof
the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately.
This, notwithstanding, it is urged that said resolutions are null and
voidbecause:
1. The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed

amendments,aswellastheresolutioncallingaconvention
toproposeamendments,are,atbest,defactoCongressmen

2. Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives
propose amendments or call a convention thereforbut
may not avail of boththat is to say, propose amendment
andcallaconventionatthesametime
3. The election, in which proposals for amendment to the
Constitution shall be submitted for ratification, must be a
specialelection,notageneralelection,inwhichofficersof
the national and local governmentssuch as the elections
scheduled to be held on November 14, 1967will be
chosenand
4. ThespiritoftheConstitutiondemandsthattheelection,in
which proposals for amendment shall be submitted to the
peopleforratification,mustbeheldundersuchconditions
which,allegedly,donotexistasto
789
give the people a reasonable opportunity to have a fair

graspofthenatureandimplicationsofsaidamendments.
LegalityofCongressandLegal
StatusoftheCongressmen
The first objection is based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the
Constitution,whichprovides:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one

hundred and twenty Members who shall be apportioned among the several
provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective
inhabitants,buteachprovinceshallhaveatleastoneMember.TheCongress
shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the return of
every enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such apportionment shall have
been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of
Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be
elected by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. Each
representative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous and
compactterritory.
It is urged that the last enumeration or census took place in 1960

that, no apportionment having been made within three (3) years
thereafter,theCongressofthePhilippinesand/ortheelectionofits
Membersbecame'illegalthatCongressanditsMembers,likewise,
became a de facto Congress and/or de facto congressmen,
respectively and that, consequently, the disputed Resolutions,
proposingamendmentstotheConstitution,aswellasRepublicAct
No.4913,arenullandvoid.
It is not true, however, that Congress has not made an
apportionment within three years after the enumeration or census
madein1960.Itdidactuallypassabill,whichbecameRepublicAct
17
No. 3040, purporting to make said apportionment. This Act was,
however, declared unconstitutional, upon the ground that the
apportionment therein undertaken had not been made according to
the number 18
of inhabitants of the different provinces of the
Philippines.
Moreover,weareunabletoagreewiththetheorythat,inviewof
thefailureofCongresstomakeavalidap
______________
17Approved,June17,1961.
18Maciasvs.CommissiononElections,supra.
790
portionment within the period stated in the Constitution, Congress

became an unconstitutional Congress and that, in consequence
thereof, the Members of its House of Representatives are de facto
officers. The major premise of this process of reasoning is that the
constitutional provision on apportionment within three years after
the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise, is mandatory.
The fact that Congress is under legal obligation to make said
apportionmentdoesnotjustify,however,theconclusionthatfailure
to comply with such obligation rendered Congress illegal or
unconstitutional,orthatitsMembershavebecomedefactoofficers.
It is conceded that, since the adoption of the Constitution in

1935, Congress has not made a valid apportionment as required in
said fundamental law. The effect of this omission has been
envisionedintheConstitution,pursuanttowhich:
x x x Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of

RepresentativesshallhavethesamenumberofMembersasthatfixedbylaw
for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors
fromthepresentAssemblydistricts,xxx.
Theprovisiondoesnotsupporttheviewthat,upontheexpirationof
the period to make the apportionment, a Congress which fails to
make it is dissolved or becomes illegal. On the contrary, it implies
necessarily that Congress shall continue to function with the
representativedistrictsexistingatthetimeoftheexpirationofsaid
period.
It is argued that the abovequoted provision refers only to the
elections held in 1935. This theory assumes that an apportionment
hadtobemadenecessarilybeforethefirstelectionstobeheldafter
the inauguration
19
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, or in
1938. The assumption, is, however, unwarranted, for there had
been no enumeration in 1935, and nobody could foretell when it
wouldbemade.Thosewhodraftedandadoptedthe
________________
19 Under the original Constitution providing for a unicameral legislative body,

whosememberswerechosenforatermofthree(3)years(Section1,Art.VI,ofthe
OriginalConstitution).
791
Constitutionin1935couldbecertain,therefore,thatthethreeyear
period,aftertheearliestpossibleenumeration,wouldexpireafterthe
electionsin1938.
What is more, considering that several provisions of the
Constitution, particularly those on the legislative department, were
amendedin1940,byestablishingabicameralCongress,thosewho
drafted and adopted said amendment, incorporating therein the
provision of the original Constitution regarding the apportionment
ofthedistrictsforrepresentatives,musthaveknownthatthethree
yearperiodthereforwouldexpireaftertheelectionsscheduledtobe
heldandactuallyheldin1941.
Thus, the events contemporaneous with the framing and
ratification of the original Constitution in 1935 and of the
amendment thereof in 1940 strongly indicate that the provision

concerningsaidapportionmentandtheeffectofthefailuretomake
it were expected to be applied to conditions obtaining after the
electionsin1935and1938,andevenaftersubsequentelections.
Thenagain,sincethereportoftheDirectoroftheCensusonthe
last enumeration was submitted to the President on November 30,
1960, it follows that the threevear period to,make the
apportionment did not expire until 1963, or after the Presidential
elections in 1961. There can be no question, therefore, that the
SenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesorganizedorconstitutedon
December 30, 1961, were de jure bodies, and that the Members
thereof were de jure officers. Pursuant to the theory of petitioners
herein,uponexpirationofsaidperiodofthreeyears,orlatein1963,
Congress became illegal and its Members, or at least, those of the
HouseofRepresentatives,becameillegalholdersoftheirrespective
offices,andweredefactoofficers.
Petitioners do not allege that the expiration of said threeyear
period without a reapportionment, had the effect of abrogating or
repealing the legal provision creating Congress, or, at least, the
HouseofRepresentatives,andarenotawareofanyruleorprinciple
of law that would warrant such conclusion. Neither do they allege
thatthetermofofficeofthemembersofsaidHouseautomatically
expiredorthattheyipsofactoforfeitedtheirseats
792
in Congress, upon the lapse of said period for reapportionment. In

fact, neither our political law, nor our law on public officers, in
particular, supports the view that failure to discharge a mandatory
duty,whateveritmaybe,wouldautomaticallyresultintheforfeiture
ofanoffice,intheabsenceofastatutetothiseffect.
Similarly, it would seem obvious that the provision of our
Election Law relative to the election of Members of Congress in
1965werenotrepealedinconsequenceofthefailureofsaidbodyto
make an apportionment within three (3) years after the census of
1960. Inasmuch as the general elections in 1965 were presumably
heldinconformitywithsaidElectionLaw,andthelegalprovisions
creating Congresswith a House of Representatives composed of
members elected by qualified voters of representative districts as
theyexistedatthetimeofsaidelectionsremainedinforce,wecan
notseehowsaidMembersoftheHouseofRepresentativescanbe
regarded as de facto officers owing to the failure of their
predecessorsinofficetomakeareapportionmentwithintheperiod
aforementioned.
Upon the other hand, the Constitution authorizes the

impeachmentofthePresident,theVicePresident,theJusticesofthe
Supreme Court and the Auditor
20
General for, inter alia, culpable
violationoftheConstitution, theenforcementofwhichis,notonly
their mandatory duty, but also, their main function. This provision
indicatesthat,despitetheviolationofsuchmandatoryduty,thetitle
to their respective offices remains unimpaired, until dismissal or
ousterpursuanttoajudgmentofconvictionrenderedinaccordance
withArticleIXoftheConstitution.Inshort,thelossofofficeorthe
extinctionoftitletheretoisnotautomatic.
Even if we assumed, however, that the present Members of
Congress are merely defacto officers, it would not follow that the
contestedresolutionsandRepublicActNo.4913arenullandvoid.
Infact,themainreasonsfortheexistenceofthedefactodoctrineis
thatpublicinterestdemandsthatactsofpersonsholding,under
______________
20Section1,ArticleIXoftheConstitution.
793
color of title, an office created by a valid statute be, likewise,

deemed valid insofar as the publicas
21
distinguished from the
officerinquestionisconcerned. Indeed,otherwise,thosedealing
withofficersandemployeesoftheGovernmentwouldbeentitledto
demand from them satisfactory proof of their title to the positions
they hold, before dealing with them, or before recognizing their
authorityorobeyingtheircommands,eveniftheyshouldactwithin
thelimitsoftheauthorityvestedintheirrespectiveoffices,positions
22
or employments, One can imagine the great inconvenience,
hardshipsandevilsthatwouldresultintheabsenceofthede facto
doctrine.
As a consequence,
23
the title of a de facto officer cannot be
assailedcollaterally. Itmaynotbecontestedexceptdirectly,byquo
warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be 24
questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer.
Andthereasonsareobvious:(1)itwouldbeanindirectinquiryinto
thetitletotheofficeand(2)theactsofadefactoofficer,ifwithin
the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the public is
concerned.
Itisarguedthattheforegoingrulesdonotapplytothecasesat
barbecausetheactsthereininvolvedhavenotbeencompletedand
petitionershereinarenotthirdparties.Thispretenseisuntenable.It
25
is inconsistentwith Tayko vs. Capistrano. In that case, one of the
partiestoasuitbeingheardbeforeJudgeCapistranoobjectedtohis
continuing to hear the case, for the reason that, meanwhile, he had
reached the age of retirement. This Court held that the objection
couldnotbeentertained,becausetheJudgewasatleast,adefacto
Judge,
______________
21LinoLunavs.RodriguezandDelosAngeles,37Phil,p.192NacionalistaParty
vs. De Vera,35 Phil., 126:Codilla vs. Martinez, L14569, November 23, 1960. See,
also.Statevs.Carrol,38Conn.499Wilcoxvs.Smith,5Wendell[N.Y.]23121Am.
Dec,213Sheehan'sCase,122Mass.,44523Am.Rep.,323.
22Torresvs.Ribo,81Phil.50.
23NacionalistaPartyvs.DeVera,supra.
24Peoplevs.RogelioGabitanan,43O.G.3211.
2553Phil.866.
794
whose title can not be assailed collaterally. It should be noted that

Tayko was not a third party insofar as the Judge was concerned.
Taykowasoneofthepartiesintheaforementionedsuit.Moreover,
Judge Capistrano had not, as yet, finished hearing the case, much
lessrenderedadecisiontherein.Norightshadvestedinfavorofthe
parties, in consequence of the acts of said Judge. Yet, Tayko's
objection was overruled. Needless to say, insofar as Congress is
concerned,itsacts,asregardstheResolutionshereincontestedand
RepublicActNo.4913,arecomplete.Congresshasnothingelseto
doinconnectiontherewith.
TheCourtis,also,unanimousinholdingthattheobjectionunder
considerationisuntenable.
AlternativesAvailable
toCongress
Atty.JuanT.David,asamicuscuriae,maintainsthatCongressmay
eitherproposeamendmentstotheConstitutionorcallaconvention
forthatpurpose,butitcannotdoboth,atthesametime.Thistheory
isbaseduponthefactthatthetwo(2)alternativesareconnectedin
the Constitution by the disjunctive or. Such basis is, however, a
weak one, in the absence of other circumstancesand none has
brought to our attentionsupporting the conclusion drawn by the
amicus curiae. In fact, the term or has, oftentimes, been held to
mean and,
26
or viceversa, when the spirit or context of the law
warrantsit.
It is, also, noteworthy that R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose

amendments to the constitutional provision on Congress, to be
submitted to the people for ratification on November 1A, 1967,
whereasR.B.H.No.2callsforaconventionin1971,toconsider
proposals for amendment to the Constitution, in general. In other
words,thesubjectmatterofR.B.H.No.2isdifferentfromthatof
________________
2650Am.Jur.,Sec.282,pp.267268,citingHeckathornv.Heckathorn,284Mich.
677, 280 NW 79, citing RCL Robson v. Cantwell, 143 SC 104, 141 SE 180, citing
RCLGeigerv.Kobilka,26Wash171,66P423,Am.St.Rep.733andmanyothers.
795
RB.H.Nos.1and3.Moreover,theamendmentsproposedunderR.
B.H.Nos.1and3,willbesubmittedforratificationseveralyears
beforethosethatmaybeproposedbytheconstitutionalconvention
called in R. B. H. No. 2. Again, although the three (3) resolutions
werepassedonthesamedate,theyweretakenupandputtoavote
separately, or one after the other. In other words, they were not
passedatthesametime.
Inanyevent,wedonotfind,eitherintheConstitution,orinthe
historythereof,anythingthatwouldnegatetheauthorityofdifferent
Congresses to approve the contested Resolutions, or of the same
Congresstopassthesameindifferentsessionsordifferentdaysof
the same congressional session. And, neither has any plausible
reasonbeenadvancedtojustifythedenialofauthoritytoadoptsaid
resolutionsonthesameday.
Counselask:SinceCongresshasdecidedtocallaconstitutional
conventiontoproposeamendments,whynotletthewholethingbe
submitted to said convention, instead of, likewise, proposing some
specific amendments, to be submitted for ratification before said
convention is held? The force of this argument must be conceded,
butthesameimpugnsthewisdomoftheactiontakenbyCongress,
notitsauthoritytotakeit.Oneseemingpurposethereofistopermit
Members of Congress to run for election as delegates to the
constitutionalconventionandparticipateintheproceedingstherein,
withoutforfeitingtheirseatsinCongress.Whetherornotthisshould
bedoneisapoliticalquestion,notsubjecttoreviewbythecourtsof
justice.
Onthisquestionthereisnodisagreementamongthemembersof
theCourt.
MayConstitutionalAmendments
BeSubmittedforRatification
inaGeneralElection?
ArticleXVoftheConstitutionprovides:
x x x The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of threefourths

ofalltheMembersoftheSenateandoftheHouseofRepresentativesvoting
separately,mayproposeamend
796
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElection
ments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such

amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submittedtothepeoplefortheirratification.
There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the election

therein referred to is a special, not a general, election. The
circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution
hadbeensubmittedtothepeopleforratificationinspecialelections
merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the
circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to
submitproposedamendmentsforratificationingeneralelections.
It would be better, from the viewpoint of a thorough discussion
of the proposed amendments, that the same be submitted to the
people's approval independently of the election of public officials.
And there is no denying the fact that an adequate appraisal of the
merits and demerits proposed amendments is likely to be
overshadowed by the great attention usually commanded by the
choice of personalities involved in general elections, particularly
whenprovincialandmunicipalofficialsaretobechosen.But,then,
these considerations are addressed to the wisdom of holding a
plebiscite simultaneously with the election of public officers. They
donotdenytheauthorityofCongresstochooseeitheralternative,as
implied in the term election used, without qualification, in the
abovequotedprovisionoftheConstitution.Suchauthoritybecomes
even more patent when we consider: (1) that the term election,
normally refers to the choice or selection of candidates to public
officebypopularvoteand(2)thatthewordusedinArticleVofthe
Constitution, concerning the grant of suffrage to women is, not
election,butplebiscite.
Petitionersmaintainthatthetermelection,asusedinSection1
of Art. XV of the Constitution, should be construed as meaning a
specialelection.SomemembersoftheCourtevenfeelthatsaidterm
(election)referstoaplebiscite,without any election, general

orspecial,ofpublicofficers.Theyopinethatconstitution
797
al amendments are, in general, if not always, of such important, if

nottranscendentalandvitalnatureastodemandthattheattentionof
the people be focused exclusively on the subjectmatter thereof, so
that their votes thereon may reflect no more than their intelligent,
impartial and considered view on the merits of the proposed
amendments,unimpaired,or,atleast,undilutedbyextraneous,ifnot
insidious factors, let alone the partisan political considerations that
arelikelytoaffecttheselectionofelectiveofficials.
This, certainly, is a situation to be hoped for. It is a goal the
attainment of which should be promoted. The ideal conditions are,
however, one thing. The question whether the Constitution forbids
the submission of proposals for amendment to the people except
under such conditions, is another thing. Much as the writer and
thosewhoconcurinthisopinionadmirethecontraryview,theyfind
themselves unable to subscribe thereto without, in effect, reading
into the Constitution what they believe is not written thereon and
cannotfairlybededucedfromtheletterthereof,sincethespiritof
thelawshouldnotbeamatterofsheerspeculation.
The majority viewalthough the votes in favor thereof are
insufficient to declare Republic Act No. 4913 unconstitutionalas
ably set forth in the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Sanchez, is,
however,otherwise.
WouldtheSubmissionnowoftheContested
AmendmentstothePeopleViolatethe
SpiritoftheConstitution?
ItshouldbenotedthatthecontestedResolutionswereapprovedon
March16,1967,sothat,byNovember14,1967,ourcitizenryshall
have had practically eight (8) months to be informed on the
amendmentsinquestion.Thenagain,Section2ofRepublicActNo.
4913provides:
(1) that the amendments shall be published in three

consecutive issues of the Official Gazette, at least twenty
dayspriortotheelection
(2) that a printed copy of the proposed amendments shall be
postedinaconspicuousplaceineverymunic
798
ipality, city and provincial office building and in every

pollingplacenotlaterthanOctober14,1967,andthatsaid
copyshallremainpostedthereinuntilaftertheelection
(3) thatatleastfivecopiesofsaidamendmentshallbekeptin
eachpollingplace,tobemadeavailableforexaminationby
thequalifiedelectorsduringelectionday
(4) that when practicable, copies in the principal native
languages, as may be determined by the Commission on
Elections,shallbekeptineachpollingplace
(5) that the Commission on Elections shall make available
copies of said amendments in English, Spanish and,
wheneverpracticable,intheprincipalnativelanguages,for
freedistributing:and
(6) thatthecontestedResolutionsshallbeprintedinfullon
the back of the ballots which shall be used on November
14,1967.
Wearenotpreparedtosaythattheforegoingmeasuresarepalpably
inadequate to comply with the constitutional requirement that
proposals for amendment be submitted to the people for their
ratification,andthatsaidmeasuresaremanifestlyinsufficient,from
a constitutional viewpoint, to inform the people of the amendment
soughttobemade.
Theseweresubstantiallythesamemeansavailedoftoinformthe
people of the subject submitted to them for ratification, from the
originalConstitutiondowntotheParityAmendment.Thus,referring
totheoriginalConstitution,Section1ofActNo.4200,provides:
SaidConstitution,withtheOrdinanceappendedthereto,shallbepublished
in the Official Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for three consecutive
issuesatleastfifteendayspriortosaidelection,andaprintedcopyofsaid
Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall be posted in a
conspicuous place in each municipal and provincial government office
building and in each polling place not later than the twentysecond day of
April, nineteen hundred and thirtyfive, and shall remain posted therein
continually until after the termination of the election. At least ten copies of
the Constitution with the Ordinance appended thereto, in English and in
Spanish,shallbekeptateachpollingplaceavailableforexamina
799
tion by the qualified electors during election day. Whenever practicable,

copies in the principal local dialects as may be determined by the Secretary
oftheInteriorshallalsobekeptineachpollingplace.
The provision concerning womans suffrage is Section 1 of

CommonwealthActNo.34,reading:
SaidArticleVoftheConstitutionshallbepublishedintheOfficialGazette,
in English and in Spanish, for three consecutive issues at least fifteen days
priortosaidelection,andthesaidArticleVshallbepostedinaconspicuous
place in each municipal and provincial office building and in each polling
place not later than the twentysecond day of April, nineteen and thirty
seven,andshallremainpostedthereincontinuallyuntilafterthetermination
oftheplebiscite.AtleasttencopiesofsaidArticleVoftheConstitution,in
English and in Spanish, shall be kept at each polling place available for
examination by the qualified electors during the plebiscite. Whenever
practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined
bytheSecretaryoftheInterior,shallalsobekeptineachpollingplace.
Similarly, Section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 517, referring to the

1940amendments,isofthefollowingtenor:
The said amendments shall be published in English and Spanish in three

consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the
election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place in
everymunicipal,city,andprovincialgovernmentofficebuildingandinevery
polling place not later than May eighteen, nineteen hundred and forty, and
shallremainpostedthereinuntilaftertheelection.Atleasttencopiesofsaid
amendments shall be kept in each polling place to be made available for
examinationbythequalifiedelectorsduringelectionday.Whenpracticable,
copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the
SecretaryoftheInterior,shallalsobekepttherein.
AsregardstheParityAmendment,Section2ofRepublicActNo.73
istotheeffectthat:
The said amendment shall be published in English and Spanish in three

consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the
election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place in
everymunicipal,city,andprovincialgovernmentofficebuildingandinevery
polling place not later than February eleven, nineteen hundred and
fortyseven,andshallremainpostedthereinuntilaftertheelection.Atleast,
ten copies of the said amendment shall be kept in each polling place to be
madeavailableforexaminationbythequalifiedelectorsduringelectionday.
Whenpracticable,copies
800
intheprincipalnativelanguages,asmaybedeterminedbytheCommission
onElections,shallalsobekeptineachpollingplace.
Themaindifferencebetweenthepresentsituationandthatobtaining
inconnectionwiththeformerproposalsdoesnotarisefromthelaw
enactedtherefor.Thedifferencespringsfromthecircumstancethat
themajorpoliticalpartieshadtakensidesonpreviousamendments
to the Constitutionexcept, perhaps, the womans suffrageand,
consequently, debated thereon at some length before the plebiscite
took place. Upon the other hand, said political parties have not
seemingly made an issue on the amendments now being contested
and have, accordingly, refrained from discussing the same in the
current political campaign. Such debates or polemics as may have
taken placeon a rather limited scaleon the latest proposals for
amendment,havebeendueprincipallytotheinitiativeofafewcivic
organizationsandsomemilitantmembersofourcitizenrywhohave
voiced their opinion thereon. A legislation cannot, however, be
nullifiedbyreasonofthefailureofcertainsectorsofthecommunity
to discuss it sufficiently. Its constitutionality or unconstitutionally
dependsuponnootherfactorsthanthoseexistingatthetimeofthe
enactment thereof, unaffected by the acts or omissions of law
enforcingagencies,particularlythosethattakeplacesubsequentlyto
thepassageorapprovalofthelaw.
Referringparticularlytothecontestedproposalsforamendment,
the sufficiency or insufficiency, from a constitutional angle, of the
submission thereof for ratification to the people on November 14,
1967,dependsintheviewofthosewhoconcurinthisopinion,and
who,insofarasthisphaseofthecase,constitutetheminorityupon
whether the provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are such as to
fairlyapprisethepeopleofthegist,themainideaorthesubstanceof
saidproposals,whichisunderR.B.H.No.1theincreaseofthe
maximum number of seats in the House of Representatives, from
120to180,andunderR.B.H.No.3theauthoritygiventothe
members of Congress to run for delegates to the Constitutional
Conventionand,ifelectedthereto,
801
to discharge the duties of such delegates, without forfeiting their

seats in Congress. Wewho constitute the minoritybelieve that
RepublicActNo.4913satisfiessuchrequirementandthatsaidAct
is,accordingly,constitutional.
A considerable portion of the people may not know how over
160oftheproposedmaximumofrepresentativedistrictsareactually
apportioned by R. B. H. No. 1 among the provinces in the

Philippines. It is not improbable, however, that they are not
interested in the details of the apportionment, or that a careful
reading thereof may tend in their simple minds, to impair a clear
vision thereof. Upon the other hand, those who are more
sophisticated, may enlighten themselves sufficiently by reading the
copies of the proposed amendments posted in public places, the
copies kept in the polling places and the text of contested
resolutions,asprintedinfullonthebackoftheballotstheywilluse.
Itis,likewise,conceivablethatasmanypeople,ifnotmore,may
failtorealizeorenvisagetheeffectofR.B.H.No.3uponthework
oftheConstitutionalConventionoruponthefutureofourRepublic.
But, then, nobody can foretell such effect with certainty. From our
viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are
satisfiedsolongastheelectorateknowsthatR.B.H.No.3permits
Congressmentoretaintheirseatsaslegislators,eveniftheyshould
runforandassumethefunctionsofdelegatestotheConvention.
Weareimpressedbythefactorsconsideredbyourdistinguished
andesteemedbrethren,whoopineotherwise,but,wefeelthatsuch
factorsaffectthewisdomofRepublicActNo.4913andthatofR.B.
H.Nos.1and3,nottheauthorityofCongresstoapprovethesame.
Thesystemofchecksandbalancesunderlyingthejudicialpower
tostrikedownactsoftheExecutiveorofCongresstranscendingthe
confinessetforthinthefundamentallawsisnotinderogationofthe
principle of separation of powers, pursuant to which each
departmentissupremewithinitsownsphere.Thedeterminationof
theconditionsunderwhichtheproposedamendmentsshall
802
besubmittedtothepeopleisconcededlyamatterwhichfallswithin
the legislative sphere. We do not believe it has been satisfactorily
shown that Congress has exceeded the limits thereof in enacting
RepublicActNo.4913.Presumably,itcouldhavedonesomething
better to enlighten the people on the subjectmatter thereof. But,
then, no law is perfect. No product of human endeavor is beyond
improvement.Otherwise,nolegislationwouldbeconstitutionaland
valid.Six(6)MembersofthisCourtbelieve,however,saidActand
R.B.H.Nos.1and3violatethespiritoftheConstitution.
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of
declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3
unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases
mustbe,astheyarehereby,dismissed,andthewritsthereinprayed
for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered,
MakalintalandBengzon,J.P.,JJ.,concur.
Fernando,J,concursfullywiththeaboveopinion,addinga
fewwordsonthequestionofjurisdiction.
Sanchez,J.,rendersaseparateopinion.
Reyes,DizonandAngeles,JJ.,concurintheresultreached
intheseparateopinionofJusticeSanchez.
ZaldivarandCastro,JJ.,concurintheseparateopinionof
JusticeSanchez.,
MAKALINTAL,J.,concurring:
IconcurintheforegoingopinionoftheChiefJustice.Iwouldmake
some additional observations in connection with my concurrence.
Sections2and4ofRepublicA.tNo.4913provide:
SEC.2.Theamendmentsshallbepublishedinthreeconsecutiveissuesof
theOfficialGazetteatleasttwentydayspriortotheelection.Aprintedcopy
thereofshallbepostedinaconspicuousplaceineverymunicipality,cityand
provincial office building and in every polling place not later than October
fourteen, nineteen hundred and sixtyseven, and shall remain posted therein
untilaftertheelection.Atleastfivecopiesofthesaidamendmentsshallbe
kept in each polling place to be made available for examination by the
qualifiedelectorsduring
803
election day. When practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as

may be determined by the Commission on Elections, shall be kept in each
polling place. The Commission on Elections shall make available copies of
each amendments in English, Spanish and, whenever practicable, in the
principalnativelanguages,forfreedistribution.
xxxxxx
SEC.4.Theballotswhichshallbeusedintheelectionfortheapproval
ofsaidamendmentsshallbeprintedinEnglishandPilipinoandshallbein
the size and form prescribed by the Commission on Elections: Provided,
however, That at the back of said ballot there shall be printed in full
Resolutions of both Houses of Congress Numbered One and Three, both
adopted on March sixteen, nineteen hundred and sixtyseven, proposing the
amendments:Provided,further.Thatthequestionnaireappearingontheface
oftheballotshallbeasfollows:
AreyouinfavoroftheproposedamendmenttoSectionfiveofArticleVI
ofourConstitutionprintedatthebackofthisballot?
AreyouinfavoroftheproposedamendmenttosectionsixteenofArticle
VIofourConstitutionprintedatthebackofthisballot?
To vote for the approval of the proposed amendments, the voter shall
writethewordyesoritsequivalentinPilipinoorinthelocaldialectinthe
blank space after each question to vote for the rejection thereof, he shall
writethewordNooritsequivalentinPilipinoorinthelocaldialect.
I believe that intrinsically, that is, considered in itself and without

reference to extraneous factors and circumstances, the manner
prescribedintheaforesaidprovisionsissufficientforthepurposeof
having the proposed amendments submitted to the people for their
ratification,asenjoinedinSection1,ArticleXVoftheConstitution.
IamatalosstosaywhatelseshouldhavebeenrequiredbytheAct
to make it adhere more closely to the constitutional requirement.
Certainly it would have been out of place to provide, for instance,
thatgovernmentofficialsandemployeesshouldgooutandexplain
theamendmentstothepeople,orthattheyshouldbethesubjectof
anyparticularmeansorformofpublicdiscussion.
TheobjectionofsomemembersoftheCourttoRepublicActNo.
4913seemstomepredicatedonthefactthattherearesomanyother
issuesatstakeinthecominggeneralelectionthattheattentionofthe
electoratecan
804
notbeentirelyfocusedontheproposedamendments,suchthatthere
is a failure to properly submit them for ratification within the
intendment of the Constitution. If that is so, then the defect is not
intrinsic in the law but in its implementation. The same manner of
submitting the proposed amendments to the people for ratification
may,inadifferentsetting,besufficientforthepurpose.YetIcannot
conceive that the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a law
may be made to depend willynilly on factors not inherent in its
provisions.Foralawtobestruckdownasunconstitutionalitmust
be so by reason of some irreconcilable conflict between it and the
Constitution. Otherwise a law may be either valid or invalid,
according to circumstances not found in its provisions, such as the
zealwithwhichtheyarecarriedout.TosuchathesisIcannotagree.
Thecriterionwouldbetoobroadandrelative,anddependentupon
individualopinionsthatatbestaresubjective.Whatonemayregard
as sufficient compliance with the requirement of submission to the
people,withinthecontextofthesamelaw,maynotbesotoanother.
The question is susceptible of as many views as there are viewers
andIdonotthinkthisCourtwouldbejustifiedinsayingthatitsown
view on the matter is the correct one, to the exclusion of the
opinionsofothers.
Ontheotherhand,Irejecttheargumentthattheratificationmust
necessarily be in a special election or plebiscite called for that
purpose alone. While such procedure is highly to be preferred, the
Constitutionspeakssimplyofanelectionatwhichtheamendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification, and I do not
subscribe to the restrictive interpretation that the petitioners would
placeonthisprovision,namely,thatitmeansonlyaspecialelection.
BENGZON,J.P.,J.,concurring:
Itisthegloryofourinstitutionsthattheyarefoundeduponlaw,that
no one can exercise any authority over the rights and interests of
othersexceptpursuanttoand
805
1
in the manner authorized by law. Based upon this principle,
petitioners Ramon A. Gonzales and Philippine Constitution
Association(PHILCONSA)cometothisCourtinseparatepetitions.
PetitionerGonzales,astaxpayer,voterandcitizen,andallegedly
in representation thru class suit of all citizens of this country, filed
this suit for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the
CommissiononElections,DirectorofPrintingandAuditorGeneral
from implementing and/or complying with Republic Act 4913,
assailingsaidlawasunconstitutional.
Petitioner PHILCONSA, as a civic, nonprofit and nonpartisan
corporation, assails the constitutionality not only of Republic Act
4913butalsoofResolutionsofBothHousesNos.1and3ofMarch
16,1967.
RepublicAct4913,effectiveJune17,1967,isanActsubmitting
to the Filipino people for approval the amendments to the
Constitution of the Philippines proposed by the Congress of the
Philippines in Resolutions of Both Houses Numbered 1 and 3,
adopted on March 16, 1967. Said Republic Act fixes the date and
manneroftheelectionatwhichtheaforesaidproposedamendments
shall be voted upon by the people, and appropriates funds for said
election. Resolutions of Both Houses Nos. 1 and 3 propose two
amendmentstotheConstitution:thefirst,toamendSec5,Art.VI,
by increasing the maximum membership of the House of
Representativesfrom120to180,apportioning160ofsaid180seats
and eliminating the provision that Congress shall by law make an
apportionment within three years after the return of every
enumeration the second, to amend Sec. 16, Art. VI, by allowing
Senators and Representatives to be delegates to a constitutional
conventionwithoutforfeitingtheirseats.
Sincebothpetitionsrelatetotheproposedamendments,theyare
consideredtogetherherein.
Specifically and briefly, petitioner Gonzales objections are as
follows: (1) Republic Act 4913 violates Sec. 1, Art. XV of the
Constitutioninsubmittingtheproposed
______________
1UnitedStatesv.SanJacintoTinCo.,125U.S.273.
806
amendments to the Constitution, to the people for approval, at the

general election of 1967 instead of at a special election solely for
thatpurpose(2)RepublicAct4913violatesSec.1,Art.XVofthe
Constitution, since it was not passed with the 3/4 vote in joint
session required when Congress proposes amendments to the
Constitution,saidRepublicActbeingastepinorpartoftheprocess
ofproposingamendmentstotheConstitutionand(3)RepublicAct
4913 violates the due process clause of the Constitution (Sec. 1,
Subsec. 1, Art. III), in not requiring that the substance of the
proposed amendments be stated on the face of the ballot or
otherwise rendering clear the import of the proposed amendments,
suchasbystatingtheprovisionsbeforeandaftersaidamendments,
instead of printing at the back of the ballot only the proposed
amendments.
Since observance of Constitutional provisions on the procedure
foramendingtheConstitutionisconcerned,theissueiscognizable
by this Court under its powers to review an Act of Congress to
determine its conformity to the fundamental law. For though the
Constitution leaves Congress free to propose whatever
Constitutional amendment it deems fit, so that the substance or
content of said proposed amendment is a matter of policy and
wisdom and thus a political question, the Constitution nevertheless
imposesrequisitesastothemannerorprocedureofproposingsuch
amendments, e.g., the threefourths vote requirement. Said
procedureormanner,therefore,farfrombeinglefttothediscretion
of Congress, as a matter of policy and wisdom, is fixed by the
Constitution. And to that extent, all questions bearing on whether
Congressinproposingamendmentsfollowedtheprocedurerequired
by the Constitution, is perforce justiciable, it not being a matter of
policyorwisdom.
TurningthentopetitionerGonzalesfirstobjection,Sec.1,Art.
XVclearlydoesnotbearhimonthepoint.Itnowhererequiresthat
the ratification be thru, an election solely for that purpose. It only
requires that it be at an election at which the amendments are

submitted to the people for their ratification. To join it with an
electionforcandidatestopublicoffice,thatis,tomake
807
it concurrent with such election, does not render it any less an

election at which the proposed amendments are! submitted to the
peoplefortheirratification.Toprohibitionbeingfoundintheplain
termsoftheConstitution,noneshouldbeinferred.Hadtheframers
of the Constitution thought of requiring a special election for the
purposeonlyoftheproposedamendments,theycouldhavesaidso,
by qualifying the phrase with some word such as special or
solelyorexclusively.Theydidnot.
Itisnothereindecidedthatsuchconcurrenceofelectioniswise,
or that it would not have been better to provide for a separate
electionexclusivelyfortheratificationoftheproposedamendments.
Thepointhoweveristhatsuchseparateandexclusiveelection,even
if it may be better or wiser, which again, is not for this Court to
decide,isnotincludedintheprocedurerequiredbytheConstitution
to amend the same. The function of the Judiciary is not to pass 2
uponquestionsofwisdom,justiceorexpediencyoflegislation. It
islimitedtodeterminingwhethertheactiontakenbytheLegislative
DepartmenthasviolatedtheConstitutionornot.Onthisscore,Iam
oftheopinionthatithasnot.
Petitioner Gonzales second point is that Republic Act 4913 is
deficientfornothavingbeenpassedbyCongressinjointsessionby
3/4vote.
Sec.1,Art.XVoftheConstitutionprovides:
Sec.1.TheCongressinjointsessionassembled,byavoteofthreefourths
ofallthemembersoftheSenateandoftheHouseofRepresentativesvoting
separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a
conventionforthatpurpose.Suchamendmentsshallbevalidaspartofthis
Constitutionwhenapprovedbyamajorityofthevotescastatanelectionto
whichtheamendmentsaresubmittedtothepeoplefortheirratification.
Does Republic Act 4913 propose amendments to the Constitution?

IfbythetermproposeamendmentismeanttodetermineWHAT
said amendment shall be, then Republic Act 4913 does not
ResolutionsofBothHouses
_______________
2Angarav.ElectoralCommission,63Phil.139,1958,JusticeLaurel,ponente.
808
1 and 3 already did that. If, on the other hand, it means, or also
means, to provide for how, when, and by what means the
amendments shall be submitted to the people for approval, then it
does,
AcarefulreadingofSec.1,Art.XVshowsthatthefirstsenseis
the one intended. Said Section has two sentences: in the first, it
requires the 3/4 voting in joint session, for Congress to propose
amendments. And then in the second sentence, it provides that
such amendments xxx shall be submitted to the people for their
ratification. This clearly indicates that by the term propose
amendmentsinthefirstsentenceismeanttoframethesubstanceor
the content or the WHATelement of the amendments for it is this
and this alone that is submitted to the people for their ratification.
The details of when the election shall be held for approval or
rejectionoftheproposedamendments,orthemannerofholdingit,
are not submitted for ratification to form part of the Constitution.
Stated differently, the plain language of Section 1, Art. XV, shows
thattheactofproposingamendmentsisdistinctfromalbeitrelated
tothat of submitting the amendments to the people for their
ratificationandthatthe3/4votingrequirementappliesonlytothe
firststep,nottothesecondone.
It follows that the submission of proposed amendments can be
donethruanordinarystatutepassedbyCongress.TheConstitution
does not expressly state by whom the submission shall be
undertakentheruleisthatapowernotlodgedelsewhereunderthe
Constitutionisdeemedtoresidewiththelegislativebody,underthe
doctrine of residuary powers. Congress therefore validly enacted
Republic Act 4913 to fix the details of the date and manner of
submitting the proposed amendments to the people for their
ratification. Since it does not propose amendments in the sense
referred to by Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution, but merely
providesforhowandwhentheamendments,alreadyproposed,are
goingtobevotedupon,thesamedoesnotneedthe3/4voteinjoint
sessionrequiredinSec.1,Art.XVoftheConstitution.Furthermore,
RepublicAct4913isanappropriationmeasure.
809
Sec 6 thereof appropriates P1,000,000 for carrying out its

provisions. Sec 18, Art. VI of the Constitution states that All
appropriation xxx bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives.RepublicAct4913,therefore,couldnothavebeen
validly adopted in a joint session, reinforcing the view that Sec 1,
Art.XVdoesnotapplytosuchameasureprovidingfortheholding
of the election to ratify the proposed amendments, which must
perforceappropriatefundsforitspurpose.
Petitioner Gonzales contends, thirdly, that Republic Act 4913
offends against substantive due process. An examination of the
provisionsofthelawshowsnoviolationofthedueprocessclauseof
theConstitution.ThepublicationintheOfficialGazetteatleast20
days before the election, the posting of notices in public buildings
not later than October 14, 1967, to remain posted until after the
elections,theplacingofcopiesoftheproposedamendmentsinthe
pollingplaces,asidefromprintingthesameatthebackoftheballot,
providesufficientopportunitytothevoterstocastanintelligentvote
on the proposal. Due process refers only to providing fair
opportunityitdoesnotguaranteethattheopportunitygivenwillin
fact be availed of that is the lookout of the voter and the
responsibility of the citizen. As long as fair and reasonable
opportunitytobeinformedisgiven,anditis,thedueprocessclause
isnotinfringed.
Nonprintingoftheprovisionstobeamendedastheynowstand,
andtheprintingofthefullproposedamendmentsatthebackofthe
ballotinsteadofthesubstancethereofatthefaceoftheballot,donot
deprive the voter of fair opportunity to be informed. The present
wordingoftheConstitution is not being veiled or suppressed from
him he is conclusively presumed to know them and they are
available should he want to check on what he is conclusively
presumedtoknow. Should the voters choose to remain ignorant of
the present Constitution, the fault does not lie with Congress. For
opportunitytofamiliarizeoneselfwiththeConstitutionasitstands
hasbeenavailablethrualltheseyears.Perhapsitwouldhavebeen
moreconvenientforthevotersifthepresentword
810
ingoftheprovisionswerealsotobeprintedontheballot.Thesame
however is a matter of policy. As long as the method adopted
provides sufficiently reasonable chance to intelligently vote on the
amendments,andIthinkitdoesinthiscase,itisnotconstitutionally
defective.
Petitioner Gonzales other arguments touch on the merits or
wisdom of the proposed amendments. These are for the people in
theirsovereigncapacitytodecide,notforthisCourt.
Two arguments were further advanced: first, that Congress
cannotbothcallaconventionandproposeamendmentssecond,that
thepresentCongressisadefactoone,sincenoapportionmentlaw
wasadoptedwithinthreeyearsfromthelastcensusof1960,sothat
the Representatives elected in 1961 are de facto officers only. Not
beingdejure,theycannotproposeamendments,itisargued.
Astothefirstpoint,Sec.1ofArt.XVstatesthatCongressmay
propose amendments or call a convention for that purpose. The
termor,however,isfrequentlyusedashavingthesamemeaning
asandparticularlyinpermissive,affirmativesentencessothatthe
interpretationofthewordorasandintheConstitutioninsuch
use will not change its meaning (Vicksburg, S. & P. R. Co. v.
Goodenough, 32 So. 404, 411, 108 La, 442). And it should be
pointedoutthattheresolutionsproposingamendments(R.B.H.Nos.
1and3)aredifferentfromthatcallingforaconvention(R.B.H.No.
2), Surely, if Congress deems it better or wise to amend the
Constitutionbeforeaconventioncalledforiselected,itshouldnot
befetteredfromdoingso.Forourpurposesinthiscase,sufficeitto
notethattheConstitutiondoesnotprohibititfromdoingso.
Astothesecondargument,itisalsotruethatSec.5ofArt.VIof
the Constitution provides in part that The Congress shall by law
makeanapportionment within three years after the return of every
enumeration, and not otherwise. It however further states in the
nextsentence:Untilsuchapportionmentshallhavebeen
811
made,theHouseofRepresentativesshallhavethesamenumberof
MembersasthatfixedbylawfortheNationalAssembly,whoshall
be elected by the qualified electors from the present assembly
districts. The failure of Congress, therefore, to pass a valid
redistricting law since the time the above provision was adopted,
doesnotrenderthepresentdistrictingillegalorunconstitutional.For
the Constitution itself provides for its continuance in such case,
renderinglegalanddejurethestatusquo.
For the above reasons, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of
Republic Act 4913, and fully concur with the opinion of the Chief
Justice.
FERNANDO,J.,concurring:
At the outset, we are faced with a question of jurisdiction. The

opinion prepared by the Chief Justice discusses the matter with a
fullness that erases doubts and misgivings and clarifies the

applicableprinciples.Afewwordsmayhoweverbeadded.
Westartfromthepremisethatonlywhereitcanbeshownthat
the question is to be solved by public opinion or where the matter
hasbeenleftbytheConstitutiontothesolediscretionofanyofthe
political branches, as was so clearly
1
stated by the then Justice
ConcepcioninTaadav.Cuenco, maythisCourtavoidpassingon
theissuebeforeit.Whatevermaybesaidaboutthepresentquestion,
it is hard to speak with certitude, considering Article XV that
Congressmaybeentrustedwiththefullanduncontrolleddiscretion
on the procedure leading to proposals for an amendment of the
Constitution. 2
It may be said however that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 3
this
Court through Justice Tuason followed Coleman v. Miller, in its
holding that certain aspects of the amending process may be
considered political. His opinion quoted with approval the view of
Justice Black, to which three other members of the United States
Supreme Court agreed, that the process itself is political in its
entirety,
______________
1103Phil.1051(1957),
278Phil.1(1947).
3307US433(1939).
812
from submission until an amendment becomes part of the

Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or
interference at any point. In a sense that would solve the matter
neatly. The judiciary would be spared the at times arduous and in
every case soulsearching process of determining whether the
procedure for amendments required by the Constitution has been
followed.
At the same time, without impugning the motives of Congress,
whichcannotbejudiciallyinquiredintoatanyrate,itisnotbeyond
therealmofpossibilitythatafailuretoobservetherequirementsof
Article XV would occur. In the event that judicial intervention is
sought, to rely automatically on the theory of political question to
avoid passing on such a matter of delicacy might under certain
circumstances be considered, and rightly so, as nothing less than
judicialabdicationorsurrender.
Whatappearsregrettableisthatamajoropinionofanesteemed
jurist,thelateJusticeTuason,wouldnolongerbecontrolling.There
iscomfortinthethoughtthattheviewthatthenprevailedwasitself
a product of the times. It could very well be that considering the
circumstancesexistingin1947aswellastheparticularamendment
sought to be incorporated in the Constitution, the parity rights
ordinance,thebetterpartofwisdominviewofthegraveeconomic
situation then confronting the country would be to avoid the
existence of any obstacle to its being submitted for ratification.
Moreover, the Republic being less than a year old, American
SupremeCourtopinionsonconstitutionalquestionswereinvariably
accorded uncritical acceptance. Thus the approach followed by
JusticeTuasonisnotdifficulttounderstand.Itmaybesaidthatthere
is less propensity now, which is all to the good, for this Court to
accordthatmuchdeferencetoconstitutionalviewscomingfromthat
quarter.
NoristhismodeofviewingtheopinionofJusticeTuasontodo
injusticetohismemory.Forashestatedinanothermajoropinionin
4
Araneta v. Dinglasan, in ascertaining the meaning to be given the
EmergencyPowers
_______________
484Phil.368(1940).
813
5
Act, oneshouldnotignorewhatwouldensueifaparticularmodeof
constructionwerefollowed.Ashesoemphaticallystated,Wetesta
6
rulebyitsresults.
The consequences of a judicial veto on the then proposed
amendment on the economic survival of the country, an erroneous
appraisalitturnedoutlater,constitutedaneffectiveargumentforits
submission.Whynotthenconsiderthequestionpoliticalandletthe
people decide? That assumption could have been indulged in. It
could very well be the inarticulate major premise. For many it did
bearthestampofjudicialstatesmanship.
The opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion renders crystalclear
whyasofthisdateandintheforeseeablefuturejudicialinquiryto
assure the utmost compliance with the constitutional requirement
wouldbeamoreappropriateresponse.
SANCHEZ,J.,inseparateopinion:
Rightattheoutset,thewriterexpresseshisdeepappreciationtoMr.
Justice Calixto O. Zaldivar and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro for
their invaluable contribution to the substance and form of the

opinionwhichfollows.
Directly under attack in this, a petition for prohibition, is the
constitutionalityofRepublicAct4913,approvedonJune17,1967.
This Act seeks to implement Resolutions 1 and 3 adopted by the
Senate and the House of Representatives on March 16, 1967 with
theendinviewofamendingvitalportionsoftheConstitution.
Sincetheproblemherepresentedhasitsrootsintheresolutions
aforesaidofbothhousesofCongress,itmayjustaswellbethatwe
reciteinbriefthesalientfeaturesthereof.ResolutionNo.1increases
the membership of the House of Representatives from 120 to 180
members, and immediately apportions 160 seats. A companion
resolution is Resolution No. 3 which permits Senators and
CongressmenwithoutforfeitingtheirseatsinCongress
________________
5CommonwealthActNo.671(1941).
6Aranetav.Dinglasan,supra,atp.376.
814
1
tobemembersoftheConstitutionalConvention tobeconvened,
as provided in another resolutionResolution No. 2.
Parenthetically, two of these proposed amendments to the
Constitution(Resolutions1and3)aretobesubmittedtothepeople
fortheirratificationnextNovember14,1967.ResolutionNo.2just
adverted to calls for a constitutional convention also to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The delegates thereto are to be
electedonthesecondTuesdayofNovember1970theconventionto
sitonJune1,1971andtheamendmentsproposedbytheconvention
tobesubmittedtothepeoplethereafterfortheirratification.
Ofimportancenowaretheproposedamendmentsincreasingthe
number of members of the House of Representatives under
ResolutionNo.1,andthatinResolutionNo.3whichgivesSenators
and Congressmen the right to sit as members of the constitutional
conventiontobeconvenedonJune1,1971.Because,thesearethe
two amendments to be submitted to the people in the general
elections soon to be held on November 14, 1967, upon the
provisionsofSection1,RepublicAct4913,whichreads:
The amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines proposed by the

Congress of the Philippines in Resolutions of both Houses Numbered One
and Three, both adopted on March sixteen, nineteen hundred and sixty
seven, shall be submitted to the people for approval at the general election
which shall be held on November fourteen, nineteen hundred and sixty

seven,inaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthisAct.
Republic Act 4913 projects the basic angle of the problem thrust
upon usthe manner in which the amendments proposed by
Congressjustadvertedtoaretobebroughttothepeoplesattention.
First, to the controlling constitutional precept. In order that
proposed amendments to the Constitution may become effective,
Section 1, Article XV thereof commands that such amendments
mustbeapprovedbyamajorityofthevotescastatanelectionat
whichtheamendments
________________
1 The text of the law reads: He (Senator or Member of the House of

Representatives)may,however,beaMemberofaConstitutionalConvention.
815
aresubmittedtothepeoplefortheirratification.2Theaccentison
two words complementing each other, namely, submitted and
ratification.
1. We are forced to take a long hard look at the core of the
problemfacingus.Andthis,becausetheamendmentssubmittedare
transcendental and encompassing. The ceiling of the number of
Congressmen is sought to be elevated from 120 to 180 members
and Senators and Congressmen may run in constitutional
conventionswithoutforfeitingtheirseats.Thesecertainlyaffectthe
peopleasawhole.TheincreaseinthenumberofCongressmenhas
itsproportionalincreaseinthepeoplestaxburdens.Theymaynot
look at this with favor, what with the constitutional provision
(Section 5, Article VI) that Congress shall by law make an
apportionment, without the necessity of disturbing the present
constitutionally provided number of Congressmen. People in
QuezonCity,forinstance,maybalkatthespecificapportionmentof
the 160 seats set forth in Resolution No. 1, and ask for a
Congressman of their own, on the theory of equal representation.
And then, people may question the propriety of permitting the
increased 180 Congressmen from taking part in the forthcoming
constitutional convention and future conventions for fear that they
maydominateitsproceedings.Theymayentertainthebeliefthat,if
at all, increase in the number of Congressmen should be a proper
topicfordeliberationinaconstitutionalconventionwhich,anyway,
will soon take place. They probably would ask: Why the hurry?
Theseponderablesrequirethepeoplesclosescrutiny.
2. With these as backdrop, we perforce go into the philosophy

behindtheconstitutionaldirectivethatconstitutionalamendmentsbe
submittedtothepeoplefortheirratification.
Aconstitutionalamendmentisnotatemporaryexpedient.Unlike
a statute which may suffer amendments three or more times in the
sameyear,itisintendedtostandthetestoftime.Itisanexpression
ofthepeoplessovereignwill.
________________
2Italicssupplied.
816
Andso,ourapproachtotheproblemofthemechanicsofsubmission
forratificationofamendmentsisthatreasoningonthebasis of the
spiritoftheConstitutionisjustasimportantasreasoningbyastrict
adherencetothephraseologythereof.Weunderscorethis,becauseit
is within the realm of possibility that a Constitution may be
overhauled. Supposing threefourths of the Constitution is to be
amended. Or, the proposal is to eliminate the allimportant Bill of
Rightsinitsentirety.Webelieveittobebeyonddebatethatinsome
such situations the amendments ought to call for a constitutional
conventionlatherthanalegislativeproposal.Andyet,nothingthere
isinthebooksorintheConstitutionitselfwhichwouldrequiresuch
amendmentstobeadoptedbyaconstitutionalconvention.Andthen,
too, the spirit of the supreme enactment, we are sure, forbids that
proposalsthereforbeinitiatedbyCongressandthereafterpresented
tothepeoplefortheirratification.
In the context just adverted to, we take the view that the words
submitted to the people for their ratification, if construed in the
lightofthenatureoftheConstitutionafundamentalcharterthatis
legislation direct from the people, an expression of their sovereign
willis that it can only be amended by the people expressing
themselvesaccordingtotheprocedureordainedbytheConstitution.
Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid before the people for
their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber
stamps.Theyarenottovoteblindly.Theymustbeaffordedample
opportunitytomullovertheoriginalprovisions,comparethemwith
the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the
dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of
extraneous or possibly insidious influences. We believe the word
submitted can only mean that the government, within its
maximum capabilities, should strain every effort to inform very
citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed
amendmentsandthemeaning,natureandeffectsthereof.Bythis,we
arenottobeunderstoodassayingthat,ifonecitizenor100citizens
or1,000citizenscannotbereached,
817
then there is no submission within the meaning of the word as

intendedbytheframersoftheConstitution.WhattheConstitutionin
effect directs is that the government, in submitting an amendment
forratification,shouldputeveryinstrumentalityoragencywithinits
structural framework to enlighten the people, educate them with
respecttotheiractofratificationorrejection.For,aswehaveearlier
stated, one thing is submission and another is ratification. There
mustbefairsubmission,intelligent,consentorrejection.Ifwithall
these safeguards the people still approve the amendment no matter
how prejudicial it is to them, then so be it. For, the people decree
theirownfate.
Aptlyhaditbeensaid:
x x x The great men who builded the structure of our state in this respect
had the mental vision of a good Constitution voiced by Judge Cooley, who
has said A good Constitution should be beyond the reach of temporary
excitement and popular caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and
steadinessitmustyieldtothethoughtofthepeoplenottothewhimofthe
people, or the thought evolved the excitement or hot blood, but the sober
secondthought,whichalone,ifthegovernmentistobesafe,canbeallowed
efficiency,xxxChangesingovernmentaretobefearedunlessthebenefitis
certain. As Montaign says: All great mutations shake and disorder a state.
Good does not necessarily succeed3evil another evil may succeed and a
worse.Am.LawRev.1889,p.311
3.Terselyput,theissuebeforeusfunnelsdowntothisproposition:
Ifthepeoplearenotsufficientlyinformedoftheamendmentstobe
voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon, to express their
willinagenuinemanner,canitbesaidthatinaccordancewiththe
constitutional mandate, the amendments are submitted to the
peoplefortheirratification?OuranswerisNo.
WeexamineRepublicAct4913,approvedonJune17,1967the
statute that submits to the people the constitutional amendments
proposedbyCongressinResolutions1and3.Section2oftheAct
providesthemannerofpropagationofthenatureoftheamendments
throughoutthecountry.TherearefivepartsinsaidSection2,viz:
________________
3Ellinghamvs.Dye,99N.E.pp.4,15italicssupplied.
818
(1) The amendment shall be published in three consecutive

issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to
theelection.
(2) A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous
place in every municipality, city and provincial office
building and in every polling place not later than October
fourteen, nineteen hundred and sixtyseven, and shall
remainpostedthereinuntilaftertheelection.
(3) Atleastfivecopiesofthesaidamendmentsshallbekeptin
eachpollingplacetobemadeavailableforexaminationby
thequalifiedelectorsduringelectionday.
(4) Whenpracticable,copiesintheprincipalnativelanguages,
as may be determined by the Commission on Elections,
shallbekeptineachpollingplace.
(5) The Commission on Elections shall make available copies
of said amendments in English, Spanish and, whenever
practicable, in the principal native languages, for free
distribution.
A question that comes to mind is whether the procedure for

dissemination of information regarding the amendments effectively
bringsthemattertothepeople.Adissectionofthemechanicsyields
disturbingthoughts.First,theOfficialGazetteisnotwidelyread.It
does not reach the barrios. And even if it reaches the barrios, is it
availabletoall?Andifitis,wouldallunderstandEnglish?Second,
it should be conceded that many citizens, especially those in the
outlyingbarrios,donotgotomunicipal,cityand/orprovincialoffice
buildings, except on special occasions like paying taxes or
respondingtocourtsummonses.Andiftheydo,willtheynoticethe
printed amendments posted on the bulletin board ? And if they do
notice,suchcopyagainisinEnglish(samplesubmittedtothisCourt
by the Solicitor General) for, anyway, the statute does not require
thatitbeinanyotherlanguageordialect.Third,itwouldnothelp
any if at least five copies are kept in the polling place for
examinationbyqualifiedelectorsduringelectionday.Aspetitioner
puts it, voting time is not study time. And then, who can enter the
pollingplaceexceptthosewhoareabouttovote?Fourth,copiesin
the principal native languages shall be kept in each polling place.
Butthisisnot,asSection2itselfimplies,inthenatureofa
819
command because such copies shall be kept therein only when

practicable and as may be determined by the Commission on
Elections.Evenifitbesaidthattheseareavailablebeforeelection,
acitizenmaynotintrudeintotheschoolbuildingwherethepolling
places are usually located without disturbing the school classes
beingheldthere.Fifth,itistruethattheComelecisdirectedtomake
available copies of such amendments in English, Spanish or
whenever practicable, in the principal native languages, for free
distribution.However,Comelecisnotrequiredtoactivelydistribute
themtothepeople.Thisissignificantastopeopleintheprovinces,
especially those in the farflung barrios who are completely
unmindful of the discussions that go on now and then in the cities
and centers of population on the merits and demerits of the
amendments.Rather,Comelec,inthiscase,isbutapassiveagency
wliich may hold copies available, but which copies may not be
distributedatall.Finally,itisofcommonknowledgethatComelec
hasmorethanitshandsfullinthesepreelectiondays.Theycannot
possiblymakeextensivedistribution.
Voterswillsoongotothepollstosayyesorno.Buteventhe
officialsampleballotsubmittedtothisCourtwouldshowthatonly
the amendments are printed at the back. And this, in pursuance to
RepublicAct4913itself.
Surelyenough,thevotersdonothavethebenefitofpropernotice
of the proposed amendments thru dissemination by publication in
extenso.Peopledonothaveathandthenecessarydataonwhichto
basetheirstandonthemeritsanddemeritsofsaidamendments.
We, therefore, hold that there is no proper submission of the
proposed constitutional amendments within the meaning and
intendmentofSection1,ArticleXVoftheConstitution.
4. Contemporary history is witness to the fact that during the
presentelectioncampaignthefocusisontheelectionofcandidates.
Theconstitutionalamendmentsarecrowdedout.Candidatesonthe
homestretch, and their leaders as well as the voters, gear their
undivided
820
effortstotheelectionofofficialstheconstitutionalamendmentscut
noicewiththem.Thetruthisthatevenintheballotitself,thespace
accorded to the casting of yes or no vote would give one the

impressionthattheconstitutionalamendmentsarebutabootstrapto
the electoral ballot. Worse still, the fortunes of many elective
officials, on the national and local levels, are inextricably
intertwinedwiththeresultsofthevoteontheplebiscite.Inaclash
between votes for a candidate and conscience on the merits and
demeritsoftheconstitutionalamendments,wearequitecertainthat
itisthelatterthatwillbedented.
5.Thatpropersubmissionofamendmentstothepeopletoenable
themtoequallyratifythemproperlyisthemeatoftheconstitutional
requirement, is reflected in the sequence of uniform past practices.
The Constitution had been amended thricein 1939, 1940 and
1947. In each case, the amendments were embodied in resolutions
adoptedbytheLegislature,whichthereafterfixedthedatesatwhich
the proposed amendments were to be ratified or rejected. These
plebisciteshavebeenreferredtoeitherasanelectionorgeneral
election.Atnotime,however,wasthevotefortheamendmentsof
the Constitution held simultaneously with the election of officials,
national or local. Even with regard to the 1947 parity amendment,
therecordshowsthatthesoleissuewasthe1947parityamendment
and the special elections simultaneously held in only three
provinces,Iloilo,PangasinanandBukidnon,weremerelyincidental
thereto.
Intheend,wesaythatthepeoplearethelastrampartsthatguard
againstindiscriminatechangesintheConstitutionthatistheirs.Isit
toomuchtoaskthatreasonableguaranteebemadethatinthematter
of the alterations of the law of the land, their true voice be heard?
Theanswerperhapsisbestexpressedinthefollowingthoughts:It
mustberememberedthattheConstitutionisthepeoplesenactment.
No proposed change can become effective unless they will 4
it so
throughthecompellingforceofneedofitanddesireforit.
_________________
4Ellinghamvs.Dye,supra,atp.17italicssupplied.
821
Gonzalesvs,CommissiononElections
For the reasons given, our vote is that Republic Act 4913 must be
strickendownasinviolationoftheConstitution.
ZaldivarandCastro,JJ.,concur.Reyes,J.B.L.,Dizon and
Angeles, JJ., concur in the result herein reached in a separate
opinion.
REYES,J.B.L.,J.,concurring:
I concur in the result with the opinion penned by Mr. Justice

Sanchez. To approve a mere proposal to amend the Constitution
requires (Art. XV) a threefourths (3/4) vote of all the members of
eachlegislativechamber,thehighestmajorityeverdemandedbythe
fundamentalcharter, one higher even than that required in order to
declarewar(Sec.24,ArticleVI),withallitsdireconsequences.If
suchanoverwhelmingmajority,thatwasevidentlyexactedinorder
to impress upon all and sundry the seriousness of every
constitutional amendment, is asked for a proposal to amend the
Constitution,Ifinditimpossibletobelievethatitwaseverintended
byitsframersthatsuchamendmentshouldbesubmittedandratified
by just a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendmentsaresubmittedtothepeoplefortheirratification,ifthe
concentration of the peoples attention thereon to be diverted by
other extraneous issues, such as the choice of local and national
officials.TheframersoftheConstitution,awareofthefundamental
characterthereof,andoftheneedofgivingitasmuchstabilityasis
practicable, could have only meant that any amendments thereto
shouldbedebated,consideredandvoteduponatanelectionwherein
thepeoplecoulddevoteundividedattentiontothesubject.Thatthis
was the intention and the spirit of the provision is corroborated in
thecaseofallotherconstitutionalamendmentsinthepast,thatwere
submitted to and approved in special elections exclusively devoted
to the issue whether the legislatures amendatory proposals should
beratifiedornot.
Dizon,Angeles,Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur with the

aboveopinion.
822
ANNOTATION
JUDICIALDEFERENCETOPOLITICALQUESTIONS
Concept of Political Question.The phrase political question

refers to those questions which under the Constitution are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated
1
to the
legislative or executive branch of the Government , and concerns
withthewisdom,justice,policy,advisability,orexpediency,notthe
2 3
legality,ofaparticularlaw oraction .
The term political question is not susceptible of exact

definitionandprecedentsandauthoritiesarenotalwaysinharmony
as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to
meddle with 4
the actions of the political departments of the
Government .Althoughitisdifficulttodefineapoliticalquestionas
contradistinguished from a justiceable one, it has been generally
heldthatthefirstinvolvespoliticalrightswhichconsistinthepower
to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or
management of the government, while justiceable questions are
those which affect civil, personal, or property
5
rights accorded to
everymemberofthecommunityornation. Theconceptofpolitical 6
questionispredicatedontheprincipleofseparationofpowers.
_______________
1Taadavs.Cuenco,L10520,Feb.28,1957Mabanag,etal.v.LopezVito,etal.,
L1123,Mar.5,1947Climaco,etal.v.Macadaeg,etal.,L19440&L19447,Apr.18,
1962.
2Morfev.Mutuc,L20387,Jan.31,1968Sumulongv.CommissiononElections,et
al., 73 Phil. 288 (1941) Avelino v. Cuenco, L2821, Mar. 4 & 14, 1949 Cf. also
DissentingOpinionofJusticeConcepcion(nowChiefJustice)inAytonav.Castillo,et
al.,L19313,Jan.20,1962.
3 Gonzales v. Hechanova, L21897, Oct. 22, 1963 Arnault v. Nazareno, L3920
(1950).
4 Mabanag, et al. v. Lopez Vito, supra. As distinguished from the judicial, the
legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the political departments of

Government because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by
considerationofpublicorpoliticalpolicy(Taadav.Cuenco,supra).
5ConcurringOpinionofJusticeFeriainMabanag,etal.v.LopezVito,Id.
6Taadav.Cuenco,Id.InreMcConnaleghy,119N.W.408.
823
Withinthecontextofpoliticalquestionsarebroadprinciplestothe
effectthatunderourformofGovernment:Thejudicialdepartment
hasnopowertoreviseeventhemostarbitraryandunfairactionof
the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in
pursuanceofthepowercommittedexclusivelytothatdepartmentby
7
the Constitution . The legal or constitutional duties of the Chief
Executivearepolitical,andthatheisonlyaccountableforthemto 8
his country, and to his own conscience in a political manner .
However,underthedoctrinethatthejudicialdepartmentistheonly
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several9 departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof the judiciary is
empoweredtodeterminethelimitationswhichthelawplaces
10
upon
all official actions. Corollarily, the principle that the manner in
which discretionary powers are exercised is not subject to judicial
review,doesnotapplywheretheissueinvolvedistheexistenceand
11
extentofthosediscretionarypowers.
DeterminationofJurisdictioninPoliticalControversies.
When the issue is a political one which comes within the
exclusive sphere of the legislative or executive department of the
Governmenttodecide,thejudicialdepartmentorSupremeCourthas
nopowertodeterminewhetherornottheactoftheLegislatureor
Chief Executive is against the Constitution. What determines the
jurisdictionofthecourtsinsuchcaseistheissueinvolved,andnot
12
thelaworconstitutionalprovisionwhichmaybeapplied .
PARTICULARQUESTIONSHELDTOBEPOLITICAL
WhetherImputationofBriberyConstitutesDisorderly
_______________
7Osmea,Jr.v.Pendatun,etal.,L17144,Oct.28,1960,citingCliffordv.French,
146Cal.604,69L.R.A.556.
8Severinov.GovernorGeneral,16Phil.366(1910),citingHawkinsv.Governor,1
Ark.570,33Am.Dec.346.
9Angarav.ElectoralCommission,63Phil.139,157.
10Tanadav.Cuenco,Id.
11Id.SeealsoLacsonv.Roque,L6225(1953)Joverv.Borra,L6782,Jul.25,1953.
12ConcurringOpinionofJusticeFeriainMabanagv.LopezVito,supra.
824
Behavior.As to whether imputations of bribery against the

President,madebyacongressmaninaprivilegespeech,constituted
disorderlybehavior,theSupremeCourtheldthattheHouseisthe
solejudgeofwhatconstitutesdisorderlybehavior,notonlybecause
theConstitutionhasconferredjurisdictionuponitbutalsobecause
the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the
House knows best and that if the Court assumed the power to
determine whether such conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it
would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the
Constitutionneverintendedtoconferuponacoordinatebranchof
13
theGovernment .
Question Relating to Reorganization and Rules of Commission
on Appointments.The question as to whether the Supreme Court
could review a resolution of the Senate reorganizing its
representationintheCommissiononAppointments,wasdecidedin
thenegative,themainpurposeofthepetitionthereinbeingtoforce
upon the Senate the reinstatement of Senator Magalona in the
CommissiononAppointmentsonehalfofthemembersofwhichis
to be elected by each House on the basis 14
of proportional
representation of the political parties therein . The issue there
dependedmainlyontheterminationofthepoliticalalignmentofthe
members of the Senate at the time of said organization and of the
necessityoradvisabilityofeffectingsaidreorganization,whichisa
15
politicalquestion .
________________
13Osmea,Jr.v.Pendatun,etal.,Id.
14Cabili,etal.v.Francisco,etal.,L2438,May8,1951.
15Ibid.TheCabilicasewasdecidedupontheauthorityofAlejandrinov.Quezon,
46Phil.83(1924)andVerav.Avelino,77Phil.192(1946).IntheAlejandrinocase,the
SupremeCourtheldthatinviewoftheseparationofpowers,ithadnojurisdictionto
compel the Senate to reinstate an appointiveSenator who was, by resolution of the
Senate,suspendedfromofficefor12monthsbecausehehadassaultedanothermember
ofthatBodyforcertainphrasesthelatterhadutteredinthecourseofadebate.This
ruling may now be considered obsolete because at the time the Alejandrino case
arose, the legislature had only those powers which were granted to it by the Jones
LawwhereasnowtheCongresshadthefulllegislativepowersandprerogativesofa
sovereign nation, except as restricted by the Constitution. In other words, in the
Alejandrinocase,theCourtreachedtheconclusionthattheJonesLawdid
825
TheCourtcannotpassuponthecorrectnessoftheinterpretationof
theonedayperiodwithinwhicharesolutionoftheCommissionon
Appointments may be reconsidered, as prescribed in the Rules of
that body, because the matter concerns its internal
16
business which
cannotbemadethesubjectofjudicialinquiry .
Issue of Suspension of Operation of Law.The task of
suspendingtheoperationofalawallegedtobeunconstitutionalisa
matter of extreme delicacy because it is an interference with the
official acts, not only of the duly elected representatives
17
of the
people,butalsoofthehighestmagistrateoftheland .
Inquiry Regarding the Wisdom, Justice, or Advisability of
ParticularLaw.Thewisdomoradvisabilityofaparticularstatute
isnotaquestionforthecourtstodeterminethatisquestionforthe
legislaturetodetermine.TheCourtsmayormaynotagreewiththe
legislature upon the wisdom or necessity of the law. Their
disagreement,however,furnishesnobasisforpronouncingastatute
illegal.Iftheparticularstatuteiswithintheconstitutionalpowerof
the legislature to enact, whether the courts agree

18
or not in the
wisdomofitsenactment,isamatterofnoconcern .The
_________________
notgivetheSenatethepoweritthenexercisedthepowerofsuspensionforone
year.Whereasnow,theCongresshastheinherentlegislativeprerogativeofsuspension
whichtheConstitutiondidnotimpair.Cf.Osmea,Jr.v.Pendatun,Id.Further,under
ourConstitutionSenatorsandCongressmenareelective,notappointiveofficials.
IntheVeracase,theCourtheldthatithadnojurisdictiontosetasidethePendatun
resolution ordering that petitioners Vera, Diokno and Romero shall not be seated as
membersoftheSenate,thesamematterbeingapoliticalquestion.HeretheSupreme
Courtdeclaredthat"thejudiciaryisnottherepositoryofremediesforallpoliticalor
socialevils."
16Advinculav.CommissiononAppointments,L19823,Aug.31,1962.
17SocialSecuritySystemv.Bayona,L13555,May30,1962.
18Angarav.ElectoralCommission,63Phil.139(1936)U.S.v.TeYu,24 Phil. 1
(1912)Morfev.Mutuc,etal.,L20387,Jan.31,1968.
826
remedyagainstunwiselegislationisanappealnottotheCourt,but 19
to the people who elected the members of the legislative body .
Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom 20
of the
actiontaken,maybethebasisfordeclaringastatuteinvalid .
Upontheotherhand,however,ifthestatutecoverssubjectsnot
authorized by the Constitution, then the Courts are not only
authorizedbutarejustifiedinpronouncingthesameillegalandvoid, 21
nomatterhowwiseorbeneficientsuchlegislationmayseem'tobe.
Whether Public Interests Demand Creation of Municipalities.
ThecreationofMunicipalitiesisnotanadministrativefunction,but
onewhichisessentiallyandeminentlylegislativeincharacter.The
question whether or not public interest demands the exercise 22
of
suchpowerispurelyalegislativequestionorapoliticalquestion .
QuestiononPoliciesEnunciatedinPreambleandinDeclaration
of Principles of Constitution.Whether a legislative enactment of
Congress or the specific deed of any other department tallies with
the policies enunciated in the Preamble and in the Declaration of
PrinciplesoftheConstitutionisamatterofopinionwhichcannotbe
controlled by judicial pronouncements and belongs to those broad
questions,essentiallypoliticalincharacter,uponwhichopinionmust
be crystallized
23
and, when elections come, will be decided by the
people.
Thetrueofficeofapreambleistoexpoundthenatureandextent
andapplicationofthepowersactuallyconferredbytheConstitution,
24
and not substantially to create them It cannot be regarded as the
24
and not substantially to create them . It cannot be regarded as the
sourceofanysubstantivepower
________________
19Sumulongv.CommissiononElections,etal.,73Phil.288(1941).
20U.S.v.TeYu,supra.Seefootnotesnos.18and21.
21IbidMutuc,etal.,L20387,supraGonzalesv.Comelec,L28196,Nov.9,1967.
22Pelaezv.AuditorGeneral,L23825,Dec.14,1965.
23ConcurringOpinionofJusticePerfectoinCustodiovPresidentoftheSenate,L
117,Nov.7,1945.
24StoryontheConstitution,VolI,Sec.462.
827
conferredonthegovernmentoranyofitsdepartment.Nopowercan
be exercised by the State unless, apart from the preamble, it be
foundinsomeexpressdelegationofpowerorinsomepowertobe
25
properlyimpliedtherefrom .
Issues Affecting Exercise of Executive Power to Appoint and to
WithdrawAppointments.Mostifnotallappointmentsmadebythe
Presidenthavetwoaspects,namely,thelegalandthepolitical.The
first refers to his authority to make the appointments. The second
dealswiththewisdomintheexerciseofsuchauthority,aswellasits
propriety.Whetheragivenvacancyornumberofvacanciesshould
befilled,orwhoamongseveralqualifiedpersonsshallbechosen,or
whetheragivenappointmentornumberofappointmentswillfavor
the political party to whom the power of appointment belongs and
will injure the interest of a rival political party and to what extent,
are essentially and typically political matters. Hence, the question
whethercertainappointmentsshouldbesanctionedorturneddown
by reason of the improper, immoral, or malevolent motives with
which said matters were handled is, likewise, clearly political, and
assuch,itsdeterminationbelongs,nottothecourtsofjustice(Vera
v.Avelino,77Phil.192,20516C.J.S.689690,Willoughbyonthe
Constitution, Vol. III, 13261327), but to the political organ
establishedpreciselytocheckpossibleabusesintheexerciseofthe
26
appointingpowertheCommissiononAppointments.
The appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the
President,uponwhichnolimitationsmaybeimposedbyCongress,
exceptthoseresultingfromtheneedofsecuringtheconcurrenceof
the Commission on Appointments and from the exercise of the
limited legislative power
27
to prescribe the qualifications to a given
appointive office. However, where the Commission on
Appointments that will consider the Presidential appointees is
different from that existing at the time of the appointments and

wherethe
_______________
25Jacobsonv.Massachusetts,197U.S.11.
26OpinionofJusticeConcepcion(nowChiefJustice),withwhomJusticeBarrera
agreed,inAytonav.Castillo,Id.
27Manalangv.Quitoriano,L6898,Apr.30,1954.
828
names are to be submitted by his successor, who may not wholly

approveoftheselections,thePresidentshouldbedoublycarefulin
extending such appointments otherwise, such appointments
extended by the outgoing President would fall beyond the intent
and spirit of the constitutional provision granting
28
to the Executive
authoritytoissueadinterimappointments.
The President may exercise his authority to appoint ad interim
appointments,evenifhistermisabouttoexpire,butonlytoavoida
29
disruption of the operation of the Government. In the exercise of
suchauthorityoftheincomingExecutivetoeitherreappointthose
whoseadinterimappointmentshadlapsedorappointotherswhom
he may deem fit to carry out the policies of his administration, his
functions
30
are mainly political, and hence, not subject to judicial
review .
______________
28Aytonav.Castillo,Id.
29 Guevara v. Inocentes, L25577, Mar. 16, 1966. In the Guevara case, the legal
issueposedistheeffectoftheadjournmentofaspecialsessionofCongressuponad
interimappointmentsmadepriorthereto.
30ConcurringOpinionofChiefJusticeConcepcioninGuevarav.Inocentes,supra.
ThequestionraisedintheAytonacasewaswhetheranincomingPresidentcould,
before Congress had met in regular or special session, validly withdraw ad interim
appointments made by the outgoing President, in order that the Commission on
Appointmentscouldnotact,evenifitwantedto,onsaidappointments.Thisquestion
wasdecidedintheaffirmative.
IndecliningtodisregardthePresident'sAdministrativeOrderNo.2(withdrawing
the ad interim appointments of the outgoing President) in the Aytona case, the
Supreme Court considered the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the 350
appointments,ofwhichthereinpetitionerAytonawereone,inthenightofDecember
29,1961,suchasthescrambleinMalacanangofcandidatesforpositionstryingto
get their written appointments or having such appointments changed to more
convenient places the fact that such mass appointments were issued a few hours
beforetheinaugurationofthenewPresident.Thus,afterobservingthattheappointing
Presidentcouldnothaveexercisedthecarenecessarytoinsurethatsaidappointments
wouldbeapprovedbyaCommissiononAppointmentsdifferentfromthatexistingat
thetimeoftheappoint
829
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9.1967 829
Inquiry into Motive Behind Formulation of Policy of Chief

Executive.Indeterminingtheissue,whetherornotthedisposalby
burningofconfiscatedcigarettesbytheCustomsCommissionerwas
authorizedbySection2608oftheTariffCode,themotivationforthe
issuance of the directive of the President (issued allegedly in
violationofsaidsection)cannotbetakenintoconsideration.Reason
therefor is that Courts have no jurisdiction to inquire into the
motives that lie behind
31
the formulation of government policies by
theChiefExecutive. 32
ImproprietyofActofDepartmentHead.InSantosv.Yatco in
which a department head was sought to be enjoined from
electioneering,inviewoftheexplicitprovisionoftheCivilService
33
Act of 1959 , prohibiting all officers and employees in the Civil
Service,whetherinthecompetitiveorclassified,ornoncompetitive
or unclassified service, from engaging directly or indirectly in
partisan political activities or taking part in any election except to
vote, the Supreme Court held that the issue therein was one of
improprietyasdistinguishedfromillegality,andthat,assuch,it
isnotjusticiablebythisCourt.
________________
ments,theSupremeCourtdeclaredthatsuchactlendsforcetothecontention
thattheseappointmentsfallbeyondtheintentandspiritoftheconstitutionalprovision
granting to the Executive authority to issue ad interim appointments. Such
circumstances were therein found to fit the exceptional circumstances justifying
revocation of said appointments. But the Supreme Court, realizing the danger of
overstretching the effect of that decision beyond the extreme and extraordinary
circumstancesparticularlyattendingthecase,wiselystatedthat:
The filling up of vacancies in important positions if few, and so spaced as to afford some
assuranceofdeliberateactionandcarefulconsiderationoftheneedfortheappointmentandthe
appointee'squalification,mayundoubtedlybepermitted.
ThecaseofHerrerav.Liwag,etal,L20079,Sept.30,1963,comessquarelywithin
theabovequalificationintheAytonaruling.
31Gonzalesv.Enrile,etal.,L22730,May24,1967.
3255O.G.8641.
33Rep.ActNo.2260,Sec.29.
830
DeterminationofExigencyRequiringSuspensionofWritofHabeas
Corpus.OurSupremeCourtrefusedtointerferewiththedecision
oftheGovernorGeneralinsuspendingthewritofhabeascorpusfor
such a step would constitute an encroachment of the discretionary
34
powerandauthorityofanindependentanddistinctdepartment . It
wasthereobservedandheldthattheauthoritytodecidewhetherthe
exigency has arisen requiring suspension of the writ of habeas
corpusbelongstotheGovernorGeneralandhisdecisionisfinaland
conclusiveuponthecourts.Thesamepronouncementwasmadein
35
Montenegrovs.Castaneda .
IssueRegardingPowertoCallSpecialElection.TheSupreme
Court denied a petition for mandamus filed against the Governor
Generaltocompelhimtocallaspecialelectionforthepurposeof
electing a municipal president in the town of Silay stating in
support of the denial, that the GovernorGeneral is invested with
certainpoliticalpowers,intheexerciseofwhichheistousehisown
discretion36 and is accountable only to his country in his political
character.
QuestionPertainingtoExaminationofGovernmentVouchers.
37
In an earlier case which involved another petition for mandamus
filed by some elected members of the Philippine Legislature, to
direct the officials of the executive and legislative departments to
permit the petitioners to examine the vouchers showing the
expenditures of the Independence Commission, the Court held
that if the GovernorGeneral should deem it important and
advisabletoexhibitthevoucherstothepetitionersortothepublicin
order that the taxpayers might know in what manner their
contributionstotheGovernmentareexpended,thatisaquestionfor
himtodecide.Itispurelyapolitical
________________
34Barcelonv.Baker,5Phil.87(1905).
35L4221,48O.G.3391(1952).SeeArt.VII,Sec.10(2),PhilippineConstitution.
36 Severino v. GovernorGeneral, et al., 16 Phil. 366 (1910) Cf. also Sec. 22,
RevisedElectionCode,reCallofSpecialElectionsbythePresident.
37Abueva,etal.v.Wood,etal.,45Phil.612(1924).
831
question, and lies within the breast of the GovernorGeneral. On

this subject, our Constitution now provides that The heads of
departments upon their own initiative or upon request of either
HousemayappearbeforeandbeheardbysuchHouseonanymatter
pertaining to their departments, unless the public interest 38
shall
requireotherwiseandthePresidentshallsostateinwriting.
Determination of Facts Requiring Deportation of Aliens.
Courts will not take jurisdiction of a case to enjoin the Chief
Executivefromdeportinganobnoxiousalien.Theinherentpowerof
thePresidenttodeportundesirablealiensisuniversallydenominated
political,andthispowerwouldcontinuetoexistforthepreservation
ofthelifeandintegrityoftheStateandthepeaceofitspeople,even
thoughtheConstitutionisdestroyedandeveryletterofthestatutes
39
is repealed. In the enforcement of the power of the President to
deport aliens, he is the sole judge of the facts and circumstances
which require the deportation and he cannot be required 40
to show
reasonablegroundsforhisbelieftoacourtofjustice, althoughin
ourjurisdiction,Congresshasprescribedtheconditionsandmethods
under which
41
and by which the power should be carried into
operation.
WhetherLawlessViolence,Invasion,etc.andWarExists._The
President,asCommanderinChiefoftheArmedForces,isthesole
judge and authority to determine whether there exists lawless
violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion 42
and his decision
thereonisconclusiveuponallotherpersons. Thequestionwhether
war, in the legal sense, still continues, or has terminated, is within
the province of the political department, 43
and not of the judicial
department,ofgovernmenttodetermine.
______________
38Sec.24,Art.VI,PhilippineConstitution.
39Forbes,etal.v.Tiaco,etal.,16Phil.534(1910).
40InrePatterson,1Phil.23AngBengv.CommissionerofImmigration,L9621,
Jan.30,1957TanSinv.DeportationBoard,L11511,Nov.18,1958.
41Cf.Sec.69,Rev.Adm.CodeExecutiveOrderNo.455(1951).
42 Forbes, et al. v. Tiaco, et al., supra Cf. Sec. 10 (2), Art. VII, Philippine
Constitution.
43Untalv.ChiefofStaff,etc.,84Phil.586(1949).
832
PARTICULARQUESTIONSHELDTOBE
JUSTICEABLE:
Validity of Apportionment Act.Even if an apportionment law
improves existing conditions, its validity or constitutionality is a
justiceable question. Thus, the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional an Act of Congress purporting to apportion the
representative districts for the House of Representatives, upon the
groundofdisproportionofrepresentationwhichiscontrarytothe
constitutionalprovisionthattheonehundredtwentyMembersofthe
House of Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
provinces as nearly as44may be according to the number of their
respectiveinhabitants. Citing American precedents, the Supreme
Court ruled that: The constitutionality of a legislative
apportionmentactisajudicialquestion,andnotonewhichthecourt
cannot consider on the ground that it is a political question the
passageofapportionmentactsisnotsoexclusivelywithinthepower
of the legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into their
constitutionality when the question is properly brought before it
thefactthattheactionmayhaveapoliticaleffect,andinthatsense
affect a political object, does not make the question involved in a
suit to declare the unconstitutionality of an apportionment act
political instead of judicial the constitutionality of a statute
forming a delegate district or apportioning delegates for the House
ofRepresentativesisajudicialquestionforthecourts,althoughthe
statute is an exercise of political power and the mere impact of
the suit upon the 45political situation does not render it political
insteadofjudicial.
Validity of Proceedings in Senate Electoral Tribunal.The
questionwhethertheelectionoftwoSenators,bythe
________________
44Maciasv.CommissiononElections,etal.,L18684,Sept14,1961Cf. Sec. 5,
Art.VI,PhilippineConstitution
45Ibid
833
Senate, as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon

nominationbyanotherSenator,whoisamemberandspokesmanof
thepartyhavingthelargestnumberofvotesintheSenate,onbehalf
of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate
thatsaidmembersofthetribunalshallbechosenuponnomination
xxxofthepartyhavingthesecondlargestnumberofvotes,in
46
theSenate,isnotapoliticalquestion. ThereasonisthattheSenate
46
theSenate,isnotapoliticalquestion. ThereasonisthattheSenate
is not clothed with full discretionary authority in the choice of
MembersoftheSenateElectoralTribunal.Theexerciseofitspower
47
thereonissubjecttoConstitutionallimitations. Itisclearlywithin
the legislativeprovince of the judicial department to pass upon the
validity of the proceedings therewith. Hence, the Supreme Court
has,notonlyjurisdiction,but,alsoadutytoconsideranddetermine
theprincipalissueraisedbythepartiestherein.
OnthequestionofappointmentsoftheemployeesoftheSenate
Electoral Tribunal, the Supreme Court held that the officers and
employeesofthattribunalareunderitssupervisionandcontrol,not
48
ofthatoftheSenatePresident,asclaimedbythelatter. Ajudgment
renderedbytheElectoralTribunalintheexerciseofitspowers,are
exemptfromjudicialsupervisionandinterference,exceptonaclear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident
49
use of the powers as it
willconstituteadenialofdueprocess.
Determination of Number of Votes Essential50 to Constitute
Quorum.In Mabanag, et al v. Lopez Vito, et al., the Supreme
CourtheldthatitcouldnotreviewthefindingoftheSenatetothe
effect that the members thereof, who had been suspended by said
House, should not be considered in determining whether the votes
casttherein,infavorofaresolutionproposinganamendmenttothe
Con
______________
46Taada,etal.v.Cuenco,etal.,L10520,Feb.28,1957.
47Cf.Sec.11,Art.VI,PhilippineConstitution.
48Suanesv.ChiefAccountantoftheSenate,81Phil.818(1948).
49Morrerov.Bocar,37O.G.445.
50L1123,Mar.5,1947.
834
51
stitution, suffice to satisfy the
52
requirement of the latter, such
question being a political
53
one. Quoting with approval the case of
Coleman v. Miller and the opinion of Justice Black, the Court
further ruled that, the efficacy of ratification x x x of a proposed
amendmenttotheConstitutionisapoliticalquestionandhencenot
justiceable that if ratification of an amendment is a political
question,aproposalwhichleadstoratificationhastobeapolitical
question and that the amending process itself is political in its
entirety,fromsubmissionuntilanamendmentbecomespartofthe
Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or
interferenceatanypoint.
The weight of the Mabanag decision, as a precedent, has been

weakened,however,bytheSupremeCourtresolutionofMarch14,
54
1949 in Avelino v. Cuenco, in which the Court proceeded to
determine the number of55
votes essential to constitute a quorum in
the Senate. In the case under annotation, the Court emphatically
heldthattheissuewhetherornotaResolutionofCongressacting
as a constituent assemblyviolates the Constitution, is essentially
justiceable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review.
With this latest pronouncement, repudiating in effect the Mabanag
ruling, it may now be restated with certitude that the question
whethercertainproposedamendmentstotheConstitutionareinvalid
for noncompliance with the procedure therein prescribed56is not a
politicaloneandmaybetraversedandsettledbytheCourts.
Legality
57
of Appropriation Act.Custodio v. President of the
Senate involved a petition for prohibition filed by a taxpayer and
employee of the government against the Senate President, Speaker
oftheHouseofRepresentatives,theInsularTreasurerandAuditor,
praying that the Court declare invalid and unconstitutional the
appropriationof
_______________
51Cf.Sec.1,Art.XV,PhilippineConstitution.
52Mabanag,etal.v.LopezVito,etal.,supra.
53122A.L.R.625.
54L2851,Mar.4,1949.
55Gonzalesv.CommissiononElections,supra.
56Cf.Taiiadav.Cuenco,Id.
57L117,Nov.7,194542O.G.No.6,p.1243.
835
P3,000,000 for the back salaries of the Congressmen. It was there

contended that the Congress that enacted the questioned
appropriation did not have a constitutional existence because the
terms of the members thereof had already expired prior to its
enactmentofthemeasurefurther,thattheCongressdidnotconvene
during the Japanese occupation therefore, they are not entitled to
any salary for the years of their nonservice to the country. By
resolution,theSupremeCourtviewedtheseriousissueasonewitha
politicalcharacterraisedbyataxpayerwithnolegalpersonalityto
sue consequently, it dismissed the petition, stating that the
controversyxxxbelongstotheexclusivetribunaloftheelectorate
andthatxxxonewhoinvokesthepowerofthecourttodeclarean
actofCongressunconstitutionalmustbeabletoshownotonlythat
the statute is invalid but that he has sustained, or is in danger of

sustaining, some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and
not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with
thepeoplegenerally.
The opinion quoted, which considers the controversy arising
from the challenged P3,000,000 appropriation as a political
question,isnowofdoubtfulvalidity.ForinPhilippineConstitution
58
Association v. Gimenez, et al., where the petitioner therein
questioned the validity and constitutionality of Republic Act No.
3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and
commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and
Representatives of Congress, the Supreme Court did not consider
saidissueasapoliticaloneinstead,itdeclaredvoidthatprovision
of the controversial Act because it contravened the constitutional
injunction against increase in compensation until after the
expiration of the full terms59
of all the Members of Congress
approving such increase. Similarly,
60
in Philippine Constitution
Association v. Mathay, et al., where the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 4134, regarding the salary increases of the
Senators and Representatives, etc., was raised, the Supreme Court
didnotalsotreattheissueasapoliticalquestiononthecontrary,it
met
_______________
58L23326,Dec.18,1965.
59Cf.Sec.14,Art.VI,PhilippineConstitution.
60L2554,Oct.4,1966.
836
squarely the constitutional issue arising from that piece of

legislation.
TheholdingintheCustodiocasethatameretaxpayercannotbe
permittedtoquestiontheconstitutionalityofanActofCongresshas
61
alreadybeenabandonedinsubsequentcases. 62
Validity of Executive Agreement.Where the statute has
prescribed certain conditions before importation of rice could be
made by an agency or officer of the Executive Department, the
Courtmayruleonthequestionwhetherornottherewascompliance
therewith and, even if the cereal was imported for stock pile
purposes of the Philippine Army, the requisites for validity of the
importation must be complied with. Although the Chief Executive
may enter into executive agreements without previous legislative
authority,hemaynotenterintoatransactionwhichisprohibitedby
lawenactedpriorthereto.Hemaynotdefeatlegislativeenactments
that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the
same through an executive63
agreement, providing for the very act
prohibitedbysaidlaws.
RecountofVotesCastforPresidentorVicePresident.Prior to
the approval of Republic Act No. 1793, a defeated candidate for
presidentorvicepresident,whobelievedthathewasthecandidate
who obtained the largest number of votes for either office despite
theproclamationbyCongressofanothercandidateasthepresident
elect or vicepresidentelect, had no legal right to demand by
electionprotestarecountofthevotescastfortheofficeconcerned,
to establish his rights thereto. As a consequence, controversies or
disputesonthismatterwerenotjusti
______________
61SeeProvinceofTayabasv.Perez,56Phil.257(1931)Rodriguezv.Treas.ofthe
Philippines and Barredo v. Commission on Elections, L3055 & L3056, Aug. 26,
1949Pascualv.SecretaryofPublicWorks,etc.,L10405,Dec.29,1960Gonzalesv.
Hechanova, 60 O.G. 802 (1963) Philippine Constitution Association v. Gimenez,
supra Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, supra Iloilo Palay & Corn
PlantersAss'nv.Feliciano,etal.,L24022,Mar.3,1965.
62SeeRepublicActNos.2207and3452.
63Gonzalesv.Hechanova,L21897,Oct.22,1963.
837
Remotiguevs.Osmena,Jr.
64
ciable. RepublicAct1793,whichcreatedthePresidentialElectoral
Tribunal, has the effect of giving said defeated candidate the legal
righttocontestjudiciallytheelectionofthePresidentelectorVice
Presidentelect and to demand a65recount of the votes cast for the
office involved in the litigation. And by providing that the said
Presidential Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of the Chief
Justice and the other ten Members of the Supreme Court, said
legislation has conferred upon such Court 66
an additional original
jurisdiction of an exclusive character. Atty. DOMINGO .
LUCENARIO.
Note.The Constitution vests in the judicial branch of the

government,notmerelysomespecifiedorlimitedjudicialpower,but
thejudicialpowerunderourpoliticalsystem,and,accordingly,the
entirety or air of said power, except, only, so much as the
Constitutionconfersuponsomeotheragency,suchasthatvestedin
theElectoralTribunalsofCongress.(Lopezvs.Roxas,L25718,July
28,1966,17SupremeCourtReportsAnnotated756).
_______________
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Gonzales Vs Comelec (GR No. L-28196)

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Gonzales Vs Comelec (GR No. L-28196)

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3/16/2017 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATEDVOLUME021

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA),

Constitutional law Power of judicial department to determine

inherent powers of the peopleas the repository of sovereignty in a

that such failure rendered Congress illegal or unconstitutional, or that its

SameSameSenate and House constituted on Dec. 30, 1961 were de

Same Ratification of amendments need not be in special election or

Same Same Law complies with substantive due process.An

Constitutional law Constitutional amendments Certain aspects of

They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original

Constitutionallaw Constitutional amendment Majority votes cast at

G. R. No. L28196 is an original action for prohibition, with

1) Restraining: (a) the Commission on Elections from

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the

Pursuant to this provision, amendments to the Constitution may be

1. The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed

give the people a reasonable opportunity to have a fair

The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one

It is urged that the last enumeration or census took place in 1960

portionment within the period stated in the Constitution, Congress

It is conceded that, since the adoption of the Constitution in

x x x Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of

19 Under the original Constitution providing for a unicameral legislative body,

amendment thereof in 1940 strongly indicate that the provision

in Congress, upon the lapse of said period for reapportionment. In

Upon the other hand, the Constitution authorizes the

color of title, an office created by a valid statute be, likewise,

whose title can not be assailed collaterally. It should be noted that

It is, also, noteworthy that R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose

x x x The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of threefourths

ments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such

There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the election

(election)referstoaplebiscite,without any election, general

al amendments are, in general, if not always, of such important, if

(1) that the amendments shall be published in three

ipality, city and provincial office building and in every

tion by the qualified electors during election day. Whenever practicable,

The provision concerning womans suffrage is Section 1 of

Similarly, Section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 517, referring to the

The said amendments shall be published in English and Spanish in three

The said amendment shall be published in English and Spanish in three

to discharge the duties of such delegates, without forfeiting their

apportioned by R. B. H. No. 1 among the provinces in the

election day. When practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as

I believe that intrinsically, that is, considered in itself and without

amendments to the Constitution, to the people for approval, at the

requires that it be at an election at which the amendments are

it concurrent with such election, does not render it any less an

Does Republic Act 4913 propose amendments to the Constitution?

Sec 6 thereof appropriates P1,000,000 for carrying out its

At the outset, we are faced with a question of jurisdiction. The

fullness that erases doubts and misgivings and clarifies the

from submission until an amendment becomes part of the

their invaluable contribution to the substance and form of the

The amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines proposed by the

which shall be held on November fourteen, nineteen hundred and sixty

1 The text of the law reads: He (Senator or Member of the House of

2. With these as backdrop, we perforce go into the philosophy

then there is no submission within the meaning of the word as

(1) The amendment shall be published in three consecutive

A question that comes to mind is whether the procedure for

command because such copies shall be kept therein only when